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
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MARIA LOUISA

EMPRESS OF FRANCE

*Louise*

# HISTORY

OF THE

## CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE

### FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON.

BY  
ADOLPHE THIERS,

FORMER MEMBER OF THE FRENCH ASSEMBLY,

AND AUTHOR OF THE HISTORY OF THE  
FRENCH REVOLUTION.

TRANSLATED BY

ALFRED ASH LEECH, ESQ., M.A.,

WITH NOTES AND ADDITIONS.

VOL. II.

LONDON:  
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WITH NOTES AND APPENDICES.

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# BOOK XXXI.

BAYLEN.

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WHEN Napoleon left Bayonne, to visit, on his return, Gascony and La Vendée, he retained none of the illusions which he had conceived for a moment, concerning the spirit of Spain and the ease with which he should dispose of her. An insurrection, partial at first, soon universal, had just broken out, and cries of implacable hatred had rung even in his ear. He reckoned, however, upon his young soldiers and some veteran regiments, recently marched towards the Pyrenees, for quelling a movement, which might yet turn out to be but a partial insurrection, like that in the Ca'abrias. Though he was already undeceived, and perhaps even repented of what he had undertaken, he had yet much left to learn on that head, and before he had reached Paris he was fated to know all the consequences of the fault committed at Bayonne.

The Spaniards, since the month of March, had passed in a short time through the most diverse emotions. Full of hope on seeing the French make their appearance, of joy on seeing the downfall of the old court, of anxiety on seeing Ferdinand VII. obliged to go and seek in France the acknowledgment of his royal title, they had been speedily enlightened relative to what was about to be done at Bayonne, and an ardent hatred was suddenly kindled in their hearts. By all of them, it is true, this sentiment was not shared in an equal degree. The higher, and even the middle classes, appreciating the benefits which might proceed from a regeneration of Spain by the civilizing hands of Napoleon, animated against foreigners by sentiments less savage than the populace, less disposed to agitation than it was, suffered only in their pride, deeply hurt by the manner in

which their country was intended to be disposed of. Still, with mild treatment, and a sudden and irresistible display of force, they might have been overawed, and perhaps in time even reconciled.

But the people, and especially the monks, that cloistered portion of the people, were exasperated. Among these last nothing could mitigate the feeling of wounded pride—neither the hope of a regeneration which they were incapable of appreciating, nor tolerance in regard to foreigners whom they detested, neither the love of repose nor the fear of disorder. The Spanish people, the people of the streets and the fields, like those of the cloister, ardent, indolent, weary of quiet, so far from being fond of it, caring little about the burning of towns or country houses, in which there was nothing belonging to them, were ready to gratify that propensity to agitation, which the French people had gratified in 1789, by effecting a great democratic revolution. They were ready to exert, in support of the old system all the demagogic passions which the French people had exerted for the foundation of the new one. They were about to be as violent, as tumultuous, as sanguinary, for the throne and the altar, as their neighbours had been against both. They were about to be so in proportion to the warmth of their blood and the ferocity of their disposition. In the Spanish people, nevertheless, a noble sentiment blended with the feelings that we have just mentioned—the love of their country, of their kings, of their religion, which they amalgamated into one affection, and under the inspiration of which they were destined to furnish splendid examples of fortitude and frequently of heroism.

I am not, I never shall be, the flatterer of the multitude. I have resolved, on the contrary, to defy its tyrannical power, because I have been doomed to live in times when it domineers and disturbs the world. Still I do it justice: if it sees not, it feels; and, on very rare occasions, when one must shut one's eyes and obey one's heart, it is, not an adviser to be listened to, but a torrent to be followed. The Spanish people, though, in rejecting the royalty of Joseph, then rejected a good prince and good institutions, were perhaps under better inspiration than the other classes. They acted nobly in rejecting the benefit proffered by a foreign hand, and, without eyes, they saw more correctly than enlightened men, in conceiving that they could make head against a conqueror whom the mightiest armies and the greatest generals had been unable to resist.

The departure of Ferdinand VII., followed by the departure of Charles IV., and then by that of the Infantes, had clearly revealed the intention of Napoleon; and the people of Madrid, incapable of refraining any longer, rose on the 2d of May, as we have seen in the preceding Book. They rose to be cut in pieces by Murat, but had the inexpressible satisfaction of slaughtering a few Frenchmen who fell singly into their hands. In the twinkling of an eye, the news, spreading through Estremadura, La Mancha, and Andalusia, was about to kindle a fire which smouldered there, when the prompt and terrible measures of repression adopted by Murat struck terror into those provinces, and kept them quiet for some time. All

faces re-assumed a dull, sullen aspect, but impressed with profound hatred. Men held back under the check of a threatening hand; but the exaggerated account of the blood spilt at Madrid, the particulars of the events at Bayonne, circulated by the correspondence of the convents, increased every moment the secret rage which reigned in minds, and prepared an explosion so sudden, so universal, that it could not have been prevented by any blow, though struck ever so opportunely. If, however, Napoleon, treating this grave enterprise more seriously, had had a sufficient force everywhere; if, instead of 80,000 conscripts, there had been 160,000 veteran soldiers, controlling at once and the same time, Saragossa, Valencia, Carthagena, Grenada, Seville, Badajoz, as Madrid, Burgos, and Barcelona were controlled; if Murat, present and in health, had shown himself everywhere, perhaps it might have been possible to prevent the conflagration from spreading, admitting that it is given to material force to prevail against moral force, especially when the latter is strongly excited. Unfortunately, while Marshal Moncey, with 20,000 young soldiers, occupied the left of the capital from Aranda to Chamartin; while General Dupont, with 18,000, occupied the right, from Segovia to the Escorial; while Marshal Bessières, with about 15,000, occupied Old Castille, and General Duhesme Catalonia with 10,000; in rear the Asturias, on the right Galicia, on the left Aragon, in front Estremadura, La Mancha, Andalusia, Valencia, were left to themselves, and kept in order by the Spanish authorities alone, wishing no doubt to prevent disturbance, but grieved to the heart, and served by an army which shared all the sentiments of the people. It was quite plain that they would not use any great energy to suppress an insurrection with which they secretly sympathized. However, under the impression of the 2d of May, and awaiting what was to be definitively done at Bayonne, people still restrained themselves, but with all the signs of extraordinary anxiety, and of a violent passion ready to break forth.

In this state, the popular imagination, strongly excited, grasped at the most absurd reports. The forced journeys to Bayonne were chiefly the text for them. It was said that, after the royal family, all the principal personages were to be carried to that town, now become the gulph in which all that was most illustrious in Spain was about to be absorbed. After royalty, after the grantees, the turn of the army would come. It would be taken, regiment by regiment, to Bayonne, and from Bayonne to the shores of the Ocean, where the troops of the Marquis de la Romana already were, and perish in some distant war, in support of the greatness of the tyrant of the world. This was not all—the entire population was to be carried off by means of a general conscription which would be imposed upon the Peninsula, as it was imposed upon France, and they would see the flower of the Spanish population sacrificed to the atrocious projects of the modern Attila. On this subject, the most singular details were circulated. Great quantities of manacles had been manufactured, it was said, and brought

<sup>1</sup> The rest of the 80,000 young soldiers sent to Spain were in the hospitals.

in the ammunition wagons of the French army, for the purpose of carrying away the unfortunate Spanish conscripts, bound hand and foot. People affirmed that they had seen and touched them. There were, in particular, thousands of them in the arsenals of Ferrol, where neither a battalion nor an ammunition wagon of the French had made its appearance, but where much work was going on, by order of Napoleon, for refitting the Spanish navy, and where an expedition was preparing to protect the rich colonies of La Plata against the attacks of the English. To these rumours were added a multitude of others of like value. Under a French king, they said, they should have to go and oblige all the world to speak and write French. A host of French *employés* would accompany this king, and appropriate all offices to themselves.

The first and the most serious consequence of these reports was to cause almost the whole Spanish army to desert, for fear of being carried by force to France. At Madrid, two or three hundred men were to be seen every night deserting at once. The soldiers went off without their officers, sometimes even with them, carrying away arms, baggage, military stores. The life-guards, who were at the Escurial, disappeared in this manner by degrees, so that, in the course of a few days there was not one left. This desertion took place, not only at Madrid, but at Barcelona, at Burgos, at Coruña. In general, the soldiers who deserted fled either towards the South, or to those provinces which the agitation and distance rendered a safer asylum for the fugitives. Those at Barcelona fled towards Tortosa and Valencia. Those of Old Castille made for Aragon and Saragossa, a country reputed among the Spaniards to be invincible. Those of Coruña went to join General Taranco, stationed with a corps of troops in the north of Portugal. Those of New Castille betook themselves partly to the left, towards Guadalaxara and Cuenca, where they had Saragossa and Valencia for a retreat; partly to the right, towards Talavera, where they had a safe and impenetrable asylum in Estremadura. The Spanish generals, habituated to subordination, reported this alarming desertion, which left them no means of preserving order, whatever sovereign might be definitively imposed upon unhappy Spain.

There were none but the troops of the South, especially those of Andalusia, which were the furthest possible from the French, and to which all who were not with them would gladly have gone, that continued to be united and compact; and, unfortunately for us, these were the most numerous; for there were, besides the camp of St. Roque, before Gibraltar, 9000 strong, the garrison of Cadiz, which was at all times kept considerable, lastly the division of General Solano, Marquis del Socorro, destined at first to occupy Portugal, drawn afterwards toward Madrid, and finally sent back to Andalusia, of which he was captain-general. These troops, united to those in the camp of St. Roque, under the command of General Castaños, amounted to no fewer than 25,000 men; and they were the only corps not addicted to desertion. To them must be added the Swiss troops, long engaged in the service of Spain. The two Swiss regiments of Preux and Reding had been, by

order of Napoleon himself, united at Talavera, for the purpose of being joined to General Dupont's first division, destined to occupy Cadiz, where, as we know, a French squadron was lying. By his order, too, the three Swiss regiments stationed at Tortosa, Carthagena, and Malaga, had been marched for Grenada, where General Dupont was to pick them up on his way. Napoleon thought, as he said, that by placing them in a *current of French opinion*, they would serve the cause of the new royalty, and not that of the old one. Unluckily, all his views were destined to be thwarted by the movement which hurried away all hearts. The Spanish military authorities, though, like the enlightened classes, they regretted but little the incapable and corrupt government which had recently been overthrown, were also indignant at the occurrences at Bayonne, and would gladly have deserted with their men to the provinces inaccessible to the French. Murat alone, who had a certain ascendancy over them, could have kept them to their duty; but, attacked by a violent fever, weakened, exhausted, scarcely able to bear being talked to about business, painfully affected by the mere sound of the footsteps of his officers, he had taken an aversion to the country where he was not called to reign, attributed to it his death, which he believed to be at hand, asked with doleful cries for his wife and children, and insisted on being allowed to depart immediately. It was necessary to detain this heroic man, who had become all at once as weak as an infant, against his will, till the arrival of Joseph, lest the shadow of authority assumed by those about him, for ordering every thing in his name, should completely disappear. The Spaniards, apprised of the state of Murat, who had been removed to the country, and who was no longer shown, regarded his illness as a punishment of Heaven, which they would rather have seen falling not on Murat, whom they pitied more than hated, but on Napoleon, who had become thenceforward the object of their inexorable detestation. Some of them went so far as to say that it was Napoleon himself, who, to bury in the tomb the secret of his abominable machinations, had caused Murat to be poisoned. Thus does the popular imagination, when once moved and excited, go astray, and invent, utterly regardless of truth, or even of probability.

So great was the anxiety at Madrid, that the slightest noise in a street, the mere tramp of a piquet of cavalry in a public place, was sufficient to draw out the population in a mass. In every town the people thronged to await the arrival of the courier, and to learn the news, and they remained assembled for whole hours, in order to descant upon it. The populace, the citizens, the grandees, the priests, the monks, mingled together with the customary familiarity of the Spanish nation, conversed incessantly about political events in the public places. In all quarters, curiosity, expectation, anger, hatred, agitated all hearts, and nothing was wanting but a slight spark to kindle a vast conflagration.

Such then was the state of minds, when all at once arrived the tidings of the two-fold abdication extorted from Charles IV. and from Ferdinand VII. It was published in the *Madrid*

*Gazette*, of the 20th of May, immediately after the manifestation imposed on the Council of Castille in favour of Joseph. In this intelligence there was assuredly nothing unforeseen, since it was known through a multitude of emissaries that Ferdinand was at Bayonne, a prisoner, and beset by the most menacing importunities to make him give up his crown to the Bonaparte family. But the official knowledge of the sacrifice wrung from the weakness of the father and the captivity of the son, acted upon the public feeling with inexpressible violence. People were deeply indignant at the act itself, and cruelly offended by its taunting form. The effect was instantaneous, general, prodigious.

At Oviedo, the capital of the Asturias, people were already strongly agitated by two accidental circumstances: in the first place, the convocation of the provincial Junta, which was accustomed to meet every three years; and, secondly, a suit instituted against some Spaniards for having insulted the French consul at Gijon. This suit, ordered by the government at Madrid, had excited general disapprobation; for everybody felt ready to do what had been done by the authors of the outrage whose punishment was demanded. The news of the abdications having been brought by the courier from Madrid, the people were no longer to be restrained. In this province, which was a Spain within Spain, and which felt the same aversion for all innovations as *La Vendée* had formerly manifested, there was but one spirit; and the highest nobles completely sympathized with the people. They put themselves at the head of the movement, and, on the 24th of May, the day on which the courier arrived from Madrid, they concerted, through the medium of the monks and of the municipal authorities, with the country-people to take Oviedo. At midnight, at the sound of the alarm-bell, the people of the mountain actually descended to the town, made themselves masters of it, and, joined by the townsfolk, hastened to the authorities, deposed them, and conferred all the power on the Junta. The latter chose for its president the Marquis de Santa Cruz de Marcenado, a distinguished personage of the country, a bitter enemy to the French, passionately attached to the house of Bourbon, and full of patriotic sentiments, which we must honour, though contrary to the cause of France. Under his instigation, the Junta hesitated not to consider the abdications as null, the transactions at Bayonne as atrocious, the alliance with France as broken, and solemnly to declare war against Napoleon.

After proceeding in this manner, they seized all the arms in the royal arsenals, which were most abundantly supplied in this province through local industry. One hundred thousand muskets were carried away, and partly distributed among the people, partly reserved for the neighbouring provinces. Considerable donations were made to fill the chest of the insurrection, donations to which the clergy and the great landholders contributed a large part. Lastly, peace with Great Britain was proclaimed, and two deputies were despatched in a Jersey privateer to London, in order to solicit the alliance and aid of England. One of these two deputies was the Count de Matarosa, since

Count de Toreno, so well known by men of the present day, as a statesman, ambassador, and historian.

But, unfortunately, the patriotic enthusiasm of the Spaniards could not break forth without the accompaniment of horrible cruelties, and blood, which was soon to flow in the other provinces, began to flow in the Asturias, when, for the honour of that province, a priest put a stop to the effusion. There were at Oviedo two Spanish commissioners, sent at the instigation of Murat to accelerate the proceedings commenced against the offenders of the consul at Gijon. There were also the commandant of the province, named La Llave, who had appeared unfavourable to an insurrection, which seemed to him extremely imprudent; lastly, the colonel of the regiment of royal carbiniers and the colonel of the regiment of Hibernia, who had both differed in opinion from their officers, when it became a question whether they should oppose or promote the popular movement. These five persons were immediately proclaimed traitors, and the new authority had put them in prison to appease the populace. With a view to remove them from its fury, the Junta resolved to send them out of the principality. The people took advantage of this opportunity to seize their persons, and a mob, composed principally of new volunteers, were about to bind them to trees, with the intention of shooting them, when a canon conceived the idea of going in procession to the spot where preparations were making for the crime; and covering his victims with the host he contrived to save them. This was not the only effort of honest ecclesiastics to prevent bloodshed, but the only successful effort; for Spain soon became a theatre of atrocious crimes, committed not only upon the French, but on Spaniards the most illustrious and the most devoted to their country.

The insurrection of the Asturias preceded by only two or three days that of the north of Spain. At Burgos the people could not stir, for Marshal Bessières had his head-quarters there. But at Valladolid, where there were no longer any of Dupont's divisions, which were already beyond the Guadarrama, at Leon, Salamanca, and Benevente, lastly at Coruña, the news of the abdications had revolted all hearts. However, the plains of Castille and the kingdom of Leon, which the French cavalry could scour on the gallop without encountering any obstacle, were too open for the people not to hesitate a little longer about rising. It was Galicia, protected like the Asturias by almost inaccessible mountains, that first responded to the signal of Oviedo. Coruña, the capital of that province, still contained a great number of Spanish troops, though most of them had gone to Portugal with General Taranco. The spirit of subordination, military and civil, prevailed in that province, one of the centres of Spanish power. The Captain-general, Filanieri, brother of the celebrated Neapolitan lawyer, a discreet, mild, enlightened man, universally beloved by the population, but somewhat suspicious to the Spaniards in his quality of Neapolitan, strove to preserve order in his command, and was one of the military and civil chiefs who considered insurrection as neither prudent nor profitable to the country.

Having perceived that the regiment of Navarre, which was in garrison at Coruña, was ready to lend a hand to the insurgents, he had sent it to Ferrol. He had thus gained a few days, for, till the 30th of May, the insurrection, which had broken out on the 24th in the Asturias, and which was reported to be accomplished or nearly so in Leon, Valladolid, and Salamanca, was prevented in Galicia. But the 30th was the feast of Saint Ferdinand. It was customary on that day to hoist flags with the effigy of the saint at the hotel of the government and in the public places. On this occasion the authorities had not ventured to follow the practice, for, in doing honour to Saint Ferdinand, it would seem as though they were paying homage to the sovereign, detained at Bayonne, and who had just abdicated. At this sight, the people of Coruña could no longer contain themselves. A mob of men, women, and children collected in front of the troops guarding the hotel of the government, shouting, "Long live Ferdinand!" and carrying images of the saint. The boys, bolder, pushed in among the soldiers, who allowed them to pass through their ranks. The women followed, and the hotel of the captain-general was soon stormed, ravaged, and surmounted by the ensigns of the saint, which had not been hoisted at first. The captain-general, Filangieri, found himself compelled to flee.

A Junta was immediately formed, insurrection proclaimed, war declared against France, a levy *en masse* ordered, as at Oviedo, and the muskets in the arsenal distributed among the multitude. Forty or fifty thousand muskets were taken from the royal arsenals to arm all the hands that offered themselves. The regiment of Navarre was immediately recalled from Ferrol, and received in triumph. Abundant donations poured in from the grantees and the clergy. The treasury of St. Jago de Compostella sent two or three millions of reals. People nevertheless esteemed the captain-general, Filangieri; they felt the need of so eminent a personage at the head of the Junta, and offered him the presidency, which he consented to accept. That excellent man, giving way, though with regret, to the patriotic impulsion of his fellow-citizens, put himself honestly at their head, for the purpose of redeeming the temerity of resolutions by the wisdom of measures. He recalled General Taranco's troops from Portugal; he poured the insurgent population into the skeletons of the corps of the line, to swell their numbers; he employed the considerable *matériel* at his disposal in arming the new levies; and he thus lost no time in organizing a military force of some value.

In order to check the hostile troops which might come from the plains of Leon and Old Castille, he had meanwhile marched his best organized corps to the *débouché* of the mountains of Galicia, between Villafranca and Manzanal. But, while he was himself engaged in placing his posts, some furious wretches, who forgave neither his hesitations nor a prudence not in harmony with their unruly passions, atrociously murdered him in the streets of Villafranca. At that place there was a detachment of the regiment of Navarre, still irritated on account of its few days' exile at Ferrol; and to this regiment was attributed a crime which

became the signal for the massacre of most of the captains-general.

The commotion in Galicia spread immediately to the kingdom of Leon. On the arrival of 800 troops sent from Coruña to Leon, the insurrection broke out there, in the same manner and with the same forms. A Junta was instituted, war was declared, a levy *en masse* was decreed, and people armed themselves with all the weapons brought from the arsenals of Oviedo, Ferrol, and Coruña. At Leon they were already in the plain, and pretty near the squadrons of Marshal Bessières; but at Valladolid they were still nearer. It was sufficient, however, for the imprudent enthusiasm of the Spaniards not to see those squadrons, though but a few leagues off, to break out into insurrectional movements. The captain-general of Valladolid was Don Gregorio de Cuesta, an old officer, an inflexible observer of discipline, of a peevish and morose disposition, wounded to the heart, like all the Spaniards, by the occurrences at Bayonne, but not imagining that it was possible to withstand the power of France, and disposed to think that the regeneration of Spain ought to be accepted from her, as a compensation for the wound inflicted on the national pride by the benefits which would result from a general reform of the old abuses. A particular sentiment acted moreover upon his mind—this was aversion to the multitude, and to its interference in affairs of State. The populace of Valladolid, whom the occurrences at Oviedo, Coruña, and Leon had strongly excited, and who would not appear more insensible than the other populations of the North to the news of the abdications, assembled, went beneath the windows of the captain-general, Gregorio de la Cuesta, and obliged him to show himself. The old soldier made his appearance with looks of displeasure, and attempted to oppose some very sensible reasons to a rising in arms so near to the French troops; but his voice was drowned by hooting. A gibbet, brought by some of the populace, was set up in front of his palace: at this sight he yielded, and gave his assent to what he regarded as an act of insanity. Valladolid had its insurrectional Junta, its levy *en masse*, and its declaration of war.

Segovia, situated at some distance on the Madrid road, though within a few leagues of General Dupont's third division, Frère's division, encamped at the Escorial—Segovia also had its insurrection. In that city there was, in the castle which commands it, a military college for artillery. The whole college rose, and, joined by the people, barricaded the city. On the right, Ciudad Rodrigo followed the same example, and murdered its governor, because he had not been prompt enough in declaring himself. The city of Madrid started at these tidings; but the corps of Marshal Moncey, the imperial guard, all the cavalry of the army, and lastly the presence of General Dupont's corps at the Escorial, at Aranjuez, and at Toledo, forbade it to show what it felt. Besides, that capital conceived that it had paid its patriotic debt on the 2d of May, and expected the provinces of the monarchy to come and release it from its chains. Toledo, which had manifested a disposition to rise a few weeks previously, had been speedily curbed,



and was now waiting also to be delivered, watching with ill-dissembled satisfaction the universal outbreak of the national indignation. La Mancha participated in this sentiment, and proved it by affording an asylum to the deserters from the army, who everywhere found lodging, food, assistance of every kind for reaching the remote provinces, where there were assemblages of Spanish troops.

But the wealthy and powerful Andalusia, calculating upon its strength and the distance which separated it from the Pyrenees, aspiring to become the new centre of the monarchy, since Madrid was occupied, had been among the first to resent the blow struck at the dignity of the Spanish nation. It had not waited, like some other provinces, for the feast of St. Ferdinand. The news of the abdications had sufficed for it, and, on the evening of the 26th of May, it had risen. A conspiracy had been for some time in progress at Seville. A Spanish noble, a native of Estremadura, the Count de Tilly, brother of a Tilly who had figured in the French revolution, a restless, enterprising person, of bad character, ready to engage in any new schemes, whatever they might be, was secretly concerting with men of all classes preparations for a rising against the French. Another still more singular person, likewise a stranger to Seville, but who had been much there since the late events, named Tap y Nufies, a sort of adventurer, engaged in smuggling with Gibraltar, for the rest a good Spaniard, endowed, in the highest degree, with a talent for acting on the multitude, had acquired an immense ascendancy over the lower classes in that city. He had an understanding with Count de Tilly's accomplices, and on the arrival of the news of the abdications, all of them, with one accord, chose the 26th of May, Ascension-day, for effecting a rising of the province. Accordingly, on the night of the 26th, a mob collected by them, and among which appeared men of the lowest class, with soldiers of the regiment of Olivenza, proceeded to the Maestranza, an extensive establishment of artillery, containing a rich depôt of arms, stormed it, and seized all that was in it. The populace of Seville was armed in a moment, and paraded the streets of that great city, in a sort of intoxication. In order to deliberate in more quiet and independence, the municipality had quitted the Town Hall and removed to the military hospital. The Town Hall being left vacant, the people took possession of it, and an insurrectional Junta was instituted there, as was then the practice throughout all Spain. It was the leader of the populace, Tap y Nufies, who nominated the members, under the inspiration of those who were conspiring with him. Such men were chosen as are favourites in times of agitation, that is to say, turbulent characters, with the addition of a few sedate persons, to cover the inconsistency of the others. This Junta, full of Andalusian pride, hesitated not to proclaim itself the *Supreme Junta of Spain and the Indies*. It disguised not, as we see, the ambition of governing Spain during the occupation of the Castiles by the French. All this was done amidst an enthusiasm which it is impossible to describe. But, on the following day, this enthusiasm became sanguinary, as might be expected. The mu-

nicipal authority, which had withdrawn to the military hospital, was suspected, like every old authority, for it was, we repeat it, popular factiousness that triumphed at this moment under the cloak of royalism. This municipal authority was accused of patriotic lukewarmness, and even of secret connivance with the government of Madrid. Its head, the Count del Aguila, one of the most distinguished nobles of the province, came in its name to the Junta, to offer to concert with the latter. At the sight of him, the furious multitude demanded his head. The Junta, not participating in the ferocious sentiments of the populace, wished to save him, and, with this view, pretended to send him prisoner to one of the towers of the city. On the way, the unfortunate Count del Aguila was carried off by the insurgents, dragged to the court of the prison, bound to a balustrade, and despatched with carbines; the rabble then paraded the streets with the fragments of his body. Amidst the popular intoxication, and the terror which began to seize the higher classes, a series of measures, dictated by circumstances, were adopted. The Junta decreed the declaration of war against France; the levy *en masse* of all the men from the age of 16 to 45; the sending of commissioners to all the towns in Andalusia, to raise their populations, and to attach them to the Junta, which constituted itself the Supreme Junta of Spain and the Indies. These commissioners were to go to Badajoz, Cordova, Jaen, Grenada, Cadix, the camp at St. Roque. In declaring war against France, the Junta engaged not to lay down arms till Napoleon should have replaced Ferdinand VII. in the Escorial; and they promised, when the war was over, to convoke the Cortes of the kingdom, in order to effect the reforms, of the utility of which they said they were sensible, and the merit of which they appreciated, without needing to be initiated by foreigners into the knowledge of the rights of nations; for the new insurgents comprehended the necessity of opposing some promises of meliorations to the constitution of Bayonne.

It was more particularly towards Cadix that all eyes were turned, for there resided the Captain-general Solano, Marquis del Socorro, who combined with the command of the province that of numerous troops spread over the south of Spain. A commissioner was despatched to him, to decide him to take part in the insurrection, and another had been sent to General Castaños, commandant of the camp at St. Roque. The Count de Teba, who was sent to Cadix, presented himself there with all the insurrectional surliness of the moment. He had come to the wrong person, so to address himself, to the Marquis del Socorro, a man of fiery, haughty temper, esteemed by the army, and beloved by the population. Like all well-informed military men, he was thoroughly convinced of the power of France, and considered the insurrection into which people were blindly rushing as extremely imprudent. He had expressed this opinion, on his return from Portugal, both at Badajoz and at Seville, with a boldness of language which had much damped the conspirators. This they remembered, and they were filled with distrust in regard to him. General Solano summoned a meeting of generals, to hear the proposals from Seville. This

assembly was of opinion, with him, that all military and political reasons concurring to oppose an armed contest with France; and it made a declaration, in which, arguing against and concluding for the insurrection, it ordered voluntary enrolments, thus conceding out of mere deference to a popular wish, what it declared to be unreasonable. This paper, which placed a censure beside an act of condescension, read publicly in the streets of Cadiz, produced the strongest emotion there. The mob repaired to the residence of the captain-general. A young man undertook to be spokesman, entered into discussion with General Solano, contrived to embarrass that brave officer, accustomed to command, not to reason with such interlocutors, and wrung from him a promise that on the morrow the popular wish should be fully gratified. The rabble, content for that day, was nevertheless desirous of enjoying the pleasure of ravaging, and ran off to the house of the French consul, Leroy, which it pillaged. This unfortunate representative of France, lately so feared, had no other resource but to take refuge on board the squadron of Admiral Rosily, who had been waiting in vain for three years in the harbour of Cadiz for a favourable opportunity to leave it.

Next day, the populace had conceived a new wish; it desired that war should be immediately commenced against the French, and that the fire of all the guns in the road should be poured upon Admiral Rosily's squadron. The multitude feasted itself with transport on the idea of this triumph—a triumph easy and very senseless over a naval ally, for the benefit of the English marine. There was some difficulty, however, in destroying ships manned by brave crews, commanded by brave officers, unfortunate heroes of Trafalgar, who, on that terrible day, stayed to be killed at their post, while most of the Spanish seamen fled from the field of battle. Besides, they were so mingled with the Spanish ships, that these were liable to be burned first. Such was the declaration of rational men both of the army and of the navy. They added that Spain still had in the North the Marquis de La Romana's division, which might possibly have to atone for the barbarities committed upon the French seamen. At this moment, however, reason and humanity had but little chance of obtaining a hearing.

Another meeting of the generals, convoked the next day by the Marquis del Socorro, had acceded in every point to the wish of the people, and several of its members had, in conversation, basely thrown upon the marquis the blame of the demi-resistance opposed to it on the preceding day. There was yet left to be decided the very serious question of an immediate attack on the French fleet. This question concerned the naval officers more than the military officers; and they unanimously declared that, before the popular rage could be satisfied, the Spanish ships must run the risk of being burned. The communication of this opinion of competent men, made in the public place, had brought the populace once more before the residence of the unfortunate Solano. He was immediately called to account for this new resistance to the popular wish, and three deputies were sent to bring him to an explanation. One of these three deputies having appeared at

the window of the hotel to report the result of his mission, and being unable to make himself heard amidst the tumult, the populace believed, or pretended to believe, that they were refused satisfaction, and broke into the hotel. The Marquis de Solano, seeing the danger, fled to the house of a friend of his, an Irishman settled at Cadiz, who resided in his neighbourhood. Unluckily he was perceived by a monk, watched, and denounced. Pursued immediately by the furious rabble, found, wounded in the arms of the courageous wife of his Irish friend, who strove to rescue him from the assassins, he was conducted along the ramparts, riddled with wounds, and at last struck down by a mortal blow, which he received with the fortitude and dignity of a brave soldier. Thus did the Spanish people prepare for their resistance to the French, by commencing with the slaughter of the most illustrious of their best generals.

Thomas de Morla, an hypocritical flatterer of the multitude, disguising under great stateliness a base submission to all in power, was nominated by acclamation captain-general of Andalusia. He entered immediately into parley with Admiral Rosily, and summoned him to surrender, which the brave French admiral declared he would not do till he had defended the honour of his flag to the last extremity. Thomas de Morla, however, sought to gain time, not daring to resist the Spanish populace or to attack the French: meanwhile he busied himself in making the Spanish ships take a position less dangerous for them. Cadiz had also its insurrectional Junta, which acknowledged the supremacy of that of Seville, and placed itself in communication with the English. The governor of Gibraltar, Sir Hew Dalrymple, commanding the British forces in those parts, and observing with extreme solicitude what was passing in Spain, had already sent emissaries to Cadiz, to negotiate a truce, to offer the friendship of Great Britain, her succours by land and sea, and a division of 5000 men which was coming from Sicily. The Spaniards accepted the offers of a truce and of alliance, but paused before so serious a measure as the introduction of an English fleet into their ports. The remembrance of Toulon was sufficient to bring the blindest of men to reflection.

While these things were passing at Cadiz, the commissioner sent to the camp of St. Roque had found no difficulty in obtaining a favourable reception from General Castaños, for whom fortune had destined a higher part than he hoped or perhaps ever wished for. General Castaños, like all the Spanish military officers of that time, knew no more of war than was learned under the old system, and particularly in the country farthest behindhand of any in Europe. But if he did not surpass many of his fellow-countrymen in military experience, he was a discreet politician, full of sagacity and shrewdness, but sharing none of the savage passions of the Spanish people. He had begun by judging of the insurrection quite as severely as any of the other military commandants, his colleagues, had explained himself frankly to Colonel Rogniat, who was sent to Gibraltar, to make an inspection of the coast, and had appeared to accept very cheerfully the regeneration of Spain from the hand of a prince of the house of Bonaparte; so that, at

Madrid, the administration which governed till Joseph should arrive, conceived that it might reckon upon him. But when he saw the insurrection so general, so violent, so imperative, and the army disposed to join in it, he hesitated no longer, and submitted to the orders of the Junta of Seville, censuring at the bottom of his heart, but in profound secrecy, the conduct which in public he appeared to pursue with warmth and conviction. There were in the camp of St. Roque eight or nine thousand regular troops. There were as many at Cadiz, without reckoning the corps scattered over the rest of the provinces, which formed a disposable total of fifteen to eighteen thousand organised troops, fit to serve for a support to the popular rising, and for the nucleus of a numerous army of insurgents. When the title of captain-general was decreed to Thomas de Morla, the chief command of the troops was reserved for General Castaños, and by him accepted. He was ordered to concentrate them between Seville and Cadiz.

The example set by Seville was followed by all the cities in Andalusia. Jaen and Cordova declared themselves in insurrection, and acknowledged the supremacy of the Junta of Seville. Cordova, seated on the upper Guadalquivir, intrusted the command of its insurgents to an officer usually employed in the pursuit of the smugglers and banditti of the Sierra Morena: this was Augustin de Echavarri, accustomed to partisan warfare in the famous mountains of which he was the guardian. Out of the banditti, whom it was his business to put down, he made soldiers, uniting with them the peasants of Upper Andalusia; and he proceeded to the defiles of the Sierra Morena, to bar the access against the French.

Estremadura had participated in the general emotion, for, in that remote province, frequented by herdsmen and scarcely at all by traders, the new spirit had penetrated in a less degree than in the others, and the hatred of foreigners had retained all its energy. Though strongly agitated by the intelligence of the abdications and by the consequent insurrection at Seville, it did not declare itself till the 30th of May, the feast of St. Ferdinand. As at Coruña, the populace at Badajoz were irritated at not seeing the flag and effigy of the saint displayed on the walls of that fortress, and at not hearing the guns fired as usual on the anniversary of that solemnity. The people proceeded to the batteries, where they found the artillerymen beside their pieces, but not daring to discharge them in token of rejoicing. A bold woman, loading them with reproaches, seized the match which one of them was holding, and fired the first gun. At this signal the whole town was astir, assembled, and rose. The people ran, according to custom, to the residence of the governor, Count de la Torre del Fresno, to enrol him in the insurrection or put him to death. He was a courtier-soldier, of extremely mild disposition, suspected as a friend to the Prince of the Peace, and reputed to be not very favourable to the rash idea of a general rising against the French. The people began to parley with him, and were soon dissatisfied with his ambiguities. A courier bringing despatches having arrived at the moment, they took umbrage at this circumstance, alleging

that they were communications brought from Madrid,—that is to say, from the French authority, which, they said, had more empire over the captain-general than the inspirations of Spanish patriotism. Under the influence of these imputations, they broke into his hotel, and obliged him to flee. Finally, having pursued him to a guard-house, where he had sought an asylum, they murdered him in the very arms of his soldiers. After the death of this unfortunate officer, a Junta was formed, and acknowledged without hesitation the supremacy of that of Seville. The people were invited to take arms; all those in the arsenal of Badajoz were distributed among them, and as they were close to the frontier of Portugal, near Elvas, where Kellermann's division, detached from the army of General Junot, was then stationed, all well-disposed men were called upon to assist in the repair of the walls of Badajoz. The Junta sent an address to the Spanish troops in Portugal, exhorting them to desert. Badajoz offered them a secure asylum on the frontier, and useful employment for their devotion.

At the other extremity of the southern provinces, Grenada likewise rose, but, as in the provinces least prompt to bestir themselves, it needed, besides the emotion of the abdications, the feast of Saint Ferdinand to produce an insurrection there. It was agitated, like all Spain, when, on the 29th of May, an officer from the Junta of Seville entered the city in an ostentatious manner, amidst a populace disposed to turbulence, and drew the crowd after him to the residence of the Captain-general Escalante, a prudent and timid man, who was extremely embarrassed by the proposal brought by that officer from Seville, which was nothing less than to rise and to declare war against France. He deferred his answer till the following day. The following day, the 30th, was the feast of St. Ferdinand. The people assembled tumultuously, and demanded a procession in honour of the saint. From the saint they passed on to the royal prisoner, whom they proclaimed by the title of Ferdinand VII.; and then obliged the Governor-general Escalante to form an insurrectional Junta, of which he became president. A levy *en masse* was immediately ordered, and followed by a declaration of war. A young professor of the university, since ambassador and minister, M. Martinez de la Rosa, was sent to Gibraltar, to obtain arms and military stores. They were most cheerfully granted. A numerous population was immediately regimented and assembled every day to exercise. There were, as we have already observed, three fine Swiss regiments, one at Melaga, another at Carthagena, and the third at Tarragona, which Napoleon intended to concentrate at Grenada for the purpose of placing them on the high road to Andalusia, in order that Dupont, who had already rallied to him the two at Madrid, might pick them up on his way. Napoleon conceived that, by placing these five regiments along with French, they would follow precisely the impulsion of the latter. This combination was thwarted by the insurrection at Grenada. The regiment from Malaga was taken to Grenada, and Theodore Reding, governor of Malaga, a native of Switzerland, was appointed commandant-general of the troops of the province.

Blood flowed horribly in these parts, as in the others. At Malaga, the French vice-consul and another person, a Spaniard, were murdered. At Grenada, Don Pedro Truxillo, formerly governor of Malaga, suspected on account of his friendship for the demoiselles Tudo, to whom he was related, was, by desire of the populace, apprehended and taken to the Alhambra. The Junta, wishing to save him, determined to transfer him to a safer prison. Carried off on the way by the populace, he was basely assassinated, and his body dragged about the streets. Two other suspected persons, the corregidor of Velez-Malaga, and one Portillo, a skilful agriculturist, employed by the Prince of the Peace to introduce the cultivation of cotton in Andalusia, were also apprehended, in compliance with the like demands, but placed out of the city in a Carthusian convent, where it was conceived that they would be safer. The monks, taking advantage of a feast day, when the assembled people came to buy and drink their wine, excited the drunken peasants to murder the two unfortunate men confined in their convent, and were instantly obeyed. The hapless corregidor of Malaga and the accomplished Portillo were basely slaughtered. In all parts, ravage and murder accompanied and sullied the noble movement of the Spanish nation. Not far from Grenada, at Jaen, which had already risen, an odious crime marked the new revolution. In order to get rid of its corregidor, Jaen had sent him to Val de Peñas, and he had been there shot by the peasants of La Mancha.

Previously to all the risings which we have enumerated, Carthagena had hoisted the standard of insurrection. It was on the 22d of the month of May, on the news of the abdications and the arrival of Admiral Salcedo, who was about to sail, in order to conduct the squadron which had previously left Carthagena, from the Balearic islands to Toulon, that Carthagena rose, from the double motive of proclaiming the true king and of saving the Spanish fleet. A Junta was formed immediately, the levy *en masse* was ordered, and counter-orders were despatched to the Spanish fleet. This rising at Carthagena put into the hands of the insurgents an immense quantity of arms and warlike stores, which were immediately distributed among the inhabitants of the whole neighbouring country. At the call of Carthagena, Murcia rose two days afterwards, that is to say, on the 24th of May. The volunteers of the two provinces united under Don Gonzales de Llamas, formerly colonel of a regiment of militia, appointed to command them. The rendezvous assigned was on the Xuoar, in order to give a hand to the Valencians.

At the same instant, in fact, Valencia also had arisen, and with the accompaniment of horrible circumstances. The rich and populous Valencia, seated amidst its beautiful Huerta, had not less pretension to rule than Seville or Grenada. Its population, lively, ardent, tumultuous, was not capable of suffering itself to be outstripped by any other. It was on the very day of the arrival of the courier announcing the abdications that the rising took place. In one of the principal public places of Valencia, a popular haranguer, reading to

the assembled crowd the *Madrid Gazette* containing the abdications, tore the paper in pieces, crying, "Down with the French! Ferdinand VII. for ever!" An immense multitude gathered round him, and ran to the authorities, to engage them in the insurrection. But first of all, these people resolved to give themselves a chief. They chose Father Rico, a Franciscan monk, who was eloquent and daring, and put himself at their head to go and speak to the authorities. He then proceeded to the residence of the captain-general, Count de la Conquista, whom he found, like all the captains-general, not disposed to comply, from prudence and aversion for the mob. He prevailed over him, nevertheless, without murdering him, promising himself to do something better shortly, and then repaired to the tribunal of *Accord*, the principal magistracy of the province, and dictated to it his resolutions, he, Rico, the monk, still talking, ordering, deciding for all. The formation of a Junta was immediately resolved upon and executed. The highest nobles of the country had seats in it along with the vilest agitators of the streets. The Count de la Conquista not appearing zealous or energetic enough, a grandee of Spain, a rich proprietor of the province, the Count de Cerbellon, was chosen to command the troops. A levy *en masse* was ordered, and application was made for arms to Carthagena, whence they were most cheerfully sent.

So far all was well, in reference to the insurrection and Spanish patriotism. But the authorities, though subjugated, appeared liable to suspicion. It was, in fact, only against their will that they had followed a movement which they regarded as mischievous, because it placed Spain between the French armies on the one hand and a furious populace on the other. It was therefore thought desirable to ascertain the nature of their reports to Madrid, and a courier was stopped and his despatches were carried to the Count de Cerbellon, to be read before the assembled multitude. These despatches were actually of such a nature as to have caused the slaughter of the most exalted functionaries, for they solicited the assistance from Madrid against the people who were rising. The daughter of Count de Cerbellon, who was present at this scene, perceiving the danger, snatched up those despatches, and tore them into a thousand pieces, before the eyes of the astonished crowd, disconcerted by the courage of that noble lady. Singular nation, which, like all yet simple nations, having only the vices and virtues of nature, blended the example of the most atrocious barbarity with that of the noblest devotedness!

But the Valencian populace soon made itself amends for the blood which it had been prevented from spilling. It had been remarked that a nobleman of the province, Don Miguel de Saavedra, baron of Albalat, was very remiss in attending the meetings of the Junta, of which he had been nominated a member. He went to them very rarely, because, as colonel of militia, he had a few years before ordered his men to fire upon the populace of Valencia for the purpose of restoring order. This recollection made him uneasy, and he remained in preference in the country. Presently a report was circulated that the baron of Albalat was

betraying the cause of the insurrection. Messengers came to fetch him from his residence; they conducted him to Valencia, and he was conveyed to Count de Cerbellón's, where those who interested themselves for him hoped that he would be safer. Father Rico had hastened forward to save him. The Count de Cerbellón, less courageous than his daughter, showed no disposition to compromise himself in behalf of an old friend, who came to him to beg his life. He resolved to send him to the citadel, of which, owing to the complicity of the troops, the people had made themselves masters, and where all whom it was wished to save from the fury of the multitude were crowded together. Father Rico, full of zeal for the defence of this unfortunate gentleman, put himself at the head of the escort, and brought him unharmed through the streets of Valencia, notwithstanding the efforts of the populace, athirst for blood. But, on reaching the principal place of the city, the mob, having increased and become more compact, broke the square of soldiers in which the unfortunate baron of Albalat was, tore him from the hands of these who were defending him, despatched him without mercy, and carried his head about on the end of a pike.

The consternation was general at Valencia, especially among the higher classes, who found themselves treated as suspected persons, like the French noblesse in 1798. To avert the danger, they multiplied their voluntary donations, and enrolled themselves in the new levies, without succeeding in soothing the distrust and the rage of the people, which increased every day. It became evident, in fact, that one victim would not appease their sanguinary fury. Rico, the Franciscan monk, already found his authority undermined by a rival. This rival was a fanatic, who had come from Madrid, the canon Calvo, whose passions were heated by a contest between the Jesuits and the Jansenists, in which he had supported the former against the latter. He had repaired to Valencia, conceiving apparently that he should there find a more extensive field for the exercise of his rage. He affected extreme devotion, took more time than any other person in saying mass, and had become the principal idol of the populace. Calvo adopted the usual theme of those who, in revolutions, wish to surpass others, and accused Father Rico of lukewarmness. In the citadel of Valencia there were three or four hundred French, traders attracted by commerce to that city, and many of whom had been long settled there. They had been put into this place out of humanity, and to withdraw them from the ferocity of the multitude. The atrocious Calvo had persuaded a fanatical band that here was the only holocaust well pleasing to God, the only one worthy of the cause which they were serving. Doubting whether he should be able to penetrate into the citadel with his troop of assassins, to consummate the abominable crime which he meditated, he stationed his band at a postern-gate opening upon the sea-shore: he then introduced himself into the citadel; and, affecting humanity, he persuaded the French that they should all be slaughtered, unless they fled in all haste by the postern leading to the shore. The unfortunate creatures, following his advice, sallied forth, women, children, and all, by the fatal

outlet, which they considered as the only one to save their lives. No sooner did they appear than muskets, swords, knives were pitilessly plied for their destruction. The murderers, gorged with blood, exhausted with fatigue, solicited mercy for about sixty, who were not yet despatched. Calvo, perceiving that the zeal of his cut-throats had cooled, feigned compliance with their wish, and intimated that he would take with him the sixty victims thus spared. He conducted them to a by-place, where a fresh band completed the execrable sacrifice. Thus did our unfortunate countrymen expiate the faults of their government, without having any share in them!

All in Valencia not belonging to the vilest of the populace were deeply afflicted. Next day, Rico, the monk, incensed at these acts, which disgraced the cause of the insurrection, attempted to denounce, to the public honour, the crimes of Calvo: but he could not prevail, Calvo got the better of him, and Father Rico was obliged to conceal himself. Calvo was audaciously proclaimed a member of the Junta, to the great scandal and the great alarm of all honest men. Eight of the unfortunate French, who had escaped, as by miracle, from the general massacre, still lived. Not knowing where to take refuge, they went and threw themselves at the feet of the murderer in the very bosom of the Junta. Calvo ordered or suffered them to be slaughtered, and their blood spirted on the garments of the members of the Junta, who fled, seized with dread and horror.

So many crimes, however, at length produced a reaction. Father Rico took courage, issued from his retreat, repaired to the Junta, attacked Calvo to his face, denounced him, compelled him to defend himself, completely disconcerted him, and obtained an order for his arrest. Conveyed first to the Balearic islands, then brought back to Valencia, Calvo was tried, condemned, and strangled in his prison. Honest men regained some ascendancy over the villains who had ruled Valencia. For the rest, extraordinary zeal in arming, for they were aware that they should soon have to defend themselves against the just vengeance of the French, though it did not excuse, yet made some slight amends for the atrocious crimes of which Valencia had just been the odious theatre.

All the towns on that part of the coast, such as Castellon de la Plana, Tortosa, Tarragona, followed the general example. The powerful Barcelona, containing as large a population as the capital of Spain, accustomed, if not to command, at least never to obey, burned with impatience to rise. Upon the arrival of the news of the abdications, on the 25th of May, all the posting-bills were torn down; an immense population thronged the public places, hate in their hearts and indignation in their eyes. But General Duhesme, at the head of 12,000 men, partly French, partly Italians, repressed the movement, and, from the lofty site of the citadel and the fort of Mont-Jouy, threatened to burn the city if it stirred. Under this iron hand, Barcelona trembled, but took no pains to dissemble its rage. Murat, still under illusion in regard to Spain, had granted to the Catalans the right to wear arms, which had been taken from them under Philip V., mean-

ing thereby to reward them for their apparent submission. To this testimony of confidence they responded by immediately buying up all the muskets that were to be had, all the powder and lead for sale in the public depôts, and the peasants of the mountains and the people of the towns were seen parting with the most valuable things they possessed, in order to procure the means of obtaining arms. Every day, the most trifling accident at Barcelona became an occasion for riot. A stone that fell from the fort of Mont-Jouy had struck a fisherman. The poor fellow, wounded, it was alleged, by the French, was carried on a handbarrow over the whole city, to excite the public indignation. The presence of our troops repressed the rising commotion. On another day, a fifer of one of the Italian regiments, observing a Spanish boy mimicking him in mockery, drew his sword to enforce respect: a fresh tumult ensued, and threatened this time to become general. But the French army again succeeded, by its attitude, in stopping the insurrection. The indiscipline of the Italian troops, less reserved in their conduct than ours, contributed also to the irritation of the Spaniards. The most turbulent of them, however, finding themselves too tightly curbed, fled to Valencia, Manresa, Lerida, and Saragossa; and Barcelona became not more friendly to the French, but more quiet.

The other towns of Catalonia, Girona, Manresa, Lerida, rose in insurrection. All the villages did the same. Barcelona, however, was kept down; Catalonia could not undertake anything very serious; and this proves that, if precautions had been better taken, and that if sufficient forces had been timely placed in the principal cities of Spain, the general insurrection might have been, if not prevented, at least quelled and greatly retarded in its progress.

Lastly, Saragossa, the immortal Saragossa, had not been the last, as it may well be supposed, in responding to the cry of Spanish independence. It was on the 24th of May, two days after Carthagena, two days before Seville, and as soon as the Asturias, that it had risen. On the arrival of the courier from Madrid, bringing the news of the abdications, the people, as in the other provinces, had thronged to the hotel of the captain-general, Don Juan de Guillermi, and finding him timid, like the other captains-general, had deposed him, and placed General Mori, chief of the staff, in his room. The latter, on the following day, the 25th, convoked a Junta, to satisfy the people, and to surround himself with a council that should share his responsibility. General Mori and the Junta, sensible of the two-fold danger of being at the same time under the hand of the populace and under the hand of the French, who filled Navarre, were much perplexed. The people, whom the most ardent zeal would scarcely have satisfied, resolved to get rid of the chiefs who did not participate in its own excitement, but without murdering them, and gave the command to a celebrated personage, Joseph Palafox de Melzi, own nephew of the Duke de Melzi, vice-chancellor of the kingdom of Italy. He was a handsome young man, of twenty-eight, had served in the life-guards, and was known for having boldly withstood the desires of a dissolute queen, whose notice he

had attracted. Attached to Ferdinand VII., whom he went to visit at Bayonne, and whom he had found a captive and in duress, he had come to Saragossa, his native place, awaiting, concealed in the environs, the moment for serving him whom he regarded as the only legitimate sovereign. The people, informed of these particulars, hastened to seek and to appoint him captain-general. Palafox accepted the office, called around him a monk, very clever and very brave, an old experienced officer of artillery, and a professor from whom he had formerly received lessons; and, availing himself of their knowledge to supply his own deficiency, for he knew nothing of war or of politics, he placed himself at the head of the affairs of Aragon. His heroic soul soon enabled him to make amends for the want of the qualifications for command. Palafox convoked the Cortes of the province, ordered a levy *en masse*, and called the fine and valiant Aragonese population to arms. His appeal was not only listened to, but anticipated everywhere. In short, such were the agitation and excitement, that, on the confines of Aragon and Navarre, at Logroño, only five or six leagues from the French troops, the people rose. They did the same at Santander, on our right, and even in the rear of our columns.

Thus, in eight days, from the 22d to the 30th of May, all Spain, without any concert between one province and another, had risen, under the impulse of one sentiment, that of indignation, excited by the events at Bayonne. The characteristic traits of this national insurrection had been everywhere the same—hesitation of the higher classes, unanimous and irresistible indignation of the inferior classes, and very soon equal devotedness of all; local formation of insurrectionary governments; levy *en masse*; desertion of the regular army to join in the insurrection; voluntary donations of the higher clergy, fanatical ardour of the inferior clergy; in short, everywhere patriotism, infatuation, ferocity, noble actions, atrocious crimes; a monarchical revolution, proceeding like a democratic revolution, because the instrument was the same, that is to say, the people, and because the result promised to be so too, namely, a reform of the ancient institutions which Spain was taught to hope for, in order to oppose France with her own weapons.

These spontaneous insurrections, which broke out between the 22d and the 30th of May, were known only successively and tardily at Bayonne, where Napoleon resided, and where he continued to reside during the whole month of June and the first days of July. At first, those only were heard of which took place on the right and left of the French army, that is to say, in the Asturias, Old Castille, and Aragon. The difficulty of communication, always great in Spain, having been much increased at that moment, for the couriers were not only stopped, but most frequently murdered, was the cause that, at Madrid, even the French staff knew scarcely any thing of what was passing beyond New Castille and La Mancha. They learned only that in the other provinces great disturbance, extreme agitation prevailed; still they were ignorant of the details; and it was but by degrees, and in the course of June, that they were informed of all that had happened up to

the end of May, and this knowledge they derived only from confidential communications, or from the bravadoes of Spaniards, repeating at Madrid what private letters, brought by messengers, had revealed to them.

As soon as Napoleon was apprised at Bayonne of the events at Oviedo, Valladolid, Logroño, and Saragossa, which had occurred close to him, and of which he was not informed till seven or eight days after they happened, he gave prompt and energetic orders for stopping the insurrection before it had spread and become consolidated. He had taken care to place between Bayonne and Madrid, on the rear of Marshal Moncey and of General Dupont, the corps of Marshal Bessières, composed of Merle's, Verdier's, and Lasalle's divisions. Merle's division had been formed of some third battalions drawn from the coasts, and of the fourth battalions of the legions of reserve; Verdier's division of the provisional regiments from No. 18 to No. 18,<sup>1</sup> the first twelve composing, as we have seen, the corps of Marshal Moncey. At this moment, the Polish corps admitted into the service of France were arriving: they consisted of a superb regiment of cavalry, 900 or 1000 strong, since celebrated by the name of Polish lancers; of three good regiments of infantry of 16 to 1600 men each, and known by the appellation of first, second, and third of the Vistula. Lastly, Napoleon had successively brought, either from Paris or from the camps established on the coast, the 4th light and the 15th of the line, the 2d and 12th light, the 14th and 44th of the line, making them succeed one another from Paris to the camp of Boulogne, from the camp of Boulogne to the camps in Bretagne, from the camps in Bretagne to Bayonne, so as to afford them time to rest themselves, and occasion to be useful where they made any stay. He ordered, moreover, two seasoned battalions of the guard of Paris to be despatched by post. If, therefore, he had not at hand the amount of resources that might have been sufficient to suppress the Spanish insurrection immediately, he made amends for the deficiency by his genius of organisation; and he had already found means to collect some forces, which enabled him to apply a first remedy to the evil by the arrival of six French regiments of old formation, and three Polish regiments. There arrived also, by the name of marching regiments, numerous detachments destined to recruit the provisional regiments,<sup>2</sup> and which, before their incorporation with the latter, rendered service all along the route which they had to traverse.

Napoleon immediately ordered General Verdier to hasten to Logroño, with 1500 infantry, 300 horse, and four pieces of artillery, and to

make a severe example of that town. He ordered General Lefebvre-Desnoettes, a brilliant officer, commanding the horse chasseurs of the imperial guard, to proceed to Pampeluna, with the Polish lancers, some battalions of provisional infantry, and six pieces of cannon, to collect, moreover, in that place some third battalions which formed its garrison, the whole composing a total of about 4000 men, and to fly to Saragossa, to restore order in that capital of Aragon. A deputation composed of several members of the Junta was to precede General Lefebvre-Desnoettes, and to employ persuasion before force; but, if persuasion proved unavailing, force was to be energetically applied to the evil. Napoleon prescribed to Marshal Bessières, as soon as General Verdier should have finished with Logroño, to fall back with General Lasalle's cavalry upon Valladolid, to restore tranquillity in Old Castille. He despatched General Savary to Madrid, to supply the place of Murat, who was ill, to issue orders in his name, so as that the command should not appear to be changed. He enjoined him to direct Frère's division, the third of General Dupont's, to march back from the Escorial to Segovia, which had risen, and to despatch a column of 8 or 4000 men upon Saragossa, by a backward movement to the left on Guadaluza. Having picked up some vague reports of the insurrection at Valencia, he ordered Marshal Moncey's first division to be despatched from Madrid, with a Spanish auxiliary corps, with directions to proceed to Cuenca, to halt there if the reports of an insurrection at Valencia were not confirmed, and to push forward for that city if they were confirmed. Yet as it was a small force for reducing a city of 100,000 souls (60 in the city, 40 in the Huerta), Napoleon ordered General Duhesme to send Chabran's division from Barcelona upon Tarragona and Tortosa, which by the way would repress the movements in Catalonia, fix the Swiss regiment of Tarragona in the cause of France, and debouch by the coast upon Valencia, while Marshal Moncey would debouch upon that city by the mountains.

But it was particularly towards Andalusia and the French fleet at Cadiz that the solicitude of Napoleon was directed. Ever since the first moments, he had thought of ordering Dupont towards Andalusia, where it appeared to him too many Spanish troops had been suffered to accumulate, and where he apprehended, besides, some attempt of the English. He had placed that general in advance, with a first division, at Toledo; a second at Aranjuez, a third at the Escorial, so as to be *en échelon* on the road from Madrid to Cadiz, recommending

<sup>1</sup> In fact, there were no more formed than the 18th, 14th, 11th, and 18th regiments, the detachments for the 15th and 16th being wanting.

<sup>2</sup> From these various designations, one may form some idea of the complication which the extent of the wants and the resources had produced in the organization, which Bonaparte managed with so much genius. There were old French regiments of the line, numbered 1 to 112, besides light regiments numbered 1 to 32, which were scattered in Poland, Germany, Italy, and Illyria, and which had their *dépôt* battalions on the Rhine or on the Alps. There were, moreover, regiments called provisional, which had been formed of companies drafted from *dépôt* battalions, and which were detached into Spain, to serve there under a temporary form. There were, besides the detachments subsequently drafted from these same *dépôts*, to reinforce

the provisional regiments, and which, during their passage, formed marching regiments. The five legions of reserve, the first three battalions of which composed the corps of General Dupont, the fourth battalions of which formed one of the divisions of Marshal Bessières, the fifth and sixth battalions of which remained to be organized, came under a new head. There were, lastly, the Italians, the Poles, the Swiss, who concurred, on their parts, in the composition of the forces which Napoleon had at his disposal. It is necessary, therefore, to follow with sustained attention these heads, so diverse and so numerous, if one would appreciate the prodigious art with which Napoleon managed his forces, and if one wishes above all to comprehend how it happened that, notwithstanding this prodigious art, his resources began to be below the immensity of the task which he had unfortunately undertaken.

to him expressly to hold himself in readiness to start at the first signal. On the news of the insurrection, the order for departure had been despatched, and General Dupont had marched (at the end of May) towards the Sierra Morena. Napoleon reckoned upon this general, who had hitherto been always brave, brilliant, and successful, and for whom he destined a marshal's baton on the first eminent occasion. Napoleon had no doubt that he would find it in Spain. That unfortunate general had no doubt of this himself. Horrible and cruel mystery of Fate, always unforeseen in its favours and in its severities!

Napoleon, who would not urge him too far into the extremity of Spain, without sufficient means for maintaining his ground there, sent him several reinforcements. Having despatched him with his first division only, that of General Barbon, he ordered the second to be marched to Toledo, that it might rejoin him if he had need of it. He directed, moreover, that there should be given to him immediately the whole of the cavalry of the *corps d'armée*, the seamen of the guard, who were to man the two new ships prepared at Cadiz; lastly, the two Swiss regiments of the old garrison of Madrid, (those of Preux and Reding,) at that moment united at Talavera, Kellermann's division, belonging to Junot's *corps d'armée*, stationed at Elvas, on the frontier of Portugal and Andalusia, the three other Swiss regiments from Tarragona, Carthage, and Malaga, which Napoleon supposed to be concentrated at Grenada, might make General Dupont's corps amount to 20,000 men at least, even without the junction of the second and third divisions—a force assuredly sufficient to keep down Andalusia, and to save Cadiz from any *coup de main* of the English. General Dupont was enjoined to march with the utmost haste towards the object which most engaged Napoleon's thoughts, that is to say, towards Cadiz and the squadron of Admiral Rosily.

In consequence of these orders, there were to be left at Madrid two of Marshal Moncey's divisions, and two of General Dupont's divisions, for these latter, placed between the Escorial, Aranjuez, and Toledo, were considered as being at Madrid itself. There were moreover to be left there the cuirassiers and the imperial guard, that is to say, about 25 or 30,000 men, exclusively of the escort of old regiments that was to accompany King Joseph. There was good ground to believe that this would be sufficient to guard against unforeseen cases; for it was not yet known how intense, how daring, and above all how general, the insurrection was. Orders were despatched afresh to construct in Madrid, either at the royal palace or at Buen Retiro, real *places d'armes*, in which might be deposited the wounded, the sick, the military stores, the chests, and lastly the baggage of the army.

These orders, given directly for the northern provinces, and indirectly through the medium of the staff of Madrid for the southern provinces, were immediately executed. General Verdier marched first, with the 14th provisional regiment, about 200 horse, and four pieces of cannon, from Vittoria for Logroño. On reaching Guardia, not far from the Ebro, he learned that the bridge over the Ebro, which must be

crossed to go to Logroño, was occupied by the insurgents. He crossed the river at El Ciego in a ferry-boat, and on the morning of the 6th of June he advanced towards Logroño. The insurgents, composed of the populace and peasants of the environs, to the number of two or three thousand, had obstructed the entrance of the town by an accumulation of all sorts of materials. They had placed in battery seven old pieces of cannon, mounted by cartwrights of the place upon carriages of their own making, and they kept behind their rude entrenchments, animated by much enthusiasm but little bravery. After the first discharges, they ran away from our young soldiers, who removed on the run all the obstacles with which the insurgents had endeavoured to stop them. The rout of these first opponents was so prompt, that General Verdier had not time to turn Logroño, to envelop and take them prisoners. Our infantry in the interior of the town, our horse outside the place, killed about a hundred of them with the bayonet and the sword. We had only one man killed and five wounded, but among them two officers. From the insurgents were taken their seven pieces of cannon and 80,000 infantry cartridges. The Bishop of Calahorra, who had against his will been put at their head, obtained mercy for the town of Logroño, which at his solicitation was exempted from pillage, and merely subjected to a contribution of 80,000 francs for the benefit of the soldiers, among whom this sum was immediately distributed.

This conduct of the insurgents was not apt to produce any high idea of the resistance that the Spaniards could oppose to us. General Verdier returned immediately to Vittoria, in order to replace in Marshal Bessières' corps the troops of Generals Merle and Lasalle, which had just started for Valladolid. General Lasalle, with the 10th and 22d chasseurs and the 17th provisional infantry, borrowed from Verdier's division; General Merle, with his whole division, composed of one battalion of the 47th, one battalion of the 86th, one marching regiment, one regiment of the legions of reserve, had proceeded for Valladolid by way of Torquemada and Palencia, following the two banks of the Pisuerga, which runs from the mountains of Biscay into the Duero, after passing through Valladolid. While they were thus moving forward, General Frère, on leaving the Escorial, made, on the contrary, a retrograde movement upon Segovia, which was in insurrection. Old Castille was therefore traversed by two columns, one advancing upon the road from Burgos to Madrid, the other turning back upon the same road. General Frère, having a shorter distance to travel, arrived first at Segovia, which he found occupied by the pupils of the college of artillery and by a host of peasants, who had possessed themselves of the town, and were committing all sorts of excesses. They had completely barricaded the city, and placed in battery the artillery served by the pupils of the college. These obstacles could not long check our troops, who had all the ardour of youth, and who had been for a year in the ranks of the army without having fired a shot. With incredible spirit, they scaled the barricades of Segovia, killed a certain number of peasants



with the bayonet, and drove off the others, who fled, after plundering the houses which they were charged to defend. The unfortunate inhabitants had dispersed, that they might not be exposed to all the excesses of the defenders and of the assailants of their city. They did not escape the excesses of the former; and were, for this time at least, treated very indulgently by the latter. It was easy to comprehend why the wealthier classes inclined to submission to France, placed as they were between a sanguinary and plundering populace and the exasperated French armies. General Frère treated the city of Segovia very mildly, but seized the immense artillery stores kept in the military college.

The pretended defenders of Segovia had fled dispersed towards Valladolid, as if they had been pursued by General Frère, who, however, had no cavalry to despatch after them. The director of the military college of Segovia, Don Miguel de Cevallos, had retired with them to Valladolid. According to the custom of soldiers who have fled before an enemy, the insurgents who escaped from Segovia pretended that M. Cevallos, by his cowardice or his treachery, had been the cause of their defeat. He was no such thing; but he was constituted prisoner and thus conducted to Valladolid. At the moment when he was entering the city, a great bustle took place. The new recruits of the insurrection were performing their exercise on an open place which he had to cross. They rushed upon him, and, in spite of the cries of his wife, who accompanied him, in spite of the efforts of a priest, who, upon pretext of receiving his confession, begged of them to grant him a few moments, he was mercilessly murdered, and then dragged through the streets. Bleeding fragments of his flesh were carried about by furious women in Valladolid.

This melancholy event, following so many others of the same kind, made a painful and a deep impression upon Don Gregorio de Cuesta, who had become, against his will, the head of the insurrection of Old Castille. He durst not, therefore, withstand an extravagant populace, who insisted on his hastening with the utmost speed to meet the French column marching from Burgos upon Valladolid. It was, as we have said, that of Generals Lasalle and Merle, who had left Burgos with several thousand infantry, and about a thousand horse, that is to say, twice or thrice as strong a force as was needed for putting to flight all the insurgents in Old Castille. The old and soured captain-general thought with reason that the utmost that could be attempted was to make head against the French in a well-barricaded city, and with the resolution to defend themselves to the death. But he considered it as senseless to go out and defy in the open field the most efficient troops in Europe. Threatened, however, with a fate similar to that of Don Miguel de Cevallos, if he resisted, he marched with five or six thousand citizens and peasants, assisted by a few deserters from the regular troops, a hundred life-guards who had fled from the Escorial, a few hundred horse of the queen's regiment, and several pieces of cannon. He posted himself at the bridge of Cabazon, on the Pisuerga, about two leagues

in advance of Valladolid, over which passed the high road from Burgos to that city.

General Lasalle had swept off the bands of insurgents posted in his way, especially at the village of Torquemada, which he had treated very roughly. At Valencia, the bishop had come forth to meet him, at the head of the principal inhabitants, imploring mercy for the town. It was granted by General Lasalle, who merely required some provisions for his soldiers. On the morning of the 12th of June he came in sight of the bridge of Cabazon, where Don Gregorio de la Cuesta had taken a position. The measures of the Spanish general denoted neither much experience nor great judgment. He had placed his cavalry in advance of the bridge, behind his cavalry a line of 200 infantry, his cannon on the bridge itself; some peasants as *tirailleurs* along the fords of the Pisuerga, and in rear, on the other side of the river, upon the heights which command its course, the rest of his little corps. General Lasalle, bringing two regiments of cavalry and the *voltigeurs* of the 17th provisional, led them on to the attack with his accustomed resolution. His cavalry upset that of the Spaniards, which it threw back upon their infantry. Our *voltigeurs* then charged that infantry, and drove it partly upon the bridge, partly upon the fords of the river. There was a horrible confusion, for foot, horse, cannon were jammed together upon a narrow bridge, under the volleys of the Spanish troops on the opposite bank, who fired indiscriminately on friends and foes. General Merle having supported General Lasalle with his whole division, the bridge was crossed, and the position beyond the Pisuerga quickly carried. The cavalry cut down the fugitives, a considerable number of whom were killed. Our loss consisted in fifteen killed, and twenty or twenty-five wounded; that of the Spaniards in five hundred killed and wounded. General Lasalle, without striking a blow, entered Valladolid, dismayed, but almost happy in being delivered from the banditti who had occupied upon pretext of defending it. The chief mortification of the Spaniards was to see their principal general beaten so speedily and so completely. Don Gregorio de la Cuesta retired with a few horse by the Leon road, surrounded by insurgents running off across the country, and telling them all that they were but rightly served for going with untrained bands to defy regular troops, accustomed to conquer Europe.

General Lasalle picked up in Valladolid a great quantity of arms, ammunition, and provisions, and spared the city. The actions of Logroño, Segovia, and Cabazon, indicated thus far great presumption, ignorance, and foolhardiness, and above all none of that tenacity which was subsequently met with. Accordingly, though it began to be understood in the army that the insurrection was universal, this excited little uneasiness, because it was imagined that there would be an outbreak indeed, but one as easily quelled as promptly produced. What was then occurring in Aragon was of such a nature as to inspire the same confidence. General Lefebvre-Desnoettes, having arrived at Pampeluna, had there organized his little column, consisting, as we have said, of three thousand foot and artillery, one thousand horse, and six pieces of cannon. Having completed

his dispositions, he set out, on the 6th of June, from Pampeluna, leaving in that city the deputation which had undertaken to convey words of peace to Saragossa, for the violence everywhere shown by the insurgents plainly indicated that the lances of the Poles were the only means to which recourse could be had at the moment. In this march for Valtierra, on the 7th, General Lefebvre found everywhere the villages empty, and the peasants joined with the rebels. On reaching Valtierra itself, he learned that the bridge of Tudela over the Ebro was destroyed, and that all the craft on that river had been secured and taken to Tudela. He halted at Valtierra, to procure the means of crossing the Ebro. He had large barks, which served for ferry-boats, brought down the river of Aragon into the Ebro, drew them up opposite to Valtierra, and passed the Ebro at that point. Next day, the 8th, he appeared before Tudela. A host of insurgents were scouring the country and firing from lurking-places behind the bushes. The main body of the assemblage, eight or ten thousand strong, was posted on the heights in advance of that city. The Marquis de Lassan, brother of Joseph Palafox, commanded them. General Lefebvre, sending before him his voltigeurs and numerous parties of cavalry, led them from position to position till they were under the walls of Tudela. On arriving there, he opened a parley, with a view to avoid violent means, and above all the necessity of entering Tudela by main force. His flags of truce were answered by musket-shots, and the Spaniards even fired upon him. He then ordered a charge with the bayonet. His young soldiers, always ardent, dashed away on the run to the enemy's positions, and took his cannon. The lancers threw themselves at a gallop upon the fugitives, and despatched some hundreds of them with their lances. The French entered Tudela at the charge step, and in the first moments the soldiers began to plunder the city. But order was soon re-established by General Lefebvre, and mercy granted to the inhabitants. We had not above a dozen men killed and wounded, while the insurgents lost three or four hundred killed, some behind their entrenchments, others on their flight across the country.

When master of Tudela, finding the bridge of that city destroyed, and the whole country at a distance in insurrection, General Lefebvre-Desnoettes, before he proceeded further, conceived that it behoved him to ensure the safety of his march by disarming the surrounding villages, and by repairing the bridge of Tudela, which is the necessary communication with Pampeluna. He employed, therefore, the 9th, 10th, and 11th of June in re-establishing the bridge, in scouring the country, in disarming the villages; putting to the sword the obstinate insurgents who would not surrender. On the 12th, having ensured his communications, he resumed his march, and on the morning of the 13th arrived before Mallen, where he again met with the insurgents, having the Marquis de Lassan at their head, and consisting of two Spanish regiments and from eight to ten thousand peasants. Having beaten back the bands which had spread themselves in advance of Mallen, he caused the position itself to be attacked. This was not difficult,

for those undisciplined insurgents, after one discharge, retired behind the troops of the line, firing over their heads, and killing more Spaniards than French. General Lefebvre, having attacked the enemy in flank, overthrew him without difficulty, and upset every thing before him. The Polish lancers, sent in pursuit of the fugitives, gave them no quarter. Animated in this pursuit, they swam across the Ebro to get at them, and killed or wounded more than a thousand. Our loss was almost as inconsiderable as in the affair of Tudela, amounting to no more than about twenty men. The briskness of the attacks, the unsteadiness of the Spanish peasants, the embarrassment of the troops of the line, placed most frequently between our fire and that of the enemy, in short, the confusion in every thing among the insurgents, account for the brevity of these petty combats, the insignificance of our losses, the importance of those of the enemy, who fell not so much in action as in the flight and by the lances of the Poles.

On the 14th, General Lefebvre, continuing his march towards Saragossa, again fell in with the insurgents posted on the heights of Alazon, treated them as at Tudela and at Mallen, and obliged them to make a precipitate retreat. However, on account of the fatigue of the troops, he did not pursue them so far as on the preceding days, and deferred till the next day his appearance before Saragossa.

He arrived there on the 15th of June. He would fain have entered by main force; but, to penetrate with 3000 infantry, a thousand horse, and six four-pounders, into a city containing from forty to fifty thousand souls, full of soldiers, and, above all, of peasants, resolved to defend themselves with desperation, into a city, about the destruction of which they cared but little, since all of them were inhabitants of the neighbouring villages, was no easy matter. An old wall, flanked on one side by a strong castle, and from distance to distance by several massive convents, and terminating at both extremities at the Ebro, encompassed Saragossa.

Though great confusion prevailed in the city, and the regular troops, the insurgents, and the inhabitants were extremely dissatisfied with each other; the troops complaining of the banditti, who plundered, murdered, and were fit for nothing but to run away; the banditti complaining of the troops for not preventing their being beaten—only one sentiment prevailed upon the question of defence, that of resisting to the last extremity, and not surrendering the city but in ashes. These predatory and fanatical peasants, spurred by the need for excitement, after long inactivity, though useless and cowardly in the bare field, proved gallant defenders behind the walls of a city of which they were masters. The brave Palafox, moreover, shared their sentiments, and the resolution to sacrifice the city being taken by those to whom it did not belong, it became impossible to surprise it. Accordingly, no sooner had General Lefebvre appeared under its walls with his little force than he beheld it filled to the very house-tops with a population of infuriated foes, and heard an incredible shower of balls issuing from all quarters. He was obliged to pause, for his principal force consisted of cavalry, and he had in fact no

artillery but six four pounders. He encamped upon the heights on the left, near the Ebro, and reported immediately his operations to headquarters at Bayonne, desiring that more considerable force in infantry and artillery might be sent him, in order to batter the walls before him, which consisted not only in the wall surrounding Saragossa, but in a multitude of extensive edifices, which, when the wall was taken, must be conquered one after another.

In Catalonia, the situation presented difficulties of another kind, but perhaps still more serious. Instead of finding every thing easy in the country, and every thing difficult before the capital, it was precisely the reverse: for the capital, Barcelona, was in our hands, and the country presented a mountainous face, studded with fortresses and large insurgent villages. General Duhesme, with about 6000 French and 6000 Italians, found himself blockaded, as it were, in Barcelona, ever since the general insurrection in the last days of May. Girona, Lerida, Manresa, Tarragona, and nearly all the principal villages were in full insurrection, and the peasants came down even to the foot of the city walls to fire at our sentinels. Nevertheless, having, on the 3d of June, received orders to send off Chabran's division towards Valencia, that it might lend a hand to Marshal Moncey, he despatched it on the 4th, prescribing to it the route of Lerida, so as that it might observe by the way what was passing in Aragon. General Chabran, at the head of a good French division, met with not many obstacles along the high road, to which he constantly kept, treated the inhabitants well, obtaining from them provisions, which they could not refuse to a division of such strength, and reached Tarragona, almost without striking a blow. He arrived there very opportunely to prevent the insurrection, for the Swiss regiment of Wipfen, which occupied the town, was still hesitating. General Chabran pacified Tarragona, exacted from the Swiss officers their word of honour to continue faithful to France, who consented to take them into her service, and set all to rights, at least for a moment, in that important place.

But it was precisely his departure from Barcelona, and the division of the French forces, that the insurgents were awaiting in order to overwhelm our troops. The famous convent of Montserrat, situated amidst rocks in the girdle of mountains that encompasses Barcelona, was reputed to be the focus of the insurrection. The river Llobregat, which intersects this belt of mountains before it falls into the sea, is one of the obstacles which must be surmounted before one can reach Montserrat. The aim of the insurgents was to make themselves masters of the course of that river; to establish themselves strongly there; thus to shut up General Duhesme in the capital, and to cut him off from Tarragona: for the Llobregat runs to the south of Barcelona, between that city and Tarragona. General Duhesme, desirous of searching Montserrat, and preventing the insurgents from taking a position between him and General Chabran, despatched General Schwartz at the head of a column of infantry and cavalry, with orders to proceed to the Llobregat, to cross it, and then to go by way of Bruch and make his appearance at

Montserrat. That officer, setting off on the 5th of June, met at first with none but insurgents who gave up the ground to him without disputing it. He crossed the Llobregat, passed with equal ease through Molins del Rey, Martorell, Esparraguera, and thus reached Bruch. But on arriving at that place, the moment he began to direct his course towards Montserrat, he heard the alarm-bells ringing in all the villages, found himself assailed by a host of riflemen, learned that all around him they were barricading the villages, destroying the bridges, making the roads impassable, and, for fear of being enveloped, he resolved to turn back. He had then all sorts of difficulties to conquer, especially in the village of Esparraguera, which formed one long barricaded street. He had at every step to fight obstinate battles. The men fired from the windows, the women and boys threw stones and boiling oil from the house-tops upon the heads of the soldiers. Lastly, in passing a bridge, which had been so damaged as to give way at the first strain, one of our guns, in the act of passing, sank along with the bridge. General Schwartz, after losing many killed and wounded, reached Barcelona again on the 9th of June, worn out with fatigue. It was evident that these fanatical peasants, useless in the open country, might prove very formidable behind houses, barricaded streets, obstructed bridges, rocks, bushes, any obstacle, in short, by which they could cover themselves while fighting.

On the 8th and 9th of June, the insurgents, emboldened by the retreat of General Schwartz, had the audacity to come and establish themselves on the Llobregat, occupying in force the villages of San-Boy, San-Felice, and Molins del Rey. Their plan still was to envelop General Duhesme, and to intercept the communication between him and General Chabran. General Duhesme was sensible that it was impossible to suffer them to accomplish such a design, and on the 10th of June he marched out of Barcelona, in three columns, to take the position of the insurgents. Arriving at day-break on the bank of the Llobregat, our soldiers crossed it with the water as high as the waist, and then rushed upon the villages occupied by the enemy, carried them with the bayonet, took many insurgents, of whom they killed a considerable number, and punished San-Boy by consigning it to the flames. In the evening they returned triumphant to Barcelona, bringing with them the enemy's artillery, to the great astonishment of the people, who had hoped not to see them again. This feat somewhat awed the tumultuous population of that great city, and kept up a wavering disposition in the superior classes, who there, as everywhere else, were divided between their deeply wounded national pride, and the dread of a contest with France under the sway of an unruly multitude. Meanwhile General Duhesme, anxious about General Chabran, who was far from him, at Tarragona, wrote to Bayonne, that the course prescribed to this general for lending a hand to Marshal Moncey under the walls of Valencia was attended with too great danger, as well for Chabran's division itself, as for the troops left at Barcelona. For these reasons he begged permission to recall him.

Such were the events in the north of Spain, in consequence of the orders sent from Bayonne to the troops which were between the Pyrenees and Madrid. The orders transmitted through the medium of the staff of Madrid to the troops that were to act in the South were executed with the same punctuality. Murat was still in such a state as to be unable to issue any orders; but General Beiliard, acting till the arrival of General Savary, himself despatched the Emperor's orders to Marshal Moncey and to General Dupont. Marshal Moncey, with his first division, commanded by General Musnier, left Madrid to proceed by way of Cuenca towards Valencia. General Dupont set out from Toledo with his first division, under the command of General Barbon, to direct his course through La Mancha towards the Sierra Morana. There were left therefore at Madrid two of Marshal Moncey's divisions, the imperial guard, and the cuirassiers. Vedel's division, the second of Dupont's corps, took the position at Toledo left vacant by Barbon's division. Friere's division, the third of Dupont's, on its return from Segovia to the Esecorial, took at Aranjuez the position left vacant by Vedel's division. In the capital and its environs there were consequently left nearly 30,000 infantry and cavalry, a force sufficient for the moment. From it was detached only one column of nearly 8000 men, with directions to proceed by way of Guadalupe to Saragossa, but which got no farther than Guadalupe.

Marshal Moncey commenced his march on the 4th of June, with a French corps of 8400 men, 800 of whom were hussars, and 16 pieces of cannon. He was to be followed by a body of 1500 good Spanish infantry, 500 horse of the same nation, which would have made his corps amount to more than 10,000 men, and to fifteen or sixteen thousand under the walls of Valencia, in case of its junction with General Chabran's. Unluckily this junction was extremely doubtful, and what is more, in the night preceding the departure of the French division, two-thirds of the Spanish troops deserted—a defection which so weakened the auxiliary corps that it was not worth while to send it. Marshal Moncey, therefore, undertook his expedition with 8400 French troops, young, but ardent and highly disciplined. He passed the first night at Pinto, the second at Aranjuez, the third at Santa Cruz, the fourth at Tarancon, marching a very short distance every day, to avoid fatiguing his soldiers, and to accustom them to the heat, as well as to marching. Arriving on the 7th at Tarancon, Marshal Moncey granted them a halt, and allowed them to remain there on the 8th. Marshal Moncey was anxious to spare both his soldiers and the inhabitants; he obtained everywhere provisions and a good reception. The Spaniards knew him from the war of 1793, and he had preserved a reputation for humanity which gained him favour with them. It is right to add that, in these central provinces, no important city having given a patriotic impulsion, great tranquillity continued to prevail. Marshal Moncey had there-

fore no difficulty to overcome, either for marching or for subsistence. He passed the night of the 9th at Carrascosa, of the 10th at Villar-del-Horno, and arrived on the 11th at Cuenca.

On reaching that town he resolved to stop there, to procure intelligence as well concerning Valencia as General Chabran, on whom he reckoned for accomplishing his mission. But the mountains which separated him on the left from Lower Catalonia, on the right from Valencia, prevented all intelligence from finding its way to him. As for Valencia, nothing passed the defile of Requena. All that was known was that the insurrection was violent and persevering there; that horrible massacres had been perpetrated, and that nothing could be done with the insurgent population but by force. Marshal Moncey, who was informed of the arrival of General Chabran at Tarragona, and who calculated that it would take that general till the 25th of June to proceed along the sea-coast to Tortosa and Castellon de la Plana, despatched an order to him to repair thither without delay, and made dispositions for not debouching himself into the plain of Valencia before the 25th of June. He resolved to stop at Cuenca till the 18th, then to leave it for Requena, and not to force the defiles of the mountains of Valencia till a favourable moment for acting in concert with General Chabran. He purposed, during these six days passed at Cuenca, to allow his troops to rest, to provide means of conveyance, and to procure information concerning the difficult and unfrequented road which he was about to travel. This methodical mode of proceeding might assuredly have its advantages, but also baneful consequences; for it gave the insurrection time to organize and to establish itself solidly at Valencia.

Meanwhile, General Dupont was advancing at a very different rate towards Andalusia. Having left Toledo towards the end of May, he had been joined on the road by General Pryvé's dragoons, who supplied the place of the cuirassiers for his corps, and by the two Swiss regiments of Preux and Reding. Barbon's division might be estimated at 6000 men present under arms; the seamen of the guard at about 5 or 600 men, excellent for all services either on land or sea; the cavalry, composed of chasseurs and dragoons, at 2600; the artillery and engineers at 7 or 800; the Swiss at 2400; present under their colours. General Dupont crossed La Mancha without difficulty, finding that province generally deserted, still more deserted than usual, perceiving everywhere in the villages and hamlets signs of a repressed but violent hatred, and obliged to march with infinite precautions, so as not to leave any laggards in the rear. He passed, without encountering any resistance, the formidable defiles of the Sierra Morana, and arrived on the 3d of June at Baylen, a place of sinister memory, and which, though he foresaw it not, was destined to become the theatre of the greatest of calamities for him. There

<sup>1</sup> These numbers are taken from the most authentic statements, and have not been adopted by me till after numerous verifications. It is important that they should be accurately given, because General Dupont, on his trial, attributed to himself a much less force than these figures

assign, and because the accusation made it much greater. The strict truth is what I here give, after having verified the statements furnished by General Dupont, those which proceeded from the ministry of war, and, lastly, those which formed the private statements of Napoleon.

he was informed of the insurrection at Seville and in the south of Spain, the rising of the whole population, and the uniting of the troops of the line with the insurgents. There were still doubts, however, of the conduct of General Castaños, commandant of the camp of St. Roque, and hopes were entertained that he might still be retained for the cause of the new royalty; for several recent conversations between him and French officers had betrayed much hesitation and even a decided disapprobation of the insurrection. So much was certain that the three Swiss regiments of Tarragona, Carthagena, and Malaga, which were supposed to be collected at Grenada, and ready to join the French army on its route to Seville, had been enveloped in the insurrection and hurried away by it. There might be danger for the fidelity of the two Swiss regiments which Dupont had with him, and there was nothing but victory that could attach them to us. The rising of Badajoz and Estremadura left little chance of being joined by Kellerman's division, sent from Lisbon to Elvas. These considerations, though far from cheering, were not of such a nature as to make General Dupont flinch; for, after having so often encountered the Austrian, Prussian, and Russian armies, and always conquered them, in spite of the disproportion of numbers, he cared but little for the mobs of peasants that he had before him. But, while boldly marching towards them, he thought it right to apprise the general staff at Madrid of the extent of the insurrection, and to make application for the union of his whole corps, that he might be able to control Andalusia, in which, as he said, he should only have to take a conquering walk, (*promenade conquérante*.)

Having debouched from the defiles of the Sierra Morena upon Baylen, and finding himself in the valley of the Guadalquivir, he turned to the right, and resolved to follow the course of the river, and proceed to Cordova, to deal a severe blow upon the advanced guard of the insurrection. Arriving on the 4th of June at Andujar, he there learned further particulars of the events in Andalusia, persisted more strongly in his resolution of marching sharply against the insurgents, but persisted still more strongly in claiming the speedy union of the three divisions which composed his *corps d'armée*.

At Andujar, he learned with great precision the difficulties which he should meet with on his way to Cordova. Augustin de Echavarri, formerly employed, as we have related, in clearing the Sierra Morena of the banditti that infested it, had put himself at the head of these banditti, of the peasants of the country, and of the people of Cordova and the surrounding towns. He had, moreover, two or three battalions of provincial militia, and some cavalry, the whole composing about 20,000 men, 15,000 of whom at least were undisciplined bands. This assemblage was called the army of Cordova, which was at this moment encamped on the Guadalquivir, at the bridge of Alcolea. Thoroughly despising such adversaries, General Dupont hastened to march straight up to them and to take the bridge, which could not equal that of Halle, taken by him with 8000 French from 20,000 Prussians.

He continued therefore to descend the Guadalquivir, to approach Alcolea and Cordova. On the 5th he was at Aldea del Río, on the 6th at El Carpio, at dawn on the 7th right facing the bridge of Alcolea.

The position which the insurgents had taken for covering Cordova was not ill chosen. The high road to Andalusia, which, as far as Cordova, almost always follows the bottom of the valley of the Guadalquivir, is sometimes on the left, sometimes on the right of the river, running with it along the foot of the most beautiful, most luxuriant hills of that country, covered with olive and orange trees, superb pines, and some palms. Beyond these hills are perceived on the right and very near you, the dark summits of the Sierra Morena, on the left and at a great distance the misty and bluish tops of the mountains of Grenada. The road, which is at first on the right of the Guadalquivir, crosses to the left at Andujar. At the bridge of Alcolea it again passes to the right, and runs to Cordova, situated in fact on that side, and on the very bank of the river, which it commands with its Moorish towers. Though in this part the Guadalquivir is everywhere fordable, especially in summer, it is nevertheless an obstacle of some consequence, and the possession of the bridge of Alcolea, affording a clear passage to artillery, had a sort of importance. This bridge is long and narrow, and terminates at the village of Alcolea itself. The Spaniards had closed the entrance by means of a field-work, consisting of an epaulement of earth, and a deep ditch. They had manned and armed it with troops and artillery, and had taken care to scatter in advance, both on the right and left, a host of riflemen ambushed in the olive plantations. They had, moreover, obstructed the bridge, filled the village of Alcolea with peasants who were skilful marksmen, placed beyond it twelve pieces of cannon on a hill which commanded both banks, and drawn up, farther on, the rest of their force, upon an extensive plateau. To distract the assailants, they had prepared a diversion, by making a column of three or four thousand men cross the Guadalquivir below Alcolea, and who, ascending the left bank which the French occupied, were to pretend to take them in flank, while they were attacking the bridge of Alcolea in front.

It was necessary therefore for the French to clear away the swarm of riflemen posted in the olive-grounds, to attack the work, storm it, pass the bridge, make themselves masters of Alcolea, throw into the Guadalquivir the corps which had crossed it, then make a dash upon Cordova, which is only two leagues distant. They had time, for they had arrived at five in the morning in face of the enemy, on a splendid day in the month of June. General Dupont placed foremost Pannetier's brigade, formed of two battalions of the Paris guard and two battalions of the legions of reserve. He distributed some riflemen on the right and left, drew up Chabert's brigade in the second line, the Swiss in the third, and ranged on his left all his cavalry, under General Fresia, to be a check upon the corps that was ascending the Guadalquivir. He had taken the precaution to send the intrepid Captain Baste, with about a hundred seamen of the guard, to slip under

the bridge for the purpose of examining whether it was undermined. He gave orders that the attack should be sudden and brisk, so that men might not be lost in skirmishing.

At a given signal, the French artillery and the tirailleurs having begun firing, the battalions of the Paris guard, commanded by General Pannetier and Colonel Estève, advanced upon the redoubt. The grenadiers threw themselves gallantly into the ditch, in spite of a smart fire of musketry, and, mounting on one another's shoulders, got into the work by the embrasures, while Captain Baste, having finished his reconnoissance, entered at the side. The redoubt being thus stormed, the grenadiers ran to the bridge, passed it with bayonets fixed, lost a few men, and particularly their captain, who had led them valiantly to the assault, and arrived at the village of Alcolea. The third legion followed them: it attacked with them the village of Alcolea defended by a host of insurgents. More men were lost here than in the attack of the bridge; but, if we lost more, the insurgents also had more killed, and a great number of them were taken and put to death in the houses of the village. Alcolea was soon in our possession. During this warm engagement, General Fresia, on the other side of the Guadalquivir, had stopped the Spanish corps employed to make a diversion. Under the vigorous charges of our dragoons that corps soon fell back, and recrossed the Guadalquivir in disorder.

This brilliant action had not cost us more than 140 men killed and wounded. We had killed more than thrice as many in the interior of the village of Alcolea.

The bridge of Alcolea being carried, it took a few moments to fill the ditch of the redoubt, and to form a passage for the artillery and cavalry of the army. This was immediately done; the bridge was passed, and a battalion of the seamen of the guard left in charge of it. The main body of the Spaniards had rallied on the road to Cordova, on the summit of a plateau, which, on one side, was bounded by the Guadalquivir, and, on the other, connected with the Sierra Morena. The French army was at the foot of the plateau in close column, in battalions, the cavalry and artillery in the intervals. After allowing it to take breath, General Dupont gave orders to advance. At the mere sight of these troops, marching as if on parade, the Spaniards fled in confusion, abandoning to us the road to Cordova. Some more prisoners and part of their artillery were taken.

Our troops marched without intermission, notwithstanding the scorching heat of the middle of the day, and, at two in the afternoon, came in sight of Cordova, its towers, and its beautiful mosque, now the cathedral, which overlooks the city. General Dupont had no notion of giving the insurgents time to recover themselves, and to occupy Cordova in such a manner as to render its reduction difficult to an army provided with field artillery alone. In consequence, he resolved to storm it at once. He purposed, however, to summon it, with a view to spare a capture by assault. He sent for the corregidor, who had secreted himself, as much for fear of the Spaniards as of the French. That magistrate did not make his

appearance. The insurgents refused to listen to a priest who was sent to them, and fired upon all the French officers who approached to parley. Force was, therefore, the only means of getting into Cordova. Cannon were brought forward, and the gates broken open; and the French entered the city in column. They had to take several barricades, and to attack one by one many houses in which the banditti of the Sierra Morena posted themselves. The battle became furious. Our soldiers, exasperated by this resistance, penetrated into the houses, killed the banditti who occupied them, and flung a great number of them out of the windows. While some maintained this conflict, the others had pursued in column the mass of the insurgents, who had fled by the bridge of Cordova to the Seville road. But the fight soon degenerated into a downright pillage; and that unfortunate city, one of the most ancient and most interesting in Spain, was sacked. The soldiers, after storming a certain number of houses at the cost of their blood, and killing the insurgents by whom they were defended, had no great scruple to establish themselves in them, and to exercise all the rights of war. Finding the insurgents whom they slew laden with pillage, they pillaged too, but rather to procure food and drink than to fill their knapsacks. The heat was suffocating, and what they most needed was drink. Going down to the cellars, stored with the best wines of Spain, they stove in the casks with the but-end of their muskets, and several of them were drowned in the wine thus wasted. Others, completely drunk, paying respect to nothing, stained the character of the army by falling foul of the women, and subjecting them to all sorts of outrages. Our officers, always worthy of themselves, made incredible efforts to put an end to these horrible scenes, and some of them were obliged to draw their swords upon their own soldiers. The troops who had pursued the fugitives beyond the bridge of Cordova wished to enter the city in their turn to procure refreshment also—for they had received no distribution since the preceding day—and thus increased the desolation. The peasants, on their part, had fallen to plundering, and the unfortunate city of Cordova was at this moment ravaged at once by the Spanish banditti, and by our exasperated and famished soldiers. It was a painful scene, and had most mischievous consequences, from the outcry which it subsequently produced in Spain and in Europe. General Dupont ordered the *général* to be beaten to call the soldiers to their colours; but either they heard it not, or they refused to obey, and of the whole army no part remained orderly but the cavalry and the artillery, which were outside Cordova, and attached to their ranks, the one by their horses, the other by their cannon. An enemy's corps, had it come back, would have caught all the infantry dispersed, gorged with wine, overcome by sleep and intoxication. It was this very fatigue, this hideous drunkenness, that put an end to the disorder; for our soldiers, unable to hold up any longer, had thrown themselves on the ground, amidst the killed and the wounded, side by side with the Spaniards whom they had taken or slain.

Next morning, at the first sound of the drum, those same men, having become docile and humane as usual, repaired all of them to their colours. Order was immediately re-established, and the unfortunate inhabitants of Cordova were rescued from the desolation into which they had been plunged for some hours. Excepting the archbishop's palace, which had been taken by assault, and where the staff of the revolt had its quarters, the sacred edifices in general had escaped the devastation, though the convents were reputed to be the principal focuses of the insurrection. The soldiers were separated from the inhabitants and lodged in huts in the public places. Their knapsacks were examined; and the money which they were found to contain was thrown into the chest of each regiment. Several depôts of specie had been taken, some belonging to the insurgents, and arising from the voluntary donations made by individuals and the clergy to the insurrection, others belonging to the public treasury. The whole of these funds went to the general chest of the army, to clear off the arrears of pay.<sup>1</sup> The inhabitants, taking courage by degrees, returned, and even formed a wish to keep the French army with them, that they might not be liable to have fresh battles fought in their streets and in their houses. It is a singular fact, and one which may enable us to appreciate the services that are to be expected of the Swiss, that two or three hundred of them, who were serving with Augustin de Echavarri, came over to our side after the capture of Cordova; and that, at the same time, a nearly equal number of men of the two regiments which we had with us, (Preux and Reding,) left us to go over to the enemy. It was evident that these foreign soldiers, divided between their predilection for the French service and their old attachment to Spain, would waver between the two parties and side definitively with that which should prove victorious. One could, therefore, scarcely rely upon them in case of reverses, notwithstanding the known and justly esteemed fidelity of the soldiers of their nation.

The thunderbolt which had struck Cordova had at once terrified and exasperated the Spaniards. But, their hatred far surpassing their terror, they had soon formed throughout all Andalusia the plan of uniting in mass to crush General Dupont, and to revenge upon him the sack of Cordova, which they depicted everywhere in the darkest colours. They recapitulated even in the smallest villages the massacre of women, children, and aged men, the rape of virgins, the profanation of the sacred buildings—assertions atrociously false; for, though the confusion had been very great for a moment, the pillage had been inconsiderable, the massacre null, with the exception of some insurgents taken with arms in their hands. Throughout all Andalusia, there was, nevertheless, but one cry against the French, who were already too much detested to need any false statements to augment the hatred which they excited. The people vowed to destroy them to the last man, and as far as they were able they kept their word.

No sooner had our troops passed the Sierra Morena, leaving scarcely any post on their rear, on account of their small number, than swarms of insurgents, driven from Cordova, spread themselves over their line of communication, occupying the defiles, taking possession of the villages which border the high-road, and murdering without pity all the French travellers, sick, and wounded, whom they met with. General René was thus assassinated with atrocious circumstances. At Andujar, the revolt of Jaen, taking advantage of our departure, made themselves masters of the town, and slaughtered a whole hospital of sick. But for the interference of a priest, the wife of General Chabert would have been murdered. At the village of Montero, between Andujar and Cordova, occurred an event worthy of cannibals. A detachment of 200 men had been left to guard a bakery, where it was intended that bread should be made for the army till it reached Cordova. The day before it was to enter that city, and consequently before the alleged ravages which it committed there, the inhabitants of the environs, some of whom had come from the Sierra Morena, while others issued from the neighbouring villages, fell unexpectedly and in considerable number upon the French post, and slaughtered the whole. With an unparalleled refinement of cruelty, they crucified upon trees several of our unfortunate soldiers. They hung up others, kindling fires beneath their feet. They buried several half alive, and sawed others between two planks. The most brutal, the most infamous barbarity spared these hapless victims of war no sufferings. Five or six soldiers, who escaped as by miracle from the massacre, brought the army this intelligence, which made it shudder, and disposed it to any thing but clemency. Thus the war assumed an atrocious character, without, however, changing the hearts of our soldiers, who, when the heat of battle was over, again became mild and humane as they were accustomed to be, as they have been over all Europe, which they have traversed as conquerors, never as barbarians.

General Dupont, established at Cordova, availing himself of the resources of that large city to recruit his army, to repair his *matériel*, but having no more than about 12,000 men, including upwards of 2000 Swiss, upon whom he could not depend, could not prudently advance into Andalusia, before the junction of Vedel's and Frère's divisions, left, the one at Toledo, the other at the Escorial. He had most urgently applied for them, and, with this reinforcement of ten or eleven thousand infantry, which would have raised his corps to at least 22,000 men, he calculated upon traversing Andalusia as conqueror, on extinguishing the flame raging at Seville, on bringing back General Castaños to King Joseph and the regular troops, on pacifying the south of Spain, on saving the French squadron of Admiral Rosily, and thus thwarting all the designs of the English upon Cadiz. He awaited, therefore, with impatience the demanded reinforcements, having no doubt of their speedy arrival, after such despatches as he had sent to Madrid. It was nevertheless a question whether those despatches

<sup>1</sup> The only diversion, if such it were, consisted in the grant of a gratuity to the generals and superior officers, mentioned elsewhere in the accounts of the army, and for

which they had the most urgent necessity. It varied between three and four thousand francs per head. This fact results from a strict and very detailed examination.

would arrive, all the old banditti of the Sierra Morena having become its defenders, and slaughtering the couriers without suffering one to pass.

But, while General Dupont, who entered Cordova on the 7th of June, was waiting for reinforcements, the insurrection in Andalusia acquired greater consistence. The troops of the line, to the number of from twelve to fifteen thousand men, were concentrating around Seville. The new levies, though less numerous than had been hoped for, were, nevertheless, organizing, and began to be trained. Some of them were introduced into the ranks of the army to increase its effective, the others formed into battalions of volunteers. They were supplied with arms, and were receiving instruction. Time was, therefore, entirely to the advantage of the insurrection, which was preparing its means, and to the disadvantage of the French army, whose situation became worse every moment; for, independently of the non-arrival of the reinforcements, the constantly increasing heat augmented the number of the sick, and especially affected the spirits of the soldiers. At the same time our squadron was exposed to great danger at Cadiz.

Ever since the unfortunate murder of Solano, the agitation had kept increasing in that city, where the lowest of the rabble had the rule. The new captain-general, Thomas de Morla, endeavoured to support himself by flattering the multitude, and by allowing it every day such an amount of excesses as could satisfy it. Immediately after butchering the captain-general Solano, this multitude had set about demanding the destruction of our fleet and the massacre of the French seamen. It was a thing natural enough to desire, but difficult of execution, against five French ships of the line and a frigate, manned by three or four thousand seamen, who escaped from Trafalgar, and mounting from four to five hundred guns. They would have fired the Spanish ships and the whole arsenal of Cadiz, before they would have suffered a single man to come on board of them. Add to this that, placed at the entrance of the road of Cadiz, near the city, mixed with the Spanish division, which was in a state of equipment, they might destroy that, and batter the city with their guns. The English, it is true, would have been called in, and our seamen would have succumbed under the cross-fire of the Spanish forts and the English ships; but they would have severely revenged themselves before they died, on blind allies and barbarous enemies.

Thomas de Morla, who appreciated this situation better than the populace of Cadiz, was not willing to run the risk of such extremities; and he had, with his usual shrewdness, undertaken to negotiate. He had proposed to Admiral de Rosily to move his ships a little to one side, while working higher up into the road, to leave the Spanish division at the entrance, so as to separate the two squadrons and to prevent collisions between them, and thus to consign to the Spaniards alone the task of closing Cadiz against the English. It was said that they had resolved to do so; for, though they had concluded a truce with the latter, they disclaimed all intention of putting into their hands the great naval establishments of Spain.

They persisted, in fact, in refusing the aid of 5000 land-troops which had been offered them. Admiral Rosily, expecting every moment the arrival of General Dupont, whom he knew to be on march, had agreed to these proposals, certain of being in a few days master of the port and of the establishment of Cadiz. In consequence, he had separated his ships from the Spanish ships, and taken a position in the interior of the road, while the Spanish division continued to occupy the entrance.

Thus had passed the first days of June, which time General Dupont had employed in reducing Cordova. But Admiral Rosily had soon perceived that all the apparent attentions of the captain-general Thomas de Morla were but a device for gaining time, and for preparing the means of overwhelming the French squadron in the interior of the road, while no great harm could result from it to Cadiz and its vast arsenal.

In order to form an idea of this situation, you must know that the harbour of Cadiz, resembling, in this respect, that of Venice and all those of Holland, is composed of spacious lagoons which have been formed by the alluvions of the Guadalquivir. Amidst these lagoons have been constructed basins, canals, building-yards, and superb magazines; and advantage has been taken of a group of rocks, situated at some distance in the sea, and connected with the shore by a pier, to form an immense road and to close it. Upon this group of rocks Cadiz is built. It is from the top of this group that it commands the road which bears its name, and that, crossing its fires with the low ground of Matagorda, situated opposite, it renders entry impracticable to hostile fleets. The road opens to the west, and on the east extends a vast inlet, communicating by passages and canals with the great establishments known by the general name of the arsenal of the Caracas. From this entrance, of which Cadiz has the command, to the Caracas, is a distance of three leagues. The guns near the entrance are very numerous, for the purpose of beating off an enemy; but on penetrating into the interior, and amidst the lagoons, which have been made subservient to the formation of basins, the impossibility of pushing so far has rendered it needless to be prodigal of defences and batteries.

On seeing the mortars and howitzers brought by the united efforts of many hands to all the batteries which could act upon the middle of the road, on observing the equipment of gun-boats and bomb-vessels, Admiral Rosily had no further doubt of the object of these preparations, and he formed the plan, at full moon, when the tides would be higher, to take advantage of the draught of water, to push, with his ships completely armed, into the channels terminating at the Caracas. He should there be covered from the most formidable fires, able to defend himself for a considerable time, and to do a great deal of mischief before he yielded. But for this purpose he should have needed a west wind, and none but easterly winds were blowing. He was, therefore, obliged to suspend the execution of his design. Besides, the foresight of the Spanish officers soon rendered this manœuvre impossible. They sank old ships in the passages leading to the Caracas.



they placed at anchor a line of gunboats and bomb-vessels, carrying very heavy artillery. They did the same on the other side towards Cadiz, where they placed another line of gunboats and bomb-vessels, and also sank old ships. The squadron, therefore, was shut up in the centre of the road, fixed in a position which it could not quit, exposed to the fire of all the batteries on shore and of all the gun-boats, and cut off from the means of moving to a spot where it might have done the greatest mischief.

On the 9th of June, all these preparations being finished, M. de Morla, without taking the trouble to parley, issued orders for the fire upon the squadron of Admiral Rosily to commence. Twenty-one gun-boats and two bomb-vessels on the side next to the Caracas, twenty-five gun-boats and twelve bomb-vessels on the side next to Cadiz, opened their fire upon our vessels. The *Prince of the Asturias* had been brought near to the line of gun-boats next to Cadiz, to serve them for a support. The land-batteries, covered with strong epaulements, which screened them from our projectiles, added to all these fires those of 60 pieces of cannon of large calibre, and of 49 mortars. Under a shower of balls and bombs, our five ships and the frigate, which completed the squadron, behaved with a coolness and vigour worthy of the heroes of Trafalgar.

Unfortunately, the state of the tide prevented them from approaching the land batteries, which they would have demolished, and they received the fire of the latter without being able to return it in an efficacious manner, on account of the thickness of the epaulements. But they revenged themselves upon the bomb-vessels and the gun-boats, a good number of which they shattered and sunk. The firing, commenced on the 9th, at three in the afternoon, lasted till ten at night. Next day, the 10th, it began again at eight in the morning, and was kept up without intermission till three in the afternoon, and with the same circumstances as on the preceding day. At the conclusion of this dreary combat, we had received 2200 bombs, eight only of which had fallen on board, without doing any considerable damage. We had thirteen men killed and 46 severely wounded. But 15 gun-boats and 6 bomb-vessels were destroyed, and 60 Spaniards were *hors de combat*. This would have been of little consequence had there been any prospect of obtaining a great result: it was too much, a thousand times too much, for a fight without any possible result, and which could only terminate in a useless butchery. Thomas de Morla, who conceived he had done enough to satisfy the populace of Cadiz, and who dreaded some act of despair, sent an officer with a flag of truce to summon Admiral Rosily to surrender: representing the impossibility for the French to defend themselves in the middle of a closed road, and in which they were prisoners. He then caused it to be insinuated that the Spaniards were disposed, if the admiral assented, to offer an honourable arrangement. Admiral Rosily sent for answer that to surrender was inadmissible, for the crews would mutiny and refuse to obey; but that he offered the choice of two conditions—either to leave Cadiz upon a promise from the English that they would not pursue him for four days; or to remain motionless in the road,

till the general events of the war should have decided his fate and that of Cadiz; engaging to send his guns ashore, that no alarm might be felt on that score. M. de Morla replied that he could not assent to either the one or the other of these conditions, and that he was obliged to refer the matter to the Junta of Seville, which had become the absolute authority, and was obeyed by everybody in the south of Spain. Whether the proposal of this new delay was a feint or not on the part of M. de Morla, who perhaps sought again to gain time for preparing further means of destruction, it suited Admiral Rosily to agree to it; for it was known that General Dupont entered Cordova on the 7th of June, and his arrival was momentarily expected. He consented, therefore, waiting every day, as one awaits the announcement of life or death, for the report of the distant gun, the signal of the presence of the French army.

Having entered Cordova on the 7th, it was, in fact, likely enough that General Dupont might be on the shore of Cadiz by the 18th or the 14th. But during this interval the environs became covered with redoubts, cannon, and formidable means of destruction. The admiral, aware that, unless he were delivered by General Dupont, he should sink under that mass of fires, and lose to no purpose three or four thousand sailors, the best belonging to France, formed a desperate plan, which was not calculated to save them, but which offered at least a chance of salvation, and at any rate the satisfaction of revenging himself by destroying many more men than he should lose. Though the passages on the side next to Cadiz for sailing out of the road were obstructed, the admiral had discovered a practicable outlet, and resolved, whenever the firing recommenced, to fall furiously upon the Spanish division, which was very ill armed and not more numerous than his own, to burn it before the arrival of the English, to attack these latter the moment they appeared, to destroy, or to get destroyed, trusting to chance to save the whole or part of his squadron. But for this act of despair was required a first fortunate accident—a favourable wind. He waited, therefore, after making all the preparations for departure, either for the appearance of General Dupont, or for an acceptable answer from Seville, or for a fair wind.

The 14th of June arrived, and neither of these circumstances was realized. General Dupont had not appeared; the Junta of Seville required a pure and simple surrender; and, as for the wind, it blew from the east, towards the furthest extremity of the road, instead of impelling towards the outlet. It was precisely the wind that could have been wished for a few days earlier, for falling upon the Caracas, before the channels were obstructed. The enemy's means were trebled. Nothing was left but to submit to a slow and infallible destruction, under a cannonade, to which it was impossible to reply in such a manner as to be revenged. Surrender would leave at least a chance of being released from prison in a few days by a victorious French army. The admiral was therefore obliged to strike his flag without any other condition than that life should be spared. The brave sailors of Trafalgar, always unfortunate through the combinations

of a policy which had the continent in view much more than the sea, were again sacrificed here, and made prisoners by an allied nation, which, after having so ill seconded them at Trafalgar, revenged upon them general events of which they were not the authors. The ships were disarmed, and the officers conducted prisoners into the forts, amidst the frantic plaudits of a ferocious populace. Thus terminated, at Cadiz itself, the maritime alliance of the two nations, to the great joy of the English, who had landed, and who were conducting themselves in the port of Cadiz as though it had belonged to them. Thus vanished, one after another, the illusions which had been formed concerning the Peninsula, and each of them, as it vanished, left behind a prospect of immense danger.

Admiral Rosily had succumbed, because General Dupont had not arrived in time to lend him a hand—what was about to happen to General Dupont himself, thrown, with 10,000 young soldiers, amidst insurgent Andalusia? It had been calculated that all would go on smoothly with him; that five or six thousand Swiss would reinforce him by the way; that a French division, quietly traversing Portugal, would join him by Elvas, and that he might thus march upon Seville and Cadiz with 20,000 men. But the greater part of the Swiss, enveloped by the insurrection, had given themselves up to it. Portugal, beginning to participate in the emotion of Spain, was not easier to traverse, and General Kellerman had scarcely been able to reach Elvas with his cavalry. All the facilities anticipated from the ancient submission of Spain were transformed into difficulties. Every village became a den of cut-throats for our soldiers; provisions disappeared, and nothing was left but a burning climate.

General Dupont, when he paused in Andalusia, had been far from suspecting such a state of things. He had never relied much either upon the Swiss who were to meet him at Grenada, or on the French division from Portugal that was to join him. He had reckoned upon his own troops, upon the junction of his two divisions, and, at the head of 20,000 French, he had not doubted for a moment of accomplishing the object of his mission to Andalusia. But it was a question whether his couriers could have reached Madrid, where his two divisions had been detained, in the uncertainty of what might have happened in the centre of Spain. He tarried therefore for about ten days at Cordova, awaiting instructions and succours, which did not arrive. Meanwhile the intelligence of the disaster of the squadron, that of the defection of the Swiss and of the troops in the camp of St. Roque, and the answer given by General Castaños to an envoy whom he had sent to him, proving that he was irrevocably engaged in the insurrection, completely revealed to General Dupont the danger of his situation. On one side he beheld the army of Andalusia coming against him, on the right, from Seville, and on the other the army of Jaen, on the left, from Grenada. The latter was for the moment the most dangerous, for it was but a step from Jaen to Baylen, at the head of the defiles of the Sierra Morena, from which the general was about 24 leagues distant while

staying at Cordova. Such a situation was not tenable, and he could not abandon to the enemy the possession of the passes of the Sierra Morena without perishing. It was bad enough to leave there the undisciplined bands of Augustin Echavarri, which infested them, and stopped couriers and convoys. He took, therefore, though with regret, the resolution to leave Cordova, and to fall back to Andujar, where he should be upon the Guadalquivir, seven leagues from Baylen, and much nearer to the defiles of the Sierra Morena. Thus, instead of the *conquering walk* through Andalusia, he was obliged to make a retrograde movement.

As nothing pressed him, he executed this retreat slowly and orderly. He set out in the evening of the 17th of June, purposing to march during the night, as it is customary to do at this season in so hot a climate. From what had been heard of the cruelty of the Spaniards, none of the sick or wounded who could bear the fatigue of removal would be left behind. It was necessary, therefore, to be followed by an immense train of carts, which took above five hours to file off, and which the Spaniards and English, in their newspapers, afterwards called ammunition wagons, filled with the plunder of Cordova. The troops had found 800,000 francs at Cordova, and carried off very little church plate. Most of this plate had been restored, and three or four wagons would have been sufficient to carry away the greatest possible booty in valuable effects. But the wounded, the sick in considerable number, many officers' families who had accompanied our army into Spain, where it seemed destined for a long occupation rather than for an active war, were the cause of that endless train of baggage. Some sick and wounded, however, were left at Cordova, under the care of the Spanish authorities, who, for the rest, kept their word given to General Dupont, to have the greatest attention paid to them. If, in fact, the odious massacres which we have related were to be feared in Spain, in the hamlets and villages of which ferocious peasants were masters, they were less to be apprehended in the large towns, habitually under the rule of a humane and respectable *bourgeoisie*, who were strangers to the atrocities committed by the populace.

The troops had no hostility to repel during the march; but, on reaching Montero, the army was horror-struck on beholding the bodies of Frenchmen, surprised singly by the enemy, suspended to trees, half buried in mould, and torn to tatters. Never had our soldiers committed or suffered any thing of that kind in any country, though they had warred everywhere—in Egypt, in Calabria, in Illyria, in Poland, in Russia. The impression produced upon them was profound. Though violently exasperated, they were far more grieved about the fate which awaited such of them as might be either wounded or sick, or delayed upon a road, owing to fatigue, hunger, or thirst. A sort of dejection seized the army, and left behind it mischievous traces.

They arrived the next day, June the 18th, at Andujar on the Guadalquivir. All the inhabitants, fearing that vengeance would be wreaked upon them for the massacres committed, as well at Andujar as in the neighbouring hamlets, had fled, so that this little town was found ab-

solutely deserted. Search was made in it for provisions, and a sufficiency was discovered for the first days. General Dupont placed in Andujar itself the seamen of the guard, who were the most steady and best conducted troops that he had with him. He sent out emissaries to persuade all the inhabitants to return, promising that no harm should be done to them, and he actually succeeded in bringing them back. The town of Andujar afforded some resources for the sick and wounded, which were used sparingly, so as not to be uselessly exhausted. Efforts were also made to procure means of subsistence, either with money, a certain sum of which the army had brought with it, or by well-organized marauding expeditions. Andujar had an old bridge over the Guadalquivir with Moorish towers, which served for *l'île de pont*. The towers were filled with picked troops. Some works were thrown up on the right and left. The first brigade was then posted upon the river, and a little in advance the second, to the right and left of Andujar, the Swiss in rear of that town, the cavalry at a distance in the plain, observing the country to the foot of the mountains of the Sierra Morena. In short, such an establishment was formed that, with much activity in procuring supplies of provisions, the force under General Dupont might have maintained its ground for a considerable time, and awaited in security the reinforcements solicited at Madrid.

In this resolution to fall back, in order to be nearer to the defiles of the Sierra Morena, all would have been well had the best position with respect to those defiles been taken. Unluckily this had not been done, and it was a first fault of which General Dupont had afterwards to repent. The real motive for leaving Cordova and the resources of that large city was the fear of seeing, on the left of the army, the insurgents of Grenada, advanced as far as Jaen, passing the Guadalquivir at Menjíbar, proceeding to Baylen, and closing the defiles of the Sierra Morena. As at Cordova Dupont was 24 leagues from Baylen, that distance rendered the danger immense. At Andujar, it is true, he was not more than seven leagues from Baylen; but at seven leagues there was left a chance of seeing the enemy make a sudden dash upon the defiles. Moreover, beyond Baylen there were other avenues by which it was possible also to penetrate into the defiles of the Sierra Morena: there was the Baeza and Ubeda road, running to La Carolina, the point at which the defiles really begin. It was therefore necessary to watch from Andujar over Baylen, and not over Baylen alone, but over Baeza and Ubeda, which would require redoubled attention. The course most fitting to be pursued in leaving Cordova would have been to adopt in its fullest extent the prudent idea which induced the abandonment of that town, and to have proceeded at once to Baylen, where the French force, by its mere presence, would have guarded the head of the defiles, and where, by means of patrols of cavalry, one might easily have observed the secondary road to Baeza and Ubeda. Baylen had other advantages besides. It presented a fine position, on lofty hills, in good air, whence one could perceive the whole course of the Guadalquivir, and fall upon any enemy that attempted to cross it. No

doubt, if this river had not been fordable in more than one place, one might have taken post on its very banks, for the purpose of being near at hand to defend the passage of it. But, as the Guadalquivir could be crossed at an infinite number of points, the best plan would have been to establish one's self a little in rear, on a commanding position from which one might see every thing, and fall upon any corps that should have passed the river and flung it into the ravine that serves for its bed. Baylen possessed precisely all these advantages. The sacrifice of Andujar, as the centre of resources, was too unimportant a matter to cause the reasons which we have just enumerated to be overlooked. It was therefore, we repeat it, a real fault to stop at Andujar, instead of going to Baylen itself, to cut short any attempt of the enemy upon the defiles. For the rest, it would not have been impossible, with a vigilant superintendence, to repair this fault, and to prevent its consequences. General Dupont, then, established himself at Andujar, awaiting intelligence from Madrid, which did not arrive, for rarely did a courier succeed in crossing the Sierra Morena.

Such was, at the end of June, the result of the first efforts that were made to suppress the Spanish insurrection. General Verdier had dispersed the assemblage at Logroño, General Lasalle that at Valladolid and in Old Castile. General Lefebvre had driven back the Aragonese into Saragossa, but had been stopped before that city. General Duhesme, at Barcelona, was obliged to fight every day, to keep himself in communication with General Chabran, who had been despatched toward Tarragona. Marshal Moncey, marching upon Valencia, had proceeded no farther than Cuença, waiting there till Chabran's division should have approached nearer to him. Lastly, General Dupont, having arrived victorious at Cordova, after taking and sacking that city, had fallen back towards the defiles of the Sierra Morena, on account of which he had apprehensions, and had changed the position of Cordova for that of Andujar. The French squadron at Cadiz had just surrendered for want of succour.

All these details were not known at Madrid and Bayonne. There nothing more was known than what related to Segovia, Valladolid, Saragossa, and at farthest Barcelona. Entire or nearly entire ignorance prevailed respecting the south of Spain. If any thing was learned at Madrid, it was by means of secret emissaries belonging to the convents or to the great houses of Spain. Among the Spaniards devoted to Ferdinand VII. were joyfully circulated tidings that the French squadron was destroyed; that the regular troops of Andalusia and from the camp at St. Roque were advancing upon General Dupont; that he had been obliged to decamp; that he was blockaded in the defiles of the Sierra Morena; that Marshal Moncey would not get out of other defiles quite as difficult, those of Requena; that Saragossa continued invincible; that the check received by Don Gregorio de la Cuesta at Valladolid was nothing; that this general was coming with General Blake, at the head of the insurgents of the Asturias, Galicia, and Leon, to cut off the French from the road to Madrid; that the new King Joseph, who had been to set out every

day from Bayonne, would not set out at all; and that the formidable French army would probably soon be obliged to evacuate the Peninsula. These tidings, false or true, having once reached Madrid, were inserted in manuscript bulletins, or in newspapers printed in the recesses of convents, and circulated throughout the whole Peninsula. Abundant collections made for the benefit of the insurgents indicated the joy that was felt at Madrid on account of their successes, and the desire that prevailed to furnish them with all possible succours.

The French staff collected these reports, and, though wholly disbelieving them, it was nevertheless uneasy, and transmitted them to Bayonne. The unfortunate Murat had so strongly insisted on returning to France, that, notwithstanding the desire which was felt to retain at Madrid this phantom of authority, he received permission to set out, and availed himself of it with the eagerness of a child. General Savary had, therefore, become the avowed head of the French administration, and made all Madrid tremble at his threatening countenance, and his reputation of being an inflexible executor of the commands of his master. Full of sagacity, he perfectly appreciated the situation, and disguised nothing of its alarming nature from Napoleon. Having conceived apprehensions for the advanced corps of Marshal Moncey and General Dupont, he resolved to spare troops from Madrid, and to send off two divisions for the south of Spain. A convoy of biscuit and ammunition already despatched to General Dupont had been stopped at Val de Peñas, and an obstinate battle had to be fought before it could pass that village. General Savary directed Vedel's division, consisting of nearly 6000 infantry, from Toledo upon the Sierra Morena, with orders to clear the defiles and to join his general-in-chief. It was calculated that the latter, having set out with twelve or thirteen thousand men, and having, with Vedel's division, seventeen or eighteen thousand, would be enabled to maintain his ground in Andalusia. He was enjoined at any rate to secure the defiles of the Sierra Morena, to prevent the insurgents from penetrating into La Mancha. General Savary, however, endowed with a very sure tact, and guessing that General Dupont was most compromised, on account of the regular troops of the camp of St. Roque and Cadiz, was preparing to send to him to Madridejos, that is to say, half-way to Andujar, his third division, that commanded by General Frère, which would have made his corps amount to twenty-two or twenty-three thousand men, and would have placed him above all events. Upon an observation of Napoleon's, however, he sent Frère's division not to Madridejos, in the centre of La Mancha, but to San Clemente. At San Clemente it would not be further from General Dupont than at Madridejos, and it might, in case of need, go to the assistance of Marshal Moncey, of whose situation no more was known than of General Dupont's, and whom there was no further hope of succouring by Tarragona, for General Chabran, obliged to fall back upon Barcelona had returned to that city.

These precautions being taken, General Savary conceived that he might be easy about the two French corps sent to the south of Spain, and await the course of events. At Madrid

there were left but two divisions of infantry, the second and the third of Marshal Moncey's corps, the imperial guard, and the cuirassiers. These were sufficient for the moment; for the arrival of King Joseph with fresh troops would soon replace the forces of the centre on a respectable footing. General Savary, however, with the approbation of the Emperor, renounced the idea of sending a column toward Saragossa, and left to the staff of Bayonne the duty of bringing before that insurgent city a force capable of reducing it.

At this moment, the constitution of Bayonne, as we have seen in the preceding book, was just completed. It was of importance to hasten the departure of Joseph for Madrid for two reasons; in the first place, the necessity of transferring to a successor Murat's authority of lieutenant-general, and, secondly, the urgency of forwarding to Madrid the reinforcements detained for the purpose of escorting the new king. Napoleon had, in fact, made arrangements for procuring him a reserve of old troops, one part of which was to accompany him to Madrid, another to reinforce Marshal Bessières, by the way, in order to make head against the insurgents of the Asturias and Galicia, who were bringing up to fight the insurgents of Old Castille, beaten at the bridge of Cabezon, under Gregorio de la Cuesta; while a third and last was to go before Saragossa and contribute to the reduction of that important city. Napoleon, as we have said, had brought from Paris to the camp of Boulogne, from the camp of Boulogne to Rennes, from Rennes to Bayonne, six old regiments, the 4th light and 45th of the line, the 2d and 12th light, lastly the 14th and 44th of the line, two battalions of the guard of Paris, the troops of the Vistula, and several marching regiments. To the six regiments of old formation ordered to Spain, he had added two taken from the Rhine, the 51st and the 49th of the line; and he had directed that there should be drawn from the banks of the Elbe four others of the greatest value, the 82d, 58th, 28th, and 75th of the line, which formed part of the troops of observation of the Atlantic: this was a total of twelve old regiments added to the provisional corps originally sent to Spain. He thus prepared at Bayonne a considerable reserve, to meet the difficulties of that war, which had greatly increased in magnitude. He did not limit his precautions there. Apprehensive lest the bands of Navarre, Aragon, and Upper Catalonia might come and insult the French frontier, which would be a severe mortification for a conqueror who, two months before, fancied himself master of the Peninsula from the Pyrenees to Gibraltar, he formed four columns along the Pyrenees, each from twelve to fifteen hundred strong, composed of horse gendarmes, national guards of the *élite*, moun-taineers of the Pyrenees, organized in rifle companies, lastly some hundred Portuguese, relics of the Portuguese army carried to France. These columns were to keep guard on the frontier, to repel any insult of the guerillas, and to descend the back of the Pyrenees, to lend a hand to the French troops, if they were in want of it.

For the Eastern Pyrenees, however, this was not sufficient; and it was necessary to afford succour to General Duhesme, blockaded in Bar

celona. Things had come to such a pass in this province that the fort of Figueras, into which a small garrison had been introduced when the Spanish fortresses were surprised in March last, was completely blockaded and likely to be obliged to surrender for want of provisions.

Napoleon resolved to form there a small corps of seven or eight thousand men, under one of the ablest of his aides-de-camp, General Reille, to send him with a convoy of provisions to Figueras, and to unite him afterwards, under Girona, with General Duhesme, in order to increase the corps of Catalonia to about 20,000 men. But it was not easy to collect such a force in Roussillon, no troops being in general stationed either in Provence or in Languedoc. Napoleon nevertheless found means to accomplish this. To the column of gendarmerie, national guards, mountaineers, and Portuguese, under General Ritay, which was to guard the Eastern Pyrenees, he added two new Italian regiments, one of cavalry, the other of infantry, which formed part of the Tuscan troops, and which he had taken the precaution to move off early for Avignon. There were in Piedmont the corps from which Chabran's French division and Lechi's Italian division had been taken. Napoleon borrowed from them fresh detachments, easily found, owing to the abundance of conscripts in the dépôts, and directed them towards Languedoc, by the designation of marching battalions of Catalonia. He took, moreover, at Marseilles, Toulon, and Grenoble, several third battalions, which were in dépôt in those cities, a battalion of the fifth legion of reserve, stationed at Grenoble, and, lastly, addressing himself to all the regiments which had their dépôts on the banks of the Saone and the Rhone, and which could send in a few days detachments to Avignon, he borrowed one company from each, and formed with them two excellent battalions, which he called the first and second provisional battalion of Perpignan. It was with this industry that he contrived to collect a second corps of seven or eight thousand men for Catalonia, without weakening either Italy or Germany in a perceptible manner. Fortunately for him, the tranquillity prevailing in France allowed him to spare without inconvenience even troops in dépôt. These troops, it is true, of all countries, of all formations, some of them Italians, others Swiss, Portuguese, and French, mostly young and not seasoned, exhibited odd assemblages, and would not have been good for much, but for the ability of the officers appointed to command them.

These measures being taken for bringing the requisite forces upon the frontier of Spain, Napoleon turned his attention towards disposing of them conformably to the wants of the moment. He had successively directed upon Saragossa the three infantry regiments of the *Vistula*, part of Verdier's division, with General Verdier himself, a great quantity of siege artillery, and a column of national guards of the *élite*, raised in the Pyrenees, the whole forming a corps of ten or eleven thousand men. He commissioned General Verdier to take the direction of the siege, General Lefebvre-Desnoettes being only a cavalry officer, and gave him one of his aides-de-camp, General Lacoste, to direct the operations of the

engineers. There was every reason to hope that, with such a force and abundance of artillery, that insurgent city would be reduced. Napoleon, however, destined for it some more of his old regiments on march toward the Pyrenees.

He then turned his attention to organizing, with the regiments arrived at Bayonne, the corps of Marshal Bessières, which was commissioned to cover the march of Joseph to Madrid, and to make head against the revolvers of the North, the reports concerning whom became daily more and more alarming. Of the six old regiments sent for, four had arrived—the 4th light and the 16th of the line, and the 2d and 12th light—and the two Paris battalions. Napoleon placed them under the command of the brave general of division, Mouton, who had been in Spain ever since the French entered that country, and formed two brigades out of them. The first, composed of the 2d and 12th light, and detachments of the imperial guard, was commanded by General Rey. The second, composed of the 4th light and the 16th of the line, with a battalion of the guard of Paris, was commanded by General Reynaud. The old division of General Verdier, part of which had accompanied him to Saragossa, was wholly joined to Merle's division, and formed into four brigades, under Generals Darmagnac, Gaulois, Sabbattier, and Ducos. The cavalry general, Lasalle, who had already the 10th and 22d chasseurs, and a detachment of grenadiers and horse chasseurs of the imperial guard, was to join with them the 26th chasseurs and a provisional regiment of dragoons. Mouton's division might be computed at 7000 men, that of Merle at 8000 and some hundred, that of Lasalle at 2000, in all 17,000 men. Various small corps, composed of dépôts, convalescents, marching battalions, and squadrons, formed, at St. Sebastian, Vittoria, and Burgos, garrisons for the safety of those towns, and increased to 21,000 men the corps of Marshal Bessières, destined to keep down the north of Spain, to repress the revolvers of Castille, the Asturias, and Galicia, to cover the road to Madrid, and to escort King Joseph.

Thus Napoleon had already sent successively more than 110,000 men into Spain, 50,000 of whom, spread beyond Madrid, were divided between Andujar, Valencia, and Madrid, under General Dupont, Marshal Moncey, and General Savary; 20,000 of whom were in Catalonia, under Generals Reille and Duhesme; 12,000 before Saragossa, under General Verdier; 21 or 22 thousand around Burgos, under Marshal Bessières: and some thousand scattered in the various dépôts on the frontier. Against troops of the line, and for a regular war with Spain, this would have been a large force, perhaps even larger than would have been needed, though our soldiers were young and unseasoned. Against a whole nation in insurrection, keeping nowhere in the open country, barricading every town and every village, intercepting convoys, murdering the wounded, obliging every corps to send out detachments, which weakened it to such a degree as to reduce it to nothing, we shall see that it was far too small. It would have required immediately 60 or 80,000 men, and veteran troops too, to suppress this formidable insurrection, and proba-

bly they might have succeeded. But Napoleon would not draw from any other source than the depôts on the Rhine, the Alps, and the coasts, and had no idea of diminishing the great armies which insured his empire in Italy, Illyria, Germany, and Poland; a new evidence of that truth so often repeated in this history, that it is impossible to act at once in Poland, Germany, Italy, and Spain, without running a risk of being insufficient upon one or other of these theatres of war, and soon perhaps on all.

The moment having arrived for making Joseph enter Spain, Napoleon decided that one of the two brigades of Mouton's division, Rey's brigade, taking the new king to Irun, should escort him through the whole extent of Marshal Bessières' command, which comprehended from Bayonne to Madrid. His new ministers, Messrs. O'Farrill, Azanza, Cevallos, and Urquijo, some of them taken from the very council of Ferdinand VII., the others from anterior cabinets, all united by the pressing interest of sparing Spain a horrible war by rallying about the new dynasty, accompanied him, with the members of the former Junta. More than a hundred carriages, travelling at the same pace as the troops, composed the royal train. Joseph was mild, affable, knew very little of Spanish, and still less of Spain itself, and, by his face, his language, his questions, showed but too plainly that he was a foreigner. Received, therefore, and judged of with a malevolence that was quite natural, he furnished matter for the most unfavourable interpretations. Stopping every night in a small town or a large village, attempting to hold conversations with the principal inhabitants in which he had difficulty to join, he afforded subject for mirth by his strange manners and his un-Spanish accent. Though he sometimes touched them by his visible good nature, on leaving him, they nevertheless drew a thousand pictures, more or less ridiculous, of the intruder king, as they called him. Most of them chose to say that Joseph was an unhappy man, forced to reign against his will in Spain, and a victim of the tyrant who oppressed his family as well as the world.

The impressions experienced by Joseph at Irun, Tolosa, Vittoria, were deeply melancholy, and his weak soul, which had already regretted more than once the kingdom of Naples during the days passed at Bayonne, was filled with poignant grief on seeing the whole nation over whom he was called to reign risen in arms against him, slaughtering the French soldiers, or getting slaughtered by them. From Vittoria, Joseph's letters evince deep affliction. *I have nobody for me*, were the first words which he addressed to the Emperor, and which he most frequently repeated. *We want fifty thousand old troops and fifty millions; and, if you delay, we shall want a hundred thousand men and a hundred millions*—such was daily the conclusion of all his letters. Leaving to the French generals the cruel task of suppressing the rebellion, he naturally reserved for himself the part of clemency, and to all his demands for men and money he began to join daily complaints of the excesses in which the French military indulged, setting himself up for their constant accuser, and the equally constant apologist of the in-

surgents—a species of crimination which could not fail soon to produce mischievous differences between him and the army, and to irritate Napoleon himself. It is too true that our soldiers committed many excesses; but those excesses were far less than what the atrocious cruelty of which they were the victims might have deserved.

There was no need of this correspondence to reveal to Napoleon the full extent of the fault which he had committed, though he would not acknowledge it. He now knew all: he knew the universality and the violence of the insurrection. But he had found the insurgents so prompt to run away in the open field, that he hoped to be able to reduce them without too great an expenditure of strength. "Have patience," he replied to Joseph, "and have good courage. I will not let you want any resource; you shall have troops in sufficient quantity; with a tolerable administration, you will never be at fault for money in Spain. But do not set yourself up for the accuser of my soldiers, to whose devotedness you and I owe what we are. They have to do with brigands, who murder them, and whom they must repress by terror. Strive to gain the affection of the Spaniards, but do not discourage the army; that would be an irreparable fault." To these lectures Napoleon added the most rigid instructions for his generals, expressly recommending to them not to take any thing, but to exercise merciless severity against revolters. Not to plunder, but to shoot, in order to take away the motive and the disposition to revolt, became the order most frequently expressed in his correspondence.

While Joseph's journey was performing at the pace of the infantry, the contest continued with various vicissitudes in Aragon and Old Castille. General Verdier, arriving before Saragossa, with 2000 men of his division, and finding the different reinforcements successively sent by Napoleon, such as the Polish infantry and the marching regiments, had about 12,000 men and a numerous artillery brought from Pampeluna. He had already caused the outer positions to be carried by General Lefebvre-Desnoettes, cooped up the besieged in the place, and erected numerous batteries, through the exertions of General Lacoste. On the 1st and 2d of July he resolved, on the urgent importunity of Napoleon, to try a decisive attack with twenty pieces of cannon of large calibre, and 10,000 foot-soldiers led to the assault. The city of Saragossa is situated wholly on the right of the Ebro, and has but one suburb on the left. Unluckily, General Verdier had not succeeded, notwithstanding the repeated orders of the Emperor, in throwing a bridge over the Ebro, so as to be able to move the cavalry to any quarter, and to deprive the besieged of their communications outside the city. Provisions, stores, reinforcements of deserters and insurgents reached it, therefore, without difficulty, by the suburb on the left bank, and almost all the insurgents of Aragon had by degrees collected in the place. Situated entirely, as we have said, on the right bank, Saragossa was surrounded by a wall, flanked on the left by a strong castle, called the castle of the Inquisition, in the centre of a massive convent, that of Santa Engracia, and on the right by another solid convent, that of St Joseph. Ge-

neral Verdier had ordered a powerful breaching battery to be directed against the castle, and had reserved for himself this attack, the most difficult and the most decisive. He had directed two other breaching batteries against the convent of Santa Engracia in the centre, and against the convent of St. Joseph on the right, and had confided these two attacks to General Lefebvre-Desnoettes.

On the 1st of July, at a given signal, the twenty mortars and howitzers, supported by the whole of the field artillery, opened a violent fire, as well upon the strong buildings which flanked the wall of the enclosure as upon the city itself. More than 200 bombs and 1200 balls were thrown into that unfortunate city, and set it on fire in several places, without daunting in the least, its defenders, who were mostly strangers, and who, posted in the houses contiguous to the points of attack, had not much to suffer. Under the direction of some Spanish engineer officers, they had placed in battery 40 pieces of cannon, which punctually replied to ours. They had, at those points where we could have presented ourselves, columns composed of soldiers who had deserted from the Spanish army, and not fewer than 10,000 peasants in ambush in the houses. On the morning of the 2d of July, large breaches having been made in the castle of the Inquisition and the two convents which flanked the enclosure, our troops rushed to the assault, with the ardour of young and inexperienced soldiers. But they were received on the breach of the castle of the Inquisition with so terrible a fire, that they were quite staggered; and, in spite of all the efforts of the officers, they durst not penetrate any further. The result was the same at the centre, at the convent of Santa Engracia. On the right only, General Habert succeeded in forcing the convent of St. Joseph, and in procuring entrance into the city. But, when he attempted to penetrate into it, he found the streets barricaded, the houses furnished with a thousand loop-holes, and vomiting showers of balls. The soldiers of Austerlitz and Eylau would no doubt have endured this fire with greater coolness; but before material obstacles of this kind they might not perhaps have made more progress. It was evident that against such a resistance new and more powerful means of destruction were required, and that, instead of marching men uncovered past such houses to be killed, they must be battered down by cannon-balls over the heads of those who defended them.

General Verdier, retaining the convent of St. Joseph, which he had taken on the right, ordered his troops to return to their quarters, after losing from four to five hundred men killed and wounded—a very serious loss out of an effective of 10,000 men. The great number of officers who had suffered proved what efforts they had had to make to support their young soldiers in the face of such difficulties.

General Verdier resolved to wait for reinforcements, and particularly for more powerful means in artillery, before he renewed the attack upon a place which it had been at first thought possible to reduce in a few days, and which held out much better than a regularly fortified town. Napoleon, apprised of this state of things, sent him immediately the 14th and

44th of the line, which had just arrived, and several convoys of heavy artillery.

The tidings of this resistance excited extreme emotion throughout all the north of Spain, and greatly increased the boasting of the Spaniards. Joseph, on arriving at Briviesca, received on all sides proofs of their hatred of the French and their confidence in their own strength. He everywhere met with either solitude, or coldness, or an incredible degree of pride; as if the Spaniards had gained over us the thousand victories which we had gained over Europe. It was, in particular, the army of Don Gregorio de la Cuesta and of Don Joaquín Blake, composed of the insurgents of Galicia, Leon, the Asturias, Old Castille, coming towards Burgos by Benevente, that was the principal foundation of their hopes. They had no doubt that a signal victory would soon be gained by this army over the troops of Marshal Bessières; and then this victory, added to the resistance of Saragossa, could not fail, according to them, to set at liberty all the north of Spain. There was no certain intelligence from the South; but the sinister rumours concerning the situation of Marshal Moncey at Valencia, of General Dupont in Andalusia, redoubled, and were aggravated from day to day; and, at all events, said the Spaniards, they would both be obliged very soon to retreat, in order to repair the checks sustained in the North. It was, in fact, the opinion of Napoleon that the danger was now greatest in the North, for the North was the base of operations of our armies; and he had ordered Marshal Bessières to take with him Merle's and Mouton's divisions, excepting Rey's brigade, left for Joseph; to join with them Lasalle's division of cavalry; to march briskly to meet Blake and Cuesta, to dash upon them, and to beat them at any price. To be master in the North, on the route from Bayonne to Madrid, was, according to him, the primary interest of the army, the first condition for maintaining itself in Spain. While strongly recommending to General Savary's attention that South, so impenetrable, so little known, he had enjoined him to send to Marshal Bessières by way of Segovia all the forces which were not indispensably needed in the capital; for, said he, a check in the South would be a misfortune; but a serious check in the North would be perhaps the loss of the army, at least the loss of the campaign, for they should be obliged to evacuate three-fourths of the Peninsula, to recover the position lost in the North.

Accordingly Marshal Bessières left Burgos on the 12th of July, with Merle's division, with half of Mouton's division (Reynaud's brigade,) and with Lasalle's division, forming a total of 11,000 infantry and 1500 horse, as well chassours and dragoons as cavalry of the guard. With these forces he marched resolutely towards the great assemblage of the insurgents of the North, commanded, as we have said, by Generals Blake and De la Cuesta.

The Captain-general, Don Gregorio de la Cuesta, had retired into the kingdom of Leon, after his mishap at the bridge of Caberon; and, though extremely dissatisfied with the insurrection, the imprudence of which had exposed him to a disastrous check, he was anxious to repair it, and had endeavoured to

introduce some order into the confused elements of which the insurgent army was composed. He had two or three thousand regular troops, and about seven or eight thousand volunteers, citizens, students, men of the lower classes, peasants. To this assemblage he purposed to add the levies of the Asturias, and in particular those of Galicia, much more efficient than those of the Asturias, because they comprehended a great part of the troops of Taranco's division, which had returned from Portugal. The Asturians, thinking first of themselves, and fancying that they were invincible in their mountains, so long as they continued shut up in them, had refused to comply with the invitation of Cuesta, and merely sent him two or three battalions of regular troops. But the Junta of Coruña, less prudent and more generous, had decided, in spite of General Don Joaquín Blake, who had succeeded the Captain-general Filangieri, that the forces of the province should be sent in a body into the plains of Old Castille, to try there the fortune of arms. Don Joaquín Blake, sprung from one of those English Catholic families which went to seek their fortune in Spain, was a soldier by profession, for which he had been well educated. In employing the troops of the line which he had at his disposal, he had exerted himself to compose a regular army, capable of making head against an enemy so broken in to war as the French. He had swelled the skeletons of his troops of the line with a part of the insurgents, and with the rest formed battalions of volunteers, which he exercised every day, in order to give them some consistency. Whether he was desirous not to measure his strength too early with the French, or whether he was really aware how far a good organization decides every thing in war, he solicited a few months more before descending into the plains of Castille, and he proposed in the mean time to have his army trained behind the mountains of Galicia. Overruled by the will of the Junta, he was obliged to march, and to advance as far as Benevente. He might have taken with him twenty-seven or twenty-eight thousand troops, half old battalions, half new ones; but he left behind two divisions at the *débouché* of the mountains, and with three, which formed an effective of fifteen or eighteen thousand men, he pursued his march along the road to Valladolid. He formed his junction with Don Gregorio de la Cuesta, in the environs of Medina de Rio-Seco, on the 12th of July. These two generals were not formed to agree. One was imperious and testy, the other displeased at being obliged to come and risk himself in the open country, against an enemy hitherto invincible, and consequently was not disposed to be particularly compliant. Gregorio de la Cuesta assumed the command, as being senior officer, and he had an interview with his colleague at Rio-Seco, to concert operations. Between them they could bring into line from twenty-six to twenty-eight thousand men. With better soldiers, they might have had some chance of success against the French, who numbered no more than from eleven to twelve thousand.

Medina de Rio-Seco is seated on a plateau. On the left (for the Spaniards) runs the Burgos and Palencia road, by which the French,

under Marshal Bessières, were coming, on the right that of Valladolid. At dawn of day, which, at that season of the year takes place very early, the Spanish generals discovered that they were mistaken, and De la Cuesta, who had set himself in motion last, halted, taking care to appuy to the left towards the Palencia road, by which the French were advancing. Conceiving himself to be more in danger, he applied for assistance to Blake, who hastened to send him one of his divisions. The Spanish generals, therefore, found themselves ranged in two lines; the first of which, placed in advance, and more to the right, was commanded by Blake; the second, considerably in rear and more to the left, was commanded by De la Cuesta. They continued motionless in this situation, awaiting the French on the summit of the plateau, and too much accustomed to manœuvres to rectify so close to the enemy the position which they had taken.

Marshal Bessières, who, after a rapid march, had nine or ten thousand infantry and 1200 horse left, in presence of twenty-six or twenty-eight thousand men, felt not the slightest uneasiness on that account; for he had the highest opinion of his soldiers. With two old regiments, the 4th light and the 15th of the line, and some squadrons of the guard, he deemed himself capable of overturning all before him. The brave Bessières, a cavalry officer, brought up in the school of Murat, born, like him, in Gascony, had much of his brag, his promptness, and his bravery. He was advancing with his troops to the foot of the plateau of Medina de Rio-Seco, when he perceived in the distance the two Spanish lines, one behind the other, the second with its left projecting considerably beyond the first. He resolved to take advantage of the distance left between them to get upon the flank of the first, and, after breaking it, to dash in mass upon the second. He advanced immediately; General Merle, on his left, being to attack Blake's line; General Mouton, on his right, being to flank Merle, and then to throw himself upon De la Cuesta's line. The cavalry followed under the brave and brilliant Lasalle.

Our young troops, sharing the confidence of their generals, climbed the plateau with extraordinary assurance. They resolutely attacked Blake's line by its left, under a violent fire of artillery, for the artillery was the best thing about a Spanish army. Having come within musket-shot, they poured in a well-directed fire, having been much exercised since they entered Spain. They then marched up to the enemy's line and attacked it with the bayonet. The Spaniards gave way; a charge by General Lasalle with the chasseurs completely upset them, and, the left of the first Spanish line being overthrown, the second was left uncovered. At this sight, part of the latter spontaneously moved forward, and gallantly endeavoured to make head against our troops, taking advantage of the disorder which success itself had produced in our ranks. It checked them in fact for a moment, and the Spaniards succeeded in laying hands on one of our batteries, which had followed the movement of our infantry. It was supported in this effort by the life-guards and the royal carbiniers, who charged valiantly. The Spanish foot, suppos-



ing themselves conquerors, were already throwing their hats into the air and shouting *Viva el rey!* But Marshal Bessières had in reserve 300 horse, as well grenadiers as horse chas-seurs of the imperial guard, who started off at a gallop, shouting on their part, *Vive l'Empereur! Plus de Bourbons en Europe!* They overturned in an instant the life-guards and the royal carbineers, treating them as they had treated at Austerlitz the horse-guards of the Emperor Alexander. General Merle, having completed the overthrow of the first line, that of Blake, then fell upon the centre of the second, De la Cuesta's; General Mouton attacked on his side. It could not hold out long against this double attack of the young soldiers of General Merle and the veteran soldiers of General Mouton. The second Spanish line, overthrown like the first, gave way entire, and fled in disorder over the plateau of Medina de Rio-Secco, seeking to escape towards that town. At that instant, Lasalle's 1200 horse, rushing upon a mass of 25,000 fugitives, seized with inexpressible terror, throwing away their arms, setting up howls of despair, made a horrible carnage among them. Presently this immense plain exhibited a most lamentable spectacle, for it was strewn with four or five thousand wretched men, cut down by the swords of our cavalry. The vast fields of battle in the North, which we had covered with so many corpses, were not a more hideous sight. Eighteen pieces of cannon, many colours, and a great quantity of muskets, thrown away in the flight, were left in our hands. While the cavalry, having no other means of making prisoners but to strike the fugitives, furiously plied their swords, the infantry had hastened to the town of Medina. Its inhabitants, on the false report of some soldiers, who had left the field of battle before the end of the action, conceived that the Spanish army was victorious, and were all at the windows. But they were soon undeceived, on seeing the torrent of fugitives pouring along before their eyes. Part of the Spanish soldiers, recovering their courage behind walls, stopped to make resistance. General Mouton, with the 4th light and the 15th of the line, entered at the point of the bayonet, and overthrew all the obstacles that were opposed to him. Amidst this tumult, the soldiers, behaving as in a town taken by assault, fell to pillaging Medina, which was given up for a few hours to their discretion. The Franciscan monks, who had fired upon the French from the windows of their convent, were put to the sword.

This sanguinary victory, which subjected to us the whole north of Spain, and for some time discouraged the insurgents of those parts from descending into the plain, had cost us but 70 killed and 300 wounded. It was the successful effect of an attack well conceived and executed with great vigour.

The news of the victory of Rio-Secco produced, at least for the moment, a notable change in the language and dispositions of the Spaniards. They were not quite so confident that the North—that is to say the Madrid road—would soon be wrested from us, and that our whole establishment in the Peninsula would be raised to the foundation.

Joseph, continuing to proceed at the same

slow rate, had reached Burgos. He had endeavoured to gain hearts on the way, by dint of obligingness and affectation of humanity, always allowing the French soldiers to be in the wrong and the insurgents in the right. Perceiving, however, that the conquests which he made were an inadequate compensation for the time which he lost, receiving also repeated solicitations from General Savary to come and show himself in his new capital, and emboldened above all by the victory of Rio-Secco, he put an end to his useless caresses of people who made no return for them, and repaired at once from Burgos to Madrid. He entered the city on the evening of the 20th, amidst a cold curiosity, hearing not a shout except from the French army, which, though far from pleased with him, hailed in his person the glorious Emperor, for whom it was ready everywhere to fight and to die. Joseph, though he had entered Madrid after a victory of the French army, which ought to have restored the balance of opinion in his favour, found there, as everywhere else, a repugnance to approach his person that was truly mortifying. The ministers who had accepted office were dismayed, and declared to him that, had they foreseen to what a degree the country would have been inimical to the new royalty, they would not have espoused his cause. The members of the Junta of Bayonne dispersed by degrees. The magistrates composing the council of Castille, who had been so bitterly accused of complying with all Murat's wishes, refused the oath. The members of the clergy alone, obeying the injunction to *render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's*, had come to greet in him the royalty *de facto*, and especially the brother of the author of the Concordat. Joseph expressed himself before them in the most emphatic manner in favour of religion; his words, and especially his attitude, affected them, and their language, after their interview with him, had produced a good effect in Madrid. The diplomatic body, out of courtesy, not to the new King of Spain, but to the Emperor of the French, were eager to pay their homage to him. Some of the *grandes* of Spain, habitual and inevitable associates of the court, could not refrain from presenting themselves, and out of all these—French generals, foreign ministers, superior clergy, courtiers coming from habit—Joseph had been enabled to form a court of tolerably respectable appearance, which speedy victories would easily have changed into a court respected and obeyed, if not beloved.

But if the French had gained a signal victory in the North, they felt great doubt of obtaining a similar victory in the South. A month had elapsed without receiving intelligence from General Dupont, and, to learn what had become of him, his second division, General Vedel's, which had been sent to release him from blockade, had been obliged to pass by main force the defiles of the Sierra Morena. Tidings had thus been gained of the capture of Cordova, the subsequent evacuation of the city, and the establishment of the army at Andujar. Ever since, the insurrection had closed upon him and General Vedel, like the sea upon a ship that is ploughing its billows and again no information was received com-

erning him. As for Marshal Moncey, nothing had been known for a long time about his situation, of which at length intelligence was obtained. What had befallen him, during the very different events in Castille, Arragon, Catalonia, and Andalusia, was as follows.

We have seen him waiting at Cuenca, till General Chabran should be able to advance to Castellon de la Plana; while General Chabran had been obliged to turn back, lest he should be definitively cut off from Barcelona. The latter had even been obliged to exert considerable vigour to pass through the insurgent hamlets of Ambos, Vendrell, and Villafranca, and to rejoin his general-in-chief, who had gone as far as Bruch to meet him. Both had entered Barcelona, where they were obliged every day to fight obstinate battles with the insurgents, who came to the very gates of the city to attack them.

Marshal Moncey, who was ignorant of these circumstances, had waited from the 11th to the 17th of June at Cuenca, and then, conceiving that sufficient time had elapsed for General Chabran to be approaching Valencia, he had set himself in motion upon the almost impassable road of Requena, adding to his too protracted stay at Cuenca a slowness of march, beneficial no doubt for his troops, who left not a man behind, but very detrimental to the general plan of operations. He had passed through Tortola, Buenache, and Minglanilla, where he had arrived on the 20th. On the 21st he was on the bank of the Cabriel, having before him several battalions of the enemy, one of which consisted of Swiss troops, in ambuscade at the bridge of Pajazo, in one of the most difficult of positions to be forced. The Cabriel rolls at this place amidst frightful rocks. You have to pass through a narrow defile to the bridge which crosses it, and, after passing this bridge, another quite as difficult defile remains to be cleared. The insurgents of Valencia, who had been allowed time to establish themselves in this position, had obstructed the bridge, planted cannon in advance of it, and placed thousands of tirailleurs on the neighbouring rocks. Marshal Moncey brought to this point by a very rugged road some pieces of cannon, drawn by hand, caused the obstacles accumulated upon the bridge to be removed, then detached to the right and left columns which, fording the Cabriel, turned the posts in ambush on the rocks, killed a great number of the enemy, and thus made himself master of the position.

The 22d was passed by Marshal Moncey in resting himself, and in rendering the road more passable for his artillery and baggage. On the 24th he arrived in front of a long and narrow defile, leading through the mountains of Valencia into the famous plain, so renowned for its beauty, called the Huerta of Valencia. This defile, known by the name of the defile of Las Cabreras, and formed by the bed of a rivulet, which must be forded six times, was reputed to be impregnable. Marshal Moncey had by his dilatoriness allowed the insurgents to take post and to multiply their means of resistance there. To overcome in front the obstacles which were opposed to us was almost impossible, and must have cost enormous losses. Marshal Moncey directed General Harispe, the

hero of Biscay, to take with him the nimblest men, the best marksmen, and, after making them put off their knapsacks, to conduct them over the surrounding heights on the right and left, to dislodge the Spaniards from them, and to neutralize the defences of the defile by turning them. General Harispe, after incredible efforts and a thousand petty fights, conquered, rock by rock, the approaches to the position; and at length succeeded in descending upon the rear of the Spaniards who were defending the defile. At this sight the enemy fled, leaving to the army a pass which could not have been forced, if the attack must have been made in front. Marshal Moncey, victorious, again halted at the Venta of Buñol to give time for the baggage to rejoin and for his artillery to be repaired. The roads which he had travelled had, in fact, put it into a very bad state. The wild country which they had been traversing was destitute alike of the means of repair and the means of subsistence. But the whole of the Spanish artillery, having fallen into the hands of the French, furnished a change of pieces; and on the 26th the column set itself in motion for Chiva. Next day, the 27th, it debouched in the beautiful plain of Valencia, intersected by a thousand canals, by which the water of the Guadalquivir is distributed in all directions, covered with hemp of extraordinary height, studded with orange-trees, palms, and the whole vegetation of the tropics. This was a sight to cheer our soldiers, tired of the dreary places which they had traversed. But if, thanks to the slowness of their march, they arrived in tolerably good condition, all rallied to their colours, sufficiently fed and quite capable of fighting, they also found, in consequence of this same tardiness, the enemy well prepared, and able to defend his capital. At the village of Quarte, two leagues from Valencia, they had to cross the great canal which turns off the waters of the Guadalquivir, to repair the bridge over that canal, which was broken down, to carry the village of Quarte, besides a multitude of petty posts, ambushed on the right and left in the houses on the plain, or hidden by the height of the hemp. These obstacles detained our men not long; they crossed the canal, repaired the bridge, carried the village, and, running over the fields and the small canals, killed, with the loss of some of their own men, the numerous tirailleurs, who poured a shower of balls upon them from every side.

At night they bivouacked under the walls of Valencia. Marshal Moncey resolved to storm the city, by attacking the two gates of Quarte and St. Joseph, which were the first that presented themselves to him in coming from Requena. Valencia was surrounded by a massive wall, having water at its foot. Chevaux-de-frise, obstacles of all sorts, covered the gates; and thousands of insurgents, posted on the roofs of the houses, were ready to pour down a most murderous fire of musketry.

On the 28th, at daybreak, Marshal Moncey, having obliged the enemy's tirailleurs to fall back, directed two columns of attack against the gates of Quarte and St. Joseph. The first obstacles were speedily overcome; but, on approaching the gates, it was necessary, before employing cannon, to wrench off the chevaux-

de-frise which covered them. Our gallant young fellows dashed several times through the fire with hatchets to perform these perilous operations. But, after several attempts directed by the engineer General Cazals, and productive of considerable losses, it was found to be impossible to force the gates, the object of our attacks. Had they even proved successful, it would have been discovered, as at Saragossa, that the ends of the streets beyond were barricaded, and there would have been so many new assaults to make. After acquiring this conviction, Marshal Moncey called off his troops, remaining, however, master of the suburbs which he had taken.

This sanguinary attempt, which had cost him 300 men killed and wounded, furnished him with a subject for much reflection. He had brought with him eight thousand and some hundred men. He had already left behind on his route a thousand, sick or *hors de combat*. He had just learned from prisoners that General Chabran had fallen back upon Barcelona. He had before him a city of 60,000 souls, increased to at least 100,000 by the assemblage within its walls of all the husbandmen of the plain, determined to defend themselves to the death, from the apprehension which they entertained that the French would revenge upon them the odious massacre of their fellow-countrymen. For conquering such a resistance, the marshal had no heavy artillery. He very wisely renounced, therefore, all idea of renewing an attack which had no chance of success, and which would only have augmented the difficulties of his retreat, by augmenting the number of the wounded to be carried along with him. He had the good sense, when this resolution was once taken, to execute it without delay. He had been informed that the captain-general, Cerbellón, who was not in Valencia, but in the open country at the head of the insurgents of the province, was then, with seven or eight thousand men, on the banks of the Xucar, a small river, which, after turning the mountains of Valencia, falls into the sea a few leagues from that city at Alcira. The presumed intention of the captain-general was to cross the Huerta, and to post himself in the defiles of Las Cabrerías in order to bar the passage of them against the French. This would have been a serious difficulty; for Marshal Moncey, having already lost the best soldiers of his *corps d'armée*, and carrying with him a great quantity of wounded, might possibly fail in an operation in which he had once been successful. Besides, the high road, which, to avoid the mountains of Valencia, crosses the Xucar at Alcira, and runs through the province of Murcia to Almansa, though rather longer, was much better. Marshal Moncey resolved, therefore, to march direct for Xucar, to force the defile of Almansa, and to return by Albacete.

Arriving on the 1st of July on the banks of the Xucar, he there found the insurgents of Valencia and Carthagena posted behind the river, the bridge of which they had broken down. The army forded the Xucar at three points, then repaired the bridge, and sent over its immense baggage. It rested on the 2d. On the 3d, apprized that other insurgents purposed to defend the pass of the mountains of Murcia, called the defile of Almansa, he hastened to

get through it, met with no serious difficulty, repulsed the insurgents everywhere, and even took from them their artillery. Resuming his slow and methodical march, he arrived on the 5th at Chinchilla, on the 6th at Albacete. There he learned with real joy that Frère's division, which at first had been placed at Madrid *en échelon* on the road to Andalusia, and which had since been placed, by order of the Emperor, at San Clemente, was close to him, and on the 10th of July he effected his junction with it.

He brought back his division in good condition, though fatigued, and had not left behind either one wounded man or one gun. But we must repeat it, if his tardiness had allowed him to bring back his division entire, it had caused him to fail in reducing Valencia, which he would certainly have taken, as General Dupont had taken Cordova, if he had marched briskly enough to surprise the insurgents before they had had time to make their preparations for defence. At any rate, his slow and firm manner of marching amidst insurgent provinces, beating the enemy everywhere, and not strewn the roads with baggage, wounded, sick, had a merit which Napoleon took a certain pleasure in acknowledging and proclaiming.

While Marshal Moncey was executing this difficult march, the province of Cuenca, at first quiet, then rising, had taken the hospital which Marshal Moncey had established there for the reception of his sick. General Savary had been obliged to send General Caulaincourt with a column of troops to punish it. The latter had inflicted on the town of Cuenca two hours' pillage, of which the soldiers had availed themselves to their great material profit, but to the great moral injury of the army.

The events at Valencia had preceded by some days the battle of Rio-Secco, but they were not known at Madrid till nearly about the same time as that battle. Though the Spaniards triumphed much in the obstinate resistance which we had met with before Saragossa and Valencia, and though this resistance revealed the necessity for serious attacks in order to the reduction of great insurgent cities, still we kept the field everywhere in a victorious manner. The insurgents could not make their appearance in any quarter without being immediately dispersed. General Duhesme, rejoined by General Chabran, had left Barcelona along with him, stormed the fort of Mongat, taken and sacked the little town of Mataro, and, though he had failed in the escalade of Girona, he had returned to Barcelona, spreading terror upon his route, and exercising an energetic repression. General Verdier, still detained before Saragossa, had sent a column under General Lefebvre, which had chastised the town of Calatayud. Lastly, at Rio-Secco, as we have seen, we had annihilated the only considerable army that had yet appeared before us. Our ascendancy was, therefore, ensured in the North. The difficulty lay in the South. There General Dupont, encamped on the Guadalquivir, and backed on the Sierra Morena, had to do with an army which appeared numerous, composed not only of insurgents but of troops of the line. The Spaniards did not merely keep the field before him, but reduced him to the defensive in the position of Andujar and,

if any disaster happened at this point, the insurgents of Andalusia and Grenada, joining those of Carthage and Valencia on the one hand, those of Estremadura on the other, could cross La Mancha and appear before Madrid in considerable force, which would give the war a totally new aspect. Such a misfortune, indeed, was far from being apprehended, notwithstanding the reports circulated by the Spaniards on this subject. General Dupont, in fact, had received Vedel's division, which raised his *corps d'armée* to sixteen or seventeen thousand men. Confidence was placed in his tried ability: it was not imagined that the general who, before Albeck, had found himself with 6000 men opposed to 60,000 Austrians, who had extricated himself from this situation and taken 4000 prisoners, could succumb to undisciplined insurgents, among whom Marshal Bessières, with so few soldiers, had just made such frightful slaughter. But if confidence was felt, it was not wholly unmixed with anxiety. In accordance with Napoleon, who could only direct the military operations from a distance, and with that uncertainty of direction produced by time and distances, General Savary had sent General Gobert to Madridejos, to replace there Frère's division, the third of General Dupont's, employed as we have seen in aiding Marshal Moncey, towards San Clemente. General Gobert had orders to proceed to the middle of La Mancha, and, if circumstances rendered it necessary, to advance to the Sierra Morena, and there join General Dupont. He went, therefore, to do the duty of third division under that general, instead of Frère's division, engaged elsewhere. One of his regiments having already been sent off as convoy to Andujar, he brought with him only three regiments of infantry, but very fine ones, though young, and a superb provisional regiment of cuirassiers, commanded by an excellent officer, Major Christophe. This junction effected, no doubt seemed possible respecting events in Andalusia. But General Savary's precautions were not limited to this. He had brought under Madrid Musnier's division, returned from Valencia, Frère's division, sent to its support, Caulaincourt's column, directed to punish Cuenca. He had always had Morlot's division of Moncey's corps, the imperial guard, and he had just received Rey's brigade, which had served as escort to king Joseph. This still formed a total of 25,000 men, which, had there not been many wounded and sick, would have exceeded 30,000. With this force he had sufficient to baffle all the hopes of the Spaniards. The latter persisted, nevertheless, in asserting that Saragossa would not surrender any more than Valencia; that General Dupont would be obliged to repossess the Sierra Morena; that the insurgents of Estremadura, Andalusia, Grenada, Carthage, and Valencia, would presently be at his heels: that those of the North would soon make their appearance again on the Burgos road; and that, before this mass of forces, the new royalty would be obliged to return from Madrid to Bayonne. The French, on the contrary, expected soon to see Saragossa carried by assault, General Verdier's army, set at liberty, marching back to Valencia with Marshal Moncey's corps, General Dupont, victorious, advancing into Andalusia, and reducing the whole south

of Spain to submission. One or other of these alternatives must be realized, according to what was to happen in Andalusia. All eyes, both of Spaniards and French, were, in consequence, at this moment (from the 15th to the 20th of July,) exclusively directed towards that quarter.

General Dupont, as we have already had occasion to relate, had come, on leaving Cordova, and established himself at Andujar on the Guadalquivir, an ill-chosen position, for he had much better been at Baylen itself, at the entrance of the defiles, which he would have closed by his mere presence, and where he would have found himself in a healthy, elevated, and commanding position, from which he could throw into the Guadalquivir all who should attempt to pass it. This general, as we have likewise said, had placed Pannetier's brigade a little to the left and in advance of the bridge of Andujar, Chabert's brigade a little in rear and on the right, the seamen of the guard in Andujar itself, the two Swiss regiments in rear of the town, the cavalry at a distance in the plain. He had been left there, without any attempt to disturb him, during the whole of the concluding part of June and the first half of July, because the insurgents of Andalusia and Grenada had need of that time to organize themselves, to concert measures, and to effect a junction between Cordova and Jaen. The only hostility that he had experienced was the occupation of the Sierra Morena by a host of banditti, who murdered couriers and intercepted convoys. Echavarri's men were so intently on the watch that not a single horseman could pass between Puerto del Rey and La Carolina without being robbed; women and even children mounting guard incessantly, and giving notice of every individual, the moment he came in sight. During this pernicious inaction of nearly a month, partly occasioned by the delay of the reinforcements applied for, General Dupont had sent out several detachments round about him to chastise the insurgents and to procure provisions. He had sent to Jaen Captain Baste, of the seamen of the guard, an officer equally intelligent and intrepid, with the commission to punish that town, which had contributed to the massacres of our wounded and our sick, and to draw from it the resources in which it abounded. Captain Baste, with a battalion, two pieces of cannon, and about a hundred horse, had daringly entered Jaen, put the inhabitants to flight, and brought back an immense convoy of provisions, wine, and all sorts of medical stores.

Unfortunately, General Dupont not considering the inconveniences attached to the position of Andujar, but having a confused notion of them, was always uneasy about Baylen and the ferry of Menjibar, which affords a passage across the Guadalquivir before Baylen. In consequence, he had not failed to place a detachment there, and to make incessant reconnoissances in that part. His anxiety extended still further, for he was obliged to push his reconnoissances to the left of Baylen, as far as Baeza and Ubeda, whence ran a cross road, by Linares, in the rear of Baylen, to the environs of La Carolina, quite close to the entrance of the defiles. Here we may repeat that he would not have been under this concern had he taken

post at Baylen itself, which he would have guarded by his mere presence, and where a few patrols of cavalry, sent towards Baeza and Ubeda, would have been sufficient to secure him from all surprise. His most usual concern, however, was about provisions, though he was in rich Andalusia. Sheep, which abounded in Castille and Estremadura, were not so plentiful in the Sierra Morena, where scarcely any animals but goats were to be met with, the flesh of which is not wholesome or nutritious. Wheat was scarce, the crop of the preceding year having been consumed or destroyed by the insurgents. That of the current year was still standing. The soldiers were obliged to cut the corn themselves in order to have bread, and in general they had but half-rations. They had barley given them instead, which they boiled with their meat. They had but a single mill for grinding their corn, on the bank of the Guadalquivir, and they had frequently to defend this mill against the attacks of the enemy. On this parched soil they were destitute of fresh vegetables. The wine, though excellent at some distance, at Val de Peñas, could come only through the Sierra Morena, for Val de Peñas is in La Mancha. It was not obtainable but by means of money, and was reserved exclusively for the sick. Vinegar, so useful in hot countries, was not to be had. The water of the Guadalquivir was almost always lukewarm. For the young soldiers, not accustomed to extreme climates, this long stay at Andujar became detrimental and dangerous. Independently of the wounded, there were a great number of sick, attacked by dysentery. The privation of all news added to bodily suffering a feeling of profound dejection. Still the soldier, though not much seasoned by war, had a sense of his own superiority and great confidence in his general, and was desirous of having occasion to measure his strength with the enemy.

The arrival of Vedel's division soon afterwards served to increase this confidence. Having set out in the last days of June, it had arrived on the 26th at Despeña-Perros, at the entrance of the defiles, had forced them, killing some of Augustin d'Echavarri's men, and had then debouched on La Carolina, a pretty German colony, founded towards the end of last century by Charles III. The narrow valley by which you cross the Sierra Morena somewhat widens at La Carolina, a little more at Guarroman, and still more at Baylen, where it opens completely, debouching on the Guadalquivir. Between La Carolina and Baylen terminates that cross-road which we have mentioned, and which leads from Baeza or Ubeda to the entrance of the defiles.

Vedel's division, having halted at La Carolina, and put itself in communication with General Dupont, had taken position at Baylen itself, having one battalion in rear to guard the entrance of the defiles, and two in front to guard the ferry of Menjibar across the Guadalquivir.

No sooner had General Vedel joined than General Dupont assigned him his position, recommending to him extreme vigilance on his rear and on his left, lest the enemy should possess himself of the defiles and close them against the French army. After the arrival

of General Vedel, the inconvenience of leaving Baylen unoccupied was less, but there was still that of being in a defensive position, six leagues from one another, behind a river that was everywhere fordable. A daring enemy could, in fact, pass it in the night, and place himself between our two divisions. Now, notwithstanding the junction of General Vedel, the number of the French troops, in presence of the insurgents of Andalusia, was not so considerable that they could divide without danger. The corps of Dupont was much weakened by sickness. Barbou's division could not present more than about 5700 men to the enemy, 6400 including the engineers and artillery. The seamen were at most 400, the dragoons and chasseurs 1800, which formed a total of 8600 French. The Swiss, sometimes sending deserters to the insurgents, sometimes receiving deserters from them, were reduced to 1800, and in a sort of wavering state which forbade their being trusted in all cases. Vedel's division brought 5400 men of all arms and 12 pieces of artillery. With General Dupont's 8600 men, and General Vedel's 5400, there were 14,000 combatants, 16,000 including the Swiss. This number was not too large, even if kept united, before the 40 or 50 thousand insurgents, whose coming was announced. Gobert's division having soon afterwards arrived, and brought a reinforcement of about 4700 men, infantry and cavalry included, the corps of General Dupont was gradually augmented to the desired force (which, however, was not more than 18,000 French and 2000 Swiss) at the very moment when the insurgents were deciding to take the offensive. With Gobert's division, General Dupont received intelligence of the check sustained before Saragossa and Valencia, of the retreat of Marshal Monecy upon Madrid, of the insulated situation in which this retreat placed the army of Andalusia, and at the same time a recommendation to keep firmly upon the Guadalquivir, but not to penetrate further into Andalusia. It would have been imprudent, in fact, in the then state of things, to advance further into the south of Spain.

At this moment there appeared favourable opportunities for striking severe blows at the insurrection without abandoning the defensive. The insurgents of Grenada under General Reding, partly Swiss, partly Spaniards, had marched to Jaen to the number of 12 or 15 thousand. While the insurgents of Grenada were thus advancing towards Jaen, those of Andalusia, under General Castaños, to the number of 20 and odd thousand, having ascended the Guadalquivir, arrived before Bujalance, and, from some bands of tirailleurs and some patrols of cavalry, it might be inferred that they were not far off. Though military espionage was impossible in Spain, for not a peasant would betray the cause of his country, (a noble sentiment which redeemed the ferocity of that people, and accounted for it,) yet it was easy, from the signs picked up every moment of that double march, to form a correct idea of it, and consequently to oppose it. General Dupont might very well, by leaving Gobert's division at Baylen and Menjibar, advance with Barbou's and Vedel's divisions beyond the Guadalquivir, place himself with 14 or 15 thousand men between the enemy's two

armies, beat them one after the other or both together, and return to his position after mauling them roughly. Whatever might be their force, there was no rashness in encountering them in the proportion of one against two. This operation, which would have obliged him to make a forward movement of three or four leagues, was assuredly no infraction of the order not to penetrate into the south of Spain. If however this resolution appeared to him too bold, he could, while keeping a strict defensive and waiting for the enemy, unite with Vedel and Gobert at Baylen itself, and he was very certain, with 20,000 men in that position, to crush any force that should present itself. To leave Andujar for Baylen was no infraction either of the order not to repossess the Sierra Morena, any more than to advance four leagues to oppose an active defensive to the enemy was an infraction of the order not to penetrate into Andalusia.

Motionless in presence of the Spaniards, conceiving nothing, ordering nothing, General Dupont, who had at last three divisions at hand, made no other disposition than that of remaining for his own person at Andujar, leaving Vedel at Baylen, Gobert at La Carolina, recommending to each of them to be vigilantly on his guard, to keep a continual look-out around him, lest the defiles should be turned by Baeza, Ubeda, and Linares.

On the 14th of July, in the evening, the enemy appeared on the heights that border the Guadalquivir, opposite to Andujar. The troops of Grenada, under General Reding, had remained at Jaen, preparing to form their junction with those of Andalusia. The latter, who were perceived before Andujar, and who were commanded by General Castaños, came from Lower Andalusia, by Seville and Cordova. They had, like those of Grenada, a junction for their object, but they purposed first to examine the position of Andujar, to ascertain whether it were possible to carry it. They were about 20,000 strong, partly regular troops augmented by new enrolments, partly volunteers recently regimented in skeletons of recent creation. They had more steadiness and solidity than any of those that we had yet seen, for they were chiefly composed of troops from the camp of St. Roque, and of the division which was to have invaded Portugal under General Solano.

On the morning of the 15th of July, appearing in mass, they forced our advanced posts to retire and to abandon to them the heights that command the banks of the Guadalquivir. Each then took his position for battle, the Paris guard in the works in advance of the bridge, the third legion of reserve on the bank of the river, the seamen of the guard in Andujar, Chabert's brigade on the right of the town, the Swiss in rear, the cavalry, with the 6th provisional, at a distance in the plain, to observe the undisciplined guerillas hovering around the Spanish army, like the Cossacks about the Russian army.

The sight of the enemy rejoiced the French soldiers by dispelling their *ennui*; though many of them were ill, they had an extreme desire to come to blows. But the Spaniards were not able to pass the river in the face of the French army. They confined themselves to an

insignificant cannonade, which did us no great harm, and which was but coolly replied to, in order to avoid expending our ammunition; but our balls, being well directed, and falling among the thick masses, swept off many men at once. The guerillas showed themselves on the right of the river, which we occupied. Some had crossed the Guadalquivir at a distance; the others descended upon our rear from the gorges of the Sierra Morena. General Fgeia directed his squadrons upon them, while the 6th endeavoured to come at them with the bayonet. Some of them were killed, and these flocks of birds of prey were soon obliged to fly off into the mountains.

This affair denoted nothing more than a preparatory trial of the enemy's strength against our position, and an endeavour to ascertain the point at which he might attack it with the least difficulty. There was reason, however, to expect a more serious effort on the following day. General Dupont despatched, therefore, one of his officers to General Vedel, to learn what was passing as well at Baylen as at the ferry of Menjibar, and to desire him, in case he had no enemy before him, to send to his aid either a battalion or even a brigade; a precaution which would have been superfluous, as we have already several times observed, had all been united at Baylen. The close of that day passed off at Andujar in the profoundest tranquillity.

Towards Baylen, the insurgents of Grenada, established in advance of Jaen, had appeared along the Guadalquivir, feeling their way everywhere, and everywhere seeking the weak side of our positions. Before Baylen they had passed the ferry of Menjibar, and repulsed the advanced posts of General Vedel. But the latter, hastening up with the bulk of his division, and deploying his battalions in a very ostensible manner, had so intimidated the Spaniards that they had completely disappeared. Further to our left, towards Baeza and Ubeda, points that still occasioned uneasiness, the insurgents had crossed the Guadalquivir, and had detached some of those bands of scouts, who were little to be feared, but who might at a distance afford occasion for strange mistakes. General Gobert, posted at La Carolina, being informed of their presence, had hastily sent cuirassiers to observe and to awe them.

In this state of things, General Vedel, seeing no longer any enemy before him, was about to ascend again from Menjibar to Baylen, when an aide-de-camp of General Dupont's arrived to desire the reinforcement of a battalion or a brigade, according to circumstances. Learning from this aide-de-camp that the main body of the enemy had appeared before Andujar, supposing the danger to be there only, and prompted by an inconsiderate zeal, he resolved to proceed with his whole division for Andujar, and sent word to General Gobert to come and occupy Baylen, which would be left vacant by the departure of the second division. Setting off immediately, towards the close of the 15th, he marched the whole night between the 15th and 16th. Though an honourable sentiment actuated General Vedel, his conduct was nevertheless imprudent, for he knew not what might happen at Baylen after his departure, and what

was to befall in his absence that point so important to the safety of the army.

On the morning of the 16th he came in sight of Andujar with all his troops. General Dupont, so far from reprimanding him for his precipitation, was gratified to find himself reinforced in presence of an enemy who appeared more numerous than on the preceding day, and more disposed to a serious attack: he approved what General Vedel had done, and even thanked him. The soldiers, who had seen no French for two months, shouted for joy on perceiving their comrades, and imagined that they were going at last to punish the Spaniards for their boasting. It was really an occasion for repairing the faults committed, to fall upon the enemy with 14,000 French and 2000 Swiss, and to beat them off for a long time to come. With the ardour that animated all our young soldiers, nothing would have been easier. But General Dupont suffered the Spaniards to cannonade Andujar the whole day, merely enjoying their hesitation, their inexperience, without doing any thing more than firing volleys of cannon at them from time to time. The Spaniards would fain have forced the position of Andujar, but not daring to attempt it, they descended and ascended several times in the course of the day the heights which they occupied, to and from the bank of the river; but never tried to cross it in presence of our bayonets. For a moment they showed an inclination to cross the Guadalquivir higher up, but from that point was descried Vedel's division marching on the opposite bank, and this sight damped their courage. This day, therefore, ended as peaceably as the preceding, with very few dead and wounded on our side, but a considerable number on that of the Spaniards, who had suffered infinitely more by our cannonade, though it was more rare and slacker than theirs.

Things had not gone off so well about Baylen and the ferry of Menjibar. On the morning of the 16th, when General Vedel was marching without necessity to Andujar, General Reding, who, at the head of the army of Grenada, had also made on the 15th some attempts before Baylen, renewed them with rather more boldness than on the preceding day. After crossing the ferry of Menjibar, he found at the foot of the heights of Baylen nobody but General Liger-Belair, with one battalion and a few companies of *élite*. He then debouched in force, and appeared, with several thousand men, before General Liger-Belair, who, having scarcely a few hundred, could do no other than retire in good order. At this moment arrived General Gobert, apprized by General Vedel of the evacuation of Baylen, and bringing, in order to provide for it, three battalions with some cuirassiers. General Gobert's division, already reduced by several detachments that had been left behind—for it had been obliged to leave detachments at La Carolina, Guarroman, and Baylen—Gobert's division had been thinned in passing through the gorges of the Sierra Morena, and could not get at the enemy but with the head of one column. Nevertheless, this young general, full of intelligence and fire, with his three battalions and his cuirassiers, stopped short the Spaniards. Major Christophe, commanding the cuirassiers, made a vigorous charge, and drove back the Spanish

infantry, unused to the rude shock of those heavy horse. But, while he was himself directing these movements, he received in the middle of the forehead a ball, which issued from a bush where was concealed one of those Spanish marksmen who were found everywhere in ambush. He fell insensible, having but a few hours to live, and was bitterly regretted by the whole army.

General Dufour, whose rank pointed him out for General Gobert's successor, hastened to the ground, found the French troops shaken by the loss of their general, and conceived that he could not do better than make them fall back upon Baylen. The Spaniards who were seeking the weak point of our positions, without having resolved upon an attack in earnest, went no further, but they felt convinced that, if thrust on this side, the sword would enter.

General Dufour returned to Baylen, where he had a considerable part of Gobert's division. Perceiving that the Spaniards did not follow him, but continued fixed on the bank of the Guadalquivir, he was led to believe that their serious attack was directed elsewhere. In fact, while the danger had appeared so small towards Menjibar, it assumed alarming proportions on the side next to Baeza and Ubeda. The reconnoissances sent in that direction, whether the officers who executed them were not intelligent men, or whether the irregular bands which had crossed the Guadalquivir above Menjibar, made a great appearance, all denounced the presence of a real army on the cross-road, which, running from Baeza and Ubeda by Linares, terminates at La Carolina, passing behind Baylen. To these indications were added the reiterated instructions of General Dupont, who, having committed the fault of not placing himself at Baylen, aggravated instead of repairing it by the continual apprehensions which he felt, and which he communicated to his lieutenants. On the preceding day, and on that same day, he had written to General Gobert to keep his eye incessantly upon that cross-road from Baeza and Ubeda to Linares; that on the first sign of the movement of the enemy on that side, he must fall back in mass from Baylen to La Carolina, for there was the salvation of the army; and that this point must be preserved at any price,—strange precaution, and which lost the army that it was intended to save!

General Dufour, to whom were transmitted of right the instructions of the general-in-chief, after the death of General Gobert, receiving the most alarming information concerning the cross-road from Baeza to Linares, would wait no longer, but set out the same evening for Baylen, purposing to proceed to La Carolina, imagining that he should thus preserve the army from the misfortune of being turned. That fatal Baylen, where we were destined to meet with the first rock of our greatness, was therefore once more evacuated and exposed to the invasion of the enemy.

General Dufour had, it is true, for excuse, the instructions which he had received, the tidings that had been brought him, the certainty he felt of the speedy return of General Vedel to Baylen. He set out, therefore, in the evening of the 16th, to hasten to La Carolina,

leaving scarcely a detachment on the heights commanding Menjíbar and the Guadalquivir.

The intelligence of the death of General Gobert and of the falling back of his division reached Andujar in the very evening of the 16th, for they were but six or seven French leagues distant, and that an officer on horseback could travel in two or three hours. These tidings arrived just at the close of day, and with it that of the sterile cannonade, the insignificant effects of which we have related. General Dupont, who had shared the fault of General Vedel in approving it, began to regret that the latter had left Baylen and come to Andujar. Though still ignorant of the departure of General Dufour for La Carolina, struck by the seriousness of an attack which had occasioned the death of General Gobert and the retreat of his division, he directed General Vedel to set out immediately for Baylen, to occupy that point in force, to beat the insurgents at Baylen, at La Carolina, at Linares, in short, wherever their presence should be revealed to him; and, this done, to return in all haste, and assist him to destroy those whom he had before him at Andujar. It never entered into his mind for a moment to accompany Vedel himself, or to follow him forthwith, or in a day's time, to make the more sure of preventing all the results which he dreaded. Fatal and incredible blindness, which is not without example in war, but which, fortunately for the safety of nations and of armies, is not often productive of such calamitous consequences! Let us not accuse Providence: after Bayonne we deserved not to be successful.

The heat for some days had been suffocating. The nights were scarcely cooler than the days, and, moreover there was always a great scarcity of provisions at Andujar. It was with difficulty, and not without submitting to privations, that Vedel's soldiers could be supplied with refreshment. They left Andujar at midnight of the 16th, still much fatigued with the march which they had made in the day to arrive there; and leaving their comrades of Barbon's division sorely grieved at this separation. The march was continued the whole night, and it was not till eight in the morning of the 17th that they reached Baylen; the sun was already very high above the horizon, and the heat scorching.

On his arrival at Baylen, General Vedel was extremely astonished to learn that General Dufour had set out for La Carolina, leaving only a weak detachment before Baylen. His astonishment soon ceased when he learned what had drawn General Dufour towards La Carolina, that is to say, the report everywhere circulated of a Spanish army having passed through Baeza and Linares to occupy the defiles. On this intelligence, without more consideration than on the preceding day, when he had hurried from Menjíbar to Andujar, he doubted not for a moment what was reported to him. He fully believed that the Spaniards, who had hung back before Andujar, who had not followed up the success obtained at Menjíbar over General Gobert, were proceeding in the execution of a skillfully calculated plan for deceiving the French by a false attack, and turning them by Baeza and Linares. However, though swayed by one idea, which he sought not to examine thoroughly, he directed a re-

connaissance to be made in advance of Baylen, to ascertain whether, from those positions, which overlooked the whole valley of the Guadalquivir, any thing could be discovered. The detachment sent out could not discover any thing either at the foot of the heights or on the Guadalquivir itself. Not the slightest doubt could then be felt: the entire force of the enemy, according to General Vedel, had passed through Baeza and Linares, in its progress to La Carolina, for the purpose of closing the defiles of the Sierra Morena on the rear of the French army. He hesitated no longer, and but for the mid-day heat, which was not less than 40 degrees of Réaumur, and under which men and horses sank, struck with apoplexy, he would have set out instantly. But, at the close of that same day, the 17th, he left Baylen, taking with him even the post that guarded the heights above the Guadalquivir, so apprehensive was he that he should not arrive in sufficient force at La Carolina. Generals-in-chief, in their prosperous days, find lieutenants who correct their faults; General Dupont, on this occasion, found such as cruelly aggravated his.

Of all these alleged movements of the Spaniards towards La Carolina, by Baeza and Linares, not one was true. Bands of guerillas, more or less numerous, had inundated the banks of the Guadalquivir, gained the Sierra Morena, and misled officers either unintelligent or inattentive. But the two principal armies had moved, that of Grenada before Baylen, that of Andalusia before Andujar. Their real intention had been to sound the position of the French, to ascertain on which side it might be attacked with the greatest probability of success. The impatience of the insurgents urged them to demand an immediate attack, no matter on what point, and the prudence of the general-in-chief, Castaños, had to battle with the declaimers of the staff, to spare himself a check, like that of Cuesta's and Blake's. His soundings were a mode of occupying the impatient, and of seeking the point where the imprudence of the offensive would be least serious. The imposing attitude of the French before Andujar on the 16th and 16th, their resistance less invincible between Menjíbar and Baylen, since one of their generals had been killed there and the ground abandoned, indicated that to Baylen they must proceed, if they would risk an effort which had any chance of success. This reasoning of General Castaños did honour to his military perspicacity, and he was about to be favoured by Fortune for a moment of clear-sightedness, while General Dupont was doomed by her to suffer for a moment of error. A council of war was convoked at the general-in-chief's. There the impatient insisted on attacking the position of Andujar in front, without further delay. The wise and wary Castaños conceived that it would be tempting Fortune much too far, and would not run the risk of a reverse so easy to be foreseen. The events of the preceding day promised, according to him, much more success to an attack on the side of Baylen, and this plan suited him the better, inasmuch as it threw the responsibility on General Reding and the insurgents of Grenada. To second this attempt it was agreed that the army of Andalusia should



strengthen General Reding with Coupligny's division, one of the best organized in the army of Andalusia, and that General Castaños should remain with the two divisions of Jones and La Peña before Andujar, in order to deceive the French respecting the real point of attack. General Reding, having already about 12,000 men, and being reinforced by six or seven thousand, would have under him at least 18,000. The commander-in-chief would have about 15,000 left to occupy the attention of the French at Andujar.

This plan being agreed upon, they proceeded forthwith to its execution, and, while Coupligny's division was marching to ascend the Guadalquivir, as high as Menjibar, to join General Reding and to concur in the attack of Baylen, on the following day, the 18th, the troops of General Castaños deployed with ostentation on the heights which face Andujar.

Meanwhile, in the course of this same day, the 17th, there might be discerned, with some attention, in the French camp, a movement of the Spaniards towards their right, a consequence of the plan which they had just adopted. General Fresia, commanding the French cavalry, had sent a regiment of dragoons over the bridge of Andujar, to the other side of the Guadalquivir, with directions to approach very near to the Spaniards, who, on seeing them, drew up in order of battle, and saluted our horse with discharges of musketry. But the colonel of that regiment of dragoons clearly discerned the movement of the Spaniards from their left to their right, towards Menjibar, that is to say, towards Baylen, and instantly made his report to the general-in-chief, Dupont. The latter, struck at first by this circumstance, took for a moment the salutary resolution, which would have changed his destiny and perhaps that of the Empire, to decamp during the day and march to Baylen. Without knowing the enemy's secret, it was evident, from the direction which the Spaniards were pursuing, and even from the false reports of an attempt upon La Carolina, that the danger was accumulating towards the left of the French, towards Baylen, towards La Carolina, and that, to concentrate himself upon those points was the safest of all manœuvres. Moreover, the intelligence which General Dupont received on the evening of General Vedel's departure for La Carolina after General Dufour, and of the complete evacuation of Baylen, ought to have decided him to set out immediately. There was still time in the evening of the 17th to proceed to Baylen, since the Spaniards were not to enter it till the 18th.

But General Dupont, still bewildered by the mass of enemies that he had before him at Andujar, having difficulty to believe that the danger had removed to another place, having above all an immense quantity of sick to carry away, and determined not to leave any behind, for every unfortunate creature so left was sure to be murdered, deferred till the morrow the execution of his first idea, with a view to give the administration of the army twenty-four hours which it needed for the evacuation of the hospitals and the baggage—a fatal and ever-to-be-lamented delay!

The resolution to decamp was postponed, therefore, till the next day, July the 18th. On

that day, General Dupont received intelligence from Generals Dufour and Vedel: he learned that they were still seeking the enemy in the bottom of the gorges; that they had advanced to Guarroman without finding him; that they should march to La Carolina and St. Helena, to every point, in short, where he was said to be; that they would attack him with impetuosity, destroy him, and then take their position at Baylen, either to remain there or to rejoin the general-in-chief at Andujar. But meanwhile Baylen was uncovered, liable to fall before the weakest detachment, and every thing indicated that the Spaniards were marching thither in force. A patrol had pushed, in the course of the day, to the bank of the Rumbiar, a torrent which must be crossed in going from Andujar to Baylen, and had fallen in with troops of the enemy. It was necessary, therefore, to hasten to leave Andujar, without losing a moment, in order to reach Baylen before the Spaniards.

General Dupont, not yet entertaining any serious uneasiness, and supposing that the troops seen on the bank of the Rumbiar were only a detachment sent on reconnaissance, gave his orders for the 18th. He would not set out till night, in order to conceal his movement from General Castaños, and to get seven or eight hours' start of him. He might have blown up the bridge of Andujar, which would have delayed the pursuit of the Spaniards; but, fearful of appraising the enemy by such an explosion, he contented himself with obstructing the bridge in such a manner that it would take some time to clear it; and, at night-fall, between eight and nine o'clock, he began to decamp. Unfortunately, he had, as we have said, an immense quantity of baggage, the number of the sick having singularly increased, owing to the heat and bad provisions. Half of the corps was attacked with dysentery. None but the weakest had been admitted into the hospitals, and a great number of men who could scarcely carry their arms had been left in the ranks. The worst of the sick were placed in carriages, and five or six hundred men, for whom there were no means of conveyance, followed the baggage on foot, wasted, pale, and piteous to be seen. The heat had never been more intense; it exceeded 40 degrees. The oldest Spaniards did not recollect to have ever experienced the like. At night, then, the French set out, oppressed with the heat of the weather, men and horses scarcely able to breathe, and moving in an atmosphere of fire, though the sun had sunk beneath the horizon. The army had not had its entire ration. The soldier set out on his march hungry, thirsty, and deeply depressed at a retreat which did not denote that affairs were in a good situation.

It was necessary to keep vigilant watch over the rear; for General Castaños, being better served than General Dupont, might receive from Andujar itself information of the retreat of the French, and start in pursuit of them. General Dupont, therefore, placed at the head of the baggage only one brigade of infantry, Chabert's brigade, that which was in rear and to the right of the bridge. This brigade was farthest from the enemy, and its departure would be least remarked. It moved off silently from right to left, in rear of Andujar, and

formed the head of the column. It was composed of two battalions of the fourth legion of reserve, and of a French Swiss battalion—Freuler's regiment—a regiment to be depended upon, because it had been long in the service of France. A battery of six four-pounders accompanied this brigade, about 2800 strong. Then came the baggage, covering two or three leagues of ground. The Spanish Swiss regiments, (of Preux and Reding,) reduced by desertion to about 1600, marched after the baggage. They were followed by Pannetier's brigade, composed of two battalions of the third legion of reserve, and of two battalions of the Paris guard, forming about 2800 men. Lastly the cavalry, consisting of two regiments of dragoons, two of chasseurs, and a squadron of cuirassiers, reduced from 2400 horse to 1800, closed the march with the seamen of the guard and the rest of the artillery. This *corps d'armée*, which comprehended more than 10,000 French and 2400 Swiss on leaving Toledo, 8600 French and 2000 Swiss on leaving Cordova, scarcely contained 7800 French and 1600 Swiss, in all 9400 men, when it left Andujar. Besides the smallness of their number, they were divided by the baggage into two masses, one of which, that marching at the head, was by far the weaker, and that which formed the rear-guard by far the stronger, from the number and quality of the troops. The general, as we have just seen, had so arranged it, because, apprehensive of being pursued, he beheld danger in rear and not in front.

The troops proceeded all night amid the heat, which not a breath of air arose to diminish, and through a cloud of dust, raised by the marching columns. The horses, exhausted, dripping with sweat, swallowed nothing but dust instead of air when they breathed. Never did a more miserable night precede a more frightful day.

About three o'clock the corps reached the banks of the Rumbiar. This torrent, when it contains water, rolls between steep rocks, and in a deep ravine. A small bridge thrown over its bed conducts from one bank to the other. The soldiers, on arriving at it, expected to quench their thirst, but it was found completely dried up. They were obliged to march on. Having crossed the bridge, the road rises over heights covered with olive-trees. Here were usually stationed the advanced posts of the French division charged to guard Baylen, which is only three-quarters of a league distant from the Rumbiar. Instead of General Vedel's advanced posts, were perceived, by the day-light which began to peep, Spanish posts, which received our troops with a discharge of musketry. General Chabert's advanced guard immediately put itself in a posture of defence, and replied to the fire of the enemy. The road, jammed between heights, was barred by several Spanish battalions, drawn up in close column. If these battalions had defended the banks of the Rumbiar, we should certainly not have been able to cross it. They formed the advanced guard of Generals Reding and Coupigny, who, conformably to the plan adopted by the Spanish staff, had crossed at the ferry of Menjibar in the day-time of the 18th, marched immediately to Baylen, found it abandoned, and established themselves there. They had in the evening

placed several battalions in close column on the Andujar road, and it was these that we found on the morning of the 19th barring the Baylen road against us.

The French advanced guard immediately stood upon its defence, on the left of the road and in the olive plantations. It was composed of a battalion of Chabert's brigade, four companies of voltigeurs and grenadiers, a squadron of chasseurs, and two four-pounders. It commenced a very brisk fire of tirailleurs, while an aide-de-camp galloped off to fetch General Chabert's three other battalions, the rest of his artillery, and the brigade of chasseurs. While waiting for this reinforcement, the advanced guard did its best, kept up the tirailleur fire for an hour or two, killed a good many of the Spaniards, lost many itself, and maintained its ground. At length, about five in the morning, the sun being already high above the horizon, the rest of Chabert's brigade arrived. The soldiers of that brigade, though out of breath, which they had not had time to recover, neither could they quench their thirst, charged through and through the Spanish battalions, either in front or in flank, and obliged them to abandon that cooped-up road, and to fall back upon their main body. Our soldiers then came to the entrance of a small undulated plain, bordered on the right and left by heights covered with olive-trees, and terminated at the further end by the village of Baylen. The Spanish army under Reding and Coupigny, 18,000 strong, having in front an artillery formidable by its number and the calibre of its guns, appeared drawn up in three lines. It was about to march for Andujar, to take us in rear, while General Castaños was to attack us in front, when our advanced guard had put a stop to this intended movement.

No sooner had we beaten back the Spanish battalions which obstructed the road, and debouched in this plain, than the artillery of the Spaniards poured a horrible fire of balls and grape upon our troops. General Chabert immediately ordered six four-pounders to be placed in battery. But before they had fired more than a few rounds, they were dismounted and rendered unserviceable. What, in fact, could six four-pounders do against upwards of twenty-four well-served twelve-pounders? About eight in the morning, when this battle had already lasted for four hours, arrived the rest of the artillery, the cavalry, and the Swiss brigade, composed of the regiments of Preux and Reding. Pannetier's brigade, which closed the march, with the seamen of the guard, had orders, on its arrival, to take post, as rear-guard, at the little bridge of Rumbiar, so as to prevent the troops of General Castaños from crossing, if it should turn out that he was in pursuit of the army. It was a new mishap, after so many others, not to have employed in mass all the troops there were to force a passage through Baylen, and thus to rejoin Vedel's and Dufour's divisions.

Be this as it may, on the arrival of the reinforcements, the fight became more animated and more general. Chabert's brigade, the Swiss brigade, and the cavalry, debouched in the little plain of Baylen, striving at the same time to gain ground. Our artillery had in vain endeavoured to silence with four and eight-

pounders the formidable battery of twelves, which covered the middle of the Spanish line. It beheld every moment some of its pieces dismounted, without doing much harm to those of the enemy. It threw balls, indeed, amidst the deep mass of the Spaniards, and swept away whole files. The Swiss brigade of the regiments of Preux and Reding, placed at the centre, behaved with firmness, though it was grieved to fight against the Spaniards whom it had always served, and against its countrymen, of whom there were several battalions in the enemy's army.

At this moment, the Spaniards, proposing to take advantage of their great number, in order to surround us, attempted to ascend a small height which rises on our left. General Dupont immediately sent thither General Pryvé's dragoons, the French Swiss battalion of Freuler, and a battalion of the 4th legion of reserve. These two infantry battalions advanced resolutely, while, on their right, General Pryvé led up his squadrons on the trot. The road, covered with brushwood and olive-trees, preventing the cavalry from marching in good order, General Pryvé directed it to disperse as tirailleurs, and to get forward as it could, while the two battalions sustained, deployed, the fire of the Spaniards. Our horse, having arrived at the height, formed, and then, dashing at a gallop upon the Spanish battalions, broke them and obliged them to fall back upon their line of battle, after taking from them three colours.

The attempt which had just been repulsed on our right was repeated by the Spaniards upon our left, on some heights which commanded it. General Dupont, who had at length decided to bring into line all the rest of his troops excepting a battalion of the Paris guard, left in observation at the bridge of Rumbler, opposed Pannetier's brigade to this new movement of the Spaniards, and ordered the dragoons, drawn from the right to the left, to repeat the manœuvre, which had already succeeded with them.

While the three battalions of Pannetier's brigade were making head against the Spaniards, who threatened our left, by keeping up a fire of small arms with them, General Pryvé, recommencing what he had before done, led his horsemen as tirailleurs through the thorns and olive-trees, formed them when they had arrived on the plateau, and then directed them upon the Spaniards, who, broken by the shock, again fell back upon their main body. Meanwhile the Swiss brigade continued to maintain its ground in the midst of the plain with the same firmness, while the brave General Dupré, brought into line with his horse chasseurs, made brilliant charges upon the centre of the Spaniards. But every time that they were charged on the right, on the left, at the centre, either with bayonet or sword, they fell back on two immovable lines, which were perceived in the back-ground of the field of battle, like an impenetrable wall of brass. These two lines, independently of their number, three or four times as large as ours, were appuyed in rear on the village of Baylen, protected on their wings by wooded heights, lastly, covered in front by a formidable artillery. At this sight our soldiers began to feel their courage fail them. It was ten in the morning, the heat overwhelm-

ing, men and horses gasping for breath, and, on that field of battle parched by the sun, there was nowhere a drop of water or a patch of shade to cool them during the short intervals of a horrible combat.

But what was General Vedel doing—he who yesterday and the day before was so prompt to march when there was no occasion for him, but who came not now when his presence would have been so serviceable? He was expected, however, for he could not refrain from hastening up on the report of the cannon, which in those deep gorges must have been heard at La Carolina. General Dupont directed his coming to be announced in the ranks, in order to animate his soldiers, and then decided to try a general movement with a view to carry the position by assault. He went along the front of his troops, and had the colours taken by the cavalry brought before them. At this sight, their young courage reviving burst forth in shouts of *Vive l'Empereur!* Some officers, excited by the danger, then advised that they should form in close column on the left, and charge upon one point—that one which could afford a passage to the road from Baylen to La Carolina, that is to say, towards Vedel's division, and save themselves by submitting to a painful but necessary sacrifice, that of the baggage full of our sick. General Dupont, ever blind on those fatal days, was not sensible of the merit of this counsel. He persisted in charging the whole line of the Spaniards in front, as if he meant to take their entire army at a blow. At a given signal his soldiers rushed in mass upon the enemy, but they were met by a murderous fire of musketry and grape, and their line wavered and reeled. The officers set them to rights and led them forward, while the brave General Dupré dashed, with his horse chasseurs, through the intervals of our infantry, and set an example by charging through the Spanish line. He made breaches in it, which he entered, taking even some guns, which he could not bring away; but, when he attempted to proceed further, he was always stopped by a solid, impenetrable barrier, which there was no hope of breaking through. The unfortunate general, after heroic efforts, fell from his horse struck by a ball in the abdomen.

It was now noon. This so unequal combat had already lasted eight or nine hours. Almost all the superior officers were killed or wounded. Captains were commanding battalions, serjeant-majors companies. All the artillery was dismounted. General Dupont, in despair, having received two gun-shot wounds, redeemed his faults by his valour. He required one more proof of devotedness from his soldiers. He led them back into line. They marched, supported by the example of the seamen of the imperial guard, who never ceased to be worthy of themselves. But, after a fresh effort on the first line, they perceived the second still immovable; and they again returned to the entrance of that melancholy and fatal plain, which they had not been able to pass. At this horrible moment an event, unexpected, though easy to be foreseen, completed their demoralization. The Swiss regiments of Preux and Reding, which at first behaved honourably, nevertheless deeply grieved to be obliged to fire upon Swiss and upon Spaniards, the one their

countrymen, the other their old companions in arms. Though the French Swiss of Freuler fought by their side with rare fidelity, they could not bear up either against grief or ill fortune, and, in spite of the efforts of their officers, almost all of them deserted. In a few moments 1600 men quitted the field of battle, where our number was already so small. In fact, not 3000 men were left on their legs upon that ground out of 9000 who appeared there in the morning. Eighteen hundred, struck down by the fire, were dead or wounded; sixteen hundred had gone over to the enemy. Two or three thousand more, worn out with fatigue, overcome by heat and the dysentery, had sunk to the ground and dropped their arms beside them. Despair had seized every soul. General Dupont went through the thinned ranks of his army, and found every face impressed with the same grief that was consuming himself. Still he clung to a last hope, and listened to catch the sound of General Vedel's cannon. But he listened in vain. On that scorching and blood-drenched plain not a sound was to be heard but that of single musket-shots; for the fight had ceased on one side as well as on the other. All at once, however, reports of artillery broke the dull silence that began to prevail. An additional cause for despair! those sounds came not from the left, but from the rear, that is to say, from the bridge of Rumbiar. General Castaños, apprized at two or three o'clock in the morning of the evacuation of Andujar by the French, had immediately sent in pursuit of them all the troops he had left, under the command of General de la Peña, who by a concerted signal gave notice to General Reding of his approach by discharges of artillery. All, therefore, was lost. The three thousand men left in the ranks, the three or four thousand dispersed over the country, the wounded, the sick, must all be slaughtered between the armies of General Reding and General de la Peña, amounting to about 30,000 men. At this idea, General Dupont's affliction was at its height, and he perceived no other resource than that of treating with the enemy.

He had among his officers an equerry of the Emperor's, M. de Villoutreys, who, desirous of engaging in active service, had been attached to his *corps d'armée*: he charged him to go to General Reding, to propose a suspension of arms. M. de Villoutreys traversed that melancholy plain, the theatre of our first disasters. He went to General Reding, and applied in the name of the French general for a truce of a few hours on the ground of the fatigue of both armies. General Reding, extremely glad to have done with the French, for he was still fearful of a change of fortune with such adversaries, assented to the truce, on condition of its being ratified by the general-in-chief, Castaños. For the moment, he promised to suspend his fire.

M. de Villoutreys returned to General Dupont, who gave him a fresh commission, that was to go and meet General de la Peña, and to stop him at the bridge of Rumbiar. Villoutreys hastened to the bridge of Rumbiar, and there found the troops of General de la Peña skirmishing already with some soldiers of the Paris guard. General de la Peña, less accommodat- ing than M. de Reding, and full of Spanish

passions, declared that he was willing to accede to the truce, but provisionally, and till the adhesion of the general-in-chief. He likewise intimated that the French would obtain quarter only by surrendering at discretion. The firing was suspended on both sides. The French rested themselves at last on that fatal plain upon which lay pell-mell so many dead and dying, where a consuming heat prevailed, where an awful silence reigned, and where no water was to be found but in some muddy holes of the Rumbiar, and the possession of which was violently disputed. All else was motionless: but joy filled the hearts of the one, despair those of the others.

M. de Villoutreys, returning to his general-in-chief, was directed to follow the Andujar road, to meet General Castaños, and to obtain his ratification of the truce, agreed to by his lieutenants. The unfortunate General Dupont, hitherto so brilliant, so successful, retired to his tent, overwhelmed by moral pains which rendered him almost insensible to the physical pains of two severe wounds. Such is the mutability of fortune, in war as in politics, as in every thing else in this world, an agitated world, a changeful theatre, where prosperity and adversity are linked together, succeed, efface each other, leaving after a long series of contrary sensations only nothingness and misery. Three years before, on the banks of the Danube, this same General Dupont, arriving breathless to the succour of Marshal Mortier, saved him at Diernstein. But other times, other places, another spirit. It was in December and in the North; they were veteran soldiers, full of health and vigour, braced by a colder atmosphere, instead of being depressed by an enervating climate, accustomed to all the vicissitudes of war, actuated by a high sense of honour, never hesitating between death and surrender. If the position of these men became bad for a moment, one had time to come up to their aid and to save them. And then Fortune again smiled and made amends for all: none came too late, none made a mistake; or, if this did happen to one, the other corrected his fault. Here, in this Spain, which had been so foully entered, the men were young, weak, sickly, oppressed by the climate, new to suffering. They began to be no longer prosperous; and if the one committed a fault, the other aggravated it. Dupont had come to succour Mortier at Diernstein; Vedel did not come to succour Dupont till it was too late.

What, then, we again say, was General Vedel doing, who, but a few leagues off, with two divisions, one of which only would have changed the issue of that fatal day, never made his appearance? Twice he had already deceived himself; and he deceived himself a third time. Setting out from Baylen in the evening of the 17th, he arrived in the night at Guarroman; resuming his march on the 18th for La Carolina, pursuing the phantom of an enemy, who had gone, it was said, to secure the defiles, he had at length, on the 18th, acquired the conviction that he and General Dufour were running after a chimera. The supposed Spanish army which had proceeded entire to the defiles, to shut up the French army in them, turned out to be a few guerillas, whom some officers, either incompetent observers or easily fright-

ened, had taken for formidable masses. Reconnaissances sent out in every direction, prisoners examined, peasants questioned, had at length convinced Generals Dufour and Vedel of the truth. They immediately formed the plan of returning to Baylen, for it was not in zeal that they were deficient. General Vedel, setting out last and not having entered so deeply into the gorges, had to fall back first upon Baylen. But by these multiplied goings and comings, he had exhausted his unfortunate soldiers with fatigue. Almost without eating, without halting, they had marched from Baylen to Andujar, from Andujar to Baylen, from Baylen to La Carolina, and he could not help granting them the remainder of the 18th to rest themselves. The coolness of the place, the fruit, the vegetables, the provisions, which they had at La Carolina, were at the moment a strong reason for making a halt there. Moreover, the artillery carriages, broken in consequence of the bad roads and the dry weather, required some repairs. Lastly, they were ignorant of the melancholy secret of events, and imagined that they should be in time if they arrived at Baylen on the morrow. It might not have been too late, indeed, had they started at three o'clock the next morning, the 19th; for they would have reached Baylen by eleven, they would have caught M. de Reding between two fires, and have converted the fatal day of Baylen into another battle of Marengo.

At three in the morning of the following day, the 19th, some diligent officers, stirring before the others to attend to their troops, heard the cannon at Baylen, the sound of which, transmitted from echo to echo, was reverberated to the furthest extremity of the gorges of the Sierra Morena. These guns, according to them, could be no other than those of the general-in-chief, engaged with the Spaniards, for none but he had been left behind on the Guadalquivir. Yet how was it possible that he, who had been left with the Spaniards at Andujar, should be firing his cannon in a position which must be that of Baylen? This they could not make out: but certain it was that they heard repeated discharges of artillery, and the vulgar precept of going straight up to cannon, so often cited and so often misunderstood, did not permit them to hesitate. By setting off immediately in the cool of the morning, and hastening their steps, they might arrive in time to deal the enemy decisive blows. General Vedel, so prompt in forming a resolution on the 16th and 17th, manifested on this occasion an inexplicable indecision. He lost two hours in rallying his column, and did not start before five o'clock. The heat was already great; the troops, marching in columns near to each other, on account of the proximity of the enemy, raised a dust that suffocated them. It was, therefore, not till about eleven o'clock that they reached Guarroman, midway between La Carolina and Baylen. At this moment, the fight having slackened at Baylen, the echoes of the guns were much less heard. Still, however, the reports of guns continued to be heard, sometimes more distinct, sometimes more faint, according to the direction of the wind.

General Vedel, without any ill intention, for he was, on the contrary, deeply devoted to the honour of the French arms, but from an infatu-

ation similar to that which had persuaded General Dupont that the danger was at Andujar alone, persisted in doubting and in considering what was heard as only an affair of advanced posts on the banks of the Guadalquivir. He resolved, in particular, not to return to Baylen till he had completely explored the gorges and ascertained that the enemy was not in the cross-road of Linares, which terminates exactly at Guarroman, and he sent thither a reconnaissance of cavalry. By this time it was noon. The guns ceased to roar, for the battle was over at Baylen. This silence of defeat and despair left no doubt in the mind of General Vedel, and he concluded definitively that the people had been mistaken. At this moment his troops had just got hold of a flock of goats; they were hungry; he allowed them two hours to make their soup. In two hours they again started. They marched without impatience, for the most profound silence everywhere prevailed. About five o'clock they debouched on Baylen and perceived the Spaniards. Without figuring to themselves precisely what might have happened, they imagined that the enemy had placed himself between General Dupont and Vedel's and Dufour's divisions. General Vedel hesitated no longer, and would have passed the main body of the Spanish army to rejoin his general-in-chief. He was preparing, therefore, to attack by the right, for it was on this side that, by turning Baylen, he could force a passage to the Andujar road, and meet with General Dupont, no matter at what point of that road. At that moment when he was giving his orders, a Spanish flag of truce came to inform him that there was a suspension of arms. General Vedel refused to believe it, and despatched one of his officers to General Reding's camp to ascertain what was the real fact; declaring that he would grant a delay of half an hour, after which, if he received no answer, he should open his fire. While waiting, he continued to make his dispositions, and the half-hour having elapsed, as the officer whom he had sent had not returned, he attacked vigorously. His troops marched up with ardour, enveloped a battalion of infantry, and made the men prisoners. The cuirassiers charged and overturned all before them. But all at once a group of Spanish officers, in which was an aide-de-camp of General Dupont's, came to him to desire him to cease his fire, and to replace all in its former state. Before this order of the general-in-chief's, General Vedel, though highly animated for fighting, was obliged to desist. But such was the power of his illusions, that he could not yet imagine the extent of the misfortune of the army; and he fancied that the truce referred to in order to stop him was but a commencement of negotiations with General Castaños, whose zeal for the insurrection had always been deemed doubtful in the French army, and who was believed to be disposed to treat on the first occasion.

Such was the manner in which General Vedel had employed his time on the 19th, such the manner in which he finished that fatal day. On learning that Vedel's division had arrived, the Spaniards were seized with fear, and transported with rage at the news that the men of one of their battalions were already prisoners. They would have fallen upon Barbou's divisions,

and slaughtered the whole of it, supposing that the truce demanded had only been a feint to give General Vedel time to arrive and to renew the fight the moment he appeared. They raised furious outcries, which General Dupont hastened to appease by giving the order that we have just reported. It was a fitting occasion for taking counsel from the terror and the very rage of the Spaniards to renew the fight, while moving in close column upon his left. General Pryvé, commanding the dragoons, made this proposal to General Dupont, and even pointed out to him the heights by which they might rejoin Vedel's division. But the unfortunate general, himself weakened by the disease which had for some time past prevailed in the army, suffering severely from his wounds, and seized with the general dejection, was absorbed in his affliction, and heard what General Pryvé said to him without making any reply. He seemed, in his despair, no longer to comprehend the words that were addressed to him.<sup>1</sup>

The night was passed on the field of battle, awaiting the negotiations of the morrow. But, while the Spaniards were enjoying abundance, our soldiers were destitute of every thing, and they passed the night as they had passed the day, without bread, without water, without wine. Those only who still had some remnants of their ration in their knapsacks, or some drink in their gourds, had any thing to refresh themselves with.

Next morning, the 20th, M. de Villoutreys, who had been sent to the Spanish head-quarters, to obtain the ratification of the truce, returned, intimating that General Castaños was ready to treat on equitable bases, and, with this view, he would come himself to Baylen. General Dupont thought of employing, on this occasion, the celebrated engineer General Marescot, who was on passage in his division on a mission to Gibraltar, and who had been well acquainted with General Castaños in 1796. He sent for him and urged him to use his influence with the Spanish general, in order to obtain the better conditions. General Marescot, having no desire to negotiate and sign a capitulation which could not be advantageous, at first refused the mission that was offered him, but afterwards yielded to the solicitations of the general-in-chief, and consented to proceed to the Spanish head-quarters.

In order to come at General Castaños, it was necessary to take the road to Andujar and to pass through La Peña's division. General Marescot found General de la Peña at the bridge of Rumbiar, indignant, threatening, complaining of alleged movements of the French army to escape, saying that he had powers for treating, requiring that all the French divisions should immediately surrender at discretion, and declaring that, if he had not an answer in two hours, he should attack and crush Barbon's division. To stop him, General Marescot was obliged to promise that an answer should be given in two hours.

He returned, therefore, without loss of time, to report these melancholy details to General Dupont. At this intelligence the latter roused

himself, exclaiming that he would rather perish with the last of his men than surrender at discretion. He summoned to him all his generals of division and of brigade, to ascertain if he could rely upon their devotedness and that of their soldiers. But almost all of them replied that the soldiers, worn out with fatigue and famine, and utterly discouraged, wished for no more fighting. General Dupont, to assure himself of this, went out of his hut, walked through the bivouacs with his lieutenants, and strove to revive the depressed courage of his young troops. Veteran soldiers of Egypt or of St. Domingo, accustomed to defy hunger, thirst, and heat, would not have been deaf to his voice. But what was to be expected of boys of twenty, dispirited by the excessive heat, who had neither eaten nor drunk for thirty-six hours, knowing that they were placed between two fires, and must fight in the disproportion of one to five or six, and with their artillery dismantled! They complained to their generals that they had been sacrificed: some of them, in their despair, even flung their arms and their cartouch-boxes on the ground. Instead of raising the spirits of others, General Dupont needed some one to raise his own. He returned in dismay. The officers who had behaved the most gallantly on the preceding day, themselves declared the case desperate, and maintained that they might treat honourably, after they had fought so valiantly. They forgot that the last act always effaces those which precede it, and that it is by the last that we are judged. In another situation, without General Vedel on their left, it would have been excusable in them to treat, for there would have been no other resource but to provoke their slaughter, though that is sometimes a resource which succeeds. But with General Vedel on their left, and having a chance of rejoining him by a last effort, they were inexcusable to surrender till they had made that effort. Physical exhaustion and moral depression could alone account for such a weakness. Besides, they flattered themselves that the enemy would be satisfied with their evacuation of Andalusia, and allow them to retire to the north of Spain, without requiring the surrender of their arms. They were, therefore, in favour of treating with the enemy instead of recommencing what in their opinion was an impossible combat.

The unfortunate General Dupont, carried away by the general demoralization, yielded, and gave his powers to General Chabert, who was selected because on the preceding day he had conducted himself at the head of his brigade with extreme intrepidity. General Marescot had declined accepting any other mission than that of accompanying, advising, and supporting General Chabert. M. de Villoutreys, who had already carried proposals to the commanders of the Spanish armies, was associated with Generals Chabert and Marescot.

They set out immediately to treat, not with General de la Peña, but with General Castaños himself, whom they found at the post-house half way between Baylen and Andujar. He had with him the Count de Tilly, one of the most influential members of the Junta of Seville, and the Captain-general of Grenada, Escalante. General Castaños, a mild, humane,

<sup>1</sup> All these particulars are extracted from the very curious, very secret, and voluminous proceedings instituted against General Dupont, from 1808 to 1811.

and discreet man, received the French officers with a politeness which they did not experience from the Captain-general Escalante, who made up for his weakness by his violence, or from Count Tilly, who conducted himself as a demagogue. Agreeably to their instructions, the French officers required, in the first place, that Vedel's and Dufour's divisions, which had taken no part in the battle, were not enveloped, and might therefore escape the fate of Barbou's division (that which had fought under General Dupont,) should not be comprehended in the capitulation, and that, as for Barbou's division, it should be allowed to retire upon Madrid, either laying down or not laying down its arms, according to the result of the negotiation. The Spanish generals obstinately refused these propositions, for they had in their hands the fate of Barbou's division; and if they consented to treat, it was to acquire the disposal of Vedel's and Dufour's divisions, which were not in their power. They insisted, therefore, that these should be included in the capitulation, granting, in other respects, to each of the French divisions a treatment conformable to its actual situation. They proposed, therefore, that Barbou's division should remain prisoners, while Vedel's and Dufour's divisions should be conveyed to France by sea.

The French negotiators strongly opposed these various pretensions, and at length, after long discussion, the parties agreed to the two following conditions: in the first place, that the three divisions should retire upon Madrid; secondly, that Vedel's and Dufour's divisions should make their retreat without laying down their arms; while Barbou's division, being enveloped, should surrender theirs. These conditions, grievous to the honour of the French arms, would save the three divisions, and they were subscribed to. The negotiators were just proceeding to digest them, when a fresh incident occurred to crown the misfortunes of that army of Andalusia, on which Fortune seemed to wreak her malice without pity. General Castaños received a note taken upon a young French officer, who had been sent from Madrid by General Savary to General Dupont. This note contained instructions despatched on the 16th or 17th of July, before the favourable news of the battle of Rio-Seco had reached Madrid. Before intelligence of this success was received there, great anxiety had been felt, many doubts entertained respecting the reduction of Saragossa, a general concentration of the troops of the South upon Madrid ordered, and, in consequence of this order of concentration, it was intimated to General Dupont, that, notwithstanding anterior instructions, it was time that he should return to La Mancha. On reading this precious despatch, which accident put into his hands, General Castaños comprehended perfectly well that to grant the return to Madrid would not be obtaining the voluntary evacuation of Andalusia and La Mancha on the part of the French, but merely lending one's self to their plan of concentration; that, even without the events of Baylen, they would have retired; that consequently the Spaniards would gain nothing by this capitulation but the sterile honour of taking Barbou's division, its artillery, and its small arms, with which it would soon be sup-

plied again at Madrid; that the return of these twenty thousand men to the north of Spain must therefore be prevented, as their presence there would not fail to re-establish the affairs of the new king.

When, therefore, the negotiators were proceeding to digest the conditions of the capitulation, and it was proposed to specify the return by land of the three divisions, one without arms, the two others with arms, General Castaños, always moderate in form, but this time peremptory in substance, declared that this article was not agreed to. The French generals then exclaimed against this sort of breach of faith, observing that, some moments before, the condition now contested had been admitted. This M. de Castaños acknowledged; but, to prove his good faith, he gave General Marescot General Savary's intercepted letter to read, and asked if, after what he had just learned, he could require him to adhere to the conditions first granted. General Marescot read the letter, and communicated it to his dismayed colleagues, who were obliged to treat upon new bases. In consequence, it was stipulated that Barbou's division should remain prisoners of war; that Vedel's and Dufour's divisions should merely engage to evacuate Spain by sea; that they should not lay down their arms, but that, in order to prevent all quarrels, they must be given up, and restored to them on their embarkation at San Lucar and Rota; that they should sail under the Spanish flag, and the Spanish generals engaged to cause this flag to be respected by the English. They then proceeded to some material details, and our negotiators obtained what is customary, permission for the officers to keep their baggage, and for the superior officers to have a wagon exempt from examination; but the knapsacks of the soldiers were to be searched, to ascertain that they were not carrying away any sacred utensils. A warm discussion took place on this article, defamatory of the soldiers, and which ought never to have been subscribed to. M. de Castaños, always extremely shrewd, alleged the fanaticism of the Spanish populace, to which it was necessary to give some satisfaction, and said that, if they could not announce that the knapsacks of the soldiers had been searched, the people would imagine that they were carrying away the sacred vessels of Cordova, and would not fail to fall upon them; that, for the rest, the French officers themselves should make this search, and that of course there would be nothing in it to wound the honour of the army. The French negotiators were disposed to yield; they did yield, and the whole was settled, except the definitive drawing up, which was postponed to the following day, the 21st.

While the grievous conditions of this capitulation were under discussion, and getting accepted one after another, an aide-de-camp of General Vedel's, and Captain Baste, of the seamen of the guard, arrived at the place of the conferences. These officers came to plead the interests of Vedel's division on the following grounds. When, on the morning of the 20th, General Vedel, better informed, had learned the misfortune which had befallen General Dupont's division, partly through his fault, he was sorely grieved, and he immedi-

ately offered to renew the attack in the night of the ensuing day, (that between the 20th and 21st,) promising to cut his way through General Reding's corps, and to extricate his general-in-chief, if the latter would but make an effort on his part. He added that, if the general-in-chief would not venture, he ought at least not to sacrifice Vedel's division, which, from its situation, totally different from that of Barbou's division, for it was not enveloped, had a right to totally different treatment. He directed Captain Baste and one of his aides-de-camp to convey this message to General Dupont. Captain Baste, intelligent, intrepid, fond of mixing himself up in matters of command, urged General Dupont to authorize a desperate attack to be attempted in the following night, abandoning all the baggage and even the artillery, if he must, setting in motion all who were able to stand, and endeavouring to force a passage, General Dupont by his left, General Vedel by his right. It is evident that success was possible; but General Dupont, still overwhelmed with dejection, scarcely heard what was said to him, alleged the deep discouragement of his army, a negotiation already begun, a treaty almost concluded, perhaps even signed on the road to Andujar, and sent off Captain Baste to the negotiators themselves to plead the cause of Vedel's division.

It was in consequence of this reference that Captain Baste appeared at the place of the conferences. He first addressed himself to the French negotiators, whom he found fatigued by a long disputation, and not capable of renewing a discussion in which they had always been beaten. Captain Baste, having come from a place where the greatest ardour and indignation were felt at the bare idea of surrender, and transferred to another where all was dejection and despair, could not comprehend sentiments which he did not feel, and returned indignant to General Dupont.

After this incident, the three French negotiators accompanied the three Spanish negotiators to Andujar, where was to be definitively drawn up the capitulation devoted to so grievous an immortality; and Captain Baste returned to Baylen, to the camp of General Dupont, to report what had passed. At this account, General Dupont, awakened to all his sentiments of honour, directed Captain Baste to advise General Vedel to set out immediately for La Carolina and the Sierra Morena, in order to get away in all haste towards Madrid. Generals Vedel and Dufour might take back nine or ten thousand men to Madrid, and, by gaining the start of the Spaniards, it is beyond doubt that they would have many chances of successfully effecting their retreat. This would be more than half the French army saved from that cruel catastrophe by a noble inspiration of General Dupont's, who well knew to what a degree he should thereby aggravate the lot of the other half.

Captain Baste set out instantly for General Vedel's camp, situated between Baylen and La Carolina, and brought him, along with the melancholy result of the conferences at Andujar, the authorization to retire upon Madrid. Without losing a minute, General Vedel issued orders for departure, and in that same night

all his troops set themselves in motion with those of General Dufour. In consequence of the continual marches backward and forward of these two divisions, six hundred men at least were lame. They had had some wounded in the action at Menjibar, and so they must leave behind seven or eight hundred men destined for slaughter. It was a sore affliction to part from them, but such is war! The welfare of all, constantly placed above the welfare of some, hardens the heart, or disposes it at least to a continual resignation to each other's misfortunes. They left their unhappy comrades in the villages bordering the road, and pursued with incredible precipitation the route for Madrid. By daybreak next morning, the 21st, they were at La Carolina, and pushed on, notwithstanding the heat of the weather, to St. Helena.

A few hours after the departure of the column, the Spaniards at Baylen were informed of it, both in General Reding's camp and in that of General de la Peña, which soon rang with the cries of cannibals. The French, it was alleged, had broken the truce, a charge for which there was very little foundation; for nothing prevented Vedel's division, which was out of reach, from moving, and the Spaniards moreover did not impose upon themselves that immovability, since they had been for thirty-six hours incessantly manœuvring about Barbou's division, for the purpose of investing it more completely; which really constituted an infraction of the truce, but which the French had neither complained of nor revenged, for want of the means of enforcing respect under their calamity. But no reason, no sense of justice, were left to those furious foes, who had become conquerors by chance. They all cried out that Barbou's entire division must be exterminated. They forgot that six thousand French, pushed to extremity, were capable of being roused from a temporary despondence by a noble despair, and of cutting their way through their enemies. Perhaps it is to be regretted that they did not follow up the suggestions of their barbarity, and give rise to that noble despair which, by raising the courage of all, would have saved all. Be this as it may, numerous officers hastened to Andujar to carry the news of the departure of Vedel's and Dufour's divisions, and to report the exasperation of the Spanish army. The Spanish negotiators immediately made themselves the organs of an ignoble military populace, declaring that the most terrible treatment should be inflicted on Barbou's division, unless Vedel's and Dufour's divisions returned to their first position. The answer was easy; for what more could be done against Barbou's division than make prisoners of it? To threaten to put prisoners to death would have been infamous; and it would have been necessary to reply to those who dared utter such a threat as one replies to murderers. But the hero of Genoa, the inflexible Masséna, was not there. His officers hurried to the unhappy Dupont; they beset him with fresh importunities; they told him that he was likely to occasion the massacre of his faithful division, that which had fought so gallantly by his side, and all for the purpose of saving two divisions which were the real cause of the ruin of the



army: and this, indeed, was true in regard to the latter. Yielding once more, he sent a formal counter-order to General Vedel.

On the arrival of the counter-order, there was a unanimous outbreak in Vedel's division, which insisted on continuing its march upon Madrid. Another officer had to be despatched after it, charged to render General Vedel responsible for all consequences if he persisted in retiring. General Vedel then assembled his officers, communicated to them the situation in which they stood, represented the danger in which they should place their brethren in arms, and prevailed upon them to submit. The troops, less compliant, would not accede to these proposals, and, in a country where solitary individuals would not have been murdered, they would almost all have deserted. In Spain they were obliged to keep together and to act all in common. They submitted, therefore, and returned from St. Helena to La Carolina, and from La Carolina to Guarroman, resigned to share the lot of Barbou's division.

At length, on the 22d, that fatal capitulation was brought from Andujar to Baylen, to General Dupont. He hesitated several times before he signed it. The unhappy chief struck his forehead and flung down the pen: then, urged by those men who had all been so brave under fire, and who were all so weak out of fire, he wrote his name, once so glorious, at the foot of that document, which was destined to be the everlasting torment of his life. Why had he not fallen at Albeck, at Halle, at Friedland, or even at Baylen? How deeply he regretted it subsequently, before judges who inflicted on him a dishonouring condemnation!

Hunger had been the cruel ally of the Spaniards in this negotiation. While Barbou's division was kept blockaded, it had not been allowed a morsel of bread, and ever since the evening of the 18th our poor soldiers had not received any distribution. They had nothing but a few remnants of rations to subsist on, so that on the 22d there were many of them who had not tasted food for three days. They were under the olive-trees, dying of hunger, gasping for breath, without even a draught of water to allay their thirst.

The capitulation being signed, General Castaños consented to grant them provisions. He could be humane, since Fortune had just prepared for him such a triumph that he could afford to be generous, as men are when the heart is satisfied. For the rest, he showed himself worthy of a triumph owing more to chance than to valour and genius, by genuine humanity, perfect modesty, and a conduct which denoted extraordinary discretion. He said to our officers, with the most honourable frankness, "De la Cuesta, Blake, and I, were not in favour of the insurrection. We yielded to the national movement. But this movement is so unanimous that it acquires chances of success. Let not Napoleon insist upon an impossible conquest; let him not oblige us to throw ourselves into the arms of the English, who are hateful to us, and whose assistance we have hitherto rejected. Let him restore our king to us, requiring such conditions as can satisfy him, and the two nations will be reconciled for ever."

On the following day our soldiers filed before

the Spanish army. They were cut to the heart. They were too young to be able to compare their present humiliation with their past triumphs; but among the officers there were some who had seen Melas's and Mack's Austrians, Hohenlohe's and Blücher's Prussians, file off before them, and they were overwhelmed with shame. Vedel's and Dufour's divisions did not lay down their arms, which, however, they would have to do by and by; but Barbou's division underwent that humiliation, and at this moment was sorry that it had not rather perished to the last man.

The French troops were immediately marched off for San Lucar and Rota, where they were to be embarked for France in Spanish vessels. Their route was made to avoid the two great cities of Cordova and Seville, in order to withdraw them from the popular fury, and lay through the less important towns of Bujalance, Ecija, Carmona, Alcala, Utrera, and Lebrija. In all these places the conduct of the Spanish populace was atrocious. Those unfortunate French, who had behaved like brave men, who had made war without cruelty, who had suffered without revenging the massacre of their sick and wounded, were pelted with stones, and often attacked with knives, by men, women, and children. At Carmona, at Ecija, the women spat in their faces, and children flung mud at them. They trembled with rage, and, though disarmed, were more than once tempted to take a terrible revenge, by seizing such as they could lay hands on and making weapons of them: but their officers restrained them, in order to prevent a general massacre. Care was taken to make them pass the night outside villages and towns, and to collect them in the open field like droves of cattle, to spare them still more cruel treatment. At Lebrija, and in the towns near the coast, they were stopped and doomed to tarry, upon pretext that the Spanish vessels were not ready. But they soon learned the cause of this delay. The Junta of Seville, governed by the lowest demagogue passions, had refused to acknowledge the capitulation of Baylen, and declared that the French should be detained prisoners of war, under various pretexts, all illusory, and false even to impudence. One of the reasons alleged by this Junta was, that they were not sure of obtaining the consent of the English to the passage by sea—a false reason, for the English, notwithstanding their animosity, manifested a generous pity for our prisoners, and, as we shall see, soon suffered other troops, which they would have been greatly interested in detaining, to pass by sea. Our officers addressed themselves to the Captain-general, Thomas de Morla, remonstrating against this unworthy violation of the law of nations, but received from him only the most indecorous answers, to the effect that an army which had violated all laws, divine and human, had forfeited the right of appealing to the justice of the Spanish nation.

At Lebrija the furious populace broke, in the night, into a prison, in which was one of our regiments of dragoons, and slaughtered seventy-five, of whom twelve were officers. But for the clergy, they would have put all of them to death. Lastly, the generals, who had committed the serious fault of separating them-

selves from their troops, in order to travel apart with their baggage, were severely punished for having thus withdrawn themselves. No sooner had they arrived at Port St. Mary, with their wagons exempt from examination, than the people, unable to contain themselves at the sight of those vehicles, crammed, as they said, with all the riches of Cordova, fell upon them, broke them in pieces, and plundered them. Men belonging to the Spanish authorities were not the last to assist in this pillage. But, though these wagons contained the whole of the savings of the officers, and even the chest of the army, no more was found in them than eleven or twelve hundred thousand reals, according to the Spanish newspapers themselves, that is to say about 800,000 francs. That was the whole result of the sacking of Cordova. The French generals had well nigh been slaughtered, and they escaped the fury of the populace only by throwing themselves into boats. They were conducted to Cadiz, and detained prisoners till their embarkation for France, where other hardships not less cruel awaited them.

Such was that famous capitulation of Baylen, the name of which, in our boyhood, rang in our ears as frequently as that of Austerlitz or Jena. At this period, the ordinary persecutors of misfortune, judging of that deplorable event without knowledge and without pity, imputed to cowardice and to anxiety to save the wagons laden with the spoils of Cordova the terrible disaster which befell the French army. Thus it is that the baseness of courtiers, ever rancorous against those whom power gives it the signal for immolating, is accustomed to judge! There were many faults, but not a single infraction of honour, in that deplorable campaign of Andalusia. The first fault was that of Napoleon himself, who, after exciting, by the events of Bayonne, an unparalleled popular fury, before which every operation of war became extremely perilous, contented himself with sending 8000 men to Valencia, and 12,000 to Cordova, apparently conceiving that these were sufficient. After this fault of Napoleon's came the military fault of General Dupont and his lieutenant, General Vedel. General Dupont, leaving Cordova, to move nearer to the defiles of the Sierra Morena, ought, from this very motive, to have drawn so near to them as to close them completely, and, to this end, to have placed himself at Baylen, which would have rendered all separation of his divisions impossible. After committing the fault of establishing himself at Andujar and not at Baylen, it was a fault not less serious not to have followed General Vedel, when he sent him back in the evening of the 16th to Baylen, and, this fault committed, in not decamping on the 17th instead of having decamped on the 18th, in having, on the day of the battle of Baylen, engaged partially, successively, and in parallel line to the enemy, with the forces at his disposal, instead of making an attack and in close column on his left; lastly, in having, after the most honourable efforts of valour, given way too much to the general despondency. The fault

of General Vedel was his coming on the 16th with his whole division to Andujar, and leaving Baylen uncovered, (for which the approbation of the general-in-chief himself was but a very imperfect excuse;) his great fault was following General Dufour to La Carolina, thus leaving Baylen a second time without any precaution for defending it; and, lastly, when undeceived at La Carolina, not having returned immediately, but, on the contrary, wasted the whole of the 19th in vain loitering. Lastly, the fault of the generals about General Dupont was, to urge him to the capitulation, and, after fighting valiantly on the field of battle of Baylen, showing the most culpable weakness in the general negotiation, yielding to the threats of the Spanish generals like the most cowardly of men, while they were some of the bravest: a fresh proof that moral courage and physical courage are two very different qualities.

Thus a serious error of Napoleon's in regard to Spain, a military position ill chosen by General Dupont, too great delay in changing it, an ill-planned battle, false movements of General Vedel's, demoralization of generals and soldiers—such were the causes of the cruel reverse of Baylen. All that has been said in addition is mere calumny. The long file of baggage, it has often been repeated, brought upon us all our misfortunes. Supposing that a general had been capable of so stupid a calculation as to sacrifice his honour, his military profession, the marshal's baton that was reserved for him, for a few hundred thousand francs, a sum far inferior to what Napoleon gave to the least favoured of his lieutenants, eight or ten wagons would have carried all the pretended riches of Cordova in gold and silver plate, and the question related to several hundred carriages, the extraordinary number of which was evidently occasioned by the moral state of the country, in which not a sick or wounded man could be left behind. At last, as we have seen, those famous baggage-wagons were plundered, and the chest of the army carried off: it contained not more than three or four hundred thousand francs. All that can be said, in short, is, that General Dupont, intelligent, capable, brilliant under fire, had not the indomitable firmness of Masséna at Genoa and Essling. But he was ill, wounded, exhausted by a heat of forty degrees; his soldiers were boys, worn out with fatigue and hunger; disasters followed close upon disasters, accidents upon accidents; and if we sound this tragic event to the bottom, we shall see that the Emperor himself, who placed so many men in a false position, was not in this case the most irreproachable. Still we must add, for the interest of military morality, that, in these extreme situations, the resolution to die is the only worthy, the only salutary resolution; for certainly, on General Vedel's arrival, the resolution to die in the attempt to cut a passage through Reding's division would have enabled the two parts of the French army to join, and to get triumphantly out of the scrape, instead of finding themselves humbled and prisoners. By sacrificing on the field of battle one-fourth

\* If I venture to express these opinions on purely special questions, it is because they are conformable to plain common sense, and supported by the soundest of all irrefragable authorities, Napoleon and Berthier. In fact, in all that relates to the military operations of General Dupont, VOL. III.—A

these judgments are but the ideas of Napoleon and Berthier, drawn for the former from the questions which the *procureur-général* put by his direction to the accused, and, for the second, from the speech which he delivered during the proceedings.

of the men who afterwards died in a cruel captivity, one might have transformed into a triumph the most signal of the reverses of that extraordinary period.<sup>1</sup>

The news of this strange disaster, deemed impossible at Madrid, since the army of General Dupont had been increased to 20,000 men by the successive despatch of Vedel's and Gohbert's divisions, spread rapidly, at first by the secret communications of the Spaniards, then by some officers who had escaped and got from post to post into La Mancha, and lastly by the arrival of M. de Villoutreys himself, who was commissioned to carry to the Emperor the convention of Baylen. The details of such a reverse struck with dismay all who were French or attached to the fortune of France. The Spaniards were intoxicated with pride, and they had a right to be proud, not of the ability or valour displayed on this occasion, though they had behaved gallantly, but of the obstacles of all kinds which their patriotic insurrection had created for us, obstacles which had been the principal cause of General Dupont's misfortunes. The twenty thousand men who were destined to conquer Andalusia, and, in case of ill-success, to fall back upon La Mancha and cover Madrid, being all at once withdrawn, the situation became most difficult. It was evident that the insurgents of Valencia, Carthagena, and Murcia, giving a hand to those of Grenada and Seville, elated by their unforeseen triumph, drawing after them those of Estremadura and La Mancha, who had not yet ventured to show themselves, would soon march upon Madrid. Though the number of those who were regimented with troops of the line was greatly exaggerated, and there were no numerous bodies but the bands of rovers, who, by the title of guerillas, covered the country, intercepting convoys, slaughtering the wounded and the sick, and ravaging Spain much more than the French armies themselves, still General Castaños might arrive with the troops of Valencia, Murcia, Carthagena, Grenada, Seville, Badajoz, that is to say, at the head of sixty or seventy thousand men, greatly encouraged by the

events at Baylen, and all we had to oppose to them were Musnier's, Morlot's, and Frère's divisions, Rey's brigade, and the imperial guard. All these corps, without wounded and sick, ought to have furnished about 30,000 men in line, and in the then state of health of the troops would supply twenty or twenty-five thousand at most. Nevertheless, with an energetic general, Murat, for instance, instead of Joseph, one might beat 60,000 Spaniards with 20,000 French, and make the conquerors of Baylen fall back upon La Mancha and Andalusia, if they should appear before Madrid. The French, it is true, had behind them a great capital, which they were obliged to guard and to awe, but it was possible (as Napoleon has since observed) to bring towards that capital a considerable reinforcement, sufficient to daunt the enemy, within or without. Marshal Bessières, after his victory at Rio-Secco, had marched towards Galicia, and was preparing to penetrate into it. It was necessary to call him back to Burgos, and to limit his part to the covering of the road to Bayonne. There might then be taken from him Lefebvre's brigade, temporarily detached from Morlot's division, before the victory of Rio-Secco was known, Mouton's division composed of old regiments, the 26th chasseurs recently arrived, the 51st and 48d of the line ready to arrive at Bayonne, (and forming part of twelve old regiments called to Spain,) which would present a reinforcement of about 10,000 excellent troops, capable of fighting against all the armies of Spain. Marshal Bessières would besides have, with the marching troops and the movable columns placed at Vittoria, Burgos, and Aranda, about fourteen or fifteen thousand men. Lastly, the 14th and 44th of the line, also forming part of the old regiments called to Spain, had strengthened the corps of General Verdier before Saragossa and increased it to 17,000 men. One might, in strictness, whether the new attack prepared against Saragossa, and the success of which was daily announced as probable and near at hand, were executed or deferred, detach these two regiments and take

<sup>1</sup> I here express, from pure love of truth, and especially from the disgust that I have always felt for injustice towards the unfortunate, this opinion concerning the affair of Baylen, which will shock all the prejudices of the imperial period. But every man of upright mind, after reading the documents which I have had in my possession, will not be able to pronounce any other judgment than I here pronounce myself. These documents have been of different sorts, and are infinitely curious and conclusive. In the first place there are in the dépôt of war several volumes of papers relative to the affair of Baylen, with the models of the interrogatories, which were dictated by the Emperor, and which reveal the opinion that he formed respecting the military faults committed in that campaign. There is his correspondence with General Savary, which forms not the least important of these documents, the correspondence of General Dupont with his lieutenants, and, lastly, the proceedings instituted against Generals Dupont, Marwot, Vedel, Chabert, &c. Napoleon had resolved, in a first paroxysm of rage, to have all the authors of the capitulation shot. Very soon, on the remonstrances of the wise, and always wise, Cambacérès, and under the inspiration of his own heart, which would have been sufficient to stop him after the first moment was past, he referred the decision on the affair of Baylen to a tribunal of honour composed of grandees of the Empire. The sentence pronounced was degradation, and an imperial decree ordered three manuscript copies of the entire proceedings to be deposited, one with the Senate, one in the dépôt of war, and the third in the archives of the high imperial court. When, after the Restoration, General Dupont was taken into favour, (and at that moment he became, in my opinion, more culpable than at Baylen,) he obtained an ordi-

nance from the king, cancelling the imperial decree, and prescribing the destruction of the three copies of the proceedings. The two copies belonging to the Senate and the dépôt of war were readily found and destroyed. The third, assigned to the high imperial court, was not in the archives of that court, because it had never been organized. It was in the hands of one of the great families created by the Empire, and there it has remained. It is this valuable manuscript, in which every thing is found in my opinion completely cleared up, which contains the justification of General Dupont, that, at least, which one can furnish with reason and justice. If General Dupont had succeeded in destroying it, he would have destroyed the elements of his reinstatement with posterity: an evident proof that we ought always to trust to truth, and to leave that to act. For the rest, whoever reads in those proceedings the judgment of Prince Berthier, for each of the grandees of the Empire delivered his own, will there find, besides a rare superiority of reason and an honourable humanity, of which other personages, and particularly personages of the civil order, did not set an example, nearly the same judgment that I express here. Let me add that Napoleon himself, subsequently influenced by more justice, frequently repeated, "Dupont was more unfortunate than culpable." He then felt himself the assaults of misfortune, and, with his great mind and his great heart, he appreciated better to what point one ought to make allowance for circumstances, in order to judge more equitably. For the rest, I have not, in my career, met with any of the actors who figure in this narrative, either with them or their families, and what I say proceeds from a pure feeling of impartiality.

them to Madrid. In case of the reduction of Saragossa, they would arrive with their material force and a great moral effect to boot. In the contrary case, the capture of Saragossa would only be retarded, and Madrid would be covered from any attempt, and the enemy, whoever he might be that should approach it, must be driven off to a distance. Spain, after all, with the 30,000 men who might be collected at Madrid, the 14,000 who would be left with Marshal Bessières, General Verdier's 17,000, General Duhesme's 11,000 in Catalonia, and General Reille's 7000, would still contain about 80,000 French; and assuredly it was possible with such a force to make head against the Spaniards, without taking into account that fresh reinforcements, prepared by Napoleon, would be arriving every moment at Bayonne. But there was required a military prince, we repeat it, not a mild, discreet, well-informed prince, but a soldier, though, in moments of peril, he might recollect that he was the brother of Napoleon.\*

There was consequently no reason to despair, since, by calling back Marshal Bessières from Galicia to Old Castille, by limiting his duty to guarding the Madrid road, by drawing to one's self part of the forces under him, besides a portion of the troops besieging Saragossa, and lastly those that were soon to pass through Bayonne, one would be enabled to keep Madrid, and to beat the insurgents who should dare to show themselves under its walls. But the unfortunate King of Spain had not the case-hardened character of his brother. The joy of the Spaniards who were hostile to him, and they were far the greater number, the despondence of those who had attached themselves to his cause, the perplexity of his ministers, the want of firmness of the French generals about him, his embarrassment in finding himself amidst a city that was strange to him, all contributed to shake his soul profoundly, and to impel him to take the disastrous resolution to leave his new capital ten days after he had entered it. He ought to have braved everything rather than resolve to evacuate Madrid, for the mere moral effect could not fail to be immense. While he was there, the events of the war might be considered as alternations of misfortune and success. Rio-Seco might be opposed to Baylen, though not so important; the justly anticipated reduction of Saragossa might soon be set down against the resistance of Valencia; and Madrid continuing to be occupied served for a proof of the superiority of the French in the Peninsula. The insurrection might still feel doubtful of its cause, and the English, presuming less on its power, would not have made such mighty efforts to second it. But the evacuation of Madrid looking like a formal avowal of the new royalty that it was incapable of retaining by force the kingdom which it pretended to have received from Providence. What Providence wills, it knows how

to sustain, and suffers it not to fall. From this moment all Spain would be astir, and the particular disgrace of Baylen, which lighted upon a few generals, was destined to be succeeded by a cruel confusion for Napoleon, the confusion of his policy, a consequence of the total evacuation of almost the whole of Spain.

General Savary was still at Madrid, though Joseph, disliking both his person and his way of thinking and acting, had done his best to get rid of him. General Savary was the representative of the system of military executions, of application to keep the French army well, let it cost Spain what it might, of absolute submission to the will of Napoleon, and of indifference to the orders of Joseph, when they were not strictly conformable to those emanating from the imperial staff. Joseph, desirous to make himself popular in Spain, and consequently disposed to sacrifice the interest of the army to that of the Spaniards, felt a deep aversion for General Savary, and the whole of the things which he represented at his court. Accordingly, he applied to Napoleon to grant him Marshal Jourdan, whom he had been in the habit of employing at Naples, who was upright, discreet, quiet, not more active than was requisite for the indolence of his master, and not at all disposed to prostrate himself before Napoleon, whom he comprehended little and liked still less. Joseph, impatient to have Marshal Jourdan, and to have done with General Savary, had given the latter to understand that he might as well set off; and General Savary, always intractable unless towards Napoleon, replied that he should be delighted to leave him, as soon as he should receive permission from the Emperor, his only master. While awaiting this permission, he had remained at Madrid, drawing every day, in his correspondence with the Emperor, pictures of men and things that were far from flattering. After the disaster of Baylen, Joseph was too happy to have General Savary about him, to share the responsibility of the important resolutions which he had to take, and he consulted him with much more deference than usual. General Savary, who was not a weak man, but who saw how incapable this unfortunate monarch was to maintain himself in Madrid with 20,000 men, thought it more prudent to let him leave it, and he even advised him to retire as soon as possible. "And what will the Emperor say?" asked Joseph, meanwhile with some uneasiness. "The Emperor will scold," replied General Savary; "his fits of anger are boisterous, you know, but they don't kill. He no doubt would stay here; but what is possible for him is not so for others. One disaster like that of Baylen is enough; let us not have a second. When we shall be upon the Ebro, well concentrated, solidly established, and able to resume the offensive, the Emperor will decide what is to be done, and send you the necessary reinforcements."

\* These observations are not wholly derived from my own mind. When reflecting upon these events, I always thought that there were left, even after the disaster of Baylen, sufficient forces to continue to occupy Madrid; but I have lately found a note of the Emperor's, dated Bordeaux, the 24 of August, which confirms me in this opinion, and it is from this very note that I extract the calculations which I have just given, as well as the indication of the concentrations that might be effected. I have only reduced a

few exaggerated figures in that note relating to the force of the corps remaining in Spain. Napoleon, solicitous to induce his brother to be firm, naturally flattered the situation in some degree, and, between doubtful figures, always preferred the highest. Though he reckoned more than 80,000 men in Spain, after the loss of Dupont's 30,000, there was scarcely that number, diseases and the fire had made such ravages.

King Joseph afforded General Savary no occasion for repeating this advice a second time, and issued orders for retreating from Madrid. But there were at Madrid more than 8000 sick and wounded, and an immense quantity of military stores accumulated in the Buen Retiro, which had begun to be converted into a fortress. It would take therefore much time, and require great exertion, to remove so many men and such a mass of *matériel*. They fell to work without delay. Unfortunately the ill disposition of the inhabitants added to the difficulty of the operation. The rumour of the retreat of the French soon spread at sight of their preparations, and the Spaniards, transported with joy, resolved to render this retreat as disastrous as they could, collected all their carts, piled them up in heaps, and set fire to them. They chose rather to destroy those vehicles than to suffer them to be serviceable to the French. Hence the transport of the wounded, the sick, the administrations, was attended with much more difficulty, and it was several days before the troops could be allowed to march.

On the mere rumour of such a resolution, all who had for a moment espoused the cause of the French disappeared. Two of Joseph's ministers, Messrs. Pinuela and Cevallos, absented themselves without the slightest explanation. The latter, in particular, who afterwards became a pamphleteer, intent on defaming France, held a conduct worthy of the rest of his life. Long the base flatterer of the Prince of the Peace, afterwards his implacable enemy, the obsequious servant of Ferdinand VII. during his two months' reign, a minister of Joseph's, whom he ought never to have thought of serving, he went off disgracefully on the news of Baylen, saying nothing to the French whom he was leaving, but telling the Spaniards, to whom he went back, that, if he had consented to be Joseph's minister, it was that he might have permission to return to Spain, and the occasion to attach himself again to a cause, the triumph of which he had always foreseen and desired. Old Azanza, and Messrs. O'Farrill and Urquijo, acting like grave men who had known their own mind in accepting the French royalty, that is to say, who aimed at the regeneration of Spain, did not desert Joseph, but followed him with hearts rent with grief. M. de Caballero, treated by his comrades with an insulting contempt which he deserved much less than M. de Cevallos, remained at Joseph's court as in an asylum. Among the grandees, the Prince of Castel Franco, who had confronted the storm, found his courage fail him at the last moment, and did not depart, after promising to do so. Not one of those who followed Joseph could take a Spanish servant along with him. All persons of that condition stayed at Madrid. There were more than two thousand individuals employed in the palaces and the stables of the Crown, on account of the great number of magnificent horses usually kept by the Spanish royal family. For fear of being carried away, almost all of them stole off in one night. Joseph could scarcely obtain any attendance in his retreat.

He set out on the 2d of August for Chamartin, without any insulting demonstration, for his person had gained a sort of respect. The

people beheld the French troops march away with a perfectly neutral joy, but durst not offend them, for they trembled at the mere sight of them, and, notwithstanding a well-founded presumption on this occasion, they had a vague impression that they might see them again. From the time of this retreat, Joseph had not a creature in Spain on his side, neither the populace, whom he had never had, nor the middling and higher classes, who, after hesitating a moment for fear of France and in the hope of the meliorations which might be expected from her, now hesitated no longer, since France herself seemed to acknowledge that she was conquered, by retiring from Madrid.

The army fell back slowly, by way of Baytrago, Somo-Sierra, Aranda, and Burgos. Having found numerous traces of cruelty upon its route, it could not repress its exasperation, and revenged itself in more than one place. Rage being aggravated by hunger, the troops destroyed a great deal upon their passage, and left everywhere marks of their presence, which increased the hatred of the Spaniards to the highest degree. Joseph, apprehensive of the effects which would thus be provoked, strove in vain to prevent the excesses committed along the route. But he only offended the army itself, the soldiers saying that he ought to interest himself a little more about them by whom he was supported, than about the Spaniards who rejected him. When things go on ill, disharmony is associated with disaster. Joseph's ministers agreed very ill with the French generals, and the new court of Spain with the army, which was its sole stay. Sadness prevailed among the chiefs, irritation among the soldiers, the fury of revenge among the populations through which they passed.

King Joseph and those about him, more and more disheartened at every step, did not conceive themselves in safety even at Burgos. They were afraid lest they should still have upon their rear the whole country comprehended between Burgos and the Biscayan provinces; and they judged it proper to proceed to the line of the Ebro, taking Miranda for the head-quarters. They had brought Marshal Bessières upon their right, and purposed to bring General Verdier upon their left, caring little about throwing away all the efforts which had hitherto been made for taking Saragossa, and which, at this moment, were on the point of being crowned with success. Not till they were behind the Ebro did they recover some assurance, having, besides the 20,000 men from Madrid, the 20 and odd thousand of Marshal Bessières, General Verdier's 17,000 and all the reserves at Bayonne.

To all these faults was to be added that of abandoning so much ground, so many works, and in particular those accumulated before Saragossa. Since the last attacks, the means of all kinds had been considerably augmented for reducing that obstinate city, which proved that the most skillfully-combined defences of art are less powerful than the courage of inhabitants determined to perish in their houses. Two old regiments, the 14th, so fortunate and so heroic at Eylau, and the 44th, which distinguished itself in the same battle and at Dantzic, had just arrived, and increased the besieging corps to sixteen or seventeen thou-

sand men. The heavy artillery, necessary for battering down the convents which flanked the wall enclosing the city, had been conveyed from Pampeluna by the Ebro and the canal of Aragon. The Emperor's aid-de-camp, Colonel Lacoste, of the engineers, had made skilful dispositions for effecting in a short time large breaches in the outer wall and battering down the strong buildings which served it for a support. All being ready, on the morning of the 4th of August, 60 pieces of ordnance, mortars, howitzers, sixteen-pounders, poured their fire upon the city and the convent of Santa-Engrazia, which is in the centre of the enclosing wall, at a salient angle which it forms at about the middle of its extent. On the left and right of this convent are two gates, by which it was proposed to penetrate, and then to proceed rapidly through a tolerably wide street toward the Cosso, a sort of inner boulevard which runs through the whole length of Saragossa; and, once masters of that, the besiegers might consider themselves in possession of the whole city. The French artillery having about noon silenced that of the enemy, and made large breaches in the wall of enclosure, the columns for storming were formed, and two of these columns, one on the right under General Habert, one on the left under General Grandjean, rushed to the battered wall, shouting *Vive l'Empereur!* The Spaniards, who had not made their resistance consist in the defence of an enclosure which was neither bastioned nor terraced, but in their barricaded streets and their embattled houses, awaited our soldiers on the other side of the two breaches, and, as soon as they had passed them, received the assailants with a shower of balls. The right column, the more fortunate of the two, entered first, and, destroying the obstacles that stopped the left towards the gate of the Carmelites, assisted it to enter in its turn. In spite of the fire from the houses, it then threw itself into the street, that of Santa-Engrazia, which descended perpendicularly towards the Cosso, the principal object of our attacks. Three great barricades, armed with cannon, divided that street. Our soldiers, hurried away by their ardour, carried these barricades by assault, took thirteen pieces of cannon, killed the Spaniards who served them, and debouched on the Cosso, considering themselves already as masters of the city. But on their rear they left insurgents, some, peasants and monks, others, soldiers of the line, entrenched in the houses, and resolved to let them be set on fire before they would leave them. The French were therefore obliged to turn back to dislodge them, before they established themselves on the Cosso. This they did, fighting from house to house, losing men in taking them, and revenging themselves when they were taken by the death of those to whose fire they had been exposed.

The left column had found a serious obstacle in its way: this was a vast edifice, the convent of the Carmelites, which had been surrounded with a ditch, and in which were lodged many Spanish troops under experienced officers, as in an entrenched camp. It had been necessary to take this convent, which had been done with vigour, but not without great loss. This business being finished, they, and the right column as well, had begun to attack with small arms

one house after another, while the artillery continued to throw in bombs and balls, which, passing over the heads of our soldiers, proceeded to punish and ravage the city. This horrible conflict had been kept up ever since morning with incredible animosity, when our weary soldiers began to disperse themselves in the houses which they had conquered, to seek provisions, which they were in great need of, particularly wine, with which they knew that all the towns of Spain were abundantly supplied. In this interior search they found unfortunately the wreck of their valour; for presently half our troops were overpowered with sleep and intoxication. In spite of all the exertions of our generals, most of them wounded, they could not rouse the soldiers either to the fight or at least to provide for their own safety. If the Spaniards had suspected the state in which the assailants were, they might have made them repent the sanguinary success of the day. It was necessary to wait till morning to recommence and to prosecute the difficult conquest of Saragossa, house by house, and street by street. We had, besides many officers wounded, and especially the two generals-in-chief, Verdier and Lefebvre-Desnoettes, the first by a ball in the thigh, the second suffering from a violent contusion of the ribs—we had about eleven or twelve hundred men *hors de combat*, three hundred of whom were dead, and eight or nine hundred wounded. The two old regiments, the 14th and the 44th, fancied that in the streets of Saragossa they found themselves again in the musketry fire of Eylau.

Next morning, General Verdier being unable, from his wound, to resume the command of the attacks, General Lefebvre-Desnoettes, taking his place, rallied the troops dispersed in the houses, barricaded himself, for the account of the French, the conquered streets leading to the Cosso, and resolved, in order to spare blood, to employ sapping and mining, conceiving that he was not bound to show much tenderness for a Spanish city for which the Spaniards felt none themselves.

In this state of things arrived the news of the disaster of Baylen, of the evacuation of Madrid, and of the general retreat upon the Ebro. Our generals and our soldiers were extremely mortified to see so much blood spilt to no purpose, and the prey on which they had been so obstinately bent ready to escape from their clutches. As the corps of Saragossa was to form at Tudela, on the Ebro, the left of the new position which the French army was about to occupy in Spain, the wounded were first sent off, then the artillery that could be removed, the rest being spiked, and the troops marched, vexation in their hearts and grief in their faces, humbled to the lowest point at having to fall back before soldiers whom they held of little account, notwithstanding the obstinacy displayed in the streets of Saragossa by peasants and monks. They brought back about 16,000 men to Tudela, some of old, the others recently, seasoned to war, but all capable of heating in the open field three or four times as many Spaniards as they numbered men in their ranks.

In Catalonia, the French had been obliged to shut themselves up within the walls of Bar-

celona. General Duhesme had at first endeavored to suppress the insurrection in the south of that province, that he might be able to communicate with Valencia; but, having no need to concern himself about what was passing in that quarter, since the retreat of Marshal Moncey, he had then attempted to act in the north, in order to maintain his communications with France, and to give a hand to General Reille's column. He had marched at the head of the principal part of his troops by Mataro and Hostalrich, upon Girona, with the intention to possess himself of this latter place, one of the most important in Catalonia, which the French had been wrong not to occupy. On reaching Mataro, he had been obliged to take that little town by assault, and to give it up to the fury of the soldiery, daily more exasperated at the barbarous war that was carried on against them. From Mataro he had marched upon Girona, which he had hoped to surprise and to carry by escalade. His grenadiers, provided with ladders, had already climbed the enclosure of the town, and were about to enter it, when they were repulsed by the people, mixed with soldiers and monks. Without heavy artillery, and despairing of carrying the place by main force, General Duhesme returned to Barcelona, obliged to fight incessantly by the way, and to sack villages, to revenge the murder of his soldiers. During this incursion it had not been possible for him to communicate with General Reille, who had gone on his part to Figueras, but not been able to advance further. All that the latter could do had been to revictual the fort of Figueras, occupied by a small French garrison, and to deposit there a sufficient quantity of provisions and ammunition. But, whenever he had attempted to push further, he had been assailed on all sides by the bold Miquelets, baffling by their swiftness and their skill in firing the courage of our young soldiers, who were not qualified to run after mountaineers accustomed to the hunting of the chamois.<sup>1</sup> General Reille had thus sustained considerable losses to no purpose, and, being informed of the return of General Duhesme to Barcelona, he had confined himself to the guarding of the frontier, waiting, before he attempted any thing, for new means and new orders.

Such was our situation in the month of August, 1808, in that Spain which we had so rapidly overrun, and which we had deemed it so easy to conquer. We had lost the whole of the South, after leaving one of our armies prisoners in it. Under the impression of that check, we had abandoned Madrid, broken off the siege of Saragossa when nearly finished, and fallen back to the Ebro; and the only one of our corps which had not evacuated the province which it was charged to occupy, that of Catalonia, was shut up in Barcelona, blockaded on land by innumerable Miquelets, by sea by a British fleet, which had come in all haste from Gibraltar on the report of the Spanish insurrection.

At the furthest extremity of the Peninsula was left a French army, respecting the fate of which serious uneasiness might justly be felt:

it was Junot's, peaceably established in Portugal, before the terrible commotion which had so violently shaken all Spain. No intelligence was received from it, neither could any be transmitted to it, Andalusia and Estremadura having risen in the South, Galicia and the kingdom of Leon in the North, and intercepting all communications.

As soon as the insurrection of the month of May had broken out, the Spaniards, according to their custom, claiming the victory before they had won it, had not failed through Galicia and Estremadura to fill Portugal with sinister news for the French army. The Juntas had written to all the Spanish corps, to induce them to desert in mass, and to come and join the insurrection. General Junot, soon informed confusedly of what was passing in Spain without knowing all the details, had felt the necessity of taking the strictest precautions against the Spanish troops which had been sent to second him, and which, instead of affording him any assistance, became, in the present state of things, the principal of his difficulties. He had near Lisbon Caraffa's division of three or four thousand men, charged to assist in reducing the Alentejo. He surrounded it unawares by a French division, and, on the ground of circumstances, summoned it to lay down its arms, which it did shuddering. However, several hundred foot and horse contrived to escape across Alentejo, towards Spanish Estremadura. A French regiment of dragoons, sent in pursuit of them, retook some. The others succeeded in reaching Badajoz.

General Junot had collected in the Tagus a certain number of vessels past service. These were anchored in the middle of the channel, and in them he placed the Spanish soldiers, deprived of their arms, but sufficiently provided with all necessaries.

During these proceedings at Lisbon, Caraffa's division, Taranco's division, comprehending 16 battalions, and which there were no French troops to control at Oporto, had risen, made the French General Quessnel and all his staff prisoners, and set out for Galicia to join General Blake, at the same time calling the Portuguese to arms: not that the Portuguese wanted inclination to rise, for the Portuguese, though enemies to the Spaniards, are at bottom only Spaniards, who detest all other nations. At the sight of the French they had certainly felt that they were of that race of Christian Moors who inhabit the Peninsula and hate whatever is beyond it. They would have desired nothing better than to rise, but, before the face of the French army, they had not dared, and the good order maintained by Junot among his troops had contributed to render this submission less galling. But, when informed of the rising in Spain, on hearing the Spaniards told that they had conquered the French, they had naturally conceived a desire to follow such an example, and nothing was wanting but the appearance of their old allies the English, at once allies and tyrants, to produce a general insurrection among them.

Admiral Sir Charles Cotton was cruising, in fact, from Cape Finisterre to Cape St. Vincent; nothing, however, was yet to be seen but ships sailing in the offing, not making for the shore.

<sup>1</sup> I employ the most general appellation; but in the Pyrenees the chamois is called *icard*.

and the Portuguese waited with impatience for the convoy that should bring at last an English army. Lisbon, which Junot kept down with the bulk of his troops, could not well permit a rising; whereas, at Oporto, which had all the Portuguese sentiments in its heart, and moreover the mortification of no longer seeing the English in its port—Oporto was ready to break out on the first signal of England.

The brave General Junot was fully sensible of the critical nature of this situation. At the moment of General Dupont's catastrophe he had been a month without news from France, for the sea, subject to the English, suffered not a vessel to pass, and the Spanish insurrection, which enveloped Portugal from north to south, suffered not a courier to pass. The report of the event at Baylen, transmitted by Spanish enthusiasm to Portuguese hate, spread with incredible celerity throughout Portugal, and excited an extraordinary commotion there. On the contrary, the victory of Rio-Seco, though much anterior to the disaster of Baylen, was not yet known; for the human mind propagates facts which flatter it, and has no echo for others. There was no harm in this, however, and that success, which the public was soon to be informed of, was destined to become, as we shall presently see, a resource for the encouragement of our soldiers. Though young, they had been already seasoned by a difficult march to Portugal. They had recruited themselves, and reorganized, trained, and habituated to the climate, they exhibited the finest aspect. Having entered to the number of 23,000, being joined by 8000 more, they still found themselves, after their disastrous march last autumn, amounting to 24,000, perfectly capable of supporting the honour of the French arms, before they surrendered, if they too were doomed to succumb, in expiation all over the Peninsula of the outrage at Bayonne.

General Junot, seeing himself so far from France, shut up between the Spanish insurrection, which proclaimed itself victorious, and the sea which appeared covered with English sails, did not delude himself respecting his dangers; but he was intelligent and brave, and he resolved to conduct himself in such a manner as to obtain the approbation of Napoleon. He held a council of war composed of generals brought up in the school of Napoleon, and the resolutions adopted in this council were conformable to the true principles of war. Unfortunately, if the true principles were recognised in theory, they were not followed up in practice with the vigour and precision which the master alone was capable of applying. To abandon all the accessory points which they occupied, to concentrate themselves in mass at Lisbon, in order to control the capital, and to put themselves into a posture to fling into the sea the first English troops that should land, naturally constituted the plan which every one would conceive and adopt. It was therefore resolved to evacuate the Algarves, Alentejo, the Beyras, in short all the parts where they had troops, excepting the two fortresses of Almeida to the north, Elvas to the south, excepting also the positions of Setubal and Peniche, on the coast, and to concentrate themselves between Lisbon and Abrantes. The resolution was a good one, but

not complete enough, for there was still at those points what would absorb four or five thousand men, of the twenty or twenty-two thousand effectives; and reckoning what would be requisite for Lisbon itself, they could not have more than ten or twelve thousand soldiers wherewith to oppose a landing, whereas fifteen or eighteen thousand ought to have been reserved for a decisive action.

They had near them an ally, who could have rendered great service; this was the Russian Admiral Siniavin, with his squadron, manned by crews which were indifferent sailors, but excellent soldiers. Had he frankly espoused the common cause, it would have been easy for him singly to have guarded Lisbon, and then three or four thousand more French troops would have been disposable. But he insisted, as he had already done, on returning to Russia, being strongly attached to England, full of hatred against France, and quite disposed to open his arms to the enemy. He replied coldly or negatively to all the proposals for concurrence that were addressed to him, although, from his position in the middle of the Tagus, it behoved him to defend the entrance more than Junot himself. For the latter, it was a serious difficulty, especially as he had to control an hostile population of 300,000 souls, in which were comprehended 20,000 mountaineers of Gallicia, engaged, like the Savoyards and Auvergnats at Paris, in laborious occupations, who manifested no very amicable dispositions. However, as the principal establishment of the French army was at Lisbon, Junot hoped, with the dépôts, the sick, and the store-keepers, to repress the disaffection of the capital. He ordered General Loison to quit Almeida, with his division, General Kellerman to quit Elvas with his, leaving only a garrison in these two places. His plan was, when once those two divisions had returned, to keep a mass in constant readiness to act upon the coast against the English army, the speedy landing of which was announced.

The insurrection, though it had not yet broken out, was at this time secretly hatching in Portugal; and it was almost impossible to effect the arrival of a courier. So many messengers, however, were sent to General Kellerman, and particularly to General Loison, who was more difficult to reach than General Kellerman, on account of the remoteness of the province which he occupied, that both received timely notice. General Loison, at the moment of departure, was already surrounded by insurgents, infected by the contagion of the Spanish insurrection. The priests, not less ardent in Portugal than in Spain, had put themselves at the head of the peasantry, and guarded all the passes, carrying on the same kind of warfare that was then practised all over the Peninsula; that is to say, barricading the entrances of the villages, carrying away the provisions, murdering the sick, the wounded, and stragglers. But General Loison was as vigorous as any officer of his time. He left in the forts of Almeida fourteen or fifteen hundred men, the least capable of sustaining the fatigues of a long march, supplied them with provisions and ammunition, and proceeded with three thousand to traverse the whole north of Portugal, by way of Almeida, La Guarda, Abrantes, and Lisbon. He had several times to



cut a passage through the revolted, and to punish them severely; but he knew how to enforce respect everywhere, to open the roads for himself, and to procure subsistence; and he at length reached Abrantes, having lost but two hundred men during this toilsome and perilous march.

General Kellerman withdrew quite as successfully from Elvas. On the report of the insurrection in Andalusia and Estremadura, the Algarves and Alentejo had already begun to rise. General Kellerman sent detachments in various directions, particularly to Beja, where he inflicted a severe execution, found means to repress the revolted, then left at Elvas, as General Loison had done at Almeida, all who were least capable of marching in the suffocating heat of July, and arrived without obstacle at Lisbon, by the left bank of the Tagus. There were then no French troops but at Almeida, Elvas, Setubal, Peniche, Lisbon, and the environs.

Accounts from all quarters actually announced as certain the arrival of a British army, coming, according to some, from Gibraltar and Sicily, coming, according to others, from Ireland and the Baltic. Admiral Sir Charles Cotton had touched several times upon the coast, parleyed, now at the mouth of the Tagus, now at that of the Douro, and everywhere promised a speedy landing. The intelligence of General Dupont's disaster, received at the same time, acted as a last stimulant to the minds of the people, and, in the twinkling of an eye, Portugal, which had as yet but partially revolted, rose universally from the Minho to the Algarves.

It was at Oporto that the flame first burst forth. A convoy of bread was preparing there for a detachment of French troops. At this sight the people rose, seized the carriages, plundered them, and in an instant the whole city was astir. The bishop put himself at the head of the insurrection, and the Portuguese flag was everywhere hoisted, amidst shouts of "Long live the Prince Regent!" The conflagration spread into the provinces, had well nigh communicated to Lisbon itself, crossed the Tagus, extended into Alentejo, and at length joined the flames, kindled a second time towards Elvas by the contact with Estremadura. At Oporto the authorities were in open communication with the English; at Elvas they entered into quite as open communication with the Spaniards. A corps of the latter, composed of regular troops, advanced even from Badajoz to Evora, to serve for a support to the Portuguese insurrection.

Junot, who was brisk and enterprising, unluckily yielded to a desire to suppress the insurrection wherever it might show itself. He despatched General Loison, with his division, to disperse the insurgents of Alentejo, who were in the environs of Evora. He directed General Margaron, with the cavalry, against an assemblage that was coming from Coimbra towards Lisbon. It had been much better, in that intensely hot season, to keep his troops fresh and resting around Lisbon, than to diminish their number by fighting and fatigue, for the purpose of suppressing seditions as ready to break out again the moment they were gone as to submit when they were marching against them.

General Margaron had but to appear with his cavalry, in order to disperse and cut down the few hundred insurgents collected towards Coimbra. As for General Loison, he was obliged to traverse the whole of Alentejo, to come at the insurrection of that province, assembled near Evora, and supported by a corps of Spanish troops. After a difficult and fatiguing march, he arrived before Evora, and there found the Spaniards and Portuguese in order of battle. He attacked them in flank, overthrew them, took their artillery, and killed a good number of them. The gates of Evora having been closed, he scaled the walls, entered the town, and sacked it. In a few days the Spaniards were sent home, and the Portuguese reduced to a momentary obedience. The soldiers were laden with booty, but exhausted with fatigue, and had to march back to Lisbon in an overpowering heat.

Meanwhile, the English, so often announced, made their appearance at last. On the insurrection of the Asturias and the mission of two deputies to London, to make known there the general rising of the Spanish provinces, the English government had been apprized of the unforeseen occasion that presented itself for multiplying our embarrassments. The Canning and Castlereagh administration had naturally resolved to transfer all its efforts to the Peninsula, and to raise up there, in far more enlarged proportions, and in a much more durable manner, the obstacles which it had for a moment raised against us in the Calabrias. Orders were sent to all the British forces, military and naval, scattered in the Mediterranean, the Gulf of Gascony, the Channel, and the Baltic, to concur towards this single object. Carriages of arms, supplies of money, were despatched to the coasts of Spain and Portugal. All the troops for the organization of which the Boulogne [query, Baltic?] expedition had furnished occasion, and part of which had recently distinguished itself at Copenhagen, were destined to act on this new field of battle. It was impossible, in fact, to offer England one that was better chosen or more convenient for her. With a fair wind, one might pass in four days from the coast of England to Cape Finisterre, to the bays of Coruña and Vigo, to the mouths of the Douro and the Tagus. The immense navy of England, cruising incessantly around this girdle of coasts, might at all times supply an army there with provisions and ammunition, while the adversaries of that army in a half-wild country, destitute of roads, would have the greatest difficulty to procure subsistence. The heavy and solid British battalions, disembarked in the numerous gulfs of the Peninsula, setting foot, on landing, in well-entrenched posts, advancing boldly in case of success, falling back promptly if they experienced a reverse, to reach that sea which was their *appui*, their refuge, their magazine of provisions and ammunition, supporting in offensive operations the nimble Spaniards against the impetuous onset of the French army, or perhaps leaving them, in case of retreat, to get off as they could, by dispersion or by a momentary submission, beginning this manoeuvre again without tiring, till the French force succumbed from exhaustion—the British battalions, we say, were about to wage the only war

which they are fit for, and in which they could be successful on the Continent.

All the orders for a great expedition were issued with extreme despatch. Five thousand men, under General Spencer, who had come from Egypt to Sicily, had been conveyed from Gibraltar to Cadiz, where the Spaniards, scrupling to receive them, had deferred the acceptance of their services. These five thousand English, refused at Cadiz, had landed at the mouth of the Guadiana, on the territory of Portugal, till a favourable moment for acting should arrive. Ten thousand men were at Cork, in Ireland. These were immediately embarked in a flotilla escorted by several ships of the line: for their commander was selected an officer who had already distinguished himself in India, and who had recently rendered important services to General Cathcart before Copenhagen; this was Sir Arthur Wellesley, since celebrated for his good fortune, as much as for his eminent military qualities, by the title of Duke of Wellington. His instructions were to sail for Coruña, to offer the Spaniards of the Asturias and Galicia the concurrence of the English forces, and to exert himself in short everywhere against the French to the utmost of his power. General Spencer had orders to place himself under the command of Sir Arthur, as soon as he should be required. Sir Arthur Wellesley would then find himself at the head of 15,000 men. But these troops were only a part of those which were destined for the Peninsula. Five thousand men, under Generals Anstruther and Acland, were at Ramsgate and Harwich. Transports were already ordered to those points of embarkation, to convey them to Sir Arthur Wellesley. Owing to the proximity of the places and the vast means of the English navy, it was an operation of ten or twelve days only to assemble all these forces at one spot. Lastly, Sir John Moore, returning from the Baltic with 11,000 troops, was to be sent soon to the point which the English generals should have designated on the coast of the Peninsula for there effecting a general concentration.

It was not thought fitting to put this entire force of about 30,000 men, when united, under the command of Sir Arthur Wellesley, still too young in age and renown to be placed at the head of an army which, in the estimation of the English, might be reckoned very considerable. The supreme command of it was therefore assigned to Sir Hew Dalrymple, then governor of Gibraltar, who was to have under him Sir Harry Burrard, as chief of the staff. Till all these troops should be assembled, and Sir Hew Dalrymple should arrive, Sir Arthur Wellesley was to direct the first operations, with the 10,000 men who sailed from Cork, and the 5000 landed on the coast of the Algarves. Admiral Sir Charles Cotton, commanding the naval forces of England in those seas, had orders to second all the movements of the armies.

Embarking on the 12th of July, the English troops from Cork were, on the 20th, off Coruña, and exhibited to the Spaniards, delighted to find themselves so well supported, an immense flotilla. The sight of this considerable force, which foreboded many more, had somewhat cheered them under the defeat of Generals

Blake and De la Cuesta at Rio-Seco, and had caused them to conceive new and great hopes of the contest in which they were engaged against Napoleon. Still they had not consented, any more than the Andalusians, to admit the English troops into their territory, especially so near the arsenal of Ferrol. They had, therefore, accepted a large quantity of arms, money to the amount of £500,000 sterling (12½ million francs,) but they had recommended to the English to turn all their efforts towards Portugal, which it was not less important to wrest from the French than Spain itself.

Sir Arthur Wellesley had immediately proceeded to Oporto, where he had been received with extreme joy; for the Portuguese merchants, living entirely by their commercial connection with the English, felt, at sight of the latter, their interests as much gratified as their passions. From that moment the action of the British army had been decidedly directed towards Portugal. This resolution, which suited the Spaniards, always jealous of foreigners, suited the English also, who could not but desire above all things the deliverance of Portugal, and it served the common cause in an equal degree, the aim of the new coalition being to expel the French from every part of the Peninsula. It was left to be seen what part of Portugal they would choose for landing, in presence of a French army, without running a risk of being flung unceremoniously into the sea.

Sir Arthur Wellesley left his convoy cruising between the mouths of the Douro and those of the Tagus, and repaired personally to Sir Charles Cotton, off the Tagus, to concert with him his plan of debarkation. To land at the entrance of the Tagus would be attended with the advantage of disembarking very near the goal, since Lisbon is but two leagues off; and one could, moreover, give the numerous population of that capital such an impulsion that the French would not be able to withstand the commotion which it would excite; for they were 15,000 at most, including the sick, amidst 800,000 inhabitants, all enemies. In fact, if this population were to rise at a moment when the English army should be advancing to support it, the business might perhaps be finished in a single day. But the French occupied all the forts; they had acquired the habit of controlling the people of Lisbon; the coast on the right and left of the mouth of the Tagus is abrupt, exposed to breakers, and a change of weather might put one part of the English army into the hands of the French, before the other part had completed its landing. It would moreover be coming ashore very near to a strong and formidable adversary, whom the English were not yet accustomed to challenge and to fight.

From all these considerations, Sir Arthur Wellesley, in concert with Sir Charles Cotton, resolved to land between Oporto and Lisbon, at the mouth of the Mondego, near a very commodious bay, commanded by the fort of Figuera, which was not occupied by the French. The choice of this point, situated at a certain distance from Lisbon, gave Sir Arthur Wellesley time to land before the French could come to meet him, to await General Spencer's corps, which he had sent for, and, when once on the

soil of Portugal, to advance towards Lisbon, following the coast, in order to take advantage of such occasions as Fortune might offer. The French, whom he knew to be at most twenty or twenty-two thousand strong, having several places to guard, particularly the capital, never could march against him with more than ten or twelve thousand; and, by keeping constantly near the sea, either for the sake of receiving supplies, or of re-embarking, in case of need, he had a chance of approaching Lisbon, and there making some attempt that might succeed, without running too much risk. Knowing that Sir Hew Dalrymple was soon to supersede him, he was impatient to achieve something brilliant before he passed under superior command. These resolutions were most judicious, and denoted those qualities in the English general which his career soon revealed—good sense and firmness, the first of all next to genius.

He began to land on the 1st of August, at the mouth of the Mondego. That sea, so frequently agitated by gales from the west, several times interrupted the disembarkation of the men and the *matériel*.

Nevertheless, in five or six days the English troops that came from Cork were all put on shore, to the number of nine or ten thousand men, with the immense train that always follows English armies. At this moment, General Spencer's corps arrived at the same anchorage. General Spencer, before he received Sir Arthur Wellesley's orders, on the news of General Dupont's disaster, had embarked to transfer his efforts to some other quarter, well aware that there was no further services to render in Andalusia, delivered for the moment from the presence of French troops. Apprized of the arrival of the Cork convoy, he had come to join it off the mouth of the Mondego; and on the 8th of August he had finished his disembarkation, and effected his junction with the corps of Sir Arthur Wellesley. The latter thus found himself at the head of an army of about fourteen or fifteen thousand men, composed almost entirely of infantry and artillery. It numbered at most 400 horse; and this is the usual state of every expedition by sea, the transport of cavalry being difficult, and even impossible to any great distance. But that infantry was very fine, possessing all the qualities of the English army. That army, as everybody knows, is composed of men of all sorts, enlisting voluntarily into its ranks, serving for the whole of life or nearly so, subject to a formidable discipline, which flogs them to death for the slightest faults, which, out of the good or the bad subject, makes a uniform and obedient subject, marching to danger with invariable submission, led by officers full of honour and courage. The English soldier, well fed, well trained, firing with remarkable precision, travelling slowly, because he is not formed for marching and wants the requisite ardour, is solid, almost invincible in certain positions where the nature of the place seconds his resisting character, but becomes weak, if forced to march, to attack, to conquer those difficulties which are not to be overcome without animation, hardihood and enthusiasm. In short, he is firm, not enterpris-

ing. In like manner as the French soldier, by his ardour, his energy, his disposition to brave every thing, was the predestined instrument of the genius of Napoleon, so the solid and slow soldier of England was formed for the limited capacity, but discreet and resolute mind of Sir Arthur Wellesley. Such a soldier one ought, if one could, to draw away from the sea, to oblige him to march, to be enterprising; in short, to show his defects, instead of running one's head against his qualities by attacking him in strong positions. But the brave and boiling Junot was not a man to conduct himself with so much prudence and calculation, and there was reason to fear that he would come and wreck his impetuosity upon the cold obstinacy of the soldiers of England.

On the 8th of August, Sir Arthur Wellesley commenced his march along the sea-coast, so as to be always within reach of his supplies and of his means of retreat. He had, from his first arrival, rather warm disputes with the Portuguese army. The insurgents of Portugal had formed, by uniting all their forces in the north of their territory, an army of five or six thousand men, under General Freyre. Sir Arthur Wellesley was desirous to have it with him, to cover his flanks. But they, whether they were afraid, as the English general in writing to his government accused them of being,<sup>1</sup> to meet the French too close, or had no great confidence in these auxiliaries, ever ready to retire to their ships on the first reverse, and to leave their allies exposed by themselves to the blows of the enemy, made demands with which the English general would not comply—namely, to be subsisted by the British army with the supplies drawn from the ships. This requisition being rejected, the Portuguese resolved to act for themselves, and took the roads to the interior, leaving to their allies the route along the coast. They gave them, however, 1400 light infantry and 400 horse to serve as scouts.

No sooner was Junot apprized at Lisbon, at first by the ill-dissembled joy of the inhabitants, and soon by positive intelligence, of the landing of the British army, than he formed the resolution to hasten to it and throw it into the sea. To concentrate himself, to withdraw the soldiers to the very last man from all posts of secondary importance, to confine himself to the guard of Lisbon alone, to leave there none but such as were incapable of marching, that he might advance against the English with fifteen or eighteen thousand men, to choose, for the purpose of fighting them, a moment when they should not have their natural advantages, those of the defensive, was the only wise resolution that could be adopted. Unluckily, Junot concentrated himself very incompletely, and he was seized with an extreme impatience to attack the English, no matter where, no matter how, and fling them into the sea as soon as possible.

Between Almeida, Elvas, Setuval, Peniche, and various posts, Junot had already sacrificed four or five thousand men. By the expeditions which he had recently sent out, under Generals Loison, Margaron, and others, he had many

<sup>1</sup> Such is the assertion of the Duke of Wellington, in his correspondence with the British cabinet, recently printed

in England, as everybody knows, and containing a mass of documents equally valuable and interesting.

soldiers too valuable not to have been preserved put *hors de combat* or worn out with fatigue; and he had at most about 10,000 men to oppose to an enemy who already numbered fourteen or fifteen, and could soon increase his force to twenty or thirty. Junot recalled General Loison from Alentejo, and he sent off General Delaborde, with his division, to go and meet the English, to observe them, to harass them, till all the disposable troops could be collected against them. He prepared to march himself with the reserve when they should be nearer to Lisbon; and then to meet them, to fight them, to beat them, would not require him to be absent from Lisbon more than three or four days. He thought, and justly, that his presence and that of the reserve could not long be spared at Lisbon without serious inconveniences.

In consequence, General Delaborde, with the troops of General Margaron, was to proceed first, by way of Leiria, to meet the English; while General Loison, returning from Alentejo by forced marches, was to rejoin him by Abrantes, and Junot himself would go and complete this concentration of forces, by taking with him all that he could abstract from the guard of Lisbon.

General Delaborde, on his march upon the Leiria road, came in sight of the English on the 14th or 15th. He waited before he came to closer quarters with them for the junction of General Loison, who was doing his best to arrive, but whose troops were exhausted with fatigue and overcome by the heat. On the 16th of August he fell in with the enemy's advanced posts, and on the 17th he had to fight them in a manner which proved what advantages are to be gained by leaving to the English the initiative of attacks.

General Delaborde, an old officer, full of energy and experience, kept alongside of the English upon that coast-road, which terminated near Torres Vedras, at the mountains with which Lisbon is surrounded; and, in the evening of the 16th, he had met with them in the environs of Obidos. He retired quietly before them, till a favourable position should offer for making them feel the valour of his soldiers, without engaging in any decisive action, which he ought not and would not risk before the general concentration of the French troops. In the environs of Roliça he found the position which he sought, in the midst of a sandy plain, crossed by several streamlets, closed by heights on which the high road rose in a serpentine line, and descended again to the village of Zambugeiro. On the morning of the 17th, the English army followed General Delaborde's division, not three thousand strong, across this plain of Roliça. The English marched slowly and collectedly after nimble, resolute Frenchmen, in no wise intimidated by their numerical inferiority, though they were but one to five, three thousand against fourteen or fifteen thousand. General Delaborde thought that he ought not to make a point of defending Roliça in the middle of the plain, for, even in defending this point successfully, he could not fail to be soon surrounded, and, to avoid being taken, obliged to leave it precipitately and in confusion. He preferred retiring to the extremity of the plain, to the heights which the road ascends before it runs down to Zambugeiro. Accordingly, he

placed himself on the summit of the hills along which the road ascended, and there waited resolutely for the English. General Nightingale's brigade marched first in a single line, supported by Hill's and Fane's brigades in close columns, while, on its left, Craufurd's brigade made a circuit to turn the French, and on its right the Portuguese detachment did the same, to get to Zambugeiro before them.

General Delaborde, leaving the English to pursue their toilsome course through ravines full of myrtle, cistus, and other large shrubs, which grow in southern countries, chose the moment when they were most impeded by the obstacles of the ground for attacking them. He first had a fire of musketry poured upon them by dexterous tirailleurs, and then caused them to be briskly charged with the bayonet by his battalions, and thrown to the foot of the heights. He repeated this manœuvre several times, and in this manner killed or wounded twelve or fifteen hundred of the enemy. He kept up this fight for four successive hours, always manœuvring with extraordinary art and precision, and destroying twice or thrice as many men as he lost himself. He did not retire till he found himself in danger of being turned by the columns that were marching on the right and left upon Zambugeiro. Several detachments attempted in vain to stop him: he forced his way through them, and arrived at Zambugeiro, having himself five or six hundred men *hors de combat*, but leaving behind the dead only, carrying off all his wounded, and impressing the heart of the enemy with a dread of what French troops, well conducted, were capable of doing; for what was there not to fear from a general union of their forces, when fewer than three thousand men had made so vigorous a resistance!

General Delaborde proceeded to Torres Vedras, where he was to be joined by General Loison coming from Abrantes, and by General Junot coming from Lisbon.

Sir Arthur Wellesley had learned from his own experience in this fight what he before knew, that he had to do with an enemy very difficult to conquer, and he had determined not to advance but with extreme circumspection. A numerous convoy, bringing fresh troops, had just been despatched at sea. These were Anstruther's and Acland's brigades, recently embarked, and followed very closely by the main body of Sir John Moore's army. These two brigades brought him a reinforcement of five thousand men at least, but did not bring Sir Hew Dalrymple, which had the two-fold advantage of strengthening him without rendering him dependent. He resolved therefore to approach the sea by Lourinha, in order to pick up Anstruther's and Acland's two brigades; and for this purpose he took a position on the heights of Vimeiro, which cover an anchorage favourable for landing. In the evening of the 19th he was joined by Anstruther's brigade, and on the 20th by Acland's brigade. Deducting the killed and wounded at Roliça, this reinforcement increased his army to 18,000 men present under arms.

General Junot, on the news of the approach of the English, had hastened to leave Lisbon with all the force disposable, and directed his course towards Torres Vedras, where General

Loison had just arrived. From having endeavoured to retain too many posts, though he had evacuated many, from having run to suppress the principal insurrections, though he had neglected secondary insurrections, General Junot could not collect more than nine thousand and some hundred men present under arms. He would, therefore, have to fight that redoubtable English infantry brought by Sir Arthur Wellesley, in the proportion of one against two. He had a great superiority over him in cavalry, an arm of not much utility in the positions that were about to serve for fields of battle. Nine thousand French, however, conducted as General Delaborde's three thousand had been, would be able, by stoutly defending the positions which are in advance of Lisbon, to make head against 18,000 English, and to render it impossible for them to conquer the capital of Portugal, provided that their ground were chosen as skilfully as it had been at Rolica.

The English had to cross the promontory which forms the right of the Tagus, and on the back of which Lisbon is seated. This promontory presents narrow defiles, which must be passed in order to reach Lisbon, and in which the English might have been overwhelmed when they had once entered them, by leaving to them all the inconveniences of the offensive. Junot, hurried away by his excessive ardour, would not wait for them in these passes, where it would have been possible to beat them, and resolved to go and seek them in their position, to storm them there, and to throw them into the sea. He arrived on the evening of the 20th before the heights of Vimeiro.

Sir Arthur Wellesley would have been in a critical situation, if he had been vigorously attacked and with sufficient forces; for he occupied heights, the back of which rose perpendicularly from the sea. If forced in these positions, he might be precipitated into the waves before he had time to embark. He was, therefore, between a victory and a disaster. But he had 18,000 men, a numerous artillery, positions of very difficult access. He knew, from various reports, that he should have to fight an enemy inferior by half; lastly, he was endowed with a firmness of character which equalled that of his soldiers. He was, therefore, not at all uneasy. The chain of positions which he occupied was cut in two by a ravine which formed the bed of the little river Maceira. The village of Vimeiro was at the bottom of this ravine. But he possessed sufficient means of communication for going from one of these groups of heights to the other. He had four brigades on the group situated on his right, two on the group situated on his left. His infantry, ranged in three lines, with a formidable artillery in the intervals, exhibited three stages, rising one above another, and one strengthening the other.

Had this position, strong as it was, been previously reconnoitred, the French must either have abandoned the idea of taking it, or have attacked it on one side only with their whole united force. The English, when once partly dislodged, might have been completely shaken and precipitated into the abyss which they backed. But the French arrived at daybreak on the morning of the 21st, without having

taken suitable precautions, and without concealing their movements from the enemy. General Junot, perceiving that the left of the English was their least defended wing, ordered a movement from his left to his right, that he might be more numerous on that side, a movement which Sir Arthur Wellesley, discovering it from the heights that he occupied, hastened to imitate, for the purpose of restoring the balance of forces, but much more rapidly than his adversary; for he had only the cord of the bow to describe, and it took him less time by half to move his troops from one wing to the other.

The French, while their right was manœuvring, attacked Vimeiro with their left. Vimeiro formed the right of the English and their strongest side. Thomière's brigade, of Delaborde's division, marched resolutely towards the enemy. The brave General Delaborde conducted this attack with extreme vigour; but the ground, which he had not chosen, as at Rolica, presented almost insurmountable obstacles. Besides the difficulty of climbing a steep position, he would have to brave two lines of infantry, an artillery powerful by number and calibre, and then find, without being discouraged, a third line, formed by Hill's brigade, crowning the heights in rear. The French dashed gallantly forward, liable to fall first under the fire of grape, and then under the continuous and well-directed musketry fire of the English; but they could not even reach their lines. When they found themselves thus stopped, General Kellermann, who commanded the reserve, composed of two regiments of grenadiers, picked out of all the corps, proceeded with one of these regiments to the attack of the plateau of Vimeiro. He was preceded by a battery of artillery, which attempted to place itself in position. The tremendous fire of the English soon dismounted it. Colonel Foy was severely wounded. General Kellermann, nevertheless, pushed forward with the grenadiers. He climbed the hill, debouched on the plateau, but encountered such a fire in front, in flank, and from all directions, that his brave soldiers, flung back upon one another, and unable to advance, were driven to the foot of the plateau. On seeing this, four hundred dragoons, composing the whole of the English cavalry, would have taken advantage of the dangerous situation of our grenadiers to charge them. But General Margaron, who was at that point with his brave cavalry, rushed at gallop upon the English dragoons, and, cutting them in pieces, revenged on them the reverse of our infantry. The second regiment of grenadiers marched, in its turn, to attack the enemy, though without hope of carrying the position. During these occurrences on the left, Solignac's brigade, of Loison's division, met with the same obstacles on the right. Everywhere three lines of infantry, a formidable artillery, a steep hill which it was impossible to climb under the downward fire, stopped our brave soldiers, foolishly directed against a position where the enemy fought with all his advantages, and where we had none of ours.

It was noon. This combat, so unfortunately commenced, without the least chance of our conquering the difficulties opposed to us, had

already cost us 1800 men, that is to say, a fifth part of our effective. To persist further in it would be to risk the destruction of the whole army to no purpose. General Junot, therefore, made up his mind, on the advice of his bravest officers, to retreat, which he did in good order to Torres Vedras, his cavalry cutting down the tirailleurs or the English horse who had the boldness to follow us.

After this fruitless attempt to throw the English into the sea, the French had no further hope of maintaining their ground in Portugal. On assembling all the disposable force at Lisbon, there were found to be not more than 10,000 men in a condition to fight, and these 10,000 men had to control an hostile population of 300,000 souls, and to stop an English army, which in a few days would be increased to 28 or 29 thousand combatants. One resource it is true was left: that was, to make a retreat through the north of Portugal and Spain, similar to that of the Ten Thousand, through insurgent populations, leaving several thousand sick in the hands of the Portuguese, and strewing the roads with the dead and dying. One would thus have lost more than half the army. These two resolutions were therefore impossible to be fulfilled. To enter into negotiation with the English nation, which performed the engagements which it contracted, would therefore assuredly be a step that honour would not condemn, especially after the battle of Roliça, and the battle of Vimeiro.

In consequence, General Kellermann, who united extreme shrewdness with great military talents, was selected and sent to the English head-quarters to treat respecting the fate of the prisoners and wounded. At this moment a change had just taken place in the British army. Sir Hew Dalrymple had arrived, with Sir Harry Burrard, chief of his staff, to assume the command. Sir Arthur Wellesley, always fortunate in his brilliant career, was not superseded till after a victory, chiefly due to the faults of the enemy. He was not sorry that the campaign should cease with this victory, and that the conquest of Portugal should be exclusively attributed to him. Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Harry Burrard, on their part, unacquainted with the state of things, ignorant of the difficulties which might be left for them to conquer, were delighted, at their outset, to find the French ready to give up Portugal to them, and to have no new risks to run. If, however, they had appreciated the situation, and what it was about to become for them by the arrival of the army of Sir John Moore, they might not have shown themselves so easy. In a long conversation with General Kellermann, whom they treated with all the distinction that he deserved, they suffered their disposition to negotiate to be perceived. The latter, with great tact, seized the opportunity, and at first agreed with them upon a suspension of arms, reserving a definite arrangement for the evacuation of the country for future negotiation.

General Kellermann, returning to the French head-quarters, informed the commander-in-chief and his companions in arms of the disposition of the English, and it was agreed that they should treat for the evacuation of Portugal, if the conditions were perfectly honour-

able. He returned to the head-quarters of the enemy, and the meeting for the conferences was fixed at Cintra. They lasted several days, and displayed not less courtesy in the forms than vivacity in the discussion of subjects. The English would not grant so many advantages in regard to military honour as the French demanded. They refused in particular to treat the Russian Admiral Siniavin so well as Junot required, from a scruple of honour much more than from duty; for that admiral, who might have saved the common cause by seconding the French, and who had ruined it by not doing so, did not deserve that the negotiations should be rendered more difficult on his account. Junot, nevertheless, demanded that the Russian admiral should be at liberty to retire to the North Sea with his squadron, and he threatened to destroy all with fire and sword, not to surrender Lisbon till it was half in ruins, if what he claimed were not granted. Fortunately, Admiral Siniavin, an ally as disagreeable as he was backward at assisting, expressed a desire to negotiate on his own account, apparently unwilling to owe any thing to the French army, from which he was sensible that he had not deserved any thing. Junot hastened to assent to it, and then, the principal difficulty being removed, the parties speedily came to an agreement.

The convention dated from Cintra was signed on the 30th of August. It stipulated that the French army should retire with all the honours of war, taking with it all that belonged to it; that it should be conveyed in English vessels to the nearest ports of France, those of La Rochelle, Lorient, or others; that it might serve immediately; that the wounded and the sick should be treated with care, and sent home in their turn, as soon as their state would allow them to bear the voyage; that this should apply also to the garrisons of Almeida and Elvas, left in the interior of the country. It was agreed, moreover, that the French should not carry away any thing belonging to Portugal, the finances of which they had administered with equal regularity and integrity, and where they had left nine millions in the chests which they had found absolutely empty on their arrival. Lastly, it was stipulated that no inquiry should be made into the past; and that the Portuguese who had sided with the French should not be molested in person or property.

This arrangement was as honourable as could be desired for the French army, for it was saved entire, and replaced in a state to resume arms against Spain in a month. The English were incapable of imitating the Spaniards and violating the convention of Cintra, as the latter had violated the capitulation of Baylen. Accordingly, they assembled at the mouth of the Tagus the numerous vessels which had just landed 30,000 of their soldiers upon the coasts of Portugal, and prepared them to convey the 22,000 French left of the 26,000 which had accompanied General Junot. They took them on board in the first days of September, and landed them faithfully on the coasts of Saintonge and Bretagne.

Thus the whole Peninsula, overrun so easily in February and March, was evacuated by the end of August as far as the Ebro. Two French armies had capitulated, the one honourably,

the other in a humiliating manner; and the others occupied on the Ebro nothing more than the *débouché* of the Pyrenees. Of the 130,000 men who had crossed the Pyrenees there were not 60,000 under arms, though 80,000 were left, exclusively, it is true, of the 22,000 returning to France under the British flag.

Such was the recompense of an enterprise undertaken with raw troops and too few of them, planned moreover by a knavish and iniquitous policy. We had lost in a moment our renown for honour, the spell of our invincibility; and Europe had a right to believe for an instant that the French army had lost its superiority. This, however, was not the case, and that heroic army was about to prove again in a hundred fights that it was still the same.

To crown the confusion, those rich Spanish colonies which occupied so large a space in the projects of Napoleon were escaping from us in all quarters. Mexico, the vast southern continent, from Peru to the mouths of the La Plata, rose on the news of the events at Bayonne, opening their ports to the English, and embracing the cause of the captive dynasty.

Thus all the combinations of Napoleon were baffled at once by the indignation of a deceived and exasperated people. Thus nothing was wanting to the chastisement of his fault, assuredly nothing; for his brother himself, terrified at the task which he had imposed upon him, deeply regretting the quiet and peaceful kingdom of Naples, wrote him on the 9th of August, from the banks of the Ebro, a most distressing letter, which was no doubt to him the most poignant of reproaches:—"I have not a single Spaniard left who is attached to my

cause. Philip V. had but one competitor to conquer; while I—I have a whole nation. As general, my part would be endurable, nay easy, for, with a detachment of your veteran troops, I would conquer the Spaniards, but as king my part is insupportable, since I must slaughter one part of my subjects to make the other submit. I decline, therefore, to reign over a people who will not have me. Still I desire not to retire as conquered. Send me, therefore, one of your old armies; I will return at its head to Madrid, and there I will treat with the Spaniards. If you wish it, I will restore Ferdinand VII. to them in your name, but retaining part of their territory as far as the Ebro; for France victorious will have a right to exact payment for her victory. She will thus obtain the price of her efforts, of her blood spilt, and I—I shall demand back from you the throne of Naples. The prince for whom you destined it has not yet taken possession of it. I am, besides, your brother, your own blood: justice and consanguinity require that I should have the preference, and I will then go and continue, amidst the quiet which suits my tastes, the happiness of a people that consents to be prosperous under my care."—Such was the substance of what Joseph wrote from the banks of the Ebro to Napoleon. No judgment could be more severe and more just than that which resulted from this language of a deeply-afflicted king, forced against his will to reign over a people in revolt. Napoleon comprehended it, and proved by the answer, which the reader will find by and by, how keenly he felt the involuntary harshness of this judgment pronounced by his own brother.

## BOOK XXXII.

## ERFURTH.

The capitulation of Baylen becomes known to Napoleon whilst he is on a tour in the southern provinces of the Empire—His intense emotion at the news of that unhappy event—Order for the arrest of General Dupont on his return to France—Napoleon makes his promised visit to La Vendée, and is received there with enthusiasm—His arrival in Paris on the 14th of August—Indignation of Austria at the events of Bayonne—Explanation with M. D. Metternich—Napoleon wishes to force the court of Vienna to manifest its real sentiments before he comes to a final decision as to the redistribution of his forces—Obliged to withdraw a portion of his old troops from Germany, Napoleon consents to evacuate the territory of Prussia—Conditions of the evacuation—The good-will of the court of Russia more than ever needful to Napoleon—Desire frequently expressed by the Emperor Alexander to have another interview with Napoleon, in order to a direct mutual explanation as to the affairs of the East—The interview appointed to take place at Erfurth at the latter end of September—Pains taken to give it the utmost possible éclat—Meanwhile Napoleon makes his military preparations to meet every contingency—State of things in Spain whilst Napoleon is in Paris—King Joseph's operations—Napoleon's distribution of his forces—French and Italian troops ordered from Piedmont to Catalonia—Departure of the 1st and 6th divisions from Prussia for Spain—March of all the dragon divisions in the same direction—Efforts to supply the place of the troops about to be abstracted from the grand army—Fresh conscription—Expense of these levies—Means taken to check the depreciation of the public funds—Effects produced on the several courts by Napoleon's diplomatic manifestations—Austria is intimidated and lowers her tone—Prussia joyfully accepts the evacuation of her territory, at the same time appealing for a last alleviation of her pecuniary burdens—The Emperor Alexander's eagerness for the meeting at Erfurth—His mother's opposition to his intended journey—Arrival of the two emperors at Erfurth on the 27th September, 1808—Extreme courtesy towards each other—Afflux of sovereigns and great civil and military personages from all the capitals—Magnificent spectacle exhibited to Europe—Political ideas to be established by Napoleon at Erfurth—For the chimera of a partition of the Turkish empire he wishes to substitute an immediate gift of Wallachia and Moldavia to Russia—Effect of this new bait on Alexander's imagination—He enters into Napoleon's views, but in consenting to take less he insists on having it so much the more quickly—His impatience to be possessed of the Danubian provinces surpassed even by that of his old minister, M. de Romanzow—Agreement of the two emperors—Reciprocal satisfaction and brilliant fêtes—M. de Vincent, representative of Austria, arrives at Erfurth—False position in which Alexander and Napoleon strive to place him—After coming to a mutual understanding, the two emperors endeavour to put in writing the substance of their verbal resolutions—Wishing that peace should result from the interview at Erfurth, Napoleon would begin with pacific overtures to England—Alexander consents to this, provided the taking possession of the Danubian provinces be not thereby retarded—Difficulty of finding a phraseology which should satisfy these two conditions—Convention of Erfurth signed on the 12th of October—To oblige Alexander, Napoleon grants Prussia further reduction of its contributions—First idea of a marriage between Napoleon and a sister of Alexander—Disposition on that subject manifested by the young czar—Satisfaction of the two emperors, and their separation on the 14th of October after signal demonstrations of affection—Departure of Alexander for St. Petersburg and of Napoleon for Paris—Arrival of the latter at St. Cloud on the 18th of October—His last arrangements before joining the army of Spain—Reassured for a while as to Austria, Napoleon withdraws from Germany another division, the 5th—The grand army becomes the army of the Rhine—Composition and organization of the army of Spain—Departure of Berthier and Napoleon for Bayonne—M. de Romanzow left in Paris to pursue the negotiation opened with England in the name of France and Russia—Manner in which the message of the two emperors is received in London—Efforts of M. de Champagny and De Romanzow to elude the difficulties raised by the British Cabinet—Feeling to discourage the Spaniards and the Austrians, England abruptly puts an end to the negotiation—Bitter reply of Austria to the communications addressed to her from Erfurth—From the manifestations made by the several courts, it may be foreseen that Napoleon will have time to make but a short campaign in Spain—His measures in order to render it decisive.

The months of June and July, during which were accomplished the events which we have just narrated, were spent by Napoleon at Bayonne and in the departments situated at the foot of the Pyrenees. He visited in succession Pau, Auch, Toulouse, Montauban, and Bordeaux, and was everywhere received with transport by populations, always delighted to hail the passing appearance of the sovereign who for a moment occupies their leisure, but now more than usually eager to behold that extraordinary sovereign who so justly excited their curiosity and admiration. The Basques performed before him their graceful and picturesque dances, and impetuous Toulouse displayed all its customary vivacity of sentiment. Scarcely any thing was known even in those provinces about the events in Spain, for Napoleon permitted nothing to be published that was contrary to his own views. It was known, indeed, by means of the communications inevitably subsisting between the two opposite slopes of the Pyrenees, that Aragon was in insurrection, and that the establishment of King Joseph was encountering some rather serious difficulties; but no importance was attached to any resistance which unhappy Spain, enfeebled and disorganized by twenty years of bad government, could offer to the vanquisher of the continent. The people, therefore, shared in their sovereign's delusion respecting the progress of

events beyond the Pyrenees. They ceased not to regard him as the emblem of success, power, and genius. At the very most, a few obstinate old royalists, rendered prophetic by their vindictive feelings, predicted at random disasters that should trace their origin to Spain. But the multitude ran with noisy enthusiasm to greet the restorer of order, of religion, and of the greatness of France. They still believed him fortunate at the moment when he was beginning to be so no longer, and when a ray of sadness had already shot into his daring and intrepid heart.

When he quitted Bayonne, Napoleon was disabused of almost all his illusions regarding the affairs of Spain. He knew the extent and violence of the insurrection; he was informed of the retreat of Marshal Moncey, the obstinate resistance of Saragossa, and the difficulties which General Dupont had encountered in Andalusia. But he knew also of the brilliant victory won by Marshal Bessières at Rio-Secco, the entry of Joseph into Madrid, the numerous succours sent to Dupont, and the great preparations for attack made before Saragossa. He flattered himself, therefore, that Marshal Bessières would follow up his advantages, and drive back the northern insurgents into Galicia; that with reinforcements sent him, Dupont would repel the southern insurgents to Seville, perhaps to Cadiz; that one day or other Sara-



gossa would be taken, and that it would be possible, with the old regiments which were coming, to reinforce sufficiently the various divisions of our army, and gradually to consummate the submission of Spain. A victory on the Guadalquivir, like that of Rio-Seco, would have sufficed to substitute these brilliant results for the sad ones we have just depicted; but unhappily it was Baylen, instead of another Rio-Seco, that was to be inscribed in the bloody and heroic history of that time! As for Portugal, there had been no news from it, absolutely none, for more than a month.

It was at Bordeaux, where he passed the first three days of August, that Napoleon became aware of that eternally deplorable catastrophe of Baylen. The affliction it caused him, his sense of the humiliation endured by the French arms, the bursts of rage to which he gave way, are not to be described. They have left a deep impression on the memory of all around him, as I have a hundred times gathered from their own lips. His mortification exceeded that which he had experienced at Boulogne on learning that Admiral Villeneuve declined entering the British Channel; for to defeat was added dishonour, the first and only dishonour inflicted on his glorious banners. Charles IV. and Ferdinand VII. were avenged! Pious souls in all ages have believed that beyond this life there is a remuneration for good and for evil, and the wise have regarded this belief as accordant with the general scheme of things. But there is a remark which all profound observers have likewise made, namely, that even in this life events carry with them a certain remuneration for good and for evil. The violation of good sense, reason, and justice, such encounters here below a just and first chastisement. God, no doubt, has appointed another place and time for finally balancing the account of the master of an empire as well as of the humblest swain.

Napoleon perceived at a glance all the probable consequences of the occurrence of Baylen; the discouragement it would cause in the French army; the enthusiastic energy it would infuse into the insurgents; and he regarded the evacuation of almost the whole Peninsula as certain, before information of that event had reached him. The despatches that hourly arrived soon acquainted him with the extent to which the consequences of the disaster were doomed to be aggravated under the rule of a good but weak and vain prince. Had Murat been King of Spain, he would have rallied all his remaining troops and fallen upon Castaños before the latter had entered Madrid. Joseph, weak Joseph, through ignorance still more than timidity, retreated in all haste to the Ebro, raised the siege of Saragossa, a town half won, stopped Bessières in his victorious march, and scarcely believed himself safe when he had put the Ebro behind him and had his foot already on the Pyrenees.

The least important consequences of this

disaster were those which concerned Spain only: its European consequences were far more momentous. The dejected enemies of France took courage again. Austria, always engaged in preparations for war since the Polish campaign, feignedly quiescent since the convention that had given her back Braunau, excited anew by the events of Bayonne, and superexcited by those of Baylen, was now becoming hostile. Her apparent rupture with England, procured by force of threats, was about to be changed into a close and secret alliance with that power. And it was in the face of such a state of things that it was necessary to recall a part of the Grand Army from the banks of the Vistula and the Elbe to be transferred to the Ebro and the Tagus! From a triumphant position Napoleon was, through his own fault, about to enter upon one of difficulty at least, and one that called for the fullest display of his genius. He was strong enough certainly to meet the crisis, for the Grand Army was still entire, and capable of crushing Austria even after sending off a strong detachment to Spain. But from being absolute arbiter of events, as he had been in 1807, Napoleon was now reduced to the necessity of struggling to control them. These were weighty cares, and they were aggravated by mortified pride. He had deceived himself, visibly deceived himself: of that fact nobody in Europe could entertain a doubt. His invincible soldiers had been beaten; and by whom? By undisciplined bands of insurgents; and public opinion, that inconstant harlot who delights in forsaking those she has flattered most, would doubtless exaggerate the event by concealing the facts that explained it, such as the youth of the soldiers; the influence of climate; an unparalleled combination of unfortunate circumstances; in fine, the momentary error of a general of incontestable ability. Doubtless that fickle opinion would depreciate at once the political foresight of Napoleon and the heroic valour of his armies. The great man's self-love and his prudence were both assailed by this disastrous news, and he was punished, punished in every way—punished as offenders are wont to be by infallible Providence. Still the blow might prove to be but a salutary warning, and he might yet triumph over the momentary disaster, and triumph so completely as to remain all-potent in Europe, if he knew how to profit by that first bitter lesson.

What often happens happened in this case: an unfortunate man who had his share, and no more than his share, in a series of blunders, paid the penalty for everybody. Deeply incensed against General Dupont, and desecrating with his superior sagacity the military errors which the latter had committed, and which sufficed to explain every thing,<sup>1</sup> but suffering himself also to believe all the dishonouring suppositions which malevolence added thereto, Napoleon exclaimed that Dupont was a traitor.

<sup>1</sup> There exists, as I have said, in the archives of the Secrétairerie d'Etat a minute of the questions addressed to General Dupont by order of Napoleon. With the help of that document an exact idea may be formed of the opinion Napoleon had conceived of the catastrophe of Baylen and the conduct of General Dupont. He saw plainly the military faults which sufficed to explain the catastro-

phe; but he allowed himself to be influenced for a while by the calumnious rumours propagated respecting General Dupont, and he caused the latter to be interrogated on the subject of them, without himself putting much faith in them. Some time afterwards he had ceased to believe them altogether.

a dastard, a wretch, who had lost his army for the sake of saving a few wagons, and that he would have him shot. "They have sullied our uniform," he said, in speaking of Dupont and the other generals; "it shall be washed in their blood." Accordingly he ordered that General Dupont and his lieutenants should be arrested on their arrival in France, and delivered up to the High Imperial Court. But real as his anger was in the main, it was also to a certain degree feigned. He wished to account to those about him for the disappointments experienced in Spain, by attributing the unexpected turn of events to the errors, the pretended crimes, and the dastardy of one general. Docile to his will, the servile courtiers soon railed implacably against General Dupont. That unfortunate man had erred in judgment, as we have seen, and had been prostrated by a combination of overwhelming circumstances; and now he was at once proclaimed a coward and a robber that deserved capital punishment. After all, these insults were still confined to the circle of the imperial staff: for in order to restrain as much as he could the babbling tongue of rumour, Napoleon had forbidden the publication of any thing relating to Spain; and that none might suspect the extent of the difficulties he had brought upon himself, he had applied that prohibition to the victory of Rio-Secco no less than to the capitulation of Baylen. Involved in that catastrophe, Marshal Bessières saw the fairest exploit of his military life covered by the same veil that hung over the disaster of General Dupont. But the English press soon conveyed, not to the multitude but to the enlightened classes, the knowledge of the reverses sustained by our armies in Spain. Moreover, the exasperation against General Dupont, because he had succumbed, became so violent, that Napoleon's dormant generosity was stirred, and he exclaimed frequently, "The unfortunate man! What a fall after Albeck, Halle, Friedland? What a thing war is! One day, one single day is enough to tarnish the lustre of a lifetime." And thus contradicting himself, he fell into the habit of saying that Dupont had only been unlucky, and his genius, discerning the hard conditions of human life, seemed to behold his own destiny written in that of one of his lieutenants.

The discreet and quickwitted people of Bordeaux gave him magnificent entertainments, at which he appeared with a serene aspect, and without betraying any of the feelings that filled his soul. To those who, without venturing to question him, nevertheless touched, in talking to him, upon the grand object that had brought him to the south, he said that some peasants, wrought to fanaticism by priests, and hired by England, were endeavouring to embarrass his brother, but that he had never seen a more cowardly rabble since he had been in the service; that Marshal Bessières had put several thousands of them to the sword; that a few French squadrons were enough to put to flight a whole army of those Spanish insurgents; that the Peninsula would ere long be subjected to the sceptre of King Joseph, and that the provinces of the south of France, to which it was of so much interest that good relations should be maintained with Spain, should reap the prin-

cipal fruit of this new enterprise. Those with whom he conversed believed whatever he pleased whilst their eyes were on him, and they were satisfied; but when his back was turned, their thoughts assumed a very different complexion, on learning, through commercial correspondence, the momentous facts that were occurring beyond the Pyrenees.

Napoleon would have wished to proceed without any delay from Bordeaux to Paris, in order to apply himself to his three pressing occupations of the moment: the explanation with Austria, the consolidation of the union with Russia, and the transference of a part of the Grand Army from the Vistula to the Ebro. But he had promised to pass through La Vendée, and he would have appeared either to regard that province with distrust, or to have such formidable business on hand as compelled him to break all his engagements. Now he had made one with the Vendéans which he could not and would not break without absolute necessity. He resolved therefore to journey by way of Rochefort, La Rochelle, Niort, Napoleon-Vendée, Nantes, Saumur, Tours, and Orléans, dictating his orders on the road, receiving hundreds of despatches at every station, and sending off as many as he received.

He arrived at Rochefort on the 5th, and was hailed with enthusiasm by a wholly maritime population whose arsenals and dockyards had become doubly active under his reign. He visited the isle of Aix and the works at fort Bayard, glad to examine personally those places respecting which he was constantly giving orders of the greatest importance. Curiosity, admiration, and gratitude, drew the urban and rural populations around him. Proceeding from Rochefort to La Rochelle, Niort, and Napoleon-Vendée, he was everywhere greeted with every demonstration of respect by immense multitudes. The prodigious man who had rescued those provinces from civil war, and had given them back quiet, safety, prosperity, and the exercise of their religion, was in their eyes more than a man; he was a sort of a demigod. But just punished in Spain for the evil he had done, Napoleon was now recompensed for the good he had accomplished in France! If he had suffered for his bad deeds, he enjoyed the fruits of his good ones, and his cares were almost dissipated at the sight of grateful and enthusiastic La Vendée. The province could not have given a better reception to Louis XVI., could he have risen from the grave to which he had been consigned by the crime of '93. At Nantes and at Saumur the welcome was as cordial, and Napoleon could not restrain the pleasure with which it filled him; it overflowed into his correspondence, which at Bordeaux had been full of vexation, anger, and hurried orders.

He arrived in Paris late on the 14th of August, the eve of the grand fête of the 15th, when he was preparing to appear in all the lustre of power, and with a serenity of visage which should disconcert the conjectures of malevolence. It was, above all, before the *corps diplomatique*, eagerly on the watch to observe him, that he wished to display an imposing attitude, and to hold a language that should resound through all Europe.

He had just received highly satisfactory

news from Russia, which depicted that power as still acquiescent in his designs, in consideration of the advantages she expected in the East. But the news from Austria was of a very different nature. In that quarter every thing was beginning to look threatening. It will be recollected that Austria,—always hostile at heart, notwithstanding the promises made by the Emperor Francis at the bivouac of Urschitz; dissatisfied with herself for not having taken advantage of the battle of Eylau to occupy the banks of the Oder, whilst Napoleon was embarrassed on the Vistula; then soothed for a while by the convention that gave her back Braunau,—had effected, after the battle of Copenhagen, to participate in the indignation of the continental powers against England. She had, in fact, dismissed Mr. Adair, the British minister, but had probably given him to understand at the same time that this rupture of intercourse meant nothing, and was not to be regarded as of any importance. It is certain that the English ships of war in the Adriatic had continued to allow free passage to the Austrian flag, and that the colonial trade had not been for a moment interrupted at Trieste. But on being made aware of the snare laid at Bayonne for the royal family of Spain, and of the disasters that had followed, Austria could contain herself no longer, and had almost thrown off the mask. A terror, partly feigned, partly real, had seized the court and its familiars. "This, then, is the fate that awaits all the old royalties of the continent!" was the cry in the salons of Vienna. "It is a horrible trap, an evident danger, which must be a warning to any one who has the least foresight; for every sovereign who shall have neglected to defend himself will be treated like Charles IV. and Ferdinand VII.!" The Archduke Charles himself, usually more reserved than the rest, and less malevolent towards France, exclaimed, "We will die, if it must be so, with arms in our hands; but the crown of Austria shall not be disposed of as easily as that of Spain has been."

The news from Rome had likewise contributed to excite emotion and passionate comment in Vienna. General Miollis having, as we have elsewhere stated, received and executed an order to take military possession of Rome, and having left the pope only the spiritual authority, the latter had withdrawn into the palace of St. John of the Lateran, barricaded the doors and windows as if he had to sustain a siege, shut himself up with his domestics, refused to communicate with any but the foreign ministers, declared himself oppressed, enslaved in his own dominions, and a victim to an abominable usurpation, and protested every day against the violence under which he succumbed. To these events were added the annexation of the provinces of Ancona, Macerata, and Fermo to the kingdom of Italy, under the titles of departments of the Mésaure, the Musone, and the Tronto.

These facts had exasperated the public of Vienna almost as much as the events in Spain, and both court and town indulged in the bitterest language, even in the presence of the French ambassador, General Andréossy. Some of those who did so really believed what they said, and seriously imagined that Napoleon desired to su-

persede all the reigning families of the continent. The rest believed nothing of the kind, and aware that his system, modelled upon that of Louis XIV., might extend to Italy and Spain, but not to Austria, they nevertheless reiterated the current expressions in order to excite the credulous multitude. All, however, were agreed in saying that, without attacking, it was necessary to make preparations for self-defence; and even, after the highly exaggerated disasters of our armies, they suffered themselves to be carried away far beyond the idea of a merely defensive policy. The military preparations were in conformity with this state of public feeling.

The Austrian army had never ceased to be kept up at its full complement, and in perfect training and organization, by the assiduous care of the Archduke Charles. Not content with this effort, ruinous as it was to the Austrian finances, new measures, some of which were imitated from France herself, had just been adopted for an extraordinary augmentation of the forces of the monarchy. Independently of the army in actual service, a system of reserve had been devised, which consisted in assembling and exercising a certain number of recruits in each locality, and holding them in readiness to march. The avowed number of these recruits was sixty thousand, and their real number one hundred thousand, making the effective force of the army amount to more than four hundred thousand men. Then, under the name of a militia, very much resembling our national guards, nearly the whole population had been enrolled, clad, armed, and exercised every day. The people of Austria, usually strangers to their own government, felt in a manner flattered to find that recourse was had to them; and partly moved by the pleasure of being counted for something, partly by the fear of danger from without, they had enrolled themselves with singular alacrity—nobles, burghers, populace and all. Voluntary donations made by the states and by individuals had furnished sufficient means for equipping that mass of men; and it was computed that not fewer than three hundred thousand persons were prepared to serve locally, or even generally, for the maintenance of the monarchy. Four hundred thousand men enrolled for active service, and three hundred thousand men in local corps, for a population of fifteen or sixteen millions then subject to the house of Austria, constituted an enormous force, such as that house had never before displayed. It was probable in fact that it could have actually brought three hundred thousand fighting men under fire; and that was an immense thing which it had never yet accomplished, nor had it yet been done by any of the powers opposed to France. The government had just purchased fourteen thousand artillery horses, and given orders for a million of infantry muskets. Whilst Braunau on the Inn was being dismantled, twenty thousand workmen were occupied in Hungary upon the fortifications of Comorn, works which proved the intention of waging a long and obstinate war, and retiring, if beaten on the frontier, into the interior of the monarchy, and there maintaining a desperate resistance. Already even troops, that had somewhat the appear-

ance of divisions of an army, were beginning to assemble towards Bohemia and Galicia, no doubt in order to confront the French forces on the Vistula and the Oder.

The emotion of the court spread gradually to all classes of the population, and whilst at the waters of Toeplitz, Carlsbad, and all Germany, there was an affected desire to assume towards the French an attitude of unwonted arrogance, in the streets of Vienna the populace threatened General Andréossy's people; in Trieste the people insulted the French consul, and in Istria our couriers were assassinated on the military roads that had been surrendered to us. Germany, humiliated by our triumphs, and trampled by our armies, was beginning to thrill with wrath and hope. The events in Spain, serving at once to excite her indignation and to encourage her, had evoked the display of her secret feelings.

Though Napoleon, backed by Russia, had nothing to fear from the continent, yet it was so serious a matter to march a part of the grand army from the Vistula to the Ebro; this transfer of his forces from the north to the south might so embolden his enemies, that he wished previously to force Austria to explain, that he might know exactly how he stood with regard to her. If she desired war, he preferred making war upon her immediately, (postponing the suppression of the Spanish insurrection,) and making it with all his forces, so as to dispense even with the aid of the Russians, have done with Austria for ever, and then fall back from the Danube to the Pyrenees to subdue the Spaniards and sweep the English into the sea. But this was only an extremity. He would rather not have had that new war to wage, for war was no longer his ruling passion. After Rivoli, the Pyramids, Marengo, Austerlitz, Jena, Friedland, military glory could no longer be for him a source of very keen delight. Thenceforth war was to be for him but a means of upholding his policy—a policy unfortunately exorbitant, and which would still render necessary many a bloody triumph. Thus, without wishing to provoke Austria, he was bent on exacting from her the clearest explanation.

Receiving the representatives of the powers, as well as the great state corporations, on the 15th of August, he took the opportunity to have an explanation with M. de Metternich; not passionate and provocative, like the explanation he had formerly had with Lord Whitworth, and which had led to the war with England, but mild, calm, and yet peremptory. His demeanour towards the ministers of all the courts was gracious and serene; he was affable with M. de Tolstoy, though he had reason to complain of his military sallies; with M. de Metternich he was amicable, open, but pressing. Without raising his voice so as to be heard by all present, he yet spoke in a manner to be understood by some of them, especially M. de Tolstoy. "You wish either to make war on us or to frighten us," he said to M. de Metternich.<sup>1</sup> M. de Metternich having replied that his cabinet did not wish to do either the one or the other, Napoleon instantly

replied, mildly but positively, "Wherefore then your armaments, that agitate yourselves and Europe, put peace in jeopardy, and ruin your finances?" On receiving an assurance that these armaments were only defensive, Napoleon applied himself, like one who was profoundly acquainted with the subject, to prove to M. de Metternich that they were of a very different nature. "If your armaments," he said, "were as you assert, purely defensive, they would not be so much hurried. When a new organization is to be created, one takes one's time, and does nothing abruptly, because things are done best that are done slowly; but one does not erect magazines, order assemblages of troops, and buy horses, particularly artillery horses. Your army amounts to nearly four hundred thousand men. Your militia will nearly equal that number. Were I to imitate you I should add four hundred thousand men to my effective force, and that would be an armament out of all reason. I have no need to do so. Less than two hundred thousand conscripts will be enough to maintain my grand army on a formidable scale, and enable me to send a hundred thousand veteran troops into Spain. I will not follow your example, therefore, for it would soon be necessary to arm women and children, and we should relapse into a state of barbarity. But meanwhile your finances suffer; your exchange, already so low, will fall still lower, and your trade will be interrupted. And wherefore all this? Have I demanded any thing of you? Have I advanced claims to any one of your provinces? The treaty of Presburg has settled all questions between the two empires; your master's word, in the interview we had together, ought to have settled every thing between the two sovereigns. There remained yet to be made some arrangements respecting Braunau, which was still on our hands, and on the subject of the Isonzo, the thalweg of which was not sufficiently determined; these have been provided for in the convention of Fontainebleau (convention of October 10, 1808). I demand nothing of you—I want nothing of you—except mutual quiet and security. Is there any difficulty—any one difficulty between us? Let it be known, that we may settle it on the spot." M. de Metternich having again affirmed that his government had no thought of attacking France, and alleging in proof that it had not ordered any movement of troops, Napoleon immediately replied, with the same quiet decision, that he was mistaken, that assemblages of troops had taken place in Galicia and Bohemia, opposite Silesia, in front of the quarters of the French army; that the fact was incontestable; that the immediate consequence would be the assembling of no less considerable forces on the French side; that instead of demolishing the fortresses in Silesia, he was about to repair some of them, arm and provision them, convoke the contingents of the confederation of the Rhine, and put every thing again on a war footing. "I shall not be taken by surprise, you are well aware," he said to M. de Metternich; "I shall be always prepared. You reckon, perhaps, on the Emperor of Russia, and you deceive yourself. I am certain of his adhesion, of the disapprobation he has formally manifested respecting your

<sup>1</sup> This conversation, committed to paper on the instant by M. de Champagny, was sent to Vienna to M. Andréossy, and is preserved in the archives of the foreign-office. I give only the substance of it in the text.

armaments, and the course he will adopt on the occasion. If I had doubts on this subject I would make war at once on you and him alike, for I should not choose to leave the affairs of the continent in doubt. If I confine myself to mere precautions, it is because I am perfectly confident with regard to the continent, because I am so with regard to the Emperor of Russia. Do not imagine, then, that the opportunity is a fair one for attacking France; it would be a grievous mistake on your part. You do not desire war; I believe this of you, M. de Metternich, I believe it of your emperor, and of the enlightened men of your country. But the German nobility, dissatisfied with the changes that have occurred, fill Germany with their rancour. You let yourselves be moved; you communicate your emotion to the masses in urging them to arm; from armament to armament, you come at last to an extraordinary situation, which cannot be long maintained; and by and by you will be brought perhaps to that point at which one longs for a crisis as a means of escaping out of an insupportable situation, and that crisis will be war. Moral and physical nature alike when they are come to that troubled state which precedes the storm, have need to explode in order to purify the air and bring back serenity. This is what I fear from your present conduct. I repeat to you," continued Napoleon, "I want nothing of you, I demand nothing but peace—nothing but a peaceable and stable condition of our mutual relations; but if you make preparations, I will make such that the superiority of my arms shall not be more dubious than in the preceding campaigns; and thus, in order to preserve peace, we shall have brought on war."

On concluding this conversation Napoleon was most gracious in his demeanour towards M. de Metternich, and behaved in all respects like a man who desired peace without fearing war, but who was resolved not to remain in a state of uncertainty. M. de Metternich and the others who heard the conversation could not entertain any doubt as to his real intentions, for his manner was as decided as it was calm and business-like.

Next day, the 16th, was a day of multifarious orders. M. de Champagny had to transmit to Vienna an account of Napoleon's conversation with M. de Metternich, and to draw precise conclusions from its general tenor. M. de Metternich was told in Paris, and General Andr  ossy was instructed to repeat in Vienna, that it was absolutely necessary either to stop the armaments that had been begun, and to do so in a satisfactory manner, or to fight forthwith. Then, in order the more surely to sound the disposition of Austria, Napoleon addressed a demand to her for the immediate recognition of Joseph. This was beyond all doubt the most infallible means of knowing what she thought, or at least what she desired at that moment; for were it possible to extort from her, contrary to all her sentiments, and to her most emphatic and most recent declarations, the recognition of Joseph's royalty, it would be proof that she was incapable of encountering any risk, and that for some time at least one might be at ease as regarded her.

M. de Metternich, who in Paris displayed great zeal for the maintenance of peace, and was lavish of pacific assurances in all his conversations, whether with the imperial ministers or with the Emperor himself, replied with alacrity, that full satisfaction should be given relatively to the armaments of Austria. But as to the recognition of King Joseph, assuming a less affirmative tone, and a more constrained manner, he declared that as far as he was aware, he foresaw no resistance on the part of his cabinet, but that he could not give a definite answer without referring for instructions to Vienna. It was evident that the point in question was the greatest of the existing difficulties, and that to obtain from Austria such a disavowal of her sentiments, and her most recent language, to inflict such a humiliation upon her, would require no less an effort than it would cost to extort fresh provinces from her. It was nevertheless a means of embarrassing her and forcing her to more circumspection, if she was not prepared to fight.

In reality, Napoleon was beginning to believe, that he should be obliged to have one more conflict with her in order to bring her finally into submission; but he wished to know if he should previously have at least six months leisure to make a rapid campaign in Spain, and move thither a hundred thousand of his veteran soldiers, without hazarding his preponderance beyond the Rhine.

All his demonstrations and demands for explanation had no other object than this.

In order to give them a still more imposing character he called upon all the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine for a first contingent, a small one indeed, but sufficient to excite much uneasy comment in Germany, and to give Austria matter for reflection. Should war finally break out between her and France, those small contingents would be raised to their legal effective amount; otherwise they were to go as they were to Spain to aid in the new war Napoleon had brought upon himself; for he chose that the princes of the Rhine should be engaged with him in all his quarrels, and should take their full share of the burden laid on France. This was good policy in one sense, bad in another; for if he thus forced them to identify their cause with his own, on the other hand he exposed them to experience the general hatred which was sure to be provoked, soon or late, by these repeated conscriptions, both right and left of the Rhine, and north and south of the Alps and Pyrenees.

The care Napoleon had taken to make Austria explain, was not the only one imposed on him by circumstances. Whatever were the number of troops detached from the Grand Army for the war in Spain, it would be necessary to effect a new retrograde movement in Poland and Germany in order to approach the Rhine. Already, when he had finally determined on engaging with Spain, Napoleon had made a first change in the positions of his troops, and transferred them from the space between the Pregel and the Vistula to that between the Vistula and the Oder. Marshal Soult, leaving the Oudinot grenadiers in Dantzic, and the heavy cavalry in the delta of the Vistula, had fallen back with the 4th division into Pomerania, Brandenburg, and Hanover. Marshal

Bernadotte had continued to occupy the Hanseatic towns with the Boudet and Molitor divisions, the Spaniards, and the Dutch. Marshal Davout with the third division, the Saxons, the Poles, and the rest of the cavalry, had fallen back into the duchy of Posen, having his base on the Oder. General Victor, raised to the rank of marshal, had established his quarters at Berlin with the first division. Marshal Mortier with the fifth and sixth divisions was cantoned in Silesia.

Napoleon's intention in prolonging this occupation of Prussia was to force it finally to settle the question of the war contributions; next to observe from a strong position the development of the consequences of his alliance with Russia, and his latent strife with Austria; and lastly, to keep his army always in serviceable condition, living on the enemy's country—at least, in part, for he defrayed a portion of its expenses from the extraordinary treasury.

It was indispensable, however, to put an end to this prolonged occupation. In fact, since the war in Spain, it was becoming impossible to keep so vast an extent of country, and it was necessary to abandon a certain number of provinces. It was necessary, not in order to please Russia, with whom every thing depended on a concession in the East; not to please Prussia, who, borne down by her heavy burden, demanded to treat on any conditions, reserving to herself the faculty of not executing those conditions at a future time, should she be unable to do so, or should fortune relieve her from the necessity; nor yet was it to please Austria, with whom there was an end to conciliation; but it was necessary in order to bring the French forces into greater compactness, and move a portion of them towards the Pyrenees. It was expedient, however, to derive from this retrograde movement, which had become necessary, an advantageous settlement with Prussia; it was expedient also to extract from it something agreeable to the Emperor of Russia; for, next after the arrangement of the affairs of the East, what the Emperor Alexander most desired, in order to be delivered, as he said, *from the importunities of unfortunate people, who upbraided him with their misfortunes*, was the evacuation of Prussia, and the final arrangement of the war contributions, which were still insisted on at the hands of that power.

For many months had been resident in Paris Prince William, brother of the King of Prussia, and envoy to Napoleon, for the purpose of obtaining, if possible, a reduction of the charges imposed on his country. This prince had won the esteem of everybody, and particularly that of Napoleon, by his dignified deportment and his prudence. Still he had hitherto ineffectually alleged the inability of Prussia to pay the sums demanded of her, and had quite as vainly offered the most complete and absolute submission of the house of Brandenburg, to be guaranteed by a treaty of alliance offensive and defensive. Napoleon had not suffered himself to be moved either by the prince's allegations or his offers, because he believed that whatever resources he restored to Prussia she would employ in reconstituting her forces, in order to turn them against him. Before Jena he might have counted upon her; but since

that date he felt she must be implicable, and that to exhaust, if he could not destroy her, was the only sagacious policy. Obligated, however, to recall his troops, he consented at last to hear Prince William's propositions; and, after rather long debate, he agreed to evacuate Prussia entirely, with the exception of three fortresses on the Oder—Glogau, Stettin, and Custrin—which he would keep until the payment of the stipulated contributions; and he granted this evacuation on condition of the payment of a sum of 140,000,000, as well for the ordinary contributions as for the extraordinary contributions not defrayed. This sum was to be paid half in money or good bills of exchange, half in mortgages on the territorial domains of Prussia, in such sort that the whole should be liquidated within a brief term—the bills of exchange in eleven or twelve months, at the rate of 6,000,000 a month; the mortgages in a year and a half at the most. The evacuation was to begin immediately, and the French troops were to retire into Swedish Pomerania, the Hanse towns, Hanover, Westphalia, and the Saxon and Franconian provinces taken from Prussia and retained by France. But with Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau on the Oder, Magdeburg on the Elbe, and his troops in Hanover, Saxony, and Franconia, Napoleon was still present as before in Germany, and in a condition to command it. For the greater security he had a secret article inserted in the convention for the evacuation, an article hitherto unknown, by which Prussia bound herself for ten years to confine her military effective within the following limits: ten regiments of infantry, containing 22,000 men; eight regiments of cavalry, 8000 strong; a corps of artillery and of engineers, amounting to 6000; and the royal guard, 6000—making together a total of 42,000 men. The King of Prussia furthermore bound himself not to create any local militia which might serve to disguise any process of arming whatever. Finally, he engaged to make common cause with the French empire against Austria, and to furnish it against her, in case of war, a division of 16,000 men of all arms. For the year 1809 alone, if war broke out, Prussia, not having yet reconstructed her army, was to limit her contingent to 12,000. Napoleon, whose wish was to hold Prussia in check, not to humiliate her, consented to leave this disagreeable part of the treaty unknown. The worthy and discreet prince who defended the interests of his country in Paris could obtain no better terms, for Napoleon, though he had dealt himself the blow which was one day to destroy his power, was still formidable enough to make Europe tremble, and to dictate the law to all his enemies.

Having signed this convention, he wrote to the King and Queen of Prussia, congratulating himself that an end had been put to all the differences between the two courts, and promising for the future to maintain the most amicable relations with the court of Berlin, if the latter was not again misled by hostile passions. Hard as was this treaty for Prussia, it was better than the state of things it superseded, for she was at last delivered from the French troops; and if she was limited in her armaments, it is doubtful that she could have paid for more than the treaty allowed her.

Besides the advantage for Napoleon of setting his accounts with Prussia, and allowing him to withdraw his troops, this arrangement was further recommended by its being agreeable to Russia, which was exceedingly importuned by the complaints of the Prussians, and very desirous to be relieved from them. Now, to be agreeable to Russia was become for the moment one of the conventional rules of Napoleon's policy, and he was as eager to be on a good understanding with her as to bring Austria to an explanation, and to end his disputes with Prussia.

The state of things had undergone no change in St. Petersburg. Alexander, who was always engrossed by the passion of the moment, set no bounds to his complaisance since Napoleon had consented to entertain the question of partitioning the Turkish empire. Constantinople, above all, was an object on which his heart was set more than on the fairest provinces of that empire, because Constantinople implied glory and renown as well as utility. But to give away that key of the straits was of all concessions in the world the very one most repugnant to Napoleon. As the reader has already seen, he had never given it his formal assent; and when he permitted his ambassador, M. de Caulaincourt, to listen to the expression of such desires, it was with a simultaneous announcement of an intention to have the Dardanelles if the Bosphorus was given up to the Russians; an arrangement which could not be acceptable to the court of St. Petersburg. Alexander did not despair of carrying his point with Napoleon. He was incessantly repeating that he desired no territory south of the Balkans, no portion whatever of Roumelia, nothing but the precincts of Constantinople, and anybody else might have Adrianople. In the familiar jargon he talked with the French ambassador he used to give the name of *the cat's tongue* to that tongue of land which is destined as it were to be the lodging of the gatekeeper of the straits.—"Well," he would often say to M. de Caulaincourt, "have you heard from your master? Has he mentioned *the cat's tongue*? Is he disposed to understand and admit the wants of my empire, as I understand and admit the wants of his?"—M. de Caulaincourt gave only evasive answers to these questions, always alleging Napoleon's engrossing occupations, his absence from the capital and his approaching return, after which he should be able to turn his attention from the affairs of the West to those of the East. Alexander rejoined by saying that another interview was necessary to end these differences, that it was indispensable towards the vigorous revival of the policy of Tilsit, and that it could not take place too soon. He himself, however, had not his hands freer than Napoleon's; for the affairs of Finland had taken almost as bad a turn as those of Spain. His troops, after driving back the Swedish armies to Uleaburg, and thereby concentrating them, had themselves been driven back in turn, and even beaten, thanks to the incapacity of General Buxhoeveden, a court favourite, and secured against the indignation of the army by that circumstance only. At the same time, an English fleet, blockading the Russian fleet in the Gulf of Finland, spread terror along the coast. It was not possible, therefore, for the

Emperor Alexander to leave home immediately. But the closing of the navigation in September, and the shutting out of the English for several months, would set Alexander free again, and he asked that the interview in which he hoped to arrange every thing with Napoleon should be fixed at the latest for that month. M. de Caulaincourt always replied to these pressing instances in the manner most likely to make him have patience, and promised that the interview should certainly take place at the time he specified.

Alexander certainly spared no pains to induce Napoleon to enter into his views. The introduction of the French armies into Spain, the occupation of Madrid, the forcible removal of the Spanish princes to Bayonne, the spoliation of their rights, and the proclamation of Joseph's royalty, all this he had found natural, legitimate, and necessary by way of completing Napoleon's policy.—"Your emperor," he said to M. de Caulaincourt, "cannot suffer any Bourbons so near him. This is on his part a consistent policy, which I entirely admit. I am not jealous of his aggrandisements," he was continually saying, "especially when they are prompted by the same motives as the last. Let him not be jealous of those which are in like manner necessary to my empire, and quite as easy to justify."

The higher circles in St. Petersburg, emboldened by the disagreeable, rather than dangerous, checks sustained in Finland, shocked more or less sincerely at the events of Bayonne, and finding a plausible pretext for their complaints in the interdiction of the navigation, were again holding disparaging language as to the policy of an alliance with France; and it is true that the said policy was not distinguished at that time either by morality or by success; for the act of wresting Finland from a relation, whose natural extravagance one had long excited, and over whose weakness it was painful to triumph, was not much better than what was passing in Spain, and was even very like it. "*You must make the best of a bad job*" (*bonne mine à mauvais jeu*), said Alexander to M. de Caulaincourt, "and go through with this difficult affair without finching." With his usual tact he avoided as much as possible talking to M. de Caulaincourt about our disadvantages in Spain, and only adverted to the subject when he could not be silent respecting it without an affectation that would be disagreeable to the very person whose feelings he wished to spare. And when the English party in St. Petersburg proclaimed General Dupont's disaster with shouts of joy, and so much exaggerated our losses as to announce as destroyed the army which was still entire on the Ebro, and as prisoner King Joseph, who was holding his court in Vittoria, he spoke on the matter to M. de Caulaincourt as being neither publicly nor secretly pleased at the disaster of an army that had long been opposed to his own; but on the contrary, as being grieved at such an occurrence, and as seeing in what had occurred nothing but what was simple, indifferent, and easy to explain. "Your master," he said, "sent young soldiers thither, and not enough of them; besides, he was not there; blunders have been committed; he will soon have repaired all that. With some thousands of his

old soldiers, one of his good generals, or some days' presence in his own person, he will soon have brought back King Joseph to Madrid, and rendered the Tilsit policy triumphant. For my part, I shall be invariable, and I am about to address Austria in language that will induce her to reflect seriously on her imprudent conduct. I will prove to your master that I am faithful in bad and good fortune. It is a very slight misfortune this; but, such as it is, it will afford him an opportunity of putting me to the test. Tell him, however, that we must see each other, and as soon as possible, to arrange together and master Europe." Alexander, moreover, kept his word, imposed silence on the censorious and the alarmists, made the Austrian legation especially hold its peace, and enjoined such a reserve upon his mother's circle, that they spoke of our discomfitures in Spain with as much discretion as of those of the Russian armies in Finland.

Such was the aspect of the court of St. Petersburg after, and as influenced by, the events in Spain. Informed in the most exact manner of what was passing there, by the despatches of M. de Caulaincourt, who transmitted to him scrupulously by way of question and reply his daily dialogues with the Emperor Alexander, Napoleon at last resolved to accept an interview. This was the principal one among the determinations taken by him in consequence of his new position. He thought the time was come to realize, not all the wishes of Alexander, which was impossible without jeopardizing the safety of Europe, but a part at least of those wishes; and that it was thus expedient to see him, fascinate him again, concede to him something considerable, such as the Danubian provinces for instance, and, for the rest, to disabuse him or make him wait; in one word, to put him in good humour, which was possible, for Wallachia and Moldavia, immediately and really bestowed, were enough to satisfy the vastest ambition. Besides the advantage of conferring directly with the young emperor, under circumstances of great moment, ascertaining what was at the bottom of his heart, and securing his good will by some important concessions, a public interview in the face of Europe would be a grand spectacle, which would strike men's imaginations, and bear visible testimony to an alliance which it was necessary to render not only real and solid, but apparent, in order to awe all the enemies of the empire.

Whilst he was pressing Austria with his questions, and according to Prussia the evacuation of her territory, Napoleon despatched a courier to M. de Caulaincourt, authorizing him to consent to a solemn interview with the Emperor Alexander. The latter had named the end of September, on account of the closing of the navigation which took place at that season. The time was convenient for Napoleon, and he accepted it. Alexander had seemed to desire for the place of rendezvous either Weimar, for the sake of his sister, or Erfurth, on account of the greater freedom that might be enjoyed there. Napoleon accepted Erfurth, one of the territories that remained in his hands since the parcelling of Germany, and of which he had not yet disposed in favour of any of the sovereigns of the Con-

ederation. Having thus generally determined the time and place for the interview, and leaving it to the Emperor Alexander to specify the days and hours, he gave orders that the interview should have all desirable éclat.

There were still some detachments of the imperial guard on the Rhine. Napoleon ordered a superb battalion of grenadiers of that guard to Erfurth. He gave orders to select a fine regiment of light infantry, a regiment of hussars, and one of cuirassiers, from among those which were returning from Germany, and to march them likewise to Erfurth, to serve as a guard of honour for the sovereigns who were to be present at the interview. He despatched officers of his household with the richest portions of the crown furniture, in order that the largest houses in the town might be elegantly and sumptuously arranged, and adapted to the wants of the persons about to be assembled—emperors, kings, princes, ministers, and generals. He desired that French literature should contribute to the splendour of the assemblage, and commanded the administration of the theatres to send to Erfurth the first French actors, and the first of all, Talma, to perform there "Cinna," "Andromaque," "Mahomet," and "Œdipe." He excluded comedy, although he held the immortal works of Molière in the esteem they deserve; "but they are not well understood," he said, "in Germany. We must set before the Germans the grandeurs of our tragic stage; they are more capable of seizing them than of penetrating the depth of Molière." Lastly, he gave orders for the display of prodigious sumptuousness, for it was his will that France should command respect by her civilization as much as by her arms.

These orders being given, he employed the time that remained to him in making his military preparations against two contingencies; that, namely, in which he should have to encounter only Spain aided by the English, and that in which, besides Spain and England, he should have to fight once more, and immediately, with Austria. The state of things had not mended in Spain since the retreat of the French army on the Ebro. Joseph had, between Catalonia, Aragon, Castile, and the Basque provinces, and including some recent reinforcements, more than a hundred thousand men, partly young soldiers already inured to war, partly old soldiers who had arrived successively, regiment by regiment, from the Elbe to the Rhine, and from the Rhine to the Pyrenees. This was more than would have been enough in the hands of an able general to overwhelm the insurgents, who were audaciously advancing from all points of Spain, from Galicia, from Madrid, from Saragossa. But nothing was done except running to and fro, complaining, and soliciting fresh resources without knowing how to use those at hand. Napoleon tried to inspire the panic-stricken Joseph with courage by the energy of his language. "Be worthy of your brother," he said to him, "try to bear yourself as becomes your position. What care I for a parcel of insurgents whom I shall settle with my dragons, and who are not likely to defeat armies that neither Austria, Russia, nor Prussia could withstand? *I shall find the Pillars of Hercules*



*in Spain; I shall not find there the limits of my power.*" He promised him immense reinforcements, and added much wise and provident advice, which Joseph and his generals were incapable of understanding, still more of following. Joseph had chosen to have about him his little court of Naples, and in the first place Marshal Jourdan, a very respectable man, as we have said, decent, slow, mediocre, just the sort of man suited to the mediocrity of Joseph, and above all to his love of domineering; for the emperor's brothers indemnified themselves for his domination over them by that which they endeavoured to exercise over others. Next after Marshal Jourdan, Joseph had asked for M. Roederer to aid him in the political and financial administration of Spain; a request which Napoleon had not yet granted, because he distrusted, not the heart or understanding of M. Roederer, but his practical capacity in business of state. With the exception of this latter, Joseph had already round him all his Neapolitan household; and in his half-military, half-political court, it was a favourite practice to speak ill of Napoleon, to inveigh against his oddities, his perverse commands, and his want of justice and reason; and without venturing to deny his genius, these critics were fond of observing that he judged of things from a distance, and therefore ill and superficially; in short, that he was mistaken, and they were not so. They were not very far even from believing that, so far as one was his brother, one must possess a share more or less of his genius, and that with a little of his experience in war one would be no less capable than himself of commanding.

Inspired by Napoleon's energetic language, and emboldened by the reinforcements which were arriving from all parts, Joseph plucked up courage, was often on horseback attended by his trusty Jourdan, and took some pleasure in playing the warrior king, giving orders, directing movements, showing himself to the troops, and holding reviews. But, reassured as he was, he had not ventured to remain in Burgos, or even in Miranda, and he finally established his head-quarters at Vittoria. He had there 2000 men of a royal guard, half Spanish, half Neapolitan, 2000 men of the imperial guard, and 3000 of the Rey brigade, which always accompanied him; in all 7000. On his right he had Marshal Bessières, with 20,000 men distributed between Cubo, Briviesca, and Burgos, holding the latter town by cavalry; on his left, from Miranda to Logroño, Marshal Moncey, with 18,000; and from Logroño to Tudela, General Verdier's division, still fifteen or sixteen thousand strong after its losses at Saragossa. In his rear Joseph had the marching depôts and regiments, a disjointed assemblage of soldiers detached from all the corps, but useful for covering the rear, and comprising not fewer than fifteen or sixteen thousand men. The last arrived of the old regiments which Napoleon had successively withdrawn from the Grand Army, namely, the 51st and 43d of the line, with the 26th regiment of chasseurs, had served to form the Godinot brigade, an excellent body of troops, which, by a sudden attack on Bilbao, had cleared it of the insurgents, and killed 1200 of them. Lastly, the movable columns of gendar-

merie and mountaineers guarding the passes of the Pyrenees, to the number of 3000 or 4000 men, the division of General Reille 6000 or 7000 strong, that of General Duhesme, in Catalonia, 10,000 or 11,000, completed a total of 100,000 men, forming the forces that still remained in Spain.

Napoleon wearied himself with sending to Joseph's head-quarters instructions, which, as we have said, were ill understood and worse executed. In the first place, he converted from provisional into regular regiments those from 118 to 120, and gave orders to incorporate with them all the marching detachments in order to the consolidation of the several corps, and to concentrate the imperial guard, one part of which was with Marshal Bessières, the other with Joseph, and to form with it and the two old regiments of Godinot's brigade a good reserve, such as was necessary against unforeseen contingencies. His arrangements for the general distribution of the forces were as follows. Considering Aragon and Navarre as a separate theatre of operations, which had its own secured line of retreat on Pampeluna, he gave orders to form there a distinct mass of from 15,000 to 18,000 men, which should serve to cover the left of the army, to guard Tudela, which was the key of Aragon, and to collect there a vast amount of artillery for the purpose of ultimately resuming the siege of Saragossa. Then placing the centre of the principal operations in Burgos, in Old Castille, on the high road to Madrid, he ordered the establishment there of a body of from 40,000 to 50,000 men, to be ready to fall upon any insurgent corps that should present itself on the one hand or the other, and to overwhelm it; for there was no Spanish army whatever that could stand against a combined force of 80,000 or 40,000 Frenchmen. Finally, he gave orders to wait in that imposing attitude for the arrival of the reinforcements, and for his presence, which he hoped to give at no distant time. All this, which was as clearly set forth in Napoleon's instructions as it was sagaciously planned, was not understood by any one in Vittoria, and Joseph and those about him passed their time in taking fright at the least movement of the enemy, and decrying insurgents everywhere by hundreds of thousands. Thus, since the retreat of Marshal Bessières, General Blake had reappeared with some 20,000 men in Old Castille, and his force was exaggerated into 40,000 or 50,000. Since the capitulation of Baylen, General Castaños was advancing slowly on Madrid with about 15,000 men, and he was supposed to be on his march to the Ebro with 50,000. Lastly, the Valencians and Aragonese might reckon on 18,000 or 20,000 men, and their force was set down at 40,000. All together, then, the enemy were computed at one hundred and thirty or one hundred and forty thousand men, potent and skilful enough to reduce French armies to capitulate, as at Baylen; and when more precise information had reduced these exaggerations to their true value, the alarmists excused themselves on the plea that it was so difficult to obtain exact information in Spain.—"In war it is at all times and in all places difficult to know the truth," was Napoleon's reply to them; "but it is always possible to collect it if one will be at the pains. You have a nu-

merous cavalry, and the brave Lasalle. Send out your dragoons to sweep the country over a range of ten to fifteen leagues; seize the alcaides, the curés, the notable inhabitants, and the postmasters; keep them until they speak, interrogate them judiciously, and you will learn the truth, which you will never learn by going to sleep within your lines."

These grand lessons were thrown away, and Joseph's courtiers continued to people space with imaginary enemies. Towards the end of August, for instance, the Aragonese, Valencians, and Catalonians, under the Conde de Montijo, having presented themselves in the environs of Tudela, Marshal Moncey, who was much intimidated since his campaign in Valencia, imagined that all the insurgents of Spain were swarming down upon him, and hastened to take up a defensive position, and to cry out loudly for succour. General Lefebvre-Desnoettes, acting in place of General Verdier, who had been wounded at Saragossa, immediately advanced. He crossed the Ebro at Alvaro with his Polish lancers, and put to flight all that came in his way, thus demonstrating what sort of thing was the formidable army of Aragon and Valencia.

This curious adventure covered the alarmists with confusion, and contributed to induce a more correct estimate of the enemy's strength. Emboldened by what he had just seen and by the severe letters he received from Paris, Joseph then took it into his head to imitate his brother's grand manœuvres. Establishing himself in Miranda as a centre, he meditated the plan of rushing from one division of the enemy to another, and beating them in succession, after the manner frequently practised by Napoleon. The Spaniards, it is true, rather facilitated such a system; for General Blake, with the insurgents of Leon, the Asturias, and Galicia, aimed at introducing himself into Biscay on our right; a detachment under General Castaños intended to arrive at the Ebro on our front; and the Aragonese, Valencians, and others, purposed to enter Navarre so as to turn our left. Their hope was to out-flank and surround us, cut off our communication with France, and thus achieve another Baylen: an absurd chimera, for there was no chance of repeating with sixty thousand Frenchmen, all very resolute in spite of the timidity of some of their leaders, what had been effected for once against eight thousand disheartened Frenchmen. To counteract this ridiculous plan, initiated from the chance affair at Baylen, Joseph proposed to employ the equally ridiculous imitation of his brother's grand style of operations, and to fall *en masse* on each of the insurgent bodies in its turn, so as to crush them one after the other. The intention might be good; but opportune precision is every thing in war, and imitation succeeds no better in that art than in any other. Thus, whilst Blake's insurgents were making demonstrations on Bilbao, and those of Aragon on Tudela, Joseph was sending his divisions thither, in all haste, sometimes galloping with them himself in breathless speed, arriving when it was too late, or stopping short midway in his manœuvres; he would then march his wearied and exhausted soldiers back to Vittoria, and write to the emperor that he had followed

his advice, and hoped soon, with a little experience, to become worthy of him. Pitiable spectacle often given to the world by commonplace men who seek to copy their more gifted brothers, and succeed in equalling them only in their defects or their vices!

Napoleon could not refrain from smiling at these silly displays of his brother's vanity, but anger soon overcame his disposition to laugh, when he reflected on the time and the forces which were thus utterly wasted. He thought, therefore, of sending to those who imitated him so badly one of his ablest lieutenants, Marshal Ney, that he might put fresh energy into them; and then he ordered them to confine themselves to reorganizing the army, repairing their matériel and artillery, keeping good guard on the Ebro, and remaining quiet until his own arrival.

He then made up his mind as to the detachments he should take from Italy and Germany in order to complete the subjugation of Spain. Not less than from one hundred to one hundred and twenty thousand men he thought would be required promptly to terminate the Spanish insurrection and drive the English into the sea. He had been made acquainted with the convention of Cintra, and, finding it honourable for the army which had fought well and which had remained free, he wrote to Junot,—"As a general you might have done better; as a soldier you have done nothing contrary to honour." At the same time he gave orders at Rochefort to receive and re-equip the troops from Portugal, which, being acclimated, inured to war and re-armed, might again render great services, and increase by twenty thousand men the succours destined for the Peninsula.

Italy had for some months received back the Italians, now become good soldiers by serving in the North. Napoleon ordered Prince Eugene to despatch them, to the number of ten thousand, under General Pino, towards Dauphiné and Roussillon. With two fine French regiments, the 1st light and the 42d of the line, taken from Piedmont, where their place was supplied by two regiments of the army of Naples, he formed the nucleus of a division, which was given to General Souham, and completed by several battalions belonging to corps already put under contribution for Catalonia. This division, artillery and cavalry included, amounted to nearly seven thousand men. Then there were sixteen or seventeen thousand men on the march from the Alps to the Pyrenees, and these, with the division under General Duhesme, Reille's column, and a brigade of Neapolitans already on its way to Perpignan under General Chabot, made up a total of about thirty-six thousand troops destined for Catalonia. That province being separated from the rest of Spain, and forming a distinct theatre of war, Napoleon gave the command-in-chief of the troops there to General St. Cyr, a general of incomparable ability as regarded methodic warfare, and who always operated well when he was alone. He could not have made a better choice.

It was Germany and Poland that were to furnish the most considerable detachments. Napoleon resolved to take thence the 1st division, already transferred to Berlin under the command of Marshal Victor; and the 6th, which had belonged to Marshal Ney, and was then

encamped in Silesia under Marshal Mortier. It was his intention subsequently to take thence the 5th, which had belonged successively to Marshals Lannes and Masséna, and which, as well as the 6th, was encamped in Silesia under Marshal Mortier. For the present, Napoleon removed it to Bareuth, one of the Franconian provinces remaining in his possession, where he intended that it should remain in readiness to act against Austria, if she decided for immediate war; or to be marched to Spain if the court of Vienna desisted from arming. The first and sixth divisions, reinforced by the recruits furnished by the dépôts, amounted to not less than fifty thousand men, including the artillery and the light-horse attached to each division. They were all, with the exception of a small contingent of conscripts, tried veterans, combined together in a matchless framework of military organization. Napoleon thought also of borrowing from Germany a part of the general reserve of cavalry, and made choice of the dragoons, an arm that seemed to him excellently adapted for employment in Spain, because, whereas it could be applied to various services, and was solid enough to be opposed to the Spanish infantry, it was yet less cumbersome than the heavy cavalry. He resolved on the other hand to leave in the plains of the North his numerous and valiant cuirassiers, as useless against the undisciplined troops of the South, but necessary against the martial bands of the northern regions. He gave orders for marching three divisions of dragoons to Spain, postponing the departure of the remaining two until he should have cleared up the mystery of the Austrian policy.

He resolved to make the kings, his allies or brothers, co-operate in this war, which belonged to his system of confederated royalties; and he demanded 8000 Dutchmen of the King of Holland, 7000 Germans of the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine, and of the King of Saxony 7000 Poles, whom he had long engaged to take into his service. Finally he sent off about 8500 engineers and artillerymen, with an immense matériel.

This was not the whole force which was marching towards the Pyrenees. Already, as we have said, Napoleon had ordered to Spain eight old regiments comprised in the hundred thousand men then acting on the Ebro. Four others, from the banks of the Elbe and from Paris, the 28th, 82d, 68th, and 75th of the line, were on the roads of France, and were to form with the 5th regiment of dragoons a fine division of seven or eight thousand men, whom Napoleon put under the command of General Sebastiani, who had returned from Constantinople. To these twelve old regiments, taken successively from Germany and France, he had added two others on the news of Joseph's disaster; these were the 38th and 55th of the line, at that moment approaching Bayonne and destined to reinforce Joseph's reserve. Lastly, the guard was to furnish four thousand men more, besides three thousand who were at Joseph's head-quarters. These troops, without the 5th division, the destination of which remained undetermined, and without Junot's troops, which were but just arriving and required to be reorganized, formed altogether a total of between 100,000 and 115,000 men,

worthy of the Grand Army from which they were drawn. Napoleon was about to take means for further augmenting their numbers by means of a judicious recruitment from the dépôts, which were to be kept at their full complement by conscription.

The next consideration was, how to supply the places of the troops withdrawn from the army of Italy, and, above all, from the Grand Army, without too much weakening either. After the regiments successively recalled from Poland and Germany, after the departure of the 1st and 6th divisions, and of the dragoons, and the discharge of the auxiliaries, the force of the Grand Army was very considerably reduced. There remained in Swedish Pomerania and in Prussia, Marshal Soult's 4th division, consisting of 34,000 foot, 3000 light horse, 8 or 9000 heavy horse, 4000 artillerymen and engineers—in all about 50,000. Marshal Bernadotte, Prince of Ponte Corvo, was keeping garrison in the Hanse towns and on the Baltic coast with two French divisions of 12,000 men (the Boudet and Gency divisions. Molitor's division having been united to that of Marshal Soult,) 14,000 Spaniards, and 7000 Dutchmen—in all 33,000 men. Marshal Davout, with the 8d division, the finest and most strongly organized of the whole French army, was occupying the duchy of Posen, from the Vistula to the Oder. It numbered 38,000 foot, 9000 horse, chasseurs, dragoons, and cuirassiers. He occupied, moreover, Dantzic, with the Oudinot division of 10,000 grenadiers and chasseurs *d'élite*. He had 3000 artillerymen and engineers, which made a total of 60,000 Frenchmen. He had 30,000 Saxons and Poles. The general park for the whole grand army, in Magdeburg and the principal fortresses of Prussia, was served by 7 or 8000 men of all kinds. This was a total of 180,000 men, of whom 130,000 were French, 50,000 Poles, Saxons, Spaniards, and Dutch. If to this mass was added the 5th division, established in Silesia, and amounting to about 24,000 men, the Grand Army might be estimated at 200,000 of the very best soldiers, quite sufficient, with the army of Italy, to overwhelm Austria, even should the Emperor Alexander bring us little or no help. It was not enough, however, to withstand the universal antipathy of the continent, for, though Austria alone manifested her dislike and her wish to shake off our yoke, all Germany was beginning to feel a deep and ill-concealed aversion for us, both in the countries subject to the Confederation of the Rhine and in all the rest.

Napoleon resolved immediately to raise the effective of the armies of Germany and Italy almost to what it had been before the deductions he had made from them. Unfortunately he could render them equal in quantity only, not in quality, to what they had been, for he sent them recruits only in place of old troops. Yet the nuclei of those armies were so excellent, and the number of experienced soldiers in them was still so considerable, that an addition of conscripts could not sensibly weaken them. He began, in conformity with the convention he had entered into with Prussia, by moving the troops he had in Germany towards the Rhine. The 1st and the 6th divisions,

destined for Spain, were, by his orders, on the march for Mayence, with an interval of six halts between them, so that they might not impede each other on the route. Marshal Soult's division was moved to Berlin, to take the place of the 1st, which had just left that capital. Marshal Davout's corps was to take the place left vacant on the Oder and in Silesia by the 4th and 5th divisions, the former of which had gone, as we have seen, to Mayence, and the latter to Bareuth. General Oudinot was to quit Dantzig with his picked battalions and proceed to Central Germany, his place being supplied at Dantzig by the Poles and Saxons. This movement, which began the execution of the convention with Prussia, rendered recruitment easier, by diminishing the distance by one-half.

Napoleon's first step was to put in force the decree passed in the preceding year, which fixed the force of each regiment of infantry at five battalions. Consequently, he resolved to have four complete battalions in all the regiments of the Grand Army, leaving the fifth, that of the dépôt, on the Rhine. For Spain, he determined that every regiment should have three battalions of war with the main body, a fourth at Bayonne, as a first dépôt, and a fifth in the interior of France, as a second dépôt. The armies of Italy and of Naples were likewise to have five battalions per regiment, four in Italy, and the fifth in Piedmont, or in the southern departments of France.

To this end it was necessary to have recourse again to the conscription. There remained to be enrolled, out of the conscriptions of 1807, 1808, and 1809—the latter already decreed in January of the current year—about 60,000 men. Napoleon resolved to demand, in addition, that of 1810, thus beginning the practice of anticipating the conscription by more than a year. He took the precaution, however, not to dispose for the present of more than a part of these levies. The 60,000 men for the years 1807, 1808, 1809, and the 80,000 for 1810, were to form a total of 140,000 men, to be thus distributed: 40,000 to the infantry of the Grand Army, 30,000 to that of the army of Spain, 26,000 to that of Italy, 10,000 to the five legions in reserve, 10,000 to that of the imperial guard, which made in all 116,000 for the infantry. There remained 14,000 for the cavalry, and 10,000 for the artillery, engineers, and baggage department.

It will be remarked, no doubt, that Napoleon levied 10,000 men for the imperial guard. That choice corps, after its return to France, was reposing in Paris, and was generally less employed than the others. Napoleon resolved to make it a school of war, by sending to it chosen young men, to be trained by it into battalions of fusileers. After having passed a year or two at Paris or Versailles in the imperial guard, these conscripts would naturally have acquired its spirit, its discipline, and its fine soldierly appearance. At the same time he did not neglect to prescribe the ordinary recruitment of the guard, at the rate of twenty picked men from each regiment in the whole army, so as to maintain its excellent composition, and to leave open that career of advancement for the old soldiers who had no other way of rising.

For the present, Napoleon called out only 80,000 men—60,000 upon the conscription already decreed, and 20,000 only upon that of 1810; and desired that the enrolment should begin with the conscripts of the classes in arrear, and that 20,000 of them, chiefly from the southern departments, should be marched to Bayonne. He ordered that skeletons of each fourth battalion should be sent to that town, to begin forthwith the training of these conscripts, who were already of a vigorous age, and thus to provide for the future recruitment of the corps entering Spain. In consequence of this provident measure, the Grand Army would soon contain nearly 200,000 Frenchmen, not including the fifth division, the army of Italy 100,000, the army of Spain 250,000, of whom 100,000 were already on the Ebro, 110,000 were on the march, and 40,000 were serving their military apprenticeship in the fourth battalions.

Pending the execution of these measures, Napoleon had the dépôts cleared immediately of all their disposable inmates, so as to procure more space, and send a first contingent of recruits to all the divisions. Three marching regiments were formed and sent off, one to Berlin, for Marshal Soult (4th division;) one to Magdeburg, for Marshal Davout (8d division;) one to Dresden, for Marshal Mortier (5th division.) Two others were sent to Mayence and to Orleans, to recruit the 1st and the 6th divisions. This was an immediate reinforcement of 12,000 well-trained men for the various corps which were to remain in Germany or to proceed to Spain.

Napoleon directed, at the same time, with a view to facilitate the formation of the regiments left in Germany into four war battalions, that those which had companies of grenadiers and chasseurs in the Oudinot division should immediately recall them; and to indemnify that division for the loss, he sent it companies of grenadiers and chasseurs from the regiments stationed in France which had not yet furnished it with any such companies. There was an extraordinary movement of troops in all directions; young and old soldiers, some with their faces set northwards, others towards the south, from the Vistula to the Ebro; all coming and going, with as little confusion as was possible with regard to such vast distances and such considerable masses of men.

Always attentive to the pleasures of the soldier, and aware that, if he sets little store by his life when he has been well fashioned to his trade, he likes to enjoy that life as long as it is left him, Napoleon bespoke brilliant entertainments for the troops which were traversing France from the Rhine to the Pyrenees. The municipalities of Mayence, Metz, Nancy, Rheims, Orléans, Bordeaux, and Périgueux, were by his order to hold military festivities, the cost of which he secretly promised to defray. He devoted to this purpose more than a million out of the treasury of the army, taking care to leave the municipalities all the merit of this gracious hospitality. Martial songs composed at his desire were sung at banquets where nothing was talked of but the heroic exploits of our armies and the greatness of France, the only allusion to politics allowed at those festivities, where old soldiers, on their way from

the Niemen to the Tagus, met lads of eighteen or nineteen who were quitting the banks of the Seine or the Loire for those of the Elbe or the Oder, and who, already forgetting the pain of quitting the paternal cot, mingled their adieux with cheerful anticipations of good fortune in the adventurous career of battle and glory. In general those who were bound for the South were the more joyous, simply because they had the prospect of good wine before them; so great was the forgetfulness of self in those men devoted to almost certain destruction, as they were well aware.

Besides men, Napoleon sent also immense masses of matériel towards the Pyrenees. There was no need to send any to the Rhine, because since the beginning of the war on that frontier a considerable matériel had been accumulated there, which the fortress of Magdeburg, becoming almost French on becoming Westphalian, could scarcely contain, and which it had been necessary to transport to Erfurth, Mayence, and Strasburg. But at Perpignan, Toulouse, and Bayonne, almost every thing was to be created, the war being new in the South, and now assuming such vast proportions. Accordingly Napoleon gave orders for collecting at Bayonne immense quantities of woollen and linen cloths, leather, muskets, cannons, tents, kettles, grain, fodder, and cattle. He desired that every soldier should carry three pairs of shoes in his knapsack, and find two other pairs at the Pyrenees, which were for the most part bestowed upon him gratuitously. He commanded an extraordinary manufacture of shoes, great-coats, and biscuit, persisting in the maxim, that the soldier, furnished with shoes, raiment, and biscuit, has what is indispensable, and that with such appliances, he may be made capable of any thing. He had a great number of oxen and mules purchased for food and transport. Lastly, he took care to apply large sums to the repair of the roads, for they broke down under the enormous trains of wagons that traversed them. These orders were to be executed in the latter half of October, the interview at Erfurth being fixed to take place in the first half. Napoleon calculated on crossing the Ebro at that period, marching to Madrid at the head of formidable armies, and re-establishing his brother on the throne of Philip V.

These vast expenses demanded resources no less vast. Victory and good administration had provided them beforehand; yet it is not the less true that a notable portion of the funds amassed with so much forethought, for the improvement of the soil and the dotation of great families, was about to be diverted from those objects and dissipated. Napoleon thus gathered from his errors in Spain two equally deplorable consequences, namely, the dispersion of his old soldiers of the North in the South, and the dissipation of the wealth created by his able economy. The budget he had taken such pains to confine within the amount of seven hundred and twenty millions (exclusive of the cost of collection, which was one hundred and twenty millions, and the departmental expenditure of thirty millions) was now to rise to eight hundred millions, and even higher, without counting all that the foreigner would continue to furnish, for the Grand Army was partly maintained out of the contributions of Prussia.

The income, which had gone on continually increasing under a reign so peaceful at home, had fallen short in one of its most important items, the customs. It had been expected that they would yield eighty millions, and it was doubtful that they would yield fifty millions. This was a first effect of the formidable Milan decrees, which had prohibited, by new and more rigorous means, the importation of English colonial produce. The income therefore was diminishing while the outgoings were increasing. It is true that the army funds were to supply the deficit.

The last arrangement with Prussia promised considerable resources. About ninety millions, received in kind, had been consumed severally on the spot, and two hundred and six millions had been spent in money from the contributions, which made nearly three hundred millions drawn from Germany for the maintenance of the French armies. There remained in the receiving office of the contributions, that is to say in the army treasury, about one hundred and sixty millions in value, received or to be received soon, besides one hundred and forty millions due by Prussia, in all three hundred millions. But these three hundred millions were not wholly available; for, independently of the one hundred and forty millions payable in bills of exchange or mortgages, there were in the hundred and sixty millions reckoned as cash twenty-four millions already deposited in the treasury for arrears of pay, and seventy-four deposited in the *caisse de service* out of the eighty-four due to it for the loan destined to raise the notes of the receivers-general to par. There remained then sixty-two millions immediately available, besides twenty millions accruing from the contribution of Austria, but absorbed by loans granted to some towns, and to Spain herself. Thus the present resources were very limited, since the one hundred and forty millions to be furnished by Prussia in bills of exchange and mortgages were to be paid only by instalments, extending over a space of eighteen months. It is true that the income of the treasury was obtained with extreme facility, and that the *caisse de service* abounded with money, thanks to the credit it enjoyed; that, according to the arrangement concluded with Prussia, the Grand Army was paid entirely for the whole year 1808; and that, although a failure of resources might be foreseen, there was nothing as yet that indicated embarrassment. Napoleon had, nevertheless, by the war in Spain, dealt as heavy a blow to his finances as to his armies, for both were about to be weakened by division.

There resulted from that fatal war a new burden, which Napoleon chose to take upon himself for political reasons of a very controvertible kind, and very much controverted by his minister of the treasury, M. Mollien. Though he took great pains to conceal from the public all knowledge of the events in Spain, even hiding victories the better to suppress all mention of defeats, yet they came to be known either through the English journals, some of which always found their way into France, in spite of the most vigilant police, or by the letters of the officers to their families, written as usual according to the exaggerated impressions of the moment. Thus the public became

cognisant at last of the principal events, and it was known that a French army had been unfortunate in Andalusia, that a fleet had capitulated at Cadiz, and that Joseph, after having entered Madrid, was then at Vittoria. Now it is the general results that are important far more than the details, and in substance it was generally known that the attempt made upon the crown of Spain, instead of being, as had at first been supposed, a simple act of entering into possession, was becoming a desperate strife against a whole nation, backed by the entire strength of England. The division of the forces of France being an inevitable consequence of this new war, it was confusedly felt that the empire was no longer so strong as it had been; that its lately prostrate enemies might raise their heads again, and all that had seemed settled might again become matter of dispute. Self-interest, though often blind, has nevertheless an instinctive perspicacity that often renders it prophetic. Thus, although the mercantile movement of the public funds reveals in general only the unreasonable hopes or fears of the day, yet does it indicate in the long run the prudent and well-grounded opinion of the existing state of things which the commercial classes entertain upon mature reflection. Now, in spite of Napoleon's efforts to disguise the true situation of affairs in Spain, the aroused sagacity of the money-market belied the official language of the government, and the public funds fell considerably. After Tilsit they had been quoted at the price, then unprecedented, of ninety-four for the five per cent. stock, which was maintained with some slight variations, until the barbarous expedition against Copenhagen had induced the culpable invasion of the Peninsula, and all hope of peace was gone. The funds then fell from ninety-four to eighty, and even so low as seventy after the Spanish insurrection. This was a judgment spontaneously pronounced on the Emperor's policy by the interests it alarmed; it was a very hard truth obtruded upon him in spite of all his awe-inspiring power. As always happens, the natural movement of the market was complicated with the factitious movement produced by speculation, and the price of the public funds tended to fall even below the level justified by reasonable considerations; for if Napoleon had committed a serious fault, it was still possible for him to repair it, and to save himself, provided he did not add to it others of a still more dangerous nature.

But he was not the man to give way before this new kind of foes, and he resolved to fight against them. "I mean," he said to M. Mollien, "to make a campaign against the bears,"—for the stockjobber's slang was as well known in those days as now. It is enough indeed that a country has passed through a revolution to give general currency to that jargon, since revolutions afford the amplest of all fields for the exercise of stockjobbing. In spite then of M. Mollien, who as a man accustomed to the regular course of business, was averse to expedients, Napoleon resolved to make extraordinary purchases of stock in order to raise the public funds. For this purpose he had recourse to the army treasury, which he deemed inexhaustible, just as he deemed invariable in

its favours the gale of victory that had filled that treasury. Accordingly he ordered considerable purchases on account of the army treasury, independently of the purchases on account of the sinking fund, which were then infrequent and irregular; and in so doing he thought he acted for the advantage both of the army and of the creditors of the state. For the army he procured investments yielding six or seven per cent. interest; and for the creditors of the state he maintained their security at a sufficient price. Nor, after all, considering the matter in reference to the habits of the time, was there much to blame in this mode of operating; for in those days men had not yet come to understand that the purchases made by the state ought to be constant and daily, as a regular function, not accidental, as a speculation.

Not having the army funds in his hands, Napoleon ordered the *caisse de service* to make advances, and it did so to the amount of thirty millions for purchases of stock. He did not stop there. There was in the bank, since the issue of its new shares, capital which it knew not how to employ, the discount business not proving proportionate to the capital he had thought fit to assign to the bank. The stocks at the current price yielded a return of seven per cent., which was a better employment for money than that of discounting. Napoleon required the bank to purchase stock to a large amount; which it did without demur, and which was indeed in conformity with its own true interests as well as with those of the state, since no other investment could just then yield it so much profit. By means of these purchases, steadily and resolutely planned and executed for a month or two, the speculators for a fall were beaten, many of them even ruined, and the public funds rose again to eighty, a price which Napoleon deemed it a point of honour for his government to maintain. A rise above that point was in his eyes a token of the exuberant prosperity which his victories would soon give back to the Empire; a fall below it was a mark of decline which he would not endure. He resolved that whenever the funds fell below eighty, the treasury should renew its purchases; and so, in spite of the efforts of the gamblers for a fall,—the worst of all gamblers, since they speculate on the impoverishment of the public fortune,—the price of stock was upheld by the power of that singular speculator who had at his disposal the combined resources of the treasury and of victory. He exulted at this success as much as at a battle gained over the Russians or the Austrians. "We have beaten the bears," said he to M. Mollien. "They will not try the game again; and meanwhile we shall have preserved for the creditors of the state the capital to which they have a right; for eighty per cent. is that on which I will have them enabled to reckon; and besides this, we shall have effected good investments for the army funds." He then bestowed some private revenues on several of the vanquished in this financial warfare. It was, after all, a singular symptom, and worthy of observation, that open conflict waged by speculators against Napoleon's policy, whilst timorous opinion as yet confined itself to whispered rumours. Why did he not hearken

to that lesson, ignoble as was the source whence it flowed? for truth is good and wholesome, come whence it may.

These occupations of all kinds consumed the latter part of August and almost the whole month of September. The interview at Erfurth was approaching. In the interval the manifestations of the imperial diplomacy had attained their end. Austria, intimidated since the return of Napoleon to Paris, had considerably lowered her tone. The declarations he had made, confirmed by the call for the German contingents, had shown her the imminence of war and prompted her to serious reflection. Moreover, it suited her to postpone her purposes; for, supposing her bent on again taking the field, it would be better for her to wait until a hundred thousand Frenchmen should have quitted Germany for the Peninsula, and until she should have further improved her preparations. She did not hesitate therefore to offer such explanation as might allay Napoleon's irritation, and postpone the moment of rupture. She attributed her armaments to an alleged reorganization of the Austrian army, begun, as she stated, by Archduke Charles, and steadily continued by him for more than two years past, a fact which no one had a right to think strange or amiss. As for the indulgence with which England had treated the Austrian flag on the Adriatic, she accounted for it, not as the result of a secret connivance, but as a token of lingering forbearance on the part of England towards an ancient ally. Lastly, as regarded the recognition of King Joseph, she eluded the overtures of French diplomacy, by putting off the question from day to day on pretence of not having yet been able to fix the attention of the Emperor Francis on that important subject.

Napoleon was not deluded as to the import and the sincerity of the replies made by Austria; but he saw clearly from her language that she would do nothing that year, and that he should have time to make a prompt and vigorous campaign beyond the Pyrenees. Moreover, it was at Erfurth he was finally to make that point certain. Prussia had eagerly ratified the convention of evacuation, and even the secret articles which so strictly limited her military establishment; but she demanded, as a signal favour, longer periods for the payment of the one hundred and forty millions remaining due by her. She hoped to obtain this indulgence through the direct personal inference of the Emperor Alexander at Erfurth; for everybody hoped or feared something from that famous interview, which had been announced all over Europe, and was now the theme of every conversation. Some denied, others affirmed, it would take place, each according to his own desires. Others talked of sovereigns who were to be present at it, such as the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria, who had not been invited; for, besides the sovereigns of France and Russia, none had been summoned, or received a favourable answer to their request to be admitted, except the princes whose homages were expected, and who would serve to give more *clat* to the proceedings.

Whilst rumour was busy with these contradictory surmises, one fact was true, namely, that the interview was about to take place on the 27th of September, at Erfurth, some leagues

from Weimar. The Emperor Alexander, after having so strongly desired it, could not decline it when it was offered to him. Besides, his affairs allowed, and even commanded, him to accept it; for things were beginning to wear a better aspect in Finland, the English had quitted the Baltic, and events were hurrying onwards in the East. Gladly, therefore, he accepted the opportunity of seeing Napoleon once more, and at last obtaining from him the realization in whole or in part of his most cherished wishes. M. de Romanzoff, who was, if possible, still more eagerly bent on the consummation of the same desires, approved quite as much as his master of this important interview, and was to accompany him to it. Besides M. de Romanzoff, Alexander resolved to bring with him his brother, the Grand-duke Constantine, as a military man, and the first officer of his palace, M. de Tolstoy, brother of the Russian ambassador at Paris, and, in addition to these two personages, a few aides-de-camp. In order to facilitate his intercourse with the imperial court of France, he desired that M. de Caulaincourt, whom he had become habituated to see daily, and to converse with in the most unrestricted manner, should be present at Erfurth. He made but one request before setting out on his journey, namely, that he should be enabled, when he passed through Königsberg, again to speak a few words of comfort to the ruined and most unfortunate sovereigns of Prussia. The convention of evacuation, though most welcome to them as regarded the deliverance of their territory, bore very distressingly upon them in its pecuniary stipulations. Now, it was a good-natured weakness of Alexander's to wish always to say to those he saw what it was agreeable to them to hear. His inclination that way was particularly strong with regard to the King and Queen of Prussia, whose misfortunes were a continual reproach to him. He insisted therefore on being authorized, as he passed through Königsberg, to promise some further pecuniary remissions, to which M. de Caulaincourt, who had no instructions on the subject, assented with much hesitation and reserve; and this point being carried, he made his arrangements for being at Erfurth on the 27th of September, stopping only one day with the unfortunate court of Prussia.

In St. Petersburg the party hostile to an alliance with France, exulting in the difficulties she was encountering in Spain, arguing from those which were befalling Russia in Finland, and ostentatiously deploring the distresses of the Russian commerce, bitterly censured the interview at Erfurth. After the indignities committed at Bayonne, said this party, to go so far to visit their author, to enter into direct conference with him, with a view no doubt to ratify all he had done and all he should yet do, was not very honourable conduct. The representative of Austria, especially, allowed himself certain liberties of speech on this head which it was necessary to check. The court of the empress-mother had with difficulty held its peace at the express command of Alexander. At the last moment, however, the empress-mother, exasperated by the dangers to which she seemed to think her son exposed, broke out into violent reproaches against M. de Romanzoff, telling him he was leading Alexander to his de-

struction, and that, perhaps, there would befall the Emperor of Russia, at Erfurth, what had befallen the unhappy sovereigns of Spain at Bayonne. Finally, she could not refrain from expressing her apprehensions to the emperor himself, who reassured her rather in the tone of a grateful son, than as an absolute master offended at seeing his conduct and its possible consequences judged so ill. Such strange suppositions proved two things—the infatuation of the old courts, and the strength Napoleon had infused into their prejudices by his conduct at Bayonne.

Alexander paid no heed to these fears, set out from St. Petersburg with his brother and some aides-de-camp, (he had sent M. de Romanzoff and M. de Caulaincourt on before him,) and travelled post in the simplest and most rapid fashion. It had been agreed that Napoleon, being on his own ground at Erfurth, should take upon himself the task of providing all the accessories of that grand demonstration, and that Alexander should only have to convey thither his own person and those of his officers. He travelled in a plain calèche more rapidly than the most hurried couriers. He stopped on the 18th of September at Königsberg, seemed greatly to commiserate the misfortunes of his old allies, who were almost reduced to a life of indigence in one of the extremities of their kingdom, and immediately set out again for Weimar.

Wherever there were French troops, a most brilliant reception was prepared for the young czar. The military were under arms in their best uniform, shouting *Vive Alexandre! Vive Napoleon!* Alexander reviewed them, complimented them on their military aspect, which corresponded with their valour, and charmed them by his infinite grace. Napoleon had sent Marshal Lannes, created Duke of Montebello, to receive him at the limits of the Confederation of the Rhine, which extended to Bromberg. Alexander completely won by his gracious condescension the heart of the old soldier, who, though very obstinate in his revolutionary notions, was not the less sensitive to the well-merited marks of approbation bestowed on him by the occupiers of thrones.

Alexander arrived on the 25th of September at Weimar, and remained with that court, to which he was connected by family ties, until the 27th, the day appointed for the meeting at Erfurth.

Napoleon on his part had quitted Paris, preceded, surrounded, and followed by all that was most distinguished in his army and his court. M. de Talleyrand was one of the personages he had despatched before him, in order to impart such a tone as was fitting to the language and demeanor of everybody. Though already displeased at some expressions uttered by M. de Talleyrand respecting the affairs of Spain, from which the latter endeavoured to hold himself aloof, since they had taken an unfavourable turn, Napoleon chose to have him, that he might employ him in various delicate communications for which M. de Champagny was not adapted. A great number of generals and diplomatists were of the party; Germany was represented by a crowd of crowned princes. On the 26th, the King of Saxony made his prompt appearance in Erfurth. That little

town formerly belonged to a prince of the church, and accustomed, like Weimar and several other studious capitals of Germany, to invariable quiet, was become a place the most animated, the most brilliant, the most thronged with soldiers, officers, equipages, and servants in livery. Kings, princes, and high and mighty lords of the old and the new régime, were met in the streets in the guise of simple pedestrians. Napoleon despatched thither beforehand all that was necessary to cover the grave aspect of business under a veil of elegant and magnificent pleasures. He arrived there on the 27th of September, at ten in the forenoon. After having received the civil and military authorities assembled from all the environs, then the diplomatists of Europe, the potentates of the Confederation of the Rhine, and the King of Saxony, he rode out of Erfurth on horseback about midday, surrounded by an immense staff, to go and meet the Emperor Alexander, who was approaching from Weimar in an open carriage. Weimar is four or five leagues from Erfurth. Napoleon met his ally at the end of two leagues. On perceiving the carriage in which he rode, he galloped towards him as if to manifest his eagerness for the meeting. On coming together the two emperors alighted and embraced each other cordially and with every sign of extreme pleasure; a pleasure which was real, for, besides that they had great need of conferring together on their affairs, they felt mutually a personal liking. Horses had been provided for Alexander and his suite, and the two emperors rode into Erfurth side by side, talking with friendly animation; asking and hearing news of each other's family, as if those families had sprung from the same spot, and had been old and affectionate acquaintances. In short, the demeanour of the two emperors was such as to delight the crowds that had flocked from all the country round to behold them; for their manifest good understanding was a pledge to the spectators that the latter should not see again those formidable armies, which two years before at the same season and on the same spot, had laid waste their fine fields.

Arrived at Erfurth, Napoleon presented to the Emperor Alexander all the personages admitted to the interview, beginning with the kings and princes; and then he escorted him to the palace prepared for him. They were to dine every day at Napoleon's table, since he was the host, and the sovereign of the North was his guest. In the evening there was a splendid banquet, at which were seated Napoleon, Alexander, the Grand-duke Constantine, the King of Saxony, the Duke of Weimar, Prince William of Prussia,—in a word, the whole crowd of reigning princes and titled personages civil and military. The town was illuminated, and the tragedy of *Cinna* was performed before the imperial party by the most accomplished tragic actors France ever possessed. The judicious clemency of the founder of empire, disarming parties and attaching them to his power, was the spectacle chosen by Napoleon to open the series of representations of French tragedy.

It was arranged that in the intervals between these entertainments the two chief personages should find time in the morning and evening,



either within-doors or in their promenades, to confer freely on the important matters they had to arrange. Napoleon had come to Erfurth with his mind fully made up as to the essential topics about to be discussed, and his plan was all arranged beforehand. With respect to the East, in the first place, he had renounced all idea of partition, having perceived, after some discussions into which he had entered from complaisance, that it was impossible for him to agree with Russia on that subject. If he did not give Constantinople, he gave nothing, though he should grant the whole Turkish empire; for in the eyes of Alexander and M. de Romanoff the question consisted solely in the possession of the two straits; and if he gave Constantinople, he gave a hundred times too much—he gave away the future welfare of Europe—he gave away, in fine, a conquest the lustre of which would eclipse all his own. But he had perceived that in paying cash down, if the exprossion may be allowed, in sacrificing at once a portion of the Turkish territory which Russia passionately coveted, he would afford her a pleasure sufficiently great to attach her completely to him in the present crisis. Now this was enough for Napoleon's purpose.

Thus, instead of a magnificent dream, but one that was dangerous to Europe, to substitute a limited but immediate reality, was for this time his plan for conciliating Russia. All that the Emperor Alexander and M. de Romanoff had been saying for many months proved that in spite of the loftiness of their expectations they would readily enough forego the notion of partitioning the Turkish empire, on account of the difficulty of coming to a common understanding, provided they were forthwith and definitively put in possession of a portion of territory which was convenient for them, that portion of territory being situated on the Danube. This was no doubt a weighty concession to Russian ambition, but the least dangerous of any that could be made; it was one that was particularly disagreeable to Austria, whose inclinations there was no reason to study; and it was become inevitable, in consequence of the great embarrassments Napoleon had brought upon himself in Spain. In the position in which the recent events had placed us, this sacrifice was indispensable, and, when reduced to certain proportions, it assuredly did not exceed—it did not even equal—the advantages which France obtained on her side.

In return, Napoleon required of Russia a close alliance for peace and war, and an absolute union of efforts against Austria and England. That union was indeed inevitable; for, in conceding Wallachia and Moldavia to Russia, Napoleon bestowed a gift which could not fail to set Alexander at variance with Austria and England. Since, therefore, a rupture with them was about to be incurred for that important cause, it was necessary to agree together beforehand for resisting them, and the offensive and defensive alliance followed as a matter of course.

In consenting then to the cession of the Danubian provinces, Napoleon possessed an almost infallible means of making the conference at Erfurth end in the result he wished for. His plan being well determined, it was not

difficult for one who possessed such profound skill in the art of captivating and swaying men's minds, when he so pleased, to bring Alexander over to his views.

The conference having been opened with the usual protestations, the two sovereigns addressed themselves vigorously to the grand topics they had to consider. Alexander repeated his usual language as to the convenience and necessity of a union between the two empires. He again affirmed that all jealousy was extinct in his heart, but that France had just received vast aggrandisements, and that, if he desired some compensations beneficial to Russia, it was less for himself than for his nation, which must be prevailed on to tolerate the great changes effected in the West. As to the strange events of Bayonne, and the sudden harsh occupation of Rome, he scarcely uttered a word; merely observing that the princes of Spain and the Roman pontiff were poor creatures who deserved their fate for their incapacity, and had rendered themselves, through their infatuated blindness, incompatible with the existing state of things in Europe. Nevertheless, said Alexander, it was necessary to have comprehended Napoleon's system as thoroughly as he had done before one could acquiesce so easily in the catastrophes which the world had just witnessed; and it was requisite that notable changes in the East also should attract the attention of the Russians, in order to divert it from those which were taking place in the West. As for the enemies of France, Alexander declared that he took them all for his own; for in compliance with Napoleon's wish he had engaged in war with England; and as regarded Austria, scarcely any thing remained for him to do to become her declared adversary, since he was ready to employ the most imposing and decisive manifestations to curb her, and, if those manifestations were not sufficient, to proceed from words to deeds,—that is to say, to war,—supposing the court of Vienna would incur the blame of aggression, which he would not take upon himself.

Napoleon replied to these friendly protestations with all possible fervour, and in terms of exact reciprocity. On his part he expressed his readiness to accede to all reasonable aggrandisements of Russia, but he stood his ground as to the impossibility of agreeing upon certain projects, and as to the embarrassments in which the two empires were involved—embarrassments which forbade them to attempt at that precise moment too vast territorial redistributions; for surely there were enough such of great magnitude before the world without adding others of a prodigious kind, such, for instance, as the partitioning the Turkish empire and partitioning it wholly. Examining in detail the projects that had so much busied the minds of Alexander and M. de Romanoff, Napoleon discussed one after the other the various plans of partition which had been proposed; and the better to bring over the Emperor Alexander to his views, he was peremptory, as he had always been, on the subject of Constantinople, that is to say, the possession of the straits, and he left not the least hope of a concession on that point. Next he pointed out how difficult it would be for Rus-

sia herself to venture forthwith upon the execution of such a project. Austria would certainly not accede to it, whatever offers might be made to her, and she would prefer a desperate conflict to a partition of the Turkish empire. England, Austria, Turkey aroused from her very foundations, Spain, and part of Germany, would join in a last effort to resist this unsettlement of the whole world. Was the present moment just such as the two empires ought to choose for so gigantic a work? Russia was encountering obstacles in Finland, which, like Spain, had seemed at first so easy of subjugation. She had an army on the Danube sufficient no doubt to make head against the Turks, but not in case of a national rising on their part; and she had very few forces in front of Austria. Napoleon would therefore have to make head alone against Austria, England, Spain, and those portions of Germany which might endeavour to rise. This he could unquestionably do, for he was in a condition to overwhelm all his enemies; but was it wise to undertake so much at once? and wherefore too? For an object rendered chimerical by its vastness, and respecting which the two empires themselves could not agree. Was there no other course more simple, more practical, more certainly satisfactory? Might they not, for instance, agree as to certain acquisitions strongly indicated beforehand, for which it would not be difficult to gain the assent of European diplomacy, even without departing from pacific means, and which would of themselves constitute the most brilliant result for Russia, surpassing even her utmost hopes? If, for instance, in the sequel of current events, she obtained Finland, Moldavia, and Wallachia, would not the reign of Alexander have equalled those of his predecessors which were most productive of territorial aggrandisement? As for France, she coveted nothing thenceforth. With Spain secured to Joseph, and the French masters of the temporal power in Rome, she would have nothing more to desire. She did not wish for a single territorial change more. To prove this, she was about to distribute among the sovereigns of the Confederation of the Rhine the German territories which remained to her from the dismemberment of Prussia. Her natural frontiers were enough for her, and Spain even, which she had lately grasped, was not a territorial acquisition, but a complement of her federative system, since, after all, Spain remained separate and independent under a prince of the house of Bonaparte, instead of being so under a prince of the house of Bourbon. Now all these advantages for Russia and for France might, it was not impossible, be obtained by diplomacy, and by a final military effort—of the Russians in Finland, of the French in Spain. Was it not probable, indeed, that Europe, weary of so much agitation, and seeing the two empires strongly united together, would finally choose peace rather than war? And peace—after having secured to Russia Finland, Wallachia, and Moldavia, and to France the completion of her federative system by the subjection of Spain to King Joseph—peace was certainly a very noble and acceptable *dénouement*, which would fill the exhausted world with delight. But if peace

was impossible on these conditions, the two empires might, after having finished, the one with Finland, the other with Spain, commit themselves to the vast unknown future opening to them in the East, and they might do so with the more freedom in their movements, and the greater mastery over their means. Besides, Alexander and Napoleon were young; they had time to wait, and postpone their vast projects regarding the East.

The strange situation being once admitted that brought the two sovereigns of the East and West face to face to treat of such subjects, nothing could be more discreet than such a system. To complete what was begun before engaging in fresh enterprises was a lesson of prudence which a first defeat had impressed on Napoleon, and which a little weariness of war contributed also to render agreeable to him. Would to Heaven that he had been more attentive to those first lessons of fortune!

It was not in one conversation, but in several, that Napoleon and Alexander had opportunities of talking of all these things. As for Alexander, once he was refused Constantinople, the partition of the Turkish empire ceased to have any charms for him. To adjourn that vast question, which was pregnant with the fate of the old world—to adjourn it until a time when Russia should be more independent of the West—was all that remained to be done. But instead of those gigantic and far too chimerical projects, to substitute a reality, such as the gift of the Danubian provinces, provided this was not a vain promise, but a sure immediate gift, was also a thing calculated to yield the czar satisfaction; and, on the whole, he himself felt, in his discreeter moments, that it was the arrangement which best suited him, for in that case nothing would have to be given to France along the shores of the East—neither Albania, the Morea, Thessaly, Macedonia, Syria, nor Egypt. The decrepit old empire of the sultans would remain as a prey always at hand whenever the moment should have come for devouring it; and, meanwhile, there was the immediate acquisition of a reality, which, in any other than a time of prodigies, would have been deemed magnificent, and one for which no irksome compensation was to be paid, since, after all, whether Spain belonged to the house of Bourbon or to the house of Bonaparte was a question in which England was certainly interested, but Russia not at all.

Alexander could, therefore, with great advantage to himself, accede to Napoleon's new views. It is true that the prospect presented to him was no longer one of marvellous grandeur; and, to a man with an imagination like that of Alexander, that was a circumstance much to be regretted. The most positive result, without a little tinge of the marvellous, would want charms for him, and the French alliance was in danger of becoming one of those ardent but short-lived friendships which were common with him. There was one thing, however, which could stand in the young emperor's estimation in lieu of the prestige of any plan of partition—this was, the instantaneous realization of his desires, which had all the ardour of youthful appetites, that will be satisfied on the instant. His old minister, M. de Romanzoff, who had reached the opposite term of ex-

istence, equalled his master in the juvenile ardour of his desires. He, too, panted for the immediate accomplishment of his wishes; he could not brook a day's delay, as though fearing that at his age there was not time enough left him to enjoy his glory—the glory that so well became one of Catherine's disciples—of securing the mouths of the Danube for the Russian empire. Promptitude was then the charm which Napoleon had to substitute for that of the marvellous. What he gave he should give quickly, in order that the gift might be prized at its true worth.

This new system of arrangement having been adopted, Alexander and M. de Romanoff seized with the most intense and passionate ardour on the idea of acquiring Moldavia and Wallachia, and resolved to carry back with them from Erfurt, not a vain promise, but a reality, which they might proclaim on their return to St. Petersburg.

Hitherto Napoleon had tolerated the temporary occupation of the provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia by the Russians, but not without some remonstrances and hints that the French would be forced in consequence to prolong their occupation of Silesia. Nothing of the sort was now to be thought of. France was to consent by a formal treaty to Russia's permanent possession of the Danubian provinces, and was to engage not only herself to ratify that acquisition, but also to cause it to be ratified by Turkey, Austria, and even England, when the time was come for treating with the latter. Russia would, in consequence, break the armistice with the Turks, advance her armies to the foot of the Balkans, and even beyond them, to Adrianople and Constantinople, if necessary, in order to extort that sacrifice from the Porte. Should Austria attempt to interfere, the two allies would jointly overwhelm her. As for England, being already at war with that power, they had no new course to adopt with regard to her. It was for Napoleon to compel her, by some heavy blow dealt her in the Peninsula, to acquiesce in whatever he and his ally might do in the rest of the continent.

Napoleon had no objection to these views. To give forthwith was his own inclination, for he felt the necessity of exciting a new passion in Alexander's breast. He only wished to observe some prudence in the promulgation of the resolutions which should be adopted at Erfurt, in order not to throw any obstacle in the way of the overtures for peace he intended to make after the interview. He, therefore, admitted the principle that Russia should immediately enter on possession of Moldavia and Wallachia. The manner of publishing the thing could only be a question of composition, the care of which would devolve on the ministers of the two sovereigns.

Their desires being thus gratified, Alexander and M. de Romanoff felt a delight almost as great as that with which they had dreamed three months before of the conquest of Constantinople. Napoleon had, therefore, attained

his purpose of satisfying Alexander by a limited but immediate gift almost as much as by a magnificent but doubtful prospect. It was to the arrangement of these points that the first eight or ten days of the interview were devoted; and, extreme as had been the mutual courtesy of the two emperors, their conduct towards each other from that moment was expressive of more good-will than ever. Alexander especially seemed to blend affection with politics; in the promenade, at table, at the theatre, his demeanour towards his illustrious ally was familiar, friendly, deferential, and enthusiastic. When he spoke of him it was in a tone of admiration, with which no one could fail to be struck.

Erfurt was become the most extraordinary gathering-place of sovereigns of which history makes mention. Besides the Emperors of France and Russia, the Grand-duke Constantine, Prince William of Prussia, and the King of Saxony, there were the Kings of Bavaria and Wurtemberg, the King and Queen of Westphalia, the Prince Primate, Chancellor of the Confederation, the Grand-duke and Grand-duchess of Baden, the Dukes of Hesse-Darmstadt, Weimar, Saxe-Gotha, Oldenburg, Mecklenburg-Strelitz, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, and a host of others too long to enumerate, with their chamberlains and their ministers. They dined every day at the emperor's table, seated in the order of their respective ranks. In the evening there was a dramatic performance in a theatre which Napoleon had repaired and decorated for the occasion. The last part of the *soirée* was passed in the palace of the Emperor Alexander. Napoleon, having perceived that Alexander laboured under some defect of hearing, had a platform constructed in the place usually occupied by the orchestra in modern theatres, and there the two emperors were seated in chairs so placed as to make them very conspicuous. Right and left stood seats for the kings. Behind, that is to say, in the pit, were the princes, ministers, and generals; hence the saying, so often repeated, that at Erfurt there was a pitful of kings (*parterre de rois*). After the representation of *Cinna*, followed that of *Andromaque*, *Britannicus*, *Mithridate*, and *Edipe*. At the performance of the latter a singular incident struck the audience with surprise and satisfaction. It was a mark of exquisite affectionate flattery, bestowed on Napoleon by Alexander in the fullness of the joy with which the former had just contrived to inspire him. When *Edipe* uttered this sentiment, "*The friendship of a great man is a blessing from the gods*," Alexander grasped Napoleon's hand and pressed it warmly, in a manner to be observed by all the spectators, whom that sudden and opportune gesture struck with surprise and unanimous approbation.

There had arrived in Erfurt a personage whom all these doings tormented, perplexed, and filled with intense anxiety; this was M. de Vincent, representative of the court of Austria. His master had sent him, ostensibly to compliment the two sovereigns who were come so

\* There are in the archives of the Secrétairerie d'Etat some very curious letters from M. de Champagny to Napoleon, which narrate the writer's interviews with M. de Romanoff, and give a most singular idea of the impatience of the

Russian minister. Further on the reader will meet with various passages from the letters which vividly depict that impatience.

near to his empire, but in reality to observe what was passing, penetrate if possible the secret of the interview, and complain, but in respectful terms, that Austria was neglected; giving it at the same time to be clearly understood that, if the Emperor Francis had been invited to attend, he would have complied with alacrity, that his presence would not have impaired the splendour of the interview, and that his adhesion would not have been prejudicial to the accomplishment of whatever resolutions might then be adopted.

Napoleon had arranged beforehand the line of conduct to be pursued with regard to the Austrian envoy. In the first place, that the secrets of the interview might be well kept, they had been confined to the knowledge of but four persons—the two emperors and their two ministers, M. de Romanzoff and M. de Champagny. Alexander and M. de Romanzoff, for the sake of their own ambitious hopes, Napoleon for the sake of his whole policy, and M. de Champagny from his tried discretion and fidelity, were incapable of allowing any part of the secret of the negotiations to escape them. Their purport had even been concealed from M. de Talleyrand, whom Napoleon daily distrusted more and more, particularly in matters in which Austria was concerned. He had been made aware, indeed, that the object of the interview was to unite the two empires of France and Russia more closely, and even to fix by treaty the principles of their union; but the positive object of the resolution was carefully concealed from him. Not a word on the subject was breathed to M. de Vincent; and when he complained that his master was left out of that imperial meeting, he was answered roundly enough, that this was the consequence of his master's inexplicable armaments; that in order to be associated in a policy it is before all things necessary to appear favourable to it, and not to have the air of preparing against it all the forces of one's dominions; and that all that Austria would gain by such conduct would be, to be daily held more aloof from the serious affairs of Europe, and that, if she desired great intimacies, nothing would remain for her but to go seek them in England.

M. de Vincent was in a false position, the awkwardness and even humiliation of which Napoleon took pains to augment, though all the while observing an extreme politeness towards him in outward forms; and his sly contrivances to that end were seconded by Alexander to the best of his ability. M. de Vincent's only resource was in M. de Talleyrand, who was more and more attached to the policy of Austria, and who strove to set M. de Vincent's mind at ease by assuring him that nothing serious was at hand, and that the great show of intimacy was affected only to maintain peace, of which all parties had need. There was a distinguished lady, the Princess de la Tour et Taxis, sister of the Queen of Prussia, who used to entertain the most eminent persons, and often the Emperor Alexander himself. Her drawing-rooms served as a place for in-

sinuating what it was not convenient to say openly in the diplomatic conferences; and this was a species of communication in which M. de Talleyrand was much employed, as we shall see by-and-by. Wit, refinement, and grace reigned in the princess's circle, where Germany's men of genius, Goethe and Wieland, who had come with their august patrons the Princes of Weimar, mingled with kings, ministers, and generals. There it was that inquirers sought to guess what could not be known, to detect in a word incautiously uttered some great political or military conception. The unfortunate M. de Vincent was one of the guessers, and exhausted himself in observations and conjectures of all kinds; and his very visible tortures greatly amused the two emperors, who were glad to punish Austria for her imprudent as well as hostile conduct.

Concord with Russia appearing secured in consideration of the formal and not deferred cession of the Danubian provinces, and the co-operation of that power against Austria following as a necessary consequence, Napoleon decided even before quitting Erfurth many questions that had been left open with respect to the distribution of his forces. He ordered the fine Sebastiani division, which was to be composed of some of the old regiments destined for Spain, and which had not yet been put in movement for Bayonne, to march immediately from Paris and from the points where it was assembled. He gave a similar order respecting the Leval division, formed entirely of German auxiliaries, so that these two divisions should arrive at Bayonne at the close of October. He now decided what he should do with the 5th division, and ordered that its march, at first directed to Bareuth, should finally be to the Rhine and the Pyrenees. Lastly, to the three divisions of dragoons already on the move to Spain he added two others, and left in Germany only the cuirassiers with a notable portion of the light horse. These arrangements were the natural result of the security he derived from his compact with Russia, and of his desire at once to overwhelm the Spaniards and the English by an irresistible mass of forces.

The two monarchs had now been ten days together: the task of embodying the conditions of their compact remained to be executed, and this was no easy matter, considering the new passion for immediate possession which had seized on Alexander and M. de Romanzoff. To avoid troubling by discussions on matter of detail the daily increasing cordiality of their union, the two sovereigns agreed to leave to their ministers, M. de Romanzoff and M. de Champagny, the task of committing to paper the convention which was to contain their recent resolutions, and they set out on the 6th of October to pass two days at the court of Weimar, where magnificent fêtes had long been prepared for them. M.M. de Romanzoff and De Champagny remained behind to proceed with the important work assigned to them.

It was Napoleon's wish, as we have stated, that there should result from the interview at

\* I have already said that there were letters from M. de Champagny to the Emperor, in which the details of the negotiations were related day by day, even when M. de Champagny and Napoleon were together in Erfurth. These letters were of course continued while Napoleon

was at Weimar. I am not, therefore, reduced to conjecture, and it is from the most authentic documents that I retraced the details of this interview, the resolutions adopted at which were not less interesting than the spectacle exhibited to Europe.

Erfurth an accordance with Russia that should be solid, and, above all, conspicuous; one that should awe his enemies and constrain them to peace by depriving them of all hope of success. He conceded to Russia, in consideration of what she allowed him to do in Spain and Italy, that Finland, Wallachia and Moldavia, should belong to her in any case, whether there was peace or war; but with the understanding that, if it was possible to procure these advantages for Russia by peace, that course should be tried before plunging into a new general war that would involve the whole world, especially Turkey and Austria. Napoleon was convinced that, if the union of the two powers, Russia and France, was very complete, very sincere, and very manifest, Austria would be forced to remain quiescent, for she would be crushed between the two empires if she attempted to stir; and that the submission of Austria would compel England also to yield, and agree to a naval peace. He moreover undertook to urge her to that conclusion by various other means. In the first place he desired that overtures of peace should be made to England solemnly, in the name of the two emperors, and in such a manner that they should be well known to the English public; and pending those overtures he proposed, under the security afforded by the Russian alliance, to leave in Germany only a very small portion of the Grand Army, move the rest to the camp at Boulogne, and at head of a reinforcement of 150,000 veterans, which would raise the French forces beyond the Pyrenees to a total of 250,000, march in person into the Peninsula, overwhelm the insurgents, and inflict some grand disaster on the English troops in that quarter. By these combined means he expected to constrain England to treat for peace. It is true that he should have to bring her to consent to two considerable matters, the establishment of the house of Bonaparte in Spain, and the possession of the Danubian provinces by Russia. But these were matters already consummated, or on the point of being so, for Spain, in his opinion, would be reduced to subjection in two months, and the Danubian provinces were occupied by Russia in a manner that precluded the Turks and their friends from entertaining any hope of effecting their evacuation. England, moreover, had already testified to Russia a sort of inclination to concede to her Moldavia and Wallachia. Napoleon did not therefore regard the proposed arrangements as quite incompatible with peace, particularly should he succeed in the great blows he expected to deal the Spaniards and the English.

His design, therefore, was to make a proposal to England, in the name, as the manifest should state, of the two emperors, *united together for peace and war*, and offering to negotiate

a general arrangement, on the principle of *uti possidetis*. This was a convenient basis for negotiation, since, while it left England her maritime conquests, including Malta, it secured to France Spain and Naples, and to Russia Finland and the Danubian provinces. In order to insure Russia's possession of the latter, a declaration was to be addressed to the Porte, to the effect that Russia intended to keep those provinces, and that declaration was to be backed by the presence of the Russian armies and by the advice of France. Should the latter be disregarded, France would abandon the Porte to Russia, in which case there could be no doubt as to the result.

The parties being agreed on all these points, the business of recording that agreement could not be difficult, for there never is difficulty in the expression when there is none in the thought. But there was one important point respecting which agreement seemed difficult. While positively and immediately conceding Moldavia and Wallachia to Russia, it was Napoleon's wish that the latter should postpone for some weeks its communications to the Porte. If that power became aware of what was impending, it would be exasperated, would inform England, and throw itself into her arms; and England, seeing a new ally arise, would see, in the union of Spain, Austria, and Turkey, chances of success in a fresh struggle that would dispose her to reject peace. On the other hand, by waiting a few weeks only, it would be possible to bring England to negotiate. Once engaged in a negotiation, it would not be so easy for her to desist from it, since the English public must naturally long for the end of the war; and when at length she should be informed of the last condition—that, namely, of leaving to Russia the two provinces which that power possessed *de facto*—it was to be doubted she would forego the ideas of peace, she had been led to entertain, and revert to those of war, for a question in which she had personally no great interest. It was in this additional clause that the difficulty consisted—that is to say, in this delay of some weeks to which it was sought to condemn the impatience of Russia.

The Emperor Alexander had left this matter entirely to the discretion of his old minister, whose impatience was at least equal to his own. On conferring with M. de Romanzoff, M. de Champagny found him ready to assent to every thing without the least hesitation, until the question was raised of postponing the communication to the Porte, and then he became intractable. A new delay, after fifteen months of expectation from the date of the meeting at Tilsit, was, in M. de Romanzoff's opinion, not to be endured. For fifteen months France had been making promises to Russia, without realizing any one of them, and had thus compelled

\* The following is what Napoleon wrote to M. de Champagny on this subject:—

"The whole discussion, therefore, can only turn upon the single phrase added to Article VII. It is, nevertheless, an immediate consequence of the step which has been taken; for, if England is disposed to enter into negotiation, it is evident that, upon news reaching her that a power of such considerable extent as Turkey is coming over to her interests, that fact will render her more pre-emptory in the negotiation. Why reopen to her without good reason the ports of Syria, Egypt, Africa, and the Morea? The French factories would be pillaged, several

thousand men imprisoned and slaughtered, commerce stopped, and all this for no advantage at all to Russia. And, if peace were made between Russia and the Porte while the negotiations are pending with England, this would be an incident attended with more disadvantages than otherwise, since England would have a clearer insight into the affairs which have been treated at Erfurth; and the treaty made with the Porte would give her to understand that the idea of a partition is postponed, and would alarm her less. There is every motive, therefore, for scrupulously executing the proposed article."

her to remain in a state of armistice with regard to the Turks. But for the urgent requests of France, said M. de Romanzoff, Russia would already have marched her armies across the Balkan, and compelled Turkey to surrender the provinces she was no longer able either to retain or govern. All that had been got by the compact at Tilsit was this clog upon the action of Russia, and she had suffered too much from it to submit to it again. It was, in fact, for the very purpose of putting an end to an intolerable *status quo* that the emperor had come all the way from St. Petersburg to Erfurth, in spite of opposition, sinister warnings, and great sacrifices.

In vain did M. de Champagny urge that the delay in question would be only of a few weeks' duration, that couriers were about to be despatched, and that an answer could not be long wanting; that if England consented to the opening of negotiations it would soon be seen whether the principle of *uti possidetis* was accepted or not; that if it was accepted it would have been worth while to have a little patience in order to obtain the valuable acquisitions in question in that way without having recourse to war; that if, on the contrary, it was not accepted, Russia might forthwith prefer her demand at Constantinople, and follow it up by arms or otherwise, for the acquisition of the coveted banks of the Danube. The Russian minister would listen to none of these reasons. "Always delays?" was his dolorous ejaculation. "You do nothing but impose delays on us, whilst you impose none upon yourselves at Madrid or at Rome. If it were even a delay for a definite term, after which all uncertainty should cease, that might be borne; but you require us to have patience until the moment when the negotiation shall have assumed an aspect utterly of impracticability. Now there have been negotiations that

lasted for years. Would you have us to continue for years in a state of armistice towards the Turks?"

M. de Champagny was struck by the fervid impatience of the old minister, whose whole soul was engrossed by one of those violent passions that sometimes seize upon aged men and take from them all the gravity of their years, without imparting to them the engaging vivacity of youth.<sup>1</sup> It was plain too that a certain degree of distrust was mingled with the ardour of his desire, and that M. de Romanzoff feared there was an intention to cajole himself and his master by a fresh postponement. M. de Champagny, seeing that he set the honour of his remaining span of life on that acquisition, and that he would be more peremptory than Alexander himself, thought it best to await the return of the two monarchs, and leave the Emperor of the French to exercise his personal ascendancy over the Emperor of Russia, in order to obtain from him the admission into the treaty of a precaution deemed indispensable.

The two emperors with their whole train of kings and princes had gone to Weimar, with the intention of remaining there the 6th and 7th of October, and returning on the 8th to their important affairs. Between Erfurth and Weimar is the forest of Ettersburg, where the Grand-duke of Weimar had caused a line of elegant tents to be pitched for all his crowned visitors. That of the emperors and kings, which was in the centre, was magnificent. Before these tents had to pass an immense mass of game, stags, does, and hares, enclosed within a circle of nets, and compelled, in attempting to fly, to expose themselves to the fire of the archduke's guests. Alexander had never fired a shot, so gentle was the nature of his tastes; nevertheless, he brought down a

<sup>1</sup> M. de Champagny writes thus on the subject to the Emperor:—

"Erfurth, October 6, 1809.

"Discussing this question with all possible good faith, fully persuaded that the delay required (that, namely, which subordinates to the issue of the negotiation with England every step for obtaining the two provinces) is as much for the interests of Russia as of France, I hoped to dissipate the feeling of distrust indicated by M. de Romanzoff's reply: but I could not move him. One who is ready to seize a prey he has long coveted is deaf to all arguments that would retard his enjoyment. For thirty years M. de Romanzoff has set his mind on this acquisition; it is the triumph of his system, the point on which are centered his reputation and his honour. Compared with that, every other interest will seem to him insignificant. The Emperor Alexander, who is urged by no personal motive, and to whom all the interests of his empire are equally dear, must be much more accessible to the force of the reasons that enjoin him, for his own sake, to postpone, not an enjoyment, but a mere taking possession of a province which cannot escape him. I have, therefore, concluded nothing with M. de Romanzoff; even had I been authorized, I was not more than himself disposed to yield, and I consider it useless to speak to him again on the matter before the arrival of your majesty. As to the rest, we pretty nearly agreed. (Signed) "CHAMPAIGNY."

"Erfurth, October 8, 1808.

"Sir,—A conference of two hours with M. de Romanzoff has led to no result. His system appears to be irrevocably fixed; he will have the Turkish provinces; he will have them at all costs; he will have them to-day rather than to-morrow. His objections are not so much against Article VI., the form of which your majesty is pleased to preserve, as against the addition your majesty proposes to Article VII. of the counter-project, and which reads in these words:—

"No hint shall be given to the Porte as to the intentions of Russia until the effect of the proposals made by the two powers to England shall have been known."

"These words greatly alarm M. de Romanzoff. No delay appears to him admissible, least of all an indefinite delay.—When, and how," he says, "shall one know the effect of these proposals? Will not a first result give occasion to wait for a second, and this for a third, and thus our arrangement with Turkey be continually adjourned?" He applied this line of argument to every thing. If I talked to him of the precautions requisite for the sake of the French who were established in the Levant, he retorted, "But do you mean to wait until they are come back to France? When can they return thither?" Peace with England appears to him to be difficult, and that is why he does not wish to subordinate to it peace with Turkey. He talked to me also of the necessity of striking the minds of the Russians by the certainty of this important acquisition, and appeared to me to have some apprehensions should such not be the result of the Emperor Alexander's journey. He rather let me surmise his fears than declared them; but the feeling manifest in every word was distrust, distrust of events, distrust also of our intentions. Hence it was that he attached less importance to Article VI. It matters not to him, in fact, in what manner that article declares the consent of France to the acquisitions of Russia, if the following article allows the latter to act and to go straight to her mark. Hence it is, too, that an indefinite delay alarms him the more: he is afraid of exposing to chances an advantage that seems to him almost secured at this moment. He would rather consent to a delay, the limit of which should be specified. He wants to have precision in every thing. 'The vagueness of the Tilsit articles,' he says, 'has done us too much harm; a year has been lost, and that is as yet the sole result of our alliance with you.'

"This obstinacy on the part of M. de Romanzoff is not an affair of the moment. It results from long meditations exclusively devoted to one end, from the impetuosity of hope deferred, and from an opinion that at the present moment nothing can withstand the execution of the views of Russia. I despair of overcoming it. I am, &c.

(Signed) "CHAMPAIGNY"

stag, and a multitude of others fell beneath the fire of those illustrious sportsmen. A sumptuous reception awaited the two emperors at Weimar. A splendid banquet was followed by a ball, at which the most brilliant society of Germany was assembled. Goethe and Wieland were there. Napoleon left the whole company to go and hold a long conversation in a corner of the room with the two celebrated writers of Germany. He talked to them of Christianity, and of Tacitus the historian, the terror of tyrants, whose name he uttered without fear, as he said with a smile. He maintained that Tacitus had somewhat overcharged the gloomy picture of his own times, and that as a painter he was not simple enough to be quite true. He then passed on to the subject of modern literature, which he compared with that of antiquity, and showed himself to be in matters of art, just as in matters of policy, a partisan of regularity and orderly beauty. Speaking of the drama imitated from Shakespeare, in which tragedy and comedy, the terrible and the burlesque, are mingled together, he said to Goethe, "I am astonished that a great intellect like yours does not prefer the more sharply defined forms!"—A profound saying, which very few critics of our day are capable of comprehending.

After this long conversation, in which he displayed infinite grace, and let those two eminent men of letters see that he had given up for them the noblest company, Napoleon left them flattered, as it was natural they should be, by so high a mark of attention. It was to the interview at Erfurth they were indebted for the decoration of the Legion of Honour, a distinction they merited by all means, and which lost nothing of its lustre when bestowed on such personages.

On the following day another fête was given him on the very field of the battle of Jena, between that town and Erfurth. Such was the desire to please Napoleon, that perhaps his entertainers forgot their own dignity in volunteering to recall the memory of one of the most terrible battles gained by France over Germany. A tent was pitched on the Landgrafen-berg, a hill where Napoleon had bivouacked on the night of the 18th of October, two years before; for the anniversary of the memorable battle of Jena was almost arrived. After a *déjeuner*, and a thousand commemorations of the day by the crowds of guests who had taken part in it, to which Napoleon replied in terms of due consideration for his German entertainers, the party proceeded to the right, towards the plain of Aoldau, situated between the battle-field of Jena and that of Awerstaedt, and famous for the inaction of Marshal Bernadotte. Another battue was prepared there, and occupied some hours of the morning, after which the company returned to Erfurth. Before quitting the heights that command the town of Jena, Napoleon wished to leave there a token of beneficence, the memory of which might mingle with the terrible reminiscences that already connected his name with that spot. The unfortunate city had been set on fire by the bombs. Napoleon gave a sum of three hundred thousand francs to indemnify those who had suffered by his presence on that occasion.

Having returned to Erfurth, he had next day to apply himself again to the weighty matters that had brought him to Germany, and that had made the sovereign of Russia perform so long a journey. He spoke of them to the Emperor Alexander, but he particularly imposed on M. de Champagny the duty of insisting peremptorily that some prudence should be observed in the communications to be made to Constantinople, and that England should not, upon the very opening of the negotiations, be furnished with alliances that would dispose her to persevere in war. As regarded the acquisition of the Danubian provinces, he authorized M. de Champagny to employ the most positive forms of expression, so as to give the most satisfactory assurance of its certainty, at the same time stipulating such a delay in its accomplishment as should render possible the commencement of the negotiations in London.

After frequent conferences Napoleon prevailed on Alexander to abate somewhat of his impatience, and trusted to M. de Champagny to effect as much with M. de Romanzoff. He was anxious, however, that his young ally should have no cause for discontent, for he reckoned on making his whole present policy rest not only on the reality, but also on the notoriety of the Russian alliance both for peace and war. Accordingly, notwithstanding his immediate want of money, he did not refuse to grant a fresh reduction of the burdens imposed on Prussia. By the convention of the 8th of September the final evacuation of the Prussian territory had been stipulated, with the exception of three places of surety. Stettin, Custring, and Glogau, and in consideration of one hundred and forty millions payable in two years. The King of Prussia, while gladly signing that convention, which secured the deliverance of his territory, had said that he nevertheless did not forego the privilege of exploring of his victor's generosity an alleviation of a burden which his country was wholly unable to support. Himself and the queen had entreated Alexander to take the opportunity of his interview with Napoleon in order to obtain for them a further abatement. Alexander, whose heart was oblivious, but kind, had promised what they required; and it would have pained him to be unsuccessful in his suit on their behalf. The gift of the mouths of the Danube would have lost something of its value in his eyes, if on returning to the North he were again to read reproaches written in the faces of his unfortunate allies. He asked Napoleon to forego forty of the hundred and forty millions, and to extend the term for the payment of the entire sum from two years to several. He even drew up with his own hand the form of the letter by which Napoleon was to announce to him that concession, and attributed it to his own personal and pressing intervention. Napoleon knew this was one of the modes in which he could most sensibly oblige the Emperor Alexander, and after having resisted enough to make the latter appreciate the sacrifice—and a real sacrifice it was, in the state of his finances—he consented to a reduction of twenty millions on the amount, and to a year's prolongation of the term of payment. Thus, instead of one hundred and forty millions in two years, Prussia would have to pay only one

hundred and twenty millions in three years, half in money, and half in mortgage bonds. The letter, drawn up by Alexander, after being modified by Napoleon, was written nearly as at first proposed.

The two sovereigns, thus seeking to gratify each other, and every day more and more satisfied with the mutual agreement of their views, some difficulties of detail excepted, had yet a last overture to make each other, wherein Napoleon did not choose to take the initiative. It related to a family alliance, which would have rendered their political alliance, if not more solid, at least more conspicuous,—in short, to a marriage between Napoleon and a sister of the Emperor Alexander. Napoleon had often thought of divorcing Josephine in order to marry a princess who could give him an heir, and had always been stopped in that design by the affection that bound him to the wife of his youth, and by the difficulty of fixing his choice. Nevertheless, he was continually recurring to this project, and he had now more than ever reason to do so, since he was in the society of the sovereign on whose alliance he designed to base his policy, a sovereign who had marriageable sisters of excellent endowments, as fame reported. Yet, though he had Alexander by his side morning and evening, and though they already stood towards each other on the footing of the most confidential intimacy, Alexander had never alluded to a subject that interested him so keenly. Thinking in his greatness that he honoured all those with whom he allied himself, Napoleon was too proud to be the first to make overtures without being sure of success. Every day did he and Alexander talk together of their union, which nothing, they said, could disturb, for their might could give umbrage only to England, which they were both pressing upon at sea, or to Austria, which they were pressing upon, the one on the Isonzo, the other on the Danube, and they could find no enemy but one or both of these two. They had, therefore, every political reason for being closely allied. They had personal reasons also, since they had seen, appreciated, and come to like each other; since they suited each other in all points, both in views and in tastes; since they were young, and had still an immense future before them, and would have time one day to resume even the projects they adjourned with regard to the East. “Romanzoff is old,” said Napoleon to Alexander; “he is impatient to enjoy; but you are young; you can wait.” “Romanzoff is a Russian of the times gone by,” replied Alexander; “he has passions which I do not share. I wish to civilize my empire much rather than to enlarge it. I desire the Danubian provinces for my nation much more than for myself. I can wait for the other territorial arrangements necessary for my empire. But you,” he said, continuing to address Napoleon, “it is time that you should enjoy the great things you have accomplished—that you shall cease at last to expose your precious head to cannon-balls. Have you not enough of glory, enough of power? Had Alexander or Cæsar more? Enjoy them, be happy, and let us put

off the rest of our projects to the future.” To these professions of disinterestedness Napoleon responded by protestations of love for peace and quiet. Alexander seemed to care no more for Constantinople, and Napoleon to have conceived a disgust for war, battles, and conquests. Riding and walking about Erfurth, at some distance from their officers, the two monarchs thus held confidential converse, in which Alexander went so far as to talk of his most secret affections. More than once the remark had been made that it was greatly to be regretted that Napoleon had no son; but though Alexander thus closely approached the point to which Napoleon would fain have led him, he never actually touched it. The young czar stopped short of it, though he could not be unaware of the talk there had been after Tilsit, both in Paris and St. Petersburg, about a marriage between Napoleon and the Grand-duchess Catherine, Alexander's eldest sister. If Alexander was so reserved on this point, it was not that, in his present prepossession in favour of the French alliance, he would have refused to give his sister to Napoleon, or regarded as a *mésalliance* her union with the vanquisher of Europe; but he foresaw and dreaded a dispute with his mother, and durst not offer what he feared he could not bestow.

Not knowing the secret of Alexander's reserve, Napoleon was near feeling pique, and even manifesting it, notwithstanding the immense interest he had in appearing perfectly agreed with the Emperor Alexander. It was for such a contingency, and for that only, that M. de Talleyrand became useful at Erfurth; for if he was capable of betraying the secrets of the cabinet to M. de Vincent, and if for that reason Napoleon let him know but a part of them, on the other hand, he alone was capable of adroitly insinuating what it was not wished to say plainly; and when marriage was to be talked of with the dignity becoming the two greatest potentates in the world, a more skillful matchmaker could certainly not have been found.

The emperor, therefore, had recourse to him, in order to bring Alexander to an overture which he did not choose himself to make. M. de Talleyrand, who was shy of playing a part in the concerns of the imperial family, for fear of offending the one party or the other, had no inclination to meddle with a divorce, which was more or less foreseen by everybody, and was become a frequent subject of conversation among politicians. Napoleon took a curious course in order to bring him to the subject in spite of himself. “You know,” said he to him, “that Josephine accuses you of buying yourself about a divorce, and has avowed implacable hatred against you in consequence?” M. de Talleyrand exclaimed vehemently against such a calumny. Napoleon replied that he had no need to defend himself against it, for it must come to that some time or other; that, notwithstanding his affection for the empress, he should be obliged to contract a new marriage, which might give him an heir, and connect him with one of the great reigning families of Europe;

\* M. de Talleyrand, as we have said, knew in a general way that a convention was under consideration, which, should determine the fundamental principles of the alliance; but he was not aware that the main point was the

cession of Moldavia and Wallachia. and, above all, that the point in dispute was the delay of a few weeks, required of Russia, before she took open proceedings with reference to the ceded provinces.



that nothing would be stable in France so long as there was not an assured prospect for the future, which was not the case at that moment, for every thing rested on his own head; and that it was time for him, before he grew old, to take a wife and have a son by her. Such a conversation could not fail to lead directly to some mention of the reigning family of Russia, and of a conjugal alliance with them. M. de Talleyrand complimented Napoleon greatly on his personal success with Alexander, which was at least equal to that which he had obtained at Tilset. The young emperor was a frequent visitor at the house of the Princess de la Tour et Taxis, and was never tired of expressing there his admiration of Napoleon, not only as regarded his genius, but also his grace, *esprit*, and good-nature. "He is not only the greatest man living," he would often say, "but also the best and most agreeable. People think him ambitious and fond of war. He is no such thing; he makes war only from a political necessity, from the compulsion of circumstances." Such were his frequent remarks, which M. de Talleyrand took care to report to Napoleon. "If he likes me," said the latter, after having listened to M. de Talleyrand, "let him give me proof of the fact, by uniting himself with me more closely, and bestowing on me one of his sisters. Why has he never said a word to me of this in our daily confidential intercourse? Why does he affect thus to avoid the subject?" It was easy to see that Napoleon wished M. de Talleyrand to undertake the commission, and employ on it the art with which nature had endowed him of saying things or making others say them. M. de Talleyrand undertook it accordingly, and lost no time in bringing the Emperor Alexander to the subject in one of the frequent opportunities he had of seeing him; for, as it was that monarch's vanity to wish to please everybody, men of wit especially, and M. de Talleyrand above all others, he took great pleasure in often conversing with him.

M. de Talleyrand did not wait for a pretext for speaking, but made one, for the days were numbered, and he had the desired conversation with Alexander. After expatiating on the alliance, which formed the leading topic of every conversation in Erfurth, M. de Talleyrand proceeded to talk of the means for rendering it more solid and conspicuous, for it was requisite that it should be both in order to be really efficacious. The means seemed obvious, namely, to add family ties to the ties of policy; and this was an easy thing, since Napoleon was obliged, for the sake of his empire, to contract a new marriage in order to have a direct heir. Now, if he were to contract a new marriage, to what great family could he more properly unite himself than to that which reigned over Russia, and the head of which was become his intimate ally? Alexander received this overture with the most flattering expressions of regard for Napoleon, and protested how much he would have desired personally to be still more closely allied to him; for since he made him his personal friend, he could not feel reluctant to make him his brother-in-law. But here he touched the limits of his power. Whatever might be said in St. Petersburg of his mother's influence, said he to M. de Talleyrand, he was master and sole master, but he was so in the affairs of the empire,

and not in those of his family. The empress-mother, who was a princess of grave habits and worthy of all respect, exercised an absolute control over her daughters, and suffered no one to interfere with her in that particular. Now, if she held her peace respecting the present policy from deference for her son, she did not go the length of approbation. To give that policy such a pledge of adhesion as the bestowal of one of her daughters, to send that daughter to fill the throne which had been occupied by Marie Antoinette, a throne, indeed, which had been again raised to a loftiness surpassing that of the throne of Louis XIV., would infer a degree of condescension on his mother's part which he durst not expect. Alexander added, that he should no doubt succeed in favourably disposing his sister, the Grand-duchess Catherine, but that he could not flatter himself with the hope of subduing his mother's prejudices, and that he could never bring himself to constrain her by an exertion of his imperial authority; that such had been his sole motive for maintaining so much reserve on this subject; and finally, that if it were Napoleon's wish that he should make such an attempt he would do so, but without answering for its success. Very well satisfied with having brought things to that point, M. de Talleyrand thought it was for the two sovereigns to complete the work he had begun, and he hinted to Alexander that in such a matter it was fitting he should speak first. The latter, having made known the real difficulty, could no longer feel any repugnance to speak, since he ran no risk of incurring an engagement he should be quite unable to fulfil. Accordingly, he promised to talk with Napoleon on the subject at their next meeting.

The two monarchs saw each other daily, and several times a-day, at Erfurth, and made haste to say all that was on their minds, for the termination of the interview was at hand. Alexander explained to Napoleon his views of the delicate subject on which M. de Talleyrand had talked to him, and signified how much he should desire to add a new tie to that which already united the two empires, and how happy he should be to have a member of his family in Paris, so that he might embrace a sister when he arrived there to treat of the affairs of the two empires. But he repeated to Napoleon what he had stated to M. de Talleyrand as to the nature of the obstacles he should have to overcome, and his respect and forbearance towards his mother, whom he could never think of constraining. Nevertheless he promised that he would strive to overcome her repugnance, and hinted that every thing might be obtained from the court of Russia, if contented, and that it would be contented if the nation were so. This was welcome language, and Napoleon replied to it in the most affectionate terms. The two emperors anticipated the day when they should be more than friends, when they should be brothers. Their countenances beamed with new satisfaction, and they seemed more than ever delighted with each other.<sup>1</sup>

It was now the 12th of October, and time to resolve the last difficulties as to the terms of

<sup>1</sup> I have often heard this affair related by M. de Talleyrand himself, and I have been able to prove the truth of his account by comparing it with the official documents.

the convention. The two emperors had given their ministers, M. de Romanzoff and M. de Champagny, authority to conclude the matter, and on the 12th they agreed upon the following convention, which was to remain a profound secret.

The Emperors of France and Russia solemnly renewed their alliance, and engaged to make peace or war in common.

Every overture made to the one was instantly to be communicated to the other, and receive only a joint and concerted reply.

The two emperors agreed to make a formal proposal for peace to England, and to do so immediately, publicly, and as conspicuously as possible, so as to render refusal the more difficult on the part of the British cabinet.

The basis of the negotiations was to be *uti possidetis*.

France was to consent only to such a peace as should insure to Russia Finland, Moldavia, and Wallachia.

Russia was to consent to such a peace only as should secure to France, independently of all she possessed, the crown of Spain on the head of Joseph.

Immediately after the signing of the convention, Russia might begin such steps towards the Porte as were necessary to obtain by peace or war the two provinces of the Danube; but (here was the compromise agreed to respecting the principal point) *the plenipotentiaries and agents of the two powers were to agree between them as to the language to be held, so as not to compromise the friendship existing between France and the Porte.*

Moreover, if, for the acquisition of the Danubian provinces, Russia encountered Austria as an enemy in arms, or if on account of what France was doing in Italy or Spain she was exposed to a rupture with Austria, France and Russia should furnish their respective contingents, and make war in common against that power.

Lastly, if war, and not peace, should result from the conference of Erfurth, the two emperors promised to meet each other again within a year.

Such was the substance of the treaty as agreed on between MM. de Champagny and De Romanzoff on the morning of the 12th of October. The ambiguous phrase respecting the precautions to be observed in order to avoid disturbing the union between France and the Porte was a manner of freeing Russia from all delay, and yet preventing too abrupt proceedings at Constantinople, such as might render impracticable from their outset, the negotiations about to be undertaken at London.

No sooner had M. de Romanzoff snatched from the hands of the French minister the booty he so coveted, than he would have its possession secured to him by the immediate apposition of the signatures. It was necessary, however, to make two copies of the new secret treaty; he had not patience enough to wait until they were written out in M. de Champagny's office, but had one made under his own eye for the greater speed. Immediately on the completion of the copies he hurried in the afternoon to have them signed by M. de Champagny, and then bore them off to his master in an intoxication of joy.

The interview of Erfurth had attained its

end; the two emperors were agreed; and, above all, they appeared to be so. Alexander thought he already possessed Wallachia and Moldavia; Napoleon thought he had hold of the young emperor, enough at least to render any coalition impossible, enough to make him have nothing to fear from Austria before the following spring. He hoped even that peace might result from that close and publicly proclaimed alliance between the two greatest powers of the world. Instead of the unhappy story of Baylen, he had made the marvellous story of the assembly of kings at Erfurth the subject of conversation in Europe. The two monarchs were perfectly satisfied with each other, and it seemed likely that a tenderer union would one day be added to the political union in which they were joined thenceforth. It was decided that the 13th should be given to intimacy, and the 14th to separation, and that those last days should be employed in lavishing honours and presents on the servants of either court. Seeing clearly that M. de Tolstoy had too much the attitude of a soldier in Paris, Alexander had agreed to send in his stead the old Prince Kourakin, an obsequious courtier, incapable of setting his master at variance with Napoleon, and who was then ambassador at Vienna. But it was agreed also that, in order to follow up more closely the negotiation with England, and delay as little as possible the steps to be taken with regard to the Porte, M. de Romanzoff should repair in person to Paris, to receive the replies and make the rejoinders, without more loss of time than was necessary to pass from London to Paris. Napoleon drew up at Erfurth, with his own hand, the joint letter to the King of England, which was to be signed by the two emperors, and the notes in corroboration, so as to prevent all delay.

M. de Tolstoy was at Erfurth. Napoleon desired to receive there his letters of recall, and to give him such marks of favour as should take away all appearance of disgrace from his removal. He made him a present of the Sèvres porcelain and Gobelien tapestry that had adorned his residence in Erfurth. He lavished presents and decorations on all Alexander's suite. Alexander, not less magnificent in his bounty, conferred the order of St. Andrew on the principal persons of Napoleon's court, and was prodigal of portraits, snuff-boxes, and diamonds.

The only person who had no share in these favours was M. de Vincent, the representative of Austria. In spite of his prodigious efforts to discover the secret of what had been done at Erfurth, he had not been successful. He knew that marks of amity of all kinds had been interchanged, and that the principles of the alliance had been laid down in a formal convention; but the true secret of the acquisitions mutually conceded by the contracting parties, and of the negotiations about to be undertaken, was unknown to him, and he even supposed more than really existed. On granting him his audience of leave, the Emperor renewed his remonstrances, and repeated to him that Austria should for ever be excluded from all share in the affairs of Europe, so long as she should seem disposed to have recourse to arms. He gave him the following letter for

the emperor, which contained the full expression of his thoughts :—

“Erfurth, October 14, 1806.

“Sir and Brother,—I thank your imperial majesty for the letter you have been pleased to write to me, and which the Baron de Vincent has delivered to me. I have never doubted your majesty's upright intentions; but I have, notwithstanding, had fears for a while of seeing hostilities renewed between us. There is a faction in Vienna which affects alarm in order to hurry your cabinet into violent measures, which would prove to be the origin of greater calamities than those which have preceded. I have had it in my power to dismember your majesty's monarchy, or at least to leave it less potent; I did not choose to do so. What it is is by my consent. This is the most evident proof that our accounts are liquidated, and that I desire nothing of your majesty. I am always ready to guaranty the integrity of your majesty's monarchy; I will never do any thing contrary to the main interests of your dominions; but your majesty must not reopen questions which fifteen years of war have settled. Your majesty must prohibit every proclamation or proceeding provocative of war. The last levy *en masse* would have produced war, could I have feared that that levy and those preparations were made in concert with Russia. I have just broken up the camps of the Confederation. A hundred thousand of my troops are proceeding to Boulogne to renew my projects against England. Let your majesty abstain from every armament which could give me uneasiness and cause a diversion in favour of England. I had reason to believe, when I had the pleasure to see your majesty, and when I concluded the treaty of Presburg, that our affairs were terminated for ever, and that I could devote myself to the naval war without being troubled or distracted. Let your majesty mistrust those who talk to you of the dangers of your monarchy, and thus trouble your welfare and that of your family and your peoples. Those men are dangerous; those men alone invite the dangers they pretend to fear. Pursuing a straightforward, frank, and plain line of conduct, your majesty will render your peoples happy, will yourself enjoy the happiness for which you must long after so many troubles, and will be sure of having in me a man resolved never to do any thing contrary to your main interests. Let your majesty's proceedings display confidence, and they will inspire it. The best policy in these days is simplicity and truth. Let your majesty make known to me your apprehensions whenever any one succeeds in filling you with them, and I will instantly disperse them. Let your majesty permit me one word more: hearken to your own opinion, your own sentiments; they are very superior to those of your counsellors.

“I entreat your majesty to read my letter in a good sense, and to see in it nothing that is not for the good and the tranquillity of Europe and of your majesty.”

To this letter, so lofty and so polished, Napoleon again added a formal demand for the recognition of King Joseph, as the surest means of eliciting the true disposition of Austria, and

implicating her in his system, or placing her in a dilemma from which he would compel her to extricate herself by peace or by war, whenever he should please to push things to extremity.

The sovereigns assembled at Erfurth, having taken leave of the two emperors, had departed one after the other. On the morning of the 14th, Alexander and Napoleon rode out of Erfurth on horseback, side by side, as they had entered it, amidst the population that thronged around them from all quarters, and in presence of the troops under arms. They rode a certain distance together, then dismounted; their horses were taken by grooms, and they walked a few minutes, briefly reiterating what they had so often said to each other about the utility, fecundity, and greatness of their alliance, their mutual liking, and their desire and hope to strengthen the ties that united them; and then they embraced with a sort of emotion. Though there was policy, ambition, and interest in their friendship, all was not selfish calculation in that sentiment. Men even the most constrained to practise dissimulation are never so false, so destitute of sensibility, as is imagined in their cunning by the vulgar, who think themselves profound when they assume the existence of evil in every thing. Alexander and Napoleon parted with emotion, and there was good faith in the grasp of the hand they exchanged, the one seated in his carriage, the other in his saddle. Alexander departed for Weimar and St. Petersburg, Napoleon for Erfurth and Paris. They were never to meet more, and of their projects of that hour not one was destined to be accomplished!

On his return to Erfurth, Napoleon dismissed the personages, princes and others, who still remained, and some hours afterwards his carriage bore him away, leaving the little town to the silence and solitude from which he had roused it for a while, to fill it with bustle, pomp, and movement, and then let it relapse into its peaceful obscurity. It will nevertheless remain celebrated as the theatre in which was given that prodigious representation of the grandeur of this world.

Napoleon left Erfurth on the 14th of October, and arrived, on the morning of the 18th, at St. Cloud. Through the interview he had had with the Emperor Alexander, he had attained his object, for Austria was held in check—at least for the moment; he had time to make a short and decisive campaign in the Peninsula; for the impressions caused by the affairs of Spain others of a less painful kind were substituted; the event of Baylen, very well known to Europe, very little known to France, was effaced by the event of Erfurth, which was known to all; and, lastly, it was possible that England, intimidated before the united forces of France and Russia, might consent to listen to words of peace.

Immediately on his arrival at Saint Cloud, Napoleon set about realizing the design of a negotiation with Great Britain. He ordered the commander of the naval forces at Boulogne to embark, in the most public manner, the two messengers sent from Erfurth, and respectively designated as couriers from the Emperor of Russia and from the Emperor of the French. The despatch which they bore to Mr. Canning,

and which contained a letter from the two emperors to the King of England, offering him peace in dignified but formal terms, was enclosed in an envelope, the superscription of which signified that it was addressed by their majesties the Emperor of the French and the Emperor of Russia to his majesty the King of Great Britain. The couriers were ordered to say everywhere, and particularly in England, that they were come from Erfurth, where they had left the two emperors together, and that they had passed on their road numerous bodies of troops marching to the camp at Boulogne. In this way Napoleon thought to make the responsibility of rejecting peace lie heavily upon the cabinet of London, and also to strike the imagination of the English by the possibility of a new Boulogne expedition.

He proposed to remain in Paris the number of days requisite for the execution of his last orders, and then set out for Spain, personally to direct the military operations with the activity and vigour peculiar to himself, and then more than ever necessary in order to take from England the aid afforded her by the Spanish insurrection, and to render his armies sooner available in case of a renewal of hostilities with Austria, which he still regarded as possible, in the ensuing spring. To postpone that new crisis, nevertheless, was his whole desire. To alarm England and tranquillize Austria, so as to prompt the one to peace and take away from the other the thought of war, was the twofold object of his last arrangements.

Accordingly, he made an entirely new distribution of the forces he had left in Germany. In the first place, he took from them the title of *Grand Army*, for which he substituted the less imposing appellation of *Army of the Rhine*, the command of which was to be given to Marshal Davout, of all his marshals the most capable of keeping and disciplining an army. Marshal Soult's division was broken up, and he himself was ordered to Spain. Of the three corps which formed his division, one, the St. Hilaire, was added to Marshal Davout's division, which became the army of the Rhine; the other two, those of Carra St. Cyr and Legrand, were marched towards France, and ostensibly towards the camp of Boulogne, but very slowly, so that, if need were, they might fall back upon the Upper Danube. The Boudet and Molitor corps were ordered to Strasburg and Lyons, as if destined ultimately for Italy, but so as to retain the possibility of returning into Swabia and Bavaria. Marshal Davout, with his three old corps, Morant, Friant, and Gudin, the St. Hilaire corps newly detached from Marshal Soult's command, the fine Oudinot corps *d'élite*, all the cuirassiers, a large portion of light cavalry, and a magnificent artillery, was to occupy the left bank of the Elbe, having his cavalry cantoned in Hanover and Westphalia, and his infantry in the old Franco-German and Saxon provinces of Prussia. His force would consist of about 60,000 foot, 12,000 cuirassiers, 8000 hussars and chasseurs, 10,000 artillery-men and engineers, in all 90,000 fighting men, the best in all the French armies. There remained on the shores of the Baltic 6000 French and 6000 Dutchmen, commanded by Prince de Ponte Corvo. The four corps, on their way back to France might by a move-

ment to the left reinforce the troops left in Germany, by 40,000 men. In consequence of the plan for adding a fifth battalion to every regiment, and sending the fourth battalion to join the body, by employing the new conscription, these forces would be further augmented to nearly 180,000 men.

In consequence of the same plan, all the Italian regiments, having four battalions with the main body, would form a total of 100,000 men, being 80,000 foot, 12,000 horse, the rest artillerymen and engineers. Napoleon ordered that the close of October should be profitably employed, so that the conscripts should be on their march before the winter. He desired that every thing should be ready in Italy by the month of March. The army of Dalmatia, which had continued to be called the second division of the Grand Army, from the time it had been detached, after the battle of Austerlitz, to occupy that province under Marshal Marmont, took the name of first division of the army of Italy, which was thus raised to 120,000 men.

Thus, whilst allaying the fears of Austria by the distribution and direction of his forces, Napoleon kept himself in readiness with regard to her. At the same time, to alarm England, he made a great parade of the movement of the Carra St. Cyr and Legrand corps towards the camp at Boulogne.

Napoleon gave at the same time his final orders as to the composition of the army of Spain. He formed it into eight divisions, of which he purposed to be himself the commander-in-chief, Prince Berthier being as usual his major-general. The first division of the Grand Army, marched from Berlin to Bayonne towards the end of October, preserved under Marshal Victor the title of first division of the army of Spain. The Bessières division became the second, and was destined for Marshal Soult. Marshal Moncey's division was styled the third of the army of Spain. The Sebastiani division, combined with the Poles and Germans under Marshal Lefebvre, was designated as the fourth. The fifth division of the Grand Army, under Marshal Mortier, had been moved, by an order issued at Erfurth, from the Rhine to the Pyrenees. It retained its numerical rank as the fifth division of the army of Spain. The sixth division of the Grand Army, recently arrived from Germany, and still composed of the Marchand and Bisson corps, and commanded by Marshal Ney, was to be called the sixth division of the army of Spain. Its numerical force was raised higher than it had ever been, by the addition of a third corps, a fine body under General Dessoles, and newly formed out of some old regiments transferred to the Peninsula. General Gouvion Saint Cyr, with the troops of General Duhesme shut up in Barcelona, the Reille column remaining before Figueras, and the Pino and Souham corps, arrived in Roussillon from Piedmont, was to form the seventh division of the army of Spain. Junot, with the troops that had returned by sea from Portugal, rearmed, recruited, and provided with artillery and cavalry horses, formed the eighth. Marshal Bessières was put at the head of the reserve of cavalry, composed of 14,000 dragoons and 2000 chasseurs. General Walther took the command of the im-

perial guard of 10,000 men. This was a mass of 150,000 old troops, which, added to the 100,000 already beyond the Pyrenees, presented the enormous total of 250,000 fighting men. Such were the efforts to which Napoleon was driven for having in the beginning undertaken to invade Spain with too small and too raw an army.

Of this reinforcement of 150,000 men, at least 100,000 that had left Germany or Italy at the end of August had reached the Pyrenees at the end of October; these were the first, fourth, sixth, and seventh divisions, the guards, and the dragoons. The fifth, under Marshal Mortier, having set out later than the others, and the eighth, under General Junot, recently landed by the English at Rochelle, were still on the march.

Joseph, as we have stated, had never ceased devising and executing false movements, sometimes to the right, sometimes to the left, the only result obtained by this imitation of the Emperor's manœuvres being to fatigue his troops to no purpose, and deprive them of all confidence in the authority that commanded them. To crown his miserable autumn campaign on the Ebro, he had projected, or some one had projected for him, an offensive movement upon Madrid, abandoning the communications of the army with France to the mercy of chance, and leaving to Napoleon the task of re-establishing them with the help of the 150,000 men he was bringing from Germany and Italy. Napoleon looked with pity on this silly conception, wrote his brother the most admirable and instructive letters on the art of which he was the great master, and enjoined him to stay quiet at Vittoria, attempt no operation, allow the insurgents of the right under General Blake to advance as far as Bilbao, and the insurgents of the left under Generals Palafox and Castaños to advance to Sangüesa, or even farther if they pleased; because he himself, arriving soon at the centre, about Vittoria, with an overwhelming force, would be able to fall upon them in the rear, cut them to pieces, and finish the war at a blow. Major-general Berthier set out before his master for Bayonne, in order to organize head-quarters, and put every thing in place, so that when Napoleon arrived he should have nothing to do but order the movements to be made. After having opened the Legislative Body with little pomp, having commissioned M. de Talleyrand to receive the members of the two assemblies, keep up a continual intercourse with them, and direct them in the peaceable and laborious way they were then pursuing, and having committed to M. de Romanzoff and M. de Champagny the task of conducting the great negotiation begun with England, Napoleon quitted Paris on the 29th of October for Bayonne. It was with some apprehension his kindred, and those to whom his precious existence was dear, saw him about to expose himself in that land of fanatics, where General Gobert had died by a ball fired from a bush. As for him, calm and serene, thinking no more of a bullet fired from a bush than of the hundreds of cannon-balls that traversed the battlefield of Eylau, he departed full of confidence, and cherishing the hope of inflicting some humiliating disaster.

Before his departure he had given orders to the fleet. Obligated to renounce the vast maritime projects he had conceived when he thought he could easily control Spain, and make her co-operate in his gigantic expeditions, he was again reduced to mere cruises. He had despatched several frigates with soldiers and supplies for the colonies, whence they were to bring back sugar and coffee on commercial account, and to make what prizes they could by the way. He had, moreover, given orders for fitting out two strong cruising expeditions, the one, consisting of three ships and several frigates, sailing from Rochefort under Rear-admiral Lhermite, the other, also of three ships and several frigates, from Lorient, under Captain Troude, both under orders to touch at Guadeloupe and Martinique, land troops and supplies there, bring back colonial produce, and make their way back to Toulon. Lastly, he ordered his fleet at Flushing to leave port on the first favourable occasion, and to proceed to the Mediterranean, either through the British Channel, or by circumnavigating the British islands. It was always his intention, previously to the conclusion of peace, to attempt a grand enterprise against Sicily, in order to unite it to the kingdom of Naples. Murat had just seized the island of Capri, and Napoleon did not despair of seeing the kingdom of the Two Sicilies entirely reconstituted under that warlike prince, aided by the French marine.

Whilst he was on his way to Spain, the negotiations were to be continued, as we have said, in his absence, by M. de Champagny and M. de Romanzoff, acting under the advice of M. de Talleyrand. The couriers despatched from Boulogne had some difficulty in reaching England, for the most precise orders had been given to all the British cruisers not to let any vessel pass under a flag of truce. Nevertheless, a very able officer who commanded the brig they were on board of succeeded in passing through the line of English cruisers without being captured, and moored in the Downs. Some objection was at first made to admitting the two couriers; at last the Russian was sent on to London, and the French courier was detained in the Downs, until, by an order from Mr. Canning, he was soon after allowed to repair to London. The two couriers were very well treated, but placed under the guardianship of an English courier, who never quitted them for a moment; and they were sent back again after a lapse of forty-eight hours, and made bearers to M. de Champagny and Romanzoff of a mere acknowledgment of the receipt of the despatch, and an intimation that an answer would be subsequently sent to the message of the two emperors.

This cold response, coupled with the many precautions taken with regard to the two couriers, indicated no great desire to establish communications with the continent. The public, in fact, were not disposed for peace on the other side of the channel. Though in general the English nation was always inclined to accept proposals for peace when any were made to its government, and though it was much given to blame the obstinacy of the cabinet in continuing the war, on this occasion it manifested quite a different temper. This change of sentiment was the result of various causes. In

the first place, if after Tilsit the prospect of war with the whole continent, particularly with Russia, had alarmed England as in 1801, she had soon recovered confidence on seeing that the consequences of that general war were not in reality very serious. It had given her one effective enemy the more; and, being still mistress of the seas, she might laugh at the efforts of all her adversaries. She was proud in her conviction of their impotence, and quite free in her movements, for she had none to care for, and she believed herself in a condition to attempt more enterprises by directing them solely to her own profit. If the continent indeed seemed closed against her from one end to the other, it was not closed so effectually as to prevent her from still introducing large quantities of goods, both by the North and by the South, and especially by way of Trieste. And then the late events in Spain promised her immense commercial advantages, by opening to her the ports of the Peninsula, and securing to her an exclusive trade with the Spanish colonies, which were all in insurrection against King Joseph. England suddenly found a vast market in those quarters, and an opportunity for seizing the magnificent Spanish colonies, or urging them to independence,—a brilliant revenge for the insurrection of the United States. So that, after all, when, after the war in Spain, Napoleon, forced Russia to declare against England, he did not thereby raise up a new enemy against her, and by imperfectly closing the northern ports against her he opened to her those of the south of Europe, and all those of South America. Moreover, the Spanish insurrection had just given England a new ally on the continent, the only one that since 1802 had gained advantages over the French troops. There is no people more prone to conceive extravagant predilections than are the sober inhabitants of Great Britain, and they were then possessed with a violent liking for Spanish insurgents, just as we have seen them in our day seized with a liking for the insurgents of every country. The English nation admired their generous devotedness, their incomparable courage; and, beholding in the victory only the naked fact without inquiring into its cause, it was quite ready to declare those men to be the equals at least of the French. Austria, though ostensibly she had broken off her intercourse with the British government, still held out to her furtive signs of intelligence, continued to arm without intermission, and was probably about to recommence war with France. Prognostics of a new and perhaps a successful struggle were, therefore, in the opinion of the English, springing up in all directions, and it was no time to think of a peace, the first condition of which would have been to leave Napoleon master of the second of the maritime powers of the continent,—that is to say, of Spain. Lastly, an accident, a pure accident, set all the English heads in a ferment at that moment. The convention of Cintra appeared to them an unworthy act of weakness on the part of the British generals. Comparing it with that of Baylen, jealous of not having obtained such an advantage over the French as that obtained by the Spaniards, alleging that General Junot had been in as bad a position after the battle of Vimeiro as General Dupont

after that of Baylen, which was false, the English were enraged that there had been granted to General Junot's army conditions a hundred times more advantageous than those obtained by General Dupont, and they intensely regretted the pleasure of which they had been deprived,—a pleasure for them beyond compare,—that of seeing a French army defile as prisoners through the streets of London.

The exasperation against the ministry on this subject amounted to frenzy, and the public had insisted on the formation of a high court to try the victorious generals. Sir Arthur Wellesley himself was compromised with Sir Hew Dalrymple in this affair, although his military operations were applauded. Certainly, when, instead of blaming as formerly the pertinacity against the French, public opinion inveighed against an excessive complaisance towards them, the moment was ill adapted for overtures of peace. The Canning-Castlereagh ministry, extravagant imitators of Mr. Pitt's policy, would have been afraid of incurring still more violent accusations had it listened to pacific proposals under such circumstances. Thus, from one cause and another, every opportunity of reconciliation with Great Britain was successively frustrated: that of Lord Lauderdale in 1806, because France was bent on pursuing and completing the conquest of the continent; that of 1807 after Tilsit, and that of 1808 after Erfurth, because England was bent on pursuing and completing the conquest of the seas. Nevertheless, though England was at the moment averse to treat for peace, the British cabinet would not have dared to refuse peremptorily in the face of Europe and of its nation to listen to pacific overtures; accordingly, it replied to M<sup>r</sup>. de Champagny and De Romanzoff, some days afterwards, on the 28th of October, by a message which was conveyed to Paris by an English messenger.

The message stated that England, although she had often received proposals for peace which she had strong reasons for not believing to be sincere, would never refuse to give ear to proposals of that kind, but that they must be such as were honourable for her. And now, avoiding all discussion on the basis of the negotiations, that of *uti possidetis*, which could hardly be gainsaid, since it was the basis which the British government itself had proposed on all former occasions, the message made it a point of honour and duty for England to insist that all her allies should be included in the negotiation, the Spanish insurgents as well as the others, though England was not bound to them by any formal act. But though such a bond was wanting, a community of interests, a sentiment of generosity, and numerous relations already established, forbade her to abandon them. On this condition Mr. Canning said he was ready to name plenipotentiaries, and to send them wherever their presence might be desired.

The British cabinet well knew that to demand the admission of the Spanish insurgents to the conferences which should be opened to treat of peace was to make all negotiations impossible; for between Kings Joseph and Ferdinand VII. there could be no compromise imaginable. It was all or nothing, Madrid or Valençay, for the one as for the other.

When M. de Romanzoff and M. de Champagny received this reply, which was accompanied with excuses to M. de Romanzoff for not replying to the sovereigns themselves but to their ministers, by reason that one of the two emperors was not recognised by England, they were not a little embarrassed. To take upon themselves to make any explicit declaration, one way or the other, respecting the essential condition, that, namely, of the admission of the insurgents, seemed to them too bold a step, even though it were sanctioned by the advice of M. de Talleyrand. They resolved, therefore, to refer the matter to Napoleon, and meanwhile they acted towards Mr. Canning just as he himself had acted, merely acknowledging the receipt of his communication, and promising him a reply at a future day.

M. de Romanzoff had been from the first very eager to bring the negotiations with London to a conclusion, in order to be able the sooner to appropriate the Danubian provinces; and now that he was in Paris publicly engaged in efforts for peace with England, it was a point of personal vanity with him to consummate the business, especially as the convention of Erfurth had clearly stipulated that in any case Finland, Moldavia, and Wallachia should be secured to Russia. He was therefore of opinion, with MM. de Talleyrand and De Champagny, that the English message, in requiring the presence at the negotiation of all the allies of England, including the Spanish insurgents, nevertheless presented in its form nothing so absolute as to preclude all possibility of agreement. For this reason they all three wrote to the emperor, praying him to make a reply which should allow of continuing the preliminaries, and arriving at a meeting of plenipotentiaries.

Napoleon was at that moment on the Ebro, wholly engrossed with war and with the hope of overwhelming the Spaniards and the English, and under that new phase of mind no longer attaching so much importance as at first to the preliminaries with England. Mr. Canning's message left scarcely any uncertainty in his mind, and he counted on nothing but a great disaster inflicted on the British army to bend the obstinacy of the cabinet of London. That being the case, he was the more disposed to leave to others the conduct of this affair, and he permitted the three diplomatists in Paris to reply as they thought proper, provided the insurgents were formally excluded from the negotiation. He sent a sketch of the reply, which MM. de Champagny, De Romanzoff, and De Talleyrand were authorized to modify as they pleased, and which they took care, indeed, to modify considerably.

This new message, conveyed to London by the same couriers, noticed some offensive allusions in the English message, and then admitted, without difficulty, all the allies of England to participate in the negotiation, except the Spanish insurgents, who were but rebels, and could not represent Ferdinand VII. since he was at Valençay, where he disavowed them, and confirmed the abdication of the crown of Spain.

On receipt of this note the British cabinet, fearing to discourage its new allies in Spain and Austria by rumours of peace, to chill the fanaticism of the one nation, and to retard the military preparations of the other, resolved to

break off at once a negotiation that seemed to it neither useful nor made in earnest. Having documents in their hands which proved that France would make no concession to the Spanish insurgents, who were immensely popular in England, it had nothing to fear from parliament. Accordingly, it made a peremptory declaration, offensive both to Russia and France, to the effect that no peace was possible with two courts, one of which dethroned and kept as prisoners the most legitimate kings, and the other of which suffered them to be treated unworthily for interested motives; that, moreover, the pacific proposals addressed to England were illusory, and devised for the purpose of disheartening the generous nations that had shaken off the oppressive yoke of France, and those which were yet preparing to do so; that the negotiations were therefore to be considered as finally broken off, and that war should be continued with all the energy which was called for by the circumstances.

It was evident that, calculating on a speedy renewal of the struggle, England had been afraid of chilling the ardour of the Spaniards and the Austrians if she continued the negotiation. M. de Talleyrand felt the natural and honourable regret he always experienced upon the failure of an attempt for peace. M. de Romanzoff was piqued at the offensive allusions to his court, and vexed at his own failure, but comforted by the freedom thenceforth possessed for acting immediately in the East. M. de Champagny, in his thorough devotion to the emperor's person, ideas, and fortune, looked upon this refusal only as an opportunity for new triumphant wars to be waged by a master he deemed invincible. The public knew and cared little about the matter, and looked for a decisive result only to Napoleon's presence in Spain.

Whilst such was the reply of England, that of Austria to the declarations of France and Russia was scarcely better. She protested her intention to preserve peace, and, in fact, she made less display of her preparations, without however discontinuing them; but she received with bitterness the joint proposal that she should recognise King Joseph, and declared that when she should have been made acquainted with what had taken place at Erfurth she would explain her views regarding the new royalty constituted in Spain, adding, that a knowledge of what had been settled between the two emperors was indispensable towards enabling her to see her way to a definite conclusion. The form of this declaration, no less than its substance, revealed the deep irritation with which Austria was filled. It was evident that Napoleon would have time to make a campaign in the Peninsula, but only one. It was expected, from his genius and his troops, that it would be decisive. The public, habituated to war, accustomed under that invincible master to sleep amidst the sound of cannon, whose distant echoes were but presages of victory, remained calm and confident, notwithstanding the melancholy and even ominous character of the war waged beyond the Pyrenees against the fanaticism of a whole nation. The brilliant spectacle exhibited at Erfurth still dazzled their eyes, and blinded them to the too real perils of the moment.

## BOOK XXXIII.

## SOMO-SIERRA.

Arrival of Napoleon at Bayonne.—Non-performance of part of his orders.—Manner in which he made amends for it.—His departure for Vittoria.—Arduous of the Spaniards in maintaining a war begun with success.—Project for arming five hundred thousand men.—Rivalry of the provincial Juntas, and creation of a central Junta at Aranjuez.—Direction of the military operations.—Plan of campaign.—Division of the forces of the insurrection into armies of the left, of the centre, and of the right.—Premature meeting of the corps of Marshal Lefebvre with the army of General Blake, in advance of Durango.—Battle of Zornosa.—The Spaniards defeated.—Napoleon, having arrived at Vittoria, rectifies the position of his *corps d'armée*, forms the plan of suffering himself to be turned on his two wings, then to push briskly forward to Burgos, with a view to fall upon Blake and Castaños, and to take them in rear.—Execution of this plan.—March of the 2d corps, commanded by Marshal Soult, upon Burgos.—Battle of Burgos, and capture of that city.—Marshals Victor and Lefebvre, opposed to General Blake, pursue him unrelentingly.—Victor meets with him at Eplonosa, and disperses his army.—Movement of the 3d corps, commanded by Marshal Lannes, upon the army of Castaños.—Manœuvre on the rear of that corps, by the sending of Marshal Ney across the mountains of Sorio.—Battle of Tudela, and defeat of the armies of the centre and the right.—Napoleon, having got rid of the masses of the Spanish insurrection, advances upon Madrid, regardless of the English, whom he is desirous of drawing into the interior of the Peninsula.—March towards the Guadarrama.—Brilliant battle of Somosierra.—Appearance of the French army under the walls of Madrid.—Efforts to spare the capital of Spain the horrors of capture by assault.—Attack and surrender of Madrid.—Napoleon will not allow his brother to enter the city, neither does he enter himself.—His political and military measures.—Abolition of the Inquisition, of feudal rights, and of part of the convents.—Marshals Lefebvre and Ney moved upon Madrid, Marshal Soult directed upon Old Castile, with a view to ulterior operations against the English.—Operations in Aragon and in Catalonia.—Compulsory tardiness of the siege of Saragossa.—Campaign of General St. Cyr in Catalonia.—Crossing of the frontier.—Siege of Roses.—Skillful march to avoid the fortresses of Girona and Hostalrich.—Meeting with the Spanish army, and battle of Cardener.—Triumphant entry into Barcelona.—Immediate departure to take the camp of the Lobregat, and victory of Molina del Rey.—Continuation of the occurrences in the centre of Spain.—Arrival of Marshal Lefebvre at Toledo, of Marshal Ney at Madrid.—Intelligence of the English army brought by deserters.—General Moore, joined near Benavente by the division of General Baird, marches to meet Marshal Soult.—Manœuvre of Napoleon's to throw himself on the flank of the English, and to envelop them.—Departure of Marshal Ney, with Marchand's and Maurice Mathieu's divisions, of Napoleon with Lapierre's and Desolles' divisions, and with the imperial guard.—Passage of the Guadarrama.—Tempest, deep mud, inevitable delays.—General Moore, apprised of the movement of the French, beats a retreat.—Napoleon advances to Astorga.—Couriers from Paris decide him to establish himself at Valladolid.—He consigns the pursuit of the English army to Marshal Soult.—Retreat of General Moore, pursued by Marshal Soult.—Disorder and devastations of that retreat.—Meeting at Lugo.—Hesitation of Marshal Soult.—Arrival of the English at Coruña.—Battle of Coruña.—Death of General Moore, and embarkation of the English.—Their losses in this campaign.—Last instructions of Napoleon's before leaving Spain, and his departure for Paris.—Plan for conquering the south of Spain after giving the army a month's rest.—Movement of Marshal Victor upon Cuenca, for the purpose of definitively ridding the centre of Spain of the presence of the insurgents.—Battle of Uclés, and capture of the greater part of the army of the Duke de l'Infantado, formerly the army of Castaños.—Under the influence of these successes, Joseph at length enters Madrid, with the consent of Napoleon, and is well received there.—Spain seems disposed to submit.—Saragossa is the only point in the north and the centre of Spain that continues to resist.—Nature of the difficulties to be encountered before that important city.—Marshal Lannes sent to accelerate the operations of the siege.—Vicissitudes and horrors of that memorable siege.—Heroism of the Spaniards and of the French.—Surrender of Saragossa.—Character and conclusion of the second campaign of the French in Spain.—Chances for the establishment of the new royalty.

NAPOLEON, setting out in all haste for Bayonne, finding the roads entirely ruined by the weather and the great quantity of military carriages, the post-horses knocked up by the numerous passages, was highly irritated against the administrations charged with these different services, and, on reaching Mont de Marsan, mounted a horse to ride post through the Landes. He arrived at Bayonne at two in the morning of the 3d of November. He sent immediately for Prince Berthier, to learn how things stood, and how his orders had been executed. Nothing had been done as he directed; in particular, not so speedily, though he was the most far-sighted, the most absolute, and the most obeyed of administrators.

He had required that 20,000 conscripts of the classes in arrear, taken from the South, and destined to form the basis of the fourth battalions in the regiments serving in Spain, should be collected at Bayonne. Five thousand of them at most had arrived. He reckoned upon 60,000 great-coats, 129,000 pair of shoes, and on a proportionable quantity of clothing, the rest to be furnished as wanted. He found but 7000 great-coats and 15,000 pair of shoes. Now, on these two articles he laid the greatest stress, as we have elsewhere observed, in

winter campaigns; he was therefore excessively displeased. While the supply of clothing was so backward, that of provisions was considerable; and this was absolutely according to the rule of contraries; for the Castilles abounded in articles of subsistence, in grain and cattle. It is superfluous to mention wine, which forms the chief produce of the hills of the Peninsula. The mules, of which Napoleon had ordered a large purchase, chosen, for want of others, at four years and a half old, were too young to do good service; which was as much to be regretted as all the rest, for means of conveyance were precisely what they ran most short of in Spain, on account of the state of the roads and the mode of transport, performed almost exclusively on the backs of mules. Napoleon had, besides, prescribed that the troops coming from Germany should be concentrated between Bayonne and Vittoria; that no operation should be commenced; that the insurgents should even be permitted to turn us on the right and the left; for it consisted with his plan to let the Spanish generals, in their ridiculous pretension to envelop him, advance very far upon his wings. Now, the fine troops drawn from the grand army had been hastily dispersed on all the points where the timidity

\* We have seen in the preceding Book that Napoleon had increased all the regiments to five battalions: that, of those which were in Germany, he resolved to have four with the army, and the fifth at the dépôt on the Rhine;

that, of those serving in Spain, he purposed that three should be beyond the Pyrenees, the fourth at Bayonne as a first dépôt, and the fifth in the interior of France as second dépôt.



of Joseph's staff had led it to imagine that danger was to be perceived. Lastly, Marshal Lefebvre, commanding the 1st corps, enticed by the opportunity of fighting the Spaniards at Durango, had defeated them—an advantage of no value to Napoleon, who had a liking, and in his position an actual need, for extraordinary results.

Great as were the disappointments he experienced, Napoleon could not find fault either with himself for want of foresight, or with his agents for want of docility, but solely with the nature of things, which began to be forced in all that he had undertaken for some time past. He had, in fact, devoted two months at most to making on the Pyrenees preparations for an immense war. Now, if two months might have been sufficient perhaps upon the Rhine and upon the Alps, whither all the military resources of the Empire had not ceased to flow for several years, those two months were far from sufficient on the Pyrenees, whither, since 1795, that is to say for thirteen years, no part of our military resources had been directed, France having from that period been always at peace with Spain. The agents of the administration, moreover, being yet unacquainted with the nature and wants of this new theatre of war, sent provisions, for example, when clothing was

most needed. Besides, the quantities of all articles changed so suddenly, since the augmentation from sixty or eighty thousand conscripts to 250,000 men, as to outstrip all anticipations. On the other hand, if the troops, instead of being concentrated at Vittoria, were dispersed in various directions, the reason was that a staff, in which as yet figured none of the energetic lieutenants whom Napoleon had trained in his school, was uneasy at the first appearance of danger, and sent off the corps at the very moment of their arrival, to any quarter where the enemy showed himself. Lastly, Marshal Lefebvre himself had indulged the unseasonable desire of fighting only because, wherever Napoleon was not, the command was relaxed and became weak and uncertain.<sup>1</sup>

Napoleon passed the 8d in expressing, orally or in writing, his extreme dissatisfaction to those agents who had ill comprehended and ill executed his orders, and, what was still better, in repairing the inaccuracies or tardiness, more or less inevitable, of which he had to complain.<sup>2</sup> He ordered all contracts which the contractors had not executed to be thrown up; the immediate creation at Bordeaux of workshops in which the cloths of the South should be used for making clothes; countermanded all the commissions for corn and cattle in order to devote

<sup>1</sup> On this point I quote a curious letter of Marshal Jourdan's, chief of Joseph's staff, and charged to command when Napoleon and Berthier were not there:—

*Marshal Jourdan to General Belkard.*

"Vittoria, October 30, 1808.

"My dear General,—Notwithstanding the want of good-will manifested by everybody, General Morlot is at Lodi, Marshal Ney at Legnoco. The enemy has given us time to go backward and forward, and allowed us to take our positions.

"General Sebastiani had received orders to leave the 5th regiment of dragoons at Murquias; but as every one does just what suits him, he has brought with him, as I am told, half of the regiment with the colonel, so that he is going to shut up half a regiment of dragoons in a country where it is almost impossible to ride on horseback. Ah! my dear general, if you could assist me to get out of this cursed situation, you would do me a great service. How happy should I be to go and plant cabbages, if things are to remain in the same state as at present!

"The King received last night a letter from Marshal Victor, dated from Mondragon. Monsieur le maréchal complains rather warmly that one of his divisions has been detained at Durango. He would, perhaps, have preferred finding the enemy at Mondragon and at Salinas. Every one has his taste and his manner of viewing things.

"The king had a strong desire to have the enemy attacked at Durango, but I imagine, he was fearful that this attack might be disapproved by the Emperor. I know not yet what his majesty will decide upon, but assuredly success is certain. It is true that if he waits a few days, and Monsieur Blake has the kindness to remain where he is, he will have some difficulty to get off. The obstinacy of that general appears to me very extraordinary. Is he expecting reinforcements by sea? If so, it would be well to overturn him immediately. But how can one take any resolution when one is not master?

"I write to you, my dear general, all that I know, all that I think, and all that passes. I have no other desire, no other interest, but to see the Emperor's arms triumphant, and the king seated on the throne of Spain. If what I write to you can be of any utility, make whatever use of it you think proper."

<sup>2</sup> I quote two letters of Napoleon's to Dejean the minister, remarkable for his views respecting matters of administration and contracts:—

*To the minister Dejean, director of the administration of war.*

"Bayonne, November 4, 1808.

"You will find annexed a report of the ordonnateur's. You will there see how unworthily I am served. I have yet but 1400 coats, only 7000 great-coats, instead of 50,000, 16,000 pair of shoes instead of 120,000. I am in want of every thing; the clothing proceeds in the worst possible manner; my army, which is about to take the field, is naked; it has nothing. The conscripts are not clothed;

your reports are mere paper. It is convoys that I need; they ought to be sent off regularly, and an officer or a clerk put at the head of them, and then one might be sure of their arrival.

"You will find herewith letters from the prefect of the Gironde, and a report from Dufrene, the inspector of reviews; you will there see that all is robbery and waste. My army is naked, though it is taking the field. I have nevertheless spent a great deal of money; but it is so much thrown into the sea."

*To the minister Dejean, director of the administration of war.*

"Tolosa, November 5, 1808.

"The provisions which are at Bayonne shall not be consumed. There is no want of provisions in Spain, particularly in cattle and wine. I have given orders for the reserve of bullocks to be countermanded, it is useless; this will be a saving of two millions.

"What I want are great-coats and shoes. I should not be in want of any thing if my orders had been executed. None of my orders have been executed, because the *ordonnateur* is not to be depended upon, and because people deal with none but rogues. An *ordonnateur* above suspicion must be sent to Bayonne. I want no bargaining. Bargaining, you know, produces nothing but rogues."

"I have cancelled the contract for clothing at Bordeaux. Send a director, to get making done on my account, who shall be assisted by the prefect, who shall make a requisition for a building and work-people. Set out upon the principle that people make contracts only to rob, that when one pays there is no need of contracts, and that the system of administration is always better.

"How are we to manage, then, for this workshop? As we do in the regiments; put an honest commissary of war at the head of that establishment, add three or four master-tailors, under his orders, as *employés* of the workshop, and charge three superior officers of those who are at Bordeaux with the superintendence of the reception, so as not to receive any but good clothes. There is no need of contract for all this, if money be placed at the disposal of the said commissary.

"By the decree you will see that the only question is about having a good assistant to the commissary of war, who will stake his reputation on making the workshop answer, and of having two good store-keepers, honest and clever, and two master-tailors, taken out of the army. By means of these five persons the workshop will go on perfectly well, and I shall have clothes as well made as those of the guard.

"As for activity, if you wish to get 10,000 coats made in a day, they will be made, because you will have nothing to do but to make requisitions of workmen throughout all France. If you had acted upon these principles, all would have gone on smoothly. But better late than never. For your rule, I will have no more contracts; and when I shall not have the making done by the corps, this method must be followed."

his resources to clothing only; had barracks erected at Bayonne for lodging the fourth battalions; hastened the march of the conscripts to fill the skeletons; reviewed the troops that were arriving; sent to the administrations of the posts, and of bridges and roads, a great number of luminous and imperative intimations; then, in the evening, crossed the frontier, and went to pass the night at Tolosa, and on the following day, the 5th, he proceeded to Vittoria, where were the head-quarters of his brother Joseph. He travelled on horseback, escorted by the cavalry of the imperial guard, and entered Vittoria in the night, wishing not to receive any homage, and to lodge out of the town, in order to gratify his taste, which was to live in the open air, and to be with his brother as little as possible. This was neither from coldness nor estrangement towards the latter, but from calculation. He felt that by his side the position of Joseph would be secondary, as he had already remarked during their joint residence at Bayonne; and he wished, on the contrary, to leave him the first place in the eyes of the Spaniards. In Spain he wished, moreover, to be nothing but general, invested with all the rights of war, and exercising them without mercy, until Spain should submit. He consented, therefore, to reserve for himself the part of severity, even of cruelty, in order to leave to Joseph that of majesty and clemency. In this view, it was his wisest course not to lodge with Joseph.

No sooner had he arrived at Vittoria and released himself from the embraces of his brother, who was much attached to him, than he summoned around him his staff, particularly those French and Spanish officers who were best acquainted with the roads of the country, in order to commence immediately the decisive operations which he had projected.

To comprehend the remarkable operations which he ordered on this occasion, and which were not among the least remarkable of his military life, it is necessary to know what had occurred in Spain during the months of September and October, months spent, as well in Paris as at Erfurth, in negotiations, in preparations for war, in movements of troops.

The Spaniards, doubly excited by the unhopd-for triumph of Baylen and the retreat of King Joseph to the Ebro, were intoxicated with joy and pride. It was not a body of conscripts oppressed by the heat and led by an unfortunate general that they fancied they had conquered, but the grand army of Napoleon himself. They supposed themselves invincible, and thought of nothing less than collecting a mass of 500,000 men, and pushing these 500,000 men beyond the Pyrenees, that is to say, of invading France. In the negotiations with the English, whom they knew to be conquerors also in Portugal, but whose convention of Cintra they disdained in comparison with that of Baylen, they talked of nothing but enterprises directed against the south of France. They accepted and even desired the aid of an English army; but they asked this without attaching to it the salvation of Spain, which they undertook to accomplish without any foreign aid. Let us figure to ourselves Spanish boasting, so great at all times, heightened by an unparalleled

triumph, and we shall scarcely have a just idea of the silly exaggerations of the insurgents.

What was most urgent, and at the same time most difficult, was to constitute a government; for, since the departure of the royal family for Compiègne and Valençay, since the retreat of Joseph to the Ebro, there was no other authority than that of the insurreccional Juntas formed in each province, an extravagant authority, divided among twelve or fifteen centres hostile to each other. In Madrid, formerly the sole centre of the royal administration, there was left only the council of Castille, equally despised and hated for having opposed no other resistance to foreign usurpation than a little ill-will and abundance of tergiversations. This body was then in the same situation in Spain in which the ancient parliaments had been in France at the commencement of the Revolution, which had been made use of before 1789, and which after 1789 were held of no account, because they had remained far below the desires of the moment. Endowed, however, like all old bodies, with a patient and tenacious ambition, it despaired not of possessing itself of the supreme power, and conceived that it had found occasion to do so in the murder of an old man, Don Luis Viguri, formerly intendent of the Havannah and a favourite of the Prince of the Peace, long forgotten, but unluckily recalled to the attention of the people by an old servant who turned traitor to his master. The unfortunate Don Luis having been slaughtered and dragged about the streets, the need of a public authority was universally felt, and the council called to Madrid the Spanish generals victorious over the French, to lend a strong hand to the law. It proposed, at the same time, to the insurreccional Juntas, to depute one representative each, for the purpose of composing, with the council itself, a central government at Madrid.

The Spanish generals, accordingly, were not backward in going to triumph at Madrid; and Don Gonzalez de Llamas, with the Valencians and the Murcians, the pretended conquerors of Marshal Moncey, and Castaños, with the Andalusians, the too real conquerors of General Dupont, successively arrived. The enthusiasm for the latter was extreme, and it was deserved, if success can be accounted equal to genius. But the Juntas were not in a humour to submit to the preponderance of the council of Castille, and to content themselves with a mere participation in power, under the supreme direction of that body. The only answers returned to it by all of them, with the single exception of that of Valencia, were the most vehement reproaches; that they would not acknowledge any authority which had formerly been a purely administrative and judiciary authority only, and which had recently not conducted itself in a manner to obtain from the confidence of the nation a power which it did not derive from the Spanish institutions. They discussed among themselves by deputies the form of the central government which they should constitute. On this point they were as much divided in views as in pretensions. In the first place, all were jealous of their neighbours. That of Seville was at variance with that of Grenada, each attributing to itself the

honour of the triumph of Baylen, and carrying their violence so far as to be ready to make war against one another, and which they would have begun but for the prudent Castaños. Moreover, this same Junta of Seville insisted upon being the centre of the government, as well on account of its services as its geographical situation, which placed it at a distance from the French; and it purposed by means of successive adhesions to draw all the others to itself. The Juntas of the North, forming two by no means amicable groups, on the one hand, those of Galicia, Leon, and Castille, on the other that of the Asturias, tended, however, to coalesce, and, once united, to fix the government of Spain in the North. The Juntas of Extremadura, Valencia, Granada, and Saragossa, less ambitious, more discreet, and not less meritorious, advanced none of these exclusive pretensions, and declared in favour of the formation of a single government placed in the centre of Spain, but not at Madrid, to avoid the domination of the council of Castille.

All these Juntas were at length brought to agree through the medium of deputies, and it was settled that they should each send two representatives to some place specified, Ciudad Real, Aranjuez, or Madrid, in order to compose a central Junta of government. This plan was adopted; and the two representatives nominated, after much agitation, repaired, some to Madrid, others to Aranjuez. Those of Seville, always the most jealous, because they were the most ambitious, would not go further than Aranjuez, and finally drew to them all the others. It gratified the pride of these substitutes of absent royalty to meet in its ancient residence, and to usurp even its forms.

Constituted at Aranjuez, under the presidency of M. de Florida-Blanca, formerly minister of Charles III., illustrious, enlightened, able, but unfortunately old, and a stranger to the present time, the central Junta declared itself invested with the entire royal authority, assumed the title of majesty, decreed that of highness to its president, that of excellence to its members, and to each of them a salary of 120,000 reals. Amounting at first to twenty-four members, it was soon increased to thirty-five; and its first act was to enjoin the council of Castille, as well as all the other Spanish authorities, to acknowledge its supreme power. The council of Castille, finding the creation of such a power not at all to its taste, thought at first of resisting. It objected by a formal declaration that, according to the laws of the kingdom, the Junta, if claiming to be a council of regency, was far too numerous, and, as a national assembly, it could not in any way supply the place of the Cortes. In consequence, it demanded the convocation of the Cortes themselves. We have already had occasion to remark, that in this rising of Spain for royalty there was an explosion of all the democratic sentiments; and that, in the name of Ferdinand VII., the people were in reality indulging the passions of 1793. Thus nothing sounded better in Spanish ears than the word Cortes. But from the council of Castille every thing was taken ill. In all that it proposed they perceived a snare for annulling the Junta and substituting itself in its stead, and, without renouncing the Cortes, the Juntas answered its

declaration only by a universal murmur of hatred and contempt. The support of the generals was then the only efficacious force. Now, all of them belonged to that central Junta, composed of the provincial Juntas, by which they were appointed, with which they had an understanding; and they adhered to the Junta, save one only, old Gregorio de la Cuesta, always sour, always unsociable, detesting the insurrectional and tumultuous authorities which had recently sprung up, and far preferring the council of Castille, of which he had formerly been president. He even thought for a moment of concerting with Castaños to attribute the military government to those two, leaving the civil government to the council of Castille. Events soon proved that such a combination would have been better; but Castaños was not enterprising enough to accept the offers of his colleague, and, besides, raised by the Junta of Seville, he was on the side of the Juntas. Don Gregorio de la Cuesta was therefore obliged to submit; and the council of Castille, destitute of all support, was forced to follow his example.

The central Junta of Aranjuez, in the full exercise of the supreme power ever since the first days of September, began to govern unfortunate Spain after its fashion.

Its first and sole care ought to have been the levy of troops, their organization, and their direction. But, in a country in which there had always been but very little administration, where a sudden revolution had just destroyed the little that there was, the central government could do nothing, or next to nothing, in regard to the most essential point, that is to say, the organization of the forces, and possessed at most some influence over their general direction. The enthusiasm was assuredly very boisterous in Spain, as boisterous as it is possible to imagine; but we have just seen how feeble an effective resource enthusiasm is, how inferior in results to a regular law, which calls men, whether willing or not, to serve the country. Spain, which could and ought to have furnished, under such circumstances, four or five hundred thousand men, highly courageous by nature, gave scarcely one hundred thousand. ill-equipped, worse disciplined, incapable of making head even in the proportion of four to one against our most indifferent troops. After a great deal of noise and agitation, the only persons who enrolled themselves were the youth of the universities, some peasants urged by the monks, and a very small number of hot-headed individuals in the towns. In some of the provinces these recruits went to swell the ranks of the troops of the line; in others they formed, under the name of *Tercios*, a name borrowed from the ancient Spanish armies, special battalions serving along with troops of the line. Andalusia, so proud of its successes, had its army composed of four divisions, under Generals Castaños, De la Peña, Coupigny, &c. That of Granada was under Major de Reding. Valencia and Murcia sent, under Llamas, part of the volunteers who had resisted Marshal Monecy. Extremadura, which had not yet figured in the ranks of the armed insurrection, formed, under General Galuzzo and the young Marquis de Belveder, a division into which entered, besides the volunteers, many deser-

ters from the Spanish troops in Portugal. With this division were joined the men enrolled in La Mancha and New Castille. Catalonia continued to raise bands of Miquelets, who closely pressed General Duhesme in Barcelona. Aragon, responding to the voice of Palafox, and encouraged by the resistance of Saragossa, organized a tolerably regular army, composed of troops of the line and Aragonese peasants, the finest and boldest men in Spain. The northern provinces, Galicia, Leon, Old Castille, the Asturias, taking advantage of a considerable nucleus of troops of the line, some returned from Portugal, others in garrison at Ferrol, rallied under Generals Blake and Gregorio de la Cuesta, compensated for their defeat at Rio-Seco by the success of the insurrection in the rest of the Peninsula. They received also an unexpected reinforcement, that of the troops of the Marquis de la Romana, escaped, with his corps, from the shores of the Baltic, by a sort of miracle which deserves to be recorded.

It will be recollected that the Spanish troops sent by Napoleon to concur in guarding the shores of the Baltic had been spread over the Danish provinces, where they were destined to make head against the English and the Swedes. These troops, summoned to take the oath to Joseph, began to murmur. Those who were in the Island of Seeland, around Copenhagen, rose, and would have murdered General Fririon, who commanded them, but could only get at his aide-de-camp, whom they put to death, and declared that they would not have any usurper. The King of Denmark caused them to be disarmed. But the greater part of the Spanish corps was in the Island of Fühnen and in Jutland. The troops who were in these two localities, long excited by Spanish agents, brought over in English vessels, had resolved to escape from the ruler of the Continent, and for this purpose to proceed suddenly to a point of the shore where English ships would be ready to receive them. The Marquis de la Romana, a man of ardent and singular mind, filled with the reading of ancient authors, more learned than discreet, more boiling than energetic, was at the head of this noble plot. At a given signal, all the Spanish detachments hastened to the port of Nyborg, where you embark to cross the Great Belt, where they found about a hundred small craft, which they seized, and proceeded to the Isle of Langeland. There, under the protection of English ships of war, they had nothing to fear. The other detachments scattered in Jutland, on their part, hurried to Frederica, passed the Little Belt in barks seized by them, crossed the Island of Fühnen to get to Nyborg, and from Nyborg gained the Isle of Langeland, the general rendezvous of these fugitives. The cavalry, leaving their horses in the fields, followed the infantry on foot, and arrived with it at the general rendezvous. The English, forewarned, having collected the vessels necessary for a short passage, had soon conveyed the fugitives to the coast of Sweden, and placed them out of danger; and, sufficient means having been at length collected, they carried them from Sweden to Spain in the first days of October, after three months' marvellous adventures. Of the 14,000 Spaniards placed on

the shore of the Baltic, from nine to ten thousand returned to Spain, and four to five thousand were left in Denmark, disarmed and prisoners.

At a moment when the Spaniards regarded the slightest success as a triumph, the least sign of courage and intelligence as certain proofs of heroism and genius, the Marquis de la Romana could not fail to appear an accomplished hero, a great man worthy of Plutarch. But, if they were so prompt in respect to admiration, they were not less so in respect to jealousy; and Castafios, for example, who, though frequently irrelative, was, nevertheless, the most intelligent and the most discreet of their generals, and for that reason ought to have been invested with the general direction of the war, did not obtain that command. Every Junta had its hero, whom it would not place below the hero of any neighbouring Junta; all that could be done, therefore, was to form a council of war, placed beside the Junta of Aranjuez, and composed of the principal generals or their representatives. It is impossible to recapitulate all the ridiculous plans proposed in this council; but the one which was preferred as an imitation of Baylen was that which consisted in enveloping the French army, which had retired upon the Ebro and was concentrated around Vittoria, by turning both its wings, by Bilbao on one side, by Pampeluna on the other. It is true that, in consequence of the usually odd configuration of the valleys, which among high mountains are entwined in one another, the French army, holding the road from Bayonne to Vittoria, which passes through Tolosa and Mondragon, had on its right the valley of which Bilbao occupies the centre, and which is called Biscay; on its left the valley, the entrance of which is occupied by the fortress of Pampeluna, and which is called Navarre. From Bilbao, by Durango, one might fall at Mondragon upon the rear of Vittoria, and cut off the high road which formed the principal communication of the French army. From Pampeluna one might also fall upon Tolosa and cut off the road to France, or even debouch upon Bayonne by St.-Jean-Pied-de-Port. Granting that they had met with French troops cowardly enough to flinch from undisciplined bands, led by incapable generals, it is certain that they might entertain well-founded hopes of enveloping the French army, of taking Joseph, his court, and the fifty or sixty thousand men who were left him on the Ebro, and carrying the brother of Napoleon prisoner to Madrid. This would assuredly have been a signal vengeance, and a very legitimate one, since Ferdinand VII. was at Valençay. But chances are not to be reckoned upon, and Baylen was a chance not destined to recur; for all the Spanish armies united would not have been a match for the soldiers and generals who had retired upon the Ebro, much less for the soldiers whom Napoleon was bringing with him. To force the passes of Bilbao at Mondragon, of Pampeluna at Tolosa, the Spaniards must have cleared their way, on the one hand, through the corps of Marshals Victor and Lefebvre; on the other, through those of Marshals Ney and Lannes, of Generals Mouton, Lasalle, and Lefebvre Desnoettes, marching at the head of old soldiers

of the Grand Army, and no troops in Europe would have found out how to do that. Thus, without any chance of turning the French, they were left the faculty of debouching from Vittoria as from a centre, to throw themselves in mass, either to right or left, upon one or other of the Spanish armies, which were separated by great distances, which could not succour one another, and thus inflict on them the disaster which they purposed to make the French army undergo. But it was not given to the inexperienced generals of Spain to form these rational conclusions. To envelop a French army, to take it, was, ever since Baylen, a military process surrounded with an irresistible spell. The plan in question, then, prevailed in this council, in which it was a prodigy that any thing should prevail, so numerous and so vehement were the contradictions there. In consequence, it was agreed that they should advance at once by the mountains of Biscay and Navarre upon Bilbao on the one hand, upon Pampeluna on the other, to cut off Joseph from Vittoria and treat him in the same manner as they had treated General Dupont. They then made the distribution of the forces at their disposal, and which, in the hopes of the Spaniards, were to have amounted to at least 400,000 men.

There were formed four corps, one, of the left, at first under General Blake, comprehending a considerable mass of troops of the line, those of Taranco's division, of the maritime arrondissement of Ferrol, of the Marquis de la Romana, and, with these troops of the line, the volunteers of Galicia, Leon, Castille, and the Asturias, among whom were to be seen in particular, students of Salamanca and mountaineers of the Asturias. This army of the left might be computed at 86,000 men exclusively of De la Romana's division, at 45,000 with that division, the cavalry of which, returned from the North, was dismounted and incapable of serving. The army of General Blake was to advance along the southern slope of the Asturias and of Leon to Villareayo, then to endeavour to cross those mountains to Espinosa, in order to penetrate into the valley of Biscay, and descend upon Bilbao. In communication with this army of the left was to be formed an army of the centre, under General Castaños, which was to comprehend the troops of Castille, organized by La Cuesta, and led by Pignatelli, the troops of Estremadura, commanded by Galuzo and the young Marquis de Belveder, the two divisions of Andalusia, placed under the orders of De la Peña, and, lastly, the troops of Valencia and Murcia, which Llamas had led to Madrid. These troops deducting those of Estremadura still behindhand, might amount to about 30,000 men. They were to line the Ebro, from Logroño to Calahorra. Those of Estremadura were to come and occupy Burgos, with the remnant of the Walloon and Spanish guards, the best troops of Spain, to the number of 12,000 men. The army of the right, formed in Aragon under Palafox, composed of Valencians, of some troops of Grenada, and of Aragonese, nearly 18,000 strong, was to cross the Ebro at Tudela, and, following the bank of the river of Aragon, to march by Sanguesa upon Pampeluna. The army of the centre, under

Castaños, was to join the army of the right, in order to act in mass by Sanguesa, when the plan for enveloping the French army was to be definitively put into execution. Behind these three armies it was resolved to form a fourth, destined to play the part of reserve, and composed of Aragonese, Valencians, and Andalusians, who never appeared in line, and of an effective wholly unknown. Lastly, on the extreme right, that is to say, in Catalonia, there were, unconnected with the general plan, without any possible estimate of number, and secluded, like that province itself, bands of Miquelets, who, with regiments brought from the Balearic Islands, and Spanish soldiers from Lisbon, undertook to dispute that part of Spain with General Duhesme, and blockaded him in Barcelona. But, if we confine ourselves to the enumeration of the forces acting upon the real theatre of the war, those of the left under Blake, those of the centre under Castaños (including the division of Estremadura,) lastly, those of Aragon under Palafox, we find their total number to be scarcely 100,000 men, comprising all the disciplined soldiers and ardent volunteers that Spain possessed, exhibiting a confused medley of troops of the line, sufficiently instructed to be aware of the defectiveness of their organization and to be discouraged by it, peasants and students, wholly untrained, without any idea of war, ready to run away on the first serious encounter, ill-equipped, ill-fed, commanded by generals incapable, or suspected because they were prudent, jealous of each other, and thoroughly divided. The great courage of the Spanish nation could not make amends for so many insufficiencies; and if the climate, a foreign army, the general circumstances of Europe, and the political faults of Napoleon, did not come in aid of the old dynasty, it was not from the defenders armed for it that it had to expect its re-establishment.

However, the principal of the means of salvation was preparing for Spain—that was the assistance of England. That power, after delivering Portugal from the presence of the French, had no intention of stopping at this first effort. Beseet by Spanish agents sent by the Juntas, perceiving in the rising of the Peninsula a powerful diversion which would absorb part of the French forces, not despairing of raising up a new coalition on the Continent, and of throwing it upon Napoleon thus weakened, she was determined to afford the Spaniards all possible succour. She had despatched to Santander, Coruña, and other ports of the Peninsula, arms, stores, provisions for war, and was even preparing an aid in money. No more neglecting her commercial interests than her political interests, she had besides inundated the Peninsula with her merchandise. A last reason, if all those which we have just enumerated had not been decisive enough to determine her to act energetically, was the sensation produced by the convention of Cintra, the object at this moment of the profound anger of the British public. Thus, though the expedition to Portugal, such as it was, was one of the best conducted and most successful expeditions that England had yet executed on *terra firma*, it was nevertheless requisite to repair the effect of it as it would have been requisite to repair the

of a disaster. Whether from this necessity, or the enthusiasm of the English for the Spanish cause, the British cabinet was therefore obliged to make the greatest efforts. In consequence, it resolved to send a considerable army to Spain. The south of the Peninsula, as safer, further from the French, nearer to Portugal, would have been preferred for the theatre of its military enterprises; but, when the general rendezvous was on the Ebro, when it flattered itself with the prospect of crushing definitively, at the very gates of France, King Joseph's dispirited armies—destroyed, it was said—it would have been a new disgrace, worse than that of Cintra, to land timidly at Cadiz, or to advance from Lisbon by Elvas upon Seville. The assemblage of an English army in Old Castille was, from these motives, decided upon; and its formation was set about in the following manner.

There were left about Lisbon nearly 18,000 men of the expedition to Portugal, terminated at Vimeiro. Sir John Moore, who had come from the North with 10,000 men, after a fruitless attempt to employ them in Sweden, had landed at Lisbon a few days after the convention of Cintra, and increased the British forces in Portugal to about 28,000. He was a prudent, clear-sighted officer, irresolute in council, though extremely brave in the field of battle, full of integrity and honour, and well worthy to command an English army. Participating neither in the glory of the late expedition, nor in the prejudices which it had excited, since he had arrived after all was over, he was invested with the chief command, which assuredly he deserved more than any other, if the English had not had Sir Arthur Wellesley at their disposal. But the latter had a sort of account to settle with the public opinion, and his part in Spain was deferred. Sir John Moore, therefore, had the command. Twenty thousand men, of the twenty-eight already assembled in Portugal, were to concur in the new expedition to the north of Spain. Twelve or fifteen thousand, partly cavalry, were to be landed at Coruña, under Sir David Baird, an old officer of the Indian army. This addition would form a total of thirty-five or thirty-six thousand excellent troops, worth, of themselves, all the troops that Spain had on foot. An immense fleet of transports was placed under the orders of Sir John Moore, to follow the movement of his troops, to convey them to the place of rendezvous, if he preferred going by sea, and to supply him, whichever route he adopted, with provisions, stores, and artillery and cavalry horses. It was left to his own judgment to conduct himself as he pleased, provided that he acted in the north of the Peninsula, and concerted with the Spanish generals for the greater success of the campaign.

Sir Charles Stuart and Lord William Bentinck had been sent to Madrid, to give some good advice to the Junta of Aranjuez, and to bring about somewhat of unity in the military operations of the two nations.

Sir John Moore, left free in his action, could transport by sea from Lisbon to Coruña the 20,000 men whom he was to draw from the army in Portugal, and join them in that port to Sir David Baird's 15,000 men; or he could cross all Portugal by the roads which the

French had followed on entering that country. After mature reflection, he decided on the latter course. On the one hand, almost all the transports were engaged at this moment in carrying Junot's army back to France; on the other, a new embarkation could not fail to prove very detrimental to the organization of the English army. The route from Coruña to Leon was, moreover, exhausted by Blake's army; and it would at most supply Sir David Baird's division. By setting out before the rainy season, and by advancing slowly in small detachments, Sir John Moore hoped to arrive in Old Castille in good condition, and to give his troops by this trip, what English troops are deficient in, patience and strength for marching. In consequence, he resolved to direct his infantry by the two mountainous routes which debouch upon Salamanca, that of Coimbra to Almeida, and that of Abrantes to Alcantara; and his artillery, with the cavalry, through the level country from Lisbon to Elvas, from Elvas to Badajoz, from Badajoz to Talavera, from Talavera to Valladolid. He flattered himself that he should thus have reunited, in the course of October, his infantry and his cavalry in the centre of Old Castille. Sir David Baird's corps, which had a larger proportion of cavalry, was to land at Coruña, to proceed from Coruña by Lugo to Astorga, and to join the principal army by the Duero. This plan being decided on, Sir John Moore commenced his march about the end of September, and Sir David Baird, leaving the shores of England, sailed for Coruña.

We must do this justice to the Spaniards, that, whether from presumption or patriotism, probably from both these sentiments together, they treated proudly with the English, not accepting their succour without certain reservations, and on condition of not delivering up to them their great naval establishments. They would never consent to admit into Cadiz the 5000 men offered them by Sir Hew Dalrymple; and, when Sir David Baird appeared off Coruña, they refused to allow him to enter the great harbour. He was obliged to write to Madrid to obtain an order for permission to land, which order was at length granted on the urgent application of Sir Charles Stuart and Lord William Bentinck.

But, while the English had difficulty to procure a reception for the land troops that had been solicited from them, and the Spanish generals, engaged in intrigue with the Junta or against it, in rivalry with one another, were opposing further difficulties of execution to a plan which had been most cordially adopted, and were wasting time in an incredible confusion, a letter from the French staff, intercepted by the numerous scouts who infested the roads, acquainted them that, in the course of October and November, reinforcements to the amount of 100,000 men would enter Spain, in addition to those which had already arrived: and that, while they were busy in doing nothing, they were letting slip the occasion for surprising the French army, such as they figured it to themselves, exhausted, decimated, and dispirited by Baylen. In this government, which, like all tumultuous and feeble governments, acted only by fits and starts, such a revelation could not fail to give an impulsion for a mo-

ment. Its members ceased disputing; they ordered the generals to set off, whether agreeing among themselves or not; they sent Castaños to the Ebro; they urged the arrival of the men of Estremadura at Madrid, and their departure from Madrid for Burgos; lastly, they set in motion all they could and how they could.

It was important not to lose any more time, and yet they did lose a great deal more: so that they were not in a condition to act seriously before the end of October. General Blake, though he had not collected all his forces, had been the first in line; having marched along the foot of the mountains of the Asturias, without penetrating into them, he had crossed them at Espinosa, and had made several demonstrations upon Bilbao. The Castilians, under Pignatelli, kept along the banks of the Ebro to the environs of Logroño. The Murcians and the Valencians under Llamas, and the two divisions of Andalusia under La Peña, extended themselves along the river, from Tolosa to Calahorra and Alfaro. Palafox's Aragonese and Valencians, crossing the Ebro and lining the little river of Aragon, had their head-quarters at Caparrosa.

According to the plan agreed upon, Castaños and Palafox were to concert for the purpose of uniting on the extreme left of the French, towards Pampeluna, and it was urgently necessary that they should; for General Blake, already far advanced upon their right, was liable to be compromised, unless some one hastened to occupy part of the enemy's forces: but it was not easy for Castaños and Palafox to agree, each wishing to draw the other to himself. Castaños was fearful of disgravishing the Ebro too much; Palafox was desirous to be enabled to overrun Navarre with superior forces. At length, making a movement in advance, they had crossed the Ebro and the river of Aragon, and established themselves at Logroño on the one hand and Lerin on the other.

But it was too late: the French, before they were reinforced, would not have put up any longer with the inconsiderate audacity of their adversaries, still less since the finest troops in the world were joining them every day. It will be recollected that, even before setting in motion four corps of the Grand Army, Napoleon had successively detached a number of old regiments from France and Germany, and that, with those last arrived, there had been composed in the first place Godinot's division, and next Dessoles' division, which was to be the third of Marshal Ney's corps. The intrepid marshal himself was with the latter on the Ebro, awaiting the arrival of his *corps d'armée*.

Though Napoleon had interdicted any operation before he was present, from a desire to allow the Spaniards to gain ground upon his wings, and to induce them to advance so far that they could not retreat, Joseph's staff, unable to endure the sight of their movements, resolved to repulse them. It therefore ordered Marshals Ney and Moncey to retake the line of the Ebro and of the Aragon. In consequence, on the 25th of October, Ney had marched to Logroño, and entered it at the point of the bayonet, driving Pignatelli's Castilians before him. He had even crossed the Ebro and forced the insurgents to fall back to Nalda, at the foot of the mountains which separate the

district of Logroño from that of Soria. Marshal Moncey, on his part, had sent Generals Wathier and Maurice Mathieu, with a regiment of the Vistula and the 44th of the line, upon Lerin. These generals had driven back the Spaniards at first into the town and castle of Lerin, then, by cutting them off from all relief, had taken them prisoners, to the number of about a thousand men. The Spaniards had everywhere been overthrown, with a vigour and a promptness which proved that, before the French army, conducted as it was accustomed to be, the insurrectional levies of Spain could not oppose any serious resistance.

At this very moment arrived the 1st corps, under Marshal Victor, the 4th, under Marshal Lefebvre, and the 6th, destined for Marshal Ney, comprehending his two divisions of Bisson and Marchand, with which he had so eminently signalled himself in every country.

Joseph had scarcely reviewed Sebastiani's fine division, belonging to Lefebvre's corps, in the plains of Vittoria, when, forgetting his brother's instructions, he had directed it upon his right, by the Durango road, into the valley of Biscay, in order to repress General Blake, who gave him uneasiness about Bilbao. He did not stop there. Believing the report of the Spanish peasants, who, when there were 20,000 men, gave out, either from braggadocio or from credulity, that there were 80,000, he had judged that Lefebvre's corps would not be sufficient, and, in order the better to protect his rear, had sent one of Marshal Victor's divisions, that of General Villatte, by Mondragon, upon Durango. Lastly, the head of the 6th corps having appeared at Bayonne, he had lost no time in directing Bisson's division, by St.-Jean-Pied-de-Port, upon Pampeluna, to secure his left, as he had just secured his right by the position which he had caused Marshal Lefebvre to take. At the same instant the guard, having arrived to the number of 10,000 men, placed itself *en échelon* between Bayonne and Vittoria.

These unseasonable dispositions brought on a new and unforeseen engagement on the right between General Blake and Marshal Lefebvre, as there had been one on the left between Pignatelli and Marshals Ney and Moncey. General Blake, as we have said, after crossing the mountains of the Asturias at Espinosa, and occupying Bilbao, had posted himself in advance of Zornoza, upon the heights that face Durango. Having not yet been joined by La Romana's division, he was there with about twenty or twenty-two thousand men, half troops of the line, half peasants and students. He had left in rear, on his right, about 15,000 men in the adjacent valleys, between Villaro, Orozco, Amurrio, and Balmaseda, to guard the *débouchés* communicating with the plains of Vittoria, by which other French columns might have made their appearance.

Having arrived in presence of Marshal Lefebvre, not far from Durango, on the Mondragon road, and thus finding himself near the goal which he had been ordered to reach, for the purpose of turning the French army, he hesitated, as a man hesitates at the decisive moment, when he has undertaken a task beyond his strength.

His soldiers, more daring than he, because they were more ignorant, displayed an assur-

ance which he himself had not, and, on their lofty position, raised loud shouts, insulted our troops, and threatened them by gestures. The impatience of our soldiers, unaccustomed to take insult from the enemy, had excited that of old Lefebvre, who was not sorry, in his coarse williness, to make a bold dash upon the Spanish army before the arrival of the Emperor. The marshal had with him Sebastiani's division, composed of four old regiments of infantry (the 82d, 58th, 28th, and 76th of the line) and one regiment of dragoons, forming an effective of about 6000 men; Leval's division, composed of 7000 Hessians, Badeners, Dutch; and lastly, but as merely auxiliary, Villatte's division, consisting of four old regiments, with an effective of nearly 8000 men, some of the best in the French army. These were more than he needed to beat the Spanish army, though part of the men, after a long march, had not yet rejoined.

The Spaniards were in advance of Durango, on a line of heights, the right of which, less strongly appuyed, might be turned. Marshal Lefebvre placed Sebastiani's division in the centre of his line, and on his two wings the Germans, intermixed with Villatte's division, to set them an example. He commenced the attack on his left, in order to turn the right of the Spaniards, which, as we have observed, was less solidly established. On the morning of the 31st of October, in a thick fog, General Villatte, with two of his regiments, the 94th and 95th of the line, and part of the Germans, advanced so vigorously upon the position, that the Spaniards, surprised, could scarcely hold out. Though they had many obstacles of ground to oppose to the French, they suffered themselves to be precipitated from post to post into the bottom of the valley. A fire kindled by General Villatte was to serve as a signal to the centre and the right, which marched with not less vigour than the left. A shower of howitzer shot, fired through the fog, had already much shaken the Spaniards. They were then briskly attacked, and driven so speedily down the back of the heights which they occupied, that the French had scarcely time to overtake them. Their way of fighting consisted in firing upon our columns in march, and then throwing themselves in confusion into the bottom of the valleys. In the plain our cavalry would have cut them down by thousands. All that our infantry could do in these steep mountains was to fire at them in their flight, taking much better aim than they were capable of doing. In this manner we killed or wounded from fifteen to eighteen hundred men, while they put two hundred of ours *hors de combat*. But several thousand of them, seized with terror, dispersed on this first rencounter, beginning to comprehend and to have less relish for war with the French. It was assuredly not that they were deficient in natural courage, but, without discipline, men never retain in danger the requisite firmness, without which, in war, every operation is impossible.

Marshal Lefebvre following up his victory, on the next day entered Bilbao, which the Spaniards made no effort to defend, and where some soldiers of the enemy's, some wounded, and a great quantity of stores brought by the English, were taken. The trembling inhabi-

tants had fled, some into the mountains, others to the shipping of all sorts lying in the waters of Bilbao. Marshal Lefebvre, then pushing on to Balmaseda, durst not go much further, for beyond it was the pass leading by Espinosa into the plains of Castille; and having already fought without order, it would have been too bad to extend his operations still more. He established Villatte's division, which was not his but Marshal Victor's, at Balmaseda, and fell back with his corps upon Bilbao, to seek there for provisions, which were not abundant in these mountains, where people live upon maize, milk, and preparations from it.

Such was the state of things at the moment of Napoleon's arrival. His intentions had been entirely misconceived, since he meant that his officers should allow themselves to be nearly turned both on the right and on the left, in order to be more sure, when debouching from Vittoria, of taking the two principal Spanish armies in rear. The movement executed by Marshals Ney and Moncey on the Ebro had, in fact, produced no other result than to place Castaños and Palafox rather further apart, and to do these latter the service of disengaging them. The movement which Marshal Lefebvre had taken the liberty of making, in driving Blake back from Bilbao upon Balmaseda, had extricated the Spanish general from a situation from which he never could have escaped, if he had been allowed time to entangle himself in it completely. Moreover, the French troops were scattered in various directions, which were not the best chosen. The 1st and 6th corps, which Napoleon would fain have had at hand in the plains of Vittoria, were dispersed in various places very distant from one another. The 1st corps had one of its three divisions, that of General Villatte, in Biscay. The 6th had Bisson's division at Pampeluna, and another, Marchand's division, on the Vittoria road, with all its artillery.

Napoleon, arriving at Vittoria on the 5th of November, after expressing there, as at Bayonne, his displeasure at being so ill obeyed, gave, on the 6th, all the orders necessary for repairing the faults committed in his absence. Had he not been disappointed in the execution of his plans by unseasonable operations, he would have opposed to General Blake, merely as a check upon him, the corps of Marshal Lefebvre, (4th corps;) he would have opposed to Palafox and Castaños, still solely for a check, the corps of Marshal Moncey, (8d corps;) then, collecting under his hand the corps of Marshal Soult, formerly Bessières' corps, (2d corps,) the imperial guard, and the 14,000 dragoons, and debouching with 80,000 men upon Burgos, he would have cut the Spanish armies in two at the centre; he would then have fallen upon them, have taken them alternately in rear, enveloped, and destroyed them. Unluckily, this plan, without being absolutely thwarted, could not be executed in so certain and complete a manner; in the first place, because the action, commenced too soon, had somewhat kept back the Spanish generals, and prevented them from thoroughly entangling themselves, some in Biscay, others in Navarre; secondly, because the various corps of the French army, employed at the very moment of their arrival, were widely dispersed. Still, neither Blake, who had fallen



back to Balmaseda, nor Castaños and Palafox, obliged to retire again to the Ebro, were yet aware of the danger of their position, and they did nothing to extricate themselves from it. Napoleon's plan could therefore be still put into execution. Accordingly, he made his dispositions upon the same principle, that of cutting the Spanish line into two parts, in order to fall first upon one and then upon the other. He ordered Marshal Victor, (1st corps,) one of whose divisions, that of General Villatte, had already been diverted from its course to reinforce Marshal Lefebvre, to support the latter, if he needed it, by the road from Vittoria to Orduna, and then to return by Orduna to Vittoria, and join the centre of the French army. Such reports of the strength of the Spaniards were circulated in the country, that Napoleon thought it would not be too much to oppose two corps (the 1st and 4th) to Blake's army, amounting by the lowest estimate to 50,000 men, and by the highest to 70,000. These two marshals, however, agreeably to the plan of Napoleon, were rather to check Blake than to repulse him, till the moment when the signal to fall upon him should be given from the centre of the army.

Having thus regulated the operations of his right, Napoleon, turning his attention to his left, directed Marshal Monecy to hold himself in readiness to act when he should receive orders to that effect; but till then to confine himself to covering the Ebro, from Logroño to Calahorra. He returned him Morlot's division, detached for a moment from his corps; he added to it a reinforcement of dragoons; and, lastly, one of the two divisions of the 6th corps, (Marshal Ney's.) Bisson's division, having by a false movement taken the Pampeluna road, he ordered him to allow it to rest in that place, then to direct it upon Logroño, to support there the right of Marshal Monecy, and to remain there provisionally. This division changed commander, and was called Lagrange's division, after its new chief. It was destined subsequently to rejoin Marshal Ney, and to contribute meanwhile to keep the Spaniards in check on the Ebro.

His right and left being thus secured, but without being moved forward, Napoleon resolved to debouch by the centre, with the corps of Marshals Soult and Ney, (2d and 6th,) with the imperial guard, and the greater part of the dragoons. The corps of Marshal Soult, formerly Bessières', though it numbered many young soldiers, comprehended likewise Mouton's division, composed of four old regiments, which nothing in Spain could withstand, as they had proved at Rio-Seco. Ney's corps, though deprived of Bisson's division, directed by mistake upon Pampeluna, and placed temporarily on the Ebro, included Marchand's division, which had always belonged to it, and Dessoles' division, which had recently been formed of old regiments, called successively into Spain. These troops had not their match in the world. With these two corps, the guard, and the reserve of cavalry, Napoleon had about 50,000 men to push upon Burgos. These were more than he needed to crush the centre of the Spanish army.

His dispositions adopted on the 6th and 7th of November were suspended by a new incident.

The Spanish generals, though much disconcerted by the vigour of the attacks which they had sustained, some at Zornoza, others at Logroño and Lerin, did not renounce their plan, but differed more than ever about the execution of this plan, and applied to one another for reinforcements. Blake, in particular, the most roughly treated, seeing on his flanks the corps of Lefebvre and Victor, had solicited succour of the centre and the right. But there was a circuit of fifty or sixty leagues to traverse, in order to communicate from one end to the other of the Spanish line; and, after holding a council of war at Tudela, Castaños and Palafox had replied, that it was impossible for them to go to the aid of the army of the Asturias, and had merely enjoined the corps of Estremadura to hasten its arrival in line, that it might go and cover Blake's right by taking position at Frias. They had also promised to enter into action as soon as they could, in order to draw upon them part of the forces of the French.

Meanwhile Blake, driven from Bilbao and Balmaseda towards the gorges which form the entrance of Biscay, had stopped there, and been rejoined by the twelve or fifteen thousand men placed at Villaro and Orozco, while he was fighting at Zornoza and by the corps of La Romana. With what he had lost in dead and wounded, and particularly by dispersion, which loss amounted to six or seven thousand men, he had about 38,000 left to place in line. He moved forward, therefore, on the 6th of November, upon Balmaseda, where Marshal Lefebvre had left Villatte's division, that it might itself fall back on Bilbao, in order to live there more at its ease.

After the fault of having moved forward too soon, Marshal Lefebvre could not commit a greater than to fall back all at once on Bilbao, leaving Villatte's division at Balmaseda. There needed soldiers as firm as ours, and a foe as far from formidable as the Spanish insurgents, to cause no calamity to result from such false dispositions.

Marshal Victor, on his part, had acted no better. Sent by Orduña to Amurrio, in order to flank Marshal Lefebvre, he had despatched General Labruyère with a brigade to Oquendo, and had kept him in that position without ever conceiving the idea of repairing thither himself to direct him. General Labruyère, among those steep mountains, where it is difficult to find out where you are, where the winter fogs add to the dreariness of the places, left without any directions, not knowing what enemies he might have in presence, had abstained from engaging, and had suffered the corps which flanked Blake during the battle of Zornoza to pass before him, not daring to do any thing to stop their retreat. On the following days he had remained in position, seeing Balmaseda in the distance, perceiving Villatte's division without thinking of rejoining it, perceiving also Sebastiani's division, which was making reconnaissances from Bilbao on the Orduña road; so that our troops, instead of uniting to overwhelm Blake, the only operation that was reasonable after committing the fault of fighting before orders arrived from head-quarters, were dispersed between Bilbao, Balmaseda and Oquendo, exposed in their solitary situations to serious checks.

The faults of Marshal Victor had not stopped there. Impatient to return to head-quarters, in order to serve before the eyes of the Emperor himself, and finding in his instructions that he might take the road to Vittoria as soon as his presence should be no longer necessary in Biscay, he had recalled General Labruyère, in order to recross the mountains and again descend into the plain of Vittoria, abandoning Villatte's division, which was left quite alone at Balmaseda. Thus commenced that series of faults, owing to the egotism and the rivalry of our generals, and which, by ruining the cause of France in Spain, ruined it in all Europe.

While Marshal Victor was executing this retrograde movement, General Blake, reinforced, as we have said, by the troops of his left, and by those of La Romana, had resolved to move forward, and to dispute Balmaseda with Villatte's division, which he knew to be there quite alone. The stay of Marshal Lefebvre at Bilbao, and the retreat of Marshal Victor upon Vittoria, offered every facility for an attempt of this nature. Accordingly, on the 5th of November, he advanced at the head of thirty and some thousand men, and crowned the heights around Balmaseda, to surround the town before he attacked it, and to make prisoners of the French by whom it was guarded. But General Villatte, at the head of a superb division of four old regiments, had beheld other foes and other dangers than those which threatened him in Biscay. He possessed equal presence of mind and intelligence. Desirous of securing the heights of Gueñies, which are in rear of Balmaseda, and which command the communication with Bilbao, he placed three

of his regiments there *en échelon*, and then left the twenty-seventh light in Balmaseda itself, to hold the town as long as possible. Having taken these dispositions, he allowed the Spaniards to approach, and received them with a fire to which they were not accustomed. Those who attempted to enter Balmaseda were most horribly maltreated by the twenty-seventh, and strewed the environs of the town with dead and wounded. Meanwhile the neighbouring heights were crowned with enemies, and Marshal Lefebvre not arriving from Bilbao, General Villatte deemed it his duty to retire. He brought the twenty-seventh from Balmaseda over the heights of Gueñies, and fell back in mass, with his four entire regiments, on the Bilbao road. The Spaniards who attempted to approach him were vigorously attacked, and paid dearly for their imprudent boldness. Villatte's division had nevertheless two hundred men, *hors de combat*, after bringing down seven or eight hundred of the enemy. If Marshal Lefebvre had been at hand, and if Marshal Victor, instead of withdrawing Labruyère's brigade from the position which it occupied, and from which it should have dashed upon Balmaseda, had acted with his whole corps upon that point, Blake's army might have been enveloped and taken that same day.

Accounts of the affair of Balmaseda, which had no other importance than that of a danger uselessly incurred, being transmitted one after another to the head-quarters, with the usual exaggerations of reports so communicated, produced an aggravation of Napoleon's ill-humour with generals who so wrongly comprehended and executed his conceptions.<sup>1</sup> He directed General Berthier to address to them a severe

<sup>1</sup> I quote despatches which clearly explain the situation, and prove what was thought of the conduct of these two marshals by an infallible judge, Napoleon himself, who generally showed rather weakness than severity towards the two lieutenants in question.

*The major-general to Marshal Lefebvre.*

"Vittoria, November 6, 1808, noon.

"The Emperor is extremely angry at the false movement of retreat from Bilbao. His majesty did not expect this capital fault on the part of a marshal so zealous for his service. His majesty has no doubt that, if you had placed your head-quarters at Balmaseda, and encamped with your three divisions to act according to circumstances, you would already have taken more than eight or ten thousand prisoners from the enemy, but the conduct lately held is the more extraordinary, since, in speaking of the inconveniences of retrograde movements, you have begun with one of five leagues.

"The Emperor orders you to unite yourself with Villatte's division, in order to push the enemy briskly. If, on the 5th, Monsieur le Maréchal, you had not attacked, and had left time for making the necessary dispositions, the campaign in Spain would at this moment be far advanced. The Emperor finds in your conduct that too much zeal has caused you to infringe the military regulations in attacking without orders; but his majesty does not conceive that the enemy can remain entire when a success has been gained over him. The Emperor may have need of his troops, and when they are engaged, one cannot leave a single division by itself before the enemy, or when, on the other hand, one makes a retrograde movement. His majesty finds that it is with such dispositions that one loses the advantage of one's successes. The Emperor thinks that the time when the troops of Generals Villatte, Labruyère, and Ruffin were before the enemy, and manoeuvring to cut him off, was not the moment for you to retire, and, under such circumstances, his majesty thinks it improper that the troops of the fourth corps should remain inactive at Bilbao.

"Marshal Soult marches to-morrow upon Burgos, whence he will proceed to Reinos and Santander. March briskly, then, Monsieur le Maréchal. The intention of the Emperor is that there should not be a moment's rest till Blake's corps is destroyed, and till he is driven back into the Asturias.

"The enemy, having retreated upon Balmaseda, Villacayo, and Santander, you must kick him upon the corps that are coming to stop him at Reinos.

"ALEXANDER."

*The major-general to Marshal Victor.*

"Vittoria, November 6, 1808, midnight.

"I have laid before the Emperor your letter of the 6th, which your aide-de-camp says was written at noon. His majesty has been extremely displeased that, instead of having supported General Villatte, you have left him engaged with the enemy—a fault the more serious, since you know that Marshal Lefebvre has committed that of leaving one division of your corps *d'armée* exposed by making his two other divisions fall back upon Bilbao. You knew that this division was exposed at Balmaseda, as General Labruyère had communicated with it on the morning of the 5th. How, instead of proceeding in person at the head of your troops, to succour one of your divisions, could you leave that important operation to a general of brigade, who had not your confidence, and who had with him only one-third of your force? How, after receiving intelligence that, on the 5th, Villatte's division was in action with the Spaniards, could you, instead of marching to its assistance, suppose gratuitously that this general was victorious? His majesty asks how long the fire of musketry and attack have been signs of the retreat of an enemy. Nevertheless the instructions of Marshal Jourdan were precise that you should not proceed for Miranda till you had ascertained that the enemy was retreating; and instead of this, Monsieur le Maréchal, you set off when you had positive proof that the enemy was fighting. You know that the first principle of war dictates that, in the doubt of success, we must go to the aid of one of our corps that is attacked, since upon this may depend its salvation. In the other supposition your movement could not have any inconvenience, as your instruction to proceed for Miranda was but hypothetical, and consequently its non-execution could not have an influence over any of the plans of the general-in-chief.

"What has happened, Monsieur le Maréchal, is this: the column before which General Labruyère fell back met with General Villatte, who, attacked in front and rear, owed his safety to his intrepidity alone, after making a great carnage among the enemy: his loss has been but

reprimand, ordered Marshal Lefebvre to return to Balmaseda, Marshal Victor to march back to Biscay, and to push Blake with the greatest vigour, to crush him even, if he found an occasion to do so. Notwithstanding his plan for cutting the centre of the enemy's line before acting against his extremities, he would not put himself in motion till he had ascertained that a fault upon his wings would not come to compromise the base of his operations.

On receiving these remonstrances of the Emperors, Marshal Lefebvre lost no time in marching upon Balmaseda. He passed the 6th in collecting the detachments sent to the environs of Bilbao to drive the English from the coast, and, on the morning of the 7th, he directed his course towards Balmaseda by Sodupe and Gueñes, with Sebastiani's, Villatte's, and Leval's divisions, the first two French, the third German, the three forming a mass of about 18,000 men, almost without artillery and cavalry, which could not be brought into those narrow valleys, where means of transport for the ammunition of the infantry were scarcely to be found.

The road followed the bottom of the valley. Marshal Lefebvre advanced, having Villatte's division on the left of that road, Leval's division on the road itself, Sebastiani's division on the right, a little in advance of the two others. Sebastiani's division first stormed the village of Sodupe, then, proceeding beyond it, encountered Blake on the heights of Gueñes, with twenty odd thousand men and three pieces of cannon. The troops of Sebastiani's division immediately climbed the heights, in spite of the not very annoying fire of the Spaniards, who discharged their pieces at a distance, that they might run away the sooner. On reaching the summit they could not take any prisoners; for the Spaniards, much nimbler than our soldiers, though they were extremely nimble, ran at full speed down the back slopes of their mountains. While our troops were thus taking those positions on the right, the obstacles upon the road itself were all removed, and ten thousand Spaniards, turned by this rapid movement, were left in rear upon the heights on the left, cut off from their main body. The marshal ordered one of the regiments of Sebastiani's division, the 28th of the line, to cross the river which forms the bottom of the valley; thus it found itself on the rear of the Spanish corps, while General Villatte went to attack it in front. But our troops, always finding the insurgents ready to fire before they came within musket-shot, could not overtake them, and of course sustained little injury from them. The enemy, however, had some hundred men killed or wounded. A much greater number were dispersed, and filled with a distaste for the profession of arms.

Having returned with about 36,000 men to Balmaseda, Blake did not carry away so many when he again retired towards the gorges. But if he had met with the corps of Marshal Victor on his rear, all the agility of his soldiers would not have prevented his being enveloped and the

greater part of his troops being taken. The next day, the 8th, Marshal Victor, on his part, started for the goal which he ought never to have lost sight of, while Marshal Lefebvre entered Balmaseda. They were henceforward united, and capable of undertaking any thing against the Spanish army. The only difficulty was how to subsist. Amidst these steep mountains, where cultivation is rare, our soldiers were in want of every thing. The Spaniards were equally destitute. Under these reciprocal privations, the country was plundered and ravaged. Balmaseda and all the villages had been laid waste, and sometimes burned, to supply the two armies with fuel.

On the morning of the 9th, Napoleon knew that his troops, having resumed the offensive, had only to show themselves to make the enemy vanish before them. Though he had a very mean idea of the insurgents, still, before he had acquired complete experience of what they were, he had introduced into his movements greater caution than was needed. But on the morning of the 9th he no longer hesitated to order Marshal Soult to break up for Burgos with the second corps and a strong body of cavalry. The brilliant Lasalle commanded the light cavalry of that corps, composed of chasseurs and Poles of the guard. To these was added Milhaud's division, consisting of four fine regiments of dragoons. There was a total of about seventeen or eighteen thousand infantry, and 4000 horse. Napoleon had just learned that the troops of Estremadura had arrived at Burgos. He enjoined Marshal Soult to push forward, without waiting for either Marshal Ney or the guard, to break through these Spanish troops if they were bold enough to place themselves so near him, and to take Burgos from them.

Marshal Soult, who had returned on the preceding day to Briviesca, had immediately given orders to the three divisions of Mouton, Merle, and Bonnet, to unite on the road from Briviesca to Burgos, in the environs of Monasterio. He had Lasalle's cavalry in advance, and that of Milhaud with his main body. It is beyond Burgos that the plains of Castille commence, and it was to gallop over them in pursuit of the fugitive Spaniards that Napoleon had brought with him so large a mass of dragoons.

On the 10th, at four in the morning, Marshal Soult moved off his *corps d'armée* on the road from Monasterio to Burgos, Lasalle's light cavalry and Mouton's gallant division at the head, Bonnet's division and Milhaud's dragoons in second line, Merle's division, the most distant of the three, as rear-guard. About 12,000 men of the corps of Estremadura had left Burgos for the upper Ebro, to proceed to Frias and cover the right of General Blake, conformably to the decisions of the council of war held at Tudela. Six thousand men of this corps remained in mass at Aranda, on the Madrid road. The twelve thousand, carried in advance of Burgos, were composed, like all the Spanish troops, of old troops of the line, and volunteers, peasants, students, and others.

small; and he retired upon Bilbao, two leagues in advance of that town, on the evening of the 6th.

"The pleasure of the Emperor is that you set out without delay to proceed for Orduña, that you march at the

head of your troops, that you keep your corps together, and that you manoeuvre so as to put yourself in communication with Marshal Lefebvre, who will be at Bilbao."

"ALEXANDER."

This corps, it is true, included in its ranks some battalions of the Walloon and Spanish guards, who were the best soldiers of Spain. It possessed a numerous artillery, well horsed and well served, but it was commanded, in the absence of the Captain-general, Galuzzo, by the Marquis de Belveder, a young man without experience, who had advanced against the French with the most silly presumption.

At daybreak, Lasalle's cavalry, marching at the head of the *corps d'armée*, fell in with the Spanish advanced posts, exchanged some carbine-shots with them, and fell back on Mouton's division, for they were in presence of obstacles which infantry alone could overcome. In following the high road, and in approaching Burgos itself, they had on the left the little stream called the Arlanzon, which waters the foot of the wooded heights of the Carthusian convent; in the centre, the wood of Gamonal, with the high road running through it; and on the right, the heights of the park of Villimar, on the summit of which is seated the fortified castle of Burgos, and at the foot the city of Burgos itself. The Spaniards had tirailleurs on the heights on right and left of this position, their principal infantry in the wood of Gamonal, barring the high road, their cavalry on the skirt of that wood, their artillery in advance. No sooner had Marshal Soult arrived on the ground than he set in motion Mouton's division, to attack the most serious obstacle, that of the wood of Gamonal. He ranged his cavalry in rear, to dash upon the Spaniards when the obstacle of the wood should be overcome, and a little further in rear Bonnet's division, to storm the heights crowned by the enemy, if they offered any resistance. The illustrious General Mouton advanced without hesitation, with his four veteran regiments, the 2d and 4th light, and 18th and 36th of the line, upon the wood of Gamonal. The Spanish artillery, firing briskly, at first swept away a few files; but our soldiers, marching, with bayonet fixed, upon the wood of Gamonal, broke into it, in spite of the Walloon and Spanish guards, and cleared it in the twinkling of an eye. At this sight the whole Spanish army disbanded with unparalleled alacrity. Colours, cannon, and all, were abandoned. The troops which followed picked up in the wood more than twenty pieces of cannon. All the surrounding heights were in like manner deserted by the Spaniards, and the mass of their fugitives threw themselves either into Burgos or across the Arlanzon to escape more speedily. Lasalle and Milhaud then passed the Arlanzon, partly by fording, partly by bridges that cross the stream, rushed at a gallop upon the dispersed soldiers of Estremadura, and cut down a considerable num-

ber. General Mouton's infantry entered Burgos at the heels of the Spaniards, received a few musket-shots from several convents which it sacked, and made itself master both of the city and of the castle itself, which the enemy had not taken the precaution to put into a state of defence. This feat, accomplished by a single charge of Mouton's division, put into our hands not only Burgos and its castle, but also twelve colours, 30 pieces of cannon, about 900 prisoners, exclusive of all the fugitives who were killed or taken in the plain. Those who fell or were wounded by the swords of our cavalry beyond Burgos were computed at 2000. With soldiers so nimble in flight, there was no other way of diminishing the force of the enemy than to cut down the fugitives, for it was impossible to make prisoners in a different manner. Marshal Soult exerted himself to re-establish order in Burgos, where, in the first moment, very great confusion prevailed, from the concurrence of the vanquished and the victors, and the disappearance of nearly all the inhabitants. In a few days, however, that important city had assumed its usual aspect.

Napoleon, impatient to make the central point of Burgos the pivot of his operations, had hastened on the 10th to move forward his headquarters. He had passed the night of the 10th at Cubo, and on the 11th he entered Burgos. During his stay at Vittoria, he had taken care to order the construction at Miranda, Pancorvo, and Briviesca, of posts, which were demi-fortresses, capable of containing an hospital, a magazine, a storehouse, and in which columns on march might rest and re-victual themselves, and leave their fatigued or sick men out of the reach of the guerrillas. He had perceived, in fact, with his habitual promptness, that in a country where the regular force was so far from formidable, and where the irregular force did so much mischief, there would be much to apprehend for his communications. He took, therefore, not a single step in advance without labouring to secure them.

Napoleon entered Burgos in the night, and *incognito*, persisting in leaving the royal honours to Joseph, and in reserving for himself the odium of the rigours of war.<sup>1</sup> He gave orders for burning the standard used at the proclamation of the royalty of Ferdinand, received the clergy and the authorities with extreme sternness, assumed the attitude of an irritated conqueror who has acquired all the rights of war, is determined to exercise them all, and not disposed to forego any but what the clemency of King Joseph might be able to obtain from him.

In the warehouses of Burgos, or in the environs, there were considerable quantities of wool, belonging to the great land proprietors

<sup>1</sup> On this subject, here is another letter of Napoleon's, which seems worthy of being transcribed:—

*The Emperor to the King of Spain.*

"Cubo, 10th November, 1808.

"I shall set out at one in the morning, to be before daylight to-morrow *incognito* at Burgos, where I shall make my dispositions for the fight: for 'tis of no use to conquer if one does not profit by success.

"I think you ought to go to Briviesca to-morrow.

"As much as I think it behoves me to make little ceremony for myself, so much I think that it ought to be made for you. As for myself, that does not harmonise with the profession of war: besides, I will not have it.

"I should think that deputations ought to be sent to meet you, and to give you the best reception. On my ar-

rival I shall order every thing for the disarming, and for burning the standard which was used at the proclamation of Ferdinand. Seek to produce an impression that this is no laughing matter.

"Word is sent me that the army of Estremadura is destroyed. It is, however, only an infamous swarming rabble, which did not stand the charge of one brigade of General Mouton's. If you know of any thing towards Orduña, or of Marabala Lefebvre or Victor, inform me of it. The hope of having some news from that quarter has made me stop here.

"General Dejean, who commands a thousand horse at Miranda, has orders to protect the passage of the Spaniards who are with you, of the parks proceeding to Burgos, of the treasure, &c.

"NAPOLEON."

of Spain—such as the Dukes of Medina-Cœli, Ossuna, Infantado, Castel-Franco, and others, on whom Napoleon purposed to inflict a heavy stroke, by favouring all who were below them. He ordered the confiscation of those wools, which amounted in value to twelve or fifteen millions of francs. His plan was to sell them to the merchants of Bayonne at very low prices, with a view to favour the woollen manufactures of France, and afterwards to devote the produce, either to the compensation of the French who had suffered in Valencia, Cadiz, and the different cities of Spain, or to the augmentation of the funds of the army. Hitherto he had given to the Senate all the colours taken from hostile armies. He resolved that the Legislative Body should also have a share of these trophies, and made it a present of the twelve colours taken from the Spanish and Walloon guards, wishing to remove as much as possible the dislike attached in France to the war in Spain.

But these were mere accessory concerns for him. The conduct of the military operations was at this moment the principal and the most urgent. Having arrived on the 11th at Burgos, he despatched, on the very same day, General Lasalle, with his light cavalry, upon Lerma and Aranda, to push the Spaniards to the foot of the Guadarrama, to clear the country, and to prepare the ways for the columns which were to take the Spanish armies in rear. While he sent off Lasalle's straight before him, he directed Milhaud's 2000 dragoons to the right upon Valladolid, with injunctions to cut down the fugitives, to make prisoners, to displace everywhere the authorities instituted in the name of Ferdinand VII., and to create others in the name of Joseph. But what was most urgent for him, and what he executed immediately, allowing but a single day's rest to the troops, was to send Marshal Soult from Burgos towards Reinosa, with the 2d corps, in order to throw it upon the rear of Blake. Once arrived at Burgos, in fact, the moment was come for him to fall to the right and left upon the rear of the Spanish armies, and to begin with that commanded by General Blake, because it was that which was engaged at the moment with the French generals, and against which it was of importance to march, if one wished to be in time to take it in rear. Napoleon, therefore, ordered Marshal Soult to set out from Burgos on the morning of the 12th, by forced marches, and, by a backward movement to the right, to proceed by Huermeces and Canduela upon Reinosa. It was probable that, if Blake's Spanish army had been beaten, and if, instead of retreating in order, like regular armies, it was broken up into bands of fugitives, he might at least pick up some of the wrecks. From Reinosa, Marshal Soult was to march upon Santander, to reduce the Asturias. In this march of Marshal Soult's Napoleon found a twofold advantage—in the first place, that of turning Blake; secondly, that of restoring the 2d corps, which was the former corps of Bessières, to its first destination, namely, to occupy Old Castille and Leon, countries with which it was acquainted, and in which it had been accustomed to act. His design was, at the same time, as soon as Marshals Lefebvre and Victor should have finished their operation in Biscay, to recall them to him by

Vittoria, where their artillery, which they could not take with them into the mountains, would be waiting for them, and to draw them by Miranda and Burgos upon the Madrid road. Marshal Soult, setting out with all his artillery, which he had not been obliged to leave behind, because he had followed the high road, had all that was necessary for the operations with which he was charged.

Napoleon bethought him on the same day of the means of preparing a considerable reinforcement for himself. Vague reports of the English were current at Burgos, and several prisoners, closely questioned, had announced their presence on the roads leading from Portugal into Spain. Others had spoken of English landed at Coruña, and proceeding by Astorga upon Leon. Letters intercepted at the post contained the same indications. It was evident that, without knowing the period at which they might be expected, we should have to do with them in the plains of Old Castille, whether, established in Portugal, they came from Lisbon upon Salamanca, or, disembarking in Galicia, they came from Coruña to Astorga. Napoleon did not imagine them to be so near him as they really were, for the English plan was punctually executed. The detachments of Sir John Moore had already passed Badajoz and Almeida; and the corps of Sir David Baird, admitted at length into Coruña, was advancing upon Lugo and Astorga. But whether the English were more or less near was of little consequence to Napoleon, who wished, on the contrary, to see them venture so far into the interior of the Peninsula that they would not be able to get back again, and, in anticipation of such a case, made all dispositions for crushing them. He had resolved to join with Marshal Soult General Junot's corps, brought from Portugal by sea, conformably to the convention of Cintra, which, though censured by the English, they had punctually executed. He had already given orders that this corps should be re-formed, re-organized, and put without delay into such a state as to be fit to appear again in line. He despatched fresh orders from Burgos that the first division, that of General Delaborde, should pass the Bidassoa on the 1st of December; that the second, General Loison's, should march immediately afterwards; and that the third, to which he had just appointed General Heudelet, but which was not in so forward a state of preparation as the other two, should follow them with the least possible delay. Napoleon had no doubt that this corps, already well seasoned, would show an anxiety to revenge the disaster of Vimiero, and that it was very capable of doing so. The corps of Marshal Soult and General Junot resisting the English in front, he might, from Madrid, where he proposed to be soon, make some manœuvre on their flanks or their rear, the more decisive the further they should be suffered to advance. At this moment, therefore, he did not concern himself about the English, whose appearance it was easy to foresee, unless to prepare the means of stopping them subsequently on their march.

After the departure of Marshal Soult, Napoleon, left alone at Burgos, with the imperial guard and part of the dragoons, hastened the movement of Marshal Ney's two divisions upon

that city, having destined them to operate by-and-by on the rear of Castaños, when he should have done with General Blake, and could weaken his centre for the benefit of his left. He had traced the route of Marshal Ney upon Burgos, by Haro, Pancorbo, and Briviesca.

While he was sending Marshal Soult into the Asturias, upon the rear of General Blake, Marshals Lefebvre and Victor continued to pursue the Spanish general through Biscay. Marshal Lefebvre had met with no serious resistance at Gueñes on the 7th, had entered Balmaseda on the 8th, and had pushed forward Villatte's division, which had been lent him for a few days, to the environs of Barcena. On his part, Marshal Victor, reprimanded for having thought of leaving Biscay, had returned by Orduña, Amurrio, and Oquendo to Balmaseda, and on the 9th had made his junction near that town with the corps of Marshal Lefebvre, indemnified for the new direction which was given him by the advantage of recovering Villatte's division, and of being enabled to meet and beat an enemy already demoralized. He saw Marshal Lefebvre on the 9th, and promised to concert his own march with his. But, on the next day, the 10th, fearful of a proximity which might further deprive him of Villatte's division, he hastened to push Blake's army with the greatest vigour to the entrance of the gorges of Biscay, passed them at its heels without losing a moment, and about the second half of the day arrived on the other side of the mountains, near Espinosa, a little town, which was important for its position, for it was situated at the point of intersection of all the roads of the plain and of the mountains. From Espinosa, in fact, you may proceed by a high road either to Bilbao or to Santander, if you choose to go from the plain to the mountains; and if, on the contrary, you choose to descend from the mountains into the plain, you may again go by a high road either to Villarcayo or to Reinosa, and thus reach either Burgos or Leon. It was, therefore, worth while for General Blake to halt at this point and to contest it obstinately. It was also worth while for Marshal Victor to fight in order to gain possession of it; he depended, moreover, on being rejoined, in case of emergency, by Marshal Lefebvre, though he had left him without seeing or speaking to him on the subject. Marshal Lefebvre had followed him into the same valley, pursuing a parallel route, but a little to the left and in rear, and much hurt at his colleague leaving him unawares, and having neither spoken to him nor sent him word concerning the operations to be jointly executed by them. Fortunately, one only of the two French corps despatched against Blake proved sufficient to crush him, so wretchedly organized were the Spanish troops, and so irresistible those which Napoleon had just brought into Spain.

Marshal Victor, having arrived before Espinosa de los Monteros on the 10th about noon, found there General Blake in position, on heights of difficult access, and which he had occupied with considerable intelligence. There were left about 80,000 or 82,000 men of the 36,000 which he had when he marched back to Balmaseda, and six pieces of cannon, which he had not brought with him, but received from Reinosa, for it was impossible to drag them

along in these mountains. Neither of the two armies had any with it, but fought without artillery and without cavalry, with musket and bayonet. Scarcely could they bring with them a few mules to carry the biscuit and the cartridges.

General Blake had on his left steep and wooded heights, towards his centre an accessible ground, but covered with fences, towards his right a tolerably elevated plateau, but not so much so as the heights on the left, likewise wooded, and backed upon a small river, that of La Trueba, which, issuing from the mountains, ran all along the rear of that position. The town of Espinosa, traversed by the Trueba, was placed precisely behind the centre of the Spanish army. The object to be attained, therefore, was to force one or other of the wings of the Spanish army, to push it upon its centre, and to throw the whole into Espinosa, where a single bridge would not be sufficient for the passage of an army in flight. The advanced hour and the short days of November afforded little hope of performing all this in one day.

General Villatte, who was at the head of Marshal Victor's corps, debouching by the Edesa road, perceived the Spanish army in this formidable position, with its six pieces of cannon in the centre of its line. That army appeared to be not destitute of assurance, though always vanquished since the commencement of the operations. The general sent forward Pacthod's brigade, composed of the 27th light and the 68d of the line, ordered the 27th light to make the Spaniards fall back upon the heights on which they appured their left, and enjoined the 98d of the line to place itself in order of battle before their centre, to keep it in check. With the second brigade, composed of the 94th and 95th of the line, commanded by General Puthod, he attacked the wooded plateau upon which the right of the Spaniards was appured. The assailants were obliged to advance without artillery, against an army provided with it, though it had but little, and to carry all the positions by the fire of musketry or by the bayonet. Luckily the wooded ground which they had before them scarcely admitted of the use of any other arms than what the French had at the moment at their disposal. The soldiers of La Romana, placed on this plateau, defended themselves very valiantly, and under favour of the wood kept up a destructive fire on our troops. But General Puthod, with the 94th and 95th, surmounted all obstacles, carried the plateau, penetrated into the wood, dislodged the Spaniards from it, and precipitated some of them into the Trueba. The others fell back, in not very great disorder, upon their centre, backed upon the town of Espinosa. While our left brigade was maintaining this very sharp combat with the enemy's right, the 27th light of the right brigade had kept up all day a tirailleur fire with the Spaniards at the foot of the heights on their left, and the 68d had been obliged to charge several times with the bayonet to curb their centre. The combat began to be difficult, and might have proved hazardous with other troops, for six or seven thousand men were engaged with more than thirty thousand. But Marshal Victor, having arrived with Ruffin's and Lapisse's divisions, lost no

time in supporting the right and left of Villatte's division, and would have entered completely into action, had not a fog, coming on about five o'clock, prevented the two armies from seeing, and obliged them to defer the conclusion of the contest till the following day. The Spaniards, according to custom, concluding that they were victorious, because they were not entirely conquered, kindled fires, shouting for joy and proclaiming their victory; but their triumph was destined to be of short duration.

Next morning, the 11th, at dawn of day, Marshal Victor renewed the action, determined to render it this time decisive. He numbered in his three divisions seventeen or eighteen thousand infantry, present under arms, and it was more than he needed against the thirty odd thousand Spaniards opposed to him. Already on the preceding evening he had changed the 94th and 96th of the line, which had been fighting all day, for the 9th light and the 24th of the line of Ruffin's division, supported in rear by the 96th of the line. These three regiments of General Ruffin's, substituted for Puthod's brigade, were destined to complete the victory on our left, upon the plateau backed on the Trueba. The general-in-chief had charged the first brigade of Lapisse's division, commanded by General Maison, one of the most intrepid and intelligent officers of the French army, to support the 27th on our right, to dislodge the Spaniards from the steep and wooded heights on which their left was established, and to throw them upon Espinosa, where there was nothing to favour their flight, but the bridge of that town. At the centre he had placed the 8th of the line, of Lapisse's division, to support General Villatte's 68d. He had kept in reserve the 54th, the last regiment of Lapisse's division, to direct it to any point where it might be needed.

At dawn of day, General Maison, marching at the head of the 16th light, which rivalled in ardour General Villatte's 27th light, climbed under a plunging fire the heights which were on our right, carried them with the bayonet, killed several Spanish generals, a great number of officers and soldiers, and seconded by the 45th, had soon thrust them upon their centre, that is to say, upon Espinosa. At the same instant, the 68d, commanded by the brave General Mouton-Duvernety, and the 8th, pushed the Spaniards from enclosure to enclosure on the spacious and somewhat lower ground which formed the centre of the position. Our soldiers, carrying one garden-wall after another, at length drove back the Spaniards upon Espinosa, at the moment when General Maison had already pushed them to the same point and taken their six pieces of cannon. The left brigade, led by General Labruyère, had likewise accomplished its task, and crowded the right of the Spaniards into an elbow of the Trueba, where they had accumulated into a dense mass, which exhibited the form of a full square, apparently for the better resisting the shock of our troops. The enemy, repelled from all points at once upon Espinosa, at length fell into frightful confusion, and fled in disorder in all directions, here thronging to the bridge of Espinosa for the purpose of crossing it, there throwing themselves into the bed of the

Trueba, to ford the river. Then was to be seen, instead of a retreat, the unparalleled rout of 80,000 affrighted men, running away in a delirium of terror. In a plain, and with cavalry, almost all of them would have been cut in pieces. Our soldiers firing from above down upon these dense masses, or thrusting them forward with the point of the bayonet, killed or wounded nearly 8000 men, but took only a few hundred prisoners, for they could not come up to such nimble mountaineers in running. We lost in killed and wounded about 1100 men, a much larger proportion than usual in fighting the Spaniards, and which was owing to the nature of the ground which we were obliged to take from them. But we had done better than take prisoners; we had completely disorganized Blake's army. Its commander plunged into despair, deprived of his best generals, who were wounded or slain, had no longer an army around him. The Asturians had dispersed confusedly on the road to Santander. The wrecks of La Romana's troops of the line and those of Galicia escaped by Reinosa to the road to Leon. Another detachment fled by the Villarcayo road in the hope of not finding the French there. Most of them, having thrown away their muskets, ran across the country, with the resolution of not resuming arms. It is true that courage might return as speedily as it forsook them; but we had done, if not for ever, at least for a long time, with that army of Leon and Galicia, which was to have come by Mondragon to cut the line of operation of the French army.

Meanwhile, Marshal Lefebvre, having debouched on his part from the mountains into the plain by a different route from that which Marshal Victor had followed, had approached, at the noise of the musketry, to assist his colleague, from whom he received no communication. He had come in time to cover his left; but, seeing that his support was not necessary, he had taken the road to Villarcayo, which was recommended to him as the easiest for reaching Reinosa. By the way, he came up with a detachment of Blake's, which was retreating in that direction, ordered Sebastiani's division to charge and disperse it, took a great quantity of arms and wounded, besides a certain number of unhurt prisoners, and arrived in the evening of the 11th at Villarcayo.

Marshal Victor passed the remainder of the 11th and the whole of the 12th at Espinosa, as he could not lead any further soldiers who were exhausted by the marches which they had made in the mountains, whose shoes were worn out, almost all their cartridges spent, and the biscuit carried on their backs entirely consumed. Besides, there was little hope of overtaking the five or six thousand men left with General Blake, on account of their celerity in marching, and their promptness in dispersing and dissolving. It was for the French cavalry, already despatched to the plains of Castille, it was for Marshal Soult, if he did not arrive too late, to stop and to take them. General Blake arriving on the 12th at Reinosa, where all the depôts of the Spanish army were established, made no stay there, and endeavoured by a mountain track to reach the road to Leon.

Marshal Soult, having left Burgos on the

18th, and marched by Huermèze for Canduela, fell in with a fugitive band of 2000 men, escorting 42 carriages laden with muskets, a great quantity of baggage and wounded, left the business of destroying them to the dragoons, who made a very great carnage among that band, and went to pass the night midway to Reinosa. He entered the town the next day, and there found all the *matériel* of Blake's army, 35 pieces of cannon, 15,000 muskets, and a great quantity of provisions for war supplied by the English. He was there joined by Marshal Lefebvre, and, after concerting with him, took the road to Santander, with a view to go, agreeably to his orders, and effect the submission of the Asturias.

Napoleon, so difficult were the communications, was not informed till the night between the 13th and 14th of the decisive battle fought on the 11th at Espinosa with Blake's army. He had not doubted for a moment of success, but he began to perceive, and with great regret, that victory, always certain with the Spaniards, did not produce, owing to the difficulty of overtaking them, the results which were obtained with others. He was persuaded that Marshal Soult, if he arrived in time at Reinosa, would have nothing to do but to finish a dispersion nearly complete already, and to pick up a few prisoners. Nothing more was to be expected but from the swords of the cavalry. Napoleon, therefore, sent orders to General Milhaud to sweep with his dragoons all the roads of Old Castille, and enjoined all the other divisions of that arm to join General Milhaud, and to pursue in all directions, and to cut down without mercy, all the fugitives of Blake's army that they could come up with.

The left of the Spaniards being thus destroyed, it was necessary to think of falling upon their right, and treating this as that had been treated. Napoleon ordered Marshal Victor, after allowing the 1st corps to rest at Espinosa, and ascertaining that Marshal Soult would afterwards have nothing to do but with fugitives, to take the road to Burgos, and, in fulfilment of his first destination, to join the head-quarters. He directed Marshal Lefebvre, who was incessantly complaining that he was deficient in number, since he had left 2000 Germans at Bilbao, since he had no longer Villatte's division, and since the Poles had not yet arrived, to establish himself at Carrion with the nine or ten thousand infantry that he had left there, to rest himself, to collect his artillery and his stragglers, and thus form a link between Marshal Soult, who was going to scour the Asturias, the cavalry of General Milhaud, which was to sweep the plain of Castille, and head-quarters, where preparations were making for operating from Burgos upon Aranda. At Carrion, in fact, Marshal Lefebvre would be at nearly an equal distance from Reinosa, Leon, Valladolid, and Burgos. When Junot's corps should arrive to take his place on Marshal Soult's flanks, Napoleon purposed to bring him nearer to the Madrid road, either by Miranda or Segovia.

As he was to be soon joined by Marshal Victor, and should retain Marshal Lefebvre, to connect him with the corps of Marshal Soult, Napoleon had no further hesitation to part with Marshal Ney, that he might manœuvre

on the rear of Castafios. Remaining at Burgos with the guard only and part of the cavalry, he sent off the gallant marshal on the morning of the 14th, at the head of Marchand's and Dessolles' divisions, for Lerma and Aranda. His plan was, as soon as Marshal Ney had reached Aranda, to move him to the left upon Osma, Soria, and Agreda, which would place him on the rear of Castafios, whose headquarters were at Cintruenigo, between Calahorra and Tudela. Marshal Ney was to march upon Aranda without loss of time, but without precipitation, so as to arrive in good condition behind an immense curtain of cavalry, which was to extend into the plain, to the foot of the Guadarrama, a great chain of mountains in advance of Madrid, and separating Old from New Castille.

Napoleon recommended to Marshal Moncey not to make any movement upon the Ebro, to avoid giving umbrage to Castafios, but to hold himself in readiness to act on the first signal. He had collected at Logroño, as we have seen, that division of Ney's which had been left behind, late Bisson's division, now that of Lagrange. After returning its artillery to it, he had left it Colbert's light cavalry, formerly attached to the 6th corps, and joined to it General Dijon's brigade of dragoons. That division, completely collected at Logroño, where it had rested, had but a step to go to join Marshal Moncey, and would form with him a mass of 80,000 combatants, partly veteran troops, a mass quite sufficient to push Castafios and Palafox upon Ney, who would come to Soria, to place them between two fires, and to crush them. If this fine manœuvre proved successful, the entire corps of Castafios must be taken, that is to say, as far as it is possible to take a corps in Spain, where the soldiers always contrive to escape by deserting their ranks. But, in order to its success, it was requisite that Marshal Moncey, holding himself in readiness to act, should not act, and that Marshal Ney should so accelerate his march as to be upon the rear of Castafios before the latter should be aware of it. Napoleon, though he esteemed Marshal Moncey, did not sufficiently depend on the firmness of his character to intrust him with a high command. He had with him the illustrious Lannes, beginning to recover from a very dangerous fall from his horse, and he destined for him the command of all the troops collected on the Ebro. It was therefore between Lannes and Ney, between those two iron hands, that the Spanish army of the right was about to find itself grasped, and probably crushed. Before he gave his last orders, Napoleon waited till Marshal Ney, having left Burgos, should have reached Lerma and Aranda, whence he was enjoined to turn off to the right by the Soria road.

While Napoleon was displaying so much activity—for no sooner had he arrived at Vittoria, and satisfied himself respecting the incident of Villatte's division at Balmaseda, than he had sent off Marshal Soult to Burgos; no sooner was he master of Burgos, than he had dispatched that same marshal against Blake; no sooner was Blake destroyed than he threw Marshal Ney upon Castafios—while Napoleon, we say, was displaying so much activity, so



much manœuvring science, against armies which it was sufficient to attack in front in order to conquer, the central Junta of Aranjuez, and the court of generals, of demagogue royalists, around it, learned the destruction of the army of Blake and the Marquis of Belveder with extraordinary astonishment and emotion, as if these events were not to be foreseen. It did not absolutely imitate those cowardly soldiers, who, when running away, murder their officers, whom they accuse of treachery, (of which we shall soon see some new and atrocious examples,) but it obeyed a sentiment somewhat similar, in displacing without pity the vanquished generals. Amidst the habitual confusion of its counsels, it declared Blake, though the best of the officers of the army of Galicia, unworthy of the command, and it repaid his devotedness by stripping him of it. It pursued the same course towards the fortunate conqueror of Baylen, towards Castaños, the most intelligent of the Spanish generals, because he resisted all the silly proposals of the brothers Palafox. Certainly Castaños was not the boldest of the Spanish generals, but he had an enlightened sense of the situation, and thought that by advancing upon the Ebro they should reap nothing but disasters. Having perceived how strong the French were on the Ebro, though weak on the Guadalquivir, he desired that an attempt should be made to oppose to them, either in the southern provinces or in the maritime provinces, the obstacle of the climate, of distances, of British assistance; and he highly censured the war which he was obliged to wage with two divisions of Andalusia, tolerably good ones by-the-by, and an assemblage of untrained peasants and students, against the best armies in Europe. To all the plans of the central Junta, founded on the blindest presumption, he had perfectly reasonable objections to make, and this annoying censor, who pretended to be wiser than his fellow-citizens, had already lost his glory and their favour. It was said in the army, and repeated at Aranjuez, that the Spanish ranks contained a great number of traitors, and that Castaños was the one who most deserved to be narrowly watched. Letters intercepted by our advanced corps were full of these absurd notions.

Accordingly, the command was taken at once from Generals Blake and Castaños, and given to a single individual, to the fortunate favourite of Spanish mob-rule, to the Marquis de la Romana, the runaway from Denmark. A single command would have been an excellent institution had there been a Spanish officer competent to that part, and at any rate, in the then state of the insurgent armies, Castaños would have been the only one to attempt it. But a jealousy had been excited against him on account of Baylen—he was detested for his good sense; and the eccentric Marquis of La Romana, forming every day extravagant plans, pleasing by a sort of romantic enthusiasm, recommended by an escape which had something marvellous, agreeable to all the envious because he had not yet won any victory, a stranger to all animosities because he had lived at a distance—the Marquis of La Romana was elected commander of the armies both of Blake and Castaños. It was, however, an utter impos-

sibility to assume both these commands, because he would have been obliged, by the longest and the most arduous of marches, across mountains covered with snow, to retreat to Leon, with seven or eight thousand fugitives, whom he hoped to rally, and to increase to fifteen or twenty thousand. Being at Leon, more than one hundred leagues from Tudela, he would be incapable of commanding the centre and the right. Castaños, meanwhile, was to retain the command. Thomas de Morla, the perfidious and arrogant Captain-general of Cadix, of whom the French had so much reason to complain after Baylen, had been appointed director of military affairs with the Junta. He was called to introduce harmony among the Spanish generals, and especially between the Spanish generals and the English, who were about to enter into line.

Napoleon, having spent the 15th, 16th, and 17th of November in collecting information concerning his different corps, and certain, from this information, that Marshal Soult had entered Santander without difficulty, that Marshal Lefebvre had established himself at Carrion, that Marshal Victor was on march for Burgos, and, lastly, that Marshal Ney had just arrived at Aranda, behind the curtain of French cavalry—Napoleon gave orders to the latter to leave Aranda on the 18th, and to proceed to San Estevan, and from San Estevan to Almazan. He enjoined him, when once arrived there, to have an eye and an ear upon Soria and Calatayud, to learn if Castaños was falling back; and, if it was upon the road from Pampluna to Madrid, which passes through Soria, or that from Saragossa to Madrid, which passes through Calatayud, he was to place himself so as to be on the 22d or the 23d on the rear of the Spanish army; Lannes, with 80,000 men, was to push it violently, as he was accustomed to push an enemy, in one or the other of these directions. Considering places and circumstances, these instructions were as precise as possible. On the same day Napoleon sent off Lannes, who could scarcely sit his horse, with orders to proceed to Logroño, there to unite the infantry division of Lagrange and the cavalry of Generals Colbert and Dijon with the troops of Marshal Moncey, to throw himself with 24,000 foot, 2000 artillerymen, 4000 horse, upon Castaños and Palafox, and to thrust them back upon the bayonets of Marshal Ney.

The two marshals immediately set about the execution of the movement prescribed to them. Marshal Ney, leaving Aranda on the 19th, arrived in the evening of the same day at San Estevan, and on the 20th at Berlanga. If he had always found it difficult to obtain intelligence on a march in Spain, that difficulty was increased on leaving the high road of Madrid and penetrating into the mountainous country of Soria, across that chain which rises immediately between the Pyrenees and the Guadarrama. He was forced to go to the back of these mountains, in order to fall upon the Ebro and to seize Castaños in rear. On advancing into this less frequented tract, where of course the ancient manners of Spain prevailed in greater force, Marshal Ney was fated to meet with a population more hostile, less communicative, and to be exposed more than anywhere else to false intelligence. The inhabitants fled

at his approach, and left the French army to live upon what it could get, without thinking of staying on the spot, to diminish damage by supplying it with what it needed. Those who did remain spoke with emphasis of the armies Castaños and Palafox, which some represented as amounting to sixty, others to eighty thousand men. Each of these accounts assigned to them different head-quarters. Nobody could tell whether Castaños was retiring upon Madrid, or whether, in case of his retiring upon that capital, he would pass through Soria or Calatayud. Napoleon, in his instructions, had admitted one or the other hypothesis as possible, and Marshal Ney found himself under great uncertainty. With Marchand's and Desnoes' divisions he numbered scarcely thirteen or fourteen thousand men, and, intrepid as he was, and having at Guttstädt made head against 60,000 Russians with 15,000 French, he first asked himself whether he was upon the real track of Castaños' retreat; and secondly, if it was not to be feared that Castaños and Palafox, falling back before they were beaten, might appear before him with sixty or eighty thousand men, which would render his position serious. He marched, therefore, with cautious steps, observing, listening to every thing around him, and applying to head-quarters for information which he could not obtain on the spot. On the 21st, he was at Soria with one of his divisions, waiting till next day for the second, which he had directed to make a circuit to the right, in order to obtain intelligence from Calatayud. This intrepid marshal hesitated for the first time in his life, surprised, embarrassed at the diverse reports which he picked up in this country of ignorance, exaggeration, and adventures. Meanwhile, time pressed, for it was on the 22d or the 23d that the French troops on the Ebro were to be engaged with Castaños and Palafox.

Marshal Lannes, on his part, having mounted on horseback before he was completely recovered, had left Burgos on the 19th, and was at Logroño in the evening of the same day. He had ordered Lagrange's division, General Colbert's cavalry, and General Dijon's brigade of dragoons, to employ the 20th in concentrating themselves around Logroño, to cross the Ebro on the morning of the 21st, and to descend along the right bank of that river, till opposite to Lodosa, where Marshal Moncey was to debouch. Setting out again on the 20th for Lodosa, he had seen Marshal Moncey, who was temporarily placed under his orders, and had enjoined him to hold himself in readiness to cross the bridge of Lodosa in the evening of the 21st, in order to effect his junction with the troops of General Lagrange.

The instructions of Marshal Lannes were punctually executed, and, in the evening of the 21st, General Lagrange, having descended the right bank of the Ebro, arrived before Lodosa, whence the corps of Marshal Moncey was debouching. There was a total mass of twenty-eight or twenty-nine thousand men, infantry and cavalry. Marshal Lannes had placed under the command of the brave Lefebvre-Desnoettes all his cavalry, composed of Polish lancers, provisional cuirassiers, and dragoons, and light horse, which General Colbert had brought, and old dragoons brought from the extremity of

Germany by General Dijon. The infantry was composed of Lagrange's division, late Bisson's division, young troops of Marshal Moncey's corps, to which had been subsequently joined the 14th and 44th of the line, as well as the legions of the Vistula. The young soldiers had become almost worthy of the old, excepting that they were deficient of good officers, like all corps of recent creation, the skeletons of which have been formed with retired officers. Lannes made them all bivouac, in order to start the next morning. Every soldier had bread for four days in his knapsack.

Accordingly, next day, the 22d of November, the troops set out, descending the right bank of the Ebro towards Calahorra. Lannes marched at the head with Lefebvre-Desnoettes, followed by the Polish lancers, who had rendered themselves the terror of the Spaniards. On coming in sight of Calahorra, they perceived the Spaniards retiring upon Alfaro and Tudela, where they naturally expected to find them in position on the following day. Lannes hastened the pace of the troops, and went to pass the night at Alfaro. It was impossible to proceed further that day. For the rest, if they started from Alfaro next morning by day-break, they might reach Tudela early enough for a battle. The divisions of Maurice Mathieu, Musnier, and Grandjean, kept along the left of the Ebro. Morlot's and Lagrange's divisions followed the right bank, and passed the night at Coralla. In this march the cavalry preceded the infantry.

Next day, the 23d, Lannes gave orders for starting at three in the morning for Tudela. With a view to lose no time, he set off at a gallop with Lefebvre and the Polish lancers, being desirous to arrive before the troops, and to reconnoitre the position, in case the enemy should be waiting to fight.

The Spanish generals had been long disputing about the best course to be pursued, Palafox being desirous to act offensively in Navarre, Castaños, on the contrary, unwilling to cross the Ebro, and going so far as to say that it would be better to fall back ever so far into Spain, and to avoid general engagements with the French. Amidst this controversy they had been surprised by the presence of Lannes, and forced to accept battle by the outcry of the Spanish populace, who called them traitors. Things were in such a state that the Aragonese, under O'Neil, had not yet recrossed the Ebro at Tudela on the morning of the 23d, and that, between the left wing, formed by them, and the extremity of the right wing, formed by the Andalusians, there was a distance of nearly three leagues. Castaños hastened to range both in order of battle on the heights which rise in advance of Tudela, and which, gradually subsiding, extend to the environs of Cascante, amidst spacious plains of olive plantations.

Lannes, having come facing this position, perceived on his left, upon the heights preceding Tudela, and near the Ebro, a large mass of Spaniards. These were precisely the Aragonese, finishing their passage, and covered by a numerous artillery. In the centre he discovered, on somewhat less elevated heights, and protected by an olive wood, another mass: these were the Valencians, the Murcians, and the Castilians. Further to the right, but at a

very great distance towards Cascante, was discernible a third assemblage: these were the divisions of Andalusia, under La Peña and Grimarest, which had not yet come into line. The whole might amount to 40,000 men.

Lannes immediately resolved to storm the heights on the left, and, when he should have nearly accomplished this, to break the centre of the enemy, then to fall upon that portion of the Spanish army which was perceived on the right towards Cascante, and against which he purposed to direct his rear-guard, formed by Lagrange's division, which had been left at some distance behind.

He despatched forthwith Maurice Mathieu's division, one of the best composed and best commanded, to the heights on the left, appuyed on the Ebro, and kept in reserve Musnier's, Morlot's, and Grandjean's divisions, to act against the centre at the proper time. The cavalry was deployed in the plain, one part facing the right, for the purpose of keeping the enemy in check towards Cascante, and to give Lagrange's division time to rejoin.

Generals Maurice Mathieu and Habert, preceded by a battalion of tirailleurs, advanced at the head of a regiment of the Vistula and of the 14th of the line, an old Eylau regiment, for which battles with the Spaniards were not formidable affairs. Lannes had given orders not to be prodigal of musketry fire against an enemy superior in number and advantageously posted. Accordingly, when the tirailleurs had made the Spaniards upon the heights on the left fall back, Generals Maurice Mathieu and Habert formed into columns of attack, and began to climb the acclivity. The Aragonese, more brave, more enthusiastic, than the rest of the nation, and more committed by their anterior demonstrations, were obliged to stand their ground, and most obstinately did they maintain it. After making good use of their artillery against the French, they disputed with them one hillock after another, and killed a considerable number of their men. But Maurice Mathieu's division, vigorously supported, compelled them, after a fight of two hours, to fall back upon Tudela. As soon as Lannes perceived that the issue of the combat in this quarter was not doubtful, he despatched Morlot's division, which had just arrived, to support Grandjean's division, and pushed both of them upon the centre of the Spaniards, composed, as we have said of Valencians, Murcians, and Castilians. The obstacles of the ground, which were numerous, presented more than one difficulty for Morlot's division to overcome. Filled with young and ardent troops, they surmounted them with the loss, it is true, of three or four hundred men, and drove back the Spaniards upon Tudela, into which Maurice Mathieu, on his part, was ordered to penetrate.

A general rout ensued; for the Spaniards, precipitated by Maurice Mathieu's and Morlot's divisions from the heights that surround Tudela upon the town itself, and into an extensive plain of olive plantations situated beyond it, fled in tremendous confusion, leaving many dead and wounded, a greater number of prisoners than usual, all their artillery, and an immense quantity of stores and baggage-wagons.

It was now three in the afternoon. Lannes

ordered Marshal Moncey to pursue them upon the Saragossa road, with Maurice Mathieu's, Morlot's, and Grandjean's divisions, Colbert's light cavalry, and the Polish lancers, under the command of General Lefebvre-Desnoettes. This cavalry, passing through the gap in the centre, entered Tudela and Cascante, and dashed at a gallop upon the fugitives, by all the beaten tracks through the olive-plantations that surround Saragossa. Lannes remained, with Musnier's division and the dragoons, to make head against the left of the Spaniards, composed of La Peña's troops, who were seen in the distance towards Cascante.

Castafios, hurried away in the rout, could not rejoin his left. La Peña was there alone, with a formidable mass of infantry, that which had taken Dupont in rear at Baylen, and which had all the pride of that day, without having the merit of it. La Peña led it in line from Cascante towards Tudela, into a plain where the cavalry could deploy. Lannes let slip upon it the dragoons of Dijon's brigade, which by several repeated charges kept it in check, while waiting for Lagrange's division, which had not yet come into action. It arrived at length, at a very advanced hour. General Lagrange, placing it in *echellons* very close to one another, proceeded immediately to the attack of Cascante. He led himself the 25th light, forming the first *echelon*. These were old Friedland regiments, which considered it as no difficulty to have to deal with the pretended conquerors of Baylen. The 25th marched with bayonets fixed upon Cascante, overthrew La Peña's division, and hurled it back upon Borja, to the right of the Saragossa road. General Lagrange, charging at the head of his division, received a ball in the arm.

Night put an end to the battle, which, on the right as on the left, exhibited but one immense rout. The Aragonese were thrown back upon Saragossa, and the Andalusians upon Borja, and from Borja upon the Calatayud road. The retreat could not but be divergent, even if the sentiments of the generals had not disposed them to separate after a common disaster. This day put into our hands about forty pieces of cannon, three thousand prisoners, almost all wounded, because the cavalry had no means of stopping them but by cutting them down, besides two thousand dead or dying left on the field of battle. The dispersion here, as at Espinosa, was, after all, the principal result. The following days gave us a great many more prisoners, taken, like the others, by the swords of our horse.

On the following morning Lannes was unable to bear the fatigue of riding, from having exposed himself to it too soon. He charged Marshal Moncey to continue the pursuit of the Aragonese upon Saragossa, with Maurice Mathieu's, Morlot's, and Grandjean's divisions, and part of the cavalry. He consigned Lagrange's division, whose commander had been wounded, to the brave Maurice Mathieu, added to it Musnier's division, the dragoons, and the Polish lancers, and ordered these troops, placed under the chief command of General Maurice Mathieu, to pursue Castafios, with the sword at his loins, upon Calatayud and Sigüenza, on the road from Saragossa to Madrid. He hoped though he had not heard any thing of the

march of Marshal Ney, that the Andalusians might meet with him on their way, and have to atone under his strokes for the day of Baylen.

Unfortunately, amidst the uncertainty in which he was, Marshal Ney, not knowing by which road to advance, that of Soria to Tudela, or that of Soria to Calatayud, awaiting ulterior orders from head-quarters, which orders did not arrive, had passed not only the 22d at Soria, for the purpose of rallying his two divisions, but also the 23d and 24th, looking for

intelligence; and it was not till the 25th that he decided to march for Agreda, at which point he would be but a day's march from Cascante. Had he only started on the morning of the 23d, he might have been by evening, or the next day, on the rear of Castaños. But the instructions of the head-quarters, though very clear, had left the marshal too much latitude. The last particulars collected at Soria respecting the force of Castaños had thrown him into a real perplexity of mind. He had been told

"Respecting this important fact in the career of the illustrious marshal, we here quote several letters from the head-quarters, which prove how highly Napoleon valued this great officer, and what he thought of the motives for his hesitation. We shall there see, in the first place, that the instructions were very clear, very positive; the dates were specified with great precision; that, if there was at first some uncertainty respecting the two roads of Soria and Calatayud, on the 21st all uncertainty had ceased at the head-quarters, and that Agreda, on the Soria road, was indicated. It was evidently nothing but the false reports picked up at Soria that caused Marshal Ney to hesitate. Besides, a better opinion may be formed on this important fact from the original documents. We shall add that, as for the reproach addressed to Marshal Ney, that he lost time from jealousy of Marshal Lannes, there is not the slightest foundation for such a reproach, though it has often been deserved in Spain by our generals. The better part of the triumph would have fallen to the share of Marshal Ney if he had succeeded, for it was he who would have taken Castaños. The real cause is that which Napoleon himself assigned for the conduct of the marshal, and which I have pointed out in my narrative. One may refer to such a judge as Napoleon, especially when his opinion was not formed under the influence of ill-humour; for, besides his infallibility in this matter, he had the advantage of being close to the events, he knew all the facts, and did not suffer himself to be biased by any consideration. At any rate, here are the documents, hitherto unpublished: the reader, when he has perused them, will decide for himself:—

*The major-general to Marshal Ney, at Aranda.*

"Burgos, November 18, 1808—noon.

"The Emperor orders you to set out to-morrow, before light, with your two divisions, the whole of your artillery, the 25th regiment of horse chasseurs, and General Beaumont's brigade of cavalry, which Marshal Bessières will place at your disposal, and to proceed for San Estevan de Guzman, and thence to Almazan or Soria, at your option, according to the intelligence which you shall receive. You will intercept at Almazan the road from Madrid to Pamplona, and you will then find yourself on the rear of General Castaños. On your route, and particularly at Almazan, you shall have the most precise information. If you learn either that General Castaños has retreated upon Madrid, or that he has retired from Calahorra or from Alfaro, and that his line of communication with Madrid was that from Saragossa by Calatayud or Daroca, your expedition would then have for its first object the subjection of the town of Soria, which it is important to reduce before marching further. To this end you will proceed to that town; you will disarm it and blow up the old walls; you will cause the insurrectionary committees to be seized; you will form a government of the most respectable men; and you will tell the town to send a deputation to the king. You will put yourself in communication with Marshal Lannes, who is marching with Lagrange's division, Colbert's brigade, and the whole corps of Marshal Moncey, upon Calahorra, Alfaro, and Tudela. Marshal Lannes will proceed for Lodoso on the 21st; he will be there on the 22d, and join Marshal Moncey's corps. You, Monsieur le duc, will be in the evening of the 21st at Almazan, and on the 22d at Soria. The Emperor will be on the 21st at Aranda. Thus, on the 22d, the left will be at Calahorra, the centre, which you form, will be at Almazan or Soria, the right upon Aranda."

*The major-general to Marshal Ney, at Almazan.*

"Burgos, November 21, 1808—4 P. M.

"On the 23d Marshals Lannes and Moncey attack the enemy at Calahorra; you are, therefore, to continue your movement upon Agreda, to get upon the flanks of the enemy, and to form your junction with Marshal Lannes, if this is necessary."

*The major-general to Marshal Ney, by Agreda.*

"Aranda, November 27, 1808—10 morning.

"It appears that, after the battle of Tudela, the army of Aragon retired into Saragossa, and that the army of Castaños retreated upon Tarazona, and if you had been at Agreda on the 23d it would have been taken.

"His majesty desires me to repeat the order to pursue Castaños—do not leave him, but pursue him with the bayonet at his loins. No rest till your army has got hold of a piece of the army of Castaños."

"Listen not to the reports of the country. It was said that at Tudela there were upwards of 80,000 men; and there were not more than 40,000, including the peasants, and they ran away as soon as our troops marched towards them, leaving behind colours and cannon. This rabble is not made to withstand you, and nothing in Spain can resist your two divisions when you are at their head. Do not, then, leave Castaños, and get your share of him."

*The major-general to Marshal Ney, by Agreda.*

"Aranda, November 23, 1808—7 evening.

"The Emperor desires me to give you orders to pursue Castaños with the sword at his loins. If he proceeds towards Madrid, you will follow him. Be incessantly at his heels. The Emperor goes to-morrow to Somosierra, and his intention is to have Castaños cut off, if possible, towards Guadalaxara. But it is essential that you, Monsieur le maréchal, that you should pursue him, and not let him throw himself upon the French corps marching to Madrid, and which might have at the same time to defend itself against the efforts of the English, who, according to accounts, are setting themselves in motion. The Emperor's head-quarters will be to-morrow at Boecuilas, and the day after at Buytrago. Thus, Monsieur le duc, the object which you have to accomplish is neither the defence, nor the conquest, nor the occupation of a territory, but to follow, to attack, and to fight the army of Castaños, particularly if it should proceed for Madrid."

*The major-general to Marshal Ney, at Guadalaxara.*

"Chamartin, December 8, 1808.

"The English are running away as fast as their legs can carry them; but we have been here for a moment in a serious situation. It is a fault to have come hither too late; it is also a fault not to have followed the spirit of your first instructions: they informed you that Marshal Lannes was to attack the enemy on the 23d, that you were destined to cut off and pursue Castaños, and consequently to proceed rapidly upon Agreda, instead of stopping two days, as you have done, in pure waste, at Soria."

"His majesty does not approve of your having mingled your corps with that of Marshal Moncey; you ought to pursue Castaños, and leave the Duke de Conegliano to besiege Saragossa. The Emperor cannot conceive why, when you left Saragossa on the 2d, you did not leave Dessoles' division with Marshal Moncey, thereby exposing him to the necessity of making a retrograde movement. However, what is past is past: his majesty is too well acquainted with your zeal to be angry with you; he will even put it in your power to repair all this. The Emperor has hesitated to give orders to Dessoles' division and the Poles to return to Saragossa, in order to spare his troops fatigue. His majesty has preferred making alterations in his ulterior plans. He has just ordered Marshal Mortier to proceed to Saragossa."

*The Emperor to Marshal Lannes.*

"Aranda, November 27, 1808.

"Your aide-de-camp arrived on the 26th, at 8 in the morning, and informed me of the brilliant affair of Tudela. I congratulate you upon it. Marshal Ney has not fulfilled my object on this occasion. Arriving at noon on the 22d at Soria, he ought, according to the orders which he had received, to have been early on the 23d at Agreda. But, having suffered himself to be imposed upon by the insubstantials and giving credit to the heap of absurdities which they circulated, believing upon their word that there were 80,000 troops of the line there, &c., he was fearful of compromising himself, and remained on the 23d and 24th at Soria. I gave him orders to set out immediately and to fear nothing. He ought to have been at Agreda on the 25th. He had heard your cannonade on the 23d and 24th, and he thought that you had been beaten, without reason, and without any reasonable indication. I have since given him orders to pursue Castaños with the sword at his loins. I am engaged in recalling Marshal Victor's corps, which I had sent towards Aragon, in order to be as length able to march for Madrid."

that Castaños had 80,000 men, that Lannes himself had been beaten, and, imposed upon by such-like reports, the daring marshal had this time been fearful of being too rash. On the 25th of November, after passing the 28d and 24th at Soria, he had marched, on repeated intimations from head-quarters, had arrived in the evening of the 26th at Agreda, on the 28th at Tarazona, where he at length learned, with great regret, the error into which he had fallen, and the lost occasion for immense results. What had then happened to him had happened to all our generals, who suffered themselves to be deceived by the exaggerations of the Spaniards, exaggerations against which Napoleon strove in vain to put them on their guard, by repeating to them that the troops of the insurrection were mere *canaille*, which ought to be trampled down. Of this he himself, a few days afterwards, set a memorable example.

Marshal Ney effected his junction with Marshal Moncey, who was much weakened by the departure of Lagrange's and Musnier's divisions, sent in pursuit of Castaños. Marshal Ney, desirous of at least rendering his presence useful on the spot, agreed with Marshal Moncey to assist him in the investment of Saragossa, in which the brothers Palafox and the Aragonese fugitives had shut themselves up. Meanwhile General Maurice Mathieu was pushing with equal rapidity and vigour the wrecks of Castaños, retreating in disorder upon Calatayud. Lannes remained ill at Tudela, but offered Napoleon to mount his horse again even before he was recovered, if it were necessary to make head in any quarter against the English, and to throw them into the sea. Would to heaven, indeed, that Napoleon had consigned to such an officer the duty of pursuing those formidable enemies of the Empire!

It was not till the 26th, again owing to the difficulty of communications, that Napoleon received the news of the vigorous conduct of Lannes at Tudela, of the dispersion of the Spanish armies of the centre and the right, and of the non-execution of the movement prescribed to Marshal Ney. Regarding that marshal as one of the first military officers of his time, he attributed his error solely to the false ideas which the French generals formed of Spain and of the Spaniards; and though the fine manœuvre which he had ordered from Soria had miscarried, he nevertheless considered the regular armies of Spain as annihilated, and the Madrid road as henceforth open to him. In fact, the Aragonese, under Palafox, were barely capable of defending Saragossa. The Andalusians, conducted by Castaños, were retreating, to the number of eight or nine thousand, upon Calatayud, and could do nothing more than augment the garrison of Madrid, by falling back upon that capital by way of Sigüenza and Guadalaxara, if they were allowed time. The Marquis of La Romana, with six or seven thousand fugitives, destitute of every thing, was laboriously gaining the kingdom of Leon, across the snow-covered mountains. Lastly, on the Madrid road itself was left nothing but wrecks of the army of Estremadura, already so roughly handled in advance of Burgos.

There was but one obstacle that could have stopped Napoleon—that was the English army,

of which he had only the most vague and uncertain accounts. But that army itself was not yet in a state to undertake any thing. Sir John Moore, conducting his two principal columns of infantry across the north of Portugal, had arrived at Salamanca with thirteen or fourteen thousand infantry, worn out by the long march which they had performed, and by privations to which English soldiers were not at all accustomed. General Moore had not with him either a horse or a cannon, his cavalry and his artillery having taken the route from Badajoz to Talavera, under the escort of a division of infantry. Lastly, Sir David Baird, landing at Coruña with eleven or twelve thousand men, advanced timidly towards Astorga, being yet 60 or 70 leagues from his commander-in-chief. These three columns knew not how they were to contrive to form a junction, and in their separate state were neither capable nor desirous of entering into action. They found themselves by no means encouraged by what they beheld around them; for, instead of receiving them with enthusiasm, the Spaniards of Old Castille, terrified at the defeat of Blake, and submitting to a mere squadron of French cavalry, received them coldly, and would not furnish them with any thing but in exchange for gold sovereigns or silver piastres, delivered at the same time as the supplies themselves. Such was the account given by the discreet Moore to his government, to undeceive it in respect to the Spanish insurrection, and to prove to it that the English army was engaged in a very perilous adventure.

Napoleon was ignorant of these circumstances; he knew only that the English were coming through Portugal and Galicia; but he persisted in his plan of drawing them into the interior of the Peninsula, in order to envelop them by means of some great manœuvre, while Marshal Soult and General Junot left upon the rear, were to keep them in check in front. For acting in this manner, Madrid, whence one might operate by the right on Portugal or Galicia, became the best centre of operation, and this was a new motive for marching thither without delay. Napoleon gave orders in consequence, as soon as he was acquainted with the affair of Tudela.

In the first place, he directed Marshal Ney, whom he wished to have at hand, for the purpose of employing him on difficult occasions, particularly against the English, to relinquish the investment of Saragossa, to march upon Madrid by the same route as Castaños, to pursue him to the last extremity, and until he had not a man left. He enjoined General Maurice Mathieu, who was pursuing Castaños with part of Marshal Moncey's troops, to stop, to return to Marshal Moncey the troops belonging to him, that the latter might resume the operations of the siege of Saragossa with all his divisions. He again urged General St. Cyr, charged with the war in Catalonia, to accelerate the operations that were to conduct him to Barcelona, and lead to the raising of the blockade of that great city. Having made these dispositions on his left, Napoleon sent the following instructions upon his right.

Marshal Lefebvre, posted at Carrion, to connect the centre of the French army with Marshal Soult, to whom had been assigned the task

of reducing the Asturias, was to follow the general movement upon Madrid, and to proceed, with Milhaud's dragoons, upon Valladolid and Segovia, in order to cover the right of the headquarters. General Junot, whose first division was approaching, was to hasten his march, for the purpose of taking Marshal Lefebvre's place on the southern slope of the mountains of the Asturias, where Marshal Soult would soon appear again, after reducing the Asturias themselves. These two corps, one of which, under under Bessières, had formerly conquered Old Castille, the other of which, under Junot, had formerly conquered Portugal, united under Marshal Soult to meet the English first in Old Castille and then in Portugal, according to the operations that one might be led to direct against them. Lastly, the head of the 5th corps, the last that left Germany, having begun to make its appearance at Bayonne, Napoleon ordered Marshal Mortier, its commander, to come to Burgos, and take the place that was about to become vacant on the transfer of the headquarters to Madrid.

Having thus regulated every thing on his wings and his rear, Napoleon marched direct for Madrid. He had with him only Marshal Victor's corps, the imperial guard, and part of the reserve cavalry, that is, much less than 40,000 men. These were more than he needed to meet any enemy whom he had to conquer, before he opened for himself the capital of Spain.

Having first moved Marshal Victor to the left of the Madrid road, in order to support the rear of Marshal Ney, he brought him back by Ayllon and Riaza upon that road to the very point where it begins to rise for the purpose of crossing the Guadarrama. He had already sent Lasalle, with the light cavalry, to the foot of the Guadarrama. He sent thither, besides, Lahoussaye's and Latour Maubourg's dragoons. Lastly, he despatched to the same quarter the guard, the fusiliers of which, under General Savary, who had been accustomed to command them in Poland, advanced to Bocequillas, to observe the relics of the Marquis de Belveder, which had taken refuge between Sepulveda and Segovia. On the 23d he set out himself from Burgos for Aranda.

After the rout of Burgos, the capital found itself uncovered; but the Junta of Aranjuez, not yet imagining, in its presumptuous ignorance, that Napoleon could soon march thither, had merely despatched what forces were left disposable at Madrid to the gorges of the Guadarrama. There had thus been collected on the summit of the Guadarrama, towards the narrow pass leading from one slope to the other, the wrecks of the army of Estremadura, and such men belonging to the divisions of Andalusia as had remained at Madrid. This was a force of about twelve or thirteen thousand men, placed under the command of an able and valiant officer, Don Benito San-Juan. He had established an advanced guard of 8000 men beyond the Guadarrama, at the very foot of that slope which we should have to ascend, and a little to our right, and then distributed the nine thousand others at the pass of Somo-Sierra, at the bottom of the gorge which we had to go through. One part of his force, posted on the right and left of the road, which rose forming numerous windings, was to stop our soldiers by

a double fire of musketry. The others barred the causeway itself, near the most difficult part of the pass, with 16 pieces of cannon in battery. The obstacle might be considered as one of the most serious that one is liable to meet with in war. The Spaniards imagined themselves invincible in the position of Somo-Sierra; and the Junta itself relied so much on the resistance which had been prepared there as not to leave Aranjuez. It hoped, moreover, that Castaños, whom it would not believe to be destroyed, would have time to come by the Guadalupe road to place himself behind the Guadarrama, between Somo-Sierra and Madrid, and that the English, making a corresponding movement to that of Castaños, would press forward, some by Avila, the others by Talavera, to cover the capital of Spain. We have already seen what foundation there was for such hopes.

The orders issued on the 26th for the march to Madrid being completely executed on the 29th, Napoleon himself proceeded on the 29th to the foot of the Guadarrama, and established his headquarters at Bocequillas. General Savary had pushed a reconnaissance upon Sepulveda, not to disperse the corps which was there, but to learn its force and its intention. After taking some prisoners, he had retired, having no orders to advance further. The Spaniards, surprised at keeping their ground, had sent news to Madrid of a considerable advantage gained over the imperial guard.

Napoleon, having arrived at Bocequillas at noon on the 29th, mounted a horse, entered the gorge of Somo-Sierra, reconnoitred it with his own eyes, and decided on all his dispositions for the following morning. He ordered Lapisse's division to proceed to the right of the causeway, in order to storm at daybreak the post of Sepulveda, and Ruffin's division to set out at the same moment, to climb the acclivity of the Guadarrama, to the very pass of Somo-Sierra. The 9th light was to follow from height to height the right brink of the chasx, and the 24th of the line the left brink, so as to annul the defences established on the two flanks of the road. The 96th was to march in column upon the road itself. Then were to come the cavalry of the guard, and Napoleon with his staff. The fusiliers of the guard were directed to support this movement.

At this period of the year, though the weather had become superb, there was yet no sun, excepting in the middle of the day. From six to nine in the morning a thick fog covered the country, especially the mountainous part of it; then, after that hour, a bright sun gave the army real spring days. Napoleon, in ordering Sepulveda to be attacked at six in the morning, reckoned upon making himself master of that accessory position by nine, the moment when the column marching towards Somo-Sierra would have reached the summit of the pass. Thanks to the fog, then, it was to arrive there unperceived, and to commence firing from the top of the mountain when the fire at the foot was over.

Next day, the 30th, the column sent against Sepulveda had scarcely time to show itself. The three thousand men placed for its defence fled in disorder, and ran off towards Segovia, to join the other fugitives under the Marquis de Belveder.

The column climbing the acclivities of Somo-Sierra arrived unperceived very near to the point which the enemy occupied in force. The fog clearing off all at once, the Spaniards were not a little surprised to find themselves attacked from the heights on the right and on the left, by the 9th light and the 24th of the line. Dislodged from post to post, they defended themselves but feebly on both margins of the chasm. But the main body of the assemblage was on the road itself, behind sixteen pieces of artillery, which opened a destructive fire on the column that followed the causeway. Napoleon, wishing to teach his soldiers that, with the Spaniards, they must not consider danger, but drive over them wherever they found them, ordered the cavalry of the guard to take at a gallop all that was before it. A brilliant cavalry officer, General Montbrun, advanced at the head of the Polish light horse, a young troop of *élite*, which Napoleon had formed at Warsaw, that he might have all nations and all costumes in his guard. General Montbrun, with those gallant young soldiers, dashed at a gallop upon the sixteen pieces of cannon of the Spaniards, in defiance of a horrible fire of musketry and grape. The first squadron received a discharge which threw it into disorder, sweeping down thirty or forty men in the rank. But the squadrons which followed, passing beyond the wounded, reached the pieces, cut down the gunners, and took all the cannon. The rest of the cavalry started off in pursuit of the Spaniards beyond the pass, and descended with them the back of the Guadarrama. The brave San-Juan, covered with blood, having received several wounds, strove in vain to stop his soldiers. There was, as at Espinosa, at Tudela, a frightful rout. Colours, artillery, two hundred wagons with stores, and almost all the officers, were left in our hands. The soldiers dispersed on the right and left in the mountains, and made off more particularly to the right, in order to reach Segovia.

In the evening all the cavalry was at Buytrago, with the head-quarters. It was the French who informed the Spaniards of the disaster of what was called the army of Somo-Sierra. Napoleon was delighted to have proved to his generals what the Spanish insurgents were, what his soldiers were, and in what estimation both were to be held, and to have overcome an obstacle which some had seemed to think extremely formidable. The Poles had about fifty men killed or wounded at the pieces. Napoleon loaded them with rewards, and included in the distribution of his favours M. Philippe de Segur, who had received several shot-wounds in this charge; and he destined him to carry to the Legislative Body the colours taken at Burgos and Somo-Sierra.

Napoleon hastened to spread his cavalry from Buytrago to the very gates of Madrid, and to proceed thither in person, to endeavour to take that great capital by a mixture of persuasion and force, wishing to spare it the horrors of a capture by assault. Luckily, it was not in a state to defend itself; and, besides, the tumult which prevailed there would have rendered defence impossible, even though it had had walls capable of resisting the formidable foe by whom it was threatened.

On the news of the taking of Somo-Sierra,

the silly presumption of the Spaniards suddenly vanished, and the Junta had hastily left Aranjuez for Badajoz. On retiring, it had proclaimed its resolution to go and prepare in the south of the Peninsula means of resistance, the power of which Baylen, it alleged, had plainly revealed. But it was not the less determined to dispute Madrid with the conqueror of the West. The violent and anarchical part of the population would have it so, and talked of putting to death any one who should propose to capitulate. Thomas de Morla and the Marquis de Castellar had been charged with the defence, in concert with a Junta which met at the Post-office, and in which men of all sorts had seats. There were left at Madrid three or four thousand troops of the line, of very indifferent quality; but, to this garrison was added a frantic population both of the city and the country, which had demanded and obtained arms, useless in its hands for saving the capital, and formidable to honest men only. Some furious persons, having fancied that they discovered in the cartridges served out to them a blackish dust, which they declared to be sand and not powder, had laid the blame on the Marquis de Peralès, Corregidor of Madrid, a personage long a favourite with the multitude, because, in the gratification of his licentious taste, he had publicly made it his business to seek out the handsomest women of the lower class. One of these, deserted by him, having accused him of preparing this adulterated ammunition, and of being concerned in a plot against the safety of Madrid, the band of cut-throats seized the unfortunate man and murdered him, as they had murdered so many others since the fatal revolution of Aranjuez, and then dragged his body about the streets. After affording themselves this satisfaction, the barbarous rulers of Madrid made some hasty preparations for defence, under the direction of professional men. Madrid is not fortified: it is, as Paris was some years ago, before the construction of the immense works which have rendered it invincible, surrounded by a mere wall, neither bastioned nor terraced. Battlements were formed on this wall; the gates were barricaded, and cannon placed at them. These precautions were taken more particularly at the Alcala and Atocha gates, leading to the high road by which the French would come. Behind the gates were cut entrenchments; barricades were raised in the corresponding streets, that, the first resistance being overcome, there might be another left to conquer.

Opposite to the Alcala and Atocha gates rise, on commanding ground facing Madrid, the palace and park of Buen Retiro, separated from Madrid by the famous promenade of the Prado. The wall enclosing the Retiro was battlemented; several mounds of earth were thrown up, cannon were dragged to them; a fanatic multitude, capable of ravaging, but not of defending it, was placed there by way of garrison. The women, uniting their efforts with those of the men, set about unpaving the streets and carrying the stones to the roofs of the houses, to be thrown down upon the assailants. The bells were rung day and night, to keep the population astir. The Duke de

l'Infantado had been secretly sent off from Madrid, to seek the army of Castaños, and bring it back to the city.

In all this agitation there were no very serious means of opposing Napoleon. He arrived on the morning of the 2d of December under the walls of Madrid, with the cavalry of the guard and Lahoussaye's and Latour-Maubourg's dragoons. This day was the anniversary of the coronation, that also of the battle of Austerlitz, and for Napoleon, as well as for his soldiers, a superstition was attached to that memorable date. The weather was perfectly serene. That fine cavalry, on beholding its glorious chief, raised unanimous acclamations, which mingled with the shouts of rage set up by the Spaniards on seeing us. Marshal Bessières, Duke of Istria, commanded the imperial cavalry. The Emperor, after surveying for a moment the capital of Spain, despatched an officer of his staff to summon it to open its gates. This young officer had the greatest difficulty to get in. A butcher of Extremadura, charged to guard one of the gates, insisted that nobody but the Duke of Istria himself ought to come upon that mission. General Montbrun, who was present, having scouted that ridiculous pretension, was obliged to draw his sword to defend himself. The officer, when admitted into the interior of the city, was assailed by the populace, and would have been murdered, had not the troops of the line, feeling their honour interested in enforcing respect for the laws of war, saved his life by snatching him out of the hands of the assassins. The Junta directed a Spanish general to convey its negative answer. But the leaders of the populace required that thirty of the mob should escort that general, to have an eye upon rather than to protect him; for that furious multitude espied treason everywhere. The Spanish envoy, thus surrounded, appeared before the imperial staff, and it was easy to guess, from his embarrassed attitude, under what tyranny he and all honest men at Madrid were placed at that moment. On the repeated observation that the city could not hold out against the French army; that, by resisting, they would only expose a population of women, children, and old men to slaughter in consequence of an assault, the envoy cast down his eyes without replying, for, before the witnesses who were watching him, he durst not betray the sentiments of which he was full. He was sent back, with his sorry escort, and assured that the firing would commence immediately.

Napoleon had as yet with him his cavalry only, and he expected his infantry towards the close of day. He made a reconnaissance himself on horseback around Madrid, and formed a plan of attack which might be divided into several successive acts, so as to summon the place after each of them, and to reduce it rather by intimidation than by the employment of formidable military means.

Towards evening, Villatte's and Lapiasse's divisions, of Marshal Victor's corps, having arrived, he made dispositions for storming the Buen Retiro, which commands Madrid on the east, and the gates De los Pozzos, Fuencarral, and Del Duque, which command it on the north. The moonlight was superb. In the evening the troops took position. General Senarmont pre-

pared the artillery to batter the walls of the Buen Retiro, and every thing was ready for a first act of vigour. Previously, General Maison, charged with the gates De los Pozzos, Fuencarral, and Del Duque, took all the outworks under a violent and extremely well-directed fire. But, on coming near the gates, he paused, waiting for the signal of attack.

Napoleon, before he commenced, despatched another officer, a Spaniard taken at Somosierra. This officer was the bearer of a letter from Berthier, at once threatening and mild, to the Marquis de Castellar, governor of Madrid. An answer was soon returned: it was negative, and intimated that time must be allowed for consulting the authorities and the people before any resolution could be taken. At daybreak, therefore, Napoleon in person took his station on the heights, having the Buen Retiro on the left, and the gates of Los Pozzos, Fuencarral, and Del Duque on his right, and gave orders himself for the attack. A well-directed Spanish battery having covered the spot where he was with balls, he was obliged to move a little further. It was not, however, by such balls that such a man was fated to fall. As soon as the morning fog had given place to a brilliant sun, which for some time past had shone continually, General Villatte, charged to act on the left, advanced with his division upon the Buen Retiro. General Senarmont having broken down the walls of that fine park with cannon, the infantry entered at the point of the bayonet, and had soon dislodged four thousand men citizens and men of the lower class, who had pretended to defend them. The resistance was next to none, and our columns, passing through the Buen Retiro without difficulty, debouched immediately upon the Prado. That superb promenade extends from the Atocha to the Alcala gate, and takes them in some measure in rear. Our troops gained possession of them and of the artillery with which they were armed. Companies of *élite* then fell upon the first barricades of the streets of Atocha, San Jeronimo, and Alcala, and carried them in spite of a very brisk fire of musketry. They were obliged to take by assault several palaces situated in those streets, and to put to the sword the defenders who occupied them.

On the right, General Maison, who had been forced to remain all night under a murderous fire, in order to save the houses of the suburbs, attacked the gates of Fuencarral, Del Duque, and San Bernardino, for the purpose of penetrating to an extensive building, which served the life-guard for quarters, and the walls of which, solid as those of a fortress, were capable of withstanding cannon. He succeeded in getting into the interior of the city, and surrounding on all sides the building of the life-guard, while sustaining a tremendous fire. The field-artillery having failed to make a breach in the walls, General Maison advanced at the head of a detachment of sappers to break open the doors with hatchets. But the materials heaped up behind these doors rendered it impossible to force them. The general then ordered a violent fire of musketry to be poured from the neighbouring houses upon this building. He had been for twenty-one hours under fire, when he was struck by a ball, which shattered his foot. Two hundred men, killed



or wounded, were already extended before this formidable edifice, when the Emperor ordered a pause, before making a general assault. He was master of the gates of Fuencarral, Del Duque, and San Jeronimo, attacked by General Maison; of those of Alcala and Atocha, attacked by General Villatte; and his artillery, from the heights of the Buen Retiro, was sufficient to reduce in a short time that unfortunate city. However, at eleven in the morning, he suspended the action, and sent a fresh summons to the Junta of defence, declaring that every thing was prepared to batter down the city if it resisted any longer, but that, though ready to give a terrible example to the cities of Spain which persisted in closing their gates against him, he chose rather to owe the surrender of Madrid to the reason and humanity of those who had made themselves its rulers.

The capture of the Buen Retiro, and of the gates on the east and north, had already made a strong impression upon the defenders of Madrid. Not one rational person doubted the consequences of a capture by assault. The populace itself had experienced at the Atocha and Alcala gates what was gained by firing from the tops of houses upon the French, and the violence of men's minds began to cool a little. The Junta of defence took advantage of this to send Thomas de Morla and Don Bernardo Iriarte to the head-quarters.

Napoleon received them at the head of his staff, and with a very cold and stern countenance. He knew that Don Thomas de Morla was that governor of Andalusia under whose command the capitulation of Baylen had been violated. He determined to address him in language that should ring throughout all Europe. Thomas de Morla, daunted by the presence of the extraordinary man before whom he appeared, and by the visible though repressed anger revealed by his features, told him that all sensible men in Madrid were convinced of the necessity of surrendering; but that it was necessary to make the French troops retire, and to allow the Junta time to pacify the people, and to induce them to lay down their arms. "In vain you employ the name of the people," replied Napoleon, in an angry tone. "If you cannot find means to pacify them, it is because you have yourselves excited and misled them by lies. Assemble the clergy, the heads of the convents, the alcaldes, the principal proprietors, and if between this and six in the morning the city has not surrendered, it shall have ceased to exist. I neither will nor ought to withdraw my troops. You have slaughtered the unfortunate French who have fallen into your hands. Only a few days since you suffered two domestics of the ambassador of Russia to be dragged away and put to death in the streets because they were Frenchmen. The incapacity and the weakness of a general had put into your hands troops which had capitulated on the field of battle of Baylen, and the capitulation was violated. You, Monsieur de Morla, what sort of a letter did you write to that general? Well did it become you to talk of pillage, you who, having entered Roussillon in 1796, carried off all the women, and divided them as booty among your soldiers. What right had you, moreover, to hold such language? The capitu-

lation of Baylen forbade it. Look what was the conduct of the English, who are far from priding themselves on being strict observers of the law of nations. They complained of the convention of Cintra, but they fulfilled it. To violate military treaties is to renounce all civilization, to put ourselves on a level with the Bedouins of the desert. How then dare you demand a capitulation, you who violated that of Baylen? Behold how injustice and bad faith always turn to the prejudice of those who incur the guilt of them! I had a fleet at Cadix; it was the ally of Spain: you directed against it the mortars of the city where you commanded. I had a Spanish army in my ranks: it pleased me better to see it come over in English ships, and fling itself from the top of the rocks of Espinosa, than to disarm it. I preferred having nine thousand enemies more to fight to violating good faith and honour. Return to Madrid. I give you till six to-morrow morning. Go back then: you have nothing to say to me about the people but to tell me that they have submitted. If not, you and your troops shall be put to the sword."

These severe and deserved reproaches made Thomas de Morla shudder with terror. On returning to the Junta he could not conceal his agitation, and Don Bernardo Iriarte was obliged to give an account for him of the joint mission on which they had been to the French head-quarters. The impossibility of resistance was so evident that the Junta itself, though divided, acknowledged by a majority the necessity for submitting. It again sent Thomas de Morla to Napoleon, to inform him of the surrender of Madrid, upon certain insignificant conditions. In this same night between the 8d and 4th, the Marquis de Castellar purposed to escape with his troops as well from the clemency as from the severity of the conqueror. Followed by his soldiers and all who were most compromised, he went out at the west and south gates, which the French did not occupy. Next day, although the furious populace still vented cries of rage, the armed men having received and accepted the invitation not to resist any further, the gates of the city were given up to General Belliard. The French army took possession of the principal quarters, and established itself in the great buildings of Madrid, particularly in the convents, at the cost of which Napoleon required that it should be subsisted. He gave orders for a general and immediate disarming: then, without deigning to enter Madrid himself, he went to Chamartin, to lodge amidst his guard, in a small country-house belonging to the family of the Duke de l'Infantado. He directed Joseph to pass the Guadarrama, and to come and reside, not in Madrid, but out of it, at the royal mansion of the Pardo, two or three leagues distant. His intention was to make Madrid tremble under a prolonged military occupation, before he restored to it the civil government with the new royalty. His conduct on this occasion was as skilful as it was energetic.

He purposed, without employing cruelty, but merely intimidation, to place the nation between the benefits which he brought it and the fear

\* These are the very words of Napoleon, as recorded at length in the *Moniteur* of that time.

of terrible punishments against those who should persist in rebellion. He had already ordered the confiscation of the estates of the Dukes de l'Infantado, Ossuna, Altamira, Medina-Coeli, Santa-Cruz, and Hajar, of the Prince of Castel Franco, and of M. de Cevallos. These last two were punished for having accepted office under Joseph and then deserted him. Napoleon was resolved to use particular severity towards those who passed from one camp to another, and who should add to a resistance, perfectly legitimate in itself, treachery which was not so. The Duke de l'Infantado and the Prince of Castel Franco had been merely weak; M. de Cevallos had acted like a traitor. Orders were therefore issued to seize him wherever he should be found. But he had fled. Napoleon caused Messrs. de Castel Franco and Santa-Cruz, who had not had time to get out of the way, to be apprehended. He likewise ordered the Duke de St. Simon, a Frenchman by birth, who had incurred the penalty of those who serve against their country, to be seized and brought before a military commission. His intention was not to act with rigour, but to intimidate by the temporary confinement in a State prison of those whom he caused to be apprehended and condemned. He had also the presidents and royal *procureurs* of the Council of Castille seized and carried to France. He treated in the same manner some of the popular leaders implicated in the murder of French soldiers and of Spaniards who had fallen victims to the fury of the populace. At the same time, he issued orders for the most complete and general disarming. He required, as we have said, that the convents should receive part of the army and feed it at their cost.

While exercising these apparent severities, he purposed to strike the mass of the Spanish nation by the idea of the benefits which must arise from French rule. In consequence, he decided by a series of decrees the suppression of the lines of customhouses between one province and another, the removal of all the members of the Council of Castille, the immediate supply of the place of that council by means of the institution of the court of cassation, the abolition of the tribunal of the Inquisition, the prohibition for any person to possess more than one commandery, the abrogation of feudal rights, and the reduction to one-third of all the convents existing in Spain.

A desire to spare the clergy and the nobility had induced him at first to hesitate respecting the opportuneness of these important measures, when he was still at Bayonne, engaged in preparing the Spanish Constitution. But, since the general insurrection, the difficulty having become as great as it was possible to imagine, he no longer had need to show any indulgence to this or that class, and had only to think how to gain the sound and intelligent part of the nation by wise institutions, leaving it to time and force to reconcile the rest of it.

These decrees being promulgated, he despatched to various deputations which were presented to him, that, as for himself, he had no occasion to enter Madrid, being in Spain only a foreign general, commanding an auxiliary army of the new dynasty; that, as for King Joseph, he should not restore him to the Spaniards till he deemed them worthy to possess

him by a sincere return towards him; that he would not replace him in the palace of the Kings of Spain to see him expelled a second time; that, if the inhabitants of Madrid were resolved to attach themselves to this prince by the more enlightened appreciation of all the benefits promised by a new royalty, he would give him back to them, but not till all the heads of families, assembled in the parishes of Madrid, should have taken, on the Holy Bible, an oath of fidelity to him; otherwise, he would relinquish the design of imposing upon the Spaniards a sovereign whom they rejected; but that, having conquered them, he would exercise the rights of conquest over them; he would dispose of their country as he thought proper, and should probably dismember it, taking for himself as much as he should deem it right to add to the territory of France.

He turned his attention moreover to the forming of the commencement of an army for his brother Joseph. He ordered him to collect into a regiment of several battalions all the Germans, Neapolitans, and other foreigners, who had been long serving in Spain, and who desired nothing better than to find a new paymaster. This regiment was to be called the Royal Foreign (*Royal-Etranger*) and to amount to 3200 men. He ordered the Spanish Swiss, who had continued faithful, or who were disposed to come over to Joseph, to be collected into a regiment, which should be called Reding, because there was an officer of that name who had behaved well. It was hoped that this regiment would amount to 4800 men. He directed all the Spanish soldiers who had embraced the cause of Joseph, to the presumed number of 4800, to be collected under the name of Royal Napoleon; and lastly, by the name of royal guard, the French who, after Baylen, had taken service under Castaños, to escape captivity. It was supposed that these, joined to the conscripts drawn from Bayonne, would furnish an effective of 3200 men. This would form a first nucleus of 16,000 soldiers, who might prove valuable, if they were well paid, and pains were taken with their organization.

After taking these measures, Napoleon awaited the effect of them, persisting in residing himself at Chamartin, and leaving Joseph in the pleasure-house of the Pardo, where he lived separate, and in royal state, without having occasion to bow before the superior sovereignty of the Emperor of the French. While waiting for the Spaniards to comprehend him, Napoleon continued to make his dispositions for the entire conquest of the Peninsula.

He had brought to Madrid the corps of Marshal Victor, composed of Lapisse's, Villatte's, and Ruffin's divisions, the imperial guard, and the greater part of the mass of dragoons. On the report that the corps of Castaños was retreating by Calatayud, Sigüenza, and Guadaluara, towards Madrid, he had sent Ruffin's division, with a brigade of dragoons, to the bridge of Alcala. This corps of Castaños', in fact, pursued to extremity by General Maurice Mathieu, at the head of Musnier's and Lagrange's divisions, and the Polish lancers, briskly attacked at Bubierca, where it had sustained considerable loss, was falling back in disorder upon Guadaluara, numbering no more than nine or ten thousand men, instead of the

twenty-four whom it comprehended at Tudela. Castaños had been deprived by the Junta of the command, which was transferred to General de la Peña. Tossed in this manner from chief to chief, soured by defeat and hardships, it had mutinied, and taken definitively for its commander the Duke de l'Infantado, who, as we have seen, had secretly quitted Madrid, in order to bring reinforcements to the defenders of the capital. The entry of the French into Madrid, and the presence of Ruffin's division, with the dragoons, at the bridge of Alcala, left this former army of the centre no other resource than retreat upon Cuenca. It ran no risk of being disturbed there till the French should take the resolution of marching for Valencia, which could not be immediate.

Napoleon, seeing the army of the centre retiring three-fourths dispersed, had left the dragoons to pick up the stragglers, and recalled to him Ruffin's division of Victor's corps, destining that corps to march for Aranjuez and Toledo, in pursuit of the army of Estremadura. After securing his left, by driving the old army of Castaños to Cuenca, he purposed to secure his right by pushing beyond Talavera the wrecks of the army of Estremadura, which had fought at Burgos and Somo-Sierra. He despatched Ruffin's and Victor's divisions, preceded by Lasalle's light cavalry and Lahoussaye's dragoons, and kept Lapisse's division and the imperial guard at Madrid. Lasalle hastened to Aranjuez and Toledo, and the dragoons ran to the Escorial, to drive off the disorderly remnant of the army of Estremadura. That army was in rout when it commenced its retreat. It was still more so when it felt the point of the swords of our horse. It exhibited nothing but confused bands, which, like all troops incapable of fighting, revenged themselves upon their leaders for their own cowardice. The unfortunate Don Juan Benito, who had not left the field of battle of Somo-Sierra till the last, and covered with blood, was their first victim. With the fugitives from Somo-Sierra, he had rejoined at Segovia what was yet left of the detachment of Sepulveda and of the troops beaten at Burgos by Marshal Soult. These different assemblages, after having for a moment approached Madrid by the road from Segovia to the Escorial, fled for Toledo, on learning the surrender of the capital. They were joined by the garrison of Madrid, which had left the city with the Marquis de Castellar. Their indiscipline surpassed all belief. They plundered, they ravaged, much more than the conquerors, that country which was their own, and which it was their duty to defend. Their officers, overwhelmed with shame and grief at such a spectacle, exerted themselves to introduce some order into this retreat, and to save the inhabitants from the horrible treatment to which they were exposed. The gallant Don Juan Benito, the most severe because he was the bravest, became the object of their fury. Having endeavoured to restrain them at Talavera, he was attacked in an humble cell which served him for a lodging, dragged to the public road, and hung on a tree, where these monsters, who had not followed him to the fight, amused themselves for several hours in riddling him with balls. Such were the men to whom Spain, in her patriotic blindness, com-

mitted her defence against a royalty which had in her eyes the fault of being foreign.

General Lasalle, always galloping at the head of his squadrons, arriving soon at Talavera, drove these undisciplined bands to the bridge of Almaraz, over the Tagus. This bridge, about which the Spaniards had thrown up some works, could only be taken by infantry. General Lasalle paused there, waiting till orders from the Emperor should prescribe fresh operations in the south of the Peninsula.

While the Spanish armies were driven back in this manner, that of Palafox on Saragossa, that of Castaños on Cuenca, that of Estremadura on Almaraz, that of Blake on Leon and the Asturias, and we had thus in a few days again become masters of half of Spain, the English, who had been assured that they had only to come to gain trophies, and to complete at most the victory already secured, found themselves in the most cruel embarrassment; for they had not yet succeeded in collecting their several detachments into a single corps. The only progress which they had made in this respect was to unite the infantry, brought by Ciudad Rodrigo and Salamanca, and the artillery and cavalry, which had come by Badajoz and Talavera, under the command of General Hope. The latter, who had even well-nigh fallen among Lasalle's squadrons, had got off by a skilful march in the mountains, and had at length, by Avilla, rejoined his commander-in-chief towards Salamanca. After this junction, General Moore numbered about 19,000 men. But he had a last junction to effect,—that with Sir David Baird, who was coming by Coruña and Astorga, with about 11,000 men. The English general thought more than ever of retreating. It was not with 30,000 men that he could make head against the French, the Spanish armies being everywhere annihilated. His anxiety to withdraw from danger, and to join Sir David Baird, had suggested the salutary idea of relinquishing the line of retreat through Portugal, and adopting that of Galicia, which afforded the twofold advantage of increasing his force by one-third, and of bringing him near a good port for embarking. He was inclined, therefore, to march by Toro for Benavente, and to order Sir David Baird to proceed thither by Astorga. In acting thus he gave himself the appearance of threatening the communications of the French, because he had but a step to take in order to reach Valladolid or even Burgos; whereas he was in reality on the road to Coruña, that is, to the sea, his safest refuge. Thanks to this movement, he ensured his retreat, he seemed to do something for the Spanish cause, and he provided himself with a reply to the representations of Mr. Frere, who, having become the chief adviser of the insurrectional government, was incessantly reproaching the English army for not acting. The unfortunate Sir John Moore, who was both discreet and brave, who was accustomed to methodical war, who had been promised an enthusiastic reception, resources of all sorts, easy victories, and who found the Spaniards discomfited, running away in all directions, scarcely able to feed themselves, was in a state of surprise, dissatisfaction, and disgust not to be described, and saw no safety but in beating a retreat by the shortest route. For the rest,

he did not disguise from his government any of these disagreeable truths.

Napoleon had not at first concerned himself about the English, though he was well aware that a certain number of them were coming from Lisbon and from Coruña, because he intended in the first place to annihilate the Spanish armies, and because he purposed, in the next, to suffer the British army to penetrate into the interior of the Peninsula, in order to make the more sure of enveloping and taking it. Well conceived as was this idea, had he but known how dispersed and dispirited the English army was, he would have done better to fall upon it, and to destroy Moore at Salamanca and Hope in the mountains of Avila. But who can know every thing in war? when, in fact, nothing is known but what is guessed from certain indications; and Napoleon had here too few to conjecture with accuracy the situation of the English; which was not at all surprising, since Moore, among a friendly people, was himself completely ignorant of the movements of the French army. Napoleon, however, having learned, from the excursions of his cavalry towards Talavera, that the English were between Talavera, Avila, and Salamanca, and that from the Tagus they were proceeding to the height of the Duero, judged that the moment for acting against them was come, and he made dispositions for collecting the forces necessary for their destruction.

He ordered Marshal Lefebvre to proceed from Valladolid for Segovia, and to descend from Segovia upon the Escorial, which would bring him nearly to Madrid. His intention was to make him take the position of the Escorial, Toledo, and Talavera, in order to bring Marshal Victor's corps back to Madrid. Marshal Lefebvre was lastly to receive the Polish division, which till then had remained behind, and the Dutch, left for some time on the coast of Biscay. With Milhaud's dragoons and Lasalle's cavalry he was to form the right of the army upon Talavera. He would then number about 15,000 men.

Napoleon, in preparing to attack the English army, the solidity of which he was aware of, resolved to have at hand one of his best corps, led by one of the most energetic of his lieutenants. That corps was the 6th, its commander Marshal Ney. He had reproved Marshal Ney for the tardiness of his march upon Soria, and was anxious to make amends for that reproof by giving him the English to beat. He had already recalled him from Saragossa to Madrid, and had commissioned him to push Castaños by the way with the sword at his loins. He enjoined him to hasten his march, that he might be able to rest for a moment at Madrid, before he went forward to the right for the Tagus or the Duero.

Napoleon was, therefore, about to unite at Madrid itself the corps of Victor, Lefebvre, Ney, the imperial guard, and a considerable mass of cavalry; which would soon enable him to strike a decisive blow. The recall of Marshal Ney, with the whole of the 6th corps, including Lagrange's division, which had been temporarily annexed to Marshal Moncey's, for the battle of Tudela, would render it impossible for the latter to continue the siege of Saragossa, for he had not sufficient force left to hold

the country while attacking the city. Napoleon ordered Marshal Mortier to turn off with the 5th corps, and to take a position on the Ebro, in order to cover the siege of Saragossa, but to leave to Marshal Moncey the exclusive direction of the attacks.

Delaborde's fine division, the first of General Junot's, had just arrived at Vittoria. Napoleon assigned Burgos to it. Napoleon ordered Heudelet's division, Junot's second, which immediately followed the first, to advance with all possible haste, in the same direction. Lorge's dragoons, who accompanied the 5th corps, likewise received that destination. Millet's dragoons, a little behind these last, were drawn to Madrid. Napoleon prescribed to Marshal Soult a march conformable to these various movements. That marshal had penetrated into the Asturias, driven before him the wrecks of the Asturians, returned from Espinosa, and pushed on to the camp of Colombres. In consequence of warm and repeated fights, he had taken a certain number of prisoners, and a great quantity of stores and merchandise, accumulated by the English in the ports of Cantabria. Napoleon enjoined him to recross the mountains, and to descend into the kingdom of Leon, where, again joined with Junot and with Lorge's and Millet's dragoons, he was to make head against the English if they advanced upon our right, or to push them briskly if they fell back before the troops sent from Madrid, and even enter Portugal in pursuit of them. Thus, with three *corps d'armée*, besides the imperial guard and an immense cavalry at Madrid, with two *corps d'armée* and a great quantity of cavalry also upon his right, in rear, he was prepared to act against the English in all directions, and could pursue them by whatever route they should retreat. He awaited only the arrival of Marshal's Lefebvre and Ney, to run from Madrid to fresh operations. For the rest, the weather had continued to be perfectly fine. The month of December was like real spring, both at Madrid and in the Castilles. Our corps performed long marches, without experiencing any of the ordinary inconveniences of the season. Napoleon rode out on horseback every day around Madrid, which he never entered, reviewed his corps, made a point of supplying them with all that they had lost in their long marches and in fight, and directed his particular attention to a great military establishment at the Buen Retiro, whence he could control Madrid, and where he was certain to leave in safety his sick, his dépôts, and his *matériel*. Always careful to ensure his line of operations, what he had ordered at Miranda, Pancorbo, and Burgos, he again ordered at Somo-Sierra, on the very plateau which had been the theatre of the battle, and at Madrid, on the height of the Buen Retiro, situated facing that capital. He had resolved to have field-works thrown up around that fine park, and a fortified retreat annexed to it, near the porcelain manufactory, (where the kings of Spain produced imitations of the porcelain of China,) and that, in this retreat, there should be a place sufficiently spacious to hold the wounded of the army, and its *matériel* in artillery and provisions. He intended, moreover, that this retreat should bristle with cannon, and that it should require a regular attack to storm it.

While things were passing as we have seen around Madrid, other events were taking place in Aragon and Catalonia. In Aragon, ever since the battle of Tudela, the going and coming of our different *corps d'armée* had temporarily deprived Marshal Moncey of the means of acting efficaciously against the city of Saragossa. The day after the battle, troops were required to be sent in pursuit of the corps of Castaños, and in default of those of Marshal Ney, Musnier's and Lagrange's divisions had been despatched under General Maurice Mathieu.

From that time Marshal Moncey had been left with no more than Grandjean's and Morlot's divisions, which numbered only nine or ten thousand men. Marshal Ney had come, it is true, debouching from Soria, and offering to concur in the siege of Saragossa with Dessoles' and Marchand's two divisions. But on the very day when, in concert with Marshal Moncey, he was about to attack that famous capital of Aragon, and to make himself master of Monte Torrero, orders arrived from the headquarters to pursue Castaños to extremity, and, while pursuing him, to return to Madrid. If Napoleon could have known what was passing there, he would have left to Marshal Ney the conduct of the siege of Saragossa, and to General Maurice Mathieu the pursuit of Castaños. The latter, with Musnier's and Lagrange's divisions, would have brought to Madrid nearly as large a force as Marshal Ney, with Dessoles' and Marchand's divisions. There might thus have been avoided a cross and useless movement of General Maurice Mathieu's, coming back in order to proceed to Saragossa, and of Marshal Ney's, retiring from it, to march for Madrid by Calatayud. But accidents and false movements are multiplied in war with numbers and distances; and Napoleon added every day to the chances of errors by the prodigious extent of his operations. Marshal Ney, like all his lieutenants, too happy to serve near him, hastened to execute his orders, quitted Marshal Moncey, who was thus left quite alone, and deeply mortified that he could not undertake any thing against Saragossa, on account of the weak state to which he was reduced, particularly as Marshal Ney was to take Lagrange's division to General Maurice Mathieu and to send him back Musnier's division only. He even took away with him the famous Polish lancers, so accustomed to Aragon, and left Marshal Moncey nothing but the regiments of provisional cavalry formerly attached to his corps. Marshal Moncey, recovering Musnier's division only, was obliged to defer the attack of Saragossa. It is true, that, meanwhile, the heavy artillery was brought, under the direction of General Lacoste, from Pampeluna to Tudela, and conveyed by the canal of Aragon from Tudela to Saragossa. The Aragonese, on their part, were recovering from their defeat and fortifying themselves in their capital. All these delays on both sides served thus to lead to a memorable siege.

Serious events, not less worthy of record than those which have been already related, had occurred in Catalonia. Since the retreat of Joseph upon the Ebro, General Duhesme, who, in the early part of his establishment at

Barcelona, made continual sorties, sometimes forward towards the Llobregat, sometimes backward towards Girona—General Duhesme found himself blockaded in Barcelona, and incapable of stirring beyond the gates. Lechi's and Chabran's two divisions, extremely reduced by war and fatigues, numbered scarcely 8000 infantry, and, including artillery and cavalry, hardly amounted to 9500 men. All the efforts made to provision Barcelona by sea had failed, the English occupying the bay of Roses, the citadel of which was defended by 3000 Spanish regular troops. General Duhesme, therefore, saw that he was liable to be soon destitute of provisions, either for himself or for the numerous population of that capital. It was for this reason that Napoleon had so often urged Marshal St. Cyr to hasten his operations, and to march briskly to the relief of Barcelona.

For traversing the whole of Catalonia, in insurrection, and occupied by numerous corps of troops, General St. Cyr had, besides General Reille's division, about 7000 strong, Souham's French division, comprehending 6000, Pinot's Italian division of 5000, Chabot's Neapolitan division of 3000, 1000 artillerymen, and 2000 horse, forming a total of 23 or 24,000 combatants. Once united with Duhesme, if he should succeed in raising the blockade, he should have from 34 to 36,000 men to reduce this important province, the most difficult to conquer of any in the Peninsula, as well on account of its surface studded with obstacles, as for its very bold, very restless inhabitants, dreading for the sake of their industry too close a connection with the French empire.

The Spanish army which defended that province, and of which it was not possible to form any but an approximative estimate, amounted to about 40,000 men. It was composed of troops of the line, drawn from the Balearic islands, and conveyed to Catalonia in English ships; troops of the line from Portugal, likewise transported by the English navy to Catalonia; a division from Grenada, under General Reding; a division of Aragonese, under the Marquis de Lassan, brother of Palafox; lastly, the regular troops of the province. It had for its commander-in-chief Don Juan de Vives, who had formerly served against France during the war of the Revolution, and boasted much of successes obtained in it. It was seconded by volunteers, called Miquelets, formed into battalions, denominated *tercios*, and performing the duty of light troops. Active, brave, excellent marksmen, these volunteers, running about on the flanks of the Spanish army, rendered it numerous services. To these forces must be added the *somathènes*, a sort of militia composed of all the inhabitants, who, according to ancient custom, rose *en masse* at the first sound of their bells, and had to defend the villages and towns, and to occupy and dispute the principal passes. These troops of the line, these Miquelets, these *somathènes*, aided in their resistance by a country covered with asperities and destitute of alimentary substances, presented more serious difficulties than were to be met with in the other provinces. It should be added that Catalonia was studded with fortresses, which commanded all the communications by land and sea, such as Figueras,

which we possessed, Roses, Girona, Hostalrich, and Tarragona, which we did not possess.

Its distance and its configuration separated this province from the rest of Spain, and rendered it a distinct theatre of war. For this reason, Napoleon had selected for conquering it a general, excellent when alone, dangerous when he had neighbours, whom he always seconded ill, so meanly jealous as to imagine that Napoleon, envious of his glory, had sent him to Catalonia in order to ruin him: but, setting aside this eccentricity, an able general, profound in his combinations, and the first officer of his time for methodical war, Napoleon, be it understood, being above comparison with any of the generals of the age.

The means collected in Catalonia, as elsewhere, smacked of the precipitation with which the preparations for this war had been made. The *matériel* of the army was insufficient; shoes and clothing were wholly wanting. Reille's division was a medley of all corps and all nations, an inconvenience compensated, it is true, by the valour of its commander. Souham's division, though formed of old skeletons, swarmed with conscripts. The Italian division of Pino was composed of Italians, seasoned and trained in the school of the Grand Army. The means of transport, indispensable in a country where no resource is to be found on the ground itself, were absolutely null. There was nothing there that was not seen in the Castilles, where Napoleon himself commanded. General St. Cyr, nevertheless, imagined that all this was maliciously done for him, and that Napoleon, on the summit of his glory, meant to measure his successes, and, in particular, to render them less rapid than his own.\*

The instructions of General St. Cyr left him *carte blanche* as to the operations to be executed in Catalonia, and were imperative on one point only, the necessity of raising the blockade of Barcelona as speedily as possible. As we had Figueras, there were three places to reduce in the direction of Barcelona—Roses to the left on the coast road, Girona and Hostalrich to the right on the land road. In this mountainous country, those fortresses were so situated as not to be avoided without difficulty, if one made a point of pursuing the roads passable for artillery. Still, to stop for the purpose of undertaking three regular sieges before raising the blockade of Barcelona, was an impracticable thing. General St. Cyr determined to confine himself to one only, that of Roses, for two reasons sufficiently cogent to excuse the delay that would arise from it; the first was, that Figueras, without Roses, did not form a sufficient *point d'appui* beyond the Pyrenees, for the garrison of Roses would have incessantly annoyed Figueras, and nothing could have entered or left the latter place if the neighbour fortress were not taken; the second was, that the bay of Roses was the usual shelter of the English squadrons blockading Barcelona, and that their presence prevented the re-entrance of that

city. General St. Cyr, being inclined to establish himself there, had no inclination to be furnished in the place, as General Duhesme was apprehensive of being at that moment.

Notwithstanding the urgency of the staff, incessantly recommending celerity in his operations, General St. Cyr resolved to undertake the siege of Roses before he penetrated into Catalonia. He passed the frontier in the first days of November, at the very moment when, as we have seen, the principal masses of the French army began to act in Castille, at the moment when Marshals Lefebvre, Victor, and Soult were engaged with Blake and the Marquis of Belveder. Reille's division, placed at first at La Jonquère, moved on the 6th to Roses. Pino's division immediately followed, escorting the convoys of heavy artillery. Souham's division came third, and established itself in rear of the Fluvia, a streamlet that waters the plain of Lampourdan. This last division was directed to cover the siege of Roses against any Spanish troops which might attempt to annoy it. While our armies in Castille and Aragon enjoyed splendid weather, that of Catalonia was exposed to deluging rains, which, for several days, inundated the country, and rendered every movement impossible. Our soldiers endured these hardships with patience. They had for their commander a general who, in the ranks of the army of the Rhine, had learned to endure every thing, and to require all around him to do the same without murmuring.

It was impossible to move before the 12th of November. The rain having ceased, the troops approached Roses, and cooped up the garrison within the walls. It consisted of nearly 3000 men, commanded by a good officer, and provided with skilful engineers, of whom, for the rest, there was never any want in Spain. The fortress of Roses is a pentagon, situated between the sea and a sandy beach, in the centre of a deep spacious bay, screened from dangerous winds. At the entrance of this bay is a fort called Fort du Bouton, erected on a height, and protecting by its cannon the greater part of the road. Mazuchelli's division sent two battalions to commence the attack of this fort. There, as before the principal fortress, it was necessary to drive back within the walls the garrison supported by the fire of the English squadron, consisting of six sail of the line and several small vessels.

After various sorties, vigorously repulsed, the trenches were opened before Roses, in the night between the 18th and 19th of November, on two opposite fronts, to the east and west, so as to cut off by the fire of the trenches the communication with the sea. In a few days a battery, established near the shore, rendered the road so dangerous for the English, that they were obliged to sheer off, and to leave the garrison to itself.

The little town of Roses, composed of a few houses of fishermen and tradesmen, was situated to the east, outside the fortified enclosure. It

\* One is ashamed, when reading the Memoirs, otherwise so remarkable, of Marshal St. Cyr, relative to the campaign in Catalonia, of the meannesses which they contain, along with the soundest and most enlarged views. I have read his whole correspondence with the imperial staff, and I affirm that it completely contradicts his assertions, upon a single point, be it understood, that the Emperor had taken care to stint him in means, in order that the suc-

cesses in Catalonia might not eclipse the successes in Castille. One is, indeed, grieved to see so superior a mind abase itself to such paltry conjectures. The Emperor disliked the unsocial character of Marshal St. Cyr, but he did justice to his eminent qualities, and was not jealous of them. We see in his History of Cæsar that he was jealous perhaps of Cæsar or Alexander, but his jealousy descended no lower.

was attacked in the night between the 26th and 27th. The Spaniards, who had shown themselves so weak in the field, suddenly displayed extreme energy behind their walls, defended themselves vigorously, and did not retire till they had lost 300 men, and left us 200 prisoners. This action cost us 45 men killed or wounded. From this moment the garrison ceased to have any external support.

Meanwhile, operations were pushed against Fort du Bouton. Some pieces of heavy calibre had been hoisted by main strength up to the height, and, after dismantling the fort, the assailants had obliged the garrison to evacuate it. On the 8d of December, the third parallel was opened before Roses. On the 4th, the breaching battery was prepared, and the assault only remained to be made, when the garrison, sixteen days after the trenches had been opened, consented to surrender themselves prisoners of war. The resistance had been honourable and conformable to all rules. We there took 2800 men, a great number of wounded, and a considerable *matériel* brought by the English. Thanks to this important conquest, the communications by sea with Barcelona became, if not certain, at least very practicable, and our line of operations, supported upon Figueras and Roses, was ensured at once by land and sea.

During this siege, General St. Cyr had received, either from General Duhesme or from the imperial head-quarters, pressing solicitations to direct his efforts at length upon Barcelona. He had, with his usual obstinacy, refused to do so, till Roses should be in his power; but, now that this fortress had capitulated, he had no further motive for delay. In fact, when General Duhesme, blockaded, had scarcely any provisions left, when Napoleon advanced to Madrid—he entered it on the same day that General St. Cyr entered Roses—it became urgent to move the left of the French armies to the same height as their right, and thus to turn Saragossa on both sides. Roses being taken, General St. Cyr hesitated no longer to march for Barcelona.

He had sent into Roussillon his cavalry, which he could not feed in the Lampourdan. He ordered it back, to take it with him to Barcelona. His artillery, though extremely desirable in the rencounters which he was likely to have with the Spanish army, was a very embarrassing encumbrance to drag along through Catalonia, especially as he was obliged to avoid the high road, which was closed by the fortresses of Girona and Hostalrich, not yet in our possession. General St. Cyr adopted an extremely bold course: this was to leave his artillery at Figueras, leading by hand the horses destined to draw it. General Duhesme had written to him from Barcelona that he had an immense *matériel* in the arsenal of that place, and that, in case horses were brought, every thing requisite to form a complete train of artillery would be found. In consequence, he decided to take with him only horses, mules, infantry, and not one vehicle. He gave to each soldier four days' provisions and fifty cartridges, placed some biscuit and some more cartridges upon mules, and prepared to set out thus lightly equipped. If, in this daring march which he was about to undertake, he should meet with the Spanish army, he was determined to break

through it with the bayonet; for the real victory for him was to reach Barcelona, where he was expected by a French army, abundantly furnished with the necessary *matériel*, and which, joined to his own, would place him above all events.

All being thus regulated, he advanced towards the Fluvia on the 9th of December, leaving upon his rear Reille's division, which was indispensable at Roses and Figueras for preserving our base of operations, and went forward with 15,000 foot, 1500 horse, 1000 artillerymen, that is to say, with seventeen or eighteen thousand men. A strong advanced guard, composed of an Aragonese corps under the Marquis de Lassan, and of a detachment of the army of Vives under General Alvarez, had already made several attempts upon Souham's division, which were victoriously repulsed. General St. Cyr drove back this advanced guard from the banks of the Fluvia to those of the Ter, and obliged it to retreat precipitately. Two routes, both very difficult to traverse, presented themselves to him. The land-route, on the right, offered him Girona and Hostalrich, under the cannon of which it was extremely dangerous, if not impossible, to pass. The sea-route, which presented itself on the left, offered him the danger of the English shipping, cannonading all the passes seen from the sea, and that of the Miquelets, adding their musketry to the artillery of the English. He resolved to follow alternately each of these routes, by means of cross-roads communicating with both. For the moment, he sought to persuade the Spaniards that he was marching for Girona, with the intention of besieging that place, after taking Roses. Accordingly, on the 11th, he advanced in the direction of Girona, and when he saw the Spanish advanced guard marching thither in all haste, he stole off to the left, and proceeded towards La Bisbal, a road which would lead him to Palamos, along the sea-coast. He arrived on the evening of the 11th at La Bisbal; left it on the 12th for Palamos, after meeting at the pass of Calonja with Miquelets and *somathènes*, who kept up a fire upon his wings. The soldier, under able direction, encouraged by the successes which he had already obtained, having no encumbrance to detain him, was alert, though heavily laden, well disposed, and quite prepared to undertake any thing.

If, however, the Spaniards had been at all accustomed to war, they would have chosen the moment when General St. Cyr was separated from Reille's division, without having yet joined Duhesme's corps, and when he hazarded himself, without artillery, against an enemy who had abundance of it, to stop him with the whole of their forces. It is true that no plan is good when one has troops not capable of keeping in line; it is true also that the Spanish officers were ignorant of the particulars of General St. Cyr's march, and that none of them had sufficient intelligence to guess them. Still it is incontestable that the moment in which this general was destined to be weakest was that when he moved from the Pyrenees, without having yet touched at Barcelona, and that, if they wished to meet him on any occasion, this was the very occasion they should have chosen for uniting *en masse*, and waiting for

him at all the passes leading to Barcelona. But the insurgents had detached about 10,000 men to the Fluvià, and the rest were employed in blockading Duhesme in Barcelona. General Claros, who commanded at Girona, on seeing General St. Cyr debouch upon that place, had contented himself with despatching a courier to Don Juan de Vives.

General St. Cyr, firm in the accomplishment of his design, set out on the morning of the 12th from Palamos, had to sustain the fire of some English gun-boats which did little mischief, and directed his course for Vidreres, regaining, this time, the main land-road, because he supposed that the Spaniards, misled by the direction which he had taken from La Bisbal to Palamos, would throw themselves *en masse* towards the sea. It actually happened as he had foreseen. A corps sent from Barcelona, under Milans, proceeded by Mataró along the coast; some detachments from Hostalrich, Miquelets, and *somathènes*, hastened towards the coast to defend, with the English, the principal passes, where they expected to meet with the French.

General St. Cyr, taking cross-roads, proceeded from Palamos for Vidreres, and saw the troops of Lassan and Alvarez, whom he had misled by inducing them to throw themselves upon Girona, obliged to follow him at a distance, instead of barring the way against him, and encamping on his rear so far off as to render any attack impossible. They were not in sufficient force to cope with 17 or 18 thousand French, under a skilful and energetic leader.

General St. Cyr, having behind him the 10,000 men of Alvarez and Lassan, whom he at first had before him, having moreover upon his left the different detachments guarding the coast, advanced like a wild boar beset by hunters. The road which he had taken led direct to Hostalrich, and under the cannon of that place. Thanks to the lightness of his equipment, he was enabled to proceed over the heights around Hostalrich, without following the beaten track, got off with a few balls, which did him no more mischief than those of the English gun-boats, halted on the 14th in the environs, and marched the next day, the 15th, for Barcelona, having avoided the two fortresses which closed the land-route, and having now nothing to fear upon that route but the main army of Don Juan de Vives itself. In the afternoon of the 15th, he actually fell in with a detachment of that army, the one which had come from Barcelona under the command of Milans, and fell in with it at the entrance of the defile of Trenta-Passos. He hastened to force this defile, unwilling to have it to pass in the face of the Spanish army, which he expected to find every moment in his road, for he was but two days' march from Barcelona.

Don Juan de Vives, apprized by the courier who had been sent to him, had at length relin- quished the blockade of Barcelona, to oppose the march of General St. Cyr. He had despatched Milans before him with four or five thousand men, and brought with him 15,000, of whom the division of Grenada, under General Reding, formed a part. The rest of the grand army of Catalonia was in the environs of Barcelona, on the Llobregat.

General Don Juan de Vives took a position at Cardener, on the wooded heights over which runs the high road to Barcelona. He was there with the 15,000 men brought from his camp, and was waiting for Milans to rejoin him on his right with 5000. A host of Miquelets covered the environs. It was this regular force, posted in an excellent position, accompanied by a numerous artillery, and seconded by bold riflemen, that the French general had to overthrow, in order to open for himself the road to Barcelona.

His resolution was soon taken. By sounding he would merely have encouraged the Spaniards and discouraged the French, by enlightening both respecting their situation, for the one had cannon, the other nothing but muskets; he would merely have given time to Claros, to Alvarez, to Lassan, to overtake and attack him in rear, while Vives was attacking him in front. He therefore sent orders to Pino's division, which marched first, not to deploy, not to fire, for it would be wasting time and ammunition, of neither of which they had any to throw away; to climb head foremost the steep route to Cardener, and to clear themselves a way with the bayonet. Unluckily, before the orders of the general-in-chief were delivered and comprehended, Mazuchelli's brigade, of Pino's division, had deployed on the left of the Barcelona road, under the fire of Reding's division, the best of the Spanish army, and it suffered severely. General St. Cyr immediately marched Souham's French division, in close column, to the extreme left of that brigade, ordering it to rush, without deploying, upon the enemy with the bayonet. He prescribed a similar movement right ahead of him, and upon the high road, to Fontana's brigade, the second of Pino's, and directed it, in close column, upon the centre of the Spaniards. He sent two battalions to the right of this same road, to threaten the extremity of the Spanish line. His cavalry, ready to charge wherever the ground would permit, advanced in the intervals between the columns. These orders, executed with precision and extraordinary vigour, were followed by the most speedy and complete result. Souham's column, on the extreme left of our line, and Fontana's brigade, at the centre, attacked the Spanish line with such resolution that they broke and overthrew it in the twinkling of an eye, thus disengaging on its two wings Mazuchelli's brigade unadvisedly deployed. The Italian dragoons and the 24th French dragoons, dashing off at a gallop, charged the Spaniards, already driven back, and threw them into frightful disorder. The enemy fled in all directions, leaving on the field of battle 600 dead, 800 wounded, 1200 prisoners, all his artillery, not excepting a single cannon, and a quantity of stores, which we were in great need of. Generals Vives and Reding, hurried along in the rout, escaped by a miracle, the one towards the sea, where he embarked to rejoin his camp on the Llobregat, the other towards the Barcelona road, which he succeeded in reaching, thanks to the swiftness of his horse. This victory, won in less than an hour, gained us, besides all that we wanted, the road to Barcelona and an irresistible ascendancy over the enemy. Lassan, Alvarez, Claros, arrived towards evening upon our rear, but too late to



take part in the action. The battle being over, they had nothing to do but to return to Girona, or to proceed through by-ways to the camp on the Llobregat.

There was but one march more to make in order to reach Barcelona. It was of importance to arrive there for the purpose of procuring provisions, for the biscuit of our soldiers was entirely consumed. General St. Cyr, placing on the artillery and cavalry horses such of the wounded as could be removed, and being compelled to leave to the discretion of the *somathènes* those who were incapable of bearing the journey, marched for Barcelona, where he arrived on the 17th, to the astonishment of the Spaniards and the joy of Duhesme's soldiers, whom the sight of a French army, coming to raise the blockade, filled with the greatest delight. On every side they embraced one another with transport, and promised themselves the happiest results from this junction.

Besides the cannon taken at Cardedeu, General St. Cyr found at Barcelona a very fine and numerous artillery, and quite ready for the horses which he brought with him to be harnessed to it. He had lost very few men, and numbered 17,000 fit for service. General Duhesme, on his part, still had, exclusively of sick and wounded, 9000 fit for active service. There was, therefore, a real effective of 26,000 men, equal in number and far superior in quality to all that the Spaniards could oppose to them. Their concentration was the glorious result of a march as bold as it was skilfully conducted.

Though Barcelona was not so destitute of alimentary resources as had been represented by General Duhesme, who had exaggerated his distress in order to excite the zeal of those who were charged to raise the blockade, yet it behooved the French not to shut themselves up there long, if they meant to live. General St. Cyr, in fact, was resolved to follow up his advantages, to seek the Spanish army everywhere, and to destroy it entirely, and then to besiege the fortresses of the province one after another. He allowed his soldiers to rest on the 18th and 19th of December; on the 20th he left Barcelona and proceeded for the Llobregat.

In allowing his soldiers time to rest and to rally, he was not sorry to allow the Spaniards also time to concentrate themselves in the camp which they had long before prepared on the Llobregat, a few leagues from Barcelona. If it is judicious to endeavour to divide a formidable enemy, it is judicious, on the contrary, to strive to find in a mass an enemy far more expert at running away than at fighting, in order to destroy him by a single blow. General St. Cyr marched with his *corps d'armée*, and Chabran's division, one of Duhesme's. To the other, Lechi's division, he assigned the guarding of Barcelona. With 20,000 men he had a force sufficient to overturn whatever he should meet with on his way. On the evening of the 20th he arrived before the Llobregat, the course of which he had followed from Molins-del-Rey to San Feliu. The Spaniards were there, to the number of thirty and some thousand men, with a powerful artillery, established on wooded heights, and covered by the Llobregat, which

was fordable only at a few points. The bridge of Molins-del-Rey had been strongly defended by means of works very difficult of access. With good troops, the enemy might have depended upon such a position and have deemed himself safe.

General St. Cyr set about making himself master of it with that art which rendered him one of the first tacticians of his age. On the morning of the 21st of December he posted Chabran's division before Molins-del-Rey, enjoining him to prepare a battery there, as if it was intended to act seriously at that point, and to neglect nothing to persuade the Spaniards that this was the real point of attack. He then directed him, when they should see that the other columns had crossed the Llobregat lower down, to fall impetuously upon the bridge, to carry it, and to place himself upon the Valence road, which led precisely upon the rear of the enemy. While he was making these dispositions with Chabran's division, he moved Pino's division lower down to the left, with orders to cross the Llobregat at the ford of Lora, and still lower down Souham's division, with orders to cross it at the ford of St. John Despi. Having passed the Llobregat, these two divisions were to turn the position of the Spaniards, to attack it vigorously, and to carry it. This movement would throw the Spaniards upon Chabran's division, if it had followed his instructions. In that case, but a very small number could escape.

The dispositions of General St. Cyr were punctually executed, in part at least. General Chabran made very cleverly the feigned attack prescribed on Molins-del-Rey. Pino's and Souham's divisions likewise duly crossed the Llobregat at the two points specified, which brought them to the foot of the enemy's positions in such a manner as to turn them. On arriving before these positions, they climbed them steadily under a well-directed fire, which proved that the Spaniards had already gained some instruction. At the moment when we were coming up to them, their second line, passing in column through the intervals, and performing this manœuvre with a certain precision, seemed to manifest an intention to stop us. But it broke at the sight of our bayonets; and the Spanish reserves, not waiting till it had evacuated the ground, fired and did as much harm to it as to ourselves. The whole mass then fled in disorder, leaving behind its artillery and its stores, and flinging away muskets and knapsacks. If, at this moment, General Chabran, following up a feigned attack by a serious attack, as he had received orders to do, had carried Molins-del-Rey in time, and debouched upon the rear of the Spaniards, not one of them would have escaped. General Chabran, it is true, took the position, but too late for his presence on the Valence road to have all the utility desired. For the Spaniards this battle was, nevertheless, a frightful rout, which put into our hands fifty pieces of cannon, an immense quantity of muskets thrown away in the fight, and twelve or fifteen hundred prisoners picked up by the cavalry. In that number was the Spanish General Caldagnes. The dispersion of the enemy was complete, as at Tudela and Espinosa.

Of the whole army of General Vives, not

more than 1500 men rallied at Tarragona, without arms, and deeply dispirited. From that moment General St. Cyr was master of the field in Catalonia, and no obstacle prevented him from traversing it in all directions, to undertake any siege that he should think fit to engage in. Barcelona was submissive, being incapable of attempting any thing more.

A fortress reduced by means of a regular siege, one of the boldest and most difficult marches through a country covered with enemies, two battles gained, a decisive ascendancy acquired for our arms—such were the results obtained by the army of General St. Cyr between the 6th of November and the 21st of December, which made ample amends for some delays for which this able general was reproached. One might have acted more speedily, not more effectively.

Thus, in the second half of December, the French were free in their movements in Catalonia, engaged in Aragon in preparing for the siege of Saragossa, masters of the Asturias and of Old Castille through Marshal Soult, in possession of Madrid and of New Castille by the bulk of the French army, and were sending patrols of cavalry through La Mancha to the Sierra Morena. They had but a step to take to possess themselves of the south of the Peninsula; but Napoleon resolved first to have at hand the corps which he expected, either to take the English in rear, if they ventured towards the north of Spain, or to penetrate into the south if they retired into Portugal—a possible alternative, and which there was reason to expect, according to the contradictory accounts furnished by deserters and prisoners.

But, at the very moment when the fortunate events which we have been recording were taking place in Catalonia, the corps on march had arrived, and more circumstantial reports threw a light upon the situation. Marshal Ney had entered Madrid with Marchand's and Legrange's divisions, (the latter having become Maurice Mathieu's, in consequence of the wound of General Legrange.) Dessoles' division, having stayed behind for some days to pacify the province of Guadalaxara, had left there the fifty-fifth of the line, with artillery and a detachment of dragoons, and itself entered Madrid after the sixth corps. Marshal Lefebvre, rejoined, as we have said, by Valence's Polish division, had descended by the Guadarrama upon the Escorial, and been sent to Talavera, preceded by Lasalle's light cavalry, and by Milhaud's dragoons. Napoleon, therefore, had at Madrid the corps of Victor, Ney, and Lefebvre, the imperial guard, and Latour-Maubourg's, Lahoussaye's, and Milhaud's divisions of dragoons, comprehending about 75,000 men capable of marching immediately. He had consequently a force sufficient for striking a decisive blow wherever he pleased. Behind there were coming Delaborde's division, which had already reached Burgos, Loison's division, which was following it, Lorge's dragoons, placed beyond Burgos, Millet's dragoons on this side of it, and lastly Marshal Soult, repassing from the Asturias into the kingdom of Leon, with Merle's and Mermet's divisions, and a detachment of cavalry. Napoleon expected every moment to receive precise information concerning the

English, before he took a definitive resolution in regard to them.

General Moore, quite as much embarrassed as himself to learn the truth in a country where the people told the French nothing, out of hatred, and the English very little more, from dislike of foreigners, even when these foreigners were auxiliaries—General Moore, after long hesitations, had at length adopted a plan of campaign. Alarmed at his situation amidst French armies, disgusted with his allies, whom he had believed to be ardent, devoted, eager to second him, and whom he had found dispirited, dismayed, supplying nothing but for money, he wished to retire, and would, in fact, have retired, if the entreaties of the central Junta, which had taken refuge at Seville, had not prevented him, and, above all, if the English minister, Mr. Frere, had not backed the entreaties of the Junta by imperative admonitions.<sup>1</sup> The prudent General Moore, who, as we have seen, had abandoned his line of communication with Portugal to create a new one for himself upon Galicia, and had marched towards the Duero, in order to join Sir David Baird there, had just added something to this resolution: that was to proceed to Valladolid, which would give him still more the appearance of threatening the communications of the French, and of serving in some measure the cause of the Spaniards without compromising either his junction with Sir David Baird or his retreat upon Coruña. This resolution once taken, the English general had marched from Salamanca for Valladolid, directing Sir David Baird to join him by Benavente. But scarcely had he commenced this movement, when, the Spaniards having murdered a French officer who was carrying orders from the Emperor to Marshal Soult, and sold his despatches to the English cavalry for a few louis, he learned that Marshal Soult was passing from the Asturias into the kingdom of Leon; that he would there be inferior in force to the British army; for it was said in the intercepted despatches that the marshal had at that moment but two divisions of infantry, which could not amount, with the cavalry, to more than 15,000 men, while the English would have twenty-nine or thirty thousand, after the junction of the principal corps with Sir David Baird. General Moore, in this situation, having rather to desire than to avoid an action, nevertheless resolved, in accelerating his junction with Sir David Baird, to effect it further in rear than he had at first designed, and, instead of forming it towards Valladolid, to bring it about by Toro upon Benavente. On the 20th of December they joined at Mayorga, having about 29,000 men, of whom 24,000 were infantry, 3000 cavalry, 2000 artillery, and thirty pieces of cannon, an excellent army, moreover, which had already become accustomed in Portugal to encounter the French. General Moore hastened to write to the Marquis of La Romana, who had just left Leon with the relics of Blake's army to seek refuge in Galicia, not to leave him alone in presence of the French, whom he should soon have to meet. The Marquis of La Romana, who had by this time become the

<sup>1</sup> The despatches of Sir John Moore, published by his family, cannot leave any doubt on all these points.

Spanish generalissimo and special commander of the armies of Old Castille, Leon, Asturias, and Galicia, had rallied about 20,000 men in a state of absolute destitution, incapable of being brought before an enemy, and thinking so themselves, for they had no longer any wish to meet the French. For this reason the Marquis of La Romana was leading them by Leon and Astorga into Galicia, where he hoped to reorganize them under the protection of the mountains, which winter rendered more secure. General Moore, less regretting his support than alarmed to see the roads of Galicia encumbered, they being now the only line of retreat of the English army, prevailed upon him by dint of entreaties to return to Leon. The Marquis of La Romana actually led back thither nearly 10,000 men, the least destitute, the least disorganized of that army of Blake's, from which the Spaniards had promised themselves such wonders. The Spanish general even sent an advanced guard of five or six thousand men to Mansilla, on the river Esla.

General Moore, having joined his lieutenant, Sir David Baird, and numbering 29,000 men, good troops, with about 10,000 Spaniards, useful at least as light troops, began to advance with stealthy step towards Marshal Soult, at the same time wishing and fearing to meet with him; wishing it when he thought of the small number of the marshal's soldiers, fearing it, when he thought of the mass of the French spread over Spain, and of the rapidity with which Napoleon knew how to move them. On the 21st he marched for Sahagun, where General Paget took some men from a detachment of Lorge's dragoons.

It was on the 19th of December that Napoleon learned with certainty, from deserters of General Dupont's, that the English army, fifteen or twenty thousand strong, said these deserters, had left Salamanca to proceed to Valladolid. Reports of the cavalry informed him at the same time of the taking of some English in advance of Segovia, who probably belonged to the corps which, under General Hope, had been obliged to make so many circuits for the purpose of rejoining General Moore at Salamanca. Napoleon knew, moreover, with certainty, that another corps had come by Coruña to Astorga. He supposed, therefore, that the English army might amount to 30,000 men, and he had at first some difficulty to account for its movements; for, till then, he had always believed it to be more disposed to seek refuge in Portugal than to run upon the rear of the French. But he soon guessed the truth, in concluding from its march to the north that it intended to change its line of retreat, and to place it on the route to Coruña. His resolution was instantly taken with that promptness of decision and that unerring judgment which never forsook him.

So far from being uneasy at finding the English upon his line of operations, he wished to see them venture still further than they had done, that he might throw himself upon their rear. He enjoined Marshal Soult, and all the corps which were on march for Burgos, or beyond it, such as Delaborde's division of Junot's corps and Lorge's dragoons, to concentrate themselves between Carrion and Palencia, and to pass the time not in marching forward, but

in rallying; for he was more desirous to attract the English than to repel them. As for himself, by a movement in rear, briskly executed, he designed to pass the Guadarrama between the Escorial and Segovia, that is to say, to the right of Madrid, and to throw himself upon the flank of the English, if luckily they should venture far enough into Old Castille to meet Marshal Soult. If, as it was reported, they had appeared at Valladolid, it would be possible, by advancing rapidly by the Escorial upon Villacastin, Arevalo, and Tordesillas, to envelop them, and to take them to the last man. But it would be necessary to proceed in the utmost haste in that direction, and to take advantage of the weather, which was splendid around Madrid, for executing that decisive march.

Napoleon, informed on the 19th of December, ordered Marshal Ney to set himself in march on the 20th, with two divisions, which, besides the advantage of having that marshal at their head, were among the best of the Grand Army. Marshal Ney was to be joined on his route by Lahoussaye's dragoons, who were to proceed to him by Avila. Dessoles' and Lapisse's divisions, the latter borrowed from Marshal Victor's corps, were to follow as speedily as their then position around Madrid permitted. In case the intelligence, still uncertain, by which this considerable movement had been decided upon, should be confirmed, the Emperor designed to set out, with the whole of the imperial guard, foot and horse, and an immense reserve of artillery, to join Marshal Ney, and to crush the English if he could come at them. He would thus take with him about 40,000 men, and Marshal Soult could collect about 20,000. These would be more than were required to overwhelm the English and to take them all prisoners with good manoeuvring.

Napoleon consigned to Marshal Victor the duty of guarding Madrid and Aranjuez with Ruffin's and Villatte's divisions, and Leval's German division, which Marshal Lefebvre had not taken with him to Talavera. He joined with him, moreover, Latour-Maubourg's division of dragoons, the most numerous in the army. As for Marshal Lefebvre, who had at Talavera Sebastiani's fine French division, a good Polish division, Lasalle's cavalry and Milhaud's dragoons, that is to say 10,000 infantry and 4000 excellent horse, he ordered him to leave Talavera, where he had had leisure to rest, to move expeditiously to the bridge of Almaraz across the Tagus, to take that bridge from the army of Estremadura, to drive it beyond Truxillo, and thus to get rid of it for a long time, and then to steal away by his right to proceed by Placencia for the Ciudad-Rodrigo road. It was possible, in fact, that if the English, beaten but not enveloped, should take for their retreat the road to Portugal, they might be cut off from it by Ciudad-Rodrigo. There were, therefore, many chances of barring their return to the sea. As for the old army of Castaños, which had retired to Cuenca, Marshal Victor, with Ruffin's and Villatte's French divisions, Leval's German division, and Lahoussaye's dragoons, was strong enough to prevent any attempt, if perchance it should think of making one. At any rate, instructions were left that Marshal Lefebvre, on the first signal,

should make a retrograde movement towards Aranjuez and Madrid.

Napoleon having thus provided against all contingencies, and confirmed himself more and more in the opinion that he formed respecting the march adopted by the English, set out himself on the 22d, after sending off the guard after Dessoles' and Lapisse's divisions. He repeated the order to his brother to remain at the royal house of the Pardo, thinking that it was not yet time to restore him to the inhabitants of Madrid, and to substitute the civil government for the military government.

Leaving Chamartin on the morning of the 22d, he passed rapidly through the Escorial, and arrived at the foot of the Guadarrama, when the infantry of his guard was beginning to ascend it. The weather, which till then had been superb, had suddenly become terrible, at the very moment when forced marches were to be performed. Thus Fortune had already changed for Napoleon; for, after sending him the sun of Austerlitz, she now sent him the hurricane of the Guadarrama, on an occasion when it behoved him not to lose a moment in coming at the English. Was it then decreed that, always successful against coalesced Europe, we should not once be so against implacable England? Napoleon, seeing the infantry of his guard accumulating at the entrance of the gorge, in which the gun-carriages also were crowded together, spurred his horse into a gallop and gained the head of the column, which he found detained by the hurricane. The peasants declared that it was impossible to pass without being exposed to the greatest dangers. This, however, was not sufficient to stop the conqueror of the Alps. He made the chasseurs of his guard dismount, and ordered them to advance first in close column, conducted by guides. These bold fellows, marching at the head of the army, and trampling down the snow with their own feet and those of their horses, formed a beaten track for the troops who followed. Napoleon himself climbed the mountain on foot, amidst the chasseurs of his guard, merely leaning, when he felt fatigued, upon the arm of General Savary. The cold, which was as severe as at Eylau, did not prevent him from crossing the Guadarrama with his guard. His intention was to go on to Villacastin, but he was obliged to pass the night in the little village of Espinar, where he lodged in a miserable post-house, like many more in Spain. On the mules, laden with his baggage, had been brought wherewithal to serve him for a supper, which he shared with his officers, cheerfully conversing with them on that series of extraordinary adventures which had commenced at the school of Brienne, to end he knew not where: and sometimes complaining of his generals of cavalry, who had been beating the country between Valladolid, Segovia, and Salamanca, for several weeks, without informing him in time of the proximity of the English army. It was left for deserters from Dupont's corps, led by accident, to acquaint him with a fact so important to his ulterior operations.

Next day, the 28d, the Emperor proceeded with his guard to Villacastin. But, having crossed the mountain, snow was succeeded by rain, and frozen ground by frightful quagmires. The troops sank in the inundated grounds of

Old Castille as they had done two years before in the soil of Poland. The infantry advanced with difficulty; the artillery could not stir. On the following day, the 24th, they could not proceed further than Arevalo, Marshal Ney, who, with two divisions of infantry and Lahoussaye's dragoons, formed the head of the column, though he was two days in advance, had not got beyond Tordesillas.

The Emperor, weary of waiting, resolved to go himself to the advanced guard in order to direct the movements of his various corps, and left the imperial guard, and Dessole's and Lapisse's divisions, which he had brought with him, for the purpose of repairing to the advanced posts. Arriving on the 26th at Tordesillas, at the head of his chasseurs, he received a despatch from Marshal Soult, brought to him from Carrion in twelve hours. Marshal Soult, after having left the Asturias, and proceeded from Potes to Saldana, was that same day at Carrion, having, on his left, Delaborde's division at Paredes, and Lorge's dragoons at Frechilla. The presence of the English, between Sahagun and Villalon, one march from the French troops, had been signified to him. Since his junction with Generals Delaborde and Lorge, he had 20,000 infantry and 8000 cavalry. He was able, therefore, to defend himself, without, however, having the means of overwhelming the English, who were before him to the number of 29,000 or 80,000.

This despatch filled Napoleon with hope and anxiety. If the English, he replied to the marshal, remain for a day longer in that position, they are undone, for I shall be upon their flank. On that same day Marshal Ney actually entered Medina de Rio-Seco, and marched upon Valderas and Benavente. Napoleon ordered Marshal Soult to pursue the English with the sword at their loins, if they retreated; but, if they attacked him, to beat a retreat of one march, *for the farther they ventured, he said, the better it would be.*

Unluckily, Fortune, which had so often been kind to Napoleon, would not grant him the satisfaction of taking an English army entire, though he had deserved this success by the skill and boldness of his operations. General Moore, having arrived on the 23d at Sahagun, and making preparations for another march, to meet the marshal, whom he hoped to surprise in a state of great numerical inferiority, had picked up a double piece of information. On the one hand, he had learned that forage, in considerable quantity, was provided for the French cavalry at Palencia; on the other, the Marquis of La Romana had received and communicated to him intelligence that strong columns were proceeding towards the Guadarrama, evidently for the purpose of crossing from south to north, from New into Old Castille. On this twofold information, received in the evening of the 23d, General Moore had countermanded the movement ordered upon Carrion, and resolved to wait before he ventured further. On the next day, the rumour of the approach of numerous French troops having increased, he became apprehensive of some great manoeuvre on the part of Napoleon, and determined to commence his retreat immediately. He had, in fact, begun it in the evening of the 24th for the in

infantry, and had continued it on the next day, the 25th, for the cavalry and the rear-guard. Sir David Baird had retired upon the *Esla* by the ferry of Valencia; and the main body of the army likewise upon the *Esla*, by the bridge of Castro-Gonzalo. Both these points of passage led to Benavente. General Moore had, at the same time, entreated the Marquis of La Romana to guard well the bridge of Mansilla, on the same river, that the French might not be able to turn it; which was equivalent to asking him to sacrifice himself for the safety of the English army. On decamping, General Moore took care to write to the Spanish government at Seville, to the English government in London, that, if he retreated, it was after having executed an important manoeuvre and rendered a great service to the Spanish cause; for, by drawing Napoleon to the north, he had disengaged the south, and given time to the forces of the southern provinces to organize themselves and to arrive in line.

This presumptuous manner of representing events, very unusual with General Moore, was suggested to him by the desire to colour the sorry campaign which he had been doomed to make. At bottom, he had never thought, when once arrived on the theatre of operations, and learned the value of the Spanish armies, of any thing but falling back upon Portugal, and then upon Galicia. His movement to the north, given out for an important manoeuvre, undertaken for the benefit of the Spaniards, had therefore no other object but to change his line of retreat, and to remove it from Oporto to Coruña. For the rest, he was at Benavente on the 26th, escaped from the net in which Napoleon had well-nigh caught him, since, on the one hand, Marshal Soult was on that same day only at Carrion, and, on the other, Marshal Ney was only at Medina de Rio-Secco. The stragglers, the baggage, and the last corps of cavalry, having in the evening and on the morning of the 27th passed, the bridge, a creation of the old dynasty, of the time when royalty, counselled by wise ministers, executed noble works in Spain, was blown up. It was a pity, and a cause of great displeasure to the Spaniards.

Impatient to come at the English, Napoleon, hastening to the advanced guard, and with his chasseurs, could nevertheless not be at Valderas before the 28th, and at the approaches to Benavente before the 29th. General Moore, conducting a solid but slow army, which could not fight till it had eaten heartily, and which could not eat but upon condition of carrying a great quantity of baggage along with it, had lost a day at Benavente in making all the *matériel* which embarrassed his march file away before his face. On the 29th he set out with a rear-guard of light troops and cavalry, when the chasseurs of the imperial guard rushed from Valderas, having at their head the impetuous Lefebvre-Desnoettes, who was accustomed to dash upon the Spaniards without counting them, and to gallop over them, whatever might be their number. He brought with him four squadrons of chasseurs of the guard. The *Esla*, which runs at some distance from Benavente, and the bridge over which at Castro-Gonzalo had been destroyed, was swollen by the torrents of winter rain. After seeking

a ford and finding one, Lefebvre-Desnoettes crossed the river with his squadrons, and, galloping upon the rear of the English, began to cut down some of them. But he had not seen the English cavalry, united in mass with the rear-guard, and at this moment issuing from Benavente to cover the retreat. Almost the whole of this cavalry, nearly 8000 strong, bore down upon the chasseurs of Lefebvre-Desnoettes, and enveloped them. Not disconcerted, he charged all who attempted to bar his way for recrossing the *Esla*, then swam over, with his men, to regain the other bank; for, having but three hundred horse, it was impossible for him to fight three thousand. Most of his men contrived to escape, but about thirty were killed or taken, and he himself, leaping the last into the river, had like to have been drowned, as his horse, struck by a ball, could no longer support him, when two Englishmen saved and took him prisoner. He was conducted as a valuable trophy to General Moore. The English general had all the courtesies natural to great nations. He received the brilliant general who commanded Napoleon's light cavalry with infinite attentions, made him take a place at his table, and presented him with a magnificent Indian sword. The main body of the English army continued its march for Astorga, whither Sir David Baird had already received orders to repair.

While the English army was extricating itself by blowing up the bridges, the Spanish army of La Romana, behaving as people do when at home, had not destroyed the bridge of Mansilla, thrown over the *Esla* in advance of Leon, as that of Castro-Gonzalo, over the same river, is in advance of Benavente. La Romana, not less in haste to flee than the English, had, nevertheless, left a rear-guard of 8000 men at the bridge of Mansilla. This bridge was in the route of Marshal Soult coming from Sahagun. On the 29th, the very day of the misadventure of General Lefebvre-Desnoettes, General Franceschi, commanding Marshal Soult's light cavalry, threw himself at a gallop upon the bridge of Mansilla, which no pains had been taken to obstruct, overthrew a line of infantry which was guarding the bridge, crossed it in pursuit of the fugitives, and attacked and overturned a second line of infantry on the other bank, took its artillery, killed or wounded some hundred men, made prisoners of 1500, with a great number of guns, and then proceeded for the city of Leon, which he forced the enemy to evacuate. Thus the river *Esla* was passed at all points; and though the mountains of Galicia, which you enter on leaving Astorga, presented serious and numerous obstacles, still the speed of our soldiers admitted of their overtaking the English army, if the ground did not give way under their feet. But the rain continued, and the roads, destroyed by the passage of two armies, those of La Romana and Moore, might be rendered impracticable.

Napoleon, having arrived at Benavente, unfortunately had not with him the bulk of his forces; for Marshal Ney, Generals Lapisse and Dessoles, and the imperial guard, though they had all hastened to join him, neither followed himself nor his horse chasseurs. On the 31st of December, 1808, he was at Benavente. Mar-

shal Soult, who had taken the Leon road, was much nearer to the enemy. Napoleon had given him orders to pursue him without intermission. But the mud was deep, and the soldiers sank up to the middle of the leg.

On the 1st of January, 1809, a year destined to be not less fertile in sanguinary scenes than the most destructive years of the century, Marshal Bessières, preceding Napoleon, hastened with seven or eight thousand horse towards Astorga, while General Franceschi, preceding Marshal Soult, hastened thither by the Leon road. They were there on the evening of the 1st. It is impossible to convey an idea of the disorder exhibited by the road, and in particular by the town of Astorga itself. Notwithstanding the urgent request addressed by General Moore to the Marquis of La Romana to leave the road from Astorga to Coruña intact, and to go and shut himself up in the Asturias, in order to annoy the right flank of the French, the Spanish general had paid no attention to them, and had preferred gaining the Coruña road himself, thinking Galicia safer than the Asturias, because it was further distant, and better protected by mountains. The two armies, English and Spanish, so different in manners, spirit, and appearance, had therefore met on the Astorga road, and, obstructing one another, had encumbered it with their wrecks. There were everywhere to be seen Spaniards in rage, halting, not because they were fatigued, but because they had been touched by the swords of our horse; English, unable to march, mostly drunk; an immense number of carts, drawn by oxen, and laden with Spanish tatters or the rich *matériel* of the English. There were numerous captures to make; but what most forcibly struck our soldiers was a painful sight, that of a considerable number of fine horses, which had died of wounds on the road. The English, as soon as their horses were knocked up, stopped, fired a pistol-ball through the head, and then went forward on foot. They chose rather to kill their companion in war than to leave him for the enemy's use. We had never obtained this kind of courage from our horse-soldiers. All the dwelling-houses along the road were devastated. The English, not finding the inhabitants disposed to give them what they wanted, called them ungrateful wretches, plundered and then burned their houses, and often expired, intoxicated with Spanish wine, amidst the flames which themselves had kindled. "We ungrateful!" replied the unfortunate Spaniards. "They came to serve their own turn, and they are going without even defending us!" The Spaniards had arrived at such a point, that they almost regarded our soldiers as deliverers.

At Astorga the spectacle appeared more melancholy than anywhere else. The *matériel* abandoned by the English was immense. The number of their sick and of their stragglers had increased in proportion to the distances travelled. A firm and honourable proclamation of General Moore's, forbidding marauding, pillage, and drunkenness, had produced no result; for this army, which supports itself by discipline alone, when it loses that by fatigue and precipitation, loses all that renders it respectable. Next to the satisfaction of making its prisoner, we could not have a greater than

to see it pass from so much regularity and steadiness to such disorder, despondence, misery, and misconduct.

Napoleon, closely following his advanced guard, entered Astorga himself on the following day, the 2d of January. On the way he had been overtaken by a courier coming from France, and had stopped upon the road itself to cast his eye over the despatches which he had brought. A great watch-fire was kindled, and he fell to reading the contents of those despatches. They acquainted him with what he had previously never doubted, the probability of a great war with Austria for the beginning of spring. The good understanding between that power and England, disguised at first, when she had been fearful of betraying her designs, her armaments, denied and even slackened when she was afraid of a sudden return of the troops of the Grand Army to the Danube, were no longer concealed, now that she conceived the more considerable and better portion of Napoleon's forces to be detained at the extremity of the Spanish peninsula. She was mistaken in supposing that the force left between the Elbe and the Rhine was not sufficient to overwhelm her; and this she was doomed to learn from new and terrible experience. But, after letting slip the opportunity when the French were engaged upon the Vistula, she would not neglect that when they were engaged upon the Tagus, and she was arming with an evidence which left no doubt of her designs. At the same time, the East was becoming overcast. It was not by means of pacific negotiations that one could flatter one's self to obtain from the Turks what had been promised to the Russians. Russia, moreover, still faithful to her alliance, at the settled price of the provinces of the Danube, always admonishing Austria not to expose Europe to a fresh shock, manifested, however, less enthusiasm for the French alliance since the marvellous had disappeared, and, instead of Constantinople, the question related to Bucharest and Jassy. This latter acquisition would assuredly have been a desirable one, for, after the lapse of forty years, Russia is not yet in possession of those two capitals: but it was a mere reality, (so at least she then believed,) and not a prodigy. She still repeated that, if Austria had become aggressive, she should join the French to make her repent it; but the warmth of her demonstrations had lost its intensity; at any rate she would be too much occupied herself on the Lower Danube not to leave the Upper Danube exclusively to the French, and Napoleon must expect that the task of overwhelming Austria, Germany, England, would rest upon him alone, as in time past. He should, therefore, be obliged to employ January, February, and March in preparing his armies for Germany and Italy. This would be long enough for his wonderful power of organization, but not too long. He turned back, quite pensive, to Astorga. His absence of mind had been so visible as to strike those about him.

On his arrival at Astorga he changed all his plans. Be it understood, however, that he did not relinquish his intention to cause the English to be pursued with the sword at their loins, but he gave up the pursuit of them in person. He

intrusted this commission to Marshal Soult, who, marching upon the Leon road, was much nearer to Astorga than Marshal Ney, marching by Benavente. He placed under his command Merle's and Mermet's divisions, which were there already, Delaborde's and Heudelet's divisions, which composed Junot's corps, and which had just joined him. Bonnet's division, formed of provisional regiments, had remained in the Asturias. But Merle's (formerly Mouton's) division and Mermet's division were excellent. Junot's whole corps had been formed into the two divisions of Delaborde and Heudelet, and it was well seasoned by its last campaign in Portugal. Heudelet's division was still behind, but Delaborde's had joined Marshal Soult, and thus the latter had at hand three fine divisions of infantry, comprehending about 20,000 men. To these Napoleon added Lorge's and Lahoussaye's dragoons, which, with Franceschi's cavalry, numbered 4000 horse. Reinforced by Heudelet's division, Marshal Soult would have 30,000 soldiers; but till then only 24,000. Marshal Ney, at the head of Marchand's and Maurice Mathieu's divisions, was to support him in case of need. Napoleon ordered Marshal Soult to pursue the English to the last extremity, and not to neglect any thing to prevent them from embarking.

Napoleon then sent back Dessoles' division to Madrid, to remain in that capital, and to be ready for whatever might happen. He kept Lapisse's division in Old Castille, intending that some troops should remain in that province. Lastly, he directed the imperial guard, and proceeded himself, to Benavente, from Benavente to Valladolid, to govern from that residence the affairs of Spain and of Europe.

There was, in fact, no other great manœuvre to execute in pursuit of the English. It was requisite to march rapidly, to push them roughly, and for this operation one of Napoleon's lieutenants was as fit as himself, especially if it was Marshal Ney. Unluckily, this marshal was too far behind to be principally charged with the pursuit. Be this as it may, Napoleon, not deeming himself necessary at the tail of the English, thought that he should be better placed at Valladolid, because from that point he could conduct the war in Spain, and be there upon the route of the couriers from France, whereas, if he were posted at Astorga or Lugo, couriers would be obliged to make a circuit of one hundred leagues in order to come to him, and he could not, while directing the armies in Spain, have turned his attention to the organization of those of Italy and Germany. He proceeded, therefore, to Valladolid, with his guard, which he wished to keep as near to events in Germany as himself.

Having dissolved Junot's corps to reinforce that of Marshal Soult, he resolved to compensate General Junot by giving him the command of the troops engaged in the siege of Saragossa, which Marshal Moncey was conducting with not sufficient energy for him. He subsequently destined Marshal Moncey to operate upon the kingdom of Valencia, which he was already acquainted with. Marshal Lefebvre, whom he had enjoined to drive the Spaniards from the bridge of Almaraz to Truxillo, had, it is true, taken that bridge, but also conceived the singular idea of proceeding upon Ciudad-Rodrigo

before he had received any order to that effect, taking a former intimation of Napoleon's for a definitive instruction. In this movement he had suffered himself to be cut in two by the Tietar, which had overflowed its banks, and he had sent one part of his corps for Toledo, while he took the other to Avila. Napoleon, highly displeased, placed under the authority of Joseph's staff the corps of Marshal Lefebvre, with which he could no longer intrust a commander so incapable, though very brave on the day of battle. This corps was divided between Madrid, Toledo, and Talavera, till, affairs in the north of Spain being terminated, attention could be paid to those of the south. After making these dispositions, Napoleon, as we have just said, removed to Valladolid, to attend there to the organization of his armies in Germany and Italy, as well as to the direction of those in Spain.

Marshal Soult had set out, with Merle's, Mermet's, and Delaborde's divisions, Franceschi's cavalry, and Lorge's and Lahoussaye's dragoons, in pursuit of General Moore. Unluckily, the road had become almost impracticable, from the continual rains, and the passage of two armies, the one English, the other Spanish. There were met with every moment convoys of stores, arms, provisions, encamping apparatus belonging to the English, and conducted by Spanish muleteers, who fled the moment they beheld the helmets of our dragoons. English soldiers were picked up by hundreds, worn out with fatigue, or gorged with wine, who suffered themselves to be surprised in a state which rendered them incapable of making any resistance.

On the 31st of December, General Moore began to enter the mountains at Manzanal, a few leagues from Astorga. On the 1st of January he was at Bemibre, where he had in vain exerted all his authority to keep his men out of the cellars and the houses before the coming of the French dragoons. He had himself left Bemibre, constantly forming the rear-guard with the cavalry and the reserve, but without being able to induce all his men to follow him, so that a good number of them fell into our hands. Our dragoons, coming up at a gallop, dashed upon a long file of English soldiers, mostly drunk, women, children, aged Spaniards forsaking their habitations without knowing where to seek an asylum, fearing their allies, who plundered them in their flight, and their enemies, who arrived famished, with the sword in their fists, and dispensed from all consideration for insurgent populations. Those who had the courage to stay congratulated themselves upon it, when they compared the humanity of our soldiers with the brutality of the English soldiers, whom no curb could check, notwithstanding the honourable efforts of their general and their officers to maintain discipline.

At Ponferrada General Moore had to choose between the Vigo and the Coruña roads, both leading to fine seaports, perfectly adapted to the embarkation of a numerous army. He preferred that of Coruña, because, in following it, three marches fewer would bring him to the point of embarkation. He had persuaded the Marquis of La Romana to take the Vigo road, which passes through Orense, so as to leave that to Coruña unencumbered. He reinforced him with 3000 light troops, under General

Craufurd, which were to occupy the position of Vigo, supposing that it should be found necessary to fall back to that place in order to embark. He despatched courier after courier to Sir Samuel Hood, commanding the British fleet, with orders to send all the transports from Vigo to Coruña.

On the 8d of January he marched for Villafranca. Wishing to halt there and to give all who were marching with him a little rest, he resolved to have a rear-guard fight at Pietros, in advance of Villafranca, in a very fine military position, and where one might defend one's self advantageously.

The road, after passing through a very narrow defile, descended into an open plain, passed through the village of Pietros, then rose again up to an eminence planted with vines, which General Moore had chosen for the purpose of solidly establishing there 8000 infantry, 600 horse, and a numerous artillery.

General Morte, with his fine division, and General Colbert, with his light cavalry, marched up to the first defile, the infantry foremost, to overcome any resistance that might be made. But the English were further on, at the second position, at the extremity of the plain. We passed without obstacle, and the cavalry, heading the column, dashed away at a gallop into the plain. There it found a multitude of English tirailleurs, and was obliged to wait for the infantry, which, speedily arriving, soon dispersed, on its part, as tirailleurs, for the purpose of repulsing the enemy. General Colbert, impatient to bring the troops into line, was engaged in placing himself some companies of voltigeurs, when he received a ball in his forehead, and expired, expressing touching regrets at being so soon removed, not from life, but from the glorious career that was opening before him.

General Merle, having debouched in the plain with his infantry, passed through the village of Pietros, then assailed the position of the English by means of a very strong column, which attacked it in front, while a swarm of tirailleurs, gliding between the vines, endeavoured to turn their right. After a very brisk fire, the English retired, leaving us a few dead, a few wounded, and some prisoners. This rear-guard action cost us about fifty wounded and killed, in particular General Colbert, an officer of the highest merit. Darkness did not permit us to push any further. The enemy evacuated Villafranca in the night to proceed to Lugo, which, it was said, offered a strong military position. On entering Villafranca, we found it devastated by the English, who had broken open the cellars, ravaged the houses, drunk all the wine they could, and who had skulked into all corners of the town, in spite of the repeated efforts of their officers to rally them. We took several hundred more, with a great quantity of stores and baggage.

Next day the pursuit was continued, and our men could scarcely advance so fast as the English, notwithstanding the advantage which our infantry had over them in respect to marching, on account of the state of the roads and the difficulty of forwarding artillery. Our soldiers lived upon all that the English left, after plundering and driving their unfortunate allies to despair.

Continually marching thus at the heels of the enemy, we came in sight of Lugo in the evening of the 5th of January. We had picked up by the way a quantity of artillery and a considerable treasure, which the English had thrown down the precipices. Our soldiers, not afraid to descend into the deepest ravines filled their pockets. They saved a sum, in piastres, equivalent to about 1,800,000 francs.

In the evening of the 5th, the English army appeared in order of battle in advance of Lugo. General Moore, finding himself closely pressed by the French, and expecting to have them on his hands in a few days, seeing his army dissolving from the excessive rapidity of its march, took the resolution, which it is often necessary to take when beating a retreat, to halt in a good position and offer battle to the enemy. With solid soldiers like the English soldiers, in an excellent defensive position, he had great chances of conquering. If victorious, he should repel the enemy for a long time, distinguish his retreat by a signal achievement, raise the courage of his soldiers, and he could quietly finish his march to Coruña. If vanquished, he should suffer at once all the ill that he was liable to suffer in detail from this precipitate retreat. Besides, in war, when prudence counsels, the general ought to brave defeat, as the soldier ought to brave death. It was, moreover, impossible to choose a better position than that of Lugo for the execution of such a design. The town, surrounded by walls, rose above an eminence, which, terminating in a perpendicular cliff over the bed of the Minho on one side, was bordered on the other by a small river, towards which it gradually sloped. Numerous enclosures covered that slope, and facilitated the defence of it. On this field of battle General Moore ranged in two lines the 16,000 or 17,000 infantry which he had left. He placed his artillery on his front, and filled with tirailleurs the numerous enclosures which covered the accessible side of his position. He called back to him his cavalry, which had marched at the head ever since they had entered the mountainous region, and showed us about 20,000 men, firmly established in advance of Lugo. These were all who were left of the 28,000 or 29,000 that he had at Sahagun. He had sent 5000 or 6000, some upon Vigo, others in advance, and lost about 8000.

The French, arriving in the evening of the 5th before Lugo, scarcely discerned the enemy. They halted opposite, at St. Juan de Corbo, in a position equally strong, where they could, without losing sight of the English, await in safety the rallying of all those who had been left behind.

On the next day, the 6th, Mermet's and Delaborde's divisions, which followed Merle's division, arrived in line; but they had left behind half their effective, and, besides this mass of stragglers, their artillery and their convoys of stores. It was not in this state that they could think of attacking the English, for they were inferior in a triple point of view—in number, in material resources, and in the ground on which they would have to fight.

Every moment, however, they were rejoined by the stragglers and the convoys of artillery, and on the following day, the 7th, they were much fitter for giving battle. But before the



strong position of the English, inaccessible on one side, since it was a precipice down to the Minho, and very difficult to carry on the other, on account of the numerous enclosures which covered it, Marshal Soult hesitated, and resolved to wait till the next day, the 8th. On that day most of our means were collected, excepting, however, part of the artillery. But, still engrossed by the difficulties which this position presented, Marshal Soult again deferred till the following day, the 9th, the execution, by his right, on the left flank of the English, of a movement of cavalry, which might shake them.

It was presuming too far upon the patience of General Moore to imagine that, having arrived on the 5th at Lugo, and having passed there the 6th, 7th, and 8th, he should stay on the 9th. General Moore, in fact, having spent the three entire days in sending off his baggage and his most fatigued troops, in raising the spirits of his army, in recovering in short the honour of arms by the thrice-repeated offer of battle, conceived himself dispensed from tempting Fortune any longer. Having realized part of the results which he purposed to obtain by halting, he decamped secretly in the night between the 8th and 9th of January. He took care to leave behind him plenty of fires and a strong rear-guard, to deceive the French.

On the following day, the 9th, the French found the position of Lugo evacuated, and again made large seizures of provender and *matériel*. They collected in the environs of Lugo, and in the town itself, seven or eight hundred prisoners, who had been unable to withdraw in time, notwithstanding the repeated commands of their officers. The restoration of discipline effected by General Moore was of short duration; for, between Lugo and Betanzos, on the 9th, 10th, and 11th, whole regiments broke up, and our dragoons were able to seize nearly two thousand English, and a considerable quantity of baggage. On the 11th General Moore reached Betanzos, and, crossing at last the belt of hills that encircles Coruña, he descended to the shores of the large and beautiful bay, on an inlet of which the city is situated. Unfortunately, instead of the multitude of sails which were expected, nothing was to be seen but a few ships of war, fit at most to escort an army, but not to transport it. The great mass of transports had hitherto been prevented by contrary winds from working up from Vigo to Coruña. This sight filled General Moore with anxiety, and the English army with despondency. Nevertheless they took measures to defend themselves in Coruña until the fleet should appear. Between the town and the heights by which they had arrived at it ran the stream of the Mero, broad and swampy at its mouth. It was crossed by the bridge of Burgo. This bridge the English blew up. They also blew up, with a tremendous explosion that shook the whole bay like a hurricane, an immense mass of powder they had collected in a magazine situated at some distance from the walls. Lastly they took up a position with the best of troops on the circle of hills round Coruña. The first line of heights, though very elevated and well adapted for defence, was too distant from the town, and might therefore be turned. It was therefore abandoned to the

French, and a stand was made on the nearer and less commanding heights, which rested on Coruña itself. All the invalids, the wounded, the lame, and the *matériel*, were collected on the shore, to be immediately embarked on board some ships of war and transports previously moored in the bay. In this position General Moore waited in painful anxiety for a change of wind, without which he should be forced to capitulate.

It was only an advanced guard which had followed the English, on the evening of the 11th, to the Burgo bridge, on the Mero, and had seen it blown up. On the following day only, the 12th, appeared first the Merle brigade, and then the Mermet and Delaborde brigades successively. On being stopped by the Mero, Marshal Soult sent out the Francoschi cavalry to the left, to look for fords, which it succeeded in finding, but none of which were fit for artillery. He lined the sea-coast on his right with detachments, which strove to arrange batteries that might throw their shot to the head of the bay, and up to the quays of Coruña, a thing which was extremely difficult at such a distance.

Obliged to repair the Burgo bridge, Marshal Soult employed the 12th and the 18th on that operation, pending which the laggards and the heavy baggage had time to come up. The bridge having been made practicable on the 14th, he advanced a part of his troops over the Mero, crossed the line of commanding hills that had been abandoned to him, and took up his position on their declivity, opposite the lower range, nearer Coruña, which was held by the English. The Mermet brigade formed the extreme left, the Merle brigade the centre, and the Delaborde brigade the right, close against the bay of Coruña. At that distance it was possible to erect some batteries, that began to tell across the bay.

Not feeling himself strong enough, however—for he numbered at most 18,000 men, while the English, after all they had lost, detached, or already embarked, still amounted to seventeen or eighteen thousand fighting men—Marshal Soult resolved to wait until his ranks should be filled by those who had been left behind, and until his whole artillery should have been brought into line. The English, on their side, awaited the appearance of the fleet, which still remained out of sight, and they were in a state of torturing anxiety. The chief officers of their army even suggested to Sir John Moore that he should open a negotiation whereby they might be allowed, as the capitulation of Cintra had allowed the French, to retire on honourable terms. Having, however, no chance of escape if the transports did not arrive very speedily, it was doubtful that they would have obtained conditions that would have been satisfactory to them. General Moore therefore repudiated all thought of capitulating, and resolved to trust to fortune, which granted him, indeed, as we shall presently see, the safety of his army, but not of his person, and gave him glory at the cost of life.

On the 14th, 15th, and 16th, the wind having shifted, several hundred sail appeared in the bay, and crowded together near the quays of Coruña, beyond the reach of the French guns. They could be seen from the heights we occu-

pied, and the sight filled our soldiers with extreme ardour. They loudly demanded to be led to action without more loss of time, for the English army was about to escape from them. Marshal Soult, who had arrived in presence of the enemy on the 12th, had employed the 13th, 14th, and 15th in rectifying his position, waiting the coming up of the last of his men, and, above all, placing on a most advantageous point towards his extreme left, a battery of twelve pieces, which, pointing athwart the English line, raked it from end to end.

On the morning of the 16th, having finally reconnoitred the position of the English, he resolved to make an attempt so as to outflank and turn their line. The little village of Elvina, situated on our extreme left, and on the extreme right of the English, in the hollow ground between the two armies, was held by a large body of sharpshooters of Sir David Baird's division. About mid-day of the 16th, the French Mermet division marched, by order of Marshal Soult, upon the village of Elvina, while our left battery, firing from behind our soldiers, caused the greatest carnage throughout the whole extent of the enemy's line. The Mermet division, gallantly led, carried the village of Elvina, and forced the English to retreat. At that moment General Moore, who had come upon the field with the determination of fighting vigorously before he re-embarked, pushed forward the centre of his line, composed of Hope's division, to the village of Elvina, to succour Sir David Baird, and detached a part of Fraser's division to his extreme right, to hinder the French cavalry from turning his position.

The Mermet division, having thus to do with superior forces, was recalled; and then General Merle entered into action with his old regiments, which formed our centre. The conflict grew desperate; the village of Elvina was taken and retaken several times. The 2d light regiment covered itself with glory, but the day ended without any decided advantage on either part. Marshal Soult, who had on his right the Delaborde division, which, if brought down upon the centre of the English, would without doubt have overwhelmed them, nevertheless put a stop to the battle, not wishing, apparently, to engage all his remaining troops, and being reluctant to ask too great favours of Fortune against an enemy that was ready to retire.

The battle ended then at the close of day, after a bloody action, in which we lost three or four hundred men between killed and wounded, and the English lost about twelve hundred by the murderous effects of our artillery. In leading his regiments under fire, General Moore was struck by a cannon-ball that broke his arm and collar-bone. He was carried on a litter into Coruña, and expired there at the close of a campaign, which, if less skilfully conducted, might have been disastrous for England. He died gloriously, much regretted by his army, which, though it sometimes censured him, nevertheless did justice to his prudent firmness. General Sir David Baird was also severely wounded. General Hope took the command in chief, and, re-entering the town, he began the embarkation that same evening. The walls of Coruña were strong enough to stop us, and give the English time to set sail.

They embarked on the 17th and 18th, leav-

ing behind, in addition to the wounded collected by us on the battle-field of Coruña, some invalids and prisoners, and a considerable quantity of *matériel*. They had lost in this campaign about six thousand men, including invalids, prisoners, wounded, and killed, more than three thousand horses killed by their riders, an immense *matériel*, no particle certainly of their military honour, but much of their political weight with the Spaniards; and they withdrew with the reputation, for the moment at least, of being powerless to save Spain.

More keenly pursued, or less favoured by the season, they would never have escaped out of the Peninsula. Subsequently, as always happens in such cases, some historians, imagining after the events arrangements which no one thought of whilst they were pending, have transferred from Marshal Soult to Marshal Ney the blame of having allowed the embarkation of the English, who ought, say these writers, to have been overtaken, and captured to the last man. In the first place, it is doubtful, considering the inclemency of the season and the frightful state of the roads, that it would have been possible to march fast enough to overtake them, and that Marshal Soult himself, who was continually engaged with their rear, could have come up with them so as to surround them. Though fortune had granted him three days at Lugo and four days at Coruña, before we can be sure that his hesitation was a fault, we should be certain that his infantry, but half of which came up every evening to answer to the roll-call, was sufficiently rallied, and that his artillery was sufficiently provided, to fight with advantage an English army, equal in numbers, and posted every time it was reconnoitred, in positions the most difficult of access. But if such a question may be raised with regard to Marshal Soult, none such can be raised with regard to Marshal Ney, who was placed at some days' march from the British army. The supposition that he could have taken the Orense route, and turned Coruña by way of Vigo, rests upon no foundation whatever. Neither the Emperor, who was on the spot, nor Marshal Soult, who had been empowered to call for the aid of Marshal Ney if he had need of him, imagined at the time that he could have made such a *détour*. To do so, Marshal Ney must have marched double the distance by impracticable roads, totally inaccessible to artillery. And, in fact, when Marshal Soult, towards the end of the retreat, that is to say, on the 9th of January, signified his desire that the Marchand division should proceed to Orense to observe the Marquis de La Romana and the three thousand English under Craufurd, Marshal Ney gave orders to that effect to General Marchand, who could only accomplish the movement with a part of his infantry and without a single cannon. Marshal Ney would certainly have remained immired and stuck fast on that route had he attempted it with his whole force.

What might have been done, but was not, was to march the troops of Marshal Ney immediately after those of Marshal Soult, so that one day would have sufficed for their junction. Now, at Lugo, where we had three days at our command, and at Coruña, where we had four, it would have been possible to fight the

English with five divisions. Marshal Ney, placed by orders from head-quarters at the disposal of Marshal Soult, offered the latter to join him, and received from him only a tardy request to lend him one of his divisions, when there was no longer time for that division to arrive to good purpose.\* Another instance this of the discordant intentions and efforts that prevailed when Napoleon ceased to be present. The real misfortune in this case, the real mistake was, that he was not personally in pursuit of the English, obliging his lieutenants to unite for their destruction. But he was detained elsewhere by the fault, the irreparable fault of his life, that of having attempted too many enterprises at once; for whilst he ought to have been at Lugo to crush the English, he was called to Valladolid to prepare to confront the Austrians.\*

His attention being more and more claimed by the pressing importance of the events in Austria and Turkey, which revealed to him the prospect of a new general war, he even decided to quit Valladolid for Paris, leaving the affairs of Spain in a state which allowed him to hope soon for the entire submission of the Peninsula. The English, in fact, were driven into the ocean; the French were in possession of all the north of Spain as far as Madrid; the siege of Saragossa was proceeding actively; General St. Cyr was victorious in Catalonia. It was Napoleon's design to send Marshal Soult into Portugal with the 2d division, with which that of General Junot had been incorporated; to leave Marshal Ney in the mountains of Galicia and the Asturias, to bring into thorough subjection those difficult and obstinate regions; to establish Marshal Bessières with a large cavalry force in the plains of the two Castiles; and to send Marshal Victor, with three divisions and twelve regiments of cavalry, against Seville, by Estremadura, whilst Marshal Soult was to march against Lisbon. Once master of that capital, Marshal Soult might despatch one of his divisions, by way of Elvas, to Marshal Victor, to aid in subduing Andalusia. Saragossa being taken, the troops of the old Moncey division, engaged in the siege, might march to Valencia, and terminate on their side the conquest of the south of Spain. Pending these well-planned movements, Joseph would remain at Madrid with the Dessoles brigade, (Ney's third, returned to Madrid,) and with Marshal Lefebvre's division, including a German brigade, a Polish, and a French, (Sebastiani).

\* This circumstance is proved by the correspondence of the marshals.

\* The following is what he wrote on the subject to the minister of war and to the King of Spain:—

*To the minister of war.*

"Valladolid, January 13, 1809.

"You will see by the bulletin that the Duke of Dalmatia entered Lugo on the 9th. He was to be at Betanzos on the 10th. The English seem to intend embarking at Coruña. They have already lost 3000 men taken prisoners, twenty pieces of cannon, five or six hundred baggage and munition wagons, part of their treasure, and 3000 horses, which they themselves slaughtered according to their odd custom. Every thing leads me to hope that they will be overtaken before they embark, and that they will be beaten. I sometimes regret that I was not there myself, but the distance from this place is more than a hundred leagues; which, added the delays to which the couriers are subjected by the brigands that always infest the rear of an army, would have put a space of twenty days between me and Paris; I dreaded this particularly at the approach of the

Thus he would have a considerable reserve with which he might overawe the capital and move in any direction, as need should dictate. According to these views, should no modification be caused by the intervention of Europe, the whole Peninsula, including both Spain and Portugal, would be subdued in two months, without the employment of one additional soldier.

But for the present Napoleon resolved that his army should rest a whole month, from the middle of January to the middle of February, the period during which he calculated that the siege of Saragossa might still be protracted. In the course of that month Marshal Soult would rally his troops, unite with them the portions of Junot's division which had not yet rejoined, and would prepare his artillery; the Dessoles and Lapisse brigades would have time to return to Madrid and rest there; the cavalry would be remounted and put in marching order; and every thing would thus be in complete readiness for acting in the south of the Peninsula. The only immediate operation prescribed by Napoleon consisted in pushing forward Marshal Victor with the Ruffin and Villatte corps on Cuenca, to overthrow the remains of the army of Castaños, which seemed to be meditating some stroke. Napoleon's orders were given in conformity with these views. He sent the remains of Junot's corps to join Marshal Soult; he had a small park of siege artillery prepared for Marshal Victor, in order to be able to force the gates of Seville if that capital resisted; he ordered dépôts of horses to remount the artillery, and sent to Bayonne for battalions of conscripts to recruit the several corps during the month's rest that was granted them. Finding that General Junot, who had replaced Marshal Moncey in the command of the 8d division, and Marshal Mortier, who commanded the 6th, did not co-operate vigorously enough in the siege of Saragossa, he sent Marshal Lannes, who had recovered from his fall, to take the superior command of both divisions, so that there might be more vigour and more combined action in the conduct of that siege, which was becoming an operation of war equally singular and terrible.

Lastly, Napoleon took measures for the return of Joseph to Madrid. That prince had hitherto remained at the Pardo, very anxious to return to his capital, but not daring to do so without his brother's permission, though urgently invited thither by the whole popula-

*tion season, which gives reason to fear new movements on the continent. The Duke of Eichingen is in second line behind the Duke of Dalmatia; the force of the English is about 18,000. It may be computed that, with fatigued men, invalids, prisoners, and men hanged by the Spaniards, the English army has been diminished by a third; and if to that third we add the slaughtered horses, which render the cavalymen useless, I do not think that the English can muster 15,000 men in good condition, and more than 1500 horses. This is a long way off from the 30,000 men whom that army reckoned."*

*To the King of Spain.*

"Valladolid, January 11, 1809.

"... I am obliged to stay at Valladolid to receive my despatches from Paris in five days. The events in Constantinople, the actual state of Europe, and the new formation of our armies of Italy, Turkey and the Rhine, prohibit my removal to a greater distance. I was not without regret I was forced to quit Astorga.

"There are 1000 men of my guard in Madrid; send them to me."

tion, who regarded his return as a sure pledge of a milder rule, and as a proof that the civil would soon supplant the military power. Napoleon, in fact, had resolved, for reasons of profound policy, that his brother should become an object of desire for his subjects, and he had required that proof should be furnished him from the parish registers of Madrid that the oath of allegiance had been taken by all the heads of families. It was not, he alleged, that he pretended to impose his brother on Spain; the Spaniards were quite free not to accept him for their king; but in that case, having no cause to spare them, he would apply the laws of war to them, and would treat them as a conquered people. Moved by this threat, and delivered from the hostile influences which had excited them against the new royalty, the inhabitants of Madrid flocked to their respective parishes to plight their allegiance to Joseph upon the gospels. This formality, accomplished in December, had not yet procured them in January the king they desired, though they loved him not. Napoleon at last consented that Joseph should make his entry into the capital of Spain, previously signifying that he would receive in Valladolid a deputation bringing him the register of the oaths taken in the parishes. He received that deputation less harshly than the one which Madrid had sent him in December, but he declared to it, in very plain terms, that, if Joseph was a second time obliged to quit his capital, it should undergo the most cruel and terrible military execution. Napoleon very distinctly discerned in the alleged devotion of the Spanish people for the house of Bourbon the demagogue passions that stirred them, and which took that strange way to manifest themselves; for it was the most violent democracy under the appearance of the purest royalism. This people, extreme in all things, had in fact begun again the work of assassination in revenge for the disasters of the Spanish armies. Since the murders of the unfortunate Marquis de Parales in Madrid, and of Don Juan Benito at Talavera, they had massacred in Ciudad Real Don Juan Duro, Canon of Toledo, and a friend of the Prince of the Peace; and at Malagon, the ex-minister of finance, Don Soler. Wherever there were no French armies, honest men trembled for their property and their lives. Napoleon, resolving to make a severe example of the assassins, ordered the arrest in Valladolid of a dozen of ruffians known to have been concerned in all the massacres, particularly in that of the un-

fortunate Governor of Segovia, Don Miguel Cevallos; and he had them executed, notwithstanding the apparent entreaties of the principal inhabitants of Valladolid. "You must make yourself feared first, and loved afterwards," was his frequent remark in his letters to his brother. "They have been soliciting me here for the pardon of some bandits who have committed murder and robbery, but they have been delighted not to obtain it, and subsequently every thing has returned to its proper course. Be at the same time just and strong, and as much the one as the other, if you wish to govern." Napoleon likewise insisted on the arrest of a hundred assassins in Madrid, who murdered the French on the pretext that they were foreigners, and the Spaniards on the pretext that they were traitors; and he ordered that some of them should be shot, further desiring that these acts should be imputed to himself alone, so that above the known clemency of the new king there should lower over the guilty the terror inspired by the vanquisher of Europe.

These orders having been given, Napoleon quitted Valladolid and proceeded with the utmost speed to Bayonne, so eager was he to arrive in Paris. His brother having, in a complimentary letter on the occasion of the new year, addressed him in the following terms: "I pray your majesty to accept my wishes that, in the course of this year, Europe, pacified by your efforts, may render justice to your intentions,"<sup>1</sup>—Napoleon replied,—"I thank you for what you say relatively to the new year. I do not hope that Europe can yet be pacified this year. So little do I hope it that I have just issued a decree for levying 100,000 men. The rancour of England, the events of Constantinople, every thing, in short, indicates that the hour of rest and quiet is not yet arrived!" The terrible days of Essling and Wagram were announced as it were in these hard and melancholy words. Napoleon set out from Valladolid on the morning of the 17th of January with some aides-de-camp, escorted by piquets of the imperial guard, which had been stationed in advance along the road from Valladolid to Bayonne. He rode the whole way on horseback. He stated everywhere that he would be back in about twenty days, and he even told Joseph so; promising him that he would return in a month if he had no war with Austria.

Having permission to establish himself in Madrid, Joseph made preparations for his solemn entry into that capital. He was fond

<sup>1</sup> To the King of Spain.

<sup>2</sup> Valladolid, January 12, 1800—noon.

"The operation effected by Belliard is excellent. You must have a score of rascals hanged. To-morrow I hang seven here, notorious for having committed all sorts of atrocities, and whose presence was an affliction for the honest folks who secretly denounced them, and who are recovering courage since they are quit of them. You must do the same in Madrid. If a hundred incendiaries and brigands are not got rid of there, nothing is done. Of these hundred have a dozen or fifteen shot or hanged, and send the rest to France to the galleys. I have had quiet in France only in consequence of arresting 200 incendiaries, September murderers, and brigands, whom I sent off to the colonies. Since that time the tone of the capital changed as if at a whistle."

To the King of Spain.

<sup>3</sup> Valladolid, January 16, 1800.

"The Court of Alcades of Madrid has acquitted, or only condemned to imprisonment, the thirty rascals arrested

by order of General Belliard. They must be tried again by a military commission, and the guilty must be shot. Give orders forthwith that the members of the Inquisition, and those of the Council of Castille, who are detained at the Retiro, be transferred to Burgos, as well as the thirty rascals arrested by Belliard.

"Five-sixths of the inhabitants of Madrid are good; but the well-disposed need encouragement, and they can only be encouraged by holding the rabble in check. Here they made incredible exertions to procure pardon for the bandits who were condemned; I refused; I had the fellows hanged, and I have since ascertained that at the bottom of their hearts the petitioners were very glad not to have had their suit granted. I think it necessary that your government should display some vigour against the rabble, especially in the beginning. The rabble likes and esteems only those it fears, and the fear of the rabble can alone make you liked and esteemed by the whole nation."

<sup>4</sup> Letters of Joseph and Napoleon deposited in the *Bibliothèque d'Etat*.

of pomp, as were all the brothers of the Emperor, being compelled to seek in outward show what he found in his glory. Joseph wanted money, and he had obtained from Napoleon two millions in cash, to be debited against the price of the confiscated wools, of which the Spanish treasury was to have its share. Napoleon had procured these two millions by coining under the new king's effigy, a great deal of plate seized at the houses of the principal grandees whose property he had sequestered for treason. Joseph, however, wished to reappear in his capital under the auspices of some brilliant exploit. The expulsion of the English from the Spanish soil after the battle of Coruña, which was represented as having been disastrous for them, was itself an imposing achievement, and one that tended to destroy all confidence in the support of Great Britain. But news was daily expected of an exploit by Marshal Victor against the remains of the army of Castaños, which had retired to Cuença; and Joseph made all his arrangements for entering Madrid upon intelligence of what had been done in that quarter. The taking of Saragossa would have been the most welcome of events of that kind, but the strange pertinacity of that town forbade such a hope as yet.

Marshal Victor had marched with the Villatte and Ruffin divisions to the Tagus as soon as the arrival of the Dessoles division in Madrid had rendered it possible to withdraw from that capital some of the troops it contained. He had moved to his left against Tarancon, in order to meet the troops that had sallied out from Cuença. The following were the reasons for this sort of offensive movement on the part of the old army of Castaños, which had passed after his disgrace under the orders of General La Peña, and recently under those of the Duke del Infantado.

When General Moore, quite dismayed at what he was about to attempt, had advanced along the Burgos road, ostensibly to menace the enemy's communications, but in reality to approach the road to Coruña, he had been apprehensive of soon seeing all the forces of Napoleon turned against him, and he had requested that the armies of the South should make a demonstration against Madrid, with a view of attracting thither the attention of the French. The central Junta, incapable of commanding, and competent only to transmit the demands for succour which the insurgent bodies addressed to each other, earnestly pressed the army of Cuença to operate some movement of the kind suggested by General Moore. The Duke del Infantado, always unfortunate in war as in politics, lost no time in sending out a part of his troops in advance of Cuença, along the road to Aranjuez. Reduced at first to 8000 or 9000 very indocile and disorderly soldiers, who had been handed over to him by La Peña, he had succeeded in restoring some discipline among them, and had successively augmented them, first with laggards that rejoined, and afterwards with some detachments from Grenada, Murcia, and Valencia, until his strength amounted to a score of thousands. In accordance with the despatches of the central Junta, he sent off between 14,000 and 15,000 men to Uclès on the Tarancon road, giving the command of this detachment, which

formed the bulk of his army, to General Vénégas, who had shown some energy in the retreat of Calatayud, and he proposed to follow it himself with a rear-guard of 5000 or 6000 men.

Marshal Victor, being enabled to dispose of the Ruffin division since the return of that of Dessoles to Madrid, immediately sent it to Aranjuez to join the Villatte division, which was already on the banks of the Tagus, with Latour-Maubourg's dragoons. On the 12th of January he moved his two divisions of infantry and his dragoons on Tarancon, the whole forming a force of twelve thousand men of the best troops in Europe, capable of overthrowing three or four times more Spaniards than he was about to encounter.

Knowing that the Spaniards were waiting for him at Uclès, in a pretty strong position, he conceived the plan of setting against them only Latour-Maubourg's dragoons and the Villatte division, which were quite sufficient to dislodge them, then making a détour to his left across the mountains of Alcazar with the Ruffin division, and cutting off their retreat so that they could not escape.

On the morning of the 18th, the Villatte division advanced boldly against Uclès. The position consisted of two rather elevated peaks, between which lay the little town of Uclès. The Spaniards had their wings resting against the two peaks, and their centre in the town. General Villatte fell upon them with his old regiments, and drove them from all their positions. While on the left the 27th light infantry broke the right wing of the Spaniards, in the centre the 68d of the line stormed the town of Uclès, and put to death nearly two thousand of the enemy, with the monks of the convent of Uclès, who had fired on our troops. On the right the 94th and 96th of the line, manœuvring to turn the Spaniards, obliged them to retire upon Carrasoso, where the Ruffin division was in wait for them in the gorges of Alcazar. The unfortunate fugitives, running in all haste to Alcazar, were met by the Ruffin division, which came upon them through a narrow gorge. They immediately took up a position to defend themselves like men of resolution, but, being attacked in front by the 9th light infantry and by the 96th of the line, and in flank by the 24th, they were constrained to lay down their arms. A part of them made an attempt to escape by the gorge of Alcazar, whence the Ruffin division had debouched, and which was occupied only by General Senarmont's artillery, which had been left behind on account of the badness of the roads. The general might have been borne down by the fugitives; but, with the same intrepidity and intelligence as he had shown at Friedland, he formed his artillery into a square, and, firing in every direction, he stopped the fugitive column, which was thus thrown back on the bayonets of the Ruffin division. About thirteen thousand men laid down their arms in consequence of this brilliant operation, and surrendered thirty flags with a numerous artillery.

Without losing an instant, Marshal Victor rushed upon Cuença to attack the little that remained of the Duke del Infantado's army. But he had fled precipitately in the direction of Valencia, leaving in our hands more wounded

invalids and *matériel*. Our dragoons picked up the remnants of his army and sabred several hundreds.

After this exploit there was a certain prospect of long quiet in Madrid, and the victory of Uclès proved that the south of the Peninsula might be overcome without much difficulty. The attempt, however, could not yet be made. It was necessary that Joseph should first establish himself in Madrid, that the French army should have rest, and that Saragossa should have been taken. The events of Coruña were now thoroughly known. It was known that the English had retired in disorder, abandoning all their *matériel*, and having lost on the route or on the field of battle a quarter of their effective, their principal officers, and their commander-in-chief. The capture, at Uclès, of a whole Spanish army, an exact counterpart of the affair of Baylen, if the capture of a Spanish army could have produced the same effect as that of a French army, was a new trophy most proper to adorn the entry of King Joseph into Madrid. It was Napoleon's desire that there should be something triumphal in that entry. He placed the Desolles and the Sebastiani divisions with his brother, in order that the latter might have with him the finest troops in the French army, and that he might only appear among the Spaniards surrounded by the old legions that had vanquished Europe. "*I sent them lambs,*" he said, in speaking of Dupont's young soldiers, "*and they devoured them; I will send them wolves, who will devour them in their turn.*" It was at the head of those formidable soldiers that Joseph entered Madrid on the 22d of January, amidst the pealing of bells and the firing of cannon, and in presence of the inhabitants of the capital, tamed by victory, resigned almost to the new royalty, and, though still mortified at heart, yet preferring in a manner the sway of the French to that of the bloodthirsty populace who shortly before had assassinated the unfortunate Marquis de Peralès. The mob alone was angry and still to be feared. But a hundred of its leaders, the most notorious for their crimes, had lately been arrested, and at the Retiro, facing Madrid, stood a formidable work, bristling with cannons, and capable of reducing the capital of the Spains to ashes in a few hours. Joseph was, therefore, received with much deference, and even with a certain satisfaction, by the bulk of the peaceable inhabitants, but with concentrated rage by the populace, who felt themselves dethroned on the accession of a regular government; for it was their own reign, rather than that of Ferdinand VII., of which they deplored the fall. Joseph repaired to the palace, where he was waited on by the civil and military authorities, the clergy, and such of the grandees of the court of Spain as had been unable or unwilling to quit Madrid. Joseph was so much looked upon as the protector of the Spaniards, who pleaded for them to the conqueror whose terrible hand was stretched over them, that it was not considered a crime to go and see him. But so much are men subdued by glory, that in reality the Spaniards were nearer to liking (if any thing they could like in the court of France) the fearful grandeur of Napoleon than the indulgent weakness of Joseph; and if the latter was the pretext, the former was the true motive, that still

caused many a homage to be laid at the feet of the new monarch.

Joseph then had courtiers enough about him in his palace to believe himself established there. The celebrated Thomas de Morla accepted office from him. Petitions were addressed to him for the mitigation of certain sentences. More than one intimation was sent to him from Seville, that it would not be impossible to bring Andalusia to terms; for, besides that the central Junta had fallen into the lowest degree of contempt by its manner of governing, it had lost the president who alone had imparted some credit to it, the illustrious Florida Blanca. For one who was not in the secrets of destiny, it was natural to be mistaken as to the fate of the new dynasty imposed on Spain, and to think that it was beginning to become established, like those of Naples, Holland, and Cassel.

Amidst these appearances of submission, one single event, constantly predicted, but too slow to be accomplished, the capture of Saragossa, held men's minds in suspense, and still left some hope to the obstinately resisting Spaniards. We have seen the Spaniards fly on the plain without any care for their military honour and their ancient glory; they effaced at Saragossa all the humiliations inflicted on their arms, by maintaining against our soldiers the most glorious defence that a besieged city ever made against foreign invasion.

We have already made known the inevitable delays occasioned in the siege of Saragossa by the movements and counter-movements of our troops round that place. Though the victory of Tudela, which opened Aragon to our soldiers and suppressed every obstacle between Pampeluna and Saragossa, had been won on the 23d of November, it was not until the 10th of December that Marshal Moncey had been able to approach Saragossa, having been deprived, in the first place, of the best part of his forces by the despatch of two divisions in pursuit of Castaños, then having been joined by Marshal Ney, and quitted by him again at the moment he was about to attack the outworks of the town. At last, being reinforced on the 19th of December by Marshal Mortier, who had orders to cover the siege, and even to second the besiegers on pressing occasions, without fatiguing his soldiers in the works and assaults, he availed himself of that very limited aid to invest the place more closely and carry the outworks. On the 21st of December, the Grandjean division, by a bold and skilful manœuvre, took possession of the Monte Torrero, which commands the town of Saragossa, and on which the Aragonese had erected a work; while the Suchet division of Mortier's *corps d'armée* made itself master of the heights of St. Lambert, on the right bank of the Ebro; and on the left bank the Gazan division of the same body carried the position of San Gregorio, drove back the enemy into the faubourg, and took prisoners or killed 500 Swiss who had remained true to Spain. That day's work had decidedly shut up the Aragonese within the town itself, and enabled the besiegers to begin the works of approach. After so far co-operating with the third *corps d'armée*, Marshal Mortier resumed the passive part of an auxiliary, whose duty was confined to covering the siege. Leaving the Gazan division on the left of the Ebro, to

blockade the faubourg situated on that bank, he crossed over to the right bank with the Suchet division, and took up a position far from the theatre of the attacks, at Calatayud, so as to hinder any attempt that might be made by the Spaniards, from Valencia, or from the centre of Spain. This was sufficient for connecting the operations at Saragossa with the general range of our operations in Spain; it was too little for the progress of the siege, for the third *corps d'armée*, formed, subsequently to the departure of the Lagrange division, of the Morlot, Musnier, and Grandjean divisions, hardly exceeded 14,000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, 1000 artillery, and 1000 engineers. With such difficulties as were to be encountered, the besiegers ought to have been able to avail themselves of the 8000 men of the Gazan division, who were blockading without attacking the faubourg on the left bank, and the 9000 men of the Suchet division, who were posted towards Calatayud, at a distance of twenty leagues. This arrangement, which was made in obedience to orders transmitted from a distance by Napoleon, whose wish it was to keep Mortier's corps always fresh and ready for service elsewhere, had the inconvenience common to plans laid down too far from the spot, that, namely, of not fitting with the actual state of things. We repeat that the thirty-six or thirty-eight thousand men that constituted the two corps put together would not have been more than enough for the conquest of Saragossa.

Both parties turned all these delays to account in preparing the most terrible means of attack and defence both within and without Saragossa. Proud of the resistance they had made in the preceding year, and having proved the strength of their walls, the Aragonese were resolved to avenge themselves by the defence of their capital for all their defeats in the open field. After the battle of Tudela they had retired into the place, to the number of 25,000, and taken with them fifteen or twenty thousand peasants, rank fanatics and smugglers, good shots, and capable of killing, one by one from a roof or a window, those same soldiers whom they fled from in the plain. To these were added many of the inhabitants of the country, whom terror had driven from their houses, so that the population of Saragossa, usually forty or fifty thousand souls, amounted at that period to more than a hundred thousand.

Palafox was still the commander. Brave, presumptuous, possessed of little intelligence, but led by two clever monks and seconded by two affectionate brothers, the Marquis de Lasan and Francis Palafox, he exercised an unbounded influence over the Aragonese populace, particularly since it had come to be known that the prudence of Castaños, which was denounced as treason, had always been opposed by him with a headlong rashness, which was called heroism. The peaceable middle classes of Saragossa were destined to be cruelly sacrificed in that horrible siege to the fury of the multitude, which governed, through the instrumentality of two monks, Palafox, the town, and the army. Immense stores of corn, wine, and cattle, had been amassed through the very fears of the inhabitants of the environs, who carried with them in their flight to Saragossa all that they possessed. The English moreover, had sent

abundant munitions of war; and thus the besieged had all the means for indefinitely prolonging their resistance. To make it endure the longer, gibbets had been erected in the public places for the immediate execution of any one who should talk of surrendering. Nothing, in short had been neglected that could add to the natural pertinacity and true patriotism of the Spaniards, the support of a barbarous and fanatical patriotism.

In the army of Aragon, enclosed within the walls of Saragossa, there were numerous detachments of troops of the line, and many very able and zealous officers of engineers. In old military nations that have degenerated from their ancient valour, skilled arms are always those that longest maintain their superiority. The Spanish engineers, who were so skilful in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, had preserved a part of their old ability, and they raised numerous and formidable works round Saragossa.

The town, as we have stated (Book xxxi.), was not regularly fortified, but its site and the nature of its constructions were such as to render it very strong in the hands of a people resolved to defend it to the death. It was surrounded by a wall without either bastions or terraces; but it was protected on the one side by the Ebro, on the right bank of which it was situated, having only a faubourg on the left; and on the other side by a range of large edifices, such as the castle of the Inquisition, and the convents of the Capuchins, of Santa Engracia, St. Joseph, the Agustina, and Santa Monica—real fortresses, which it would be necessary to batter and breach before making way into the town, and which were covered by the Huerba, a small stream, enclosed between deep banks, and running along half the outer wall of Saragossa, before its junction with the Ebro. Within the town were vast convents quite as solid as those beyond the walls, and large massive square houses, receiving light from their interior quadrangle, as usual in southern countries, having a few openings on their outer sides, and devoted beforehand to destruction, for it was thoroughly determined that, when the outworks should have been forced, every house should be converted into a citadel which should be defended to the last extremity. Every house was looped and battlemented, and internal communications were opened from the one to the other. Every street was intersected by barricades with plenty of cannons. But before being reduced to this interior system of defence, the besiegers reckoned on holding out a long time in their outworks, which were really of considerable strength.

To compensate for the want of a regularly fortified wall, there had been erected, in front of the position occupied by our left, a wall of dry stone, with an embankment, extending from the castle of the Inquisition, situated on the margin of the Ebro, to the convent of the Capuchins and to that of Santa Engracia. At that spot the town formed a salient angle, and was met by the little stream of the Huerba, which ran along it until it fell into the lower Ebro, opposite our extreme right. A *dis-de-pont*, of a quadrangular form and strongly entrenched, had been formed at the point where the Huerba met the town. Lower down the

stream, on the Huerba itself, and in front of its bed, was the convent of St. Joseph, a sort of fortress with four fronts, which had been surrounded by a ditch and a bank. Behind that line ran a portion of wall, embanked in some places, and everywhere bristling with artillery. A hundred and fifty guns covered these various works. The besiegers would therefore have to carry the line of the convents and the Huerba, then the embanked wall, and after it the houses, and to take them one after the other under the fire of forty thousand defenders—some, it is true, indifferent soldiers; the rest, fanatics of singular prowess behind walls; all provided with victuals and munitions, and resolved to bring destruction upon a town that did not belong to them, but to trembling and submissive inhabitants. Such, too, was the superstitious reverence for a very ancient cathedral, that of *Our Lady del Pilar*, that all were assured the French would fail against its miraculous protection.

Setting aside the eight thousand men of the Gazan division, who were only employed in watching the faubourg on the left bank, and the nine thousand of the Suchet division placed at Calatayud, General Junot, who had just taken the chief command, had, for the besieging of this place, guarded by forty thousand defenders, fourteen thousand infantry, two thousand artillerymen or engineers, and two thousand horse, young and old, French and Poles, all admirable soldiers, led by matchless officers, as the reader will presently perceive.

The commander of the engineers was General Lacoste, one of the Emperor's aides-de-camp, an officer of great merit, active, indefatigable, full of resources, seconded by the engineer Colonel Rogniat, and by the chef-de-bataillon, who was afterwards the illustrious General Haxo. Forty officers of the same arm, all eminent for bravery and skill, completed his staff. General Lacoste had not lost for the works of his arm the month spent in marchings and countermarchings of troops, and he had caused to be conveyed from Pampeluna to Tudela by land, and from Tudela to Saragossa by the canal of Aragon, 20,000 tools, 100,000 sand-bags, and 60 guns of large calibre. At the same time he had employed engineer soldiers in constructing several thousand gabions and fascines. In these various operations he was most ably assisted by General Dedon of the artillery.

On the night of the 29th of December, whilst Napoleon was pursuing the English beyond the Guadarrama, whilst Marshals Victor and Lefebvre were driving the Spaniards into La Mancha and Estremadura, and General St. Cyr had just made himself master of the country in Catalonia, General Lacoste, in concert with General Junot, opened the trenches within 160 fathoms of the first line of defence, which consisted, as the reader is aware, of fortified convents, portions of embanked wall, and a part of the bed of the Huerba. The plan of attacking in three places was adopted on his recommendation: the first attack, on the left, before the castle of the Inquisition, was assigned to the Morlot division, but it was intended rather as a diversion than as a real attack; the second, in the centre before Santa Engracia and the *ête-de-pont* of the

Huerba, was to be made by the Musnier division, and was to be quite in earnest; the third, to the right, before the formidable convent of St. Joseph, was to be made by the Grandjean division, and was the most important of the three, because, after taking the convent, it was to be continued beyond the Huerba on the weakest part of the wall, and on a quarter by which the besiegers expected to get access to the Cosso, a wide street that traverses the whole town, and very much resembles the Boulevard in Paris. The trenches having been gallantly opened, the first parallel was completed without loss of time, and steps were taken for opening the second, with a view to approaching the convent of St. Joseph on the right, and the *ête-de-pont* of the Huerba in the centre.

On the 31st of December the regular troops of the garrison made a sortie, which was sharply repulsed. It was not in the open field that the Spaniards could recover their natural prowess. The second parallel was opened on the 2d of January, and the following days were employed in placing thirty guns, already arrived, in several batteries, in order to destroy the *ête-de-pont* of the Huerba and the castle of St. Joseph, and also to reply to the enemy's artillery behind that first line of defence. During the progress of these works, on which two thousand men were employed daily under the direction of the engineer soldiers, the besieged threw showers of stones and grenades from mortars into our trenches. We replied to them with the fire of sharpshooters, who were posted behind sand-bags, and shot with great accuracy at all the enemy's embrasures.

Our batteries, having been completed, began to fire on the 10th, some directly, some ricocheting, upon the *ête-de-pont* of the Huerba and the convent of St. Joseph. Though the Spanish artillery was well served, the superiority of ours soon enabled it to extinguish the fire of the former, and to open a large breach in the convent of St. Joseph on the right, and to begin in the centre a breach on the *ête-de-pont* of the Huerba. This one not being practicable, the storming of it was postponed; but not so that of the convent of St. Joseph, because the breach there was practicable, and its capture would greatly accelerate the approaches. The firing had continued until four in the afternoon of the 11th of January, and, the breach being quite practicable at that hour, the besiegers advanced boldly to storm the convent. At the very same moment the enemy made a sortie, which was repulsed at double quick time, and our men proceeded at once from defence to attack. The difficult enterprise devolved on two old regiments, the 14th and 44th of the line, with two battalions of the regiments of the Vistula. They were commanded by an officer named Stahl, chef-de-bataillon in the 14th, and a man justly admired by the whole army. The convent was of a square form, and was flanked by the Huerba. The enemy had placed in it three thousand men.

At the hour before mentioned, whilst chef-de-bataillon Haxo, with four companies of infantry and two four-pounders, marched openly from the trenches, and took the convent of St. Joseph in the rear, sweeping with his fire the



face next the Huerba, which dismayed the defenders, and made a considerable number recross the stream, chef-de-bataillon Stahl advanced in front to the edge of the ditch to ascend the breach. But the fragments of the wall had not filled the ditch, which was eighteen feet deep, and cut vertically, for the dry and solid soils of Spain stand at a very slight inclination without masonry. The intrepid Junot, who was present at the operation, had provided his grenadiers with ladders, by means of which some of the party descended into the ditch, others jumped into it unaided, and followed their brave leader Stahl to the breach under a rain of balls. But they had much difficulty in climbing it. Whilst they were engaged in the perilous effort, Daguenet, an officer of engineers, ran along the bottom of the ditch at the head of forty voltigeurs, turned to the left along the side face, and perceived a bridge thrown across the ditch, and leading into the interior of the work. He mounted it with his forty men, and, rushing upon the garrison of the convent, facilitated chef-de-bataillon Stahl's entry by the breach. Three hundred Spaniards, who had been left behind by their fugitive comrades were put to the sword or drowned, and forty were taken prisoners.

This operation, which had occupied at most half an hour, cost us thirty killed and one hundred and fifty wounded, almost all of them severely, a fact which, coupled with the small extent of the works attacked, sufficiently proved the severity of the action.

Once in possession of the convent, our men immediately set to work to insure their position, and protect themselves from the efforts of the enemy, and from the numerous artillery of the place, which poured out grenades, bombs, and grape, in increasing abundance as we advanced. Every day cost us from forty to fifty men put *hors de combat*, and generally with very severe wounds.

On the 16th, the breach in the *Île-de-pont* of the Huerba having been declared practicable, it was resolved to storm it, and forty Polish voltigeurs, led by officers and soldiers of the engineers, climbed the work rapidly, some with their hands, others with ladders. Whilst they were climbing, a mine was sprung by the enemy, but without wounding any of our men. They made their way into the *Île-de-pont* and drove out the defenders, who recrossed the Huerba and blew up the bridge.

Having taken on the right the convent of St. Joseph, which was washed by the Huerba, and in the centre the *Île-de-pont* of the Huerba, we were masters of the outer line of works throughout half their extent. It was the most important half, for the works of the left were useful only as a demonstration. The next thing to be done was to cross the Huerba at the two points of contact with it which we had secured, to throw bridges covered with epaulments over that narrow but deep stream, and to breach the portions of wall beyond it, which rested on the convent of Santa Engracia on the one side, and on that of the Augustines on the other. Lastly, it was requisite to erect new batteries to resist those of the town, which became more numerous and more murderous as the assailants approached. The interval

from the 16th to the 21st of January was employed in this way.

During this time the sufferings both of the besieged and the besiegers grew more severe. The crowded state of the town, and the multitude of sick and wounded within it, had produced an epidemic. Every day showers of projectiles augmented the number of victims to the siege, even among those who took no part in the defence. But a furious populace, wrought to fanaticism by the monks, overruled the peaceable inhabitants, in whose eyes that hopeless resistance was but an act of useless barbarity. The gallows erected in each of the principal streets silenced all complaints. All sorts of news, too, were invented to keep up the courage of the besieged. Napoleon was reported to have been beaten by the English, Marshal Soult by the Marquis de la Romana, and General St. Cyr by General Vives. The arrival of a powerful army to succour the town was promised, and these news, announced by beat of drum by the public criers, called forth wild vociferations, that resounded even in our camp.

What we have related of the general events of the war is enough to show what truth there was in these rumours designedly propagated by Palafox and the monks by whom he was led. Nor, after all, were these stories totally false, for Palafox's two brothers, the Marquis de Laasan and Francis Palafox, had gone forth with terrible orders to raise the country in every direction—to Tudela on one side, and to Calatayud, Daroca, Teruel, and Alcanex on the other. All the men capable of bearing arms were called out, and were to march under chosen officers, one to every ten, in order to form an army to break the blockade. Every village was obliged to furnish pay and provisions to the men who marched. Those that did not march were to destroy our commissariat, kill our invalids, and starve our camp. These orders were given under threat of the most severe penalties in case of disobedience.

It must be owned that the Aragonese had shown very patriotic zeal in executing them. Twenty or thirty thousand men were already in motion from Alcanex, on the right of the Ebro, and from Zuera, Perdiguera, and Licinena on the left. In spite of the efforts of our cavalry, no meat arrived in our camp, the sheep sent to it being intercepted on the way. Our soldiers, without meat to make soup, and often with but a deficient ration of bread, sustained severe privation without murmuring, and anticipated without dismay two or three months more of an atrocious siege. They were sad, however, when they thought of their small number, and considered that all the difficulties of the siege lay upon 14,000 of them, whilst Gazan's 8000 foot had nothing to do but to blockade the faubourg on the left bank, and Suchet's 9000 men were living at their ease in Calatayud. More than 1200 had already sunk under their fatigues or the enemy's fire. When they were wounded or seized with sickness they were carried to the hospital of Alagon; a filthy place, in which there was only rotten linen, without victuals or medicines. General Harispe was sent to inspect it, and with the humanity of a hero he severely punished the

negligent administrators, carefully reorganized the establishment, and procured at least for our soldiers the comfort of not being worse off in the hospital than in the trenches. At last the 21st brought to the camp the illustrious Marshal Lannes, who was then approaching the close of his heroic career, for it was in January, 1809, within a few months of the terrible day of Essling; and his presence was fitted to support the spirits of the soldier, and restore his confidence if he had lost it. He was delighted with General Junot's bravery, but there was need of a commander, who, taking upon himself to modify the Emperor's orders, should make all the French forces co-operate towards the success of the siege. It was for this that Marshal Lannes was useful in the first place.

He began, by virtue of his superior command, by making the 5th corps co-operate towards the taking of the place and the suppression of the troubles without that tended to starve our camp. He ordered General Gazan, who was posted with his division before the faubourg on the left bank, to undertake its attack in regular form. By depriving the inhabitants of that ground they would be driven into the interior of the town and increase its crowded condition, whilst we should have the means of battering it from the left bank of the Ebro. He appointed Colonel Dode, an excellent engineer officer, to superintend this operation.

Marshal Lannes next ordered Marshal Mortier to quit his position at Calatayud, where he was of no use, since no hostile force could come upon us from Valencia, and to cross over to the left bank of the Ebro, to disperse the gatherings that annoyed us.

Marshal Mortier crossed the Ebro on the 23d, in obedience to orders, and, leaving the 40th of the line to support the Morlot division, which was the weakest of the besieging force, he advanced with the 84th, 64th, 88th of the line, the 10th hussars, the 21st chasseurs, and ten guns, on the road to Perdiguera. He found in position at Licifena, on the slope of the mountains, the greatest part of a body of 15,000 men, which was advancing from the north of Aragon to succour the besieged capital. This force consisted of troops of the line and peasants, and comprised detachments from the regiments of Savoy, Prado, and Avila, Jaca battalions, Palafox chasseurs and other troops, of old and new formation. Marshal Mortier assailed the Spaniards with the 64th of the line, which marched against them in front with the steadiness and resolution of our old regiments, whilst the 84th and 88th of the line, turning them by the heights, drove them down into the plain. The Spaniards did not withstand this double attack; they fled as fast as they could run across the plain, and passed within reach of the 10th chasseurs, who charged the mass of fugitives at a gallop, and sabered them without mercy.

Fifteen hundred were left dead on the field. We took six pieces of cannon and two flags. At the same moment the adjutant-commander Gasquet, having advanced with three divisions of the Gazan division parallel to Marshal Mortier, routed about 3000 Spaniards of the same body, and took from them men and cannon.

Marshal Mortier, having repulsed the levies of northern Aragon for all the rest of the siege descended the course of the Ebro to Pina, with orders to exterminate the insurgents, spare the villages that were submissive, burn those that were otherwise, and send cattle to the camp of the besieging army, under an escort of cavalry.

Whilst Marshal Mortier was clearing the left bank, General Junot had sent General Wathier, commander of the cavalry of the 3d division, with 1200 choice infantry and 600 horse, to disperse an assemblage formed by the insurgents of eighty parishes within the jurisdiction of Alcanex. They were entrenched in the town of Alcanex, which they had barricaded and embattled. In that position General Wathier charged them at the head of his cavalry, as he might have done in the plain, and with such impetuosity that he entered pell-mell with them into the town, forced all the barricades, and put more than 600 of them to the sword. The rest were pursued by our cavalry, and escaped to their homes. The town was plundered, and all the cattle found in the surrounding country were sent off to Saragossa.

By means of these various expeditions the besieging army had nothing more to fear for its rear. Still it received no sheep but such as mere well escorted, and meat remained very scarce in our camp.

Whilst Marshal Lannes was having these operations executed in the environs of Saragossa, the extreme activity with which the engineering works were prosecuted by General Lacoste, and his lieutenants Rognat and Haxo, at last rendered it practicable to make the general assault which should place the besiegers within the town and enable them to begin the terrible war against the houses.

On the right attack two *points de chevrolet* covered with epaulments were thrown across the Huerba beyond the convent of St. Joseph, which had been stormed on the 11th of January. Having crossed the Huerba at that point, the assailants proceeded towards an oil-mill, an isolated building contiguous to the wall of the town. A branch trench was carried to another point of the same wall, a little to the left; and in these two places two assaults were to begin as soon as the cannon should have made practicable breaches.

In the centre it was found advisable to forego all use of the *ête-de-pont* of the Huerba, taken from the besieged, on account of the flanking fire to which it was exposed. The Huerba was passed by tunnelling opposite the convent of Santa Engracia at the very point of the salient angle made by the town at that place. A breaching battery playing upon the convent was to make its walls accessible for a storming party. Having mastered these several breaches, two on the right and one in the centre, we should have three entrances to the town, all opening into large streets which joined the *Cosso* at right angles.

On the 26th of January, fifty pieces of ordnance of large calibre played together upon Saragossa, some opening the breaches on the right and the centre, others throwing bombs, shells, and balls into the town, which bravely endured that fiery rain, for the Spaniards could hold out against any thing behind their walls,

provided they were not face to face with the enemy; and as for the inoffensive population, they cared no more for them than for the cattle they slaughtered for their daily food. The fire having been kept up the whole day on the 26th and half the day on the 27th, the three breaches appeared practicable and it was resolved to proceed immediately to the general assault.

The whole 8d corps was under arms, with Junot and Lannes at their head. On the right the Grandjean division, consisting chiefly of the 14th and 44th of the line, was in the works, awaiting the word of command for action. In the centre the Musnier division, most of them Poles, impatiently awaited the same order. It was supported by the Morlot division, which was massed on its right to second the assault of the centre. The 40th of the line and the 18th cuirassiers occupied the place vacated by the Morlot division, and were to repulse any sorties that might be made from the castle of the Inquisition, against which only a false attack had hitherto been made.

At noon Lannes gave the eagerly desired word of command, and the storming columns issued immediately from the works. A detachment of voltigeurs of the 14th and 44th, having at their head a detachment of sappers, and commanded by chef-de-bataillon Stahl, issued from the isolated oil-mill before mentioned, and rushed to the breach that lay furthest to the right. The enemy, foreseeing that a storming party would proceed from that building, had mined the ground our soldiers had to traverse. Two tremendous explosions took place, but fortunately in the rear of our first storming column, without cutting off one man. Our soldiers rushed to the breach and took possession of it; but when they attempted to advance beyond it they were stopped by a fire of musketry and grape from houses behind, as well as from batteries erected at the top of the streets. The fire was such that it was impossible to stand against it; and the assailants, after having many men put *hors de combat*, particularly the brave Stahl, who was severely wounded, were obliged to content themselves with establishing a position on the breach and forming a communication there with the oil-mill from which they had marched. The soil turned up by the enemy's mine served to facilitate their work.

At the second breach, opened close to the former and a little to the left of it, thirty-six grenadiers of the 44th, led by a brave officer named Guettemann, mounted the breach, crossed it in spite of a shower of balls, and made a lodgment in the houses next the wall. A column followed them, and strove to debouch from the houses into the streets. But the moment any one showed himself at a door or a window, he was brought down by a tremendous fire of musketry issuing from a thousand openings. Our men, however, got possession of the contiguous houses by opening interior passages from the one to the other, and proceeding in this way towards the left, they reached one of the chief streets, the Calle Quemada, which runs straight from the wall to the *Cosco*. But the grape from the barricades rendered advance impossible, and the assailants of this second breach, though more fortunate than those of

the first, were obliged to content themselves with the capture of a dozen houses.

In the centre, the action was not less keen. Voltigeurs from the Vistula, led by a detachment of soldiers and officers of the engineers, mounted to the breach in the convent of Santa Engracia. Between the Huerba and the convent-wall, they had to traverse, unsheltered, a space of one hundred and twenty fathoms, which they crossed in double quick time under a most violent fire. They reached the breach without much serious loss, and climbed it without other obstacle than that of the musketry, for the singular courage displayed by the Spaniards behind their walls was not such as to make them wait for us with their bayonets on the top of every breach. The brave Poles, mingled with our sappers, entered the convent, drove out its occupants, debouched on the square of Santa Engracia, forced their way even into the houses surrounding it, and proceeded to a small convent adjoining, which they also carried. Masters of the square of Santa Engracia, they were so likewise of the great street of that name, which, like that of Quemada, joined the *Cosco* at right angles. But numerous barricades, bristling with artillery and pouring out grape, prevented their advancing further without enormous loss. Any further advance could only be made by sapping and mining.

A piece of open ground lay between the convent of Santa Engracia and the point of the angle which the town wall made about the middle of its extent. Our soldiers rapidly crossed that space, which was mined, and, by most extraordinary good luck, it happened that not one of our men was struck, though vast funnels were opened in the earth by the simultaneous explosion of several mine-chambers. From that angle running towards the left was a line of dry stone wall, with a ditch and embankment, terminating at the convent of the Capuchins, and further on at the castle of the Inquisition. Though it was no part of the plan of attack to carry that line of works, which had not been breached, the Morlot and Musnier divisions dashed at it with unparalleled daring, in consequence of an unforeseen accident.

The Morlot division having been incommoded by a battery placed on the convent of the Capuchins, some carabineers of the 5th light infantry made a charge to rid themselves of the annoyance. The regiment followed them, and the battery was taken. At this sight the 115th of the line, one of the newly-formed regiments, could not remain in the trenches. Rushing to the long wall between Santa Engracia and the Capuchin convent, it leaped down into the ditch, scaled the scarp through the embrasures, took possession of the wall and all the artillery, and dared to advance into the interior of the town; but there the furious populace shot down our soldiers, firing upon them with almost certain execution from the adjoining houses. Bolder at this point than at the others, the Spaniards even advanced from their entrenchments to recapture the Capuchin convent. Monks acted as their leaders, and women urged them on. But they were driven back at the point of the bayonet, and our men remained masters of the convent, but were exposed to a tremendous fire of artillery, which pierced the walls in several places. They tried to shelter

themselves with sand-bags, but, not being able to hold their ground without cover along the wall, they were obliged to fall back behind it, at the same time without abandoning it, but, on the contrary, endeavouring to secure their footing.

In this bloody day the assailants had got possession of the whole range of the town wall. Had it been an ordinary siege, consummated by the taking of the fortified part of the place, Saragossa would have been ours. But we had to carry each island of houses one after the other against a frantic populace, and the great horrors of the strife were but beginning. The Spaniards had lost six hundred men put to the sword, and two hundred prisoners, with the whole line of their outer wall. The loss on the French side was one hundred and eighty-six killed, and five hundred and ninety-three wounded;<sup>1</sup> that is to say, nearly eight hundred put *hors de combat*, a considerable loss, due to the excessive ardour and heroic temerity of our troops.

Struck by this frightful spectacle, Marshal Lannes himself ordered the engineer officers no longer to allow the soldiers to advance without cover, for he would rather lose time than men. They were to proceed by way of sapping and mining, and to blow up the buildings, but, above all, to be frugal of the blood of his army. That great warrior, as humane as he was brave, experienced a deep impression from what he had seen.<sup>2</sup>

The occupation of three points in the fortifications of the town made it unnecessary to push forward a fresh attack on the extreme left against the castle of the Inquisition, for the work now to be done was to assail the Spaniards in their houses; and as the wall and its appurtenances no longer constituted their main defence, they were of little importance. The Morlot division was left in observation on the left with the Musnier and Grandjean divisions, both together mustering nine thousand men. Our men proceeded to the taking of each house by sap and mine, whilst General Gazan was to push on his works before the faubourg on the left bank, so as to deprive the population of that last asylum. To this end he received a portion of the siege artillery, which was no longer needed on the right bank, since the town wall had been laid open, and our men had to fight from street to street.

The Musnier and Grandjean divisions formed

themselves into two moieties of 4500 men each, which relieved each other in that dreadful struggle, in which it was necessary alternately to work as sappers, and to fight hand to hand in narrow passes. Never had the like been seen even at the time when war consisted almost entirely in sieges. The Spaniards had barricaded the doors and windows of their houses, cut passages from one to the other on the inside, and made loopholes in the walls so as to be able to fire into the streets, which, moreover, were crossed at intervals by barricades mounted with artillery. So, the moment our soldiers attempted to enter them, they were assailed by a shower of balls from the upper stories and from the ventholes of the cellars, and by the grape from the barricades. Sometimes, in order to make the Spaniards waste their fire, they amused themselves by presenting a shako at a window on the point of a bayonet, when it was instantly pierced with balls.<sup>3</sup> There was no choice left them but to move like them from house to house, to advance under cover against a covered enemy, and to proceed slowly, in order not to lose the whole army in combats of that horrible kind. A long and desperate struggle was the necessary result.

The Spaniards, whom the taking of their walls had exasperated to the highest degree by the aggravation of their danger, were brought to an actual state of frenzy. They would no longer content themselves with acting on the defensive, but sought to recover what had been taken from them. In the centre they aimed at repossessing themselves of the Capuchin convent in order to outflank the position of Santa Engracia. On the right they remained masters of the convents of Santa Monica and the Augustines, contiguous to the two breaches we had seized, and they made incredible efforts from those points to dislodge us. The monks, more active than ever, aided by some of those female enthusiasts whose excitable nature renders them even more ferocious than men when they give themselves up to violent courses, led into action bands consisting of the most fanatical of the population, and the most determined portion of the troops of the line. Thus, at the central approaches, after having attempted with their artillery to breach the Capuchin convent, which remained in our hands, they dared to return once more to the charge without cover. Our soldiers again drove them back at the point of the bayonet, and this time so

<sup>1</sup> We give the precise numbers, because on this occasion they are furnished in detail in the reports existing in the war depot.

<sup>2</sup> His despatches to the Emperor testify what he felt. They contain the following passages:—"Never, sir, have I seen so much desperate pertinacity as our enemies display in the defence of this place. I have seen women come and meet their death before the breach. We have to lay siege to each house severally. If we did not take great precautions we should lose many men in this way, the enemy having from thirty to forty thousand men in the town exclusive of the inhabitants. We occupy every thing from Santa Engracia to the Capuchins, and we have taken fifteen pieces of ordnance."

<sup>3</sup> In spite of all the orders I had given to hinder the soldiers from rushing too far ahead, it was not possible to control their ardour. The consequence is, that we have had two hundred more wounded than we ought to have had." (Dated, Head-quarters, before Saragossa, January 28, 1809.)

<sup>4</sup> The siege of Saragossa in no respect resembles the war we have hitherto made. It is a business that requires

great prudence and great vigour. We are obliged to take all the houses by mining or by storm. The unfortunate men defend themselves with a desperate pertinacity which it is impossible to conceive. In short, sir, it is a war that excites horror. The town is at this moment on fire in three or four places; it is shattered by shells; but all this does not intimidate our enemies. We are working hard to approach the faubourg. It is a very important point. I hope that, when we shall have made ourselves masters of it, the town will not hold out long.

"A gathering of some thousand peasants yesterday attacked the four hundred men left at El Amurria. I ordered General Dumoustier to march last night with a column of one thousand men, two hundred horse, and two four-pounders. I am sure he will have killed or dispersed all that rabble. Good as they are behind their walls, they are just as contemptible in the plain."

<sup>5</sup> This is a fact I had from the lips of the illustrious and ever-to-be-regretted Marshal Bugeaud. He was captain of grenadiers at the siege of Saragossa, and he related the details of it once more to me some days before his death.

thoroughly deprived them of all hope of success as to cure them of all desire to repeat such attempts.

The success begun at Santa Engracia was not followed up. From that convent ran a tolerably wide street of the same name, and abutting on the *Cosco*. It was lined on both sides with enormous edifices: on the right (of the French) was the convent of the Nuns of Jerusalem and the madhouse; on the left the monastery of St. Francis. These edifices being taken, the besiegers would have a means of debouching on the *Cosco*, (an interior boulevard, as we have said,) and would be in possession of the principal and widest thoroughfare in the town.

They went to work then at house after house on both sides of the street of Santa Engracia, in order to get hold of the large buildings it was essential to possess. When our men entered a house, either by the opening made in it by the Spaniards, or by one of their own making, they charged the defenders of the barricade, and drove them out or killed them if they could. But often they left behind them in the cellars or the garrets men who obstinately remained in houses one or two floors of which were already taken. Thus, the two parties were mingled together, and the French had, beneath their feet or above their heads, and firing through the floors, men habituated to that kind of warfare, familiarised with the nature of its perils, and displaying in it a sagacity and courage they had never exhibited on the plain. Our soldiers, brave in every kind of fight, but wishing to abridge the strife, employed various means to that end. They rolled bombs into the houses of which they had secured the middle part; sometimes they put bags of powder in them and blew up the roofs with their defenders. Or they had recourse to mining, and pulled down the whole house. But when they had destroyed too much in this way they had to march without cover, and fully exposed to the enemy's marksmen. A few days' experience taught them not to charge the mine too heavily, and to produce only as much destruction as was necessary to open a breach for themselves.

In this way they proceeded down the street of Santa Engracia to the convent of the Nuns of Jerusalem, into which they endeavoured to gain access by mining. Our miners soon perceived the presence of the enemy's miners, who were advancing towards them to defeat their purpose. But we got the start of them in charging our mine, and the Spaniards were buried in theirs. A breach having been made in the convent of the Nuns of Jerusalem, it was taken at the point of the bayonet, many of its defenders were killed, and a certain number made prisoners. From that convent our men made their way into the madhouse, which was likewise on the right side of the street. But it was necessary also to procure a covered way on the left side of the street, in order to reach the gigantic monastery of St. Francis, after the capture of which there would remain nothing between us and the *Cosco*. They began, therefore, to mine in that direction.

While the besiegers' centre was advancing from house to house towards the *Cosco*, their progress on the right was as keenly contested, and was achieved by the same means. We had

deprived the Spaniards of the convents of Santa Monica and the Augustins, by blowing them up with their defenders at the moment they would have dealt in that way with us but for the sagacity and skill of our miners. Our men had then advanced, always after the method already described, along the streets of Santa Monica and St. Augustin, leading into the *Cosco*. The Spaniards had devised a new expedient to retard our progress: this was to set fire to their houses, which, as they contained little wood, and had arches instead of floors, burned slowly, and were inaccessible while they were burning. Our men were then reduced to the necessity of making their way through the street, under cover of sand-bags; but the first that showed themselves before they were protected by the epaulment were almost sure to be wounded or killed. While, by one of the two breaches on the right, our men were advancing along the streets of Santa Monica and St. Augustin towards the *Cosco*, by the second they were advancing along the Calle Quemada, likewise towards the same goal, passing from one side of the street to the other, sometimes underground by the aid of the miner, sometimes on the surface by aid of epaulments of sand-bags. In this way they arrived by these several streets at two great edifices, both touching on the *Cosco*, the one forming its bottom, the other its side; and there the two hostile parties had to exert all their courage, all their artifices, and employ the most violent means, sometimes mining and countermining to blow each other up, sometimes crossing bayonets, or shooting at each other at a distance of a few paces. In these thousand fights, the most extraordinary conceivable, our soldiers generally had the advantage, in consequence of their sagacity and boldness, and, if they often lost numbers, it was because their impetuosity in attacking exposed them openly to an enemy that was always under cover. We had not less than a hundred men killed and wounded every day since the house-fighting began, and the Spaniards, who had to brave the double danger of our fire and the epidemic, had as many as four hundred men every day carried to the hospitals. It was in one of those attacks that the brave and able General Lacoste was killed by a ball in the forehead. Colonel Rogniat succeeded him, and was also wounded; so also was chef-de-bataillon Haxo.

In operations of this kind was spent the time between the 26th of January, the day of the general assault, and the 7th of February, when the faubourg on the left bank was attacked. Marshal Lannes had ordered General Gazan to make very active exertions in that quarter, and the latter, always in the saddle though ill, and seconded by Colonel Dode, was near enough to the faubourg on the 7th to make a breach in the large convent of Jesus, which was not far from the Ebro, and very near another, the capture of which would be decisive for the taking of the faubourg. In fact, the general was able on the 7th to bring into play twenty guns of large calibre, open in two hours a large breach in the convent we wanted to take, and drive out four hundred Spaniards by whom it was garrisoned. A column of voltiguers rushed in and soon took possession of it; but, attempting too impetuously to quit the convent, which was isolated,

and to advance either upon the houses of the faubourg, or against the second convent, which it was most important to secure, they were driven back by the severity of the fusillade. It was then resolved to push forward the approaches from the first convent, already taken, to the second, called that of St. Lazarus, which was washed by the Ebro, and was in contact with the head of the great bridge. From that point it would be possible to become masters of the bridge, cut off the retreat of the troops that defended the faubourg, and conquer it at a blow. The whole artillery of the right bank was instantly sent to General Gazan, in order that this important operation should be executed as soon as possible.

In the interior of the town, where the assailants of the right and the centre were engaged, the subterraneous warfare we have described continued to be waged with the same ferocity. On both sides, however, the sufferings it entailed were severely felt. The epidemic was raging in Saragossa. More than fifteen thousand out of the forty thousand engaged in its defence were already in the hospitals. The inactive population were dying without any one heeding them. There was no time to bury the dead, or to carry off the wounded. They were left amidst the ruins and the rubbish, whence they diffused a horrible stench. Palafox himself laboured under the prevailing malady, and seemed approaching his last hour, yet nothing of the firmness of command was wanting. The monks who governed under him, retaining their unbounded influence over the populace, had every man hung on a gibbet who was accused of timorous weakness. The bulk of the peaceable population abhorred this tyranny, but durst not say so. The wretched inhabitants of Saragossa wandered like shadows about their desolated city.

In such extremities as these, men think only of their own sufferings, and do not take sufficient account of those of the enemy, which hinders them from accurately appreciating their real position. Our soldiers, ignorant of the state of things within Saragossa, and seeing that after forty and some odd days' hard fighting they had barely got possession of two or three streets, began to ask themselves what would become of them if they had to conquer the whole town by the same means.—“We shall perish in the attempt,” they said. “Was there ever such a war as this? What are our officers thinking of? Have they forgot their business? Why do they not wait for reinforcements and fresh *matériel*, and bury these bedlamites under bombs, instead of sending us to be killed one by one for the sake of taking a few cellars and garrets? Could they not find some way more useful to the Emperor for expending our lives, which they say are his due, and which we do not refuse to sacrifice for him?” Such was the tenor of the conversation every night at the bivouacs of that moiety of the Grandjean and Musnier divisions whose turn it was to rest. Lannes soothed and cheered them by his harangues.—“You suffer, my friends,” he said to them; “but do you suppose that the enemy is not suffering also? For one man you lose he loses four. Do you suppose that he will defend all his streets as

he has defended some of them? He is at the end of his strength, and in a few days you will be triumphant and possessors of a town on which the Spanish nation has set all its hopes. Come, my friends; a few efforts more, and all your toils and troubles will be at an end.” The heroic marshal, however, did not think as he spoke. Bearing himself as a general with them, but as a soldier with the Emperor, he wrote to him that he knew not when that terrible siege would end; that to fix any probable term was impossible, for there were single houses that had cost whole days.

Neither Lannes nor his soldiers, however, relaxed in activity or courage, notwithstanding their complaints. Whilst the central assailants were mining from the madhouse to the large monastery of St. Francis, they discovered that the besieged were also mining. They then charged their mine with 8000 pounds of powder, and, in order to effect a greater carnage, they made a feint of an open attack, in order the more to attract the enemy to the spot. Hundreds of Spaniards immediately thronged every floor, and awaited us steadily. Major Breuille, of the engineers, then gave orders to fire the mine, the whole town shook with the tremendous explosion, and a whole company of the Valencia legion was blown into the air with the fragments of the monastery of St. Francis. Every heart shrank with horror for a moment: and then, dashing through the ruins, the flames, and the balls, our men drove the Spaniards before them at the point of the bayonet. But the latter took refuge in a belfry and on the roof of the convent church, and, flinging hand-grenades through an opening they had made, they forced our soldiers to retreat for a moment. In spite, however, of all their resistance, we were masters of the fort, and at that point we were at last in contact with the *Cosso*. Mining operations were immediately begun to pass under it, and to blow up with still more terrible explosions both sides of that public promenade.

We had also reached the *Cosso* by the approaches of the right, along the streets called Quemada, Santa Monica, and St. Augustin. Our troops had taken the college of the Ecoles Pies, undermined the vast edifice of the university, and pushed a point towards the Ebro to join the party attacking the faubourg. The university was to be blown up on the day the faubourg was taken.

It was the 18th of February. We had been fifty days attacking Saragossa, had spent twenty-nine days in penetrating within its walls, twenty-one in making way along its streets, and the moment was approaching when the exhausted courage of the enemy would find in some great incident of the siege a decisive reason for surrendering. On that same day, the 18th, the university was to be blown up in the town, and in the faubourg the convent adjoining the bridge of the Ebro was to be taken. On the morning of the 18th, mounted on horseback with General Gazan at his side, Lannes ordered the attack of the faubourg to be begun. Fifty pieces of artillery played upon the convent, the walls of which were of brick and four feet in thickness. At three o'clock in the afternoon the breach was practi-

cable. A battalion of the 28th and one of the 103d charged into it at double quick step, and killed three or four hundred Spaniards. Had the breach been wide enough to give passage to the whole Gazan division, it would have been all over with the 7000 men who guarded the faubourg, for they could have moved from the convent to the bridge and cut off the faubourg from the town. As many troops, however, were introduced as was possible, and they hastened from the convent to the bridge. The garrison of the faubourg, finding their retreat cut off, endeavoured to cut their way through. Three thousand men rushed to the entrance of the bridge; our men tried to stop them, got mixed with them, cut down a part of them, but the rest made good their escape. The four thousand remaining in the faubourg were forced to lay down their arms, and to surrender the faubourg itself.

This brilliant and decisive operation, conducted by Lannes himself, cost us only ten killed and 100 wounded. We took from the population their principal asylum, and laid upon the town to all the fire of the left bank. Whilst this event was in progress in the faubourg, the troops of the Grandjean division were under arms, waiting for the moment when the university should be blown up to rush into the ruins. It was blown up at last by a charge of 1500 lbs. of powder, with a horrible noise, and the soldiers of the 14th and 44th immediately rushed forward and took possession of the head of the *Cosco* and its two sides. The central assailants required only one day more to undermine and destroy the middle of the *Cosco*.

However obstinate was the courage of those monks and peasants, who had gladly exchanged the monotony of their convents or the hard life of the fields for the emotions of war, their fury could not hold out against the repeated blows of the 18th. Only a third of the fighting population was left standing; the non-combating portion was in despair. Palafox was dying. The Junta of defence, yielding at last to such accumulated disasters, resolved to capitulate, and sent a flag of truce, who presented himself in the name of Palafox. The unfortunate defenders of Saragossa had so often repeated that the French armies were beaten, that they had come at last to believe the tale. The envoy therefore requested permission to send out an emissary from Saragossa to know if the Spanish armies were in good truth dispersed, and if the resistance of that unhappy city was really useless. Lannes replied that he never gave his word in vain, even for a *ruse* in war, and that they might believe him when he affirmed that the Spaniards were beaten from the Pyrenees to the Sierra Morena, that the remains of La Romana's force were taken, the English were embarked, and Infantado was without an army. He concluded by saying that they must surrender unconditionally, for otherwise he would blow up the whole centre of the town next day.

Next day, the 20th, the Junta repaired to the camp and consented to the surrender of the place. It was agreed that all that remained of the garrison should come out by the principal gate, that of Portillo, lay down their arms,

and become prisoners of war, unless they would enter the service of King Joseph.

On the 21st of February, 10,000 infantry and 2000 horse, pale, gaunt, and drooping, defiled before our pity-stricken soldiers. The latter then entered the hapless city, which presented only ruins filled with putrefying corpses. Of 100,000 individuals, inhabitants of Saragossa, or who had taken refuge within its walls, 54,000 had perished. A third part of the buildings was knocked down, the two other thirds, shattered with balls and stained with blood, were reeking with deadly miasmata. The hearts of our soldiers were deeply moved. They too had suffered sore losses. They had had 3000 men put *hors de combat* out of 14,000 who participated actively in the siege. Of 40 officers of engineers, 27 were wounded or killed; and among the latter was the illustrious and unfortunate Lacoste. Half the engineer soldiers had fallen. Nothing in modern history had resembled this siege, and only in two or three instances, such as Numantia, Saguntum, or Jerusalem, did the records of antiquity present similar scenes. Nay, the horror of the modern siege surpassed that of its antique parallels by all the might of the means of destruction devised by science. Such are the sad consequences of the collision of great empires! "Princes and peoples deceive themselves," says an ancient writer, "and thousands of victims suffer innocently for their errors."

The resistance of the Spaniards was prodigious, above all, for its obstinacy, and attested their natural courage, as much as their conduct in the open field showed them to be deficient in that acquired courage which constitutes the strength of regular armies. But the courage of the French, 15,000 of them attacking 40,000 entrenched enemies, was more extraordinary still; for without fanaticism—without ferocity—they fought for that ideal of greatness whereof their flags were then the glorious emblem.

Such was the end of this second Spanish campaign, begun at Burgos, Espinosa, and Tudela, finished at Saragossa, and marked by the presence of Napoleon in the Peninsula, the precipitate retreat of the English, and a new apparent submission of the Spaniards to King Joseph. Napoleon's manœuvres had been admirable, admirable also his troops, and yet, though the results were great, they did not equal those we had obtained against the skillfully organized troops of Austria, Prussia, and Russia. It seemed as though so much science, experience, and valour were baffled by the inexperience, and disorganization of the Spanish armies; as the skill of a master of fence is sometimes defeated by the awkwardness of one who had never before handled a sword. In the open field the Spaniards did not stand their ground, but fled, leaving behind them their muskets, cannons, and flags; but they themselves were not taken, and we had yet to conquer their vast plains, their rugged mountains, their consuming climate, their hatred of the foreigner, their alacrity to begin again a kind of adventures that had cost them little more than the trouble of running away, which was easy for men so agile and so denuded; and

from time to time also we had to vanquish some terrible resistance behind walls, like that of Saragossa! It is true, however, that Saragossa was the last effort of this kind to be apprehended on the part of the Spaniards. Indefatigable as they were, they might be wearied out; blind as they were, they might be enlightened, and made to appreciate the advantages of the government which Napoleon brought them by his brother's hand. After Espinosa, Tudela, Somo-Sierra, Coruña, Uclès, and Saragossa, they were actually prostrate and disheartened, at least for the time; and if no new complications of general policy afforded them aid, they were once more about to be regenerated by a foreign dynasty. But the secret of destiny was then unpenetrated and impenetrable. On receiving a letter from Prince Cambacérès, wishing him a good year, Napoleon replied, "In order that you may address the same wish to me thirty times over again, *we must be discreet.*" But having discovered the necessity of being discreet, would he be able to be so? There, we repeat, was the question,

the sole question. He alone, under God, held in his hands the destiny of the Spaniards, the Germans, the Poles, the Italians, and, unfortunately, of the French as well as all the rest.

Whilst his armies, after resting a brief space, were preparing to march, that of Marshal Soult from Coruna to Lisbon, that of Marshal Victor from Madrid to Seville, that of Aragon from Saragossa to Valencia, we have to follow himself from the summits of the Guadarrama to the banks of the Danube, and from Somo-Sierra to Essling and Wagram. He had still some fair days to hope for, because it was still time to be discreet, and the last most irremediable faults had not been committed. It was not impossible, in fact, though doubtful, considering the course things were taking, that Spain should be regenerated by his hands, that Italy should be emancipated from the Austrians, that France should remain great as he had made her, and that his tomb should be reared on the banks of the Seine, without having rested for a while on the remote verge of the ocean.



## BOOK XXXIV.

## RATISBON.

Arrival of Napoleon in Paris on the night of January 23, 1809—Reasons for his sudden Return—Material Change in Public Opinion—Increasing Disapprobation of the War in Spain—Disgrace of M. de Talleyrand, and Danger of M. Fouché—Napoleon's Attitude with regard to the Diplomacy of Europe—He is silent with the Ambassador of Austria, and explains himself frankly with the Ambassadors of the other Powers—His Efforts to prevent War; but his Resolution to wage it terribly if he is forced to take up Arms again—His intimacy with M. de Romanzoff—Call on Russia for Co-operation—Vast military Preparations—Composition of the Armies of Germany and Italy—The Princes of the Confederation required to prepare their Contingents—First Movement of Troops towards the Upper Palatinate, Bavaria, and Friuli—Financial Means adjusted to Military Means—Effect of Napoleon's Manifestations on Europe—Exasperation and Uneasiness of the Court of Austria, in consequence of the Events in Spain—Driven to choose finally between Disarming and War, it adopts the latter Alternative—Union of Austria with England—Endeavours of the Austrian Cabinet to effect Peace between the English and the Turks, and to detach Russia from France—Alexander's growing Coldness towards Napoleon—Its causes—Alexander very much deprecates a War between France and Austria—Falling in his Efforts to prevent it, and not willing yet to abandon the Alliance of France, he adopts an ambiguous Line of Conduct—Great Preparations for terminating the War in Finland, and recommending that with Turkey—An Army of Observation sent into Galicia, under Pretext of co-operating with France—Austria resolves to begin the War in April—Declaration of M. de Metternich in Paris—War being now certain, Napoleon hastens his Preparations—Anticipated Departure of all the Reinforcements—The Army of Germany distributed into three principal Bodies—Parts assigned to Marshals Davout, Lannes, and Massena—Prince Berthier sets out for Germany with contingent Instructions, and Napoleon remains in Paris to complete his Preparations—Passage of the Inn, on the 10th of April, by the Austrians, and March of the Archduke Charles on the Isar—Passage of the Isar, and taking of Landshut—Design of the Archduke Charles to surprise the French before their Concentration, by crossing the Danube between Ratisbon and Donsauwerth—His Arrangements for the Purpose of overwhelming Marshal Davout at Ratisbon—Sudden and fortunate Arrival of Napoleon on the Theatre of Operations—Bold plan of Concentration—Difficult March of Marshal Davout—He encounters the Austrians between Teugen and Haussen—Battle of Teugen. April 19—Junction of Marshal Davout's Corps d'Armée with Napoleon—With half that Corps, and the Bavarians and Wurtembergers, Napoleon breaks the Archduke Charles's Line, extending from Munich to Ratisbon—Battle of Abensberg, April 20—Napoleon follows up that Operation by marching on the Isar, and taking Landshut on the 21st—Battle of Eckmühl, the 22d—The Archduke retreats into Bohemia—Taking of Ratisbon—Character of the Operations executed by Napoleon during these five Days—Their great military and political Results.

HAVING left Valladolid on horseback on the 17th of January, 1809, having reached Burgos on the 18th, and Bayonne on the 19th, where he stopped merely to despatch certain orders, Napoleon took coach there and arrived in the Tuileries on the night of the 22d, surprising everybody by the promptitude of his appearance. He was not expected back so soon, and his abrupt return naturally excited some perturbation both in France and Europe. The reasons for the one and for the other were the same. He had quitted Valladolid, leaving to his generals, unfortunately divided and feebly held together by Joseph's timid command, the task of completing the conquest of Spain; he had quitted, because from all quarters he had received intelligence that Austria was more actively than ever prosecuting the military preparations she had so often intermitted and renewed during the last two years; because he was furnished from Vienna, Munich, Dresden, and Milan with precise details of those preparations, so as to leave no doubt of the imminence of the danger; because from Constantinople he had reports of the incredible efforts of Austria to make the Turks break with France and to reconcile them with England; and lastly, because it was intimated to him from Paris that there was a strange uneasiness abroad, that intrigues were timidly but visibly urged at the court, that bold language was uttered in the town, and that everywhere, in short, people were uneasy, discontented, ill-disposed, and ill-spoken. In the sudden irritation of his passionate nature, he could not help returning immediately to France. Those who both within and without had provoked his return might expect to feel its consequences. European diplomacy prognosticated an explosion. The afflicted court dreaded some act of severity.

Napoleon was, in fact, about to find France such as he had not yet seen her. Though during the ten years of his reign he might have discerned through all her admiration for him some symptoms of distrust and even of disapprobation, he had never known her such as she was now depicted to him by some faithful servants, and as he was about to behold her with his own eyes. This change was entirely owing to the Spanish war, which was beginning to produce its disastrous consequences.

Public opinion had from the first condemned the enterprise itself as likely to augment the heavy burden with which the empire was already encumbered. The form, too, had been censured as nothing but a perfidy towards stupified and helpless princes. But the public had relied on the genius and the good fortune of Napoleon to conquer these new difficulties; they had been dazzled and exalted by the homages rendered to him at Erfurth, and thus they had fluctuated between fear, hope, and gratified pride. Then that very campaign in which it had seemed as though his mere presence sufficed to scatter the levies *en masses* of the Spaniards had suggested painful reflections. He had been obliged to transfer his valiant armies from the north, where they were still necessary, to the south, whence no serious danger threatened France; to spread them over a devouring soil, where they exhausted themselves in destroying gatherings that nowhere stood their ground, but that revived incessantly in guerillas when they could no longer give battle as regular armies; to force the English to re-embark, who retired defending themselves vigorously, and soon showed themselves again on other points of the coast, displaying as much mobility with their ships as the Spaniards with their legs. The universal cry was, that the

Spanish war was a gulf to swallow up much money and many men for a result which was very uncertain, which was no doubt desirable in the age of Louis XIV., but infinitely less important at an epoch when France was mistress of the continent; which, moreover, might very well have been postponed in presence of so many other unfinished enterprises, and which would be sure to render more difficult that general peace which was already so difficult and so justly desired. But what completed the public disapprobation was the very general conviction that Austria, taking advantage of the departure of the French armies for the Peninsula, would seize the opportunity to recommence the war with better chances of success. To this certainty was added the fear that other powers would join her, and that the coalition would again become general. Thus in one fault were seen a thousand faults linked one with another, and importing an interminable series of disastrous consequences. At the same time, reiterated summonses, addressed not only to the class of 1809, but to that of 1810, levied a year in advance, and even to the anterior classes of 1806, 1807, 1808, and 1809, which had supposed themselves freed from liability, were beginning to produce universal dissatisfaction in families, and make them feel as a keen affliction that war which, until then, had been only an occasion for triumph, a subject of pride, a means for making proofs of imperial munificence to old soldiers descend into the most sequestered rural districts. The old royalists, partly converted, had hitherto held their peace, and so had the clergy; but now the most inveterate among them found in the events in Spain and Austria, and in the grievances of families, a pretext for bitter invectives. To the clergy, usually united with the royalists in interest and in sentiment, the ill usage dealt to the Pope at Rome was quite as offensive as the forced renunciations of Bayonne were to the royalists. Hence many *curés*, both in town and country, indulged in very equivocal language in their pulpits, and, under pretext of preaching Christian submission, they were beginning to speak to their flocks as the church is used to do in times of persecution.

People expressed themselves in public places with strange freedom, and that restless Paris, so turbulent or so docile by turns, so disparaging or so enthusiastic in its admiration, never wholly obedient or wholly disobedient, and of which one may always expect a return to discretion at the moment when it is most extravagant, or a lapse into folly in the midst of its steadiest mood,—Paris, almost weary of admiring its Emperor, forgetting even the gratitude it owed him for having put down the scaffold and restored the altar, and for having brought back security, wealth, and pleasure; Paris, now liked to note his errors, to criticize his faults, and whilst enjoying the satisfaction of inveighing against its ruler, it was beginning to entertain serious apprehensions for the future, which it translated into sad and often bitter language. The public funds, notwithstanding the continual purchases of the Treasury, fell below eighty francs, the price declared normal by the Emperor for the five per cents., and would have fallen much lower but for the efforts made to keep them up.

Nor was there less uneasiness and frowardness in the governmental circles. The legislative body had remained assembled during the whole time of Napoleon's brief campaign beyond the Pyrenees. It had been occupied, as usual at that period, not with political, but with financial and legislative matters. It had had to discuss the Code of Criminal Instruction, a difficult subject, and one likely to awaken many an old dissension. The oppositionists, then a very small body, which had never been used to muster more than from ten to fifteen votes, had now been able to meet the government with as many as eighty to a hundred negative votes, out of a total of 250 to 280 voters, in the debates on the several articles of that code. Perceiving with his usual clear discernment this revival of the spirit of contradiction, and fearing to excite it by bringing under discussion a code which brought so strongly into collision the old *penchans* of one party for liberty, of another for authority, the arch-chancellor Cambacérès had warned the Emperor of the danger, and had sought to dissuade him from terminating the Code of Criminal Instruction in that year. He would rather have chosen a time when members were more inclined to approbation, and when the Emperor should be present, for every body grew bolder in his absence. But Napoleon, ignoring all obstacles, had resolved that the Code of Criminal Instruction should be discussed that very year, and vehement debates, followed by votes more than usually divided, had astonished reflecting minds, and had contributed to indispose a master who, though absent, was attentive to all that occurred in France.

Encouraged by that absence, certain persons, too, had given free course to their tongues, and to their propensity to intrigue. Two especially had imprudently forgotten the submissiveness to which they had seemed inured for nearly ten years. These were MM. Fouché and de Talleyrand. We have elsewhere made known the characters and the positions during the first year of the consulate of these two very dissimilar and mutually hostile personages, the most important of the day after the arch-chancellor Cambacérès. The latter, though less consulted than formerly, always strove in secret, and without ostentation, to incline Napoleon's mind to moderation and prudence, wherein he succeeded much more seldom than formerly. Events were now beginning to weary and sadden him, and he was daily become more and more disposed to retire into the background, a thing which is always easy to do, for the crowded actors on the world's stage are never loth that others should make room for them. Napoleon alone noticed the fact with regret, for he valued his signal prudence, though often irksome to himself. The public thought, therefore, much less than before of the prince arch-chancellor. MM. Fouché and de Talleyrand, on the other hand, liked much to be thought of, and gladly drew upon themselves whatever attention a public could bestow whose thoughts were all but engrossed by Napoleon alone. M. Fouché, who was an excellent minister of police in the early days of the consulate, by reason of his indulgent indifference towards all parties, which led him to deal tenderly with everybody, had yet two serious defects for a minister of police, namely, an anxiety to magnify himself

at the expense of the government, and a propensity to meddle in every thing. Whenever he mitigated or prevented an act of rigour, he attributed the merit to himself, giving the parties interested to understand, that but for him they would have suffered far more severely from the tyranny of an impetuous master. He affected to curb the headlong zeal of the prefect of police, Dubois, who was personally devoted to the Emperor, ridiculed his alleged discoveries, and treated as chimerical all the plots denounced by that functionary. In this M. Fouché may have been right, but he, too, had his own excesses of zeal. He liked to meddle with every thing, in order to appear influential in every thing. Recently, in the desire to give himself importance, he had taken upon him to recommend a divorce to the Empress Josephine, believing that he should thus gratify Napoleon by bringing about a sacrifice that the latter ardently desired but durst not demand. This self-seeking and indiscreet interference in what did not concern him had already gone near to bring M. Fouché into disgrace with Napoleon, who naturally did not choose that others should exalt themselves at his expense—should depict him as stern and cruel, and appropriate to themselves the honours of indulgence—should affect incredulity with regard to plots that might compromise the safety of the government—and should presume to take the initiative in weighty state or family matters which concerned himself alone, and the maturity of which he alone could and should determine.

A very recent circumstance had given him an opportunity to signify his sentiments in this respect, and he had done so in an unpleasant way for M. Fouché. A veteran officer, General Malet; an incorrigible conspirator, Servan, formerly minister of war; an ex-conventional, Florent Guyot, an obscure *employé* in the department of public instruction, were compromised in a plot of no very serious nature, but which was so far significant, as it marked a beginning of resistance to absolute power. There was only one thing of moment in the matter, and no one then took note of it, namely, a scheme that had taken hold of General Malet's mind, to avail himself of one of Napoleon's frequent absences in war in order to declare the death of the Emperor and provoke an insurrection. Whether this scheme of General Malet's, which he afterwards put in operation, was then only in the germ, or was ripened in the plot which M. Dubois supposed he had discovered, it is impossible to decide. M. Fouché rallied M. Dubois a good deal, and the latter, feeling that he was supported, treated his superior with little respect. Napoleon having been informed in Spain of this disagreement, and not choosing that the minister of police should play the skeptic in matters of conspiracy, or should perhaps have an opportunity of ingratiating himself with the *corps d'état*, by hushing up an affair in which several of their members were compromised, gave full support to M. Dubois, and ordered that the question should be examined in a council presided over by Prince Cambacérès. The prudent arch-chancellor pacified the quarrel by deciding that if there were no grounds for further prosecuting the inquiry, at least there was great attention to be given to these first symptoms of the spirit of

revolt. M. Fouché was sharply reprimanded by order of the Emperor. He had just been still more harshly reproved for his proposal of a divorce. This proposal, spontaneously made by the minister of police to the Empress Josephine, had struck the latter as dictated by the Emperor himself, for she could not suppose that a minister would have taken it upon himself to risk such a step without authority, and there had ensued domestic agitations that had strongly affected Napoleon. To insure the stability that was passing away from him, he desired an heir, and began gradually to entertain the project of a divorce. But the nearer he approached the realization of that project, the more unwilling he was to anticipate the poignant distress it must occasion him. M. Fouché was, therefore, disavowed as regarded this matter, and condemned to make humiliating excuses to the Empress. M. de Cambacérès was again the intermediary and the pacificator on the occasion. But from thenceforth M. Fouché might perceive the rapid decline of his credit.

As for M. de Talleyrand, his situation was likewise very much compromised, and through his own fault. He had already given many occasions of distrust and displeasure to Napoleon, particularly in quitting the ministry of foreign affairs, in 1807, for the vain motive of becoming a grand dignitary of the empire. He had regained the imperial favour by becoming the active instrument of the policy that had brought about the war in Spain, and Napoleon had by turns taken him to Erfurth or left him in Paris, in order to palliate the offensiveness of that policy in the eyes of European diplomacy. But M. de Talleyrand was of all men the least capable of resisting the opinion of the day, and, the Spanish war having at last incurred universal reprobation, it was now, in his eyes, good for nothing but to be disavowed. Accordingly, he failed not to say that he had not advised it, his grounds for the assertion, no doubt, being, that among the projects proposed he had preferred the dismemberment of Spain to the usurpation of the crown. Once in the way of disavowal, he went back to the affair of the Duke d'Enghien, for in that moment of disfavour censure fastened upon all the faults that Napoleon might have committed, and M. de Talleyrand would not own that he was an accomplice in any of them. His imprudence was great, for he could not fail to be soon denounced to the Emperor.

His misdeeds were not confined to some groundless disavowals. He had come to a reconciliation with M. Fouché, after ten years of mutual hatred and vilification. As mutually portrayed, the one was a frivolous intriguer, affecting to direct a diplomacy which went of itself, aided by victory; the other was a subaltern intriguer, teasing the Emperor with vulgar denunciations, and pompously parading a system of police which the general submission rendered easy, and even useless. M. de Talleyrand despised the vulgarity of M. Fouché; the latter the frivolity of M. de Talleyrand. Nevertheless, as though some serious contingency had required them to forget their old animosities, MM. de Talleyrand and Fouché had become reconciled, and publicly visited each other, to everybody's surprise. The real motive of their reconciliation was, that circumstance

might soon occur in which their union would be necessary to both. It was strongly surmised, in fact, that Napoleon would end by encountering the poniard of a fanatic in Spain, or a cannon-ball in Austria. MM. Fouché and de Talleyrand being well inclined to believe in the fall of an order of things which they no longer liked, seemed to share the belief that Napoleon's person would infallibly succumb before a peril braved too often. "What will become of us?—what shall we do?" were the questions they had asked themselves, and for which they had certainly found no answer. But the persons who had brought them together, exaggerating, as usual, the semi-confidential communications between the two principals, alleged that a whole plan of government had been prepared by them in case Napoleon should fall. There was even ascribed to them the idea of transmitting the imperial crown to Murat, who, before repairing to Naples, had exhaled in Paris his dissatisfaction at not being king of Spain.

These idle rumours were an unworthy the notice of history did they not indicate a commencing change in men's minds, a result of Napoleon's faults, and if they had not had the unfortunate effect of keeping foreigners awake to what was passing in Paris, and persuading them that Napoleon's authority was much weakened, that the nation was disgusted with his policy, that his means of action were much diminished, and that the moment was come to declare war against him again. It is certain that the state of men's minds in Paris at that time acted strongly on the minds of Europe generally, and contributed extremely to rekindle war, as we shall presently see.

Napoleon knew before he left Valladolid a great part of what we have just related, and it filled him with an anger he could not contain. On the eve of his departure, hearing that the grenadiers of the old guard were murmuring because they were left in Spain, at least for a while, and learning too that General Legendre, one of the signers of the capitulation of Baylen, was to appear before him in a review he was about to hold, Napoleon gave way to impulses of anger, which deeply afflicted those who witnessed them. Traversing on foot the ranks of his grenadiers, who presented arms to him, whether it was he had heard some murmur, or that he had recognised one of the malecontents, he snatched the musket out of the man's hands, and pulling him to him, "Wretch!" he said, "you deserve that I should have you shot, and I have almost a mind to do so." Then flinging him back into the ranks, and addressing his comrades, "Ha!" said he, "I know it; you want to get back to Paris, to your mistresses and your amusements; but I will keep you under arms till you are eighty years old!" Afterwards, perceiving General Legendre, he seized his hand and said: "That hand, general—that hand; how is it that it did not wither up in signing the capitulation of Baylen?" The unfortunate general seemed overwhelmed with shame, and every one bent before the inflamed visage of Napoleon, whilst secretly blaming these inordinate displays of violence.

He then set out for Paris where he arrived, as we have said, with a rapidity equal to his passion. He had received many letters in Spain, for he had numerous correspondents who

communicated to him all they thought, and all they picked up.<sup>1</sup> He had learned much on the road, rapidly as he travelled; he had given a great number of orders; in particular he had ordered the arrest of an abbé Anglade, in the Gironde, who had spoken ill of the conscription in the pulpit, and he had summoned to Paris the archbishop of Bordeaux, who had tolerated the abbé Anglade's sermons. He had scarcely entered the Tuileries when he was beset with thousands of reports on what had occurred in his absence. Highly exaggerated as they were, they could not deceive a mind so sagacious as his; but an angry man readily listens to what coincides with his present passion, and Napoleon believed, or appeared to believe, many unlikely things. He sent for the arch-chancellor Cambacérès, and repeated to him with extreme animation all that had been reported to him, inveighing especially against MM. Fouché and de Talleyrand, who, he maintained, could not have made up their quarrel without very bad intentions. The arch-chancellor strove to calm him, but with imperfect success. What incensed Napoleon was, that the offending persons disposed of the succession to his crown as though his death was certain; what incensed him still more was, the disavowal of his policy by a man who had been its accomplice, and who had been taken to Erfurth and left in Paris to be its apologist. Hence the main force of the storm was destined to fall on the head of M. de Talleyrand, M. Fouché having already been sharply reprimanded in writing, and not having yet filled up the measure of his offences sufficiently to be sacrificed.

In a council of ministers, at which were present several great dignitaries then in Paris, Napoleon complained of every thing and every body, for there was nothing with which he was not dissatisfied. At that period, acquaintance with public opinion and its rapid shiftings had become lost amid the tranquillity of the empire; the notion prevailed that a government could direct it at pleasure, and in this respect a puerile faith was reposed in the influence of the police because it had absolute authority over the public journals. Napoleon complained that the public mind had been allowed to fall into error respecting the events of the day; that it had been suffered to interpret his last signally successful campaign as one abounding in disasters; and he threw out several acrimonious hints against those who had spoken and acted as if at the close of an expiring reign and the eve of a new one. Above all, he complained with extreme bitterness of those who, in order to disavow him, did not hesitate to disavow themselves; till losing all self-control, striding across the council-hall, and addressing M. de Talleyrand, who was standing with his back to a chimney, he said to him, with the most vehement gesticulations, "And you dare to assert, sir, that you had nothing to do with the death of the duke d'Enghien! You dare to assert that you had nothing to do with the war in Spain! Nothing to do with the death of the duke d'Enghien! Do you forget, then, that you advised me to it in writing? Nothing to do

<sup>1</sup> Among these correspondents were MM. Fléville and de Montlosier, and Madame de Genlis, who wrote, not to denounce, but to give their opinions respecting what they saw daily passing before them. M. Fléville's correspondences

with the war in Spain! Do you forget, then, that you advised me in your letters to recommence the policy of Louis XIV.? Do you forget that you were the intermediary in all the negotiations that terminated in the war now pending?" Then passing and repassing before M. de Talleyrand, and each time addressing him in the most galling terms, accompanied with menacing gestures, he froze all the beholders with dismay, and left those who loved him full of sorrow at that debasement of the twofold dignity of the throne and of genius.<sup>1</sup> Napoleon then dismissed the council, vexed at what he had done, and having superadded to his dissatisfaction at others the dissatisfaction he could not but feel with himself.

M. de Talleyrand was seized with a sort of fit on his return home. His physicians had some fears for his life, for he had by no means the courage to bear up against disgrace, though he endured it with seeming impassibility. Napoleon, meanwhile, was too angry to content himself with words, and chose that the public should learn by an official manifestation that M. de Talleyrand had incurred his displeasure. That personage, who loved all kinds of honour, had aspired to be grand-chamberlain whilst he discharged the important functions of minister for foreign affairs. Having become a grand dignitary, he had remained grand-chamberlain, and enjoyed the pecuniary emoluments of both dignities on the day after the stormy scene in the council of ministers. Napoleon made him resign the grand-chamberlain's key, and transmitted it to M. de Montesquiou, one of the most deservedly honoured members of the legislative body, who, besides his more recent distinctions, possessed others of ancient date of a kind much valued by Napoleon when conjoined with intrinsic worth. M. de Talleyrand, however, perceiving that he had been too hasty in behaving towards the imperial government as towards a government undone, sought to redeem by extreme submission the imprudent language imputed to him. Two or three days afterwards he appeared at a grand *fête* at the Tuileries in the most brilliant costume, bowing profoundly before the master whose outrages he had endured, as if he would almost make him and, above all, the public doubt all that had happened. In this he succeeded to a certain extent, for Napoleon, disarmed by this cunning submissiveness, detected the cunning, but accepted the humility.

After having silenced the babbling tongues about him without silencing the public whom he could not disgrace, Napoleon immediately applied himself to the important matters that had brought him to Paris. These included both diplomacy and war, which were to be pushed on simultaneously, for a rupture with Austria was imminent. That power which we have seen so agitated for three years, oscillating between the desire to avenge her humiliation and the fear of fresh disasters; continually seeking a favourable opportunity, having found one as she thought in Napoleon's bold movement towards the north in 1807, but having

let it pass unused, and bitterly regretting that neglect; thinking she perceived a new opportunity in the Spanish war, hesitating for six months whether to avail herself of it or not, and amidst her hesitations arming with incessant activity, that power seemed at last on the point of declaring war. All she did throughout her own empire in the way of preparations, and among the cabinets of Europe in the way of political intrigue, revealed an almost matured resolution. The approach of spring, moreover, gave reason to think that there remained at most but two or three months for preparing to confront her. It was necessary to make haste, therefore, to avoid being taken unprepared; but it was in the act of well employing time and of creating by a miracle what did not exist, that Napoleon excelled; of this he afforded a new and striking proof on the present occasion.

With his military preparations he had to conduct simultaneously the negotiations which should either prevent war or render its result more certain by means of well-arranged alliances. He had some months previously, on his first return from Spain, explained himself so fully and explicitly to the ambassador of Austria, and yet to so little purpose, that it seemed superfluous and undignified to repeat the process. Napoleon was of opinion that an extreme reserve with regard to that ambassador, an extreme openness with regard to the others, and a display of great administrative activity, were the proper course to be pursued, and the only way to excite salutary reflections at Vienna, if it were yet possible. He was therefore, polite, but cold and chary of words with M. de Metternich; and he enjoined the whole imperial family, in which M. de Metternich was usually well received, to imitate his own reserve. On the other hand, he was much more open with the other ambassadors, avowed to them the reason of his return to Paris, and declared to them that it was Austria and her armaments that brought him back so soon, that he might respond to them by armaments no less formidable.

"It seems," he said to them all, "that it is the waters of Lethe, not those of the Danube, that flow past Vienna, and that they have forgotten the lessons of experience there. They want fresh ones; they shall have them, and this time they shall be terrible, I promise you. I do not desire war; I have no interest in it, and all Europe is witness that all my efforts and my whole attention were directed towards the field of battle which England has selected, that is to say, Spain. Austria, which saved the English in 1805, when I was about to cross the straits of Calais, has saved them once more by stopping me when I was about to pursue them to Corunna. She shall pay dearly for this new diversion in their favour. Either she shall disarm instantly, or she shall have to sustain a war of destruction. If she disarms in such a manner as to leave no doubt on my mind as to her future intentions, I will myself sheathe my sword, for I have no wish to draw it except in Spain against the English; otherwise the conflict shall be immediate and decisive, and such that England shall for the future have no allies on the continent."

The Emperor produced on all who heard him

has been printed, and proves that Napoleon allowed many things, and of the boldest sort, to be said to him.

<sup>1</sup> The veracious and honourable duke de Gênes, who was an eye-witness of this scene, related it to me in minute detail some days before his death.

the effect he intended; for he was sincere in his language, and spoke the truth in asserting that he did not desire war, but that he would wage it tremendously if forced into it again. Even though believing he had drawn it upon himself, by his conduct in Spain, every one thought that Austria was committing a great imprudence, and trembled for the sake of Europe at the consequences to which that court was about to expose itself.

For one reason or another, M. de Romanzoff, the Russian minister for foreign affairs, had been detained in France since the interview at Erfurth. As we have already stated, that minister had repaired to Paris in Napoleon's suite, to watch personally over the negotiations which were to be begun with England, and to hasten as much as possible the acquisition of the Danubian provinces. The negotiation with England having broken down, M. de Romanzoff might have returned to St. Petersburg, where his young master awaited him impatiently; but he remained for the purpose of promoting their common desires. Not more than two months, he had been told in Paris, would be requisite to terminate matters in Spain, bring back King Joseph to Madrid, recrown him there, drive the English into the sea, and inspire Europe with thoughts of resignation instead of resistance to the plans laid down at Erfurth. It might, therefore, be really expedient to put off still longer the overtures which were to be made at Constantinople, relatively to Moldavia and Wallachia; for if Napoleon was completely victorious, Austria would not dare to engage in a fresh conflict, England would find no allies on the continent, the Turks would find none either on land or sea, and Russia would, without a general conflagration of Europe, acquire the Danubian provinces as she was on the point of acquiring Finland, by means of a merely local war of very limited importance. These considerations were worth some further patience; for it was, after all, only a delay of two months, and that interval M. de Romanzoff thought it advisable to spend in the vicinity of the events whereof he awaited the issue. Meanwhile he carefully observed the colossus of which Russia was for a time the accomplice rather than the ally; he studied its strength, whether transient or durable: tried to ascertain the validity of the thousand phrases repeated at St. Petersburg by the echoes of European diplomacy, and lived amidst a cloud of incense, for the imperial court had received orders to be lavish of attention to the ex-minister of Catherine and actual minister of Alexander: orders, of all others, the most easily obeyed at Paris, where people delight so much in pleasing, when they do not make it a point of honour to be offensive.

M. de Romanzoff passed his two months in Paris, and then three, hardly noticing the lapse of time, and striving to allay the impatience of his master, who was continually urging him to return. Napoleon had so far kept his word that in two months he had scattered the Spanish armies like dust, driven the English out of the Peninsula, and brought back his brother to Madrid, yet without making it in the least degree probable that the Spanish war was done and ended. This was not quite what he had hoped, nor what he had promised, for no chance now remained of realizing the great acquisitions pro-

jected in the East by a simple act of volition. Napoleon saw M. de Romanzoff immediately after his arrival; exerted upon him his usual power of fascination; expressed his indignation at seeing Austria interfere again at the decisive moment to snatch the English out of his hands; for, if he had himself pursued them, not one of them, he said, would have escaped, and he avowed his determination to take signal vengeance for such a breach of faith, (alluding to the promises made him at the bivouac of Urahoitz.) Confident as he was in the immense means that remained to him, he behaved towards the representative of Russia, neither braggingly nor obsequiously, but firmly and positively, and peremptorily required from him the accomplishment of the engagements entered into at Erfurth,—like a man who was ready to wage war with all who should break their word with him, whether by attacking him or by not aiding him after they have engaged so to do. “If your emperor had followed my advice at Erfurth,” said he to M. de Romanzoff, “we should now be in a different position. Instead of mere exhortations, we should have held out serious threats, and Austria would have disarmed. But we have talked instead of acting, and we are about, perhaps, to have war—I, for what I want to accomplish in Spain; you, for what you want to terminate in Finland and begin in Turkey. In any case, I rely on your master's word. He promised that if the cabinet of Vienna should become the aggressor, he would place an army at my disposal. Let him fulfil his promise; let him proceed more actively with the war in Finland, so as to have done with that petty power which holds him in check; let him have an army on the Danube sufficient to baffle all the intrigues of the confederate English and Austrians with the Turks; and let him have an imposing army on the Upper Vistula, in order to let Austria see that we are both in earnest. As for me, I will assemble on the Danube and the Po 800 thousand French and 100 thousand Germans, and probably their presence will oblige Austria to leave us at peace, which I should prefer for your sake and my own, for in that case you will have Moldavia and Wallachia almost without a blow, and I shall be able to complete the subjection of the Peninsula without fresh expenditure. If these demonstrations are not sufficient—if we must employ force, then we will crush for ever the resistance made to our common projects. But an alliance for peace and for war, a thorough, effective alliance, that is what I have promised, what has been promised me, and what I expect.”

To this language, which was that of a man by no means intimidated, Napoleon added every gracious art necessary to complete the effect he wished to produce, and he obtained the most satisfactory declarations from M. de Romanzoff. The latter did not conceal the dissatisfaction he felt at seeing Russia exposed to a collision with Austria; the difficulty of the projected acquisitions in the East augmented by all the difficulties which the French policy might encounter in the West; in a word, the circle of the strife extending instead of contracting; but he admitted the necessity of holding strong language at Vienna to prevent the necessity of acting; he agreed that to make words effectual

certain demonstrations should be superadded to them; and he promised, in consequence, that Russia should have an army in Galicia, ready to take the route by Prague or by Olmutz, both of which lead to Vienna.

Satisfied with M. de Romanzoff, and wishing to prove to him how much he desired peace and not war, Napoleon suggested the idea of offering to Austria the double guarantee of France and Russia for the conservation of its actual dominions, a guarantee which ought completely to reassure that power, if the fears were genuine which it professed for itself in consequence of the events of Bayonne. In fact, if Austria was actuated by nothing else than personal fears, the idea of this guarantee was of a nature to satisfy her and prevent a war. M. de Romanzoff undertook to communicate the proposal promptly both to his own court and to that of Vienna.

To these interviews with M. de Romanzoff, Napoleon added a thousand delicate attentions, such as taking him himself to the manufactories of the Gobelins, Sevres, and Versailles, showing him the marvels of his empire, and every moment presenting rich specimens of them, so that, as M. de Romanzoff himself said, he durst no longer praise any thing in the presence of so magnificent a sovereign, for fear of bringing upon himself fresh presents of tapestries, porcelains, and costly arms.

Having done what was proper by the ambassador of his principal ally, Napoleon addressed himself to the ministers of the Confederation of the Rhine. He told them, and wrote to the same effect to their masters, the kings of Bavaria, Saxony, Wurtemberg, and Westphalia, and the dukes of Baden, Hesse, and Wurtzburg, that he did not wish to put them to premature expense by requiring the immediate assemblage of their troops, but that he desired them to prepare for it, since there was a new prospect of hostilities; that to prevent war if there was yet time, or to secure its prosperous issue if it was inevitable, they must put themselves in a condition to meet force with force; that for himself he was about to assemble 150 thousand French and Italians on the Po, 150 thousand French on the Upper Danube, that he counted on 100 thousand Germans, and that with these 400 thousand men he would prevent war or render it decisive, and would for ever secure his allies from the claims which Austria threatened to assert against the German powers that had formerly been dependent on or subject to her empire. He wrote in particular to the king of Bavaria and to the king of Saxony, and formally demanded of them the assemblage of a first moiety of their troops round Munich, Dresden, and Warsaw. Distrusting Prussia, which might be tempted to imitate Austria and seek the reparation of her misfortunes in an act of despair, he notified to her that if she levied a single man beyond the 42 thousand authorized by the secret conventions, he would forthwith declare war against her. He commissioned Russia to make known at Koenigsberg that the least act of hostility would be the occasion of a new contest which would be mortal to the one side or the other, if there was any symptom of a wish to join Austria.

To these manifestations, which were the more significant from the fact that they rested on pre-

cautions no less real than apparent, Napoleon added certain movements of his own troops, which were but the consequence of arrangements already conceived and prescribed at Valladolid. These arrangements were on a scale proportioned to the occasion, and to the mass of enemies known and unknown that were soon to be encountered.

Whilst he was in Spain, Napoleon had watched with extreme solicitude over the execution of his orders, foreseeing that Austria, though intimidated by the presence of the two emperors at Erfurth, and though not quite prepared, nor as yet sufficiently excited to lose all prudence, would nevertheless break out at last in the spring. These orders related principally to the levy of the two conscriptions authorized by the senate in 1808. The one comprised the conscripts of 1810, levied according to the custom one year in advance, but who could not be called out before the 1st of January, 1801, and were only liable to serve in the interior during that year. It was a levy of 80 thousand men, but this amount not being adequate to Napoleon's plans, he had thought of recurring to the anterior classes of 1806, 1807, 1808, and 1809, which had never furnished more than 80 thousand men each. The hundred and fifteen departments of that period contained a population not much greater than of the eighty-six of the present day, for whereas the present class amounts to 320 thousand young men of an age fit for service, the hundred and fifteen departments furnished 377 thousand. Napoleon held that 80 thousand out of 377 thousand was too small a portion, and that he might call out 100 thousand, or rather more than one-fourth of the whole. It was certainly a thing that might be done, provided it was not repeated too often; for there is no population that would not soon perish, if a fourth part of the adult males were abstracted from it every year.

He resolved then to fix at 100 thousand the annual contribution of the population, so that, applying the rule retrospectively, he might demand a supplement of 20 thousand men from each of the anterior classes. This plan had the advantage of procuring him much more robust recruits than those furnished by the ordinary levies, since they would be of the ages of 20, 21, 22, and 23 years, while those of 1810 were only aged about 18. But it was a serious inconvenience to drag from their homes men who might have deemed themselves exempt from all service, the class to which they belonged having already furnished its contingent. Accordingly, to diminish the unpleasant effect of this measure, he took care to subjoin to the decision of the senate an assurance that the classes anterior to 1806 should be definitively exempted, thus leaving the unfortunate classes of 1806, 1807, 1808, and 1809, liable to fresh demands. Further to allay discontent, the men who had married in the interval were not to be called out; but these mitigations of the new measure did little towards soothing the displeasure of the people, who saw the price of substitutes rising every day, and calls succeeding calls without interruption. However, except in some departments of the west, where a small number of malcontents recommenced the life of *chouans*, but were promptly put down, obedience was general, and the men once enrolled adopted

forthwith the vigorous spirit of the French army.

Employment was to be found for this vast levy of young men, and no one, it is confessed, ever equalled Napoleon in the arts of organization. He had two years previously decreed the formation of all regiments in five battalions. Various causes had hitherto prevented the complete execution of this measure; first, the number of conscripts, which was not yet sufficient, and would not become so until the arrival of the 160 thousand men lately called out; next, the expense, which could not but be great; lastly, the movements of the regiments, which were continually in transit, and passed their time, when they were not fighting, in marching from the Vistula to the Tagus, or from the Po to the Ebro. For these reasons, most of the regiments were still engaged in forming the fourth battalion, and scarcely any had formed the fifth.

After having sent into Spain three corps of the grand army—those of Marshal Victor, (formerly the first,) of Marshal Mortier, (formerly the fifth,) and of Marshal Ney (formerly the sixth,) and the troops that had formed Marshal Lefebvre's division, besides all the dragoons; after having detached from the army of Italy wherewith to treble the army of Catalonia, Napoleon had considerably weakened his forces in Germany, particularly in old soldiers. He had still, under the denomination of the army of the Rhine, commanded by Marshal Davout, six divisions of infantry, the fine Morand, Friant, and Gudin divisions, (which had formerly formed the third division;) the excellent St. Hilaire division, which had made part of Marshal Soult's division; Oudinot's famous division of grenadiers and voltigeurs, then at Hanau; Dupas' division of two regiments only, constituting with the Dutch troops the guard of the Hanse Towns; fourteen regiments of cuirassiers, an incomparable force, which no infantry in Europe had ever withstood; seventeen regiments of light cavalry, the best drilled in the world, and a formidable artillery. To these forces were to be added the Carra St. Cyr and the Legrand divisions, which had belonged to Marshal Soult's corps, and were now marching for Paris to make a demonstration towards the camp of Boulogne; and the Boudet and Molitor divisions, long left on the Elbe as a nucleus of the army of reserve in 1807, and afterwards removed to Lyons with a view to the constantly projected but never executed expedition against Sicily. These fine troops, the best in Europe, formed, however, a total of not more than 110 thousand men, after deducting all the soldiers who were incapacitated for service by age or wounds. It was not with such forces, however excellent the soldiers composing them, that Napoleon could reduce the house of Austria. This was the way in which he had resolved to increase them.

The army of the Rhine comprehended twenty regiments of infantry, which had received their three war battalions since the formation of the fourth battalions had been begun. When they had four, as was about to be the case, this army of the Rhine would present 84 battalions and 70 thousand infantry soldiers. Oudinot's corps, consisting of companies of grenadiers and voltigeurs, originally detached from the regiments

that did not form part of the army in active service, was a body formed for reasons which had ceased to operate. Now that the regiments were acting so far from their dépôts, and had battalions at the same time in Germany, Italy, and Spain, it was becoming difficult to detach picked companies to such great distances. Having, moreover, in the imperial guard a choice corps which was developing itself more and more every day, Napoleon was no longer reduced to seek for one by combining companies of grenadiers and voltigeurs. It occurred to him, therefore, merely to convert Oudinot's corps into an assemblage of fourth battalions, which should be detached from the regiments to which they belonged. At first, as the body comprised twenty companies of voltigeurs and grenadiers belonging to Marshal Davout's army, he sent them to him to serve as a nucleus for the formation of the fourth battalions in that army. The fusilier companies were to march as soon as possible from the dépôts in Alsace, Lorraine, and Flanders, to complete these fourth battalions. The other choice companies of Oudinot's corps belonged to thirty-six regiments which had passed from Germany into Spain. Napoleon resolved, likewise, to make of these companies the nucleus of thirty-six fourth battalions, which were for the present to serve in Germany, whither they were all marched, the intention being to move them afterwards into Spain, if their regiments continued to serve there. The fusilier companies were to be sent successively to them from the dépôts in the north and east of France. They were to be distributed into three divisions of twelve battalions each, and to consist, after their formation, of 80 thousand infantry.

The four divisions of Carra St. Cyr, Legrand, Boudet, and Molitor, comprised twelve regiments, then of three war battalions, and soon to be raised to four, which would make forty-eight battalions more, and give about 80 thousand men. The army of the Rhine might thus amount to 180 thousand foot, without counting the 5 thousand of Dupas' division. Out of the vast recruiting decreed, Napoleon resolved to take what was requisite to raise all the cavalry regiments to 11 hundred men each, which could not fail to insure them 9 hundred fighting men. The fourteen regiments of cuirassiers reckoned 11 or 12 thousand men in the ranks; he hoped, by taking all that the dépôts could supply, to raise them to 18 or 14 thousand present under arms. He proposed to extend to 14 or 15 thousand men the effective of the seventeen regiments of light cavalry. He resolved also to turn to account the twenty-four regiments of dragoons employed in Spain. Such a force was more than sufficient for the requirements of that war, especially considering what would be wanted for the other wars in preparation in the north of Europe. The dépôts, moreover, swarmed with dragoons quite trained, whom Napoleon deemed more useful at that moment in Germany than in Spain. He therefore ordered the *1st* major of Madrid to send back to the dépôt the skeleton of the third war squadron, draughting into the two first squadrons the men capable of serving, whereby the active force in Spain would be left at nearly the same effective amount, and skeleton squadrons would be formed for incorporating the cavalry soldiers



already trained in the dépôts. His scheme was to draught successively from the dépôts into the third and fourth squadrons all the trained men and to send them into Germany, forming with these forty-eight squadrons twelve provisional regiments of dragoons of four squadrons each. The dragoon dépôts were spread over Languedoc, Guyenne, Poitou, and Anjou. Napoleon hoped thus to have first three thousand, then six, and up to twelve thousand dragoons, as soon as the conscription should have furnished the necessary *personnel*. He might consequently reckon on having before two months 18 or 14 thousand cuirassiers, 14 thousand hussars and chasseurs, and 8 thousand dragoons—that is, together, 80 thousand cavalry, almost all veterans. With 180 thousand infantry, 80 thousand cavalry, 20 thousand artillery, 5 thousand of Dupas' division, and 15 or 20 thousand of the guard, he would have 200 thousand French in Germany, who, with 100 thousand German and Polish auxiliaries, would give him 800 thousand fighting men on the Danube. The same system of formation would procure him 100 thousand in Italy.

Napoleon had in Italy twelve regiments of infantry, the formation of which by four battalions was completed, and that by five begun. They were parted into four divisions of three regiments, and of 9 to 10 thousand men each, including artillery. The first of these divisions was at Udine, the second at Treviso, the third at Mantua, and the fourth at Bologna. The skeletons of the third battalions of the eight regiments composing the army of Dalmatia had been recalled after the men fit for active service had been draughted into the first two battalions, whereby the effective force appointed to guard that remote province was not sensibly weakened. By means of these eight skeleton battalions, and by the creation of eight others resulting from the new organization, there was formed at Padua a fifth division of sixteen battalions of infantry, at least 12 thousand strong. In consequence of the rest enjoyed by the army of Italy, and the care Napoleon had taken to secure it its share of each conscription, the new formations were more advanced there than elsewhere. Lastly, with some third and fourth battalions of the army of Naples, and two whole regiments taken from Naples itself, there had been formed a fine division, which guarded the Roman States, under the command of general Miollis. Napoleon had ordered Murat, now king of the Two Sicilies, to distribute his army into two divisions, the one placed between Naples and Reggio, the other between Naples and Rome, so that the latter, by detaching a brigade to Rome upon occasion, might render Miollis' division free and disposable. The English were sufficiently occupied in Spain, and were likely to be sufficiently occupied on the German coasts if the war was rekindled in the north, to prevent their making any very formidable attempts upon the south of Italy. There could therefore be brought into the field six divisions, comprising about 58 thousand infantry, all old soldiers who had not fought for a long while, and had a strong desire to resume their old trade. Five regiments of dragoons, and five of hussars and chasseurs, which was enough in Italy, afforded by drawing upon the dépôts a further supply of 8 thousand cavalry. With 6 thousand

artillery, there was a certainty of having an army of 72 thousand Frenchmen. Adding to these 18 or 20 thousand Italians, and, in case of a march forwards, 10 thousand Frenchmen from Dalmatia, there would be a total of about 100 thousand men in Italy who might be easily moved into Germany. Combining all these forces, it would be possible to assail the house of Austria with 400 thousand fighting men.

These formations, ordered while Napoleon was commanding in Spain, that is to say, in November and December, 1808, and accelerated in January, 1809, during his stay in Valladolid, were prosecuted with more activity than ever since his return to Paris. But though the men were arriving rapidly in the dépôts, other parts of the organization were less advanced. Much was still wanting as regarded clothing, which is always slow of production; training, which cannot be extemporised; and the formation of new skeletons of battalions, which demanded a great number of capable officers and non-commissioned officers. It is true, that in the latter respect our old armies afforded Napoleon great resources. But it was necessary to collect together the scattered elements of these various creations, and the nature of things does not yield absolute submission even to genius. One man may employ time better than others, but none can dispense with it altogether. Two or three months, which were yet hoped for, were not sufficient, and it was to be feared that all would not be ready if the war broke out too soon.

The dépôts had furnished all their disposable *personnel* to the divisions of the army of the Rhine, and to the Carra St. Cyr, Legrand, Boudet, and Molitor divisions, so that these had their three war battalions quite complete in veteran soldiers, and in young ones tolerably well trained. The organization of the fourth battalion did not proceed in as satisfactory a manner. It was on this occasion that Napoleon made excellent use of the imperial guard. He had resolved to intrust to that body 10 thousand conscripts of 1810, and 6 or 7 thousand of the anterior classes, that it might employ its leisure in training them; which had the double advantage of keeping the guard itself from the dangers of idleness, and of propagating the excellent spirit with which it was animated. It was at Versailles, Paris, and the adjacent places that it applied itself to this useful task, while the younger soldiers composing it were serving in Spain under the Emperor's eyes. A part of the conscripts intended for it having arrived, had been converted in a few months into soldiers who were on a par with the veterans in point of training and *ténue*. Selecting the strongest and most advanced of these recruits, Napoleon formed them into companies of grenadiers and voltigeurs, which he sent to Oudinot's corps, to supply the place of the twenty-two companies already given back to the army of the Rhine. He likewise sent other companies of these grenadiers and voltigeurs to the dépôts of the army of the Rhine, to facilitate the organization of its fourth battalions. At the same time he urged forward the arrival and the training of the conscripts still due to the guard, that they might serve to recruit those corps that might not find adequate resources in their own dépôts. He despatched general Mathieu Dumas,

an intelligent, exact, and active staff-officer, to visit quickly all the dépôts of the south, east, and north, from Marseilles, Grenoble, Lyons, and Strasburg, to Mayence and Cologne, and send off from them, without waiting for the orders of the minister of war, the fusilier companies that were ready, and that were to complete the fourth battalions. He further prescribed that as soon as the 80 thousand conscripts of 1810 began to arrive in the dépôts, the regiments which were in a more advanced state of progress should proceed to the formation of their 6th battalions, so as to prepare the elements of a strong reserve in the interior and on the coasts.

The cavalry dépôts abounded in men and horses, for Napoleon had not ceased to devote attention and funds to that end. He sent off more than 8 thousand cuirassiers, chasseurs, and hussars, and made the necessary arrangements for the prompt departure of as many more. He gave orders to purchase 12 thousand artillery horses, and to prepare all the furniture of that arm. He ordered General Lauriston to add to the artillery of the guard a reserve of 48 pieces, and to purchase 1800 horses in Alsace, where the guard was to receive them *en route*, with the *matériel* of that reserve. Lastly, as though he had divined the great works he would have to execute on the islands of the Danube, and foreseeing certainly the part which that vast river would play in the approaching war, he ordered that besides the usual implements of the engineer corps, there should be laid in an extraordinary store of 50 thousand pick-axes and shovels, which were to follow the army in artillery wagons. Moreover, he joined with the guard a battalion of 1200 sailors from Boulogne. As he had special need of officers and non-commissioned officers for the new battalions independently of the officers taken from the guard, he took 800 from St. Cyr. He even directed that from each lyceum in which there were only youths not exceeding sixteen or seventeen years of age, there should be taken for this purpose ten of the most precocious and the most adapted for war. Not content with this, he ordered M. Fouché to make out a census of the old noble families that were living in retirement on their estates, and having no connection with the government, in order to enroll their sons in spite of them, and send them to the military schools. If they complain, he wrote, you shall say that *such is my good pleasure*; and he added a less extravagant reason—namely, that it was not right that, in consequence of pernicious divisions, certain families should be allowed to withdraw themselves from the efforts which the present generation was making for the glory and grandeur of the future generation. He also took some non-commissioned officers from the velites and fusiliers of the guard, troops already well insured to war, though younger than the rest of

the same body. Having much cavalry, and intending to make great use of it against the Austrian infantry, he recalled from Spain the two officers of that arm he most esteemed, Generals Montbrun and Lasalle. He recalled from Aragon Marshal Lannes, who had just terminated the siege of Saragossa, and he summoned to him Marshal Massena.

Without wishing yet to commit any act of hostility, for hitherto Austria had abstained from such, he thought it expedient to draw his troops nearer to the probable theatre of war, for the double purpose of afterwards moving them without fatigue towards the point of concentration, and of giving Austria a significant hint, which might, perhaps, inspire her with more prudent reflections. In consequence, he ordered the Dupas division to quit the borders of the Baltic and approach Magdeburg. He made Saxo-Polish troops replace all the French detachments he had still in Dantzic, Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau. He ordered Marshal Davoust to proceed from Saxony to Franconia, to fix his head-quarters at Wurtzburg, and to direct one of his divisions to Bayreuth. General Oudinot was to transfer himself, with the consent of the king of Bavaria, from Hainau to Augsburg; the Carra St. Cyr and Legrand divisions were to march from the environs of Paris to those of Metz; and the Boudet and Molitor divisions were to advance from Lyons to Strasburg. These three rallying-points—Wurtzburg, Augsburg, and Strasburg—could not but be highly significant for Austria. He instructed Prince Eugene not to encamp his troops, the season not yet been sufficiently advanced, but to assemble successively in the Friuli his first four divisions, his artillery *matériel*, and his cavalry, so as to be able in twenty-four hours to bring out 50 thousand men in order of battle. He renewed the order to Murat to call back his forces to Rome, so as to leave the Miollia division free to act. He directed that all the forts in Italy should be put in a state of defence, and that the most important works at Osopo, Palma, Nova, Venice, Mantua, and Alessandria should be completed. Lastly, he sent orders to General Marmont, who commanded in Dalmatia, to concentrate his army on Zara, leaving only the necessary garrisons at the mouths of the Cattaro and some interesting points; to form at Zara an intrenched camp, which should be provisioned for a year, and thus prepare to hold out for several months against considerable forces, or to advance and join the army of Italy.

To these military manifestations, which yet did not constitute acts of hostility, Napoleon added a diplomatic manifestation. He ordered General Andréossy, ambassador at Vienna, to quit that capital, not after demanding his passports, which would have looked like a declaration of war, but on the pretext of a *congé* formerly solicited and recently obtained. The

\* The following extraordinary letter was among those he wrote when he was beginning, in Spain, to give orders for his first preparations:

"To the Minister of Police.

"Benavente, Dec. 31, 1808.

"I am informed that some families of emigrants withdraw their children from the conscription and keep them in a mischievous and culpable idleness. It is a fact that the ancient and wealthy families which are not in the system are against it. I desire that you have a list made out

of ten of those principal families in each department, and of fifty for Paris, making known the age, fortune and quality of each member. My intention is to make a decree for sending to the military school of St. Cyr the young men belonging to these families aged more than sixteen and less than eighteen. If any objection is made, no other answer is to be given than that such is my good pleasure. The future generation must not suffer for the rancours and petty passions of the present. If you ask information of the prefects, do it in this sense."

dissembled recall afforded Napoleon, in addition to the advantage of signifying his dissatisfaction, that of removing a cause of irritation between the two cabinets, for General Andréossy felt for the court of Austria a hatred which the latter reciprocated. He had orders to pass through all the Austrian cantonnements on his way back, so that, on his return, he might be able to give precise information as to the military resources of the enemy. These very active and provident arrangements prove that Napoleon took as much pains to prevent war as to prepare for it. Unfortunately his ambitious policy had imposed war upon him as a fatal necessity after it had ceased to be for him an object of predilection.

All these vast preparations demanded commensurate financial means. We have already made the painful remark that the Spanish war, while disastrously diminishing the military forces of France by their dispersion, diminished in an equal degree her financial resources by the excessive multiplication of the causes of expense; though the twofold creation of the service-chest and the army treasury secured Napoleon from all present want of funds, resources were nevertheless beginning to be less abundant, and it was easy to foresee an end to them and to the power of France, if a stop was not soon put to this course of exorbitant enterprises.

The budgets promised to be liquidated without deficit, being kept rigorously within the assigned limits, which was easily done, since the only possible excesses arising out of the state of war were covered by drafts on the army treasury. The expenditure of the years anterior to 1800, defrayed by means of bills on the *caisse d'amortissement*, (which, as the reader recollects, were but a slow alienation of the national property,) was advancing to a final settlement. That of 1806 and 1807, fixed at 780 millions for the general expenses, and 40 for the departmental, which with the costs of collection made a total of 890 or 900 millions, inspired no uneasiness for its liquidation, especially as the armies beyond the Rhine continued to be paid out of the contributions of Prussia. It was not the same as to the expenditure of 1808. This had been fixed, like the others, at 780 millions for general expenses, and 40 for special; the army of the Rhine being still paid down to the 31st December by the war contributions. But if the balance between requirements and resources was not broken by the augmentation of outgoings, it was about to be affected by a decline in receipts, till then unknown in Napoleon's reign. This decline was not manifested in the indirect taxes, or in the proceeds of registration, which would have indicated a diminution of prosperity in the interior, but in the customs, and in the alienations of the national domains. The foreign imports had been remarkably reduced by the Milan decree, and there was reason to fear a diminution of 25 millions in that branch of the public revenue. The overdue instalments of the purchasers of national property, and the slackening in the sales of that property, had caused a further falling off of 15 millions in the receipts of the treasury. A surplus expected but not realised in 1807, and debited at 8 or 4 millions in the estimates of 1808 and a deficiency of

some millions on the post-office, on powder and sulphur, and on the outport receipts of Italy, raised the total deficit for 1808, the year just ended, to 47 or 48 millions.

This was but a part of the difficulty. The expenses of the preceding years 1807, 1806, 1805, might be considered as balanced, on counting at their cash value certain securities, valid enough, but of remote realization, such as the debt of the united merchants, which was still 18 or 19 millions; the loan for Spain, which had been computed as 25 millions, and had not yet been carried beyond 7 or 8; the deposits in Bayonne, which were to have been only provisional, and were becoming permanent, like the war beyond the Pyrenees; and the advances for the Russian and Neapolitan troops, which amounted to 2 or 3 millions, and had not been repaid. These, together, made a total of receipts in arrear of 40 millions, and formed, with the 47 or 48 millions of deficient receipts in 1808, a general deficit of about 90 millions. It is further to be observed that to put the several corps in a condition to make their preparations for war, it had been necessary to pay them sooner than usual the sums remaining due for 1808, whence it resulted that in this department the receipts were in arrear, whilst the expenditure was in advance, which doubled the difficulty.

The difficulty, however, was not serious as regarded the present, for the service-chest and the army-chest were quite adequate to meet it. The reader, doubtless, recollects the creation of the service-chest and its principle, devised by M. Mollien. Instead of employing the bank or a financial company to discount the obligations of the receivers-general, the treasury had instituted a chest, into which the receivers-general were required to put their funds as soon as they received them, even when according to the regulations they did not owe them yet.\* They were paid interest up to the day when the tax represented by those funds was due, the amount being carried to their credit in the settlement of their obligations. This operation rendered it unnecessary to discount those obligations. However, as the estimated receipts of every year included more than 125 millions, which were payable only in the four or five first months of the following year, there would have been no way of avoiding the necessity of discounting a part of that amount, had not Napoleon lent to the treasury, in the name of the army-chest, 84 millions deposited therein. Thus with the advances obtained from the receivers-general, and with the 84 millions lent to it, the treasury had been able to abstain from discounting the 125 millions of obligations falling due the following year, and these were locked up and did not make their appearance in the market. For want of these obligations to employ their money, capitalists were now obliged to purchase the bills of the service-chest, which thus took the place of the former, much more cheaply for the treasury, with more order, and, above all, with the advantage of

\* This may appear obscure to readers who do not recollect what has been said in the preceding volumes, or who are unacquainted with finance. They will ask how it can be that receivers have to pay over funds which are not yet due by them. The paradox is thus explained:—The direct taxes, which form the chief branch of the public revenue in France, are due by months, that is to say, by

realizing the proceeds of the taxes as soon as they were in the receivers' hands. The treasury was thus put in possession of considerable resources, and was not embarrassed to meet a present deficiency of some 50 or 100 millions. If, for instance, it held securities for 40 millions of income not yet realized for the anterior budgets, it could obtain their amount by paying interest during the time of the advance. If the income of 1808 fell short by 48 or 50 millions, the treasury could provide for that deficiency, provided a corresponding value was quickly created. And this Napoleon did. He caused to be selected from the national domains of France, Piedmont, and Tuscany, property to the amount of 50 millions, the sale of which, slowly effected by the *caisse d'amortissement*, should serve to cover the amount by which the receipts of 1808 fell short of the estimates. Thus the service-chest furnished the immediate, and the national property of France and Italy the ultimate, means of supplying the deficit of 1808.

The budget of 1809 was fixed at the same figure as those of 1808 and 1807, that is to say, 730 millions for general expenses, and 40 millions for departmental, making 890 millions with the costs of collection. But in 1807 and 1808 the troops beyond the Rhine had been paid by the army treasury. It was necessary that the same should be done in 1809. We have already said that all the expenses of our armies in Germany having been paid to December 31, 1808, there remained about 800 millions in the army treasury, 20 millions of which were derived from the Austrian war, and 280 millions from the Prussian. Napoleon had subsequently reduced the contribution of Prussia by 20 millions, at the request of the Emperor Alexander: sundry rectifications had raised other items of income, and the total assets of the army treasury in January, 1809, were found to be 292 millions, of which 84 millions were lent to the treasury, and were represented by a like sum in *rentes*, 10 millions in excellent immovable property accruing from the liquidation of the united merchants, 24 millions in specie or in tangible value, 64 millions falling due in the year 1809, 106 millions in the years 1810 and 1811, and 8 or 4 millions lent to various persons whom Napoleon had desired to aid. The whole of these consisted of values either well placed or current, or proximately recoverable. The 24 millions in specie or tangible value, added to the 64 millions falling due in 1809, made up an immediate resource of 88 millions, respecting which Napoleon had already made certain arrangements. He had recently bestowed 4 millions in gifts to certain corps, paid 1 million to the towns that had fed the army, lent 800 thousand francs to the town of Bordeaux, 2,500,000 to the vine-growers of La Gironde, 8 millions to the city of Paris, and 1 million to the university. He had, moreover, applied 1 million in aid of maritime expeditions, 10 millions to purchasing the Canal du Midi, 12 millions to the purchase of *rentes* for

the purpose of upholding the market, and some hundred thousand francs to the creation of burses in the lyceums. Most of these were very good investments, which, while doing service to the establishments to which they had been applied, or to the credit of the treasury, enabled Napoleon to recompense certain members of the army as he desired. Nevertheless, they reduced the resources of the year to some 50 millions; enough, it is true, for the immediate requirements of the war. In continuing to pay the troops in Germany out of the army-chest, Napoleon would have required 77 millions for the year, (22 of which were to be levied from the vast magazines that remained to us, and 55 in cash,) if he would not see a deficit in the budget of 1809, which had quite enough to do to pay the armies of Spain and Italy. Napoleon contented himself with taking three months' subsistence for the army of the Rhine, which required about 20 millions. These twenty millions, all he took immediately from the army-chest, with the sums advanced upon the ordinary budget to the several corps, were sufficient to put them all at their ease. Napoleon thought that in the first months of 1809 his troops would be on the enemy's territory, where they would live gratuitously on the fat of the land, that victory would reopen the source of the war contributions, and would amply indemnify the army-chest for the sacrifices he was obliged to impose on it. Of the 12 millions of *rentes* (in capital) recently purchased, he immediately distributed 7 millions among his generals, wishing to procure them some gratifications before leading them again to death.

Thus, as we have said, the budget of 1808 was to have its diminished receipts compensated for by a sale of national property; the budget of 1809 was, like the preceding budgets, to be relieved by the army-chest of the expense of the troops in Germany; and, as for current facilities until certain values should have been realized, these were to be immediately provided by the service-chest, which enjoyed the greatest credit, and by the army-chest, which was incessantly receiving the produce of the war contributions. But if there was no actual want of money as yet, it was, nevertheless, full time to stop, if the finances were not to be ruined as well as the army. Napoleon himself thought so; for, whilst he suspended the loan assented to for Spain, and left his brother to depend solely on the wool revenues of Castile and on some hundred thousand francs worth of silver-plate converted into money, he interrupted the purchases of *rentes* which had been effected from August to December, 1808, with the intention of keeping up the price. There had been purchased 46 millions, of which 10 were on account of the Bank, 11 for the service-chest, 25 for the *caisse d'amortissement*, (acting for itself and for the army.) Independently of these sums, the Bank had already purchased 16 millions on its own account, which gave for the purchases of this year a total of 62 millions. No less an effort could, in defiance of the events in Spain, have maintained the *rente* at the price of 80, which Napoleon called the normal price in his reign—a painful admission to make, for after Tilsit and before Bayonne the price had been 94. Austrian events having given a fresh shock to credit, and there being a strong ten-

twelfth. Now some of the taxes are paid six months or a year in advance, while others remain in arrear. The receivers set off the advances against the arrears, and the more to interest them in the prompt collection of the taxes, they are themselves allowed, under the name of bonifications, two or three months' delay, during which time they have the use of the money in their hands.

money to a fall of the funds in January, 1809, Napoleon would not abridge his disposable resources to stop a decline of credit which was now imputable, not to the Spanish war, but to the Austrian. The ill effect, he maintained, would fall not on him, but on perjured powers, which, when vanquished, promised him peace, and the moment they were recovered from their defeat recommenced war. He was mistaken, for every body connected the Austrian with the Spanish war; and he became responsible for the present decline of credit which he refused to resist, as well as for the former one which had stopped by force of money. His best justification, after all, would be found in victory, and he neglected nothing, indeed, to make it certain; for, as we have seen, conscripts were flocking into the *dépôts*, new battalions were becoming organized, and the principal armies were advancing to the Upper Palatinate, Bavaria, and Friuli, to oblige Austria to reflect, or to crush her if from threats she advanced to action.

Unfortunately that power had gone too far to retract. Never had she been able to console herself for having lost in fifteen years (from 1792 to 1806) the Low Countries, the imperial possessions of Swabia, the Milanese, the Venetian States, the Tyrol, Dalmatia, and lastly, the imperial crown itself! Perhaps, if the world had settled down, as in 1718 after the treaty of Utrecht, and in 1815 after that of Vienna, she would have submitted to necessity amidst the general immobility. But whilst Napoleon was daily exposing the fate of Europe and his own to new hazards, she could not help thrilling at every chance that presented itself; and though the Austrian was an oligarchical court that had little communication with its subjects, it now felt no emotion which was not shared by the Austrian people; for nations, whatever be the form of their institutions, never remain indifferent to the fate of their government. It is not necessary they should possess free institutions in order to have pride and ambition. So, when, passing over Prussia to rush upon Poland, Napoleon had left half the continent behind him, Austria had thought of profiting by the opportunity to assail him in the rear. But this scheme was so formidable, so much remained to be done before the Austrian armies should have been reconstituted, and Napoleon had been so prompt, that the opportunity had been lost almost as soon as seen, and had left behind it in Vienna a vexation, almost a despair, that had vented itself both in words and actions. That first opportunity, offered by fortune and lost by the hesitations of prudence, had excited a universal clamour against the men whose importunate discretion was said to spoil every chance for action. It was only the restoration of Braunau to Austria by Napoleon that quieted her for a while. She did, in fact, remain quiet for some months, from the end of 1807 to the beginning of 1808, on seeing Napoleon carrying elsewhere his incessant activity, Russia uniting with him, and England giving offence to all Europe by her barbarous expedition against Copenhagen, and she even signified to the latter power the necessity of remaining quiet at least for a time. But this resignation had been of short duration. The attack upon the crown of Spain had

aroused all her passions. Her indignation was sincere, and she showed it the more freely because Napoleon for the first time seemed embarrassed. His sudden return in August after the events of Bayonne, his sharp speeches to M. de Meternich, and his intimacy with the emperor of Russia at Erfurth, had restrained, but not calmed, Austria, which had, on the contrary, being still more vexed and disquieted at the silence observed towards her. Without being informed of it, she had guessed that the Danubian provinces were the price paid by Napoleon at Erfurth for the Russian alliance, and this had not contributed to appease her. Lastly, the campaign Napoleon had just made in Spain had rather exalted than cooled her ardour. No doubt he had beaten the Spanish army, which was not a miracle, having sent his best armies against undisciplined peasants: but these peasants were rather dispersed than vanquished, and were certainly not reduced to submission. As for the English, Napoleon had forced them to re-embark without destroying them; and if the capitulation of Baylen had done great damage to the *prestige* of France, the weak pursuit of the English by Marshal Soult was doing it no less at the present moment. The English were extolled with strange exaggeration, and people repented in Vienna, with as much satisfaction as they could have done in London, that at last the French had found on the continent an army capable of withstanding them. Nor were other grounds of encouragement wanting in Vienna. The spirit of all Germany was said to be exasperated against the French, who, not content with having so often beaten and humbled it, had been too long occupying and devouring it. It is certain, that the presence of our troops in the conquered countries, added to the bitter recollections of the last years, produced an extraordinary feeling of irritation. The odious act of Bayonne, and the difficulties encountered in Spain, had, both in Germany and Austria, aroused indignation and revived hope. Men felt not only detestation but contempt for a perfidy which had not succeeded, and they declared that Europe should take vengeance for it. Prussia, deprived of her king, who, since the fatal field of Jena, lived obscurely at Koenigsberg, not venturing to show himself to subjects to whom he had nothing to announce but the necessity of paying another 120 millions of taxes,—Prussia was ready to revolt to a man, from the peasant to the noble, from Koenigsberg to Magdeburg. The retirement of the French, which was regarded, not as the faithful execution of a treaty, but as a consequence of their disasters in Spain, gained for them a contempt which was equally unjust and imprudent. The last detachments of our troops issuing from the fortresses of the Oder, and escorting our magazines to their place of assemblage at Magdeburg, were everywhere insulted, and could not pass through the villages without being pelted with mud and stones. The French durst hardly show themselves in Berlin, while an officer of partisans, a major Schill, who had incommoded the besiegers of Dantzic by some marauding attacks, was welcomed and fêted with enthusiasm, as if a partisan officer could pluck Germany out of Napoleon's hands.

The feelings manifested in the countries allied to France were not much better. In Saxony, though we had given back Poland and a royal title to the reigning house, they said that the king betrayed the cause of Germany for his personal interests, and crushed down his subjects with taxes and levies of troops; for the conscription was already a European sore, which was everywhere imputed to Napoleon. In Westphalia, where a young prince of the Bonaparte family had supplanted the old house of Hesse, and presented by his gorgeous magnificence, much more than by the wisdom of his government, a striking contrast with the hereditary stinginess of that house, the popular hatred was most keen. In Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Baden, where the sovereigns had gained aggrandizements of titles and territories, which the people paid for in lodgments of troops, conscriptions, and taxes, they loudly complained of princes who sacrificed their country to their personal ambition. Among all these people the feeling of national independence awoke that of liberty, and they talked of freeing themselves from princes who could not free themselves from Napoleon. Some bolder spirits went still further, and were already forming secret societies to deliver Europe from her oppressor, and the nations from their absolute governments. An alarming phenomenon was even beginning to appear. Certain persons, fired by the general flame, were secretly cherishing, as will presently be seen, the horrible thought of assassinating Napoleon, whom the admiration and the hatred of the world represented to all eyes as the sole cause of the events of the age.

The Tyrol, in which there subsisted an old hereditary attachment for the house of Austria, impatiently supported the yoke of Bavaria. The people boldly displayed this impatience, assembled in the houses of the innkeepers, the chief persons of those mountains as of those of Switzerland, and made preparations for a general rising on the first outbreak of hostilities. Numerous emissaries went every day to report these tidings at Vienna, without concealing their purpose from the Bavarian authorities, who were too weak to make themselves respected. All this, it is true, was but a first impulse of the heart among all the German peoples. There needed many sufferings yet on their part, and many disasters on that of the French, before they dared to rise against the so-called Attila. But if Austria raised her banner and was successful in the first instance, there was no doubt but that the insurrection might soon become general throughout Germany, and that our allies themselves would make a prompt defection.

These facts, reported of course with much exaggeration at Vienna, put the climax to the enthusiasm already felt there. The time was come at last, it was said, for acting, and for no longer letting slip opportunities, as had been done in 1807; and if that afforded by the Spanish insurrection was neglected, it could never be recalled; the moment was the more favourable since Napoleon had not 80,000 men in Germany, (which was very incorrect,) dispersed from the Baltic to the Upper Danube; since Italy itself was stripped of troops for Catalonia; since the conscription was raised

with the greatest difficulty, and since the tyrant of Europe was also that of France, for, in order to keep down his fellow-citizens, become first his subjects and then his slaves, he had been obliged to smite even his best servants, (meaning M.M. de Talleyrand and Fouché, who were said to be in disgrace.) It was said, moreover, that Napoleon could not supply the place of the veteran troops sent across the Pyrenees; that he would be taken in an unprovided condition; that his German allies would fall off from him at the first signal, the German states hostile to him would rise with enthusiasm, and Prussia to the last man; that the Emperor Alexander himself, entangled in a policy which the Russian nation condemned, would, on the first occasion of adverse fortune, abandon an alliance which he had adopted because it was powerful, not because it was agreeable to him; that in a word, it was only necessary to give the signal, for all the world would obey it, and those who gave it would thus be the authors of the general salvation.

Besides these very plausible reasons, others much less cogent were adduced, in order to swell the excitement. It was alleged that not merely for the sake of retrieving the national fortunes, but for self-preservation, it was necessary to act with all speed, for the ruin of the house of Hapsburg was decreed after that of the house of Bourbon. The Emperor of the French, it was said, intended to supersede all the old dynasties by others of his own creation. In confirmation of this belief, extraordinary stress was laid upon an insignificant expression which Napoleon had addressed to the Spaniards under the walls of Madrid, when he had displayed a sort of affectation in making them await his brother Joseph's return. "If you do not like him for your king," he said, "I do not want to force him upon you. I have another throne to give him; and as for you, I will treat you as a conquered country." This was a phrase suggested by circumstances, and uttered only to produce a momentary effect; and if Napoleon really thought of any other throne than that of Spain, at the very most it was that of Naples, which Joseph had again pressed for, and of which Murat, who was then ill, had not yet taken possession. But according to the upper classes of Viennese society, that other throne was neither more nor less than the throne of Austria. Nothing remained then but to submit and perish ignominiously, or to resist and perish, it might be, but perish gloriously. There was no other alternative, and the choice must be made, and made quickly. In short, Vienna in 1809, was just like Berlin in 1806.

The impulse thus springing from accumulated resentments coincided with another arising out of the armaments themselves, which had been so much advanced since the end of 1808, that it was absolutely necessary either to use them or abandon them. After her military disasters, Austria had naturally applied herself to discover the cause and apply the remedy. In consequence of this, she had intrusted the ministry of war to the Archduke Charles, with the understanding that he was to reorganize the Austrian army in such a manner that, on the first favourable opportunity, the contest with France might be renewed with greater chance of success. Applying himself cou-

scientiously to the task imposed on him, the prince began by completing the third battalions of the several regiments, so as to make them fit to become war battalions. He then created the landwehr, a sort of militia, formed in imitation of our national guard. It was composed of the nobles and the people; the former acting as officers, the latter as privates, and was required to assemble at certain points to form *corps de réserve*. This landwehr was diligently trained, and every Sunday the young men of all classes, wearing uniform and moustachios, and affecting the military air which Napoleon obliged all Europe to assume, manœuvred in the towns of Austria, under the direction of old nobles who had long retired from the army, but were ready to return to it for the service of a dynasty to which they were devoted. Strangers who had formerly known Austria so calm, so averse to war, could scarcely recognise her in the agitated and martial people they now beheld. The diet of Hungary had just been held, and had voted the rising, as it was called—a sort of levy *en masse*, consisting chiefly of cavalry, and independent of the regular regiments which are recruited with Hungarian soldiers. Besides this rising, the diet had voted extraordinary funds to defray its expenses. No pains, therefore, were any longer taken to conceal these preparations, and they were even hurried forward as for a war which was to break out in the spring; that is to say, in two or three months.

Austria reckoned on about 300,000 active troops, whom the Archduke Charles had spent three years in organising, 200,000 men of the reserve, including the most military portion of the landwehr, and a force which it was impossible to estimate, namely, that of the Hungarian rising. Regiments had already begun to assemble in Carinthia, Upper Austria, and Bohemia, in order to the formation of *corps d'armée*. Artillery traversed the streets of Vienna in broad day, preceded and followed by regiments of infantry, amid the acclamations of the people of the capital. Considerable works were carried on in those fortresses which were to enter into the plan of operations. These were that of the Ens, at the confluence of the Danube and the Ens, with a bridge at Mauthausen to cover Vienna against an invasion from Bavaria; that of Bruck on the Murr, to cover Vienna from an invasion from Italy; and that of Comorn, to serve as a great fortress dépôt in case of retreat into Hungary—an indication that it was intended to fight to the last, and not regard the war as ended after the loss of Vienna. That city was publicly put in a state of defence, and cannons were mounted on the ramparts.

The language adopted by the Austrians to explain to themselves and others such conduct as this in the midst of peace was, that the destruction of the house of Spain presaged an approaching attack on that of Austria; that it was necessary, therefore, to be in readiness for the month of March or April; that they should be attacked infallibly, and with such a certainty they ought not to let themselves be anticipated, but anticipate a perfidious enemy; that it mattered little who should fire the first cannon-shot, for, in the eyes of honest men, the real aggressor would be the author of the Bayonne crime.

The bulk of the population believed in this reasoning with perfect good faith; the court had little or no belief in it, although the dethronement of the Bourbons had seriously alarmed it; but it was deeply exasperated by its own mischances, and after the lost opportunity of the Polish war it was afraid of letting slip that of the war in Spain. All the nobility were of this way of thinking, being moved at once by just national resentments and by the bad passions of the German aristocracy. Moreover, the numerous agents of England, reintroduced officiously at Vienna, were doing all in their power to excite the nation. The archdukes were among the most eager in this sort of crusade, except, however, the chief and most responsible of them, the Archduke Charles, who being destined to command in chief, trembled not at the thought of the cannon-balls, for there was no braver soldier than he, but at the idea of finding himself again in front of the victor of the Tagliamento, playing at the game of war with him for the fate of the Austrian monarchy. According to his custom, he prepared for war without desiring it. In order to pique his courage, a nickname was applied to him, borrowed from the events of Spain, that of *Prince of the Peace*. The Emperor Francis, always rational but wanting in energy, yielded to an insatiation he blamed, contenting himself with a few sarcastic comments upon the faults he suffered to be committed, especially when those faults were the work of his brothers. Recently united, since the death of his first consort, with a princess of the house of Modena who was most deeply imbued with Austrian prejudices, he found in his family a unanimity that perfectly accommodated his weakness, for all its members, except himself, approved of the tendencies to which he passively yielded. This suited his character and sufficed for his repose. Thus arming continually, talking and exciting each other for months, the princes and nobles who had governed Austria had come at last into a state of open hostility, which made some decisive step inevitable. Moreover, Napoleon's abrupt return to Paris, his appeal to the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine, and the movements of French troops towards the Upper Palatinate and Bavaria, gave reason to think that France was preparing for the war with which it had been intended to surprise her. Thus the endeavour to take securities against a danger that did not exist, had actually created that danger. An attempt might no doubt have been made to come to an understanding with Napoleon, by means of the guarantee proposed in Paris by the Russian and French diplomats. But this kind of *dénouement* was stale, for it had been already employed after Tilsit to escape from a similar perplexity. To escape a second time from such a position by a sham reconciliation was not an easy thing. War, then, or immediate disarming, was the only alternative; for, besides the impossibility of finding specious apologies for preparation so far advanced, it was also becoming impossible to support the expense. But in the face of Germany, of England, and of the nation itself suddenly to express a sense of security after having appeared so alarmed, to abandon those who had been fondly called the heroic Spahniards, and to let slip what had been on all hands

declared to be the finest of opportunities,—this was impossible. It was come to this, that Austria must conquer or fall in arms. And had she not many chances in her favour? Her army reorganized and more flourishing than ever; exasperated Germany breathing earnest good wishes, and ready upon the least encouragement to pass from wishes to the most active co-operation; England offering her subsidies; Russia wavering; France beginning to think what Europe thought, and less disposed to back the conqueror who exhausted herself in order to ravage the world; and the French army dispersed from the Oder to the Tagus, from the mountains of Bohemia to those of the Sierra Morena, decimated by eighteen years of incessant wars, and feebly recruited by young soldiers, torn from their despairing families at an age which was scarcely that of adolescence. Under the headlong influence of these motives, one day it came to pass, one knew not how, that war was decreed. Orders were given to assemble five corps d'armées in Bohemia, two in Upper Austria, two in Carinthia, and one in Galicia. The Archduke Charles was to be commander-in-chief. The efforts of diplomacy were employed to prepare alliances as another means of war.

The relations with England, which had only been fictitiously interrupted, were renewed; the pteutious subsidies she offered were accepted, and the business of effecting a reconciliation between her and Turkey was continued. It was resolved also to try and bring back the Emperor Alexander to a sense of what was called the interests of Europe, by which was meant his own.

Austrian diplomacy had much to do at Constantinople. To alienate the Turks from France, bring them into relations with England, and dispose them to fall upon Russia if the latter continued to act in concert with Napoleon, or leave her at peace if she broke with him, so that there might be none but the common enemy of Europe to encounter,—this was a very judicious line of policy, and one which deserved to be actively pursued. Moreover, the continual revolutions of the court of Turkey facilitated all kinds of foreign intrigues.

Since the fall of Sultan Selim, fresh catastrophes had ensanguined the seraglio, and given Turkey the appearance of an empire perishing through its inward convulsions. The famous pacha of Rutschuk, Mustapha Baraictar, whether really attached to his master Selim, as he alleged, or offended because a fanatical faction of Janissaries and Uleamas had disposed of the sceptre without consulting him, had taken up his position at Adrianople with a large army. All the other pachas had sent deputies to him, or had repaired to him in person, and Mustapha himself, the new sultan, had sent ambassadors to his camp, as if to put himself at the pacha's discretion. Thus, under the pretext of conferring on the fate of the empire, Mustapha Baraictar became its actual ruler. Presently he encamped under the walls of Constantinople, and one day at last he marched upon the seraglio to release Selim, who was kept shut up with the women, under the guard of eunuchs, and replace him on the throne. But at the moment he was about to execute that design, the head of his unfortunate master, the best sovereign that for a long time had reigned

in Constantinople, was flung at his feet. To avenge Selim, Baraictar deposed Mustapha after a short reign, and, for want of a more eligible successor, he had been obliged to take Mustapha's brother Mahmoud, aged twenty-four, a prince who was not without merit, and who had been inoculated by the imprisoned Selim with a taste for European civilization. Having effected this revolution, Mustapha Baraictar governed the empire for some months with absolute authority in the name of the young sultan; but a fresh revolt of the Janissaries put an end to his despotism, and heaped catastrophe on catastrophe. Baraictar, having been surprised by the Janissaries before he could retreat to the seraglio, hid himself in the cellarage of his burning palace, and had perished in the ruins.

Mahmoud, who was a man of some boldness as well as cunning, had not been a stranger to this last revolution. Delivered from an insolent master, he had taken upon himself to govern his tottering empire, and he was engaged in the attempt at the moment when France and Austria were about to measure each other's strength once more on the banks of the Danube. To win the Turks to her, that she might dispose of them to her own advantage, was, as we have said, of great importance to Austria, for thus she could either set on an enemy the more against the Russians if they continued to be allies of France, or relieve them from that troublesome enemy if they consented to join what was called the European cause.

The thing was becoming easy since the new position assumed by France towards Turkey, with which it was impossible for her to remain on a friendly footing whilst united as she was with Russia. As a colourable pretext for the change which took place after Tilis, she had at first alleged the fall of her excellent friend Selim. To this sultan Mustapha replied, that this event ought not to occasion any coolness on the part of France, for the Porte remained her best friend. Upon this Napoleon rejoined, that such being the case, he would endeavour to effect a good peace between the Russians and the Turks, but he did not venture to speak of conditions. The Russians, however, insisting, both before and after Erfurth, that France should end matters with the Turks and demand from them the Danubian provinces; the Turks on their part complaining to France that she did not procure them the promised peace, whilst Napoleon was running continually from Bayonne to Paris, from Paris to Erfurth, from Erfurth to Madrid; the latter, in order to amuse both parties, ended by hinting to the Turks with demonstrations of the liveliest regret, that they were no longer capable of defending Wallachia and Moldavia, that they would do well to give them up, and at that price secure themselves a solid peace, and concentrate all their energies within the provinces that were strongly attached to the empire; and that if at that price they would terminate a war which threatened to be most disastrous to them, he promised to procure them an immediate arrangement, and to guarantee the integrity of the Ottoman empire in the name of France. Nothing could give any idea of the revolution that took place in the temper of the Turks upon this overture of French diplomacy. Though it had been made



with great caution, and nothing had been said which it was possible to avoid saying after the engagement contracted with Russia, the indignation of Sultan Mahmoud, the divan, the Ulemas, and the Janissaries was extreme; and this mere hint so violently agitated the Turkish ministry, that the emotion communicated itself like lightning to the entire nation. The talk was immediately of arming 800,000 men, of even levying the Ottoman people *en masse*, and sacrificing the very last disciple of the prophet rather than yield. France was no longer regarded as a friend who reluctantly made known a painful necessity to her allies, but as a false friend who betrayed her ancient allies to an insatiable neighbour. Watching these vicissitudes with extreme impatience to profit by them, Austria assured the Turks that the secret of the famous interview at Erfurth had been nothing less than the sacrifice of the mouths of the Danube promised by the French to the Russians; that to insure the indulgence of Russia in the affairs of Spain, France surrendered the Porte to her, and thus, after having betrayed her friends, the Spaniards, she sought for pardon by betraying her friends, the Turks, and relieved herself from a difficulty by heaping treachery on treachery. To these dark representations was added a very incorrect account of what was happening in Spain, showing how the French were beaten by insurgent peasants and by the armies of England; and as the Mussulmans entertain a superstitious respect for victory, it produced the most decisive impression upon them, since it represented Napoleon as judged by the result, that is to say, condemned by God himself. From all these allegations, Austria drew the conclusion that the Porte ought to forsake France and unite with England, forget the recent passage of the Dardanelles by Admiral Duckworth, and rely on the supports of the Austrian and English armies to resist the ambition of a formidable neighbour and the treachery of a false friend.

This language penetrated with incredible promptitude the exasperated hearts to which it was addressed, and in a short time there was effected in the foreign policy of Constantinople a revolution quite as strange as that which had occurred in its domestic policy. A year ago the French had been in high favour with the Turks, who erected great batteries under their direction, whence they discharged red-hot balls at the detested English; now the French could not show themselves in the streets of Constantinople without being insulted, and the presence of the English was invoked by the whole population. Attentive to all these movements of an ardent and fanatic people, Austria notified the English of the success of her manoeuvres, and had Mr. Adair sent to the Dardanelles. He anchored there on board an English frigate, and had not long to wait for permission to appear in Constantinople, where, after some discussion, the peace concluded with England was signed in the beginning of January, 1809. From that moment the Porte was at the disposal of the new coalition, ready to do whatever Austria and England should desire for its common cause.

Austria was not less active in her exertions at St Petersburg than in Constantinople, but

without the same success. The court of Vienna had chosen, as her representative on this occasion, Prince Schwarzenberg, a brave soldier, unskilled in the refinements of diplomacy, but capable of imposing by his very integrity, and misleading inquiries as to the real intention of his court, which were hardly known to him. He was instructed to aver that the intentions of Austria were upright and disinterested, that she had no enterprise in view, her whole anxiety being, on the contrary, to defend herself against enterprises like that of Bayonne; that if the Emperor Alexander would return to a better appreciation of the interests of Europe and of Russia, he should find in her a sure friend, by no means jealous, not at all inclined to oppose his aggrandizement in any way compatible with the balance of power. M. de Schwarzenberg was enjoined to lay particular stress on the grand argument of the moment, the perfidy committed against Spain, which made it impossible for any one to remain in alliance with the French cabinet without dishonour. On this point M. de Schwarzenberg, who was a man of strict honour, was to endeavour to awaken whatever honourable susceptibility there was in the breast of Alexander. Lastly, if he succeeded in obtaining a favourable hearing, he was to offer the hand of the heir of the Austrian empire for the grand-duchess Anne, a proposal which could not encounter any obstacle on the part of the empress mother, and which, if accepted, would have re-established the intimacy between the two imperial courts.<sup>1</sup>

The Emperor Alexander was at this period no longer sincere in his relations with Napoleon, though he had been so in the beginning, when the enthusiasm of chimerical projects led him to approve of every thing in his ally. He had then sincerely admired the genius of Napoleon and the man himself, both worthy to be admired, and, interest helping enthusiasm, he had become a perfectly cordial ally. But the illusion that had attended his grand projects had disappeared when Constantinople was no longer in question, but only Bucharest and Jassy. Doubtless the conquest of the Danubian provinces, which is not even yet accomplished at this day, was a very sufficient matter of interest for Russia; but it was one of a less dazzling character, that left Alexander's mind in a more sober mood, and made him careful about the means of execution. It had seemed in the beginning that no more would be wanting than Napoleon's consent to obtain the Danubian provinces; but when the time approached for realizing the design, the practical difficulties appeared much more serious than had been anticipated. If Napoleon, by rapidly subjugating Spain, and inflicting some signal disaster on the English, had hindered Austria from even conceiving a thought of resistance; and if the Turks had consequently been forced to submit to whatever had been desired respecting their provinces, Alexander might have retained, if not the enthusiasm inspired by his first projects, at least the fervour of an alliance which

<sup>1</sup> Prince Schwarzenberg's mission, which was of great importance at that period, was entirely known to the French cabinet, through the communications made to M. de Caulaincourt by the Emperor Alexander.

brought him sure and prompt advantages. But great as were the genius and the resources of Napoleon, he had created for himself such difficulties as gave his enemies of all kinds courage to attack him again. Russia, on her part, had not been as successful in Finland as had been expected in St. Petersburg and in Paris. That vast empire, a Hercules in the cradle, with an immense future before it, but with a present far from equalling its future, had never been able to send more than 40,000 men into Finland during the summer campaign, and had spent the fine season in waging a sort of war against Sweden that ill became her own greatness. In short, this Swedish war, which was in its origin not a jot more moral than that of Spain, had not been more successful, and the two emperors, though much superior to their enemies, had not obtained any very enticing favours from fortune; accordingly, the Emperor Alexander was by no means enchanted. He found that what Napoleon conceded to him he had still to conquer with painful efforts; and the process of disenchantment, which was always so prompt with him, was already making visible progress in his mind. He deemed Napoleon still powerful enough to make it unsafe to quarrel with him; but he did not deem him victorious enough to make his alliance as advantageous as ever, nor pure enough to make it as much an honour; and, as, moreover, he probably would not have obtained the consent of Austria and England to the conquests which continued to be his ruling passion—that of the Danubian provinces—and as a new revolution in his friendships would have dishonoured him, he had resolved to persist in the French alliance, but to draw from it the largest profit, at the cost of the least possible return.

Under these circumstances, this war between France and Austria could not but be most inopportune for Alexander, for it would render more difficult the conquest of the Turkish provinces, compel a costly effort, if it was requisite to aid Napoleon by sending an army into Galicia, and add a new war to the four already on hand with the Swedes, the English, the Persians, and the Turks. This war would, moreover, put Russia in still more flagrant contradiction with her past proceedings, for it might expose her to fight in the plains of Austerlitz for the French against the Austrians, and furnish fresh grounds of complaint to the Russian aristocracy, who blamed the close connection with France. Finally, whether prosperous or unprosperous, it would bring about a result equally to be deprecated; for if prosperous, it might inspire Napoleon with the pernicious design of destroying Austria, and thus extinguishing every intermediate power between the Rhine and the Niemen; if unprosperous it would render ridiculous, dangerous, and, at the least, fruitless, the alliance contracted with France, to the great scandal of all old Europe. There is no worse position than that of not being able to wish either the success or the failure of a war, and the best thing to do in such a case is to try to hinder it. This was what Alexander resolved to do by every imaginable means.

M. de Romanzoff had returned to St. Petersburg, seduced by Napoleon's attentions, as much as M. de Caulaincourt had been by those

of Alexander. But the two sovereigns were sufficiently superior to their ministers to escape from the seductions which beguiled the latter. Alexander listened to M. de Romanzoff's accounts of the marvels of Paris, and the attentions lavished on him by Napoleon, just as Napoleon received from M. de Caulaincourt details of the gracious favours daily bestowed on him; but he did not deviate from any of his resolutions. He settled with M. de Romanzoff the language and the conduct he was to use towards France, and held several important conversations with M. de Caulaincourt. He scarcely at all concealed from him what he thought of the existing situation, of which he spoke impartially for Napoleon and with moderation for himself. He admitted that the war in Finland had not been well conducted, but expressed regret that Napoleon on his part had not obtained more decisive successes against the English. He appeared even to think that, after all, the English alone had gained something by the enterprise against Spain, since they were about to have the Spanish colonies at their disposal, which was much more than an equivalent for the conquest—the very dubious conquest—of Lisbon and Cadiz by the French. He declared how painful it would be to him to have to fight the old allies by whose side he had stood at Austerlitz, and what perplexities that singular situation would cause him in the higher circles of St. Petersburg, and even in the nation. He avowed the difficulty he should have in assembling, besides a new army in Finland, an army of observation along the Baltic, a grand conquering army to act against Turkey, and an auxiliary army to act with the French against Austria—a difficulty which was not only military, but in a still higher degree financial. He even went so far as to declare that the success of the new war would cause him much uneasiness, for he should look with alarm on the extinction of Austria, and would not consent to its being replaced by another Poland. Peace was necessary for himself, but he believed it necessary also for Napoleon; for it did not escape him, he said, that France was beginning to desire it, and to experience a change of feeling towards her glorious sovereignty. These were all so many reasons why he should be left to act with freedom as regarded Austria, and do all he could to prevent a war, the very idea of which was utterly repugnant to him. Unfortunately, he added, he was far from believing with Napoleon that it was enough to threaten and to deliver *ultimata* in the name of the two greatest powers in the world to stop the headlong course of people swayed by hate and terror, in whose breasts there subsisted, allowing for much exaggeration of language, a portion of genuine fear, which must be taken into consideration. He asked, therefore, that he should be permitted to reassure them, and at the same time intimidate them; to reassure them by peremptorily denying the existence of any intention to treat them like Spain; to intimidate them by demonstrating the disastrous results which a new war would bring down upon them. Furthermore, Alexander refused to intrust the conduct of this affair, as Napoleon desired, to the two ministers of Russia and France at Vienna. Napoleon, whilst wishing for peace, thought

that those two ministers would be more peremptory, and would therefore be more attended to. Alexander, on the contrary, thought they would go straightway for war. "Our ministers will make a mess of every thing," said he to M. de Caulaincourt. "Let me be left to act and to speak, and if war can be avoided, I will avoid it; if it cannot, I will act, when it shall have become inevitable, loyally and frankly."

There was no choice then but to leave him to act, since, after all, his views, being quite pacific, were perfectly in accordance with those of Napoleon. So earnestly did the latter desire peace, that he had secretly authorized Alexander to promise not only the joint guarantee of Russia and France for the integrity of the Austrian dominions, but also the complete evacuation of the territory of the Confederation of the Rhine, which signified that there should not remain a single French soldier in Germany.

Alexander kept his word, and expressed himself with perfect frankness to M. de Schwarzenberg. Though unable to hide his confusion when the Austrian minister upbraided him with being the accomplice of the base conduct practised at Bayonne, he was callous to the appeal made to his feelings in favour of the European cause, and, reproaching the Austrian policy with all the falsehood and dissimulation it had been guilty of for two years, for it had never ceased to talk of peace whilst it was preparing war, he ended by declaring that he was under formal engagements contracted solely for the interests of his empire, and which he was resolved to fulfil; that if Austria was foolish enough to come to a rupture, she would be crushed by Napoleon, but that she would force Russia also to take part in the war, for the latter, having pledged her word, would unite her troops with those of France; that the enfranchisement of Europe, which the Austrian cabinet was incessantly talking about, would not be effected; that no more would be gained by occasioning a new effort of him whom they called an overwhelming Colossus than to make him more overwhelming still, and to give England, another overwhelming Colossus by sea, the means of postponing the peace which was so urgently needed; that as for him, peace was all he desired, (including the Danubian provinces, he might have added :) that peace must be had at last; that he would regard as an enemy whoever rendered it more remote, and that he would employ against such an offender, be it who it might, the whole strength of his empire. Alexander put aside all idea of a family alliance with Austria; for he would not have committed the indecorum of bestowing on an archduke a princess he had almost promised to Napoleon.

The Austrian minister was confounded by these frank declarations. The higher circles of St. Petersburg, though certainly less ardent than those of Vienna, had made him expect a different result. He had found everybody of the European party and opposed to France, though they were afraid of speaking openly for fear of vexing the emperor. He had, moreover, ascertained that the imperial family entertained the same feelings, and he had hoped for a better reception from the emperor. A more practised ambassador would have seen that beneath these very genuine feelings, which were to a

certain extent shared by Alexander himself, there lay the interests of the nation, which were just then associated with those of France; that if the Russian aristocracy and the imperial family might indulge in language which accorded best with their prejudices, the emperor and his cabinet had a different conduct to pursue, and that if they could acquire a fine territory, their course was plainly to let the courtiers and the women talk on, and to attend to the business of the empire by trying to secure in this commotion the long-coveted banks of the Danube.

Understanding nothing of these apparent contradictions, the excellent Prince Schwarzenberg filled St. Petersburg with his lamentations, and sent despatches to his government which ought to have made her pause, had it been possible yet to arrest her precipitate course. Alexander, seeing he had produced a certain impression on the representative of Austria, hoped that the latter would effect something with his own court, but not reckoning on this with much confidence, he made his preparations for a speedy war. Being most desirous of terminating the war in Finland as soon as possible, he sent a reinforcement which raised the number of men acting in that province to about 60,000. He gave orders for marching against the centre of Sweden across the Frozen Sea. A column was to wind round the gulf of Bothnia and march by Uleaburg against Tornea and Umea. Another was to march from Wassa across the gulf of Bothnia on the ice and meet the first column at Umea. A third and principal column was also to make its way across the ice by the isles of Aland to Stockholm. The guard and two divisions were to remain between St. Petersburg, Revel, and Riga, to protect the shores of the Baltic from the English. Four divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, forming 60,000 men, were to enter Galicia, to hold the balance of events much rather than to second the French armies. Lastly, as was natural, the greatest efforts of Russia were directed towards Turkey, for if Alexander desired to be a moderator in the west, in the east he chose to be a conqueror, and he sent eight divisions to the Lower Danube, one of which was a reserve consisting of third battalions. It was to take up a position midway between Transylvania and Wallachia, so that it might either second the invading army in Turkey, or join the army in Galicia, and take part in some way or another in the events which should arise in that quarter. This division was reckoned by M. de Caulaincourt as one of those which was devoted to the service of the alliance. The whole body of troops acting in this direction amounted to about 120,000 men. Thus, to end the conquest of Finland, make head against the English, conquer the mouths of the Danube, and moderate events in Germany, were the several employments to which Alexander destined the 280,000 active troops at his disposal. If he did no more, he imputed it to his finances, of the state of which he complained constantly to M. de Caulaincourt, talking incessantly of the five wars he was about to have on his hands, and though always proud in his bearing, yet becoming almost humble when money was in question, and requesting aid to enable him to contract loans in France or in Holland.

The conduct of Russia greatly disconcerted the cabinet of Vienna, which had expected to find her less refractory, because it had judged of the cabinet by the language of the aristocracy. However, though it regarded the mission of Prince Schwarzenberg as a failure, it flattered itself that the Russian cabinet could not long resist the opinion of the nation, especially when strengthened by a first victory of the Austrian arms. The 60,000 men ordered for Galicia were considered as a mere corps of observation, to which it would be enough to oppose very inferior forces, with orders likewise to observe rather than act. Neither the language, then, nor the armed demonstrations of Russia, were taken as an argument against war; on the contrary, it was resolved to hurry every thing forward, so as to gain over the French forces, still dispersed from Magdeburg to Ulm, that first victory which was to bring all the powers to side with Austria. The latter was in one of those situations in which, being no longer able to retreat, one takes every circumstance, adverse or favourable, for a reason for advancing.

Preparations for war and diplomatic movements having occupied the month of February and a part of the month of March, it was resolved to take the field in the beginning of April, the earliest period when war is possible in Austria, grass having then but just begun to cover the ground. The plan of the campaign was laid down at Vienna. In the first place it was settled that only the least forces of the empire should be made to act in Italy and Galicia. Fifty thousand men were to be sent under the Archduke John to second the insurrection of the Tyrol, and to occupy by their presence the French forces in Italy. Eight or ten thousand men were to act against General Marmont in Dalmatia. The Archduke Ferdinand, with forty thousand men, was to hold in check the Saxo-Polish army assembled under the walls of Warsaw, and to observe the Russians who were marching into Galicia.

The principal body, that which contained the best and most numerous troops, was to act in Germany by the Upper Danube, and attempt the bold enterprise of surprising the French before their concentration. It was the Archduke Charles who was to command it as generalissimo, and had organized it as minister of war. Nothing, consequently, had been neglected. It was a force of about 200,000 men, strong especially in infantry, which the archduke had taken pains to render excellent; strong also in artillery, which had always been very good in Austria, but not so well provided with cavalry, which the Archduke Charles had not augmented, but which, though not numerous, was as well trained as it was brave. It was divided into six *corps d'armée* and two *corps de réserve*, distributed between Bohemia and Upper Austria. Behind this main body, the reserve and the Hungarian rising were to cover Vienna, and if Vienna were lost, they were to retreat into the heart of Hungary, where uniting with the remains of the active army they were to prolong the war. This second body, consisting of more than 200,000 militia men unused to war, but tolerably well trained, swelled to above 500,000 men the resources of Austria, which had never before made such a display of force.

The question next to be determined was how to employ the 200,000 men of the main body, who were to act in Germany and strike the first blow. The Aulic council, reputed to be the ordinary cause of the disasters of Austria, because it was said to paralyze the authority of the generals, had been deprived of its influence in favour of the generalissimo, without there resulting much more unity in the command; for unity can only subsist where there reigns a strong will, directed by a steadfast mind. The archduke, though a prudent, enlightened, brave prince, and the best captain of Austria, had not the force of mind and character necessary to secure unity of command; and the conflict of opinions which had been complained of in the Aulic council was about to be repeated around him between the leading officers of his staff, with the improvement, it is true, of being exercised nearer to the field of battle; and this improvement was certainly not to be despised.

The archduke's staff were divided between two opinions as to the best plan to be pursued. The one was to take Bohemia for a point of departure, and, supposing the French still scattered over Saxony, Franconia, and the Upper Palatinate, to débouche on Bayreuth, that is to say, on the centre of Germany, beat them in detail, and raise up the population of Germany by this sudden apparition and prompt success. This bold plan, which conducted the Austrians by Bayreuth and Würzburg to the very gates of Mayence, had the advantage of leading them to the Rhine by the shortest route, carrying confusion into the cantonnements of the French, and the liveliest emotion into Germany. But for the very reason that it was bold, it supposed in its execution a character that is in general possessed only by captains of a superior order, who are usually fortunate, and confident because they are fortunate. There was none of that kind then in Germany or elsewhere, except in France. This plan, moreover, supposed a degree of advancement in the military preparations of Austria, which its plodding administration had not succeeded in giving them. It was not until the beginning of March that the troops destined for Bohemia were concentrated there. Many regiments wanted their third battalions, and the artillery had not arrived. This plan of surprising the French would, no doubt, have been a good one, if adequately executed; but if they were not sufficiently surprised, it might turn out disastrously, for if they should have had time enough to move from the Elbe to the Danube, and rally between Ulm and Ratisbon, the Austrian army would be exposed to have them on its left flank, making way to Vienna by the Danube, dispersing all the detachments it had left in Bavaria, and perhaps even breaking its line of operations. With a general so fertile in unexpected manoeuvres as Napoleon, this latter chance was much to be apprehended.

The second plan was humbler and safer. It was to take the ordinary route, that of the Danube, by which the French would naturally arrive on account of the facility of communication along that great river; to confront them on that route with the enormous mass of 200,000 men, and to take advantage of their less prepared state, not to surprise them, but to beat them before they had rallied their num-

ers sufficiently to dispute the victory. This plan afforded no opportunity for any of those sudden manœuvres of Napoleon's, which commonly baffled all calculations, and exposed to no risk but that of the field of battle, always perilous enough against such a captain and such soldiers.

These two plans were long debated between two officers of the archduke's staff, General Meyer and General Grün, and divided the opinions of the ablest tacticians of Austria. But, as always happens in such cases, the decision of the question was left to events, and nothing was settled until spies had reported the march of General Oudinot on Ulm and of Marshal Davout on Wursburg. It was then perceived that the Austrians would arrive too late for the successful execution of the first plan, and that by debouching by Bohemia on Bayreuth they would have the French on their left flank, reaching Vienna by the Danube. It was therefore suddenly resolved to move back into Upper Austria the corps which were originally to have assembled in Bohemia. But in this instance, again, the usual effects of feeble command displayed themselves; some portion of the first plan was retained; and the second was only adopted with a reduction of the main body of forces which should have been employed for its execution. Thus some 50,000 men were left in Bohemia under Generals Bellegarde and Kollowrath, and about 150,000 were moved into Upper Austria to be marched across Bavaria to meet the French at Ratisbon. The first of these bodies was to debouche by the Upper Palatinate on Bamberg, and extend its left towards Ratisbon. The second was to invade Bavaria and ascend the Danube, extending its right towards Ratisbon, that the two masses, communicating with each other along the river, might be able, if need were, to form a junction, though with many chances of failing in that operation. In this way the Austrian army advanced astride of the Danube as it were, wavering between two plans, still with the hope of acting before the French, and guarding against a flank movement on their part by pouring part of the Austrian forces in Bohemia into Bavaria. General Meyer, who is said to have advocated the first plan, was sent from the headquarters of the Archduke Charles to those of the Archduke John, to employ in Italy the talents that were rejected in Germany; and General Grün, the author of the second plan, remained alone with the Archduke Charles as his principal adviser.

In consequence of this new system, the first corps, which had formed at Saatz under Lieutenant-general Bellegarde, and the second, which had formed at Pilsen under General Kollowrath, of the artillery, retained the same rallying points, and had orders to debouche with fifty thousand men by the extreme frontier of Bohemia on Bayreuth in the beginning of April. The corps of Hohenzollern, of Rosenberg, and of the Archduke Louis, which had formed at Prague, Piseck, and Budweis, and the first *corps de réserve* of Prince John de Lichtenstein, which had formed at Iglau, and which was composed of grenadiers and cuirassiers, received orders to pass from Bohemia into Austria by the route from Budweis to Lintz, to cross the Danube by the bridge of the latter town, and to

be before the Inn, the frontier of Bavaria, about the beginning of April. There they were to unite with Lieutenant-general Hiller's corps, formed at Wels on the Traun, and with General Kienmayer's second *corps de réserve*, formed at Enns on the Enns. These six corps were to march together on Bavaria, having the Danube on their right, thus tending to meet Bellegarde and Kollowrath's left towards Ratisbon. Orders were likewise given to commence hostilities in Italy and Poland in the beginning of April, as well as in Bavaria and Bohemia.

Now it was not possible, without carrying dissimulation far beyond all tolerable limits, to continue talking of peace while putting armies in march, and sending them orders to cross the frontier within a fortnight. This would have been too much like the conduct of the English at sea, who usually seized the enemy's traders without any previous declaration. Besides, victory was not so sure that one might venture to violate the law of nations in the hope of doing so with impunity. Orders were consequently given to M. de Metternich to make a preliminary declaration to the French cabinet, which might serve as a transition between the language of peace and the actual fact of war.

Accordingly, on the 2d of March, M. de Metternich presented himself at Paris to M. de Champagny, the minister for foreign affairs, and declared to him, in the name of his court, that the sudden arrival of the Emperor Napoleon in Paris, the call to the princes of the Confederation to assemble their contingents, certain newspaper articles, and sundry movements of French troops, determined it to raise its armies above the peace footing on which they had been kept until then, but that it only adopted this resolution because it was forced to it by the conduct of the French government, and that it took these indispensable precautions without yet departing from its pacific intentions.

M. de Champagny replied to this communication with coldness and incredulity, saying that this change from a peace footing to a war footing was six months old, Austria having been actually engaged for six months in preparing for hostilities; that the Emperor Napoleon had not been duped in the matter, and had made preparations on his own side; that the alarm now affected could not be real, for when the French were occupying Silesia with formidable armies, Austria had not thought herself menaced, whereas, now that the greater part of the French troops had been removed into Spain, she affected the liveliest uneasiness; that this could not be the language of good faith; that evidently the English policy had prevailed at Vienna; that the Austrian government believed itself ready, and acted because it supposed the moment was favourable for action, but that France was not to be surprised, and Austria could have only herself to blame for the consequences of the war, should they prove disastrous.

Having to explain himself more fully, M. de Metternich then complained both of the silence observed towards him by the Emperor Napoleon, and of the ignorance in which Austria had been left during the negotiations at Erfurth. He appeared to attribute solely to a want of friendly explanations the misunderstanding that threatened to end in war. M. de Champagny haughtily

ly replied that the Emperor deigned no longer to speak with an ambassador whom the court of Austria deceived, or who deceived the court of France, for nothing he had promised had been fulfilled; neither the suspension of military preparations, nor the recognition of King Joseph, nor the return to pacific dispositions; that explanations were therefore useless with the representative of a court whose word could no longer be relied on; that it was not M. de Metternich personally who was treated so coldly, but the representative of a government unfaithful to all its promises; that Austria had saved the English by crossing the Inn in 1805, when Napoleon was preparing to cross the Straits of Calais; that it had just saved them once more by hindering Napoleon from pursuing them to Corunna; that it had thus twice hindered the triumph of France over her rival; that it should pay the penalty, and should this time find Napoleon neither less prompt, nor less prepared, nor less terrible than formerly.

After some other complaints of the same nature, the two ministers separated without any overture which afforded the least hope of peace, M. de Metternich appearing to deplore war, for his sagacity foresaw its disastrous consequences, and his situation in Paris made him regret his departure from that capital; M. de Champagny appearing not to fear a fresh conflict, and moreover displaying the anger of a devoted subject who never could see any fault in his master.

All hope of peace being now at end, Napoleon was seized with that extraordinary ardour that possessed him whenever events became serious, and on the 3d and 4th of March he gave his orders with unparalleled activity. Believing as he did at first that Austria could not take the field before the end of April or the beginning of May, he had assigned as mustering-places—Augsburg for General Oudinot, Metz for the Carra St. Cyr and Legrand division, Strasburg for the Boudet and Molitor divisions, and Wurzburg for Marshal Davout. He now chose others nearer to the enemy, and hastened the despatch of men and *matériel* to these new points. Ulm was made the mustering-place of the Boudet, Molitor, Carra St. Cyr, and Legrand divisions. The first two, already *en route* from Lyons to Strasburg, were ordered to diverge towards Befort, and go straight to Ulm, crossing the Black Forest by the shortest road. The Carra St. Cyr and Legrand divisions had orders not to stop at Metz, and to march by Strasburg to Ulm without losing an instant. Their reinforcements and their *matériel* were immediately despatched to meet them on their road. Fortunately these troops were old enough not to be in danger of being disorganized through such precipitation. Oudinot's corps, already on its march to Augsburg, was not so well constituted. From an accidental assemblage of grenadiers and voltigeurs, it had had to pass to a formation of fourth battalions. The Emperor despatched ten days earlier the grenadiers and voltigeurs taken from the guard to form the two *compagnies d'élite* of these fourth battalions, and the fusiliers draughted from the dépôts to form the four centre companies. But the utmost that could be hoped for was, that at the opening of hostilities this corps would have four companies to a battalion instead of six, two divisions instead of three, and 20,000 men instead of 30,000

Besides this, it would have to form almost in presence of the enemy. But the military spirit of the time, the experience of the officers, soldiers, and generals, and the fervour that animated and sustained everybody, would make up for all deficiencies.

Napoleon did not change the place of muster appointed for the corps of Marshal Davout, still called the army of the Rhine. He sent it in all haste the reinforcements necessary to complete the first three war battalions, and the detachments which were to serve as nuclei of the fourth battalions. Each of the divisions of cavalry and infantry, having to pass by Wurzburg, would find there the men and the *matériel* belonging to it. He only ordered Marshal Davout, whose head-quarters were at Wurzburg, to move his divisions immediately into the Upper Palatinate, so as to have one soon at Bayreuth, one at Bamberg, one at Nuremberg, and one at Ratisbon, in order to confront the Austrian troops in Bohemia. So pressed for time was Napoleon, that in order to hasten the departure of recruits, he had recourse to a very irregular measure, which under any other administration than his would have been attended with serious inconvenience, and produced strange confusion. Certain dépôts abounded with conscripts, ready trained and clothed, while others were without any. He ordered the conscripts who were ready to join the regiments that wanted men, whether they belonged to them or not. Only care was to be taken, when they joined, to change their buttons for others with the appropriate numbers. Napoleon, moreover, took the precaution not to make known to the officers of the dépôts the destination of the conscripts required of them, lest, taking no more interest in them, they might give them inferior equipments. He prescribed the same arrangements for the light cavalry, sending off all the chasseurs and hussars who were ready, without caring whether or not they joined their own regiments, only desiring that resemblance of uniform should be attended to as much as possible. However, as hussars could not be mixed with chasseurs, on account of the extreme difference of equipment, and as there were more hussars than could be employed, he formed of them squadrons of guides to serve in the head-quarters of each *corps d'armée*, so as to relieve the light cavalry from escort service, which obliges it to squander its strength in numerous detachments.

We mention these details in order to give an idea of the expedients to which Napoleon was reduced, in consequence of having sent his principal resources into Spain. After having attended to these various matters, he applied himself to organizing the fifth battalions. These he intended, as we have said, to serve both in their ordinary capacity as dépôts, and also as reserves, whether to protect the coasts from the assaults of the English, or to set at liberty a certain number of fourth battalions then employed at the camp of Boulogne, or to meet the various contingencies of the war. Having already demanded 80 thousand men on account of the conscription of 1810, he resolved to levy 80 thousand more, in order to raise the effective of the fifth battalions to 1200 men at least: and he also resolved to take 10 thousand strong men for his guard from the classes of

the preceding years, notwithstanding the reiterated calls that had been made upon them. He ordered that such of the fifth battalions as should be first formed should be united provisionally into demi-brigades of two, three, or four battalions each, at Pontivy, Paris, Boulogne, Ghent, Metz, Mayence, Strasburg, and Milan. As for the 10 thousand conscripts of the anterior classes, these were to be employed in giving a quite new development to the imperial guard. To the regiments of grenadiers and chasseurs composing the old guard, he had added in 1807 two regiments of fusiliers, which had served very well. He now determined to create four regiments of tirailleurs and four of conscripts, which would make the infantry of the guard amount to at least 20 thousand men, and the whole body to 25 thousand, including its magnificent cavalry and its artillery, now increased by forty-eight pieces. The young soldiers of that gallant body would soon equal the old ones in military spirit, while they had the advantage over them in point of youth and physical vigour. No conception more thoroughly attested Napoleon's profound knowledge of armies, and the inexhaustible fecundity of his organizing genius. Furthermore, he made all arrangements for a forced march of the old guard from Bayonne to Paris, and from Paris to Strasburg.

He had only addressed a word of advice to the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine; but from the 2d of March, he gave them orders as head of the Confederation. He demanded 40 thousand men of Bavaria, in order to have 30 thousand, whom he put under the command of old Marshal Lefebvre, who knew German, and who under fire was always worthy of the grand army. The king of Bavaria would have had his son command the Bavarian troops, but Napoleon would not consent. "Your army," he said, "must fight in earnest in this campaign, for it concerns the conservation and even the extension of the aggrandizements which Bavaria has received. Your son may be able to command when he shall have made six or seven campaigns with us. Meanwhile, let him come to my head-quarters. He will be received there with all the consideration due to him, and he will learn *our trade*." By way of compromise, Napoleon granted the young prince the command of one of the Bavarian divisions. Napoleon appointed Munich, Landsbut, and Straubing as mustering-places of these three divisions, far enough behind the Inn to prevent their being surprised by the Austrians and sufficiently in advance of the Lech and the Danube to cover our musterings. Of the king of Wurtemberg he demanded 12 thousand men, who were to muster at Neresheim, and serve under the orders of General Vandamme, the choice of whom was objected to by the king of Wurtemberg, but confirmed by Napoleon, who wrote in these terms to the king: "I know General Vandamme's defects; but he is a true soldier, and, in this difficult calling, much must be forgiven in consideration of great qualities." Of the grand-duke of Baden he demanded a division of 8 to 10 thousand men, and a like force of the duke of Hesse Darmstadt. They were to muster towards the end of March at Pforzheim and Mergentheim. As for the minor princes, the dukes of Wurzburg,

Nassau, and Saxony, he required of them a division composed of their joint contingents, which was to repair to Wurzburg, Marshal Davout's head-quarters. Of the king of Saxony, he demanded 20 thousand Saxons in advance of Dresden, and 25 thousand Poles in advance of Warsaw. These contingents amounted together to a nominal 110 or 114 thousand men, and to a net total of 100 thousand, 80 thousand of whom were Germans and 20 thousand Poles. Marshal Bernadotte, coming from the Hanse Towns with the French Dupas division, was to take the Saxons under his command, and was then to join the grand army on the Danube. The Poles, covered by the vicinity of the Russians, sufficed to guard Warsaw. As the events of the war might induce the temporary abandonment of Dresden and Munich, Napoleon sent word to the two monarchs to be ready to quit their respective capitals, and retire towards the centre of the Confederation; offering, if they felt inclined for a short visit to France, to place at their disposal all the imperial dwellings magnificently provided. He furthermore gave orders to his brother Jerome to muster 20 thousand Hessians; and to his brother Louis, 20 thousand Dutch; upon neither of which forces he counted much, because Jerome administered his new kingdom without economy, and Louis administered his with quite Dutch parsimony.

These forces, being thus prepared, were organized as follows by Napoleon. He had not all his marshals at hand, for four of them, Ney, Soult, Victor, and Mortier, were serving in Spain. Among those he could dispose of, there were three he prized more than all the rest; these were Davout, Lannes, and Massena. He resolved to divide the mass of the French forces between them, giving 50 thousand men to each. Massena had already commanded more considerable forces, but Davout and Lannes had not yet had that honour, of which, however, they were altogether worthy. Marshal Davout was to retain the three old divisions of the army of the Rhine, those of Morand, Friant, and Gudin, the St. Sulpice cuirassiers, a division of light cavalry, and a fourth division of infantry under General Dumont, composed of the fourth battalions of that body; the whole forming 50 thousand veteran soldiers, the best without comparison which France possessed at that period. They were placed between Bayreuth, Amberg, and Ratisbon, having the latter for their rallying point. The St. Hilaire division, detached from the army of the Rhine, with a portion of light cavalry and the cuirassiers of General Espagne, joined to Oudinot's three divisions, was to form another corps of 50 thousand men under the illustrious Marshal Lannes, and to concentrate at Augsburg. Napoleon added to it a brigade of 1500 or 2000 Portuguese, selected from the best troops of that nation cantoned in France, who were weary of inactivity, and were better placed with the army than in the interior. He also added to it the Corsican chasseurs and the chasseurs of the Po, a brave and tried body of men. The Carra St. Cyr, Legrand, Boudet, and Molitor divisions, a fine division of light cavalry, the Hessians and the Baden troops were to form another corps of the same strength, and were to muster at Ulm under the heroic Massena. The cuirassiers and carabineers under General Nan-

souty, a numerous division of light cavalry, and the dragoons organized as we have elsewhere stated, were to compose a reserve of 14 or 15 thousand cavalry under Marshal Bessières, in the absence of Murat. With the addition of the guard, 20 thousand strong, the principal mass concentrated between Ulm, Augsburg, and Ratisbon would amount to 190 thousand French, including artillery. The Bavarians under Marshal Lefebvre formed in advance an excellent auxiliary corps of some 80 thousand men; and another was formed in the rear by the troops of Wurtemberg, Baden, and Hesse, under Marshal Augereau. Further still in the rear were the Saxons, commanded by Prince Bernadotte. Consequently, there were five French corps, two being reserves, having one auxiliary corps in advance and two in the rear, the whole made up of old and young soldiers, animated by the breath of Napoleon, perfect as regarded bravery, but far from perfect as to experience and age; but, such as they were, quite competent to uphold the glory of France at its existing elevation. Prince Berthier was appointed major-general, and M. Daru intendant, or commissary-general of this army, Napoleon constituting himself its commander-in-chief. It was designated the army of Germany instead of grand army, the grand army unfortunately being no longer in Germany or Italy, but in Spain.

Napoleon's plan was to march straight from Ratisbon to Vienna by the highway of the Danube, and to send down by the river his *matériel*, his sick, and all his baggage—a plan which inferred, in the first instance, some terrible blow dealt on the Austrians. With this view, he had a quantity of boats purchased on all the rivers of Bavaria, to be sent down successively to the Danube in proportion as he should pass the several confluent of that great river. It was also with this view that he had added to the guard 1200 of the best seamen of the Boulogne flotilla.

It was at Ratisbon, then, that he intended to concentrate his forces, neglecting the Tyrol and leaving the Austrians to entangle themselves there as much as they pleased, being sure of enveloping and capturing them between his army of Germany and that of Italy, if they did not make haste to retreat. He gave orders, however, to execute works at Augsburg, to deepen the ditches and fill them with water, to palisade the walls, and construct *îlles de pont* on the Lech, so as to cover his right flank by a fortified post while he was marching with the left in advance. This was the only precaution he thought of on the Tyrolese side, and it perfectly sufficed.

Ratisbon was chosen as a point of departure, on the supposition that the Austrians would not assume the offensive before the end of April. Should they take the field earlier, Napoleon had fixed his eyes on a less advanced point of departure in Bavaria, such as Donauwerth or Ingolstadt, at which the musters from Augsburg and Ratisbon might form a junction, and he resolved to have magazines of provisions and ammunition at both those towns. Thus Ratisbon in case of deferred, and Donauwerth or Ingolstadt in case of immediate, hostilities, were to be his first head-quarters. Major-general Berthier was despatched in advance

with these instructions. M. Daru received similar instructions for the movements of the *matériel*. Expresses were established between Augsburg and Strasburg on the one side, and between Wurzburg and Mayence on the other, to connect the telegraphic lines of the frontier, and to transmit news daily to Paris from the theatre of war. Special relays of post-horses were kept, that Napoleon might rapidly clear the distance between the Seine and the Danube. Thus prepared, he awaited the movements of the Austrians, intending to remain at Paris as long as possible, in order to animate the war administration by his will, before going to animate by his presence the army destined to fight under his orders.

Some further arrangements were made with regard to Italy, Spain, and the navy. Napoleon repeated his orders to Murat to march a brigade to Rome in order to disengage the Miollis division. He traced out for Prince Eugene the direction in which he was to attack the Austrians, and ordered him to mask with some light troops the road from Carniola by Laybach, and to move the five French divisions, Seras, Broussier, Grenier, Lamarque, and Barbou, from Udine to Ponteba, in order to debouche by Tarvis on Klagenfurth in Carinthia, the direct road from Lombardy to Vienna. He had despatched some vessels from Toulon for the Adriatic, with orders to keep the best under sail and to unrig the others, in order to procure 12,000 or 15,000 French sailors at Venice, who would be very useful for the defence of the place. He enjoined his sister Eliza, governante of Tuscany, to watch over the tranquillity of that country, for discontent was already beginning to infect Italy. He sent her a column of French gendarmes, in order to organize an Italian gendarmerie; and directed that the castles of Florence, Sienna, and Leghorn should be put in a state of defence, to serve at need as places of refuge from new Sicilian vespers,—so much did his own foresight acknowledge the dangers of his political imprudence.

As for Spain, he ordered Joseph to continue the preparations for the Portuguese expedition, which Marshal Soult was to execute with four divisions, and not to send Marshal Victor into Andalusia until Marshal Soult should have passed Oporto. He recommended that particular care should be taken of the Valence, Leval, Dessoles, and Sebastiani divisions, left in Madrid as the mainstay of the Spanish monarchy, and above all, that Marshal Ney with his two divisions should vigorously keep down the north of the Peninsula. He gave General Suchet Monecy's old corps, which had just finished the siege of Saragossa, with orders to prepare to march on Valencia as soon as General St. Cyr should have terminated his operations in Catalonia. He moved the fifth corps, commanded by Marshal Mortier, from Saragossa to Burgos, that it might at need either support Marshal Ney against the north of Spain, should that region become troublesome, or return into France, if the war in Germany required fresh reinforcements.

Lastly, Napoleon ordered Admiral Willaumez to sail from Brest with two 120-gun ships and six seventy-fours, and touch at L'Orient and Rochefort, where he was to be joined by Vice-admirals Tronde and Lhermitte, each with



a division. After conducting them to the West Indies, where they were to land provisions, munitions, and recruits, and to receive colonial produce in exchange, he was to return to Europe and join Admiral Ganteaume at Toulon, to take part in various expeditions in the Mediterranean. While Admiral Willaumez was executing this cruise, Admiral Ganteaume was to quit Toulon with his squadron and convey a considerable store of powder, projectiles, and corn to Barcelona. On the Scheldt, Vice-admiral Allemand had orders to take the squadron out of Flushing, and keep it in the river always in readiness for sail, which could not fail to puzzle the English and occupy a notable portion of their force. Napoleon, moreover, directed the navy administration to collect a certain number of gun-boats at the mouths of the Scheldt and the Charente, to guard all the channels and keep watch against the probable attempts of the English to destroy the squadrons moored in those latitudes. The minister Decrès was to set out for the coast on the day Napoleon departed for Germany, in order to superintend the punctual execution of these several orders.

Suddenly, while Napoleon was thus making his last arrangements, it became known that the Austrians had had the audacity to seize at Braunau a French courier bearing despatches from the legation at Vienna to that at Munich. This courier was a retired French officer settled at Vienna, who, leaving that capital at the moment of impending war, had been charged with several despatches for the ministers of his nation. The seizure of these, notwithstanding the bearer's strong protest, and in spite of the seals of the two embassies, appeared to Napoleon tantamount to a rupture. He gave way to the most violent anger, caused M. de Metternich to be vehemently interpellated, and ordered, by way of reprisal, the immediate arrest of the Austrian couriers on all the roads. His orders being strictly and instantly executed, very important despatches were intercepted on the Strasburg road. Their attentive perusal satisfied him that hostilities would begin in the middle of April. The imminence of the danger was confirmed by M. de Metternich's demanding his passports, and Napoleon ordered Major-general Berthier to proceed to Donauwerth, either to assemble the army at Ratisbon if there was time, or to make it fall back behind the Lech to Donauwerth if time failed him, leaving Ratisbon to be occupied by one of Marshal Davout's divisions. This done, Napoleon remained with his eye upon the telegraph, ready to set out at the first signal.

Hostilities began a few days earlier than he had expected. Orders had, in fact, been given in Italy, Bavaria, and Bohemia, to open the campaign on the 9th or 10th of April. Lieutenant-general Bellegarde, who commanded the 50,000 men destined to debouche by Bohemia, passed the frontier of Upper Westphalia at two points, Tirschenreith and Wernberg. The four corps of Generals Hohenzollern, Rosenberg, Archduke Louis and Hiller, and the Jean de Lichtenstein and Kienmayer reserves, forming with the artillery a mass of about 140,000 men, were along the Traun on the 1st of April, and on the 9th of April they were along the Inn, the Franco-Bavarian frontier, the violation of

which was to be decisive of war, and to bring on one of the bloodiest campaigns of the age. On the evening of the 9th, the Archduke Charles, who had put himself at the head of his troops, and was accompanied by the emperor, who had come from Lents to be nearer the theatre of war, sent one of his aid-de-camps to the king of Bavaria, with a letter announcing that he had orders to advance and treat as enemies whatever troops should resist him. He was willing to believe, he said, that no German force would offer any impediment to a liberating army which came to deliver Germany from its oppressors. This letter was the only declaration of war addressed to France and her allies. The king of Bavaria's only reply was to quit his capital and go to Augsburg, and the Bavarian troops, encamped on the Isar at Munich and Landshut, had orders to resist. Marshal Lefebvre had already taken command of them to lead them against the enemy.

On the morning of the 10th of April, the whole Austrian army put itself in motion to cross the Inn and begin the war. It did not know very well where the French were, but it was informed there were some of them at Ulm, Augsburg, and Ratisbon, whither Marshal Davout was marching. It hoped to surprise them in that state of dispersion, reach the Danube before their concentration, cross it between Donauwerth and Ratisbon, form a junction by its right with Bellegarde's corps, and sweep victoriously over Upper Westphalia, Swabia, and Wurtemberg. Hiller's corps, that of the Archduke Louis, and the second reserve, forming a mass of 58,000 men, and having the prince generalissimo at their head, crossed the Inn at Braunau, on the morning of the 10th of April. Hohenzollern's corps, 27,000 or 28,000 strong, crossed it at the same moment below Muhlheim. Lastly, the fourth corps, with the first reserve, 40,000 men in all, effected its passage at Scharding, not far from the point where the Inn falls into the Danube. On the extreme left, Jellachich's division of about 10,000 men, after crossing the Salza, proceeded to pass the Inn at Wasserburg, and march on Munich. At the extreme right the Vecsai brigade of 5000 men, all light troops, marched along the Danube to clear the ground for the army on its right, and to occupy Passau at the junction of the Inn and the Danube. Aware of the importance of that fortress, Napoleon had incessantly urged the Bavarians to put it in a state of defence, and had even sent French officers with the necessary funds for the execution of the works. But nothing had been done in time, and the Bavarian commandant could not help surrendering to the Austrians. It was a *point d'appui* much to be regretted, which had been yielded to them through negligence, and which they might afterwards use to very great advantage.

Having crossed the Inn, the Austrians marched in three columns towards the Isar, where they were to encounter the Bavarian troops and exchange the first musket-shots. Though they had applied themselves to render their army more prompt in its movements, they advanced slowly, first from habit, next in consequence of the bad weather, and lastly from the encumbrance of their baggage. Intending to wage a war of invasion, and not possessing the art of finding subsistence everywhere like the

French, they had thought of substituting for their immense victualling depôts rolling magazines, which were to accompany them in all their movements. In this way they hoped more easily to imitate Napoleon's suddenly and generally decisive concentrations. Besides these magazines, there was a very fine bridge apparatus, and an immense artillery *matériel*. They remained, therefore, for several days, between the Inn and the Isar, and did not arrive before the latter until the 15th. Until then they had seen only patrols of Bavarian cavalry, which they had affected not to attack in order to prolong the pleasing illusion that they should encounter no hostilities on the part of the Germans. The Archduke made ready to cross the Isar before Landshut on the following day, the 16th, and now at last all illusion was at an end, for the Bavarians lined the river with all the appearance of men resolved to defend themselves.

He made some change in the disposal of his columns for this important operation, which was the first of the war, and which for that reason was to be made prompt and decisive. He detached Hiller's corps from his left towards Moosburg, to protect the operation which was to be made before Landshut from all opposition from Munich. He moved Hohenzollern's corps up to that of the Archduke Louis, which had been left alone by the detachment of Hiller's, and he ordered them both to force the passage of the Isar opposite Landshut. He posted the two reserves in the rear in column. He ordered Prince de Rosenberg's corps, which held the right, to pass the Isar at Dingolfing, where there was no resistance to be apprehended; and to send its light troops to Ebelsbach, to discourage the enemy from holding out at Landshut, when they saw that the Isar had been crossed lower down. Lastly, the Vecsay brigade, already sent forward along the Danube, was to push on to Straubing, very near Ratisbon, in order to procure intelligence of the French.

On the morning of the 16th, Archduke Charles, personally directing the corps of the Archduke Louis, the advanced guard of which was commanded by General Radetzki, advanced upon Landshut to cross the Isar there. When one comes by the Braunau road, as the Austrians did, one descends by wooded hills to the banks of the Isar, which flows through the pretty town of Landshut, and then through verdant meadows. The town is half on the slope of the hills, half on the border of the stream, which divides into two arms in passing through it. Deroy's Bavarian division occupied Landshut, with orders to dispute the passage. After evacuating the upper town and all that portion which stands on the right bank of the river, it cut down the bridge over the large arm, filled the Seligenthal suburb with sharpshooters, and drew up in order of battle on the wooded heights of Altdorf, opposite those by which one debouches on Landshut. General Radetzki, advancing from the upper town to the edge of the large arm and opposite the broken bridge, was received with a brisk fire of sharpshooters, to which he replied with that of the sharpshooters of the regiment of Gradiscans. The archduke, on his side, taking advantage of the heights to use his formidable artillery, played

with it upon the faubourg of Seligenthal, on the other bank of the Isar, which he laid in ruins and rendered untenable by the Bavarians who were lodged there. He then had the footway of the bridge replaced on the uprights, which were still standing, and crossed it without encountering any resistance in the evacuated faubourg. Towards noon the corps of the Archduke Louis debouched with a numerous cavalry, followed at a little distance by Hohenzollern's corps, and deployed before the Bavarian division of Deroy, which was drawn up in order of battle on the opposite heights of Altdorf. A brisk cannonade took place between the Austrians and the Bavarians; but the latter, receiving intelligence that the Isar had been passed above at Moosburg and below at Dingolfing, withdrew in good order through the woods by the high road from Landshut to Neustadt on the Danube. The loss on either side amounted to about a hundred men. The Bavarians, though divided between two feelings, their displeasure at fighting for Frenchmen against Germans, and their old jealousy of the Austrians, who wanted to take the Tyrol from them, nevertheless behaved very well. They fell back upon the Danube, in the forest of Dürnbach, to which the division of the prince-royal coming from Munich, and that of General De Wrede coming from Straubing, had already retired. They were there near the French, and awaited them with extreme impatience.

Archduke Charles had crossed the Isar with two corps, those of Archduke Louis and Prince Hohenzollern. He was immediately followed by his two reserves, the Jean de Lichtenstein and the Kienmayer corps. He had, moreover, occupied Moosburg on his left with General Hiller's corps, and Dingolfing on his right with De Rosenberg's. He was therefore beyond the Isar, with the six *corps d'armée* destined to operate in Bavaria, and with a mass of about 140,000 men. He had but a little way to go to encounter the French, for between the Isar and the Danube the distance is but a dozen leagues, with no considerable stream intervening. But to march that dozen of leagues he had to cross small streams, such as the Abens on the left, and the big and little Laber on the right, steep banks, woods and marshes. Much consideration was necessary before venturing into that dangerous region, with the chance of running at any moment against the French army, always very formidable, though not yet having Napoleon at its head. On his left Archduke Charles had Augsburg and Ulm, on his right Ratisbon. All he knew was that there were French at Augsburg and at Ulm, he could not tell how many or of what kind; and others at Ratisbon, better known, being Marshal Davout's corps, the arrival of which in that direction had long been announced. The Austrian commander's plan was to advance straight before him, across the country between the Isar and the Danube, and to strike the latter at Neustadt and Kelheim, by pursuing the road which leads from Landshut to those two points. At Neustadt and Kelheim he would find himself between the two known musters of French, that of Augsburg and that of Ratisbon; and he might fall upon the latter, beat Marshal Davout, take Ratisbon, and form a junction with General Bellegarde. Having then at his disposal nearly 200,000

men, it would be easy for him to march to the Rhine across Wurtemberg, sweeping the French before him, surprised and beaten before they had been able to come together. But it was necessary to cross that almost impenetrable country before the concentration of the French and the arrival of Napoleon, and it was already somewhat late to execute this ambitious project—a very good one, it must be owned, if it was as well executed as it was well conceived.

On entering that region, Archduke Charles had on his left the Abens, running directly towards the Danube, and falling into it after passing through Siegenburg, Biburg, and Abensberg. On his right, passing to his front, flowed the big and the little Laber, which he was to cross near their source, for they rise in the environs and fall into the Danube. Thus he had to advance between the Abens, with which he was to move parallel on his left, and the little and big Laber, which he was to cross on his right, marching across woods and marshes to reach the Danube by the two causeways from Landshut to Neustadt and Kelheim. If he did not choose to advance to these towns, he might make for Ratisbon by a shorter route, by taking the Eckmühl road to the right, which, after crossing the swampy bed of the big Laber at Eckmühl, rises over wooded gorges, and then descends into the plain of Ratisbon, in the midst of which flows the Danube, which here changes its direction to the east, having run in a north-eastern direction from its source to Ratisbon.

Archduke Charles resolved on the 17th to pursue the two roads from Landshut to Neustadt and Kelheim. He directed General Hiller to march from Moosburg to Mainburg on the Abens, to guard himself against the French who were known to be at Augsburg, while Jellachich's division, further to the left, was to come from Munich to Freising and join this same Hiller's corps, of which it was a dependency. A little less to the left Archduke Louis was to advance by the Neustadt road and pass through Pfaffenhausen and along the Abens, in order to watch the Bavarians posted in the forest of Dürnbach. In the centre and along the road from Landshut to Kelheim by Rottenburg, the Hohenzollern corps, after having passed the two Labers, was to march on Kelheim, followed by the two reserves, while on the right the Rosenberg corps and the Vecsay brigade were to attempt a reconnaissance of Ratisbon by the cross road to Eckmühl.

Thus with two corps on the left, three in the centre, and a sixth on the right, at distances of twenty leagues, Archduke Charles advanced from the Isar to the Danube across the rough country we have described, and which is comprised between Landshut, Neustadt, Kelheim, Ratisbon, and Straubing. He ordered Lieutenant-general Bellegarde, who had debouched in Upper Westphalia, to press hard on Marshal Davout's rear towards Ratisbon, in order to prepare for the general junction of all the Austrian forces.

The Archduke marched steadily on the 17th, and with more speed than usual, but still too slowly for the circumstances. He advanced on Pfaffenhausen on the one side, on Rottenburg on the other. The bad weather, his movable magazines, his great bridge equipage, and his artillery matériel, dragged over roads made

swampy by the rain, accounted for this slowness, if they did not justify it. The only skirmish during the march was with the Bavarian light cavalry, which was now encountered without scruple, since the Austrians had already fought at Landshut against the Germans of the Confederation of the Rhine.

On the 18th, Archduke Charles, still badly supplied with intelligence from his left, having only learned that on that side there were Bavarians behind the Abens and French towards Augsburg, but better informed on his right, where he knew that Marshal Davout was approaching Ratisbon, was thus made certain that the French were divided into two masses, and became confirmed in his intention of falling first upon Marshal Davout. Uncertain as yet whether he should go straight to Kelheim on the margin of the Danube and thence descend along the river-side to Ratisbon, or whether he should go at once to Ratisbon by the Eckmühl cross-road, he made a further move, the corps of Hiller and the Archduke forming his left along the Abens, Hohenzollern and the two reserves forming his centre round Rohr, Rosenberg forming his right towards Lanquaid on the big Laben, and the Vecsay brigade at the extremity of his line pushing forth reconnaissances by way of Eckmühl and Egglöfshausen on Ratisbon. The most decisive events were approaching, for the archduke was surrounded on all sides by French and Bavarians, in a country of almost impenetrable obscurity, in which he might at any moment find himself suddenly in face of the enemy. Three or four hundred thousand men, Austrians, French, Bavarians, Wurtembergers, Badenese and Hessians, were about to huddle together in that close space for five consecutive days with enormous pertinacity, the advantage being destined to remain not alone with the bravest, for both sides were brave, but with that side which could best make its way through that chaos of woods, marshes, hills, and valleys.

While the Austrians, having thus the advance of the French, were preparing to surprise them, the latter fortunately from their warlike habits and their assurance in danger, were not men to let themselves be disconnected even before they were in possession of all their advantages. The field of battle, on which they arrived from the opposite side, appeared to them inversely, but quite as confused. On our right and on the left of the Austrians, Marshal Massena, concentrated on Ulm with the Boudet, Molitor, Carra St. Cyr, and Legrand divisions, was marching on Augsburg to form a junction with Oudinot's corps. Marshal Massena, by order of Major-general Berthier, had taken the command of all these troops, which scarcely exceeded 55,000 or 60,000 men, the reinforcements not having arrived. At five-and-twenty leagues thence towards Ratisbon, consequently on our left and to the right of the Austrians, Marshal Davout debouched with the army of the Rhine, composed of the Morand, Friant, Gudin, and St. Hilaire divisions, the St. Sulpice cuirassiers, and the Montbrun light horse, amounting to about 50,000 men, the best soldiers in the army. General Espagne and General Nansouty's heavy cavalry had already quitted him, the former to join Oudinot's corps, the latter to form the cavalry reserve. We see that the distribution

into three corps was not effected, for the St. Hilaire division ought to have been then with General Oudinot, to complete the corps of Marshal Lannes, and Massena ought to have had only his four divisions with the Hessians and Badeners.

Lastly, between these two masses, but nearer Ratisbon than Augsburg, towards Kelheim and Neustadt, were the Bavarians, covered by the Abens, and posted in the forest of Dürnbach to the number of 27,000 men. The Wurtembergers were arriving from Ingolstadt to the number of 12,000. There was, therefore, a scattered mass of 140,000 to 150,000 men, of whom 100,000 were French and 40,000 to 50,000 Germans. The imperial guard was not yet on the ground; the reinforcements covered the roads of Swabia and Wurtemberg with long columns of men, horses, and *matériel*.

Major-general Berthier had remained a long time at Strasburg to superintend the organization of the army, not believing that the moment for action was come. On the 11th of April, being made aware at Strasburg of the march of the Austrians to the Inn, he had set off for the banks of the Danube, and had arrived on the morning of the 13th at Gmünd, and on the evening of the same day at Donauwerth. In consequence of the contradictory intelligence he received on the way, he had often given contradictory orders, always striving to accommodate matters to Napoleon's plan, which consisted, as we have stated, in assembling the army in the first place at Ratisbon, if time allowed, or at Donauwerth, if hostilities began sooner than was expected. Having arrived at Donauwerth in the evening, the major-general learned that Marshal Davout occupied Ratisbon, that Marshal Massena and General Oudinot were at Augsburg, that the Austrians had marched slowly, that Napoleon's plan consequently was still capable of being executed; and then, placing under the orders of Marshal Davout all the forces round Ratisbon, under those of Marshal Massena all that were round Augsburg, he thought it right to concentrate the army at Ratisbon, and ordered General Oudinot to proceed thither. But suddenly receiving on the 14th a very ambiguous dispatch from Paris, in which Napoleon, foreseeing the anticipated movement of the Austrians, advised him to muster at Augsburg, at the same time leaving Marshal Davout at Ratisbon with a part of his forces, he countermanded the orders he had issued to General Oudinot, and remained in presence of the enemy until the 17th with the army divided into two masses, the one at Ratisbon, the other at Augsburg, with the Bavarians between both. In the interval, he employed himself in putting the corps in order, but he did not venture to take any decided step before the arrival of the Emperor.

Fortunately, Napoleon was informed in good time of what was passing, thanks to the means of communication he had prepared beforehand. On the evening of the 12th he was made acquainted with the passage of the Inn, and entered his carriage that night. On the 15th he stopped some hours at Strasburg, and some at Stuttgart on the 16th; saw by the way and reassured the German kings his allies, and arrived on the morning of the 17th at Donauwerth, time enough to repair every thing.

Though it was not less difficult for him than for the Archduke Charles to ascertain the truth amidst a quantity of contradictory reports and in so thick a country, he had learned from the Bavarians the passage of the Austrians at Landshut, and with his usual sagacity he guessed that the main body of the Austrians was advancing to the Danube in the hope of passing between the French at Augsburg and those at Ratisbon. Some moments having sufficed for him to unravel this fact, he formed his determination with incredible promptitude.

Two plans presented themselves to him. If he could have known every thing very exactly, which never happens in war; if he could have guessed, for instance, that the Archduke was about to move on Ratisbon with several corps ill-connected together, he would have had nothing to do but let him proceed to Ratisbon, where Marshal Davout with 50,000 soldiers would have detained him the necessary time, and then with the mass of forces round Augsburg, with Oudinot, Molitor, Boudet, the Bavarians, and the Wurtembergers, that is to say, with 90,000 men, he might have fallen on the Austrian commander in the rear, have placed him between two fires and taken his army prisoners to a man. This, however, would have been braving many chances, for Napoleon would have left to the archduke the advantage of a concentrated position, which would have been contrary to the true principles of war, which he more than any other captain had professed and illustrated by immortal examples. The archduke, in fact, when placed between the two masses of the French, might have beaten them one after the other, as Napoleon had done by many an enemy on similar occasions. Besides, for the success of such a plan it would have been necessary to know more than Napoleon knew as to the situation of things, as to the moral and physical state of the French and Austrian armies, as to what was to be feared from the one and hoped from the other; lastly, as to the march of the enemy, for the bolder one wishes to be the more one needs to know with whom and with what he has to do. Having, therefore, thought for a moment of this plan, he preferred the second, which was safer. It was to take advantage of the time that remained to him and concentrate the army, bringing Davout from Ratisbon and Massena from Augsburg to Neustadt. Then with 140,000 or 150,000 men under his hand, Napoleon would be certain to bear down every thing, happen what might, for the chances are never very formidable against a well-concentrated army, which can bring its whole mass to bear on any side on which it is attacked. But this concentration by means of a double march, Davout's and Massena's, in face of the enemy, likewise presented serious dangers. To surmount these Napoleon applied all his genius in executing one of the finest operations of his long and prodigious career.

Having arrived at Donauwerth on the 17th, without guard, aides-de-camp, horses, or staff, he immediately gave his orders, transmitting them by the first officers at hand, for Major-general Berthier was at that moment at Augsburg.

First he ordered Massena to quit Augsburg on the following morning, the 16th, and go down

by the Pfaffenhofen road to the Abens on the left flank of the Austrians, whence he would afterwards direct the march of the marshal towards the Danube or the Isar, towards Neustadt or Landshut, according to the position the army might occupy on his arrival. He enjoined him to leave at Augsburg a good commandant, two German regiments, all the sick and fatigued, with provisions and all necessaries for a fortnight; to make believe that he was marching into the Tyrol, and then descend towards the Danube, in all haste; for never, said the Emperor, have I had more need of your devoted zeal. The despatch concluded with these words, *Activity and speed*. At the same moment he gave orders to Marshal Davout to quit Ratisbon immediately, leaving there a regiment to defend the town, to ascend the Danube with his *corps d'armée*, move cautiously but resolutely between the river and the mass of the Austrians, and join him, by Abach and Obersaal, in the environs of Abensberg, where the Abens falls into the Danube. Marshal Davout, after what he had detached to form the other corps, might retain about 50,000 men, fortunately very capable of encountering any number of Austrians. These being marched to the Abens, behind which lay the Bavarians, and whither were directed the Wurtembergers, the Nansouty and Espagne cuirassiers, the Demont division, composed of the fourth battalions of Davout's corps and the grand park of artillery, Napoleon would have in hand about 90,000 men; quite enough to enable him to await Massena, who was to arrive with 40,000 or 50,000. This last junction effected, he would be in a condition to destroy the great Austrian army, whatever its position, or manœuvre how it might.

These arrangements having been settled, and communicated to those who were to execute them, Napoleon left Donauwerth for Ingolstadt, to be near the point of concentration he had chosen. His orders had not far to travel to Augsburg, and Massena was able, on the same day, to begin his preparations for marching on the following morning, the 18th. But it was more than double the distance from Donauwerth to Ratisbon, and it was not until late in the evening that Marshal Davout received the orders that concerned him. He was then in the environs, with four divisions of infantry, one of cuirassiers, and one of light horse, altogether, as we have said, about 50,000 men. Generals Nansouty and Espagne, with the heavy cavalry and part of the light, and General Demont, with the fourth battalion and the great park, had taken the left of the Danube.

In concentrating round Ratisbon, Davout had had several difficulties to encounter. The Friant division, in its march from Bayreuth to Amberg, had been for a while engaged with Bellegarde's 50,000 men; it had bravely sustained the assault, repulsing the advanced guards of the Austrians; and while it was resisting them, the rest of the corps, preceded by the St. Hilaire division, had moved away towards Ratisbon, along the Wils and the Regen. The whole day of the 17th, on which Napoleon despatched his orders, had been spent in exchanging a brisk cannonade with the Austrians under the very walls of Ratisbon, in order to give General Friant time to rejoin. The Morand division, occupying Stadt-am-hof, beyond

the Danube, checked them by its superb bearing, and returned them many a cannon-shot. The projectiles shot from the heights, enflaming the streets of Ratisbon, killed some men among our troops, which were passing through the town to cross the Danube. A shell even burst between the legs of Marshal Davout's horse, killing or wounding the horses of his aides-de-camp. The old soldiers of the Morand, Gudin, Friant, and St. Hilaire divisions shared in the highest degree the passions of the French army, and they were exasperated. A French sharpshooter, under the marshal's eye, ran upon an Austrian sharpshooter, and, after braving his fire, plunged his sword in his breast.

It cost Davout the whole day of the 18th completely to rally the Friant division, and to move the whole body of his troops to the right of the Danube, while the Morand division remained in order of battle under the walls of Ratisbon, to hold Bellegarde's Austrians in check, and cover the passage of the river. The St. Hilaire and Gudin divisions passed on that day from the left to the right bank of the Danube. So did the St. Sulpice heavy cavalry, while the light horse, under the brave and intelligent Montbrun, executed reconnaissances in all directions, on Straubing, Eckmühl, Abach, to get news of the archduke; for Davout was placed between the 50,000 men from Bohemia and the main Austrian body coming from Landshut by Eckmühl. The object of these reconnaissances was to explore all the roads on the right bank, by which Davout proposed to ascend the course of the Danube. He might, no doubt, have done so by the left bank, to which the Austrians had not yet penetrated, and which was covered with our detachments and convoys; but the roads on that side were impracticable, and led rather far from the point of concentration chosen by Napoleon between Obersaal and Abensberg. Marshal Davout preferred the right bank, though exposed to the enemy, because the roads there were practicable, and led more directly to the point aimed at. He knew well that the archduke would move along it during his march; but his troops were so steady that he had no fear of being driven into the Danube; he was certain that, if jostled, they would give back shock for shock, and not fail the more to meet the Emperor at the rendezvous appointed.

It was necessary to ascend the back of the wooded heights that separate the valleys of the big and little Leber from the Danube, to cross them and descend the opposite slope, in sight of the Austrians, to reach the plateau of the Abens at Abensberg, whither Napoleon was striving to bring together the scattered portions of his army. Divers routes presented themselves for this purpose. On Marshal Davout's right was the highway from Ratisbon to Ingolstadt, running continuously along the margin of the Danube, and leading by Abach and Obersaal to Abensberg. It was large and in fine condition, but pressed in between the heights and the Danube. Davout might have marched by it, but had he been surprised by the enemy in such a defile, he would have been exposed to a disaster. He reserved it for his baggage and his heavy artillery wagons, and sent a battalion of infantry in advance to secure

it by occupying the principal passes. On his left was the cross-road from Ratisbon to Landshut, leading over the big Laber at Eckmühl. This, too, was a fine wide road, but it led right into the midst of the enemy, and was only to be chosen if a great battle was to be desired, which was not the case. Marshal Davout sent forward by it his vanguard, composed of four regiments of chasseurs and lussars and two battalions of the 7th light infantry, commanded by General Montbrun, to observe the Austrians, and occupy them during the march that was about to be executed. Between these two highways there were village roads leading from one height to another, and these were reserved for the bulk of the army. The Friant and Gudin divisions, forming a first column, preceded and followed by the St. Sulpice cuirassiers, were to march by Burg, Weinting, Wolkering, Saalhaupt, and Ober Feking. The St. Hilaire and Morand divisions, forming a second column, preceded and followed by Jacquinot's chasseurs, were to march by Ober Isling, Gebraching, Peising, Fengen, and Unter Feking. These two columns, thus advancing side by side, were to reach the back of the heights which separate the big Laber from the Danube, join the baggage column at the issue from the defile of Abach towards Obersaal, and debouche opposite Abensberg, near the Bavarians, with a chance even of not being seen by the Austrians, so woody, hilly, and obscure was the country. The vanguard, taking the high road from Eckmühl to Landshut, and consequently exposed to the risk of meeting full front with the main body of the Austrians, who were coming from Landshut, was to advance cautiously, and after having served to screen the two columns of infantry, was to make a deflection to the right, in order to reach the point assigned for rendezvous to the whole *corps d'armée*.

Marshal Davout gave orders to march on the morning of April 19. In the course of the 18th the troops were clear of Ratisbon, and the Friant division itself, having crossed the bridges in the evening, passed the night with the rest of the army on the right bank of the river. To the 65th of the line Marshal Davout committed the perilous task of defending Ratisbon against the large armies that were about to attack it from both banks. He ordered them to shut the gates, barricade the streets, and defend themselves to the uttermost until he relieved them, which could not fail to be soon.

At daybreak on the 19th, the four columns began their difficult march, the baggage on the right along the Danube, two columns of infantry in the centre, by village roads, the vanguard to the left on the highway from Ratisbon to Landshut by Eckmühl. Starting so early and traversing wooded hills, the French at first perceived no enemy. The encounter, however, could not long be delayed, for it was impossible but that hundreds of thousands of men, manœuvring within three or four leagues of each other, should come at last in contact. At that moment, in fact, the Archduke Charles, having passed the day in the camp at Rohr, on the plateau which separates the Abens from the big Laber, at the opposite side of the very hills the French were engaged in crossing, had at last resolved on his proceedings. Learning more and more positively as he advanced that

Marshal Davout was at Ratisbon, he determined to march there on the 19th, his arrangements being as follows. General Hiller, forming the extreme left with his own corps and Jellachich's division, had orders to come from Mamburg to Siegenburg to join the Archduke Louis, who had been left before Abensberg with his own corps and the second reserve corps to guard the Abens. Archduke Charles, followed by the Hohenzollern corps, with the exception of some battalions placed in observation at Kirchdorf under General Thierry, by Rosenberg's corps, the first reserve and the Vercy brigade, making together 70,000 men, was to march on Ratisbon after leaving more than 60,000 on his left under General Hiller and the Archduke Louis. Thus, while Napoleon was making the greatest efforts to concentrate his army, the Austrian commander-in-chief was dispersing his from Munich to Ratisbon, over more than thirty leagues.

He put himself in motion on the morning of the 19th, at the same time as Marshal Davout, and in a nearly similar order of march. Two columns of infantry, the one consisting of the Hohenzollern corps, the other of Rosenberg's, and the grenadiers of the reserve, were to quit the camp at Rohr and advance across the heights over which the French were marching, the first column by Gross Muss, Hausen, and Tengen, the second by Lancquaid, Schneidart, and Saalhaupt. The Vercy brigade, a brigade borrowed from the Archduke Louis, the light cavalry and the heavy cavalry detached from the reserve, were to march on Ratisbon by the road from Landshut by Eckmühl, and probably to have an affair with the vanguard under General Montbrun.

Our men had started at daybreak. Of our four columns, that of the baggage moving along the side of the Danube, and sheltered by the heights and by the mass of our infantry divisions, could not encounter any enemy. The two columns of infantry, both preceded and followed by cavalry, marched for some time without discovering any thing. At nine o'clock in the morning the head of the two columns crossed the heights, descended on the other side, and only had a glimpse of some Austrian sharpshooters. The Gudin division, which formed the head of our left column, and which had sent out the sharpshooters of the 7th to a distance, was alone engaged with the Austrian sharpshooters of Prince de Rosenberg. The village of Schneidart was rather hotly contested. But our troops having orders to march, did not stop; and while the tirailleurs of the 7th kept up their fire, Morand and Gudin defied by order of Marshal Davout, who had galloped up to hasten the march of the troops. The two divisions hurried on to Ober Feking and Unter Feking, where they were to fall in with the baggage column as it issued from the defile of Abach, very near the general rendezvous. The tirailleurs of the 7th followed Gudin after having fought gallantly, and abandoned Schneidart to the Austrians, who thought they had taken it by force of arms. But as the Austrians continued to advance, the St. Hilaire and Friant divisions, which formed the rear of our two columns of infantry, could not fail to encounter them. While Rosenberg's corps, after its skirmish with the 7th light infantry, traversed Schneidart

and moved on Dinzling, Hohenzollern's corps entered Hausen just as the last companies of the 7th evacuated it, and occupied a mass of wood that extended in a horse-shoe form opposite Tengen.

At that moment, General St. Hilaire, passing through Tengen with his division, perceived opposite him on the verge of the wood the Austrian masses of Hohenzollern, preceded by a cloud of tirailleurs. The 10th light infantry having driven back the latter, Marshal Davout, who was at that moment with General St. Hilaire, ordered the 8d of the line on the right and the 57th on the left, to storm the wooded heights that formed a semicircle in front of him, in the centre of which stood the farm of Roith. The 3d advanced rapidly, charging its arms under fire. But having attacked with too much precipitation, and before having had time to form, it did not succeed, and was obliged to retreat under a shower of grape and balls. Meanwhile, the 57th, having formed its attacking columns, put itself on the left of the 8d, and drove the enemy from the heights he occupied in advance of the wood. The 8d being soon brought back into line, supported this movement, and the two regiments succeeded in driving back the Austrians into the woods and in establishing themselves firmly on the disputed ground. During this time, the three other regiments of the division, the 10th, 72d, and 105th, were drawn up right and left behind Tengen, ready to support the first two. Unfortunately, the artillery was delayed by the bad state of the roads, and there were but six pieces to set against the mass of the enemy's artillery. Marshal Davout, seeing the battle well established at this point, hastened to the Gudin and Morand divisions, which had already defiled, to satisfy himself that they had arrived without accident at Unter and Ober Feking, to place them at his extreme right, and thus hinder the enemy, of whose position he was ignorant, from taking that course to the Danube.

At the opposite extremity to the left, General Friant, whose march had been retarded by the state of the roads, had debouched on Saalhaupt between noon and one o'clock, and hearing heavy firing in the direction of Tengen, had hastened to take up a position to the left of the St. Hilaire division with the intention of supporting it. He made the 15th light infantry and the 48th of the line advance under the orders of General Gilly, to enter the wood and clear the flank of the St. Hilaire division. He placed in the plain between Saalhaupt and Tengen the second brigade of the St. Sulpice cuirassiers,

with the 88d, 109th, and 111th, to secure the extremity of his line. General Piré, who commanded a regiment of light cavalry, was ordered to connect the division with General Montbrun's vanguard towards Dinzling.

As soon as he was within musket-shot, General Gilly proceeded to clear the wood on the left of the St. Hilaire division. The chef de bataillon Sarraire entered it with four companies of the 15th and dislodged the Austrians. The 15th and the 48th thus took up their position on the flank of the St. Hilaire division, and the voltigeur companies of all the regiments stepped out and began to exchange a tremendous fire with the Austrian sharpshooters.

While these movements were taking place on the wings of the St. Hilaire division, the battle on its front had several times changed aspect. The 88d on the right, and the 57th on the left of the horse-shoe enclosing the farm of Roith, had lost a great many men and exhausted their ammunition, which could not easily be replaced, the artillery wagons not having yet arrived. General St. Hilaire ordered up the 72d in place of the 88d, and the 105th in place of the 57th, and the fire began again with extreme violence. Prince Hohenzollern pushed forward the Manfredini and Wurzburg regiments, led by Prince Louis of Lichtenstein, which made immense efforts to debouch by the horse-shoe of which the French occupied the middle. All the officers were wounded in these attempts. Marshal Davout, having returned to the St. Hilaire division, had placed himself at the centre with a battalion of the 68d, and fell upon all who attempted to debouch by the extremities, making prisoners at every fresh move of the Austrians.

The enemy's generals then resolved to make an attempt on St. Hilaire's left, at the point of junction with the Friant division. Prince Louis de Lichtenstein, putting himself at the head of the Wurzburg regiment, and seizing a flag, debouched in column, marching straight against the French. General Gilly, with the grenadiers of the 15th and a battalion of the 111th, met Prince Louis at the bayonet's point and drove him back. The prince returned to the charge, received several shots, and was put *hors de combat*. The Austrians were withdrawn. In front of the St. Hilaire division, Prince Hohenzollern made a fresh attempt, but our artillery had just then come up, and its fire checked the assailants. The 10th light infantry then charged into the wood and forced the Austrians to fall back upon Hausen. This movement was supported by our whole line, and the Austrians were on the point of being driven into Hausen, when Prince Maurice of Lichtenstein, at the head of the Kaunitz regiment, stopped the furious pursuit of the French. The prince was wounded in saving his *corps d'armée*.

The day was drawing to a close, and in the confusion of his rencontre the French were no more willing than the Austrians to risk a more general engagement. It was enough for Marshal Davout that he had accomplished his task by arriving safe and sound at the environs of Abensberg. His right, formed by the Gudin and Morand divisions, having arrived at the rendezvous, and his left, formed by St. Hilaire and Friant, being master of the field of battle, he contented himself with bivouacking there as

<sup>1</sup> I have often had much difficulty in unravelling the truth amid the contradictory assertions of witnesses who report military events: I have never had more than on this occasion, and especially with respect to the battle of Tengen. We have the sober, clear, and moderate narrative of General Stutterheim, and many others by Germans. We have, on the French side, General Pelet, and the manuscript narratives of Generals St. Hilaire, Friant, and Montbrun, and better still, an account by Marshal Davout himself. All these narratives contradict each other as to places, hours, and the troops engaged. After having read them again and again, as many as five or six times each, I have come to understand the facts as I have stated them, and I think the account I have given is as near the truth as possible. What I am sure of is, that I have preserved the true character of the event, and that is what is most important in history. The notes that I have collected on this matter would form a memoir like those which are drawn up for the Academy of Inscriptions.

vector, and awaiting Napoleon's orders for his ulterior movements. His march had been successful on all points; for the brave Montbrun having encountered Rosenberg's corps, had gallantly resisted it, and fell back in the evening on the *corps d'armées* without having sustained any check.

The Archduke Charles, stationed on the heights of Grub, with twelve battalions of grenadiers belonging to the first *corps de réserve*, had remained a passive spectator of the battle. Seeing a fight on his left with Hohenzollern, and on his right with Rosenberg, he feared he had the main body of the French before him; and wishing to rally all his troops before risking a general engagement, he had let the fight go on without succouring the Hohenzollern corps. His intention was to renew the conflict on the following day, after having made Archduke Louis join him from his post before Abens, and made General Hiller take up the position thus left vacant.

The day had been very bloody, for there had been fighting not only at Dinzing, between Montbrun and Rosenberg, and at Tengen, between St. Hilaire, Friant, and Hohenzollern, but also between the intermediate posts left by the Austrians and the French to connect the two extremities of their lines. Our loss was 200 men of General Montbrun's vanguard, 800 of the Friant division, 1700 of the St. Hilaire division, a few men only of the Morand division, and one or two hundred of the Bavarian horse—in all 2500 men. The Austrians lost 500 at Dinzing, about 4500 at Tengen, and some hundreds at Buch and Arnhofen—in all nearly 6000.<sup>1</sup> A considerable number of their soldiers were missing. The general result was of very great importance as regarded the position of the two armies, for Marshal Davout, who might have been stopped in his march, and perhaps thrown into the Danube, had fortunately slipped through between the river and the Austrians, had reached the environs of Abensberg with his right, and victoriously assailed the centre of the Austrians with his left. Had the Archduke Charles marched in closer order, had he hesitated less for fear of the ground and of Napoleon, he might have routed the Friant and St. Hilaire divisions with his reserve of grenadiers, or at least have severely injured them. But he saw in the whole *mêlée* only reasons for waiting till matters became more clear, and till his left had come up.

Napoleon made a different use of the advantages gained by Marshal Davout. Arriving from Ingolstadt at Vohburg on the night of the 19th, he learned the events of the day, and immediately mounting his horse, he galloped to Abensberg to reconnoitre the ground in person. From that plateau he perceived that the Austrians had only a chain of posts, neither numerous nor well placed, to connect the masses that had fought at Tengen with those which were spread along the Abens. He did not know exactly where was the Archduke Charles with his main body, whether before Tengen, over against the St. Hilaire and Friant divisions, or along the Abens before the Bavarians; but he

saw clearly that the Austrian commander had strangely extended his line; and availing himself of the advantages of concentration which began to be on his side since Marshal Davout's successful movement, he thought of making the Austrians suffer the consequences to which they had exposed themselves by their imprudent dispersion. He therefore made the following arrangements on the spot. Leaving Marshal Davout the victorious St. Hilaire and Friant divisions with Montbrun's light troops, (in all 24,000 men,) he took from him for the moment the Morand and Gudin divisions, bivouacked between Unter and Ober Feking, the St. Sulpice cuirassiers and the Jacquot chasseurs, and put them under the temporary command of Marshal Lannes, who had just arrived. Bidding Marshal Davout stand fast at Tengen and resist any attack whatever that might be made on him, for the army was about to make that point its pivot in order to break the enemy's centre and drive it back upon Landshut, he ordered Marshal Lannes to march straight forward with the 25,000 or 26,000 men at his disposal and storm Rohr, which seemed to be the centre of the Austrian position. Having himself under his hand the Wurtembergers, who were at that moment debouching on the field of battle, he placed them towards Arnhofen, between Lannes and the Bavarians, which latter he ordered to cross the Abens at Abensberg and go and storm Arnhofen. The Wrede division especially, posted behind the Abens from Biburg to Siegenburg, was to wait until the enemy's line was in motion to pass the Abens by force and debouch to our right on the left flank of the Austrians. Each of these attacks was directed against one of the detached posts of the Austrians, which formed a long chain from the Abens to the Laber. It was Napoleon's design, after forcing all these posts, to push on to Landshut and seize the Archduke's line of operation, either by falling on his rear, or upon the prince himself, if he fell back in person on Landshut. To render the operation more sure, he hastened to modify the order of Massena's march. He had made him descend on Pfaffenhofen perpendicularly to the left flank of the Austrians, having it in view to bend his march either to the Isar or the Danube, according to circumstances. Thinking he had forces enough by him, since he had Marshal Davout at Tengen with 24,000 men, Marshal Lannes, about to storm Rohr with 25,000, Marshal Lefebvre preparing to attack Arnhofen and Offensteten with 40,000 Wurtembergers and Bavarians, and the Demont division and the Nansouty cuirassiers, who were arriving at the rear, he sent Massena forward to Landshut by Freising and Moosburg, ordering him to be there early on the following day, the 21st, in order to hinder the return of the Austrians to that place. It was possible, if Massena arrived in time, that he might carry every thing between the Danube and the Isar.

While Napoleon was making arrangements for thus employing the 20th, Archduke Charles, stopped in his movement on Ratisbon by the encounter with the St. Hilaire and Friant divisions, equally uninformed as his adversary respecting the march of the enemy, but not guessing so well as he what he had to fear, had imagined that the violent resistance he had just met with indicated the presence of Napoleon at

<sup>1</sup> I repeat, once for all, that those numbers (and others of the same kind) can only be approximate; but I have taken all possible pains to make them as near the truth as I could.



Tengen with all his forces, and had resolved to call up the corps of his brother Louis, which had been left before Abens, directing General Hiller, who had had to march all the 19th, to occupy the position quitted by the Archduke Louis. He therefore resolved to await on the 20th, between Grub and Dinzing, the junction of his left, in order to renew the fight. He left his brother at liberty, however, to interpret this order, and to fight wherever he might be, if he was attacked from the direction of the Abens.

And this conjecture was realized. On the morning of the 20th, the Archduke Louis perceived masses debouching, some from the Abens by Abensberg and Arnhofen: these were the Wurtembergers and Bavarians, Demont and Nansouty; the others from the Ratisbon road by Reising and Buchhofen: these were Morand, Gudín, Jacquinot, and St. Sulpice. He saw he was about to be seriously attacked, and, instead of manœuvring to rejoin his brother, he thought of defending himself where he was, until Hiller's corps should come to his aid.

At that moment Napoleon saw defile before him, on the plateau in front of Abensberg, the Wurtembergers and Bavarians, who were going to put themselves in line, and whom the pride of fighting under that great man filled with quite French feelings. He harangued them one after the other, (Wurtemberger and Bavarian officers translating his words,) and said that he was making them fight not for himself, but for themselves, against the ambition of the house of Austria, which was enraged at not having them as of yore under its yoke; that this time he would soon restore them peace and for ever, with such an increase of power that for the future they should be able to defend themselves against the pretensions of their old dominators. His presence and his words electrified his German allies, who were flattered to see him among them, entirely trusting to their honour, for at that moment he had no other escort than some detachments of Bavarian cavalry.

Between eight and nine o'clock the whole line was in motion from left to right, from Ober Feking and Buchhofen to Arnhofen and Pruck. Lannes on the left advanced with his 20,000 foot and 5000 horse on Bachel, on the road to Rohr, through a country covered with wood and intersected by numerous defiles. He encountered the Austrian General Thierry, followed by his infantry alone, for his cavalry, marching with more speed, were already near Rohr. Lannes ordered the Jacquinot chasseurs to charge, whereupon the Austrian infantry made all haste to seek the cover of the woods, but were overtaken before they could reach them, and sabred before they could form in square. They retired in disorder, running from one clump of trees to another, and leaving behind them many killed and prisoners. It was a pitiable rout, the mass of the assailants being so disproportioned to that of the assailed.

At Rohr, Generals Thierry and Schusteck, having formed a junction, endeavoured to aid each other. Lannes' two divisions of infantry marched against them with the chasseurs and the cuirassiers at their head. Kienmayer's hussars vigorously charged the Jacquinot chasseurs, but were broken up by a countercharge of French cuirassiers, and obliged to fall back on

the village of Rohr. At that moment Morand's infantry assailed the village. The 30th, supported by the cuirassiers, attacked it in front, whilst the 18th and 17th were manœuvring to surround it. Seeing this, Generals Thierry and Schusteck retreated again, and, after an ineffectual volley, fell back on Rottenburg by one of the two causeways which lead from the Danube to the Isar, that from Kelheim to Landshut. Beyond Rohr, the country being more open and retreat more difficult, the Austrian cavalry made noble efforts to cover its infantry. The Kienmayer hussars had just been joined by four squadrons of Levenehr's dragoons detached from the second reserve corps. Both charged at every rencontre with the most brilliant bravery. But if they had some advantage over our hussars, our cuirassiers, dashing upon them, sabred them unmercifully. All the infantry found on the road was taken. In this way Rottenburg was reached towards the close of the day, the disorder continually increasing among the Austrians. General Thierry, having dismounted from his horse to rally his troops, was surprised by fresh charges, and lost three whole battalions. Kienmayer's hussars and Levenehr's dragoons paid for their gallantry by almost complete destruction. Generals Thierry and Schusteck, after having lost in killed, wounded, and prisoners between 4000 and 5000 men, would have perished with all their forces if, fortunately for them, General Hiller had not afforded them very timely aid. Instead of descending the Abens to Siegenburg and Biburg, where Archduke Louis was engaged, General Hiller, perceiving from a distance the rout of Generals Schusteck and Thierry, had turned off to the right and perpendicularly to the road from Neustadt to Landshut, and continuing his march in the same direction on that from Kelheim to Landshut, he had taken up a position at Rottenburg.

Lannes might have attacked Hiller's corps with the forces at his disposal and have worsted it. But he had executed a long march without having been joined by the right, composed of the Wurtembergers and Bavarians, and the day being far advanced, he halted to await further orders. He had lost barely 200 men against 4000 or 5000 killed or taken prisoners from the enemy, and he had collected cannon, baggage, and almost all the wounded of the battle of Tengen, who were spread over the villages he had passed through. While Lannes was thus routing the Austrian Generals Thierry and Schusteck, the Wurtembergers and Bavarians were most vigorously assailing the position of Kirchdorf, which was strongly defended by the troops of Generals Reuss and Bianchi, under Archduke Louis. Victory was more sharply contested at this point, for the Austrian troops were more numerous, in a very strong position, and though well attacked, yet not so well as they might have been by the Morand and Gudín divisions.

The Wurtembergers had marched on Offenstetten, connecting themselves by their left with Marshal Lannes, by their right with the Bavarians. The latter had marched by Pruck on Kirchdorf. The Austrian General Bianchi had fallen back from Biburg on Kirchdorf to join the troops of Prince de Reuss, whilst Archduke Louis was cannonading Siegenburg to prevent

Wrede's Bavarian division from debouching beyond the Abens. The battle grew very hot round Kirchdorf, where the Austrians defended themselves with great energy. The Bavarians were several times repulsed, sometimes with musketry, sometimes at the point of the bayonet. But in the afternoon, the Wurtembergers, having carried a village that covered the right of the Austrians, and General Wrede having at the same time crossed the Abens on their left, Archduke Louis was constrained to retire to Pfaffenhausen by the road from Neustadt to Landshut. The Bavarians hotly pursued him, and did not halt until very late at the environs of Pfaffenhausen, before the *Aspre* grenadiers, who formed the remainder of the second reserve corps, and who rendered to Generals Reuss and Bianchi the service which General Hiller had rendered to Generals Thierry and Schusteck. The loss of the Austrians on that side was about 8000 killed or taken prisoners; that of the Bavarians and Wurtembergers about a thousand.

The battle of the 20th, to which Napoleon gave the name of the battle of Abensberg, though much less keenly contested than that of the 19th, cost the Austrians about 7000 or 8000 men, which made a total of 18,000 or 14,000 men for the two days. But as a manoeuvre it was of immense importance, and decided the fate of that first part of the campaign, for it separated the Archduke Charles from his left, by forcing back the latter upon the Isar, while he himself was about to be backed against the Danube towards Ratisbon. Regarded in this light, it was worthy of all the encomiums that could be bestowed upon it. When Napoleon arrived that evening at Rottenburg he was intoxicated with joy. He saw his adversary driven back on the Isar at the very beginning of the operations, and the Austrians disheartened, like the Prussians after Jena. He did not clearly see yet all that fortune had in store for him, for he could not collect, from the replies of the prisoners, where were the several archdukes; but supposing that Archduke Charles might be in front of him on the Landshut road, he resolved to march on that town in order to surprise and defeat him at the passage of the Isar, if Massena arrived in time at that point. He determined, therefore, to proceed thither on the following day, the 21st, and to push matters to extremities with the Austrians. From what he had seen during the day, he was inclined to believe that the whole force was flying towards the Isar, and that Marshal Davout, who had become his left pivot, would have only to march straight before him to pick up the remains of the fugitives. In this belief, he ordered him to drive back the few troops he supposed to be placed before Tengen, so as to follow the movement of the whole French line on the Isar, and ultimately to fall upon Bellegarde at Ratisbon, when an end had been made of Archduke Charles. He did not suspect that what seemed to be the few troops before Tengen was the Archduke Charles himself, with the main body of the Austrian forces.

The archduke had waited all the day of the 20th for the renewal of the battle of Tengen and the junction of his brother Louis. But neither having taken place—on the contrary, many French being seen on the two roads from

the Danube to the Isar—he began to be apprehensive for his left, and in order to try and rally it, if no disaster had befallen it, he took up a position on the wooded heights that separate the big and the little Laber from the valley of the Danube, athwart the road leading from Landshut to Ratisbon by Eckmühl. The whole reserve of cuirassiers had orders to place themselves on the back of those heights at the entrance of the plain of Ratisbon, the grenadiers at the summit, and the Hohenzollern and Rosenberg corps on the slope next the Laber, right and left of Eckmühl. In this position the archduke was backed against Ratisbon, faced Landshut, and was ready to change his line of operation if his left was absolutely cut off from him, and to reinforce himself with Bellegarde's corps if he were deprived of Hiller's. On his part, Lieutenant-general Hiller, who besides his own corps commanded that of Archduke Louis by right of seniority, seeing himself hard beset on the Neustadt and Kelheim roads, thought he could not too soon reach Landshut, for he despaired, with reason, of rejoining Archduke Charles, and he feared that Landshut itself, where the whole *matériel* of the army, with a vast number of wounded, had just been collected, had been carried by the enemy. In consequence, he ordered the columns on the two roads to make a night march to Landshut so as to arrive there very early in the morning.

On the night of the 20th, the Austrians poured on upon Landshut from the two roads. The French, almost as early as the Austrians, burst upon it like two torrents.

After sleeping a few hours on a chair, without undressing, Napoleon was in the saddle at daybreak of the 21st, to direct in person the pursuit along the Landshut road. Though still ignorant of the presence of Archduke Charles at Eckmühl, he had made further reflections on that subject, in consequence of which he had detached the Demont division, the Nansouty cuirassiers, and the Bavarian divisions of General Derozy and the prince-royal, on his left towards the big Laber, not wishing, in so uncertain a situation, to leave Marshal Davout reduced to a force of 24,000 men. With the 25,000 under Lannes he continued to pursue the corps of Hiller and Archduke Louis along the road from Rottenburg to Landshut, while the Bavarian General de Wrede pursued them by the Pfaffenhausen road. He reckoned on the arrival of Massena at Landshut with at least 30,000 men.

Marching with Morand's infantry, the St. Sulpice cuirassiers and the light cavalry, he arrived very early at Landshut, having picked up at every step fugitives, wounded, cannon and heavy baggage. On arriving at Altdorf, at the débouché of the woods, whence the view commanded the verdant plain of the Isar and the town of Landshut, an indescribable confusion was perceived. The Austrian cavalry was passing towards the bridges with their infantry, both arriving by the two roads before mentioned. The obstruction was further increased by the *matériel* of the army, and notably by a superb train of pontoons brought on wagons for passing the Danube, and even the Rhine, had heaven favoured this levy of bucklers against France. Bessières, who had come up suddenly, like Lannes and the Emperor, and

had only an aide-de-camp or two at hand, was leading the St. Sulpice cuirassiers, the Jacquinet chasseurs, and 15th light infantry of Morand's division. Perceiving the spectacle before him, he ordered his chasseurs to charge the Austrian cavalry, which defended itself bravely, notwithstanding the disorder and the swampy and slippery state of the ground; but the French cuirassiers, charging it *en masse*, obliged it to give way. The Austrian generals then made it hastily pass the bridges, in front of which they drew up their infantry against us to give time for the baggage to defile; and they placed the Aspre grenadiers in Landshut itself, and especially in the elevated quarters of the town. But the whole Morand division soon came up. The 13th light and the 17th of the line attacked the Austrian infantry, while the French cavalry charged it again. It could not withstand these reiterated attacks, and was compelled to fall back in all haste upon the bridges, in order to pass them in time. It did effect its retreat, leaving in the meadows many prisoners, a considerable number of artillery carriages, and the train of pontoons before mentioned. The 13th and a battalion of the 17th threw themselves into the suburb of Seilgenthal, which they carried under a most severe fire of musketry. It remained for them to cross the great bridge over the main branch of the Isar. The Austrians had set it on fire. General Mouton, the Emperor's aide-de-camp, at the head of the grenadiers of the 17th, whom he animated by voice and gesture, led them on sword in hand to the blazing bridge, crossed it under a hail of bullets, and ascended with them the steep streets of Landshut, situated on the other bank of the Isar. At that moment Massena arrived with the Molitor and Boudet divisions, one of Oudinot's divisions, and the light cavalry of General Marulaz, too late to hinder the retreat of the Austrians, but soon enough to precipitate it. At sight of this overwhelming combination of forces, the Austrians evacuated Landshut, abandoning to us, besides an immense *matériel*, 8000 or 7000 prisoners, and some dead or wounded. Their line of operation then was forced from them, and with it they lost all the military wealth one loses when the principal road is seized by which one has marched against the enemy.

While Napoleon was executing this triumphant pursuit, with his centre augmented by a part of Massena's forces, cannon was heard on his left, where Marshal Davout was once more encountering the masses of Archduke Charles. The cannonade, in fact, was extremely loud, though at the distance of eight or nine leagues from Landshut, and was of a nature to disquiet Napoleon, who, though believing he was pursuing the bulk of the Austrian army, was not certain that he had not left Marshal Davout a large part of it to contend with. Had the latter only the army of Bohemia to deal with, even that would be much for the two divisions at his disposal. What had actually happened was as follows:

Having, as we have seen, received orders on the preceding evening to sweep before him the slight forces that were supposed to have been left on the Laber after the battle of Abensberg, he had put himself in motion in the morning, at the very moment Napoleon was marching on

Landshut. The St. Hilaire and Friant divisions, after resting on the 20th from the battle of the 19th, had quitted Tengen on the 21st, at five in the morning, following the corps of Hohenzollern and Rosenberg, which were going to take up the positions assigned to them by Archduke Charles on the slopes of the hills between the valley of the big Laber and the plain of Ratisbon. The vanguard of our two divisions, in debouching from the valley of the Tengen into that of the big Laber, encountered the rear of the Austrians on a woody plateau between Schneidart and Paring. The tirailleurs of the 10th moved forward to repulse those of the enemy, while our hussars charged his light cavalry. The Austrians were forced to give way, and presently our flying artillery galloped up, poured a shower of grape after them, and obliged them to retreat with all speed. The Rosenberg and Hohenzollern corps, fearing that they had to do with a considerable part of the French army, thought it advisable to fall back immediately, in order not to lose time or the means of occupying the posts designed for them on the road from Landshut to Ratisbon, right and left of Eckmühl. Our two divisions advanced then, that of St. Hilaire on the right, along the margin of the big Laber, that of Friant to the left, along the foot of the wooded heights that form one of the sides of the valley. These heights being filled with Rosenberg's sharpshooters, the Friant division suffered much more severely than the St. Hilaire, which had the open valley of the Laber to traverse. Wishing to relieve himself from these sharpshooters, General Friant sent out from the regiments a considerable number of voltigeurs, who, led by the brave engineer, Captain Henrats, dislodged the Austrians, and cleared the woods on our left. As the division continued their march, two villages presented themselves—Paring, at the foot of the rocks, Schierling, on the edge of the stream. Both were to be carried. While our tirailleurs were penetrating into the woods, General Friant pushed forward the 4th on the village of Paring. As he was giving his orders with his usual resolution and ability, having Marshal Davout at his side, his horse was knocked down by a cannon-ball. Immediately mounting another, he had the village of Paring taken under his own eye at the point of the bayonet, and made 400 prisoners there. At the same moment, General St. Hilaire made an equally vigorous and successful attack on Schierling, and likewise took there some hundreds of prisoners. Just then the Bavarians, the Demont division, and the Nausoutz cuirassiers were seen approaching from Landshut, by the very provident orders of Napoleon. The bridges of the Laber were repaired with all haste, in order to effect a communication with these very welcome reinforcements. It was midday, and the very hour when Napoleon entered Landshut.

While Friant and St. Hilaire were thus advancing, Rosenberg and Hohenzollern had proceeded to take up a position on the heights bordering on the big Laber, just at the point where they are traversed by the cross-road from Landshut to Ratisbon. This road, crossing the big Laber here in front of the castle of Eckmühl, rose in successive inclinations through the woods, and then emerged by Egglosheim on

the plain of Ratisbon. To the left of that road, above Eckmühl, were two villages, (Ober Leuchling and Unter Leuchling,) leaning one on the other, and commanding a small ravine that debouches into the great Labor. Rosenberg's corps had posted itself in these two villages. Hohenzollern's occupied the road itself, along the inclined plains above Eckmühl, with an advanced guard beyond the big Labor, in the direction of Landshut. It was very distinctly seen in that strong position, barring the route it was ordered to defend.

Marshal Davout approached, and deployed in face of the Austrians, within a cannon-shot of them, having Friant on his left, before the villages of Ober and Unter Leuchling; St. Hilaire and the Bavarians on his right, in the low grounds adjacent to the big Labor. While he was thus deploying, a column of Hungarians advanced, as if to make a sortie against us. Marshal Davout having at hand a battery of flying artillery, made it fire immediately, and with such effect that the Hungarian column fell back in disorder. The marshal then took up a position within a short cannon-shot of the Austrians, and a tremendous cannonade began on either side. It lasted several hours without results; for the Austrians, having no other orders than to cover the approaches to the plain of Ratisbon, were not likely to assume the offensive; and Marshal Davout, surmising that he had considerable forces before him—probably the archduke himself at the head of his main army—did not choose to come to a decisive engagement without the Emperor's orders, and without sufficient means. He contented himself then with securing his position for the night, and making it convenient for the next day's attack, if, as he was convinced would be the case, Napoleon gave orders for it, with means proportioned to the difficulty. At night he put a stop to the useless firing, and the Austrians gladly followed the example, to take the rest of which they had great need. General Friant established himself opposite Ober Leuchling, with his left resting on the woody summits that separated us from the plain of Ratisbon. General St. Hilaire, bearing slightly to the left, established himself before Unter Leuchling, separated from the Austrians by the little ravine which ran into the big Labor. The Bavarians and the cavalry spread over the plain on the margin of the river. The events of this day, made up of rear-guard conflicts, storming of positions, and a long cannonade, cost the Friant division 1100 men; the St. Hilaire division, 300; total 1400; and the Austrians at least 3000. Adding to these, for the taking of Landshut, 3000 men on our side and about 7000 on that of the Austrians, our reckoning for killed, wounded, and prisoners was 1700, and that of the Austrians 10,000. The number of men whom this disheartening series of disasters induced to quit their colours was very great on the enemy's side.

The day's work being done, Marshal Davout immediately sent General Piré to the Emperor, to give him an exact account of what had taken place, and of as much as could be perceived of the position and force of the Austrians in that maze of woods and streams which lay between Landshut and Ratisbon. Anxious about the cannonade heard on his left, towards Eckmühl,

the Emperor had not lain down, that he might receive the reports that would of course be sent to him from all sides. With his prodigious penetration, he had already partly discovered the state of things, and he was beginning to have no doubt as to the enemy's position. In fact Massena, on his march from Augsburg by Pfaffenhauseu to Landshut, had fallen in with no more than a body of some thousand flankers, whom he had driven before him in disorder beyond the Isar. The masses of the Archduke Louis and of General Hiller, which had been pursued through the town of Landshut, neither by their number nor by any other sign, denoted the presence of the main army. Marshal Davout's last engagement, news of which arrived in the night, cleared up all remaining doubts. Napoleon plainly discerned that he had on his left, along the road from Landshut to Ratisbon by Eckmühl, either the Archduke Charles himself, with the main body of his forces, or, at least, the army of Bohemia, removed by the Ratisbon bridge from the left to the right of the Danube. In the former case, he ought to move to Eckmühl with all his forces; in the latter, he ought considerably to reinforce Marshal Davout. On the strength of what he had heard of the battle of Leuchling, Napoleon, at two in the morning, sent off the St. Sulpice cuirassiers and the Wurtembergers, under General Vandamme. Both these bodies had removed a little in the rear of Landshut, and had consequently a shorter distance to retrograde towards Eckmühl. He also sent General Piré to Marshal Davout, to announce this reinforcement, and to promise others more considerable when all was certainly known.

The indications, which would have been vague and indefinite for any but him, were momentarily accumulating, and at last his conviction was settled. Among other facts made known to him, there was one that dissipated all his doubts; this was the taking of Ratisbon by the Austrian army.<sup>1</sup> The reader remembers that Napoleon had ordered Marshal Davout to leave a regiment in Ratisbon to guard the town, which would have been a fault, since a regiment was not sufficient, had it not been urgently necessary to march to Abensberg with the greatest possible mass of forces. Davout then had left the 66th, an excellent regiment, commanded by Colonel Contard, with orders to barricade the gates and the streets of the town, for Ratisbon had no other fortification than a mere wall, and to defend the place to the last extremity. Colonel Contard had had to do on the 19th with the army of Bohemia, and had so well resisted it with his musketry that he killed 800 of the enemy. But on the following day, the 20th, the army of the Archduke Charles appeared before him on the right bank of the river, coming from Landshut, and he was without cartridges, having spent them in the fight of the preceding day. Marshal Davout, being

<sup>1</sup> A long series of letters he wrote during the night, and which has remained unknown to historians, displays with the greatest precision the series of views he successively entertained until his mind was made up and he gave his final orders for the battle of Eckmühl. This correspondence of a few hours is one of the most curious and instructive spectacles as regards the study of the human mind. I have read it several times with attention, and I have deduced from it the facts I relate.

informed of this, had sent him two chests of ammunition, which fell into the enemy's hands, and not a single packet of cartridges entered Ratisbon. Beset by two armies, not having a shot to fire, and not being able to defend himself from the top of the walls or the barricades with his bayonets, Colonel Coutard was constrained to surrender. Archduke Charles was then master of Ratisbon, of the two banks of the Danube, and of the point of junction with the Bohemian troops, which partly indemnified him for having been separated from Archduke Louis and General Hiller, but did not indemnify him either for the 24,000 men already lost in three days, or for the loss of his line of operation, or, above all, for his moral ascendancy wholly gone and passed over to his adversary's side. When Napoleon was made aware of the misfortune of the 65th, he was filled with a desire for vengeance, and, at the same time, convinced that Archduke Charles was on his left, since the 65th had been caught between two armies; that Marshal Davout had before him, at Eckmühl, the greater part of the Austrian forces, and that he himself must instantly make a move to the left with all the forces he could command, to support Marshal Davout and overwhelm Archduke Charles. He had already sent off in the night, as we have said, General St. Sulpice with four regiments of cuirassiers, and General Vandamme with the Wurtembergers. He immediately despatched Marshal Lannes with General Nansouty's six regiments of cuirassiers, and the two fine divisions of Generals Morand and Gudin, ordering him to march all night, so as to reach Eckmühl towards noon, and be able to afford his troops an hour's rest before battle. Doing nothing by halves, because he did not discern the truth by halves, Napoleon further resolved to march in person with Marshal Massena and his three divisions, to which he added General Espagne's superb division of cuirassiers. Marshal Davout, with the Friant and St. Hilaire divisions much reduced by the engagements of the 19th and 21st, with the Bavarians and Demont's division, numbered 32,000 to 34,000 men. Generals Vandamme and St. Sulpice brought him 18,000 or 14,000, and Marshal Lannes 25,000, which made a total of 72,000. Napoleon, accompanied by Massena and Espagne's cuirassiers, was about to swell to 90,000 the total of fighting men before Eckmühl, more than enough to overpower Archduke Charles, even were he joined by the Bohemian army. Napoleon sent word to Marshal Davout that he would arrive with all his forces between twelve and one o'clock, that he would announce his presence by several salvos of artillery, and that on hearing that signal he should begin the attack forthwith.

Napoleon made some further arrangements before his departure for Eckmühl. He gave Marshal Bessières, who was to pursue the two corps of Hiller and Archduke Louis beyond the Isar, besides the Marulas light cavalry and a portion of the German cavalry, Wrede's Bavarian division, and Molitor's fine French division. The Boudet division, one of Massena's four, and the Tharreau division, Oudinot's second, remained to be disposed of. Napoleon echoed them between the Isar and the Danube, from Neustadt to Landshut, to watch every

thing that might happen between the two rivers, and to move either to Neustadt on the Danube, if a part of the army of Bohemia threatened our line of operation, or to Landshut on the Isar, if Archduke Louis or General Hiller attempted to repair their mischance by facing round against Marshal Bessières.

Having given these orders, Napoleon galloped off, accompanied by Marshal Massena, for Eckmühl, one of the battle-fields immortalized by his genius. It was daybreak on the 22d when he started. There had been incessant fighting since the 19th, and it was about to be renewed on that memorable day with more vehemence and larger bodies of combatants.

On both sides all was ready for a decisive action. Archduke Charles could no longer indulge any hope of recovering his left from beyond the Isar, nor ought he to have had any other desire than to form a junction with the Bohemian army—a move which the taking of Ratisbon facilitated. But he wished in his turn to attempt something which, in case of success, might have turned the chances in his favour, and cut Napoleon off from his line of operations, as he had cut the Austrians off from theirs. He conceived, therefore, the singular project of making an attack in three columns on Abach, in the same direction that Marshal Davout had taken in his march from Ratisbon to Abensberg. Having his back now to Ratisbon and his face to Landshut, he had only to make a movement by his right on Abach to execute this plan, whereby he would have been placed on the French line of communication; and as there was at Abach only General Montbrun's vanguard, it would have been possible to break through and debouche on our rear. But whether from fear of what might result from any bold enterprise in presence of such an adversary as Napoleon, or from anxiety for the fate of an army on which depended the safety of the monarchy, the Archduke proceeded to the execution of this new scheme in so hesitating a manner as must have rendered its success impossible. In the first place, in order to give General Kollowrath, detached from the Bohemian army, time to cross the Danube, he decided that the attack should not take place until between twelve and one o'clock, the time fixed on by Napoleon for forcing the passage of Eckmühl. He distributed the troops into three columns. The first, consisting of Kollowrath's corps with part of the Vecsay brigade for a vanguard, was to march from Burg Weinting on Abach. It was 24,000 strong. The second, made up of the Lindenau division and the rest of the Vecsay brigade, and commanded by Prince John of Lichtenstein, was to march by Weilhoe on Peising. It was 12,000 strong, and had the commander-in-chief at its head. The third, nearly 40,000 strong, composed of Rosenberg's corps, which was placed in the villages of Ober and Unter Leuchling, in face of Marshal Davout, of Hohenollern's corps, which was barring the Eckmühl road, and of the grenadiers of the reserve and the cuirassiers, who were guarding the entrance of the plain of Ratisbon by Egglöfseheim, was to remain in its place and defend the road from Landshut to Ratisbon against the French, while the two first columns were making their attempt on Abach. So then the Archduke was preparing to assume the offensive

with his right, 36,000 strong, whilst his left, 40,000 strong, would stand on the defensive midway up the heights which separate the big Laber from the valley of the Danube. Napoleon, on his side, marching on Eckmühl to the support of Marshal Davout, was about to fall on that left with all his forces, the two hostile commanders thus acting on each other's means of communication, but the one with hesitation, the other with irresistible vigour. That left of the archduke's which was to contest with us the road from Ratisbon to the environs of Eckmühl, was disposed as follows. Rosenberg's corps was stationed midway up the heights bordering on the Laber, behind the two villages of Ober and Unter Leuchling, flanking the Ratisbon high-road. A little further and lower was Hohenzollern's corps, occupying the margin of the great Laber, the castle of Eckmühl, and the slopes of the Ratisbon road above it. On the reverse of the hills in the plain of Ratisbon was the whole mass of the cuirassiers and grenadiers in front and rear of Egglosheim. It was then in front of the two villages of Ober and Unter Leuchling, then on the Eckmühl road, and lastly, on the plain of Ratisbon, that the action was to take place.

Until eight o'clock a thick fog enveloped that rural scene which was soon to be drenched with the blood of thousands of men. As soon as it cleared away both sides prepared for action. Marshal Davout placed the Friant division on his left over against the wooded heights, against which rested Ober and Unter Leuchling; on his right the St. Hilaire division, to attack those two villages in front. More to the right and lower down on the margin of the Laber he had ranged the Bavarian and Wurtemberg cavalry, and behind these the divisions of French cuirassiers, which were already arrived. The Austrians, on their side, posted themselves as strongly as they could on the heights. Prince Rosenberg barricaded the village of Unter Leuchling, the more menaced of the two, and posted part of his forces in the two villages; the rest on a woody plateau which commanded them. To connect himself with the Eckmühl road, which ran in his rear, he deployed the Czartoryski regiment on a hillside with a large quantity of artillery, so as to sweep the whole valley by which the French were to present themselves. The Biber brigade of Hohenzollern's corps was deeply massed along the road above Eckmühl, whilst Wukassovich occupied the other bank of the big Laber with several detachments, awaiting the French who were coming from Landshut. Not a musket or a cannon-shot was fired before noon; only there were seen frequent movements of men and horses, and the masses of the Austrian army marked with long white lines the wooded hill-sides and the moist and verdant meadows. Towards noon dense columns appeared in the direction of Landshut. These were the Morand and Gudin divisions, preceded by the Wurtembergers, and followed by Marshal Lannes and Massena and by Napoleon himself, all coming up at a gallop. The French troops from Landshut debouched by Buchhausen from a chain of hills facing Eckmühl, and forming the opposite side of the valley of the big Laber. There was no need for the appointed signal, for the battle began at once on the meeting of the van-

guards. The Wurtembergers, on debouching from Buchhausen, were met with grape and charges of Wukassovich's light cavalry. They were driven back, but soon rallied by the brave Vandamme, and, supported by the Morand and Gudin divisions, they took Lintach, lined the Laber opposite Eckmühl, and connected themselves by their left with the Demont division and the Bavarians. On their right the advanced posts of the Gudin divisions pread themselves out between Deckenbach and Zaitzkofen, opposite Eckmühl and Roking.

At the sound of the first cannon-shot fired by the vanguard, the intrepid Davout put his two divisions in motion. The French artillery at first poured out a storm of projectiles on the whole front of the Austrians, and obliged them to shut themselves up in the two villages. The Friant and St. Hilaire divisions advanced in order, the former to the left upon the woods on which rested the right of Rosenberg's corps, the latter to the right upon Ober and Unter Leuchling, both of which were within a musket shot. A most destructive fire of musketry was opened on the St. Hilaire division as it moved upon the village, but made no impression on that veteran body, which was led by the brave St. Hilaire, surnamed in the army *the knight without fear and without reproach*. Ober Leuchling, which was more sunk in the ravine and of easier access, was first taken. Unter Leuchling, which was steep and barricaded within, was vigorously defended by the Austrians. The 10th infantry, which was ordered to attack, being exposed to the fire both of the village and of the wood above it, lost in a moment 500 men between killed and wounded. It forced its way into the village notwithstanding, bayoneted all who resisted it, and made several hundred prisoners. The Bellegarde and Reuss-Graitz regiments that had been posted in the villages then retired to the wooded plateau in the rear, and there defended themselves with fresh vigour. During this time the Friant division on the left had attacked the woods adjacent to the villages, and driven back their defenders, the Chasteler, Archduke Louis, and Cobourg regiments, forming Prince Rosenberg's right. After a very destructive fire of sharpshooters, the 48th and the 111th, led by General Barbanègre, charged and drove before them with the bayonet all the Austrian troops in the woods. Rosenberg's corps, thus pushed on one side towards the woods which crowned the chais, on the other beyond the two villages on the wooded plateau that commanded them, was backed against the opening through which ran the Eckmühl road, and there it tried to maintain its ground. At that moment, low down to the right before Eckmühl, the attacks were beginning with equal vigour. Whilst the Bavarian cavalry, supported by our cuirassiers, was charging the Austrian cavalry in the meadow, the Wurtemberg foot had rushed forward to take Eckmühl from the Wukassovich infantry, which they did in spite of a dense fire from the walls of the castle. The slopes of the road up the mountain were then seen covered with deep masses of infantry and cavalry. On the left were the remains of Rosenberg's corps, defending the plateau above the two Leuchlings; to the right were the wooded heights of Roking, on which a part of the Biber brigade was posted

It was necessary therefore to carry these points, and so outflank on both sides the masses that barred the road.

Napoleon, accompanied by Lannes and Massena, ordered the decisive attack, while General Cervoni, a brave officer who was holding a map open before them, was killed by a cannon-ball. Lannes led the Gudin division to the right against the Rökig heights. Crossing the great Laber at Stangelmühle, the division on one side ascended the heights directly, on the other extending its movement to the right it passed round them, and took them one by one from the Biber brigade, which contested the ground foot by foot. On the road, which was of rather steep ascent, the Bavarian and Wurtemberg horse charged the Austrian light cavalry, which, having the advantage of the ground, rushed down upon our allies and swept them away to the margin of the Laber. The French cuirassiers coming to their aid galloped up the slopes, overthrew the Austrian horsemen, and reached the summit of the road at the moment when Gudin's infantry appeared above their heads masters of the Rökig heights. Seeing the French cuirassiers galloping up the road and knocking the Austrians over in spite of the disadvantage of the ground, the Gudin infantry clapped their hands and shouted, "Vivent les cuirassiers!"

On the left the struggle was continued between the St. Hilaire and the Bellegarde and Reuss-Grätz regiments, which contested with each other the wooded plateau above Leuchling. St. Hilaire at last forced his way across it towards the road, driving the two regiments before him. Seeing this, the brave Generals Stutterheim and Sommariva charged with Vincent's *chevaux légers* and the Stipsicz hussars upon St. Hilaire's infantry, but was met at the point of the bayonet and driven to the edge of the Ratisbon road, the summit of which was then occupied by St. Hilaire on one side, while Gudin's infantry crowned it on the other. The Austrian horse, now accumulated on the road, made fresh efforts against the mass of our cavalry, charged, was charged in its turn, and ended by yielding the ground.

Every impediment was now overcome, and the Ratisbon road belonged to us, for Friant on the left, traversing the wood which surmounted the chain, was already descending on the other side, and Gudin on the right, having also crossed that chain, was beginning to debouch on the plain of Ratisbon towards Gailbach. Rosenberg and Hohenzollern's troops, outflanked right and left, retired behind the mass of Austrian cuirassiers, ranged in order of battle at Egglofsheim. Our cavalry followed them at full trot, having on its left the Friant and St. Hilaire infantry, and Gudin's on its right. It was seven in the evening, night was coming on, and behind the Bavarian and Wurtemberg cavalry the ten regiments of the Nassau and St. Sulpice cuirassiers debouched *en masse*, making the earth resound under their horses' hoofs. A terrible collision was inevitable between the two cavalries, the one wishing to cover the plain upon which Archduke Charles was then falling back, the other wanting to possess itself of that plain in order to terminate its victory beneath the walls of Ratisbon. The Gottesheim cuirassiers were the

first to charge. The French cuirassiers, coolly awaiting them, met them with a discharge of all their firearms, and then a portion of them charging in their turn, took them in flank, broke, and pursued them. Then the Austrian cuirassiers, surnamed the emperor's, came to the aid of the Gottesheimers, and were also driven back by ours. The brave Stipsicz hussars strove to support their heavy cavalry, and did not hesitate to assail our cuirassiers. After a gallant effort they were overthrown like the others, and the whole mass of the Austrian cavalry fled in disorder beyond Egglofsheim to Kofering. While our men were galloping along the road, the Austrians, finding the plain swampy, endeavoured to regain the road, and thus became mingled with the mass of our cavalry. A multitude of single combats then took place by the uncertain light of the moon, and nothing was heard but the clashing of sabres on their cuirasses, the shouts of the combatants, and the tramp of horses. Our cuirassiers wearing double cuirasses, which covered them all round, could more easily defend themselves than the Austrians, who, having only breastplates, fell in great numbers, mortally wounded by the thrusts dealt them behind. Never within twenty years had there been such a scene of carnage.

Night had now fallen, and it became a matter of prudence to stop the fight. By advancing there was a chance of meeting the archduke's army falling back in disorder on Ratisbon, and throwing it into the Danube; but on the other hand, it might be found drawn up in order under the walls of the town, and capable of arresting the victors, who debouched promiscuously by several issues from the valley of the Laber. Napoleon now came up with Massena and Lannes to Egglofsheim. After a few minutes' deliberation, the more prudent course was adopted, and he left it open till the morrow, either to fight another battle if the archduke made a stand before Ratisbon, or to pursue him across the Danube if he retreated beyond that river. He, therefore, gave orders to bivouac on the spot. This was wise, for the troops were spent with fatigue, especially those which came from Landsbut. There were none, indeed, come up but the Wurtembergers, Morand and Gudin. Massena's three divisions were still in the rear.

This decisive battle of the 22d, known as the battle of Eckmühl, cost us about 2500 men put *hors de combat*, most of whom belonged to the Friant and St. Hilaire divisions, which, by their conduct on these four days, obtained for their commander the glorious and well-merited title of prince of Eckmühl. It cost the Austrians about 6000 killed and wounded, a great number of pieces of artillery, and 8000 or 4000 prisoners, collected at night in the villages passed through in following up the retreat of the Austrian army. By this battle Archduke Charles was finally separated from Hiller and Archduke Louis, and driven back in disorder on Bohemia, after the loss of his line of operation, Bavaria, and the high road to Vienna.

For the first time in four days Napoleon could take some rest, and very little he took, for he wished to complete the series of these grand operations on the following day. He foresaw that there would be no battle to fight, for that

Archduke Charles would cross the Danube in all haste; but it was his intention to make that a work of difficulty and disaster.

The Archduke, who had halted in his movement on Abach upon learning the disaster of his left, had no other course open to him than to cross the Danube, and rejoin the army of Bohemia, half of which he had rallied under Kollowrath, and then to march down one bank of the river while Napoleon was marching down the other. To give battle with the Danube at his back would have been contrary to the rules of war, and quite inexcusable in the state of the Austrian army, which, though it had behaved very well, had returned to a sense of its inferiority as compared with the French army. Besides this, the Austrian cavalry was not numerous enough to contend with the French for the possession of the vast plain of Ratisbon. It was therefore resolved that Kollowrath's corps, which had been marched to Abach in the morning and back to Burg Weinting in the evening, should cover the retreat; for not having fought yet, it was less fatigued than the others. The bulk of the army was to pass through Ratisbon and over the town bridge, while the reserve corps crossed by a bridge of boats lower down, and that the cavalry should occupy the French by skirmishing with them in the plain. These arrangements were carried into effect on the 28d, with tolerable order and success. Long before day the several *corps d'armée* traversed Ratisbon, while General Kollowrath, retiring slowly towards the town, gave the archduke's troops time to defile. The grenadiers were collected below Ratisbon, to effect their passage: the cavalry manœuvred between Ober Traubling and Burg Weinting.

The French, too, were very early in motion. As soon as there was light enough to see by, the light cavalry was sent forward to reconnoitre, and, being attacked by the Austrian cavalry, another *mêlée* ensued, in which all arms fell into frightful confusion. In this gallant service the Austrian cavalry lost nearly a thousand men, but retiring upon the town, through which they defiled at a gallop, they drew our attention in that direction, and away from the bridge of boats over which the grenadiers were passing. A detachment of light cavalry at last caught sight of it, and Lannes' artillery galloped up and began to play on the Austrians. A great number of grenadiers were shot or drowned, the bridge was destroyed, and the blazing boats were carried down the Danube; but the bulk of the troops effected their retreat with the loss of only some hundred men. Marshal Davout on the left, with the Friant and St. Hilaire divisions, and Marshal Lannes on the right, with the Morand and Gudin divisions, and the cavalry in the centre, did not debouch on the town until the last Austrian battalions were passing through it. The gates were immediately shut against our voltigeurs.

Napoleon was determined to enter it that very day, both to avenge the mischance of the 65th and to get possession of the bridge, by which he might pursue Archduke Charles. The town was only surrounded with a wall, with towers at intervals, and a ditch. It could not give occasion for a regular siege, but, if de-

fended by numbers, it might hold out for hours, or even days, and for so long delay the pursuit. Napoleon ordered the whole mass of Lannes' and Davout's artillery to be ranged in line, to batter down the walls. The unfortunate town was immediately assailed with volleys of shot and shells, and took fire in several places.

Impatient to overcome this resistance, Napoleon approached the town amid a fire of sharpshooters, kept up by the Austrians from the walls and by the French from the edge of the ditch. While he was looking through a telescope, he received a ball in the instep, and snid, with the coolness of an old soldier, "I am hit!" The wound might have been dangerous; for, it it had been higher up, the foot would have been shattered, and amputation would have been inevitable. The surgeons of the guard took off his boot and dressed the wound, which was not serious. At the news that the Emperor was wounded, the soldiers of the nearest corps broke spontaneously from the ranks, and gathered round him with the loudest expressions of affection. There was not one of them but thought his own existence bound up with his. Napoleon shook hands with those that were nearest to him, assuring them that it was a mere nothing, and immediately mounted his horse and rode along the front of the army, which received him with delirious joy and enthusiasm. The soldiers hailed in him the fortunate victor of Eckmühl, whose person death had just grazed, to show them all that he shared danger with them, and that if he was prodigal of their lives, he was not thrifty of his own. He passed before the regiments that behaved best; called out from the ranks the officers and even the privates who had distinguished themselves by their bravery, and bestowed rewards on them all. There were privates who received grants of 1500 francs a year.

But victory was to be completed, and Napoleon sent aide-de-camp after aide-de-camp to Lannes to expedite the taking of Ratisbon. The intrepid marshal had approached the Straubing gate, and had directed all his artillery against a projecting house which rose above the wall. The house was knocked down and the ruins fell into the ditch, which it partly filled up. Still there were two escarpments to cross, one on either side of the ditch. Ladders were procured, and were placed at the edge of the ditch by grenadiers of the 85th; but every time one of them appeared he was instantly brought down by the well-aimed balls of the Austrian sharpshooters. After some men had been thus struck the rest appeared to hang back. Thereupon Lannes advanced covered with decorations, seized one of the ladders and cried out, "You shall see that your marshal, for all he is a marshal, has not ceased to be a grenadier." But his aides-de-camp, Marbot and Labédoyère, sprang forward and snatched the ladder out of his hands. The grenadiers followed them, took the ladders and descended into the ditch in crowds. The enemy's shots, fired upon a larger number of men at once, and with more precipitation, were not so well aimed. The ditch was crossed, and the wall, half broken down by our cannon, was scaled. The grenadiers of the 85th, following MM. Labédoyère and Marbot, thus entered the town and opened one of the gates to the 85th.



which marched a column into Ratisbon. The town was ours. Our men rushed along the streets under the fire, making prisoners in all directions. But suddenly they were stopped by a cry of terror uttered by the Austrians. "Take care, we shall all be blown up!" cried an officer. There were some barrels of powder left in a street, which were in danger of being fired by the shots exchanged on either side. The belligerents stopped with one accord, and rolled the barrels away, so as to spare each other a mortal peril. The Austrians then withdrew and left the town to our troops.

This day, again, cost the enemy about 2000 men *hors de combat*, and 6000 or 7000 prisoners. It was the fifth since the opening of the campaign. Let us recapitulate the proceedings of those eventful days. On the 19th of April, Marshal Davout, going up the Danube side from Ratisbon to Abensberg, met Archduke Charles at Tengen, and stopped him there. On the 20th, Napoleon, combining half Davout's corps with the Bavarians and the Wurttembergers, and summoning Massena to the common rendezvous at Abensberg, broke the Austrian line at Rohr, and separated Archduke Charles from General Hiller and Archduke Louis. On the 21st he continued the movement, and definitely separated the two masses of the enemy, by taking Landshut and the Austrian line of operations, while on the same day Marshal Davout, forming the pivot of his movements on the left, again encountered Archduke Charles at Leuchling, and held him in check. On the 22d, learning that Archduke Charles had not retired by Landshut, but was at Eckmühl on his left, before Marshal Davout's corps, he suddenly moved down on Eckmühl, and giving battle on the extremity of the enemy's line, beat the Austrians and drove them back on Ratisbon. On the 23d he terminated this five days' struggle by taking Ratisbon, and driving into Bohemia Archduke Charles's force, now combined with the Bohemian army, but separated from that of Hiller and Archduke Louis. Besides the advantage of opening for himself the road to Vienna, which was defended at the most by 36,000 or 40,000 disheartened men, of having taken the immense mass of *matériel* which was

found on the enemy's principal line of operation, of having driven Archduke Charles into the defiles of Bohemia, where he would long remain paralyzed, and of having restored to his armies all their former ascendancy, Napoleon had destroyed or taken about 60,000 men, and more than a hundred pieces of cannon. Of these 60,000 men, nearly 40,000 had been struck by the fire of infantry or the sabres of our cavalry.<sup>1</sup> And all this Napoleon had achieved by conducting himself in accordance with the true principles of war, amid an incredible confusion of places and men. No doubt, had he risked more, had he left the archduke to march upon Ratisbon without calling Marshal Davout to him, Napoleon might have thrown himself on the enemy's rear by Lanquaid and Eckmühl, and perhaps have taken the whole Austrian army in one day. But, besides that it would first have been necessary to guess the secret of that situation, which no man could have done, Napoleon would thus have violated the true principles of war by remaining divided in presence of a concentrated enemy, whom he would have afforded the chance of a great triumph. On the contrary, by making Davout on his left and Massena on his right converge to a common point, he put himself in a condition to meet all contingencies, and he was enabled to cut the enemy's line before him, make his way into Landshut, then bear down to the left, and finally defeat the great Austrian army at Ratisbon. May we venture to add, that it was better to have triumphed a little less while conforming to the true principles of war, which are, after all, only the rules of good sense, than to have triumphed more in consequence of risking too much? Napoleon would never have fallen if he had always governed his policy as on this occasion he made war. Be that as it may, those terrible blows he had dealt prostrated Austria, kept down Germany, and awed Europe. Napoleon had never better merited the favours of fortune, which in these five days seemed once more fully restored to him.

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<sup>1</sup> I state these numbers after due abatement made for the exaggerations of the bulletins.

## BOOK XXXV.

## WAGRAM.

JUDGEMENT of Hostilities in Italy.—Unexpected Entry of the Austrians by Ponteba, Cividale, and Gorice—Surprise of Prince Eugene.—He falls back on Livizna.—General Sahuc's Vanguard beaten at Pordenone.—The Army loudly calls for Battle.—Yielding to their Demand, Prince Eugene consents to fight at Disadvantage.—Battle of Sacile lost on the 16th of April.—Retreat on the Adige.—Rising of the Tyrol.—The French Army reorganized behind the Adige under the Direction of General Macdonald.—Retreat of Archduke John in consequence of the Events at Ratisbon.—He is keenly pursued by Prince Eugene.—Forced Passage of the Piave, and considerable Losses of the Austrians.—Events in Poland.—Joseph Poniatowski fights an obstinate Battle with the Austrians under the Walls of Warsaw.—Gives up that Capital in pursuance of a Convention, and carries the War to the right Bank of the Vistula, and deals the Austrians several heavy Blows.—Insurrectionary Movements in Germany.—Desertion of Major Schill.—Napoleon's Conduct after the Events at Ratisbon.—His Uneasiness at the News from Italy, too long withheld from him by Prince Eugene.—He advances into Bavaria.—His reasons for not pursuing Archduke Charles into Bohemia, and for marching on the Austrian Capital by the Valley of the Danube.—Admirably arranged March.—Passage of the Inn, the Traun, and the Enns.—Archduke Charles, attempting to return from Bohemia into Austria, is prevented at Linz by Massena.—Tremendous Battle at Kbersberg.—The Troops that defended Upper Austria are obliged to recross the Danube at Krems, and leave Vienna uncovered.—Arrival of Napoleon under the Walls of Vienna.—Entry of the French into Vienna after a short Resistance.—Effect of this Event on Europe.—Napoleon's Views for the complete Destruction of the Enemy's Armies.—His Strategy.—It is necessary to cross the Danube to reach Archduke Charles, who is encamped opposite Vienna.—Preparations for that difficult Passage.—In the mean time, the Army of Italy has resumed the Offensive.—Archduke John retires with forces diminished by one-half across the Noric and Julian Alps into Hungary and Croatia.—Evacuation and temporary Submission of the Tyrol.—Napoleon finally resolves to cross the Danube and complete the Destruction of Archduke Charles.—Difficulty of that Operation.—Choice of the Island of Lobau, in the Danube, to diminish the Difficulty of the Passage.—Bridges thrown over the Danube on the 19th and 20th of May.—The Army begins to pass.—Is immediately encountered by Archduke Charles.—Battle of Kessling, one of the most terrible of the Age.—The Passage, frequently interrupted by a sudden Rise of the Danube, is rendered impossible by the breaking down of the great Bridge.—Heroic Struggle of the French Army on the 21st and 22d of May to escape being thrown into the Danube.—Death of Lannes and of St. Hilaire.—Memorable Conduct of Massena.—After an ineffectual Resistance of Forty Hours the French are allowed to return quietly to Lobau.—Character of that tremendous Battle.—Inertness of Archduke Charles and prodigious Activity of Napoleon on the Days following the Battle of Kessling.—Efforts to re-establish the Bridge.—Utility of the Seamen of the Guard.—Napoleon applies himself to create new Means of Passage, and to bring up the Armies of Italy and Dalmatia in order to end the War by a general Engagement.—Successful March of Prince Eugene, Macdonald, and Marmont to join the Grand Army on the Danube.—Victory of Raab, won by Prince Eugene over Archduke John on the 14th of June.—Taking of Raab.—Junction of Prince Eugene, Macdonald, and Marmont with the Grand Army.—Alterations in Tyrol, Germany, and Poland.—Napoleon's Precautions with regard to those several Countries.—Inaction of the Russians.—Napoleon's Preparations for a great Battle nearly mature.—Prodigious Works executed in the Island of Lobau in the Month of June.—Extraordinary Scene of the Passage of the Danube on the Night of the 5th of July.—Sudden Debouché of the French Army beyond the Danube before Archduke Charles could offer any Opposition.—The Austrian Army having fallen back on the Position of Wagram, defends itself there against an Attack by the Army of Italy.—Momentary Panic on the Evening of the 5th.—Plans of the two Generals for the Battle of the next Day.—Memorable Battle of Wagram on the 6th of July.—Formidable Attack on the left Wing of the French Army.—Napoleon's Promptitude in shifting his Forces from right to left, notwithstanding the great Extent of the Field of Battle.—The Austrian Centre is broken.—The Plateau of Wagram carried by Davout.—Nearly equal Losses on both sides, but decisive Results in favour of the French.—Disorderly Retreat of the Austrians.—Pursuit to Znaim, and Battle under the Walls of that Town.—The Austrians ask for a Suspension of Hostilities.—Armistice of Znaim, and Negotiations for Peace opened at Altenburg.—Napoleon's fresh Military Preparations to support the Altenburg Negotiations.—Fine Encampment of his Armies in the Centre of the Austrian Realm.—Character of the Campaign of 1809.

THE Austrians had intended to assail the French armies while still dispersed from the Vistula to the Tagus, and, notwithstanding the customary slowness of their movements, they would, perhaps, have succeeded, if Napoleon, arriving unexpectedly, had not baffled by his presence, his promptitude, and his energy, that dangerous plan of surprise. In five days fighting he had broken up their principal force, and thrown back its severed fragments on both banks of the Danube. But though he had by his personal qualities made up for all that was still wanting to his armies, he could not do so where he was not present, as in Italy, whither Archduke John was marching with the eighth and ninth corps, and in Poland, whither Archduke Ferdinand was marching with the seventh.

In Italy the commencement of the campaign was not fortunate, and it would certainly have exercised an injurious influence over the general course of events if our successes had been less signal between Landshut and Ratisbon. In that country, the rash and inconsistent spirit of Archduke John, opposed to the prudent but inexperienced mind of Prince Eugene, obtained a temporary triumph over the valour of our soldiers. Archduke John, as usual with those who command in a province, would have fain drawn every thing thither, and have converted Italy into the chief theatre of war. But as he

could not hinder the Danube from being Napoleon's direct road to Vienna, neither could he hinder the bulk of the Austrian forces from being on the Danube instead of the Tagliamento. Jealous of his brother, the Archduke Charles, and surrounded by a staff who were jealous of the commander-in-chief's staff, he had raised many a dispute about the plan to be pursued. He wished, in the first place, to enter directly into the Tyrol by the Pusther Thal, passing from the sources of the Drave to those of the Adige, to descend by Brixen and Trent on Verona, and thus to break down all the advanced defences of the French, by arriving at once on the line of the Adige through the mountain road opened to him by the insurrection of the Tyrolese. Not having the fear of finding General Bonaparte or the intrepid Massena on the plateau of Rivoli, and being able to reckon on the zealous co-operation of the Tyrolese, he had excellent reasons for adopting such a project, which had, among other advantages, that of keeping him within reach of Bavaria, and in a position to take part in the operations on the Danube. But, as always happens in the case of plans debated between rival authorities, a middle course was adopted, which consisted in invading the Tyrol with a detached corps, and Upper Italy with the bulk of the army. It was in accordance with these views that the forces

destined to operate in Italy were distributed. The eighth corps mustered at Villach in Carinthia under General Chasteler, who was at first designated as its commander; the ninth at Laybach in Carniola, under Count Ignatius Giulay, ban of Croatia. General Chasteler, being well acquainted with the Tyrol, was detached from the eighth corps with 12,000 men, and ordered to operate by the Pusther Thal, advancing from east to west, while the bulk of the army moved in the same direction on the plain. With his 12,000 men and the co-operation of the Tyrolese, General Chasteler was strong enough for the Bavarians, who were barely 5000 or 6000 in the Tyrol. While he was proceeding by Lienz and Brunecken to Brixen, the eighth and ninth corps, marching from Villach and Laybach, were to debouch on Udine. These two corps, including artillery, amounted to about 48,000 men, excellent soldiers. Twenty thousand men of the landwehr, well clothed, well disposed, but imperfectly trained, were to guard the frontier, cover it with campaigning works, and form with their best battalions a reserve for the active army. A detachment of 7000 or 8000 men, to which it was to be joined the *rising* of Croatia, was to keep watch on Dalmatia, whence it was feared that General Marmont might succeed in debouching. However, as the hope was entertained of surprising the French in Friuli as well as in Bavaria, and as it was known that by reason of family complaisance, which prevailed in Napoleon's court no less than in the eldest courts of Europe, Prince Eugene had obtained the command of the army in Italy, to the exclusion of Massena, its natural chief, the Austrians flattered themselves they should soon be on the Adige, or even on the Po, and keep General Marmont shut up in Dalmatia. A summons to surrender was already prepared for the latter, and it was thought the only trouble he could give was that of discussing and signing a capitulation.

It was not alone on force of arms that reliance was placed for a victorious advance on Italy, but also on secret practices carried forth from the mountains of Tyrol to the straits of Messina. Supported in their rash attempt by the persuasion that Europe, and France too, were weary of Napoleon's power, the Austrians counted not only on Tyrol, which had always been attached to Austria, but on the old Venetian states, which still groaned for their recent downfall, on Piedmont, become, in spite of itself, a French province, on the states of the Church, some of them converted into departments of the empire, others witnesses to the pope's thralldom, and lastly on the kingdom of Naples, deprived of its ancient sovereigns, separated from Sicily, and longing to recover its dynasty and its territory. Secret intelligence had been arranged in all these countries with the nobles, who were dissatisfied with the system of equality introduced by the French, and with the priests, who regretted the supremacy of the Church, or deplored the contumelious oppression exercised over the holy father. However, though French domination was disagreeable to the Italians, as being that of foreigners, and though it cost them much blood and treasure, it possessed for the great number of them advantages which they did not overlook, and which the evils of war had not made them

wholly forget. The Italians were not, therefore, so easily moved as the Tyrolese, whose impatience for the return of the Austrian flag was extreme. Nothing could afford an idea of the attachment they then bore to Austria. Those simple mountaineers, habituated to the purely paternal government of the house of Hapsburg, had passed, in 1806, with abhorrence, under the yoke of Bavaria, their detested neighbour. The latter, feeling itself disliked by its new subjects, repaid them hate for hate, and treated them with a harshness that had only exasperated their resentment. Accordingly, they had never ceased to send emissaries to Vienna, promising to rise at the first signal, and, by their relations with the Grisons and with Switzerland, to effect a movement which would soon spread to Swabia on the one side and Piedmont on the other. Their ardour had even contributed to mislead the court of Austria, and make it believe that there were in all Europe only Tyrolese or Spaniards panting to cast off the yoke of the modern Attilla. M. de Hormayer, a very active *employé* in the department of foreign affairs at Vienna, holding in his hand the threads of these Tyrolese, German, and Italian intrigues, was appointed to accompany Archduke John, and set in motion the secret springs of policy, while the archduke was moving the open springs of war. The English had, of course, been made privy to these hopes and secret practices, and had promised to co-operate actively with the Austrians as soon as the latter should have invaded Lombardy as far as Pavia, and opened the coast of the Adriatic from Trieste to Ancona.

All was ready for action in Carinthia on the same day as in Bavaria, namely, the 10th of April. On that day, while the advanced guards of Archduke Charles were crossing the Inn, those of Archduke John presented themselves at the passes of the Carnic and Julian Alps, without any previous declaration of war. It was deemed sufficient to send a trumpeter to the advanced posts of the French at Ponteba with a declaration, on the part of Archduke John, to the effect that he was entering Italy, and if his passage was opposed he would employ force. Half an hour afterwards detachments of cavalry and light infantry fell upon our advanced posts, and even carried some of them. Using still less ceremony towards the Bavarian possessors of the Tyrol, General Chasteler entered on the preceding day, the 9th of April, the mountainous country called the Pusther Thal, which separates Carinthia from the Italian Tyrol.

Two great roads presented themselves to the Austrians for invading Friuli; the one which leads from Vienna through Carinthia, descends the Carnic Alps to the Tagliamento, and runs by Villach, Tarris, and Ponteba, to Osopo; the other which starts from Carniola, descends the Julian Alps to the Isonzo, which it crosses between Gorice and Gradisca, and abuts on Palma Nova or Udine. Napoleon had taken precautions on both roads against Austrian invasion, by constructing the fort of Osopo on the first-named; on the second, the important fortress of Palma Nova. But both of these, though quite adequate at *points d'appui* for an army, could not supply the absence of one, and were, in fact, but difficulties for an invader, not in-

vincible obstacles. Prince Eugene's troops not having yet assembled, it was easy to defile under the cannon of Osopo and Palma Nova, blockade them, and pass on.

Archduke John used neither of these roads, but preferred one that lay between them, and which, passing by the sources of the Isonzo, debouched by Cividale on Udine. It was a difficult road, especially for a numerous army encumbered with a bulky *matériel*, but for that reason it seemed less likely to be defended than the two others. He entered upon it therefore with the bulk of his army, and sent only two advanced guards along the roads from Carinthia and Carniola. Colonel Wockmann, an able officer, was to force the pass of Ponteba with some battalions and squadrons, while General Gavassini, passing the Isonzo with a detachment above Gradisca, was to march on Udine, the point to which the several portions of the Austrian army were to converge.

All these arrangements were superfluous, for Prince Eugene, not expecting to be attacked before the end of April, had at hand only the Seras division before Udine, and the Broussier division before Ponteba. He himself was engaged in personally inspecting his advanced posts, in obedience to Napoleon's advice that he should visit the places where he should have to fight battles. The Austrians, therefore, had only mere advanced posts to drive in on all the roads where they presented themselves. On the 10th, Colonel Wockmann compelled the advanced guard of the Broussier division to fall back to Portès, General Gavassini crossed the Isonzo without difficulty, and the main body debouched with equal facility on Udine, where there was but a solitary French division.

Prince Eugene, surprised by this sudden apparition, and little habituated to command, although already well trained to war under his adopted father, was highly excited by a situation so new to him. Of eight divisions which composed his army, he had with him only the two French divisions of Seras and Broussier. There were a little in his rear the French divisions of Grenier and Barbon, together with Severoli's Italian division, and still further, near the Adige, Lamarque's French and Rusca's Italian division, besides the dragoons, who formed the bulk of his cavalry. As to the sixth French division, that of Miollis, it was still far behind, retained by the position of affairs at Rome and Florence. In such an exigency, Prince Eugene had but one course to take, which was to effect a rapid concentration, by retreating upon the main body of his forces. Odious as a retrograde movement must be, it was necessary to decide on it with promptitude, since no resolution should ever be deemed unpleasant which leads to a great result. It is true that, to brave appearances, a general must be already in possession of an established reputation, whereas Prince Eugene was still young, and without other distinction than that derived from the well-merited love of his adopted father. He decided, then, on a retreat, but with a regret which soon proved fatal, by preventing the completion of his design to concentrate the army. He ordered the Seras and Broussier divisions to recross the Tagliamento, and proceeded to the Livenza, whither the Barbon, Severoli, Lamarque, and Grouchy divisions were to

make a rapid march. General Seras effected his retreat without fighting; General Broussier had some sharp engagements with Colonel Wockmann, who skillfully disputed the valleys of the Upper Tagliamento, but he retreated, leaving the ground strewed with dead. Happily, the Austrians, though desiring to surprise us, failed to use all possible diligence. They occupied four days in marching from the frontier to the Tagliamento. This allowed for the process of concentration, an opportunity by which an experienced general would have profited better than did Prince Eugene.

When recrossing the Tagliamento to reach the Livenza, he was again joined by the Grenier, Barbon, and Severoli divisions; and then, being but slowly pursued by the Austrians, he halted between Pordenone and Sacile. Arrived there, he was imprudent enough to leave at Pordenone, too far from him and from all support, a strong rear-guard, composed of two battalions of the 35th and a regiment of light cavalry, under the orders of General Sahuc. This officer, who in this instance displayed little of the vigilance necessary to the advance-guard in a forward march, and to the rear-guard in retreat, instead of scouring the country to keep the army clear from surprise, did not even take that precaution for the force he himself commanded, but shut himself up with it in Pordenone. The Austrians, hearing of a French rear-guard at this place, advanced with a detachment of infantry and a considerable body of horse, under General Nugent—an extremely able officer, eminent among the war party. With his cavalry he completely surrounded Pordenone, cutting off all communication with Sacile; with his infantry he attacked the place itself, and surprised the French asleep and feebly guarded. Suddenly assailed, they were unable to maintain the defensive, and sought refuge in a precipitate flight; but instead of finding the road from Pordenone open to their retreat, they were assailed on every side by numerous troops of horse. Our hussars endeavoured to cut their way through, by charging at full gallop. Some escaped, others were sabred or made captive. As to the infantry, it looked for safety only to a valiant resistance. The two battalions of the 35th, an old Italian regiment, formed in squares, and received the Austrian cavalry in a manner that would have repulsed any less powerful force. They shot several hundreds, and strewed the ground with the bodies of men and of horses; but soon their ammunition was exhausted, and their bayonet points alone remained to resist the finest cavalry of Austria. Five hundred of our unfortunate soldiers expiated, under the Austrian sabre, the blunder of their general; all the rest were made prisoners.

This melancholy occurrence greatly incensed the French army, and diminished its confidence in the commander-in-chief. On the other hand, it augmented the ardour of the Austrian troops, who, for the first time during a long period, saw the French retreat before them, and began to entertain hopes of victory. What Prince Eugene should have done under these circumstances, since he had begun a retreat, was to continue it, until he found a solid line to defend, and all his forces united behind that line. He would thus have retrieved the discredit of

some days of humble attitude, and would have imparted an aspect of dignity to his retrograde movement. But he was young, and most sensitive on the point of honour. The remarks of the soldiers, who retained all the pride of the old army of Italy, cut him to the heart. Much as they loved the young prince, the son of their renowned leader, they judged for themselves; they saw his inexperience, and complained of it aloud; showed no greater deference for the generals under him, and demanded to be led against an enemy who had insolently pursued them, and from whom they had never been used to fly. To the clamours of the soldiers was added the despair of the people, who were old subjects of Venice, attached for the most part to France, terrified by the approach of the Austrian army, and praying to be rescued from its vengeance. Eugene assembled his generals, whom he found equally disconcerted with himself; for they had learned, under Napoleon, to fight as heroes, but not to command. They were ready to die, but not to decide whether a conflict should be hazarded. The wisest course, then, to take was to continue the retreat, until all the troops were rallied upon a ground where they could give battle with advantage. By marching as far as the Piave they should have brought to the field, successively, five divisions of French and one of Italian infantry, besides two magnificent divisions of dragoons, and the royal Lombard guards, which was a serviceable troop. They would have found also in the Piave a line admirably adapted for defence; but Eugene had neither sufficient experience, nor sufficient reputation, to resist steadily the clamour of the army. Piqued by the silence of his generals, and by the indiscretion of his soldiers, he resolved to halt before the Livenza, between Sacile and Pordenone, upon a ground unknown to him, which offered no advantageous posts, and upon which his troops had not had time to concentrate.

On the evening of the 15th, after the disaster at Pordenone, he gave orders to halt and resume offensive measures at all points. He had in his retreat thus far, united with the Broussier and Seras divisions those of Grenier, Barbou, and Severoli, which had joined him before the Livenza. These altogether amounted to about 86,000 men, some of them old soldiers of the army of Italy, others young but already trained, and forming the fourth battalions of the armies of Naples and Dalmatia. The Austrian force, on the other hand, numbered about 45,000 of their choicest troops. The disproportion was therefore great. It is true that Prince Eugene reckoned upon a reinforcement of 10,000 foot and horse, which Generals Lamarque and Grouchy, then on their way to join him, were to bring. But this addition was not certain, and besides the ground was very unfavourable. To our right we had between Tamai, Palse, and Porcia, villages, fences, an inundated soil, numerous canals, all strongly defended by the Austrians. In the middle, the ground suddenly rising, formed a ridge which ran right before us, and along which lay the road from Sacile to Pordenone. We had in our possession upon this road the village of Fontana Fredda, opposite Pordenone, taken in the morning by the Austrians. Finally, to

our left, at the dip of the ridge, the country stretched in a plain to the foot of the Alps. On that plain stood two villages, that of Roveredo, occupied by the French, and that of Cordenons, where the Austrians were bivouacking. So then on the right, ground intersected and cut up and obstructed by obstacles of various kinds; in the centre, a broad road leading direct from our line to that of the enemy; to the left a plain: such was the ground to be disputed. It is true there was one favourable circumstance which should have been inferred, had Eugene possessed Napoleon's faculty of surmising the truth from the smallest indications; this was the division of the Austrians into two masses, the one formed of the eighth corps, and stationed in the villages of Tamai, Porcia, and Palse, behind the obstructed ground on our right; the other formed of the ninth corps and of the cavalry, stationed on the plain to the left, at Cordenons. Now between Cordenons and Pordenone there was more than a league of ground, ill kept and ill defended. This circumstance once perceived, we should have set on the Seras and Severoli divisions to attack Tamai, Palse, and Porcia on our right, so as to attract the Austrians thither; then with the Grenier and Barbou divisions stationed in the centre upon the high-road, and the Broussier division stationed on the left, on the plain, we should have formed a mass of 24,000 men, marching by the high-road through Fontana Fredda upon Pordenone, invested the last-named town, cut it off from Cordenons, where the ninth corps was stationed, and thus divided the Austrian army into two; this once accomplished, the struggle between the eighth corps and our right wing would have been soon ended, and the sooner the more that corps had entangled itself in the difficult ground which formed that portion of the battle-field.

Unfortunately, Prince Eugene, with the chief officer of the staff, Vignolle, displayed the same want of reflection in planning the battle as in their determination to offer it, and ordered exactly the contrary of what the position of the enemy and the kind of ground seemed to require. Without even reconnoitring either the one or the other, they decided that on the next day, the 16th of April, at dawn, Generals Seras and Severoli should march from Tamai on Palse and Porcia, which they should endeavour to take at any risk; that in the centre upon the high-road, the Grenier division should station itself in front of Fontana Fredda, but make no hostile demonstration, until Generals Seras and Severoli should have overcome the numerous and difficult obstacles which they had to encounter; that to the left, General Broussier, crossing the plain of Roveredo to join General Grenier, should likewise await that event; and lastly, that to the rear, General Barbou should support the French line. It was an ill-devised plan, which allowed the Austrians time to rectify their position, while our right wing was exhausting itself against mere physical obstacles, and while our centre, our left, and our rear-guard were losing their time in doing nothing. Thus it is, and with such management that the precious blood of the soldiery is often wasted and the fate of empires trifled with! Thus it is that kings and republics confide, the one to incompetent sons or brothers,

the other to favourites of the multitude quite as incompetent, the lives of men and the welfare of states! Prince Eugene was a brave soldier, full of modesty and devotedness, suited some day to lead on a division with credit, but not to command an army, or above all, to direct a campaign.

Our soldiers, unconscious of whither they were being led, but well content to attack an enemy they had not accustomed themselves to dread, marched resolutely forward at day-break on Sunday, the 16th of April. The French under Seras, the Italians under Severoli, courageously assaulted Palse and Porcia, and overthrew the first obstacles which opposed them. The Archduke John was then at mass with all his staff. This prince, although possessing more experience, and at the same time more pretensions, than the modest Prince Eugene, on this occasion displayed no more judgment than his adversary; for, after having on the evening before surprised the French at Pordenone, he now exposed himself to be surprised on the same spot. He immediately mounted horse with his staff, rushed to the front of Pordenone, and beholding before him, upon the road to Fontana Fredda, General Grenier in our centre, and General Broussier to our left, forming masses which the open ground rendered still more apparent, he imagined that we were about to double our left upon our centre, our centre upon our right; could only conceive, from what he fancied he beheld, the design of withdrawing the ninth corps from Cordenons to Fontana Fredda, in order to prevent us from executing the movement he imagined we desired to make; left the space between Cordenons and Pordenone still open, and seemed to concern himself little about his eighth corps, occupied in skirmishing with Generals Seras and Severoli, in the midst of the broken grounds which lay between Tamai, Palse, and Porcia.

Here then took place, under the direction of two commanders-in-chief, possessed of little discernment, and between soldiers of extreme bravery, a bloody and destructive conflict. The eighth corps of the Austrians, much more numerous than the Seras and Severoli divisions, had no intention of yielding up the ground, of which the latter had conquered a portion. General Colleredo attacked them with an Austrian division, took from them under a destructive fire Porcia and Palse, and thus turned the fortunes of the conflict. General Seras, who had taken care to keep back a reserve, now put himself at its head, led it forward and entered once more into the lost villages, bringing back into them both the French and the Italians. They established themselves in these unhappy villages, the theatre of so many calamities. Then the Austrians, taking advantage of the smallest obstacles, defended themselves from house to house, from fence to fence, opposing to our soldiers a resistance of which they had given no similar example since Marengo. General Grenier, condemned to inaction upon the high-road from Fontana Fredda to Pordenone, detached two battalions to the right to aid towards the decisive conquest of Porcia. General Barboiu also sent two from the rear-guard upon the same point. These reinforcements doubtless compensated for the

inferiority of our right wing in comparison with the eighth corps against which it fought; but upon such ground as that, ground obstacles which it was as difficult to lose as to win, no thing was decided by them, since our left and our centre remained motionless.

On both sides they fought with fury, when the ninth corps advancing obliquely from Cordenons upon Fontana Fredda, came up with the Broussier division, which formed our left. The brave General Broussier had disposed in *echelons* the 9th, 84th, and 92d of the line, superb regiments of four battalions, which composed his division. With perfect coolness he awaited the approach of the enemy's infantry, and closely firing upon it with extreme precision, overthrew almost a whole line. Then the magnificent Austrian cavalry, having taken advantage of the plain to charge upon him, he received them by forming a square, covered the ground with the dead, and, brave as they were, sent them back utterly disgusted with similar attempts. Meanwhile, the ninth corps, very numerous, outflanked our left, and seemed to menace Sacile, a town behind Fontana Fredda, where was the principal bridge over the Livenza. Had this bridge been taken, our most important point of communication would have been lost, and no way of retreat would have been left us but by some wretched bridges over the lower part of the Livenza. Prince Eugene, who was resolute only when under fire, was alarmed for his means of communication, and, while the issue was still undetermined, commanded a retreat, with as little reason as he had commanded a battle.

Our soldiers, after having killed as many as they had lost, retreated towards the Livenza, disheartened at the humiliating part which they were forced to play. Our right made for the bridge of Brugnera, which it was able to reach without disorder, pursuit being little to be feared over the rough and uneven ground on that side, as the Austrians were exhausted by the dreadful conflict they had sustained. All the attempts of the enemy during this retrograde movement were made upon our left, which retreated over an open space. Broussier's division, by its superb conduct, saved the army; now awaiting the enemy's infantry to fire at point-blank distance, now receiving in square the cavalry, whose progress it stopped with the bayonet. When our centre and our rear-guard had defiled through Sacile, it entered it the last, leaving the enemy themselves full of admiration for its gallant conduct.

Up to this point we had lost only our dead, our wounded, some dismounted artillery, and few prisoners. But in the night, Prince Eugene, deeming it desirable to push the retreat as far as Conegliano, to shelter himself as soon as possible behind the Piave, the bad weather, the encumbrance of gun-carriages and baggage, and their mingling with the troops, produced a disastrous disorder. The soldiers, unrestrained by the strict *surveillance* of their officers, spread themselves through the houses at the risk of being taken prisoners. The army, which upon the battle-field had lost about 3000 and some hundred men, a loss nearly equal to that of the Austrians, lost 8000 more as stragglers and prisoners. The confusion being presently increased by the terrific wea-

ther, which made the rivers overflow their banks, and rendered the roads impracticable, they arrived at length behind the Piave, in a state little creditable to that army of Italy which had formerly been so admirable. Fortunately, the Austrians, unaccustomed to vanquish, eager to enjoy their victory, and detained by the weather, which rendered pursuit to them as difficult as was retreat to us, remained several days without attacking Prince Eugene. They thus allowed him time to recover his defeat and to stay its consequences. He had been joined on his way, but too late, by the division of infantry under Lamarque, and by Grouchy's division of cavalry. But there came to him besides, what in such a moment was more valuable than a reinforcement, a general—namely, the famous Macdonald, one of the best officers of the revolution, though he had lost the battle of Trebbia. His connection with Moreau had condemned him to live for several years in a kind of disgrace and to languish in inactivity, while his equals in age or in length of service, some even his inferiors, were pursuing a brilliant career.

The great demand then existing for generals and officers, through the long continuance of the wars, caused many of those long neglected to be sought out. Not wishing to send Massena into Italy, on account of Prince Eugene, whom he feared to place in a secondary position, Napoleon consented to send General Macdonald to be his guide and support. Macdonald, one of the most intrepid men that ever graced our army, experienced, skilful, cool, with the power of making himself obeyed, was received with confidence by the soldiers, with displeasure by some of the generals, who beheld, with regret, a firm hand about to be laid upon them, and who, moreover, believing him to be in disgrace, deemed they should derive little advantage from performing service under his orders. General Lamarque in particular, who was notorious in the army for his captious spirit, openly complained, saying that the Emperor only sent General Macdonald in order to work his ruin, and that those who should serve under him would share his fate. Every thing about the general, even to his military *tenue*, in which he adhered to the style of the early days of the revolution, was made a subject of unbecoming railillery by the young officers, upon whom fashion had already asserted her power. But a man of General Macdonald's character was not to be trifled with, and he soon drew back to their allegiance such as had been tempted to stray from it. At the same time, Prince Eugene, not wishing to acknowledge too publicly a tutor in the person of this officer, did not make him the chief of his staff, but created a suitable post for him, and distributed his army under three commanders, one for the left, one for the centre, and one for the right. The right wing, the most considerable and most important of the three sections, composed of the Broussier and Lamarque divisions and Pully's dragoons, was given to General Macdonald. The centre was given to General Grenier, and was composed of the Grenier division, which passed under the command of General Paethod, and the Durutte division, which contained part of the Barbou division. The remainder of this last-named division had been

left as a garrison in Venice. The left was conferred on General Baraguay d'Hilliers, and was composed principally of Italians with a few Frenchmen to set them an example.

With the Seras division, the Italian guard, and Grouchy's dragoons, Prince Eugene formed a reserve of 10,000 men. The whole of his army amounted to 60,000 men, out of whom General Macdonald alone had 17,000 under his command, and could thus exert considerable influence upon the course of events, without at all bearing the semblance of commander-in-chief. But Prince Eugene, as modest as he was discreet, never failed to consult him on all important occasions, and always had reason to be satisfied with his counsels. General Macdonald advised a slow retreat, and that, in marching towards the Adige, where they might recover strength to reassume the offensive, they should move in a more orderly manner. To the Adige accordingly they repaired, recruited their strength, put themselves in order, and soon became more worthy of the army of Italy, whose glorious name they had for an instant compromised.

Things were in a still worse state in the mountainous heights which overlooked the plains of Upper Italy; and the Austrians obtained in the Tyrol still greater advantages than in the Friuli. General Chasteler had crossed the frontier a day sooner—that is to say, on the 9th of April—passing from Carinthia into the Tyrol, and advanced to Lienz. Although he had arranged with the secret leaders of the Tyrolese insurrection that they should wait for the 12th or 13th of April to commence operations, they had not been able to restrain themselves, and had broken out on the 11th. The motive, it is true, for this premature outbreak was very natural. The Bavarians, utterly incapable of disputing the Tyrol with the Austrian forces, now sought aid from local obstacles, by destroying the bridges. This the inhabitants would not allow, since they wished to preserve for their hills those indispensable means of communication with the plains. They had accordingly all risen at once, with a spontaneous ebullition which belongs alone to the most eager passion. In all the valleys of the Italian Tyrol, from Lienz to Brixen, from Meran to Brixen, and from Brixen to Rivoli, all over those stupendous and beautiful mountains, there had been but one impulse, but one cry. On the other side of the great chain of the Brenner, in German Tyrol, the rising had been equally prompt and general. In that country, as well as in Switzerland, the innkeepers, who derive a subsistence from their relations with strangers, being the richest and most enlightened of the population, a man of this profession, named Andrew Hofer, had obtained an irresistible ascendancy over the minds of his countrymen. A few veterans, brought up in the service of Austria, were among the most active instigators of the revolt. Among them, one Major Teimer had particularly distinguished himself. France had required the assembly of the whole Bavarian army upon the Isar, and there remained in Tyrol only about 5000 Bavarians, spread over both sides of the Brenner, from Brixen to Inspruck. Of French troops there were, in two columns, a collection of about 4000 conscripts, marching

from Italy to Germany, to recruit the Boudet and Molitor divisions, the *Espagne cuirassiers*, and the *chasseurs* of Marulaz. These soldiers had never stood fire; they had been formed into temporary marching regiments, and were commanded by *dépôt* officers, for the most part old and worn-out. More than 20,000 enthusiastic and fearless mountaineers, all certain shots, joined to 12,000 Austrians, arrayed against 4000 or 5000 Bavarians, and 3000 or 4000 French conscripts, were certain of not meeting with any prolonged resistance.

Indeed, on the approach of the Austrian general, Chasteler, all the Bavarian posts were taken from Lienz to Brunecken. Those that were able to escape, having assembled upon the marshy plain of Sterzing, at the extreme point of the Italian Tyrol, near the foot of the Brenner, were there assailed by Andrew Hofer, and a large muster from the Meran. Surrounded on all sides, attacked with fury, they at length laid down their arms, and the war being a national one—nay, almost a war of races—scenes directly opposed to the law of nations soon multiplied to a most distressing degree. On both sides prisoners were slaughtered, and no one could tell which party gave the first provocation. The Tyrolese alleged, in their own defence, that their hamlets had been burnt, their wives, old men, and children killed. The Bavarians replied that their prisoners had been assassinated, and that they had only acted on the defensive. However this may be, the most atrocious scenes were perpetrated after the defeat of Sterzing. From that time the Italian Tyrol was set free as far as Roveredo, where the French general, Baraguay d'Hilliers, was stationed with an Italian division.

At this period, the long line of French recruits, extending from Verona to Inspruck, found themselves separated in two by the insurrection. One part fell back upon Verona, where they were out of all danger, part crossed the Brenner, flattering themselves with the hope of meeting the advanced posts of the French at Inspruck. They were followed closely by Chasteler and Andrew Hofer, who were crossing the Brenner in order to accomplish the deliverance of the German Tyrol. But north as well as south of the Brenner, upon the Inn as well as upon the Adige, the insurrection was sudden and general. The Bavarian posts were assailed everywhere at the same moment; their occupants were some of them taken or slain, others driven back into Inspruck, and ultimately compelled to surrender that old centre of the Austrian dominions. The French reaching Inspruck just at the moment when the town was passing into the hands of the enemy, pursued by the victorious bands of the Italian Tyrol, and by the little army of General Chasteler, were unable to defend themselves, formed and commanded as they were. They were accordingly compelled to capitulate, to the number of about 8000, which was the more vexatious, as, besides the mere check thus received by our arms, many corps were thereby deprived of most needful reinforcements. We had, besides, to deplore the barbarous treatment which some of these unfortunate Frenchmen, confounded with the Bavarians, received, and which excited Napoleon to fearful reprisals upon General Chasteler.

Chasteler, finding the German Tyrol delivered, thought it best to return with Andrew Hofer towards the Italian Tyrol, to assist in the operations of the Archduke John. Returning by the Brenner upon Trent, he presented himself there with the whole levy from the Tyrol, and 7000 or 8000 Austrians, in front of the position of General Baraguay d'Hilliers. The French general, having his position turned by lateral valleys, could not retain Trent, and fell back upon Roveredo. Again turned, he was compelled to fall back upon Rivoli, where, backed by the army of Italy, which was being reorganized, he had no serious assault to fear. Thus, in twenty days, the two Tyrols, as well as Friuli, had passed into the hands of the enemy.

It was not only in Italy, in Tyrol, and Bavaria, that contests were taking place, but all through Northern Europe, where the Austrian declaration of war had stirred every heart, inspired vain hopes, and awakened premature desires; premature, for that, although Napoleon had already committed grand mistakes, he had not yet committed those destined to prove his ruin, and until now his masterly genius was more powerful than the hatred of the nations who had risen up to oppose his ambitious spirit. The whole of Germany, as it has already been shown, was full of indignation against the princes bound to his car by fear or interest, and although the French dominion bore, concealed in its bosom, the germs of a modern civilization, benefits which presented themselves under cover of a foreign invasion were indignantly rejected.

In Bavaria, a long standing antipathy to Austria, arising out of their proximity to each other, had greatly weakened these sentiments; but in Swabia, in the provinces once Austrian, in Franconia, in the little states, snatched from the mild rule of the ecclesiastical princes, even in Saxony, where the addition of a Polish crown flattered only the reigning family, in Hesse, where Jerome Napoleon held sway, the long pent-up feelings of hatred burst forth at the news of the daring attempts of the Austrians. In proportion as the distance increased from the Rhine, and from the reach of France, so did boldness augment until it passed into hostile demonstrations. Already had insurgent bands come down from the mountains of Hesse upon the banks of the Elbe, and had even shown themselves at the gates of Magdeburg, apparently awaiting some sudden apparition from Prussia, from whom they hoped for a vigorous and patriotic effort.

Indeed, throughout all Prussia exasperation was at its height. To the general sufferings of the Germans were added in that country other sufferings peculiarly painful to the Prussian nation. Those famous battles, in which the independence of Germany had perished, had been lost by her. She had beheld the monarchy of Frederick the Great dismembered, and for a while its glory eclipsed; and, if she was as sensitive to physical as to moral calamities, she experienced in the crushing military contributions she was compelled to pay the agonizing consciousness of a foreign dominion. Hence had audacity been pushed to greater lengths in Prussia than in any other country. A French convoy of artillery, on its way from the banks



of the Vistula to Magdeburg, was assaulted, insulted, and grossly maltreated. At Berlin the Austrian war had been openly announced before it was declared; they had also predicted, from the outset, its successful termination, that the whole world would join in it, that if King Frederick William was so dejected and dispirited as to refuse to take part in it, they would of their own accord march to the support of the Austrian army. To such a length had their audacity been carried, that on the first commencement of operations, without waiting for the result, the commandant of Berlin had given for watchwords to the garrison, *Charles and Ratisbon*.

There was at Berlin a well-known officer of the name of Major Schill, who, in 1806 and 1807, had successfully carried on a partisan warfare against us during the sieges of Dantzic, Colberg, and Stralsund. He was at the head of some cavalry, and formed part of the garrison at Berlin. His well-known bravery and his avowed hatred of the French had rendered him the idol of the people. He it was, they said, that ought to raise the standard of revolt in the name of German freedom, and lend a helping hand to a prince of the house of Brunswick, the Duke of Brunswick Oels, who at that time was going about in Saxony and Silesia, rousing all the inactive Prussian officers, and enticing them to Bohemia to form German guerillas. The fanaticism of the Spaniards was thus quickly shared by all, and it was deemed not impracticable to mould the slow and peaceful Germans into adventurers as active as the smugglers of the Peninsula. One night, in the midst of this general excitement, it was reported that Major Schill, who had been engaged for several days in reviewing his corps until a late hour of the night, had suddenly disappeared at the head of 600 horse, who constituted the cavalry of the garrison. It was said that he had marched towards the Elbe to join a vast assemblage from Hesse, and afterwards intended advancing to meet the Austrians, who were marching upon Saxony. This circumstance, as might naturally be expected, produced an extraordinary sensation. Every one persisted in believing that the Prussian government was an accomplice in the act. This, however, was a mistake; it was simply the national passion bursting forth in spite of itself. The ministers, utterly confounded, hastened to the French ambassador, making sincere protestations of regret, declaring they had been perfectly ignorant that conduct, as absurd as it was criminal, was contemplated; affirming, with truth, that the king had no hand in the matter, and promising that the severest punishment should be visited upon those who had thus compromised against its desire the government of their country. But while they were thus speaking, the infantry, following the example of the cavalry, gave similar proofs of insubordination, and whole companies escaped to follow Major Schill. Unfortunately, it was impossible to pursue these insurgents without cavalry, and Major Schill had carried off all that was in Berlin. It was necessary, therefore, to wait until troops were procured, well-disposed and well-disciplined enough to obey the orders of their government, whatever they might be, for it was not for the army to decide upon the

foreign, any more than upon the domestic policy of the country. But, in the meanwhile, these extraordinary proceedings caused a universal sensation throughout Germany, which the brilliant successes of Napoleon could alone extinguish.

The banks of the Vistula were the scene of no less weighty events. The seventh Austrian corps, commanded by the Archduke Ferdinand, and 87,000 to 88,000 strong, marched down the valley of the Vistula upon Warsaw. Formed in Galicia, it had only a short distance to march before invading Poland; besides which, it started very early, like all the Austrian corps. Its operations, like those in Germany and Italy, began on the 10th of April. Prince Joseph Poniatowski—a hero who had long wasted his days on the lap of ease, and, like many a Pole, had been kept inactive at the feet of his beautiful countrywomen—awoke at the clash of the French arms, and had espoused the cause of France, which he justly considered to be that of Poland, if ever Poland could be restored. He commanded the Polish army. Napoleon, entirely taken up with preparing the mighty blows which he intended to inflict with his own hand on the house of Austria, had had but little time to devote to that army. The whole amount of regular troops they had contrived to collect was but 15,000 men, and a small Saxon detachment left at Warsaw. Napoleon had troubled himself little about this inferiority of strength in Poland, thinking himself to decide every thing at Vienna, and, though he did not reckon on any great co-operation on the part of the Russians, believing, nevertheless, that their presence alone upon the frontiers of the grand-duchy would suffice to paralyse the Austrian corps under the Archduke Ferdinand. But the Russian co-operation was even less than he expected. The Emperor Alexander had taken care, while observing, as much as decency required, the stipulations of the treaty of alliance, to send his principal forces to Finland and Moldavia, to finish the conquest of the one and commence that of the other. He had only set aside for the Austrian war 60,000 men, who at this time were hardly gathered together, for various reasons, for the most part well founded, but liable enough to be misinterpreted. In the first place, Russia, like Napoleon himself, did not believe in the near approach of hostilities, and had, therefore, not been sufficiently rapid in its preparations. Again, its government, which had had so much trouble to assemble sufficient forces in Finland, in a cause pre-eminently Russian, knew not how to be more active in an interest exclusively French. The season, besides, had been dreadful, and floods of rain had made the vast territories between the Niemen and the Vistula almost impracticable. Moreover, the emperor and M. de Romanzoff, both of them already a little cooled with regard to the French alliance were, nevertheless, the only persons in Russia who desired it, and they had to combat the wishes of every one to make themselves obeyed when aid to Napoleon was required. Correspondences had even sprung up between the Russian and Austrian officers, wherein the former expressed all sorts of sympathy for the latter, and an earnest desire to march, not against them, but with them. It was, indeed, no easy task to persuade the

Russians to march against the Austrians and with the French, in order to assist in the re-establishment of Poland. It was true that the reward of this assistance was to be Finland, Moldavia, and Wallachia, and that if the sacrifice was great, the reward was also great. However, the aid of the Russians was not of much moment, so long as Napoleon remained victorious upon the Danube; and the worst consequence of their insufficient assistance was the mistrust thereby engendered between the two emperors and the two empires.

This explains how Prince Poniatowski, who had a right to count on the indirect, if not the direct assistance of 60,000 Russians, (and it is certain that if they had marched on Galicia they would have detained the Austrians there,) found himself on the 10th of April with Archduke Ferdinand upon his hands, as Napoleon had Archduke Charles, and Prince Eugene Archduke John. Archduke Ferdinand, marching down the course of the Vistula, which takes its rise between Silesia and Galicia, advanced along the left bank upon Warsaw, showering upon the inhabitants protestations of a most amicable nature. In the conventional language of his party, he declared that they came to deliver all nations, the Poles among others, from a dominion almost as irksome to its friends as to its enemies.

The Poles were not the people to be deceived by language such as this. They knew but too well that the old copartitioners of their country could never become her deliverers, that France alone could be their friend—a friend not always able to protect them, but sincere, because it was impossible she should be otherwise. So Prince Poniatowski advanced steadily with 12,000 men to meet the Archduke Ferdinand. These were the same Poles who had first taken arms with us, in 1807, and who, besides their own natural bravery and their ardent patriotism, possessed the germs of a military education received in our schools. Unfortunately, they were so disproportioned in number to the Austrians, that the most that could be expected of them was an honourable and energetic, but not victorious defence. Prince Poniatowski, after a few skirmishes with cavalry, resolved to dispute the approaches to Warsaw with the bulk of his troops. The 19th, the same day on which Marshal Davout halted the battle of Tengen, the Polish prince halted at Raszyn, a position formed, like all those capable of an advantageous defence in his country, of wood interspersed with marshes. For eight hours he contested the possession of these woods and marshes with 12,000 or 15,000 Poles against 30,000 Austrians, lost about 1200 or 1500 men, killed and wounded, but destroyed many more of the enemy, and fearing that they might be beforehand in reaching Warsaw, retreated towards that capital.

Should he attempt to defend Warsaw, deprived as it was of all means of resistance, and thus expose it to infallible destruction? Or was it better to evacuate it in pursuance of a convention which should soften the conditions on which the enemy should occupy it, and which would leave him the opportunity of retreating unharmed into positions easier to maintain? Such was the serious and painful question which Prince Poniatowski had to solve after

the conflict at Raszyn. The hottest spirits among the Poles were eager for an obstinate resistance, without concerning themselves about the consequences. The inoffensive mass of the inhabitants dreaded a catastrophe. The most enlightened patriots, and not the least brave, advised a retreat into the triangle of the Narew and the Vistula, between Modlin and Sierock, behind the strong works constructed by the command of Napoleon. Committing themselves to that impregnable fastness, with the secure retreat of the marshes of Pultask, they might save the capital, though leaving it for a while in the hands of the enemy. Seldom is such a sacrifice judicious; it was so, however, on this occasion, as the result proved. Prince Poniatowski sorrowfully yielded up Warsaw, after having stipulated for honourable conditions. He crossed to the right bank of the Vistula, between Modlin and Sierock, with the intention of attacking every corps that should dare to cross the river in sight of him, and firmly resolved to defend by petty conflicts the unfortunate country he could no longer defend by regular battles. The attitude he assumed, his noble language while making this sacrifice, were such as to fire rather than cool the zeal of the Poles. They flocked to him, therefore, to assist him in recovering the capital he had for a while yielded to the Austrians. Thus, then, in Italy we had fallen back upon the Adige; in Tyrol we were assailed on all sides; in Germany we were threatened and insulted by an indignant populace; in Poland our allies were losing their capital, which the treaty of Tilait had restored to them.

Such was the news that came upon Napoleon in the flush of his victory at Ratisbon, and but slightly moved him. He had reckoned little on the assistance of the Russians, and cared only to prove to Europe that they were on his side, and not on that of the Austrians; and of that fact the march of their armies, however slow, left no possible doubt. As to the grand-duchy of Warsaw, he knew that at Vienna he should make or unmake anew all the states of his last creation, and that it mattered little whether they stood or fell during his victorious march upon the capital. But the occurrences in Italy somewhat affected him; because they uncovered his right flank, exposed his Italian dominions to the horrors of war, and tarnished the youthful reputation of his adopted son, whom he so tenderly loved. One circumstance in particular almost changed his displeasure into anger. Prince Eugene, fearing more his adopted father than the opinion of the world, had scarcely dared to give him an account of his reverses, and had contented himself with writing: "My father, I need your indulgence; fearing your censure if I retreated, I accepted the offer of battle, and I have lost it." Not a single explanation followed these brief words, to tell in what condition things actually were: and this silence had been prolonged for several days, which considerably embarrassed Napoleon, who knew not what his losses actually were, what progress the enemy had made in Italy, or what danger menaced his right flank during his march upon Vienna. "You have been beaten." Napoleon replied in several letters; "be it so. I ought to have known how it would be when I named as general a young man without ex-

perience; whereas I would not allow the princes of Bavaria, Saxony, and Wurtemberg, to command the soldiers of their own nations. As for your losses, I will send you wherewith to repair them; the advantages gained by the enemy I shall know how to neutralize; but, to do this, I must be in possession of every particular, and I know nothing! I am compelled to seek in foreign bulletins for the facts of which you ought to inform me. I am doing that which I have never before done, and what must, of all things, be most repugnant to a prudent general: I am marching with my wings in the air, unconscious of what is passing on my flanks. Fortunately I can brave all risks—thanks to the blows I have struck—but it is miserable to be kept in such a state of ignorance." Napoleon added these remarkable words, which we quote, because they concern the fame of one of the greatest of his lieutenants, Massena: "War is a serious game, in which are staked one's reputation, one's troops, and one's country. A man should reason and examine himself, in order to learn whether or not he is fitted by nature for the art. I know that in Italy you affect to despise Massena. If I had sent him, this would not have occurred. Massena possesses military talents before which you should all bow; and if he has faults, they must be forgotten, for every man has some. In confiding to you my army of Italy, I have committed an error. I should have sent Massena, and have given you the command of the cavalry, under his orders. The Prince-royal of Bavaria admirably commands a division under the Duke of Dantzic! I think that, if circumstances become urgent, you should write to the King of Naples to join the army; you will give up the command to him, and put yourself under his orders. It is a matter of course that you should have less experience in war than a man whose occupation it has been for eighteen years. Burghausen, April 30, 1809."

Napoleon, knowing well that all the hope of his enemies and all their courage would vanish before the astounding news of the events at Ratisbon, resolved to push vigorously onward, and while so doing to stop first, and afterwards to drive back the forces that manœuvred on his flank or his rear. Then, as in 1805, to burst upon Vienna was the surest way to rupture all coalitions made or yet to be made.

Nevertheless, there suggested itself one of those serious questions on which the fate of empires depends, and which fall to the lot of great men, such as Hannibal, Cæsar, Frederic, and Napoleon. Should he impetuously follow the broad way which led to Vienna, that of the Danube, leaving the Archduke Charles on his left in Bohemia, driving before him the scattered forces of General Hiller and the Archduke Louis, and forcing back Archduke John on his right by the impetus of a victorious march upon the capital? or should he leave to Bessières the task of scattering with his cavalry and the infantry of Molitor the remains of General Hiller and the Archduke Louis upon the Inn, while he himself pursued Archduke Charles in Bohemia, and struck at the Austrians through the person of that prince and not through Vienna? Napoleon pondered this in his mind, (as his correspondence evidences,) but if it became a great captain like him to weigh every

alternative, it no less became him not to hesitate after having duly deliberated, but to march at once to the real object he had in view, which was Vienna. It is very true that, by instantly pursuing the Archduke Charles across Bohemia he would have had a chance of augmenting the disorganization of the principal Austrian army, hastening its dissolution, and preventing it, after its losses had been repaired, from coming under cover of the Danube to dispute with him the possession of the Austrian empire on the bloody fields of Essling and Wagram. This is certain, and the panegyrists of the Archduke Charles have from this concluded that Napoleon sacrificed every thing to the pride of entering Vienna. But this is a false decision, arrived at without any regard to the actual facts. It is quite true that the Austrian main army, driven through Ratisbon beyond the Danube, was severely shaken, and that one more blow might have completed its destruction. But Napoleon's young army, although elated by success, was worn out by five days' battle. The only corps capable of enduring this prolonged fatigue was that of Marshal Davout, and it too was exhausted, for upon it had fallen the main burthen of those five days. The rest were completely worn out. It would be necessary then with 50,000 men to pursue the 80,000 under Archduke Charles, who, whatever could be done, would still be two days in advance, and would secure all the provisions still remaining in the exhausted villages of Bohemia, while the French would not find even a crumb of bread; who, moreover, though leaving behind on the road in his precipitate retreat his laggards and his wounded, would nevertheless save two-thirds of his men, and after having induced Napoleon to follow him, would infallibly return through Lintz to the Danube, cross that river, and reunite with the 40,000 men of the corps of Hiller and Archduke Louis, Chasteler's 10,000 or 12,000, and Archduke John's 40,000, and would thus have on the real line of communication the best 140,000 men in the Austrian army; a supposition by no means chimerical, since subsequently, though separated by Napoleon's presence on the Danube, the archdukes never ceased to aim at forming a junction with each other, the one purposing to come from Bohemia by way of Lintz, the other from Italy by Inspruck and Salzburg. It is evident, therefore, that if Napoleon had chosen to pursue the archduke into Bohemia, he would have left open the middle route, that of the Danube; that then the reunion of the archdukes would have been certain, and that those princes, by acting with a little boldness, might have returned to the Isar, or even to the Upper Danube, and have cut off the retreat of the French by bringing a combined force of 140,000 men against Napoleon, who no longer had that number. To march along the margin of the Danube, and thus take the shortest course to Vienna, for the roads from Bohemia describe by Ratisbon, Pilsen, Budweis, and Lintz, a great arc, of which the Danube is the cord; to maintain himself on that road which was not only the shorter but the more central; by occupying it to separate the archduke who was in Bohemia from the archdukes who were in Bavaria and Italy; lastly, by remaining on that route to take good care of what is most precious to a general,

namely, his line of communication, that on which he has his sick, his ammunition, his provisions, his recruits, and by which it is possible for him to retreat in case of defeat, was then the only wise resolution, the only one worthy of the genius of Napoleon, and he adopted it without any hesitation.

Having resolved to take the Danube route and march straight on Vienna, Napoleon employed the most suitable means for the execution of his designs. The plan of the Austrians was not known to him; all he knew was that the larger part of them, under Archduke Charles, were on the left of the Danube by Ratisbon, and the smaller, under General Hiller and Archduke Louis, were on the right of the river by Landshut, beyond the Isar. He concluded thence, that while marching forward and sharply pursuing the latter portion, it would be necessary to take great precautions with regard to the former, which would be always on his flank or on his rear. While guarding against whatever attempts it might make upon the safety of the army, he would have to move forward a mass sufficiently strong to overcome Hiller and Archduke Louis, and rapid enough to anticipate them at the several passages over the Danube, and thus hinder the two armies of the enemy from meeting before Vienna for its protection.

It was on the 28d, the day he entered Ratisbon, and on the 24th that Napoleon made all his arrangements. Previously, on the 22d, on quitting Landshut for Eckmühl, he had sent Marshal Bessières in pursuit of the two beaten corps of General Hiller and Archduke Louis, with such a force as insured him against any forcible return of the fugitives. On the 23d, during the cannonading of Ratisbon, he had directed that the line of the Danube should be so occupied as to prevent any junction between the archdukes, whether they attempted to pass from Bohemia into Bavaria or *vice versa*. To this end Napoleon ordered Massena to descend to Straubing with the Boudet, Legrand, Carra St. Cyr, and Claparède divisions. Thus two columns were to pursue the Austrians on the right of the Danube: that of Marshal Bessières, which had orders to march by the centre of Bavaria, and to press hard on Hiller and Archduke Louis at the passage of all the affluents of the Danube; and that of Marshal Massena, which was to move along the river, and occupy before the archdukes the important passages of Straubing, Passau, and Lintz, which formed the points of communication between Bavaria and Bohemia.

Having taken these precautions on his front and his right, Napoleon disposed of Marshal Davout's corps to guard his left and his rear against any possible attack by Archduke Charles. Napoleon gave back to Davout the fine Gudin and Morand divisions, which he had borrowed for the affair of Abensberg, and took from him the St. Hilaire division, which, with Oudinot's two divisions, was to form the corps of Marshal Lannes. The Friant, Morand, and Gudin divisions, habituated to serve with Marshal Davout since the camp of Boulogne, and which had always remained out of France since that period, formed a real family, under the eyes of a father of inflexible character but devoted to his children, and were a finished mo-

del of infantry suited for war on a grand scale. They never pillaged, and because they did not, they never wanted any thing; they never had a man behind, never retreated, and beat every enemy that came before them. With Montbrun's cavalry, they still counted, notwithstanding their losses, 29,000 or 30,000 men. Napoleon ordered Marshal Davout to quit Ratisbon on the 24th, march upon the tracks of Archduke Charles to the frontiers of Bohemia, try to know whether he had crossed them, and that being ascertained, return to the Danube, and march down along its right bank, while Montbrun, with his light cavalry, was moving parallel with him on the opposite side, constantly exploring the Böhmer Wald, a large chain of wooded mountains separating Bohemia from Bavaria. Marshal Davout then, after having fully informed himself respecting the movements of Archduke Charles, was to follow the general march of the army along the Danube, behind Marshal Massena, and to occupy Straubing when Massena marched on Passau, and Passau when he moved to Lintz. General Dupas, with a French division of 4000 or 5000 men, and the contingents of the minor princes, in all 10,000 men, had orders to repair immediately to Ratisbon, and replace Marshal Davout, whom he was to follow from thence, and replace successively at Straubing, Passau, and Lintz. Finally, Prince Bernadotte, with the Saxons, had orders to quit Dresden, which was not threatened by any enemy, cross the Upper Palatinate, and enter Ratisbon, to replace the Dupas division. In this way the Danube could not fail to be well guarded, since the two best corps in the army, those of Massena and Davout, escorted by two allied corps, were to follow its course; while through the centre of Bavaria, a strong advanced guard, under Marshal Bessières, was to press on the heel of Hiller and Archduke Louis. Napoleon resolved to march himself with the St. Hilaire and Demont divisions, the disposable half of Oudinot's corps, the guard which had just arrived, and the fourteen regiments of cuirassiers, and to escort Bessières by Landshut in order to support him if he met with any difficulty on the part of Hiller and Archduke Louis's corps, or to bear down upon the margin of the river if Archduke Charles attempted to recross it on our flank or our rear. To complete this series of precautions, Napoleon detached the Bavarians on his right with orders to occupy Munich, bring back their king thither, drive away the Jellachich division—which, as the reader remembers, had been detached from Hiller's corps—force it from Munich on Salzburg, and then enter the Tyrol, and replace it under the dominion of the house of Bavaria. This last measure, by replacing the Bavarians at home, had the advantage of clearing the march of the army on the Italian side, and guarding it from any attack by Archduke John. The troops marching along the riverside had orders to stop the boats, collect them on the right side, and form convoys of them, for the transport of stores, invalids, and recruits; to prepare ovens, flour, and biscuits at all points; and to put Straubing, Passau, and Lintz in a state of defence, so as to be able to guard the river with small forces, when the several *echelons* should have been passed.

Napoleon's next care was to procure the necessary reinforcements for the several corps, whether to repair their losses or to complete their proposed effective. In the recent engagements we had lost 12,000 or 15,000 men, a third of whom only were to reappear in the ranks, and the corps had entered into action before having received their full numbers. The old divisions had not received the conscripts due to them from the dépôts, and in the new corps, like Oudinot's, formed of fourth battalions, several of these battalions had only two, three, or four companies, instead of six. Lastly, the recruits coming from Italy, for the corps which had their dépôts in that country, had been stopped in the Tyrol, and had to be replaced with others. Napoleon gave orders that the necessary supplies of men should be promptly forwarded by the well-guarded route of Bavaria, and that the cavalry should receive the horses of which they stood in much need. Napoleon had just been joined by the grenadiers, chasseurs, fusiliers, and tirailleurs of his guard. He repeated his orders for the prompt organization of the four regiments of conscripts of that guard, and of the new detachment of artillery, which was to raise its pieces to the number of sixty. He wrote to the kings of Bavaria, Saxony, and Wurtemberg, announcing to them his brilliant successes, and appealing to their zeal for the recruiting of their forces. To his brothers, Jerome and Louis, he wrote to urge the mustering of their forces, in order to provide for the security of Germany against the insurrectionary movements which were breaking out on all sides. He gave orders that the King of Prussia should be required to explain himself as to the strange adventure of Major Schill; and in announcing his victories to M. de Caulaincourt, he sent him no letter for the Emperor Alexander, wishing to signify to that monarch, by such silence, what he thought of the sincerity of his co-operation. He, moreover, forbade our ambassador to listen to a single word as to the future fate of Austria, or as to the conditions of peace which might be the result of such rapid victories.

While his troops were advancing before him, Napoleon remained at Ratisbon, to despatch the numerous orders requisite for the conduct of such great operations, and the government of the empire, which he did not neglect, though absent. He stayed in Ratisbon from the evening of the 23d April until the 26th, when he went to Landshut, to rejoin the army and command it in person. Having met the guard and the cuirassiers on the way, he marched with those fine troops in the track of Bessières and Lannes, who were advancing, as we have said, by the centre of Bavaria, while, on the right, the Bavarians were skirting along the foot of the Tyrolese Alps, and on the left, Massena, Davout, Dupas, and Bernadotte were moving down the margin of the Danube one after the other.

During this time, the Austrian generals were adopting nearly the plan of retreat imputed to them by Napoleon. Archduke Charles, driven with about 24,000 men into the Upper Palatinate, had, in fact, no other course open to him than to retreat as fast as possible through Bohemia, recross the Danube at Linz or at Krems, form a junction there with Hiller and

Archduke Louis, and even, if possible, bring Archduke John to the same point through the insurgent Tyrol. General Hiller and Archduke, on their part, had nothing better to do than to contest the lines of the Inn, the Traun, and the Enns, confluent of the Danube, and thus delay Napoleon's march, and give Archdukes Charles and John time to rejoin them, and cover Vienna with all the forces of the monarchy. This was, in fact, the plan which Archduke Charles adopted and prescribed to his brothers, thereby completely justifying Napoleon's march along the Danube, since it placed him on the direct road to Vienna, between all the archdukes, so as to isolate them from each other, and anticipate them at all points of concentration.

Conformably to the plan fixed, Archduke Charles, on quitting Ratisbon, took up a position at Cham, at the entrance of the defiles of Bohemia. He established himself between the two roads from Furth and Roetz to Pilsen, having Rosenberg's corps on his left, Hohenzollern's on his right, Kollowrath's in the middle, John of Lichtenstein in the rear with the grenadiers and cuirassiers, and Bellegarde's corps detached to the convent of Schoenthal. The position at Cham was very strong, and was worth defending in case of a keen pursuit. Prince Charles waited there for the coming up of his *matériel* and for his laggards and missing men. Marshal Davout followed him thither by Nittenau, not with the intention of giving him battle, but with that of observing his march and ascertaining his projects. Wishing, however to maintain the ascendancy in arms, he drove in the advanced posts of the Austrians nearly to Cham, and assumed the attitude of an enemy ready to come to action. Whether it was that the archduke did not wish to run the risk of another battle, or that he thought he had waited long enough, he decamped, leaving Marshal Davout a great number of wagons, and many wounded, whom the latter made prisoners. His purpose being to retreat, it would have been better to have done so sooner; for having quitted the environs of Ratisbon on the morning of the 24th, and remained in position at Cham until the 26th, he lost two days out of four, whereas it was of the first importance to him to reach the bridge of Linz, by which he might form a junction with the corps of Hiller and the Archduke Louis. His march through Bohemia, by Pilsen, Budweis, and Linz, was a great round, while Napoleon went direct to the important point of Linz by an excellent road, and with the help of the river for the transport of his heaviest baggage. The Austrian commander would, therefore, have done well to make haste, even at the risk of leaving many of his men behind him, for it was better to arrive at Linz with diminished forces than not to arrive there at all.

Be this as it may, Archduke Charles retreated into Bohemia, determined to collect all the reinforcements he could by the way, and to regain the right bank of the Danube as soon as possible. Doubting, however, that he should be able to march fast enough, he sent forward General Klenau, with nine battalions, and General Stutterheim with some light troops, to go by the shortest routes and destroy the bridges

of Passau and Linz on the Danube, if they could not occupy them. Having taken these precautions, and unable to help yielding to discouragement at sight of a war that began so badly, he proposed to the Emperor of Austria to make a pacific overture to Napoleon, under pretext of an exchange of prisoners. The Emperor Francis, who had consented to war without being impelled to it by any decided conviction, and who saw how much his brother was already discouraged, did not refuse to take this pacific step, only he made it a condition that there should not be too much weakness manifested at the very opening of hostilities. Archduke Charles, in consequence, made General Gr  nn, the chief officer of his staff, write a letter, in which, after congratulating the Emperor Napoleon on his arrival at the French head-quarters—a fact, he modestly said, he had been enabled to discover by the turn of events—he proposed to him an exchange of prisoners to assuage the evils of war, and said how happy he should be if, from the commencement of hostilities, it were possible to give them a less harsh and violent character. He then continued his march through Bohemia, after having enjoined his brother John to pass into Bavaria, and his brother Louis and his lieutenant, Hiller, strongly to contest that country with the French, in order to give time to all the Austrian forces to effect their junction behind the Traun, in the environs of Linz.

As soon as he had seen Archduke Charles strike off into Bohemia, Marshal Davout turned back to Ratisbon, recrossed the river, and proceeded along its course on the right bank, following Marshal Massena to Passau, and being followed to Ratisbon by General Dupas.

Meanwhile, General Hiller and Archduke Louis, even before they had received orders to contest possession of the Bavarian territory step by step, had, of their own accord, resolved so to do; and believing that Napoleon was intent on pursuing Archduke Charles, they had determined to make an offensive movement against the advanced guard of Marshal Bessières, in order to effect a diversion in favour of the commander-in-chief. This resolution was honourable and judicious, for they might surprise Bessières before he was joined by the reinforcement which Napoleon was sending him, and while he was in that state of imprudent confidence which victory often inspires.

The two Austrian generals had still about 50,000 men, including the remains of Kienmayer's reserve and Jellachich's division. General Jellachich was at Munich, with orders to retire on Salzburg. Deprived of his co-operation, and joined by a regiment of Mitrowaki's and by some Stipocitz hussars, they had some 38,000 or 40,000 men. Marching against Marshal Bessières, who had barely 18,000 or 14,000, and who was advancing with extreme rashness, they might cut him to pieces. Accordingly, on the morning of the 24th, before Archduke Charles had finally effected his retreat into Bohemia, and while Marshal Bessières was advancing beyond the Isar, having Marulaz with his light cavalry at the head of his column, General Wrede's Bavarians in the centre, and Molitor's infantry in the rear, the two Austrian generals advanced with the intention of driving the vanguard of the French into the

marshes of the Roth near Neumarkt. They presented themselves in three columns, and first encountered the cavalry of General Marulaz, which charged them several times with great gallantry, but could make no impression on a body of 80,000 resolute men. The cavalry being worsted, General de Wrede had his turn, and had, with 6000 or 7000 foot, to resist more than 30,000. The Bavarians were not unworthy to cope with the Austrians, though they were inferior to them; but it was impossible for them to contend against the mass which assailed them in front and on their flanks. Their only retreat over the moist and woody country that borders on the little river Roth, was a weak and trembling wooden bridge, incapable of sustaining the heavy masses that traversed it with hurried steps. Behind was the town of Neumarkt, where Bessières was at table, while his advanced guard, driven back upon his centre, was in danger of being cut to pieces. Fortunately, General Molitor, an infantry officer formed in the school of the Rhine, and the first of the lieutenant-generals of that time, arrived with his division. He recognised the danger, and imparted it to Marshal Bessières, who, looking upon it as an affair of infantry, had the discreet modesty to leave it in the hands of General Molitor. The latter instantly crossed the bridge of the Roth with his four regiments, and perceiving on the left a wooded height whence the retreat might be protected, he hastened to occupy it with the 2d of the line, precipitating from the top to the bottom an Austrian troop that was posted on it. He then ranged the 16th and 37th regiments on the right, in an advantageous position for using their fire. At that moment the light cavalry was retreating with loss across the Roth, and General de Wrede was engaged with the enemy, who were intent on destroying one of his battalions. But suddenly the attitude of the Molitor division cooled the ardour of the Austrians. The rolling and well-aimed volleys of the 16th and 37th, and the strong position of the 2d, checked them, and they were forced to let the Bavarians repossess the Roth in quiet. The 16th and 37th regiments then defiled, protected by the 2d, which had a tremendous engagement with the Austrians. So obstinately bent on fighting was that brave regiment, that General Molitor had great difficulty in withdrawing it. Before recrossing the bridge it charged several times with the bayonet, and thus forced the Austrians to let it operate its retreat, which it effected last of all with an *aplomb* that extorted the admiration of the enemy themselves.

This affair cost the Bavarians some hundreds of men, and General Marulaz some horses. It might have been disastrous for the whole advanced guard but for Napoleon's forethought in affording Marshal Bessières the support of General Molitor. However, though checked on the banks of the Roth, General Hiller and Archduke Louis would not have renounced their offensive movement if they had not learned in the night the whole extent of the commander-in-chief's disasters, and his retreat into Bohemia, and if they had not recognised the necessity of themselves retreating, for Napoleon could not fail to fall soon upon them with irresistible masses. They resolved, therefore, to fall back

upon the Inn, and thence upon the Traun, which they hoped to defend better than the Inn, because they should have more time to strengthen their position on it; besides that, they had some chance of finding one of the archdukes there—either Charles or John.

Things were in this state when Napoleon came up with the guard and the cuirassiers, preceded by Lannes, with the troops of Generals St. Hilaire, Demont, and Oudinot. He sent Marshal Bessières forward, and gave the pursuit the force of a torrent which had burst its dykes. The whole mass, from right to left, marched on the Inn—the Bavarians, by Munich and Wasserburg, on Salzburg; Marshal Lannes, by Muhlendorf, on Burghausen; Marshal Bessières, by Neumarkt, on Braunau. Supporting this movement along the Danube, Marshal Massena entered Passau, which he took by a *coup de main* from the Austrians, who, no more than the Bavarians, had had the forethought to consolidate their position there.

On the 28th and 29th of April the French had arrived on all points at the line of the Inn, and were busy on every road in reconstructing the bridges which the Austrians had broken down or burnt to the water's edge whenever they had had time.

Napoleon having entered Burghausen on the 28th, was obliged to wait two days for the rebuilding of the bridge, which was of great importance, and which had been completely burned. Having received the pacific letter of the Archduke Charles, he sent it to M. de Champagny, who was at head-quarters, and desired him not to reply to it. Full of confidence in the result of the campaign—not foreseeing the difficulties he might subsequently encounter—he fancied he held in his hand the destiny of the house of Austria, and would not be stayed in his ambitious designs by any hasty impulse of generosity. He therefore enjoined silence—at all events for the moment—reserving it to himself to reply subsequently, according to circumstances.

Marshal Massena having entered Passau, and Marshal Davout following close after him, while the whole army was stationed upon the Inn from Braunau to Salzburg, it was necessary to march upon the Traun without delay. This was the line it was most essential to secure, for it corresponded to the *debouché* of Linz, by which Archduke Charles might join General Hiller and Archduke Louis. This line being preoccupied, there remained for the Austrian commander a second and last chance of a junction in front of Vienna, which was to reach in time the bridge of Krems, and occupy St. Polten to protect the capital. Napoleon resolved to deprive him at once of the first of these two chances, by eagerly pressing forward to Linz. Having reached the Inn with all his corps, and having rebuilt the bridges on the 30th of April, he commanded a general movement to be made on the 1st of May. He desired Massena to march rapidly from Passau upon Efferding, from Efferding upon Linz, and on arriving here to seize first upon the town of Linz, then upon the bridge over the Danube if it was not destroyed, and, Linz once occupied, to go straight to the river Traun, which flows two leagues below. The Traun, which is one of the most important lines the Austrians have to defend

when they want to arrest the progress of an army marching upon Vienna, flows, like the Ens, from the Northern Alps, and falls into the Danube a little below Linz. It flows along the foot of a plateau which extends as far as the Danube, and upon which an army could advantageously post itself to oppose the progress of an invasion. Hence the bridge over the Danube, that which served as a military communication between Bohemia and Upper Austria, was situated, not at Linz itself, but at Mauthausen, below the confluence of the Traun with the Danube. It was thus sheltered by the Traun and by the plateau of which we have above spoken, on the summit of which stood the town and castle of Ebersberg.

Massena then received orders on the 1st of May to pass quickly from Passau to Linz, from Linz to Ebersberg. But as the difficulty might be considerable if the 86,000 men yet remaining to the two Austrian generals took up their quarters at Ebersberg, Napoleon thought proper to approach the Traun at several points at the same time,—at Ebersberg, at Wels, and at Lambach. He consequently directed all his columns upon the Traun, so as to arrive there on the morning of the 3d of May. General de Wrede having with his division traversed Salzburg, and having been replaced there by the rest of the Bavarians, was to proceed by Straswalchen to Lambach, on the Traun. Marshal Lannes, with the troops of General Oudinot, St. Hilaire, and Demont, was to proceed to Wels, to cross the Traun there just above Ebersberg. Lastly, Marshal Bessières, with the guard, the cuirassiers, and light infantry, was either to cross at Wels, or to turn towards Ebersberg, if he heard such a cannonade as indicated a serious opposition in that direction. Major-general Berthier had orders to inform Massena that if the obstacles he encountered were too great, the passage of the Traun effected above him, either at Wels or Lambach, would afford him aid towards overcoming them. He was, however, enjoined in these new orders, as in the preceding ones, to neglect nothing that should bring about the speedy capture not only of the town of Linz and its bridge over the Danube, but also the bridge of Mauthausen, situated, as we have said, at the confluence of the Traun, under protection of the castle of Ebersberg.

Our columns advanced in the order indicated. They were all, on the 1st of May, beyond the Inn, after having rebuilt the bridges over it, Massena crossing from Passau to Efferding, Lannes and Bessières from Burghausen and Braunau upon Ried. They collected on their route a considerable number of carriages and about three thousand prisoners. Massena, who was marching with the Danube on his left, met all along his road with the rear-guard of General Hiller and Archduke Louis, and could discern on the other side of the river the troops of the Archduke Charles coming through the defiles of Bohemia to occupy or destroy the bridge of Linz. He felt, therefore, at every step the importance of anticipating the Austrian commander-in-chief either at Linz or at Ebersberg, not so much for the purpose of availing himself of those points of transit as in order to keep them from the enemy, and to prevent the union behind the Traun of all the forces of the Austrian monarchy.

On the evening of the 2d of May, Massena exchanged some musket-shots before Efferding with the rear-guard of General Hiller, took some prisoners, and prepared to march the next day upon Lintz. On the morning of the 3d he set out, preceded by the Marulaz light horse, and followed by the Claparède division of Oudinot's corps. He appeared before Lintz at the dawn of day. To enter, rout a few posts that hastily retreated, and take possession of the town, was but the work of a moment. The detachments of Klenau and Stutterheim, despatched by Archduke Charles to occupy the passage, had succeeded only in destroying the bridge of Lintz and bringing the boats to the left bank. Being in possession of Lintz, Massena was certain that the junction of the archdukes could not be effected by the bridge at that spot. But the bridge in reality the most favourable for the junction was that of Mauthausen, situated two leagues further down, and protected, as we have before said, by the Traun. As long as we were not masters of that, it was possible for the Archduke Charles to make use of it to unite with General Hiller and Archduke Louis; and it was uncertain whether the detachments seen beyond the Danube were the outposts of the great Austran army, or mere detachments without support. It was ten o'clock in the morning. Massena did not hesitate a moment; traversed Lintz at double-quick step, and advanced to the Traun opposite Ebersberg, a position which suddenly presented itself under a formidable aspect.

In front was the Traun, flowing from right to left to where it projected itself between wood-covered islands into the immense bed of the Danube. Over it was a bridge more than 400 yards long, and beyond it an escarped plateau; above which rose the little town of Ebersberg, and higher still the Castle of Ebersberg, bristling with artillery; and lastly, in front of the bridge and on the escarpment of the plateau, a mass of troops amounting probably to between 36,000 and 40,000 men. Such a sight would have made a serious impression on any but a man of Massena's temperament, and would have induced him to wait, especially if he made the very obvious reflection that a few leagues above Ebersberg many French columns were that day or the next to force their passage and turn the position. But this certainty did not do away with the possibility that, in the course of the day, the archdukes might effect a junction by the bridge of Mauthausen if it was left in their power. There was, then, a real advantage in taking it from them at once, by seizing upon the town and castle of Ebersberg. Besides, it is by the impulses of a man's temperament, still more than by his reason, that his decisions are shaped in war; and Massena, on meeting with the enemy, with whom he had not yet had an opportunity of having a hand-to-hand encounter, felt but one desire—that of throwing himself upon him and seizing a position considered decisive. From these motives he commanded an instantaneous attack.

In front of the bridge of Ebersberg, around the village of Klein Munchen, were stationed some Austrian sharpshooters and a few troops of light cavalry. General Marulaz charged and dispersed both. The horsemen recrossed the

bridge, the sharpshooters placed themselves in the gardens and houses of Klein Munchen. Claparède's first brigade, commanded by the intrepid Cohorn, marched behind the light cavalry of Marulaz. General Cohorn, of whom we have already had occasion to speak, was descended from the famous Dutch engineer of the same name, and carried within a puny body one of the most impetuous and energetic souls which God ever gave to a warrior. He was well fitted to execute the impetuous will of Massena. No sooner was he arrived at the spot, than he placed himself at the head of the voltigeurs of his brigade, attacked the village of Klein Munchen, seized first upon the gardens, then threw himself into the houses, killed or took prisoners all their occupants, pushed on beyond the villages, gained the entrance of the bridge, which was at least 400 yards long, loaded with fagots for burning, and riddled by the shots of the enemy. Any other than Cohorn would have halted and waited for orders from Massena; but the daring general, sword in hand, rushed foremost on the bridge, crossed it at double-quick step, killed or captured all who stood in his way, left, indeed, many of his own men dead or dying on the planks of the bridge, but finally cleared it, and led on his attacking columns against the plateau, which was covered with the masses of the Austrian infantry. Cohorn, under a shower of balls, climbed with the same impetuosity the steep ascent to Ebersberg, penetrated into the town, debouched on a large open space commanded by the castle, and at last compelled the Austrians to fall back upon the heights behind. Unfortunately, they retained possession of the castle, and poured from its walls a destructive fire upon the little town now become our prize.

During these series of daring deeds, Massena, who had remained at the foot of the position, took his measures to support Cohorn, who had hitherto had to do only with the advanced guard of the Austrians, but who would soon have to deal with their whole force. In order to oppose the formidable artillery of the plateau, he brought up the guns of the whole *corps d'armée*, and placed them as advantageously as possible. Our artillery officers, as skilful as intrepid, sought to compensate by the precision of their fire and the judicious planting of their guns for the disadvantage of their position. A fearful cannonade then took place from one side to the other of the Traun. This done, Massena despatched across the long defile of the bridge Claparède's two other brigades, those of Lesuire and Ficatier, ordering them to ascend the plateau and make their way into Ebersberg to the assistance of General Cohorn. Then he despatched a crowd of aides-de-camp in orders to hasten the arrival of the Legrand, Carra St. Cyr, and Boudet divisions, whose assistance was greatly needed in order to a happy issue out of this formidable encounter. He himself remained in the midst of flying balls and bullets, giving his orders and providing for every thing.

Lesuire and Ficatier, with their two brigades, arrived opportunely; for General Hiller, again marching forward, had attacked Cohorn with a considerable force, and had compelled him to re-enter Ebersberg, and afterwards to evacuate the great square. The French once more



took possession of it, drove off the Austrians, and endeavoured to seize the castle, which they approached without being able to enter. But the Austrians, who felt the importance of the post, returned in greater numbers, (which they could easily do, since they were 36,000 against 7000 or 8000,) bore down *en masse* upon the castle, from which they repelled the French, entered the town, passed through it, and once more emerged upon the great square. The brave Claparède, with his lieutenants, then sought refuge in the houses which surrounded it on three sides, established themselves there, and from the windows poured forth a shower of balls upon the enemy. The possession of these houses was furiously contested, the artillery of the castle firing upon the Austrians as well as upon the French. The unfortunate little town was set on fire by shells, and the conflagration soon became so great that it was almost impossible to breathe.

This frightful massacre continued, and fury having equalled the courage of the combatants of either side, victory seemed on the point of being decided by superior number. The French were about to be driven into the Traun and punished for their audacity, when fortunately the Legrand division came in sight, led on by its intrepid general. At the head of his two veteran regiments, the 26th light infantry and the 18th of the line, he reached the bridge, encumbered with dead and wounded. To cross it, a heap of corpses, some perhaps of the wounded still breathing, had to be thrown into the Traun. At length it was traversed, and beyond it fresh impediments were encountered, in the shape of combatants driven back in confusion, and wounded men being carried off. An officer was endeavouring to explain the position to General Legrand, when the latter cut him short, saying, "I do not want advice, but room for my men." Room was made, and he advanced with one of his regiments to the right to outflank the Austrians, who had surrounded Ebersberg; another to the centre, through the main street of the town. While several of his battalions, formed into attacking columns, repelled the Austrians who surrounded the town, the others passed through the middle of it, and succeeded in debouching upon the great square, cleared it at the point of the bayonet, and thus rescued Claparède, who was reduced to the last extremity. Legrand then attacked the castle under a murderous fire. The gates being barred, he forced them open with the axe, penetrated into the castle, and killed all within it. From that moment Ebersberg was ours, but it was only a heap of smoking ruins, from which arose an intolerable stench of burning corpses. Our men hastened to leave behind them a spot as frightful to behold as it was hard to win, and marched against the Austrians, who were drawn up in order of battle upon a line of hills in the background, and who, perceiving afar off on the plain between Lintz and Ebersberg, the approach of the long files belonging to the division of Carra St. Cyr and Boudet; perceiving, besides, to their right, a mass of French cavalry, who had crossed the Traun at Wels, thought it not prudent to prolong the furious contest, and then retired, thus abandoning to us the confluence of the Traun and the important pass of Mauthausen. But the

bridge had disappeared at that place as well as at Lintz, the outposts of Archduke Charles having destroyed it and sent the boats to Krems.

The cavalry which had been perceived was a thousand horse, which Lannes, after having passed the Traun without difficulty, had despatched under General Durosnel to turn the position of the Austrians. It is certain, then, that if Massena had been able to guess that Archduke Charles would not be at Mauthausen with his army, and that passages already effected a little higher up would have supplied means for compelling the surrender of Ebersberg, he ought to have spared the blood shed in this terrible attack. The field of carnage was hideous, and the town of Ebersberg was so much in flames that the wounded could not be withdrawn. To prevent the fire from reaching the bridge, it had been necessary to cut off the approach at either end, so that the communication was interrupted for several hours between the troops who had already crossed and those coming to their aid. This conflict cost us 1700 killed, drowned, burned, or wounded. The Austrians lost 3000 put *hors de combat*, 4000 prisoners, and many flags and cannon, and went away appalled at so much daring. We had, therefore, much to compensate for our losses on this terrible day, and its effect was great, no less morally than physically.

Napoleon had galloped up on hearing this loud cannonade. Though well inured to the horrors of war, all his senses were shocked at that abominable spectacle, which was not sufficiently justified by necessity; and but for the admiration he felt for Massena's warlike genius, and the value he always set on energy, he would perhaps have expressed blame for what had occurred. He did nothing of the kind, however, but would not remain in Ebersberg, and took up his quarters outside it, among his guard.

The Archduke Charles, in spite of his settled purpose to come to a junction with his brothers behind the Traun, by Lintz or Mauthausen, had neither marched quickly enough nor had sufficiently calculated his movements to arrive at Lintz in serviceable time. He had only reached Budweis, in Bohemia, when Massena was so impetuously advancing beyond Lintz and Ebersberg, and the only crossing-place left open to him was that of Krems. General Hiller and the Archduke Louis were proceeding thither by Enns, Amstetten, and St. Polten, destroying in their progress all the bridges on the rivers which flow from the Noric Alps to the Danube. As to the Archduke John, it was still less likely that he could arrive soon enough, or that he should even venture into the Alps, leaving Prince Eugene on his left, and exposing himself on his right to the risk of encountering the army of Napoleon, into which he would have fallen as into an abyss. He was, therefore, not to be reckoned on. But it would be enough to create some favourable chance were Archduke Charles to combine, through Krems, with General Hiller and Archduke Louis, who were retreating along the Danube; for after having employed considerable time in collecting stragglers, assembling the landwehr, and incorporating the third battalions of the Gallician regiments, he had with him more than 80,000 men,

and could, united with his two lieutenants, who possessed at least 80,000, bring 110,000 fighting-men into the field at St. Polten. It would then be possible to dispute the victory with Napoleon; and if it were gained, the French empire, instead of being overthrown in 1814, would have been destroyed in 1809.

Napoleon, delighted at having taken from the archdukes their principal chances of a junction, by occupying Lintz and Mautausen, hastened to march upon Krems, to take from them their last resource, and to reach Vienna before any obstacle could prevent his entry.

After the Traun, our forces came upon the Ens, which runs parallel with that river, washing in its course the other side of the plateau which had just been crossed. But all the bridges were completely destroyed upon the Ens, and not less than four-and-twenty or forty-eight hours were required to rebuild them. This was an unfortunate circumstance, but perfectly inevitable. Although on the morning of the 4th of May, Lannes was at Steyer, upon the Ens, with the Demont and St. Hilaire divisions, and Bessières occupied the town of the Enns with the light infantry, Oudinot's corps, and one of Massena's divisions, they were compelled to wait the whole day of the 5th for the reconstruction of the bridges, which had been burned down to the water's edge. It was not until the morning of the 6th that they were able to cross the Ens and march on Amstetten. Bessières, with the cavalry and Oudinot's infantry, passed first, soon followed by Massena and by Lannes, who joined the principal column, since only one road remained from that point for the army between the foot of the Alps and the Danube. In the evening they entered Amstetten without firing a shot.

Next day the army continued its march to Mölk, a fine position on the Danube, crowned by the magnificent abbey of the same name, where Napoleon established his head-quarters. There remained only one day's march to reach Krems, where stands the bridge of Mautern, the last by which Archduke Charles could effect a junction with General Hiller and Archduke Louis. There was already a certainty of reaching it without impediment, for no indications could be seen of the presence of a great army. On the 8th, our advanced guard moved to St. Polten, an important and well-known position of the flanks of the Kahlenberg, which is an offset of the Alps extending to the Danube, and behind which is situated Vienna. There it was that the great muster of the Austrians should have taken place if the archdukes had had time to come together, for at St. Polten, protected by an excellent military position, are found the point of junction of the roads to Bohemia, Italy, Upper and Lower Austria, and the pass leading to Vienna through the gorges of the Kahlenberg. But the only force seen was rear-guards in retreat, some on our left, falling back towards the bridge at Krems to shelter themselves behind the Danube, others in front of us, falling back through the Kahlenberg on Vienna. It was evident then that there was no great battle to be fought in front of the capital, and the only difficulties remaining to be encountered were those of an assault on Vienna, if it was defended. These difficulties might, indeed, become very embarrassing, if Archduke Charles

arrived in sight of Vienna before us by the left bank of the Danube, crossed the river by the Thabor bridge, and offered us battle under the walls of that great city. Fortunately, what had occurred gave little reason to fear this.

In fact, Archduke Charles, having lost at least two days at Cham, and some others again on the road from Cham to Budweis, for the sake of rallying and reinforcing his army, had not reached Budweis until the morning of the 3d of May, just when Massena was taking Ebersberg. In the vain hope of a junction at Lintz, for which, however, there was very little warrant, he had advanced from Budweis to Frey-stadt, near the Danube, instead of marching straightway on Krems, which would have spared him a fresh detour, and a fresh loss of time. On approaching the Danube, he had become aware of the occupation of Lintz and the Traun, and the consequent impossibility of effecting the desired junction in that direction. He had therefore resumed the route through the interior of Bohemia by Zwoelzel, still cherishing the false hope of reaching Krems and St. Polten before us. In case, however, of his not arriving there, he had authorized the two generals who had the defence of the right bank of the river to pass over to the left, should they find themselves too hardly pressed upon; only they were to detach to Vienna the forces requisite for securing the capital from a *coup de main*. These instructions they had carried into effect on arriving at St. Polten. Fearing that they should be attacked by superior forces before reaching Vienna, and suffer a fresh defeat, as at Ebersberg, they had recrossed the Danube, as in 1805, by the bridge at Krems, destroyed that bridge, removed all the boats to the left bank, and sent a strong detachment by the direct road to Vienna.

Such had been the proceedings of the Austrian generals, which the mere aspect of things sufficed to reveal, for, as we have said, on the left were seen large bodies of troops passing the Danube at Krems, and in front were columns moving towards Vienna through the gorges of the Kahlenberg. Bent on arriving forthwith at the Austrian capital, Napoleon issued orders to the following effect from his head-quarters at the abbey of Mölk.

Marshal Lannes was to march to Vienna on the 9th of May, with the infantry of Generals Oudinot and Demont. Marshal Massena was to follow them immediately, while the bulk of the cavalry was to line the bank of the Danube, in order to baffle any attempt of the enemy to cross it. The light cavalry was distributed between Mautern, Tulln, and Klosterneuburg, along the windings of the river round the foot of the Kahlenberg. The cuirassiers were cantoned in the rear between St. Polten and Siegardskirchen. These precautions taken on our left, General Bruyère, on our right, was, with his light cavalry and a thousand German infantry, to go up the road to Italy by Lilienfeld, to disarm the mountains of Styria and watch the operations of the Archduke John. Napoleon followed Lannes and Massena with the guard and a part of the cuirassiers. Marshal Davout, already arrived from Passau at Lintz, was ordered to proceed from Lintz to Mölk, from Mölk to St. Polten, so as to resist any attempts that might be made to cross the river at Krems in our rear,

or else to march upon Vienna, if a general battle were to be fought under the walls of that capital. Nevertheless, as Passau and Lintz were nearly equal in importance to Krems, General Dupas was to remain at the former, awaiting the arrival of Marshal Bernadotte; and General Van Lamme, with the troops of Wurtemberg, was charged with the defence of Lintz. Napoleon at the same time took the utmost precautions to secure the arrival of his convoys by the Danube. All along the shore we occupied, he provided for them ports for repose, where they might shelter themselves and receive intelligence. These convoys, composed of boats collected on the Danube and its tributaries, were laden with biscuits, stores, and fatigued men. Besides Passau and Lintz, points already occupied, Napoleon fortified Ips, Waldsee, Mölk, and Mautern. Thence his convoys were to take the land route by St. Polten, since that was the shortest and the only safe one, for beyond that point the Danube ran too near the Austrians and too far from the French. Lastly, not judging it enough for his protection to forbid the passage of the river, but believing, on the contrary, that the best means of securing his rear was to have the means of passing the Danube so as to occasion the enemy the same apprehension as we felt for ourselves, and thus compel him to divide his forces, Napoleon ordered the construction of two bridges of boats, one at Lintz, the other at Krems, with whatever materials could be found.

Having relieved himself of these cares, on the 9th Napoleon gave the word to march upon Vienna by way of Siegardekirchen and Schönbrunn. Lannes and Bessières advanced in the foremost line, Massena second, the guard and the cuirassiers third. Marshal Davout brought up the rear, leaving behind the posts we have mentioned to the left on the Danube, and to the right on the roads to Italy.

On the evening of the 9th, General Oudinot halted at Siegardekirchen. At dawn on the 10th, the Conroux brigade belonging to his corps debouched by the Schönbrunn road before the suburb of Maria Hilf, just a month after the commencement of hostilities. This offensive march, at once so skilful and so rapid, was worthy of comparison to that upon the same field in 1805, and to that across Prussia in 1811. Nothing in history was superior to it. It was now ten o'clock, and Napoleon rode up to direct in person the operations against the capital of Austria, which he desired to take forthwith, but to take without destroying it. Here, as at Madrid, he had a thousand motives for procuring the opening of the gates by other means than by fire and sword.

The Archduke Charles had lost time in useless manœuvres, and was not at hand on the morning of the 10th to relieve Vienna. Nevertheless, that capital was capable of defence. We have already described it and its fortifications, and shall now only recapitulate some principal points of that description. The centre of Vienna, that is to say the old city, is encircled by a fine regular line of fortifications, which in 1683 resisted the assault of the Turkish arms. Since that period, the unremitting increase of population had called into existence several magnificent suburbs, each no less extensive than the ancient town. These were protected

by a terraced wall of no great height, zigzag, without advanced works, yet equal to resist an attack of several days. Lastly, there was at Vienna what Napoleon had always considered the most potent means of defence—prodigious quantities of wood, supplied by the Alps and the Danube. The Viennese could therefore intrench themselves, and, among a people violently animated as they were against their enemy, there would be no lack of workmen. The arsenal of Vienna contained 500 pieces of artillery. Hungary could contribute immense supplies of provisions, and, thanks to this combination of means, it was possible to prolong the defence until the archdukes arrived with reinforcements. It is inconceivable, therefore, why the Austrians, having to do with Napoleon—that renowned conqueror of capitals—had not thought of putting Vienna in a state of defence.

Much has been said of the faults committed by the Archduke Charles in the course of this campaign. That of having neglected to put Vienna in a state of defence was certainly the most serious. General Hiller and the Archduke Louis, shut up in the heart of this capital, behind all the fortifications which might have been repaired or erected, would have rendered it impregnable. The armies of Italy and Bohemia, afterwards assembled under its walls, would not have been easy to subdue. To gain a great victory over Napoleon in the open field would certainly have been a rash hope, especially if that decisive action was to be come at by means of bold and skilful manœuvres: but to accept a decisive battle at the head of the whole imperial army of Austria, and under the walls of the capital, would have been to prepare for Napoleon the only check which could then have endangered his triumphant fortunes.

Instead of that, no preparations for defence had been made at Vienna; whether from negligence, from reluctance to adopt such precautions, or fear of converting the capital into a field of battle, they had not thought of protecting the suburbs by means of the terraced wall which hemmed them round, and were contented with mounting guns on the ramparts of the old central fortress, which could make no use of them without firing on the suburbs. The only additional defenders provided were some of the mob, who had muskets put into their hands, and who only increased the garrison by some 2000 or 3000 brawlers. The garrison itself was commanded by Archduke Maximilian, and consisted of some battalions of landwehr, some dépôts, and a detachment of Hiller's corps—altogether 11,000 or 12,000 men. Their ardent but inexperienced young commandant had not studied the strong or the weak points of the important post he had to defend, and all his patriotism was exhaled in proclamations as violent as they were idle.

No sooner had Colbert's infantry and the cavy under General Conroux (Tharreau division) appeared at the entrance of the Maria Hilf faubourg, which was closed by an iron gate, than a sort of popular tumult broke out in the adjacent streets. The populace had been deceived with assurances that the French were beaten, the archduke was victorious, and his prolonged stay in Bohemia was only part of a system of skilful manœuvres; that no doubt Napoleon might detach a division to Vienna to

menace the capita', but that any such attempt would be speedily punished by the return of the victorious archduke; and that therefore, if any demonstration of the kind was made, the Viennese should resist it as a mere insolent bravado on the part of the enemy. Accordingly, the populace took to running about the streets with yells of rage, more alarming to the peaceable inhabitants than to the invaders. The houses and the shops were immediately shut. A flag of truce having been sent to head-quarters, the bearer of it was assailed and wounded. His horse was taken, and employed in bearing about in triumph a butcher's boy who had committed this violation of the law of nations. During this time, General Tharreau's column had halted before the gate of the faubourg, waiting for it to be opened. Suddenly, a French officer, Captain Roidot, climbed over the gate, and, sword in hand, compelled the keeper to give up the keys. Our columns then entered, the cavalry at a gallop, the infantry at double quick-step, driving the garrison back on the old central town. No sooner had they reached the esplanade that lies between the faubourgs and the ramparts of the old city, than the guns on the latter discharged volleys of grape, that wounded some of our men, and among them General Tharreau. The French invested the place on all points, summoned it to surrender, and received in reply a discharge of cannon-balls, that only did mischief to the handsome houses of the faubourgs.

Seeing, after all, that however vigorously the attack was prosecuted, the affair could not be terminated in one day, Napoleon went and took up his quarters at Schönbrunn, to wait for the coming up of the main body of his army. He nominated as governor of Vienna General Andréossy, who had been his ambassador to Austria, and both knew that capital and was known to its inhabitants. Napoleon meant to show by this appointment that it was not his intention to have recourse to harsh measures, for he would not have selected for their instrument a man who had lived several years among the Viennese. He also issued a proclamation, reminding the inhabitants of the excellent conduct of the French army in 1805, and promising them as good treatment, if they behaved towards the French in a manner to deserve it.

General Andréossy immediately proceeded to the faubourgs, and in each of them organized municipalities composed of the principal inhabitants, formed a burgher guard for the maintenance of order, and endeavoured to establish communications with the old town, with a view to put an end to a defence which could only be disastrous to the Viennese themselves. The fire having continued and caused some damage, the faubourgs proposed to send a deputation to Archduke Maximilian to call for a cessation of his imprudent resistance. Before proceeding on its mission, the deputation waited on Napoleon, to hear from his own lips what words of promise they were to convey to the inhabitants of the fortified town. It then entered the interior of Vienna on the morning of the 11th of May. The reply to this conciliatory overture was a fresh cannonade. Napoleon's patience was now exhausted, and he resolved to employ fire and sword, but in a way as much as possible to spare the unfortunate faubourgs the con-

sequences of a combat which was about to take place between the old and the new town.

Our troops had arrived by Siegardskirchen and Schonbrunn before the faubourg of Maria Hilf. Napoleon rode round the southern portion of the fortifications with Massena, in search of another point to assail, and found one to the east, at the spot where they join the Danube. There a secondary branch, detached from the great arm of the river, flows along the walls, supplying the ditches, and dividing the old city from the celebrated promenade of the Prater. Batteries erected in that quarter against the fortified town would be answered with a fire that would tell only upon very thinly scattered dwellings and on the islands of the river. Besides, by crossing that arm the assailants would get possession of the Prater, and by going up a little to the north-east they would cut off Vienna from the great Thabor bridge, which leads to the left bank. In this way the city would be severed from all outward aid; Archduke Charles would lose all possible chance of entering it, and its defenders, especially Archduke Maximilian, the courage to shut themselves up in, for they would be sure of being taken to the last man within forty-eight hours.

Napoleon immediately ordered some swimmers of the Boudet division to plunge into the branch of the Danube which was to be crossed, and fetch some boats from the left bank. They did so under the command of General Boudet's brave aide-de-camp, Sigaldi, and brought back, under fire of the enemy's advanced posts, boats enough to enable two companies of voltigeurs to cross to the opposite bank. They took the small building in the Prater called the Lusthaus, which might serve as an intrenched post, and made it the *tête de pont* of the bridge that was speedily formed with boats collected in the neighbourhood. At the same time, Napoleon had fifteen pieces of artillery planted on the bank we occupied, which battered the opposite one, and enfiladed the avenue leading up to the Lusthaus. By this means the two companies of voltigeurs could be supported until the completion of the bridge enabled more numerous forces to join them. A battery of twenty howitzers was at the same time set up at the extremity of the faubourg of Landstrass, near the branch of the river which had just been crossed.

At nine in the evening, after a fresh summons to surrender, and while the operation of crossing the water was still in progress, a destructive fire was opened on the fortified town. In some hours 1800 shells were discharged upon it. The streets are narrow, the houses lofty, the population densely accumulated, as in all fortified enclosures in which space is wanting, and conflagrations soon broke out in all quarters. The populace vociferated in the streets, and the opulent classes, distracted between their dread of the mob and of the foreigners, knew not what to desire. To hinder the French from crossing the small arm of the Danube, two battalions of Austrian grenadiers were sent by night to the Lusthaus, to seize that *point d'appui* for the bridge made by our men. But Boudet's voltigeurs were on their guard. Posted in the Lusthaus, under cover of felled timber, they received the two battalions with volleys of musketry at point-blank distance, while our

artillery poured grape on their flank and put them to the route. They retreated to the upper part of the Prater.

From that moment the passage of the river branch and the investiture of Vienna were insured. Archduke Maximilian, frightened at the prospect of being made a prisoner, quitted the capital on the morning of the 12th, taking with him the best part of the garrison, leaving to General O'Reilly, his second in command, only a handful of indifferent troops and some of the armed populace. After having crossed the Danube, he broke down the Thabor bridge. General O'Reilly had but one course to pursue, if he would not have the city burned to no purpose—that was to capitulate. On the morning of the 12th he asked for a suspension of the firing, which was granted, and he signed a capitulation, which guaranteed for person and property a respect which Napoleon piqued himself on observing, and from which he would not have deviated, even though the town had made no conditions. On the following day, May 13, the French entered Vienna.

Thus, in thirty-three days, Napoleon, surprised by sudden hostilities, had with one stroke of his trenchant sword cut in two the mass of the Austrian armies at Ratisbon, and, with a second, burst open the gates of Vienna. He was now established in that capital, and master of the main resources of the monarchy; but his work was far from being yet done, either in Austria or in Germany. A great difficulty remained to be overcome—one of the greatest that can be encountered in war—namely, to cross a vast river in the face of the enemy, and to give battle with that river behind him. This difficulty Napoleon had been unable to prevent, and it resulted inevitably from the nature of things. On leaving Ratisbon, he had been obliged to take the route which was shortest, which kept the archdukes separated from each other, and put himself in a position to succour Prince Eugene, in case of fresh disasters in Italy. He was consequently obliged to march along the right bank of the Danube, abandoning the left bank to the Austrians, but securing to himself exclusively the means of crossing from the one to the other.

Having now arrived at Vienna, he was about to have the Archduke Charles before him, reinforced by the remains of Hiller and Archduke Louis's *corps d'armées*, but weakened by the necessity of leaving forces in his rear; yet able, nevertheless, to bring 100,000 men into action whenever the French should cross the Danube against him. In 1805, after the events of Ulm, the Austrians arrived at Vienna with only the wreck of their force, and they had the Russian grand army at Olmutz. Under those circumstances it was natural that they should go to a distance of forty leagues from their capital to join the Russians, and try the fortune of war at Austerlitz. But on the present occasion, having the bulk of their forces opposite Vienna, and no aid to look for at a distance, they had but one course to pursue; namely, to force Napoleon to violate the laws of war, by crossing the river before them and giving battle with that river at his back. It was now not at Austerlitz; it was there, opposite Vienna, on the left bank of the Danube, between Essling, Aspern, and Wagram, names of immortal re-

noun, that the fate of one of the greatest wars of modern times was to be decided. We shall see by-and-by what efforts Napoleon made to conquer the difficulties of this gigantic operation; for the laws to be violated had been laid down in times when belligerents had to cross rivers 200 or 300 yards wide with armies of 30,000 or 40,000 men. But the problem now to be solved related to a river 1000 yards wide, and to an army of 150,000 men, crossing with 500 or 600 guns, in the teeth of an equal force. But the genius that had conquered the Alps could conquer the Danube too, wide and impetuous though it was. Many important matters, however, were to be attended to before such an operation could be attempted.

Napoleon had to establish himself firmly in Vienna, in such a manner as to avail himself of the great resources of that capital, to have no uneasiness as to his means of communication, and to cause both the belligerent armies in Italy to approach Vienna; securing the junction of the one with himself and hindering that of the other with Archduke Charles. This was a difficult problem, and it was admirably solved.

Napoleon had entered Vienna with the troops of Generals St. Hilaire, Demont, and Oudinot, under Marshal Lannes; the Boudet, Carra St. Cyr, Molitor, and Legrand divisions, under Massena; the guard, and the cavalry reserve. Being obliged to make head against the enemy, whether before Vienna, when in the act of passing the Danube, or higher up, at Krems, for instance, should the archduke present himself there for the purpose of assailing our rear, he so stationed Davout's corps that in one day it could be moved wholly either to Krems or Vienna. With this view he made St. Polten its head-quarters, where two divisions were to be concentrated, while the third was spread from Mautern to Mülk. In this way, by mustering towards one or other of these places on the Danube, Marshal Davout's 30,000 men might resist any attempt to force the passage of the river, and give time, if necessary, for the army to come down from Vienna on the threatened point. They might, likewise, by marching to Vienna in one day, raise the main army to at least 90,000 men; a force sufficient for a decisive battle with Archduke Charles.

It was possible, however, that the danger should present itself farther in the rear; at Linz or even at Passau. Though this was less probable on account of the distance, Napoleon left General Vandamme at Linz with 10,000 Wurtembergers, and with instructions to reconstruct the bridge at that town, form *êtes de pont*, and make continual reconnaissances in Bohemia. He, moreover, stationed Marshal Bernadotte, just arrived with the Saxon, at the important point of Passau. Though created prince of Ponte Corvo on the ground of his relationship to the Emperor, (he had married a sister of the queen of Spain,) Bernadotte was a discontented man; he thought his station at the head of the Saxons unworthy of him, and sent in extremely unfavourable and even unjust reports of those troops; for though they were not equal to French troops, and though they experienced the feelings that were already moving in the hearts of all Germans, it was not the less true that they were capable of standing their ground against the Austrians, and doing their

uty as well as the Bavarians and Wurtembergers. With some Frenchmen to support them and set them an example, they might have almost equalled their instructors themselves. So, to satisfy Prince Bernadotte, whose complaints annoyed him, Napoleon made two parts of the Dupas division, and leaving the German troops of the minor princes at Ratisbon under General Rouyer, he sent the French brigade to Passau under General Dupas. Bernadotte had therefore at that point 4000 French and 15,000 to 16,000 Saxons, making together an excellent corps of about 20,000 men. Thus, with 6000 Germans at Ratisbon, 20,000 Saxons and French at Passau, 10,000 Wurtembergers at Lintz, and 80,000 French veterans at St. Polten, Napoleon was guarded in an infallible manner on his rear, while at the same time he retained the means of giving battle in front of him.

It was not, however, his intention always to employ so many troops in guarding his communications, and he proposed, when the Bavarians should have subdued the Tyrol, and when the Austrians should have evacuated Italy, to bring still more forces to the decisive point, namely, Vienna. To this end he gave orders for immense works, such as might be defended for several successive days by very small bodies of men with much artillery, to be constructed at Ratisbon, Passau, Lintz, Mlk, and the abbey of Gottweit near Mautern. At Ratisbon there was little to be done, since there was a stone bridge there, and it was only requisite to put the town wall in a better state of defence. But at Passau, situated at the confluence of the Inn and the Danube, he ordered very important works, which were to be the commencement of those which he intended subsequently to require of Bavaria, in order that she might have a fortress of the first class in that place against Austria. He decided that bridges should be built there over the Danube and the Inn, with a *le de pont* on each river, with an intrenched camp for 80,000 men, ovens for 100,000 rations a day, a considerable store of victuals and ammunition, and very spacious hospitals. The object of these precautions at Passau, was to procure, in case of a retrograde movement, a strong *point d'appui* for the army behind the two lines of the Danube and the Inn; for this captain, who in politics had the imprudence never to admit a supposition of adverse fortune, always supposed it in war, and took admirable precautions against it. At Lintz, another point of transit from Bohemia, he also ordered a bridge with a double *le de pont*, ovens, stores, and hospitals. At the fine abbey of Mlk, which was not one of the issues from Bohemia, but which advantageously commanded the Danube and contained vast buildings, he gave orders to construct with wood and earth-work a small fort mounting sixteen guns, and which might very well be defended by 1200 men. It was also to contain a hospital for several thousand invalids. A similar post was to be erected at the abbey of Gottweit, opposite Krems, on an elevated position, whence might be descried every thing that presented itself within a range of several leagues on both banks of the Danube. Lastly, at Krems a bridge was to be established by means of boats collected along the river, with a double *le de*

*pont*, so that the passage might be closed against the enemy while it was kept free for our own use. In this way, Napoleon had all the approaches to the Danube guarded, both defensively and offensively, and in such a manner that the enemy could be kept in continual alarm. Moreover, in case of retreat, there was a series of *echelons* on a road dotted with magazines and hospitals to which the sick and wounded might be sent on in advance. Lastly, there was a series of ports for the convoys by water, and a body of works on the line of communication, which might be defended by small numbers of men, so as to provide for the possibility of a rapid concentration upon occasion of a great battle. So much can the vigilance of genius accomplish towards assuring the most difficult and delicate operations.

Precautions were also requisite to the right in the mountains against the agitation which was spreading from the Tyrol to Styria. Napoleon had ordered Marshal Lefebvre to put down the insurrection in Tyrol with 24,000 Bavarians, after having left 6000 in Munich. That work done, the Bavarians were to proceed to Passau to replace the Saxons, who might then move to Vienna. Nearer to him in Styria, Napoleon had already sent out General Bruyère with a thousand horse on the Italian road by Lilienfeld. He directed his aide-de-camp, Laureston, to observe that route, giving him for that purpose, besides General Bruyère's thousand horse, 2000 or 3000 Badense infantry, good soldiers, who as they spoke German, might soothe the people of the country as well as intimidate them, and quiet them with promises of good treatment. General Laureston was to advance as far as Mariazell and return to Vienna by Neustadt.

Another advantage of this movement was that of reconnoitring the Italian roads by which Archduke John was to be expected soon. That prince, not having joined Archduke Charles either at Lintz or at Krems, could only meet him in the vicinity of Vienna, marching thither through Carinthia, Styria, and Hungary by Klagenfurth, Grtz, at Gdenburg. Napoleon had two things to do with respect to him: the first was to hinder him from falling suddenly on Vienna by the Leoben and Neustadt road; the second was to constrain him to make the widest possible detour to join Archduke Charles; to oblige him, for instance, to pass by Gns, Raab, and Komorn, rather than by Gdenburg and Presburg, for the longer the road he took, the more chances Napoleon would have of rallying his Italian army to him, and of hindering Archduke Charles from rallying his, on the day of the decisive battle. It was by skilfully extending his posts around him by means of his numerous cavalry that Napoleon attained this twofold end.

Thus, while General Lauriston was to come by Mariazell and establish himself at Neustadt, on the direct road to Italy, General Montrun was taken from Marshal Davout, who had no longer need of him, and placed in *reconnaissance* with two brigades of light cavalry at Bruck, several marches beyond Neustadt, on the same road. General Colbert, with the troops of the same arm, was cantoned from Neustadt to Gdenburg, and General Marulaz along the Danube to Presburg and below it, both having

orders to be always in *reconnaissance* round the lake of Neusiedel, in the direction of Hungary. Behind them the heavy cavalry was cantoned from Hamburg to Baden, with orders to support them at need. In consequence of this well-stretched net, nothing could appear of which immediate warning would not be given, and at the same time the archduke was forced to describe a very wide circle and to strike the Danube at Komorn rather than at Presburg, which diminished his chances of co-operating at the great battle to be fought under the walls of Vienna.

While Napoleon was making every arrangement for insuring victory in that battle, his armies in Italy and Poland were, like him, occupied in marching and fighting. The Austrians, who had arrived so full of spirit, though so slowly, at the Adige, had halted before that line, not daring to attack it, first on account of its natural strength, then on account of the army of Italy, which had been reorganized and reinforced, and lastly on account of the uncertainty which prevailed at that period respecting the events in Germany. It was quite natural, that before attempting an extremely hazardous operation beyond the Adige, Archduke John should desire to know whether or not his brother, the commander-in-chief, had been successful on the Danube. Prince Eugene, advised by General Macdonald, had made use of this delay to familiarize with the sight of the enemy, not his soldiers, who had no need of this, but himself and his lieutenants, intimidated by the defeat of Sacile. To this end he had made frequent *reconnaissances* on the Upper Adige, which had often turned into real battles. In one of these *reconnaissances*, on the 1st of May, General Macdonald perceived on the horizon a vast number of wagons, apparently retrograding towards Friuli. At that time nothing was yet known at Prince Eugene's head-quarters about the events at Ratisbon, and uneasiness was felt for Germany as well as for Italy. But General Macdonald, concluding that such a movement could only be attributed to defeats sustained by the Austrians in Bavaria, galloped up to Prince Eugene, and, grasping his hand, cried out, "Victory in Germany; the time is come to march!" The prince returned the pressure of the general's hand with joy. Both galloped to the advanced post, saw with their own eyes, and soon learned by all the reports that the Austrians were retreating. Thus did Napoleon's potent impulse make itself felt at a distance. His victorious march in Bavaria obliged Archduke John to wheel round and retrace his steps to Friuli. The Austrian prince would willingly have crossed the Alps to aid his brothers on the Danube, but durst not, for though he might possibly have taken Napoleon in flank, which would have been a great advantage in case of the convergence of all the archdukes to the same point, he also ran the risk of falling alone into his hands and being stifled in his grasp. Under these circumstances, Archduke John made haste to retreat, with the intention at most of appearing in time under the walls of Vienna, and more probable with that of joining his brother below that capital, by way of Styria and Hungary. Be that as it may, the Austrian army began its retreat on the 1st of May, and was

immediately pursued by Prince Eugene. The spirits of the French rose as that of the Austrians fell. The latter, having now no other object than to evacuate the country, but languidly contested the ground, while the French attacked with the vivacity of men who had to avenge former defeats. Every evening many prisoners and quantities of baggage were brought into the lines of the French, while none were brought into those of the Austrians.

Prince Eugene marched in the order we have described, with three corps and a reserve; Macdonald on the right in the plain, Grenier in the centre on the main road of Friuli, Baraguay d'Hilliers on the left along the mountains, the reserve in the rear; the whole amounting to about 60,000 men. Grouchy and Pully's dragoons galloped on in front, to take such detachments or convoys as were ill guarded. The roads were still bad, the bridges destroyed, and the march less rapid than could have been desired.

The prince advanced on the southern side of the Alps, from the Adige to the Brenta, from the Brenta to the Piave, as Napoleon did on the northern side from the Isar to the Inn, and from the Inn to the Traun, and nearly at the same time. On the evening of May 7, he reached the Piave, all the bridges of which had been broken down by the enemy. It was resolved to ford it, and to fall upon the Austrians, who seemed to make a halt, apparently for the purpose of giving their baggage time to defile. The next day, Grouchy and Pully's dragoons crossed with an advanced guard of infantry, and charged the Austrians. The latter gave way at first, but as they had their baggage to defend, they rallied, and bore down *en masse* on the advanced guard of Prince Eugene, who, being himself at the advanced posts, beheld with dismay his cavalry and infantry driven back in disorder on the Piave. Fortunately the right, under Macdonald, came up in all haste, dashed boldly into the water, and took up a position beyond it. Then came General Grenier, and both marched together against the Austrians, who were quickly routed, and left in our hands a quantity of cannons and baggage, 2500 killed or wounded, and a nearly equal number of prisoners. Two thousand had already been taken between the Adige and the Piave. This made nearly 7000 soldiers lost by Archduke John in a few days.

On the 9th of May the prince entered Conegliano; on the 10th he arrived at the Tagliamento, which was forded at Valvasone. The cavalry was sent to the right to Udine, to raise the blockade of Palma Nova; the main body marched to the left, up the course of the Tagliamento, towards San Daniele and Osopo. On arriving at the passes of the Carnic Alps, by which they had debouched, the Austrians were again compelled to make a stand in order to save their baggage, and they incurred a further loss of 1500 men, killed, wounded, or taken prisoners. On the 11th and 12th of May, when Napoleon was taking possession of Vienna, there was no enemy left in Italy. Archduke John, who had entered that country with about 48,000 men, quitted it with 30,000 at most.

On the other side of the Alps, the Austrian prince made a new division of his forces. He

despatched from Villach to Laybach, by the cross-road from Carinthia to Carniola, Ignatius Giulay, ban of Croatia, with some battalions of the line, eighteen squadrons, and several batteries, with orders to call out the Croat *risung*, and then to support General Stoichovich, who was acting against General Marmont, and thus to cover Laybach against the French armies of Italy and Dalmatia. Having sent off this detachment, Archduke John had only about 20,000 men left. His purpose was either to proceed by Villach to Lilienfeld and St. Pölten, in order to co-operate in the long-projected junction of the archdukes, or if there was no longer time for that, to recall Chasteler and Jellachich by way of Leoben, and march thence with them on Grätz, in order to effect his junction with the Austrian grand army in Hungary. But he was keenly pursued by the victorious Prince Eugene, and he was about to fall upon the network of cavalry stretched by Napoleon from Bruck to Presburg.

Archduke John's march dictated that of Prince Eugene. The latter was obliged to watch simultaneously over the movements of Archduke John and of the ban of Croatia, in order that the junction of the former with Archduke Charles might take place as late and with the least forces possible; and that the latter might not hinder the junction of General Marmont with the French army of Italy. It was difficult to accomplish these ends if the march were continued in a single mass, for, however rapidly and well the prince manœuvred, it was possible that if he marched immediately to Vienna to reinforce Napoleon, the Archduke John and the ban might fall on Marmont with their combined forces; and that if, on the other hand, he made a detour to Laybach in order to support General Marmont, Archduke John would seize the opportunity to hasten to Presburg, and throw into the balance the decisive weight of the Austrian army of Italy. Under these considerations, Prince Eugene adopted a course very suitable to the circumstances. He gave General Macdonald 15,000 or 16,000 men, excellent troops, which were to take the road to Laybach, raise the blockade of Palma Nova, occupy Trieste, combine with Marmont, and return, thus increased to 26,000 or 27,000 men, to join the army of Italy at Grätz, on the road to Vienna. He himself, with from 80,000 to 82,000, took the road which would lead more directly to Napoleon. There were disadvantages, nevertheless, in this plan; for had Archduke John been a real general, he might, by manœuvring between those two bodies, have beaten them one after the other. But that clever prince conceived a multitude of ideas in war, and followed out none of them perseveringly. Besides, his troops were dispirited, and incapable of those rapid movements which require, on the part of the soldiers, as much confidence in the general as obedience to his orders. Prince Eugene's plan was, therefore, not so objectionable as it might have been in face of a different adversary. The two portions of the army of Italy separated on the 14th of May, not to unite again until they met on the plains of Wagram.

At that moment General Marmont, with 10,000 or 11,000 veteran soldiers, sent into Illyria after the battle of Austerlitz, was tra-

versing the hilly regions of Croatia, on his way to Carniola and Styria to join the grand army. Between his columns he had a convoy of provisions carried on horses of the country, which were to convey his sick and wounded when the grain with which they were loaded had been consumed by the army. After having dispersed the bands of General Stoichovich, he advanced cautiously, not knowing when or where he might suddenly fall in with greatly superior numbers either of friends or foes. But he and General Macdonald were eagerly seeking news of each other, which neither succeeded in obtaining.

The events in Italy had induced similar events in Tyrol. General Chasteler, drawn from the Italian into the German Tyrol by the danger of the Austrians on the Danube, had hastened to Innsbruck, and from thence to Kufstein. He had pushed forward some advanced posts on the Salzburg road by Lofen and Reichental. Another Austrian corps, that of Jellachich, which, in the beginning of the campaign had marched parallel to Hiller's corps, had pursued in its retreat, as well as in its advance, the road along the foot of the mountains. It had fallen back on Salzburg, and thence on Leoben, after having defended the posts of Luegpass and Obtenau against De Wrede's division. The combined forces of Jellachich and Chasteler amounted to 16,000 or 17,000 men, exclusive of the Tyrolese; and, if well commanded, and resolved to shut themselves up in the mountains, they might have created a disagreeable diversion on our right and in our rear. But they had received instructions to join the acting masses. They were divided into several corps independent of each other, were on bad terms with the Tyrolese, and could not, therefore, become very formidable. After having driven back Jellachich's corps into the valley of the Upper Enns, by means of De Wrede's division, Marshal Lefebvre recalled that division, returned to the fort of Kufstein, which was well defended by a Bavarian garrison, raised the blockade, and, being joined by Deroz's division from Rosenheim, advanced with both divisions into German Tyrol, which he had orders to bring under subjection. Though hardly capable of conducting a grand operation, the old marshal was admirably fitted for carrying on a series of small engagements with spirit and intelligence. He everywhere repulsed the Austrian advanced posts, and at last, on the 18th of May, he encountered General Chasteler in the position of Worgel. The latter was intrenched on some heights, having the Austrian troops behind the works, and in the distance, on his wings, the Tyrolese insurgents, who piled their rifles with great accuracy of aim, and rolled down enormous rocks. The old marshal, after disadvantageously sustaining a combat of sharpshooters on his two wings, attacked the enemy in front, carried Chasteler's position under a tremendous fire, took about 3000 prisoners, dispersed the cloud of insurgents, and completely routed the Austrians. Then, burning some Tyrolese villages on his way, he marched to Innsbruck, which offered to surrender on certain conditions; but he succeeded in entering the town without granting any terms, in consequence of the disagreement of the Tyrolese, some of whom



were for surrendering, others for resisting to the utmost. Master of Innspruck, he might consider himself secure of the submission of the Tyrol; but Hofer, the innkeeper, and Major Teimer, withdrew to the inaccessible summits that divide German from Italian Tyrol, ready to descend thence again, if a favourable opportunity recurred. Generals Chasteler and Jellachich, with greatly diminished forces, set out on a furtive retreat to Hungary across the road from Friuli to Vienna, at the risk of meeting in that perilous course either the van or the rear of Prince Eugene's army.

Thus, after a first misfortune in Italy and a lively commotion in Tyrol, every thing was succeeding to the satisfaction of the conqueror, whose fortunes, for a moment shaken, were revived by the potency of his genius. Matters were no less improved in Poland, where Prince Joseph Poniatowski had been acting with equal skill and good fortune. Having surrendered Warsaw and the left bank of the Vistula to the Austrians, he had promised himself that he would make them pay for that advantage as soon as they attempted to pass over to the right bank, of which he held possession. Some Austrian corps did attempt to cross the Vistula, and these he surprised and destroyed. Then, while Archduke Ferdinand, eager to seize fresh triumphs, continued to march down the left side of the river from Warsaw to Thorn, and ineffectually assailed the latter fortress, Prince Poniatowski marched up the right bank to Cracow, to conquer that ancient metropolis of Polish nationality, and raised the standard of insurrection in Galicia. There, too, men's hearts beat secretly for the independence of Poland; and had the Russians seconded the brave Poniatowski, by crossing the Vistula at Sandomir or Cracow, they would have cut off Archduke Ferdinand's retreat, and he would never have recrossed the frontier he had so rashly invaded.

Such were the events in Italy, Austria, and Poland, up to the 16th or 18th of May. The occupation of Vienna, after the tremendous operations at Ratisbon, had restored Napoleon's fortunes to their full ascendancy. Germany, though secretly fermenting, controlled herself better than at the beginning of the war. Major Schill, who had been forced to abandon the Upper Elbe and retreat to the Baltic coast, met everywhere with friendly hearts, but nowhere with hands ready to second him. Prussia, intimidated by the news from the Danube, at first denied, then admitted, sent pursuers after Major Schill, and addressed protestations of friendship and devotedness to the French cabinet. Napoleon, having well secured his establishment at Vienna, and skilfully staked out the route by the presence of the Germans of the minor principalities at Ratisbon, of the Saxons at Passau, the Wurtembergers at Lintz, and Davout's corps at St. Polten, resolved to bring things to a conclusion by crossing the Danube and falling on Archduke Charles, who had placed himself in face of him with his main army. Being able to avail himself of Marshal Davout's force, and thus to command 90,000 fighting men, he had it in his power to terminate the war without waiting either for Prince Eugene, or for General Macdonald, or for General Marmont. His adversary's force,

including some battalions collected in Bohemia, and the remains of Hiller and Archduke Louis's corps, did not exceed 100,000 men. There was nothing in that to intimidate Napoleon. To cross the Danube, then, in the face of that army, was still the difficulty to be overcome towards terminating the war.

But how was such a river to be crossed in such a season, with such great masses, and in defiance of masses no less considerable? This was the problem on which Napoleon meditated incessantly. In the first place, should he cross under the walls of Vienna? That first question was solved in his mind. To fall back to Krems, for instance, in order to conceal the operation of crossing from the enemy, was impossible, for Vienna would instantly have called up Archduke Charles, unless it had been kept down by a force which would have been missed on the day of battle. Napoleon would, therefore, have incurred the risk of losing the capital, the resources it contained, his means of communications with Prince Eugene, and his moral ascendancy in arms. To descend lower was still less practicable, for to the danger of departing from Vienna would be added the still graver one of elongating his line of operation, creating for himself, in consequence, a point the more to guard, and depriving himself of 25,000 or 30,000 men, who were indispensable if a battle was to be fought. Vienna was therefore the point of passage. The two adversaries were attached to it: Napoleon, for the reasons we have stated; Archduke Charles, because of the presence of Napoleon.

But the passage might be effected a league higher or lower without violating the important considerations above mentioned. The engineer officers had surveyed the river from Klosterneuburg, the point where it issues from the mountains and flows into the magnificent plain of Vienna, to the environs of Presburg, and they ascertained that the difficulty of the passage varied greatly in different parts. Before and a little below Vienna the Danube divided into a multitude of arms, and became broader, but less rapid and deep. Lower than Ebersdorf, towards Presburg, the channel again contracted and became less broken, deeper, and more rapid and confined between steep banks, which was a serious impediment to the establishment of bridges.

Napoleon chose for his operation the part of the Danube nearest Vienna, preferring to deal with the river where it was wide rather than rapid and deep, and specially where it was divided into several arms and studded with islands, whereby the difficulty was diminished, as a burden is rendered more manageable by dividing it. He thought especially how he might make use of the islands forming the partition between the branches of the river. If, for instance, there was one such large enough to contain a numerous army, where it might be safe from the view and from the cannon-balls of the Austrians, and beyond which there would be a narrow arm to cross in order to debouche before the enemy, the difficulty of the passage would be thereby greatly diminished. Even though to reach it it were necessary to cross the largest mass of the waters of the Danube, the attempt was worth making, because the most perilous part of the operation of crossing

the enemy's side would be executed under the protection of the island, its woods, and its depth. There were two islands which answered to the required conditions: that of Schwarze Laken, opposite Nussdorf, above Vienna, and that of Lobau, two leagues below, opposite Enzersdorf. Napoleon wished to double the chances of success by using both of them. But the attempt made upon the first named, rather as a demonstration than as a serious enterprise, failed for want of sufficient strength and sufficient care. General St. Hilaire sent thither 500 men and a field-officer, without having noticed a jetty which connected the island of Schwarze Laken with the left bank, which was occupied by the Austrians. Our 500 men, carried over in boats, and thinking themselves covered by the small branch on the other side of the island, kept their ground against the fire of musketry and cannon, but were presently assailed unexpectedly by several battalions which had passed over the small jetty. After a heroic resistance, not being able to recross the broad arm, they were killed or taken prisoners. For this misfortune there was some compensation, inasmuch as it drew the attention of the enemy in the direction of Nussdorf and away from the island of Lobau, by which Napoleon was resolved to make his main effort to cross the river.

The island of Lobau, for ever celebrated for the prodigious events of which it became the theatre, was most admirably adapted to Napoleon's purposes. It was partly wooded, and presented in the direction of its length a continued screen of fine trees between the enemy and us. It was very spacious, for it was a league long and a league and a half wide, so that, even in the middle of it, one was safe from the Austrian cannon-balls. Once arrived in the island of Lobau, there was no more to be crossed than an arm of the river sixty fathoms wide—a matter of great, but by no means extraordinary difficulty. To reach the island, it was necessary to cross the great Danube, formed of two vast arms, one of them 25 fathoms wide, the other 120, separated by a sand bank. To throw a bridge over such a mass of water was an exceedingly difficult operation, but it was practicable, since it was not to be effected in presence of the enemy. It was only the last bridge over the sixty-fathom branch, separating Lobau from the left bank, that was to be so set up. The operation, thus divided, had a chance of success. There remained but one really serious difficulty, that of collecting materials. There were requisite from seventy to eighty boats of large size, several thousand planks, and powerful cables to hold the bridge fast against an extremely rapid current. Now the Austrians, who had readily foreseen that the crossing of the Danube would be the main operation of the war, had, on quitting Vienna, manifested forethought on this matter alone. They had burned or sunk most of the large boats, and sent down to Presburg those they had not destroyed. There was abundance of wood, but ropes were scarce. In a word, means for mooring were almost entirely wanting. The bridges previously existing before Vienna were on piles, and consequently had never required moorage, like bridges of boats. It would have been necessary either to drive piles for fas-

tening the boats to, which would have occupied a long time, and would have been perceived by the enemy, or to procure strong anchors. Now, strong anchors were not used in the navigation of that part of the Danube, and none could be procured but with great difficulty. It was only at Presburg or Komorn that a sufficient supply could be had. Napoleon, however, strove to supply by various means what he lacked in materials, and was greatly aided in his efforts by Generals Bertrand and Ponnetti, the former of the engineers, the latter of the artillery.

As for boats, some were discovered in Vienna; for those which descended the Danube in convoys were in general of an unsuitable build, or they had been retained for the bridges of Passau, Linz, and Krems. A certain number were raised from the bottom of the river, and were carefully repaired. In this way about ninety were obtained, some of which were to bear the bridge, and others to be employed in carrying materials. With much search, some cordage was discovered in that city; for the navigation of a river like the Danube necessarily inferred the constant existence of a considerable stock. Planks were procured by cutting and sawing the timber with which the country abounded. As for anchors, they might have been forged in the iron-works of Styria, not far from Vienna; but as that would have occasioned a great loss of time, Napoleon proposed to supply the place of anchors by sinking very heavy weights in the river, such as cannons of large calibre, found in the arsenals of Vienna, or chests filled with cannon-balls. If the river did not rise suddenly, as happens when the hot season begins very early, that expedient might suffice. He trusted to it, and the weights which were to serve instead of anchors were arranged beforehand, so that at the last moment there should be nothing to do but to throw them into the river.

Every thing being ready at Vienna towards the 16th and 17th of May, the materials were brought down the river to the island of Lobau, opposite Ebersdorf. At the same time orders to concentrate were given to the troops which were to fight beyond the Danube. The whole cavalry, except a division of chasseurs left on the look-out upon the Hungarian frontier, was recalled from Presburg and Eidenburg to Vienna. Among the regiments recalled were the fourteen regiments of cuirassiers. Marshal Davout, who was at first to have come with his whole corps to Vienna, received orders to bring only two divisions thither—those of Friant and Gudin—and to distribute the Morand division between Mölk, Mautern, and St. Polten, to withstand the attempts of Kollowrath's corps, which Archduke Charles had stationed at Linz. With the corps of Lannes and Massena, the guard, the cavalry reserve, and two-thirds of Davout's corps, Napoleon could bring about 80,000 men into the field against the Austrians; and that was enough, for the archduke was not in a condition to muster more than 90,000.

The materials and the troops arrived on the 18th and 19th of May, at the little town of Ebersdorf. Massena's corps was the first moved to that point, and especially its best division—that of Molitor. On the 18th the operation began under the eyes of Napoleon, who

had removed his head-quarters from Schönbrunn to Ebersdorf. The Molitor division was ferried in boats over the two great branches of the Danube to the island of Lobau. Some Austrian advanced posts occupied the front of the island opposite Ebersdorf. General Molitor drove them back, and did not pass beyond the middle of the island, in order not to give the enemy to suppose that there was a serious enterprise in hand. He contented himself with ranging his troops behind a small channel, not more than twelve or fifteen fathoms wide, easily fordable, and which flows through the island only when the waters are extremely high. While he was thus operating, General Pernetti's artillerymen were labouring at the construction of the great bridge. There were used for it nearly seventy large boats; and it was only after repeated efforts that they could be moored, being continually swept down by the current, which was unfortunately increasing, in consequence of a somewhat alarming rise in the waters. At last the boats were fixed in their places, and the workmen could proceed to form the roadway of the bridge with planks. The whole day of the 19th, and half the 20th, were spent on that great work, which being accomplished, the passage to the island of Lobau was insured, extraordinary accidents apart. A wooden bridge was thrown over the small channel running through the middle of the island, which, though usually dry, was now beginning to fill, in consequence of the flood. The Boudet division (one of Massena's four) immediately crossed over, and joined Molitor's. Then came Lasalle's division of light cavalry and several trains of artillery. This was enough to sweep the island, which Molitor promptly did. He made some prisoners. Our men crossed the whole breadth of the island, and arrived at the last branch, which was sixty fathoms wide, much like the average breadth of the Seine in Paris. The remainder of the operation was quite practicable, even in face of an enemy, unless, indeed, he fell *en masse* on the troops who were executing it. But the Archduke Charles evidently was not yet aware of what was doing, and nothing had yet been encountered but an advanced guard.

General Molitor found a most favourable spot for the passage, and pointed it out to the Emperor, who quite approved of it. It was a re-entrant angle, formed towards us by the branch of the river that was to be crossed, so that, by planting artillery right and left of it, the ground on which we had to land might be so swept with grape that it would be impossible for the enemy to remain there. This was immediately done, but it was not even necessary, for there were only some sharpshooters on the tongue of land on which we had to debouch. Lieutenant-colonel Aubrey, belonging to the artillery, was ordered to establish the second bridge on the afternoon of this day, the 20th. The pontoon equipage taken at Landsbut had been kept for that purpose. M. de Sainte Croix, aide-de-camp to Massena, and M. Baudru, aide-de-camp to Bessières, embarked in boats with 200 voltigeurs, drove off the Austrian sharpshooters, and fastened the cable on which the bridge was to rest. Fifteen pontoons were enough, the breadth of water at that point not being more than fifty-four fathoms, and in three

hours the communication was established. Immediately after, General Lasalle passed over to the left bank with four regiments of cavalry, and was followed by the voltigeurs of the Molitor and Boudet divisions. After crossing the bridge, they found a small wood extending from left to right, and terminating at the two sides of the angle formed by the river. The wood was beaten, and some Austrian detachments that occupied it were driven out. Beyond the wood the ground expanded, and there was seen on the left the village of Aspern, on the right that of Essling—places immortal in history. A sort of shallow ditch, filled with water only when the river overflows, stretched from one of these villages to the other. The cavalry could cross it, for it was rather a depression of the soil than an actual ditch. General Lasalle galloped over it with his cavalry, scattered the enemy's advanced posts, and swept the plain of Marchfeld, which, by a gentle slope of two or three leagues, rises insensibly to heights bearing other immortal names—those of Neusiedel and Wagram.

It was a warm clear spring day, but drawing to its close, and nothing could be perceived in the fading light but a strong advanced guard of cavalry. It seemed disposed to fall upon General Lasalle, who retired behind the ditch above mentioned, and thus avoided a useless engagement. Some hundred of our voltigeurs, lying in ambush in the hollow of the ground, received the Austrian cavalry with a point-blank fire, covered the field with their wounded, and obliged them to retire. Thus began, on the evening of the 20th of May, the bloody battle of Essling!

The Danube was crossed, and if the Austrians, whose advanced guards had been seen, presented themselves on the following day, there was a reasonable assurance that the French would have time to debouch and deploy before the enemy could attempt to throw them into the river. An accident, however, was not impossible. In fact, that afternoon of the 20th, while our men were crossing the small arm of the river, the great bridge over the two principal arms was broken, some of the boats having yielded to the violence of the current. A sudden rise of three feet, produced by the melting of the Alpine snows, had caused this accident, and might cause it again. The light cavalry of General Marulaz was cut in two by the rupture of the bridge: one portion reached the island, while the other remained at Ebersdorf. Fortunately, Generals Bertrand and Pernetti set to work with extreme activity, and the great bridge was repaired in the course of the night.

Without being quite resolved to give battle with such uncertain means of passage as he possessed, Napoleon did not wish to abandon the result of the operation commenced: and it was decided that this important communication should be retained, and should subsequently be rendered safer and less intermittent. The tongue of land formed by the small arm of the river was a most convenient ground on which to debouch, and the two villages, Aspern on the left, and Essling on the right, connected by a sort of ditch, were valuable *points d'appui* for the deployment of an army. Such a position was therefore worth the pains of keeping,

whether the battle was postponed or not. The Molitor division consequently passed the night at Aspern, the Boudet division at Essling. Lasalle's cavalry bivouacked between the two villages, in front of the little wood. Napoleon took up his quarters with his guard at the same place, and, as usual with him, slept soundly without undressing. Several officers, sent out to reconnoitre during the night, brought in contradictory reports. Some alleged that the Austrians were in Marchfeld, quite ready for battle; others maintained that we had no enemy's army before us, and that what was seen was at most a strong advanced guard of cavalry. In this state of uncertainty the French awaited the morning, every thing being prepared for battle if the army succeeded in crossing, or for retreat into the island of Lobau, if the Danube could not be crossed with sufficient forces.

The great bridge having been repaired in the night, the cavalry of General Marulaz, General Espagne's cuirassiers, the Legrand division of infantry, and a part of the artillery, were enabled to pass over on the morning of the 21st. But the existence of only one bridge over each arm, and the breadth of the island of Lobau, made the operation very tedious. Towards noon, Major-general Berthier, having ascended the steeple of Essling, clearly discerned the army of Archduke Charles descending the inclined plain of Marchfeld, and describing a vast semicircle round Aspern and Essling. Berthier surpassed all men of his day in judging by the eye the extent of a tract of ground and the number of men that covered it. He estimated the Austrian army at about 90,000 men, and saw plainly that it was coming with the intention of overwhelming the French while engaged in passing the river. Having being informed on the 19th of the apparition of the French in the island of Lobau, it was not until the next day that Archduke Charles had thought of making a *reconnaissance* at the head of his cavalry. Having then satisfied himself as to their intentions, he had not put his men in motion until the morning of the 21st, so as to get them into line in the afternoon of the same day. Had he appeared on the evening of the 20th or on the morning of the 21st between Aspern and Essling, that portion of the French army which had already crossed the river would have been in immense danger.

The major-general immediately sent his report to the Emperor, who saw in it only the fulfilment of what he had himself wished for—namely, an opportunity of once more beating the Austrian army, and having done with it. But suddenly news was brought him of a fresh rupture of the great bridge, caused by the hourly-increasing flood. The Danube, which had risen three feet on the preceding day, had now risen four more. All the moorings were giving way to the current. At that moment (the afternoon of the 21st) Napoleon had with him only the three infantry divisions—Molitor, Boudet, and Legrand, the light cavalry divisions of Lasalle and Marulaz, Espagne's division of cuirassiers, and part of the artillery, altogether about 22,000 or 23,000 men; all excellent troops it is true, but not numerous enough to give battle to an army of 90,000 men. He therefore gave orders to abandon Aspern and Essling, and to recross the bridge over the

smaller arm, but not destroy it, since the angle in the river made it easy to protect the bridge with a formidable mass of artillery. Protected by a watercourse, sixty fathoms wide, and now become very rapid and very deep, the French might remain on the island until the consolidation of the bridge and the subsidence of the waters made it possible to prepare for a sure and decisive operation. This order was beginning to be executed, when the generals of division raised very natural objections to the abandonment of such points as Essling and Aspern. General Molitor pointed out to the Emperor that the village of Aspern, in which his division had passed the night, was of immense importance; that to recover it would cost torrents of blood, whereas an inconsiderable force would be sufficient to defend it for a long time against great efforts, and that he ought to reflect well upon it before he resolved on such a sacrifice. The case was just the same as to Essling. If those two posts were abandoned, the intention of crossing the river at that most favourable point must be given up, the urgent operation of the passage must be postponed for an indefinite period, the works already executed must be forsaken, and, in a word, the most serious inconveniences must be incurred. While Napoleon was weighing these observations, word was brought him that the great bridge was completely repaired, the waters were subsiding, the ammunition-wagons were beginning to defile, and he might feel assured of having all his resources at hand in a few hours. Provided he had another score thousand men, especially the cuirassiers, and his ammunition-chests well filled, Napoleon feared nothing, and he joyfully seized the opportunity, which he had been on the point of losing, of shattering the Austrian grand army. In consequence, he ordered General Boudet, who had not quitted Essling, to defend it vigorously; and he authorized General Molitor, whose division had already quitted Aspern, to re-enter it by force before the enemy had time to secure his position there. Marshal Lannes, though his corps had not yet crossed the Danube, took the command of the right wing, that is to say, of Essling, and of the troops that were to arrive there. The cavalry was put under his orders, whereby Marshal Bessières, its commander, became subordinate to him. Massena had charge of the left wing, that is to say, of Aspern, which the Molitor division was about to reoccupy. The Legrand division was to be stationed in the rear of Aspern, with the Marulaz light cavalry. Lasalle's division of light cavalry and Espagne's division of cuirassiers filled the space between Aspern and Essling. All the artillery was placed in the intervals. A swarm of tirailleurs was spread over the sort of ditch before mentioned, which was the dried bed of a watercourse that formerly flowed from Aspern to Essling, and there waited until the Austrians should come within musket-shot. Thus, from 22,000 to 23,000 men were about to give battle to 90,000.

Archduke Charles had divided his army into five columns. The first, under General Hiller, was to advance along the Danube by Stadlau, attack Aspern, and try to carry it in concert with the second column; the latter, commanded by Lieutenant-general Bellegarde, was

to march by Kagran and Hirschstatten on Aspern; the third, commanded by Hohenzollern, marching by Breitenlee on the same point, was also to attack it, for the more certainty of taking it; the fourth and fifth columns, formed by Rosenberg's corps, were to complete the semicircle traced round the French army, and were to attack, one of them Essling, the other the little village of Enzersdorf situated beyond it. As Enzersdorf was not strongly occupied by the French, and seemed unlikely to require any great efforts to take it, the two columns had orders to exert their combined strength on Essling. To connect his three columns on the right with his two on the left, the archduke had placed Prince Lichtenstein's reserve of cavalry in order of battle between those two masses. Much farther in the rear, at Breitenlee, the grenadiers *d'élite* were stationed as a second reserve. The remains of Archduke Louis's corps, much weakened by the detachments left on the Upper Danube, were stationed on the look-out at Stammersdorf, opposite Vienna. Kollowrath's corps, as we have seen, was at Lintz. The five acting columns, with Lichtenstein's cavalry and the grenadiers, might amount to about 90,000 men, with nearly 800 pieces of cannon.

Though the archduke had brought large forces together against Aspern, the point which it was essential to carry, since it covered the little bridge, nevertheless the semicircle drawn round Aspern, Essling, and Enzersdorf was weak in the middle, and might be broken by a charge of our cuirassiers. The Austrian army, being then cut in two, would have the chances turned against it. Napoleon saw this at the first glance, and resolved to profit by it as soon as his principal forces should have crossed the Danube. For the moment he thought only of taking good care of his *debouché*, by vigorously defending Aspern on his left, Essling on his right, and protecting the space between with his cavalry.

No sooner had Napoleon authorized General Molitor to reoccupy Aspern and General Boudet to keep Essling, than the conflict began about three o'clock with extreme violence. Hiller's advanced guard under General Nordmann had marched to Aspern, and had entered it after the retreat of Molitor's division. What was worse, it had entered a wooded meadow to the left of Aspern, which extended from that village to the Danube, and was embraced by a small branch of the river so as to form a sort of isle. Having possession of that island, the enemy might pass between Aspern and the Danube, turn our left, and make for the little bridge, the only issue we had by which we could advance or retreat. General Molitor, at the head of the 16th and 67th of the line, first-rate regiments, commanded by two of the best colonels in the army, Marin and Petit, charged into the high street of Aspern to dislodge the Austrians. The street was very wide, for the Austrian villages are large and solidly built. They drove all before them, and cleared the environs of the church at the end of the street. General Molitor then placed his two regiments behind an earthen breastwork which surrounded Aspern, and waited for Hiller's column which was coming to the aid of his advanced guard. He let it come up within point-blank distance, then

opened a fire that brought down a considerable number of men in its ranks, and, charging it at the point of the bayonet, put it to the rout, and completely cleared the ground. General Molitor then made a skilful use of the two other regiments of his division. With the 37th he retook the island before mentioned on the left, and availed himself of all the accidents of the ground to make it inaccessible. He placed the 2d to the right at the entrance of the village, to hinder the position from being turned. To aid these operations, Massena ranged the Legrand division to the right and the rear of Aspern, ready to charge when necessary. The four French and two German regiments of horse under General Marulaz formed the connection with the cavalry of Generals Lasalle and Espagne towards Essling. In that direction the Boudet division had as yet had to do only with Rosenberg's advanced guards, which were on the march to Enzersdorf.

But this was only the prelude of this frightful day. Hiller soon returned to the charge, aided by Bellegarde's column, and both together attacked the village on the side next the Danube and on the centre. The 16th and the 67th of the line, posted in advance of Aspern, kept up an uninterrupted fire at a very short distance, and laid thousands of enemies low at the foot of the breastwork. But the Austrian columns, continually repairing their losses, advanced up to the breastwork, and rushed over it in spite of Molitor's two regiments, which they forced to retreat into the village. General Vacquant even succeeded in getting possession of the end of the high street in which the church was situated. Seeing this, the intrepid Molitor made a dash at General Vacquant with the 2d, and a horrible *mêlée* began. The Austrians and the French, alternately beating and beaten, swept up and down the long street of Aspern from one end to the other. Fresh troops were approaching from without, for Hiller and Bellegarde's columns amounted together to at least 36,000 men, against whom General Molitor had to contend with 7000. To keep them off, Massena sent against them the six regiments of light cavalry commanded by General Marulaz, one of the ablest cavalry officers formed in our long wars. Marulaz broke several of the squares formed by the Austrian infantry to receive him, but was stopped by deep masses beyond them, and forced to return to his position, taking with him some pieces of cannon he had captured. But though he was unable to drive the enemy off the ground, he held him in check and hindered him from throwing all his force into Aspern. Meanwhile, General Molitor, barricaded in the houses with three of his regiments, made use of every thing that came to hand to aid his resistance—wagons, ploughs, and other implements, and defended his post with a fury as great as that with which the Austrians assailed it.

During this fierce conflict at Aspern, Lannes was making the most skilful arrangements for the defence of Essling, which was attacked feebly at first, and afterwards with great violence, when the fourth and fifth columns of Rosenberg's corps had come together. The fifth, which formed the Austrian extreme left opposite our extreme right at Enzersdorf, after carrying that scarcely-defended position, de-

ouched from it to assail Essling. The fourth then put itself in motion, and both together began their attack on our second *point d'appui*. Lannes received them as had been done at Aspern, covering himself with an earthen breastwork that surrounded Essling, whence he mowed down the assailants with musketry and grape, and stopped them at the foot of the breastwork.

But the battle was about to become more terrible, for Hohenzollern's column, which was the third, and formed the middle of the Austrian line, was coming at last into action, supported by the cavalry reserve under Prince John de Lichtenstein. It was marching on our centre, and might, by passing between Aspern and Essling, sever the communication between those two points, insure their conquest, and render our defeat inevitable. Seeing this, Lannes resolved to make a powerful effort with his cavalry. He had at his command Espagne's four regiments of cuirassiers and Lasalle's four of chasseurs, all under the orders of Marshal Bessières. Without heeding the latter's rank, he sent him an imperious order to charge, and *charge home*. Though hurt by this expression, for he was not used, he said, to charge otherwise, Bessières advanced with Espagne, the first officer of heavy cavalry in the army, leaving Lasalle in reserve to second him. At the head of sixteen squadrons of cuirassiers, Bessières and Espagne took the enemy's artillery, putting the men who served it to the sword, and then fell upon the infantry and broke several of its squares. But after driving in the first line they found a second, on which they could make no impression, and they were themselves suddenly attacked by the Austrian cavalry sent against them by Archduke Charles. Surprised during the disorder of the charge they had just executed, our cuirassiers were put to flight, when Lasalle, with that rapid perception and action which distinguished him, pushed forward the 16th chasseurs to their support so opportunely, that the Austrians, intent upon the pursuit of our cuirassiers, were themselves borne down, and a good number of them put to the sword. In the tumult the brave Espagne was killed with a biscayan. Bessières, with his aide-de-camp, Baudru, was surrounded by the hulans, and, after firing off his two pistols, was defending himself with his sword, when he was rescued by Lasalle's chasseurs. The cuirassiers rallied and charged again and again, still supported by Lasalle. The Austrian infantry was stopped, and Hohenzollern was hindered from breaking our centre between Essling and Aspern, and sending a reinforcement to the two columns assailing the latter.

But those two columns were of themselves sufficient to overwhelm the 7000 men of Molitor's division, half of whom were already *hors de combat*. The rest were only enabled to hold their ground by the heroism of Colonels Petit and Marin, and of General Molitor himself, who incessantly set the example to their soldiers, and put themselves at the head of every onset. At last, General Vacquant, being well seconded, succeeded in penetrating into Aspern, and getting possession of it, almost entirely, after a conflict of five hours. General Molitor was about to be driven out of that village, which it was of such moment to keep, for

if we had lost it, we would have been driven back upon the bridge over the small arn, and perhaps into the Danube. Fortunately, the restoration of the great bridge enabled a brigade of Nansouty's cuirassiers and the Carra St. Cyr division of infantry to cross over towards the close of the day. With these resources against unforeseen contingencies, Massena could bring into action the Legrand division, which he had stationed as a reserve behind Aspern. Placing Carra St. Cyr in the rear, with orders to watch the bridge, he entered Aspern at the head of the Legrand division. The heroic Legrand, with the 26th light infantry and the 18th of the line, the same regiments with which he had taken Ebersberg, charged through the main street of Aspern, drove Bellegarde's troops to the other end of the village, and obliged Vacquant to shut himself up in the church. In the centre, Lannes ordered fresh charges of cavalry. The Espagne division had lost a fourth of its effective; but Nansouty, with the St. Germain brigade of cuirassiers, took its place, and prolonged the resistance, which in that place could only be maintained with cavalry. The Austrian infantry was again broken by the charge of our cavalry, but the latter was again assailed by that of the enemy, and Marulaz, relieving Lasalle, repeated with the 23d chasseurs what the other had done two hours before with the 16th. He supported our cuirassiers, repulsed those of the enemy, and then charged several squares. Having broken into one of these, he was unhorsed, and was on the point of being killed or made prisoner, when his chasseurs, hearing his shouts, rescued him, gave him a horse, and returned, passing over the bodies of a line of infantry.

The battle had lasted six hours: at Aspern and Essling, foot soldiers were obstinately contending for the possession of burning ruins; between the two villages masses of cavalry were disputing the plain with their swords. Archduke Charles, thinking he had done enough in stopping the French army at the *débouché* of the bridge, and flattering himself that he should hurl it into the Danube on the following day, determined to suspend the firing, in order to give his men time to rest, draw his masses together, and bring into line the reserve of grenadiers left at Breitenlee.

Napoleon was present in person at this first battle, under the fire between Aspern and Essling, and his confidence remained unabated. Though half the Molitor division lay dead in the houses and streets of Aspern, and though a fourth part of Espagne's cuirassiers and of the chasseurs of Lasalle and Marulaz had fallen by the cannonade, he had no fear for the result, if he could have another 20,000 men and his ammunition brought over the Danube. The waters were still rising, and the flood swept enormous trees torn up by the roots, boats that had been left high and dry on the banks, and large burning mills, which the enemy had set on fire in hopes of destroying our only means of passage. Every moment it was necessary to turn aside these floating masses, or to repair the breaches they caused in our bridges. The latter were further weakened by the continual passage over them, and sometimes the boats were almost sunk under the weight of the artillery-wagons, and our soldiers had to cross

the river with their feet in the water, which added to the tediousness of the operation. Generals Pernetti and Bertrand, however, were still confident they should maintain the passage, and that the requisite forces should be across the river by the following day. Napoleon therefore ordered that the troops which had been engaged should take the rest of which they had so much need. He bivouacked behind the wood in advance of the small bridge, in order to be present at the passage of his forces, which were to employ the whole night in defiling. Just as he was himself about to rest, he was interrupted by a violent altercation between two of his chief lieutenants, Bessières and Lannes, the former of whom complained of the language in which the latter had signified his orders. Massena, who was on the spot, was obliged to interpose between those gallant men, who, after having braved for a whole day the cross-fire of 300 pieces of cannon, were ready to draw their swords for the sake of their offended pride. Napoleon allayed their quarrel, which was to be terminated next day by the enemy in the saddest way for themselves and for the army.

The passage of the troops continued during part of the night with frequent interruptions; but about midnight the great bridge broke again for the third time. An additional rise of seven feet had taken place, making a total rise of fourteen feet. Fortune then seemed again to desert Napoleon, or rather the nature of things, which will not bend to the will of mighty conquerors, seemed to give him fresh warning. But if it was a fault to attempt the passage of the river in the season of sudden floods, and with an insufficient *matériel*, it was now no time to draw back. Before daybreak the bridge was repaired, and over it passed St. Hilaire's fine division and Oudinot's two, (the three together forming Lannes's corps,) the infantry of the guard, a second brigade of Nansouty's cuirassiers, the whole artillery of Lannes and Massena's corps, a reserve of artillery belonging to the cuirassiers, two divisions of light cavalry, and the little Demont division, formed of Davout's fourth battalions. Thus the 23,000 men with whom the battle had begun on the preceding day were increased on the morning of the 22d to 60,000—a number sufficient for victory. Unfortunately the artillery was not sufficient; for Lannes, Massena, and the heavy cavalry had together no more than 144 pieces of cannon, and the Austrians had 300. However, some 30,000 of our men, with fifty pieces of cannon, had maintained their ground against the Austrians on the preceding day; 60,000, with 150 guns, ought this day to beat them. The thing was certain if ammunition did not fail, and supplies of this continued to arrive, the bridge being maintained in a practicable condition.

At the daybreak both armies were on foot, and the sharpshooters began to exchange shots at four o'clock in the morning. Napoleon, who had scarcely slept, was on horseback, surrounded by his marshals, and giving them orders, with full confidence that he should terminate the war that day. Massena was to occupy Aspern entirely, and dislodge General Vacquant from the church. Lannes was to repulse all assaults that might be made on Essling, and then, taking advantage of the form of the ene-

my's line, which was that of a vast semicircle, he was to break it by a sudden and vigorous effort of our right; Marshal Davout, two of whose divisions were at Ebersdorf, being shortly expected to follow Lannes, and cover him on the right during that operation.

With these instructions, Massena and Lannes proceeded to their respective posts. Feeling the necessity of well connecting Aspern with the Danube, Massena had posted the whole Molitor division in the little island on the left, where, though reduced from 7000 men to 4000, its own valour would enable it to maintain its ground with such feeble defences as that post possessed, including a small canal, some trees, and a breastwork of earth which Lazouski, the engineer, had thrown up in the night. The Legrand division, which had fought in Aspern towards the close of the preceding day, remained there still. Massena gave it the support of Carra St. Cyr's division, which was relieved in its guard of the little bridge by Demont's division. Napoleon also sent to Aspern the tirailleurs of the imperial guard, with four pieces of cannon, in order that the young soldiers of that recently-formed troop might first see fire under the intrepid Massena.

At Essling, leaving General Boudet to the task of defending the interior of the village, Lannes stationed to the left, and in advance, in the interval between Essling and Aspern, first St. Hilaire's division, then more on the left, towards the centre, Oudinot's two divisions, the cuirassiers, the hussars, and the chasseurs. The latter served as a link of connection with Massena's corps at Aspern. In the rear, at the centre, the fusiliers of the guard and the old guard itself remained as a reserve, but formed a bend towards Essling, to close the open space between that village and the Danube, by which the enemy might be tempted to penetrate, since he was master of the little town of Enzersdorf. This danger was further provided for by a strong battery of 12-pounders, which was placed on the other side of the small arm of the river and raked the ground in question. The artillery was planted in the intervals of this line of battle to second the efforts of every arm.

It was in this order that the battle began again in the morning. Massena have ordered General Legrand to dislodge General Vacquant from the church at the western extremity of Aspern, and having sent him two regiments of the Carra St. Cyr division, the 24th light and the 4th of the line, Colonel Pourailly, an excellent officer, marched as fast as he could for the dead bodies heaped together in the main street of Aspern. Hiller and Bellegarde, who still had orders to act against Aspern, were on the ground at an early hour. While the 24th was engaged with them, it was taken in flank from a side street, by a column which was traversing the village in an opposite direction. The 4th, commanded by the brave Colonel Boyeldieu, making a detour to the right, broke the enemy's column, and took its two battalions prisoners. The 24th and the 4th, led by Legrand, then drove the Austrians out of the church and the cemetery. Meanwhile, the Molitor division, from its covert in the little isle, shot down all the Austrian sharpshooters that ventured within range of its musketry.

The moment was come for executing the offensive movement designed against the Austrian centre; for while Hiller and Bellegarde were repulsed from Aspern, Rosenberg's two columns were kept at a distance from Essling by the fire of the Boudet division; and in the middle of the semicircle of the Austrian army there was only Hohenzollern's corps, feebly connected with that of Rosenberg by Lichtenstein's cavalry, and supported at a great distance by the reserve of grenadiers. It was doubtful that the Austrian centre could withstand a mass of 20,000 infantry and 6000 horse, which Lannes was going to throw upon it.

At the signal given by Napoleon, Lannes advanced with his right foremost against the centre of the Austrians, leaving Boudet in Essling. St. Hilaire's division marched first, regiment by regiment, in close columns—an arrangement which has the disadvantage of giving more prise to the cannon-ball, but which presents a solidity that defies all shocks. More to the left, and a little in the rear, Claparède and Tharreau's two divisions came next, in the same order, and presenting successive *echelons*. Still more to the left and the rear, the cavalry formed the last of these *echelons* directed against the enemy's centre.

Lannes put them in motion with the vigour he displayed in all his attacks. The 57th of the line of St. Hilaire's division, on our extreme right, charged the Austrian infantry, and forced it to give way. The whole division supported the 57th, and, as the other regiments, formed in so many close columns, came each within range of the enemy, they halted and fired, and then advanced again, gaining ground from the troops opposed to them. Oudinot's two divisions, in their turn, took part in this offensive movement, and presently the Austrians, being assailed by the whole line, began to retire in disorder. At this sight, Archduke Charles, like many another captain wavering in council but brave on the field of battle, hastened forward in person, to prevent the catastrophe that threatened his centre. He ordered up the grenadiers that were at Breitenlee, and sent word to Bellegarde to fall back from Aspern towards Essling, in order to strengthen the middle of his line. While awaiting the execution of these orders, he seized the flag of Bach's regiment, and led it back under fire. His bravest officers were struck down by his side; among the rest, Count Colloredo.

Lannes, who, like him, headed his soldiers in person, seeing the Austrian infantry disordered, let loose upon them Bessières and his cuirassiers, who, charging Hohenzollern's corps, broke several squares, and took prisoners, cannons, and flags. We were now all but arrived at Breitenlee, where Archduke Charles had placed his reserve of grenadiers. Success now seeming certain, Lannes sent a staff-officer, César de Laville, to acquaint Napoleon of his progress, and ask him to cover his rear while he was advancing in the plain, and leaving so large a space between him and Essling.

Laville found Napoleon at a place called the Tuilerie, between Essling and Aspern, coolly regarding the grand spectacle of which he was the director. He did not express any thing like the satisfaction he might have been expected to feel at such a communication. The

fact was, an unfortunate accident had occurred. After incredible efforts on the part of Bertrand and Pernetti to keep open the passage across the Danube, the flood had at last completely broken the great bridge between Ebersdorf and the island of Lobau, just at the moment when six fine regiments of artillery, Davout's two divisions, and the artillery wagons, were preparing to cross. A squadron of cuirassiers were severed in two, and swept with the boats down the stream; some to the right, others to the left. The want of troops, however, was not the worst consequence of the rupture of the bridge, for the 60,000 already passed over were enough to beat the Austrians. What was most to be regretted was the want of ammunition, a prodigious quantity of which had already been consumed, and of which there would soon be a scarcity.

At this sad news, brought by M. de Mortemart, Napoleon became too prudent, perhaps, after having been too rash. He feared he should be left on that vast field of battle with no other means of offence against the enemy besides bayonets and swords; and also that, having sent all his troops into action, excepting the foot guard and the fusiliers, who were covering Lannes's rear, he should have no resource against a sudden turn of fortune, which, with the river behind him, could not but be disastrous. He therefore resolved upon a painful sacrifice, and renounced an almost certain victory, in order not to expose himself to risks which prudence forbade him to brave. Having formed this resolution in an instant, with the firmness of a thorough soldier, Napoleon ordered M. de Laville to return as fast as possible, and tell Marshal Lannes to suspend his movement, and fall back gradually, without too much emboldening the enemy, on the Essling and Aspern line. He was also to recommend the marshal to be sparing of his ammunition.

On receiving this order, Lannes and Bessières were compelled, to their deep regret, to halt in the midst of the vast field of Marchfeld, inundated with fire. The archduke, just before so hard pressed towards Breitenlee, saw our columns suddenly become stationary, without being able to divine the cause. He took advantage of that respite to move from his right to his left a part of Bellegarde's corps, and to draw up in line behind Hohenzollern's corps the sixteen battalions of grenadiers that formed his reserve, besides an enormous mass of artillery, for he had nearly 800 guns, and could bring together 200 of them upon that threatened point. Relieved, then, from his first confusion, he opened a tremendous cannonade upon Lannes. The St. Hilaire division, the most advanced of the three, received a continual fire of grape in front and flank. It retreated slowly, with the steadiness becoming the veteran regiments composing it and the chivalric St. Hilaire who commanded it. Unfortunately, that brave officer, one of Napoleon's old friends, fell mortally wounded by a biscayan. His division, though struck with grief, still remained steady. Lannes hastened to take the place of St. Hilaire, and bring back his division to less exposed ground. He continued the retreat, but like a lion, whom it was dangerous to pursue. The corps that ventured to press upon him too nearly were fiercely charged, and



driven back at the point of the bayonet. Passing from St. Hilaire's division to Oudinot's two, Lannes led them with the same vigour in presence of an enemy whom our retreat filled with confidence. Unfortunately, Oudinot's soldiers suffered more than the rest, because it was thought too hazardous to make such young troops deploy in face of the enemy. Being ranged in deep columns, whole files of them were mowed down with cannon-balls.

Gradually Lannes brought back his line as far as the ditch running from Essling to Aspern, which formed a sort of shelter, behind which his infantry could be covered. His artillery, though inferior in number to the enemy's, and worse supplied, was left alone on the salient part of the ditch to stop the advance of the Austrian columns. Hiller's corps and part of Bellegarde's were now moving on Aspern, Rosenberg's two columns were again approaching Essling, and Hohenzollern's, reinforced by part of Bellegarde's, the grenadiers, and Lichtenstein's cavalry, were preparing to make an effort against our centre, similar to that which Napoleon had essayed against the centre of the Austrians.

The latter design being simultaneously perceived by Napoleon and by Lannes, they asked the St. Hilaire and Oudinot divisions and the cavalry to devote themselves once more for the safety of the army. Having stationed the St. Hilaire, Clapartède, and Tharreau divisions in the first line, the cuirassiers in the second, and the old guard in the third, Lannes allowed the dense mass of Hohenzollern's corps and the grenadiers to approach within half-musket-shot, and then poured in upon them such a fire of grape and musketry as soon thinned their ranks. He then launched the cavalry against the Austrian infantry, which gave way in several places, and opened like a breach in a wall. The brave Prince John de Lichtenstein made a counter-charge with his cavalry against that of Bessières. But Lasalle and Marulaz came with their chasseurs and huzzars to the aid of our cuirassiers, and presently nothing was to be seen on the broad plain but a confused mass of 15,000 French and Austrian cavalry furiously charging each other, united when they dashed forward, disunited when they returned, and rallying incessantly to charge again.

After this long *mêlée* the enemy's movement against our centre seemed suspended, and Hohenzollern's corps halted as if paralyzed before the breastwork running from Essling to Aspern. Our artillery, partly dismounted, remained on the further side of the ditch, firing with precision, but slowly, on account of the scarcity of ammunition, and exposed to the fire of more than 200 pieces of cannon. Our infantry sheltered in the ditch, our cavalry forming a screen in the rear, and filling the space between Essling and Aspern, sustained an incessant cannonade with wonderful impassibility. An imperious necessity commanded this; for it was only by holding out to the close of the day that our men could escape being driven into the swollen Danube. At this moment a dreadful calamity befell the army. While Lannes was galloping from one corps to the other, encouraging his soldiers, an officer, who was alarmed at seeing him exposed to so much danger, entreated him to dismount for the greater safety. He followed

the advice, though it was far from his habit to be careful of his life, and, as if destiny were a master whom there was no escaping, he was that instant struck by a cannon-ball that shattered both his knees. Bessières and the chef-d'escadron César de Laville raised him up bathed in blood, and almost senseless. Bessières, whom he had used very ill on the preceding day, pressed his weak hand, but with averted face, for fear of offending him by his presence. He was laid on a cuirassier's cloak and carried half a league to the little bridge where an ambulance was stationed. The news soon spread through the whole army, and filled it with deep sorrow. But it was no time for tears, for the danger was every moment increasing.

The enemy's efforts, baffled in the centre, turned with fury upon the wings against Aspern and Essling. Hiller and Vacquant now make reiterated attacks on the unfortunate village of Aspern, which is but a mass of ruins and corpses. The tirailleurs of the guard, notwithstanding their youthful ardour and the efforts of their veteran officers, are driven out of the village. Immediately Legrand with the wreck of his division, and Carra St. Cyr with the half of his, retake that heap of smoking ruins under the eyes of Massena, who stands among them broken down with fatigue, but elevated above the weaknesses of human nature by the force of his soul. Legrand, who is charged with the execution of his orders, appears everywhere, with the point of his hat cut off by a cannon-ball, and often obliged to use his sword to parry the thrusts of the enemy's bayonets. On the left, Molitor flings into the branch of the river behind which he is posted the Austrians, who attempt to gain a footing on the little island. Thanks to this heroic resistance, Aspern remains ours. But the archduke cherishes a last hope, that of taking Essling. He surrounds that position with Rosenberg's columns, and commands in person a furious attack of the grenadiers upon the centre of the village. Bessières, who has taken the place of Lannes, sees this new danger and prepares to ward it off. Napoleon to aid him, sends him the fusiliers of the guard, a superb body of men, formed during the campaign in Poland and Spain, and near attaining that perfection which is found between the extreme youth and the extreme age of the soldier. Their commander was General Mouton. "Brave Mouton," said the Emperor, "make one more effort to save the army; but make a finish of it, for after these fusiliers, I have nothing left but the grenadiers and chasseurs of the old guard, a last resource, to be expended only in case of a disaster." Mouton obeys, and sets out in the direction of Essling, where the attack of the Austrian grenadiers seems most to be apprehended. Bessières, who is nearer the spot, sees the danger on the right between Essling and the Danube, and does not hesitate to change the direction given by the Emperor. He sends part of Mouton's four battalions into Essling, and part to the right between the village and the river. This succour was urgently needed, for in front Essling was threatened by the grenadiers, and on the right by Rosenberg's columns, which were ready to pass between Essling and the Danube. It was General Boudet who still defended Essling. Five times had the

grenadiers returned to the attack, led by Field-marshal d'Aspre, and five times had they been repulsed by musketry and the bayonet. Nevertheless, on the right of the village, which was not numerously defended, Boudet was outflanked by one of Rosenberg's columns, and obliged to retreat into a granary, a large building battlemented like a fortress. There he kept his position with indomitable tenacity; but, being assailed on all sides, he was on the point of succumbing when Mouton came up with the fusiliers of the guard. Those gallant youths wrested part of the village from Aspre's grenadiers, and stopped Rosenberg's soldiers along the space extending to the Danube. But this one act of energy was not enough against an enemy four times more numerous, and resolved to make the utmost efforts to succeed. Rapp, however, comes up with two more battalions of these same fusiliers, and proposes to General Mouton to make a general charge with the bayonet. With a mutual grasp of the hand they agree on this final effort, and rush headlong on the Austrians, sweep them back in an instant from one end of the village to the other, drive Aspre's soldiers in confusion upon Rosenberg's, and clear Essling of them all. At the same moment the artillery at Lobau pours a raking fire of grape on the masses that had passed between the village and the river. Thus Essling was delivered.

The conflict had now lasted thirty hours, and Archduke Charles, despairing of the possibility of forcing us into the Danube, and finding his own ammunition also beginning to fail, determined to suspend this bloody battle, one of the most frightful of the age, and to close the day by discharging his remaining shells and balls on the troops stationed between Aspern and Essling. So, while in Aspern Generals Hiller and Bellegarde were still pertinaciously contesting some ruined remains of that unhappy village, Archduke Charles put an end to the attacks on our right and our centre, and only moved his artillery forward to cannonade our lines. A danger of this kind could only be met with passive coolness. Our artillery, in a great measure dismounted, remained as before on the bank of the ditch, firing from time to time. Behind it was the infantry, partly covered by the form of the ground, and farther in the rear our fine cavalry deployed, presenting two fronts, one from Essling to Aspern, to cover the centre of the position, the other at right angles to this, to cover the space between Essling and the river. Lastly, the imperial guard, presenting two fronts parallel to those of the cavalry, remained motionless under the cannonade, and nothing was heard amid the thundering of the artillery but this word of command given by the officers, "Close up!" In fact, there was nothing to be done but to repeat that manœuvre until night, for it was impossible either to drive off the enemy or to escape by the bridge leading to the island of Lobau. Such a retreat by a single issue could only be effected under favour of darkness, and in the month of May there were many hours yet to wait for that friendly obscurity. During the whole day Napoleon had not quitted the angle formed by our lines from Aspern to Essling, and from Essling to the river, a space swept by so many cannon-balls. So long as there was any reason to apprehend a

fresh attack, he had been deaf to all entreaties to shelter a life on which the lives of all depended. But now that the exhausted enemy did nothing but cannonade, he resolved to make a personal inspection of the island of Lobau, in order to choose the best site there for the encampment of his army, and make all other necessary arrangements for retreat. Secure of the possession of Essling, which was occupied by the remains of the Boudet division and by the fusiliers, he sent to Massena to inquire if he could rely on the possession of Aspern; for so long as those two points remained to us, the retreat of the army was insured. The staff-officer, César de Laville, who took the message, found Massena seated on a heap of rubbish, harassed with fatigue, with bloodshot eyes, but with unabated energy of spirit. On receiving the message he stood up and replied, with extraordinary emphasis, "Go tell the Emperor I will hold out two hours—six—twenty-four—so long as it is necessary for the safety of the army."

Satisfied as to these two points, Napoleon immediately proceeded towards the island of Lobau, after sending orders to Massena, Bessières, and Berthier to join him as soon as they could quit their posts, in order to make arrangements for the retreat, which was to be effected that night. The little arm of the Danube was now become a great river, and the mills thrown in by the enemy had several times endangered the bridge by which it was crossed. The aspect of its banks was of a nature to wring the heart. Long files of wounded men, some dragging themselves along as they could, others carried on the arms of soldiers, or laid on the ground until they could be removed to the island; dismounted horse-soldiers throwing off their cuirasses to march more at ease; wounded horses flocking instinctively to the river to quench their thirst, and entangling themselves in the cordage of the bridge so as to endanger its safety; hundreds of artillery-wagons half-broken, an indescribable confusion and piteous groans,—such was the scene that presented itself to Napoleon. He dismounted, took some water in his hands to cool his face, and then perceiving a litter made of branches of trees, on which Lannes lay with his legs amputated, he ran to him, pressed him in his arms, spoke hopefully of his recovery, and found him, though heroic as ever, yet keenly affected at seeing himself so soon stopped in that career of glory. "You are going to lose," said Lannes, "him who was your best friend and your faithful companion in arms. May you live, and save the army." The malevolence which Napoleon had but too much provoked, at that time propagated a report of reproaches which Lannes was said to have cast upon him in his last moments. Nothing of the kind, however, took place. Lannes received his master's embrace with a sort of convulsive satisfaction, and mingled no word of bitterness with the expression of his grief. There was no need he should do so. A single look of his recalling all he had so often said as to the danger of incessant wars, the sight of his two shattered limbs, the death of another hero of Italy, St. Hilaire, struck down on that day, the horrible hetacomb of forty or fifty thousand men laid low, were not these so many reproaches keen enough and easy enough to understand?

After pressing Lannes in his arms, and saying surely to himself what the dying hero had not said—for the genius that has committed faults is its own severest judge—Napoleon mounted his horse again, and rode to the island of Lobau. After exploring it in all directions, he satisfied himself that the army would find in it an intrenched camp in which it would be unassailable, and might take shelter for two or three days until the great bridge was repaired. The Austrians could not cross the small branch of the river in defiance of Massena, who would be there to dispute the passage; and the breadth of the island was too great to allow of their cannon-balls reaching our soldiers. And then, by employing all the boats that were on the right bank, the army might be supplied with all the necessities for subsistence and defence.

These matters having been promptly settled in his own mind, Napoleon returned at night to the small branch, where, with Massena, Bessières, Berthier, some general officers, and Davout, who had arrived in a boat, he held a council of war. Napoleon was not in the habit of assembling that sort of council in which a vacillating mind seeks, but finds not, resolutions which he is unable of himself to arrive at. On this occasion he wanted, not to ask advice of his lieutenants, but to give it them; to fill them with his own thought, and revive the spirits of those that desponded; and it is certain that, although their soldierly courage was unshakable, their minds did not sufficiently embrace the difficulties and the resources of the situation to escape being in some degree surprised, confused, and depressed. The fortitude that supports disasters is rarer than the heroism that braves death. Napoleon, calm and confident, because he saw in what had occurred a mere accident, by no means irreparable, called on the officers present to express their opinion. From the language held before him, he could infer that those two days had made a deep impression, and that some of his lieutenants were for recrossing forthwith not only the small branch, but the island and the large branch also, in order to join the rest of the army as soon as possible, at the risk of losing all the cannon, all the artillery, and cavalry-horses, 12,000 or 15,000 wounded men, and the honour of our arms. No sooner had such a thought been suggested, than Napoleon interposed with the authority that belonged to him; and, with the unfeigned confidence he derived from the extent of his resources, thus expounded his own views. The day had been a severe one, he said, but it could not be considered a defeat, since we remained masters of the field of battle; and it was doing wonders to retire safe and sound after such a conflict, sustained with a huge river at our back and with our bridges destroyed. As for our loss in killed and wounded, it was great—greater than any we had before suffered in our long wars—but that of the enemy must have been a third greater. It might, therefore, Napoleon thought, be assumed for certain that the Austrians would be quiet for a long time, and leave him leisure to wait the arrival of the army in Italy, which was approaching victoriously though Styria; to bring back to the ranks three-fourths of his wounded; to receive the numerous reinforcements that were on the march from France, and to build wooden bridges

over the Danube as solid as structures of stone, and which would make the passage of the river an ordinary operation. Napoleon went on to say, that, after all, when the wounded should have returned to the ranks, it would be only 10,000 men less on our side to set off against 15,000 on the adversary's, and two months more in the duration of the campaign; that at 500 leagues from Paris, maintaining a great war in the heart of a conquered monarchy, in its very capital, there was nothing in an accident of that kind that ought to astound men of courage,—nothing but what was very natural, nay, even fortunate, if one took account of the difficulties of the enterprise, which was no less than crossing in the teeth of a hostile army the largest river in Europe, to go and give battle beyond it. There was no reason, therefore, he maintained, for alarm or discouragement. There was a retrograde movement which was proper and necessary; namely, to recross the small arm of the Danube to the island of Lobau, there to wait for the subsidence of the waters and the reconstruction of the bridges over the large branch—an easy movement, which would be performed by night without inconvenience, without losing a single wounded man, a single horse, or a single cannon; above all, without losing honour. But there was another retrograde movement, both dishonouring and disastrous; that was, to repass not only the small but the great arm, scrambling over the latter how they could, with boats which could carry only sound men, without one cannon, one horse, one wounded man, and abandoning the island of Lobau, which was a precious conquest, and the true ground for ultimately effecting a passage. If they acted in that way—if, instead of 60,000, which they numbered at their departure, they went back 40,000, without artillery or horses, and leaving behind them 10,000 wounded men, who might be capable of service in a month, they would do well not to show themselves to the Viennese, who would overwhelm their vanquishers with scorn, and soon summon the Archduke Charles to expel the French from a capital where they were no longer worthy to remain. And, in that case, it was for a retreat not to Vienna, but to Strasburg, that they should have to prepare. Prince Eugene, now on his march to Vienna, would find the enemy there instead of the French army, and would perish in that trap; our dismayed allies, made treacherous by weakness, would turn against us; the fortune of the empire would be annihilated, and the grandeur of France destroyed in a few weeks. In a word, Napoleon foresaw, and distinctly foretold, as certain to be realised in a fortnight, all that his policy brought upon him five years later, if, instead of retiring with dignity into Lobau, the French were weak enough to make a precipitate retreat over the Danube, leaving behind their wounded comrades, their *matériel*, and their honour. Besides, to act as he advised, would cost but little efforts. Massena would hold out on the Aspern until midnight, would then defend with the army over the small bridge, defend Lobau next day against the attempts of the enemy, and wait behind the small arm of the Danube for the victuals and ammunition which would be sent to him in boats. During this time the large bridge would be constructed, and if, contrary

to all probability, Archduke Charles dared to make an attempt to cross the river at Presburg or Krems, and dispute possession of Vienna with us, Marshal Davout would confront him with his 80,000 men, who were as good as 60,000 Austrians, with the remainder of the cuirassiers, the cavalry of the guard who had not crossed the river, the Wurtemburgers, the Bavarians, and the Saxons. "So, Massena and Davout," said he to them, "you live, and you will save the army, and show yourselves worthy of what you have already done." Massena, who was often a grumbler, and who even bitterly blamed the haste with which the Danube had been crossed, was now delighted with such a display of good sense and fortitude, and, grasping Napoleon's hand, he exclaimed, "You are a man of courage, sir, and worthy to command us! No, we must not fly like cravens who have been beaten. Fortune has not been kind to us, but we are victorious, nevertheless; for the enemy, who ought to have driven us into the Danube, has bitten the dust before our positions. Let us not lose our victorious attitude; let us only cross the small branch of the Danube, and I pledge myself to drown in it every Austrian who shall attempt to cross it in pursuit of us." Davout, on his part, promised to defend Vienna from any attack, by way of Presburg or Krems, during the renovation of the bridges, after which the army, combined on one bank, would no longer have any thing to fear from Archduke Charles.

Every man felt his heart rise within him after this council. Massena, who was to take the command in chief of the army, returned to Aspern while Napoleon proceeded to cross the main branch between eleven and twelve at night. The danger was great, by reason of the darkness and the enormous floating masses rolled along by the flood. But, with the confidence of Cæsar amid the billows, Napoleon embarked in a small boat with Berthier and Savary, and arrived safely at Ebersdorf on the opposite shore. Immediately he gave orders to collect there all the barges that could be had, and sent them off to Lobau, freighted with biscuits, wine, brandy, cannon and musket-cartridges, and dressing materials for the wounded. The boats detached from the large bridge sufficed for the occasion.

Meanwhile, Massena was taking measures at Essling and Aspern for the retreat. The direct attack on those points had ceased. The Austrian cannonade grew slower as the night advanced, and only did occasional mischief here and there. Our wreny adversaries sank down overpowered at that field of carnage, while our critical position compelled us to maintain all our vigilance, though our fatigue was as great as that of the Austrians. At midnight Massena began the retreat with the imperial guard, which was nearest to the river. Every corps was to defile by the small bridge, carrying off its wounded and its cannons, and leaving behind only its dead, the number of which was unhappily great. After the guard came the heavy cavalry; and as many of the men had thrown off their cuirasses, Massena had them picked up by the dismounted soldiers, wishing to leave the enemy but as few trophies as possible. Part of the light cavalry remained in line, with the voltigeurs, in order to make a

feint of resistance in front of Aspern and Essling. Next in order were the St. Hilaire, Oudinot, Legrand, and Carra St. Cyr divisions; and at last, at daybreak, Generals Boudet and Molitor, quitting Essling and Aspern, plunged into the wood which covered the bend of the river, escorted by a swarm of their tirailleurs. The harassed enemy did not perceive the retrograde movement of our troops. It was not till towards five or six in the morning, that, seeing our advanced posts gradually disappear, he conceived a suspicion of our retreat, and thought of pursuing us. He did this slowly, and without giving us much trouble. As soon, however as he had entered Essling and reached the edge of the river, he caught sight of the little bridge over which our last columns were passing, and he immediately turned the fire of his cannon and his sharpshooters in that direction. Massena remained on the left bank with some of his staff, resolved to be the last man to cross the bridge. It was pointed out to him that our posts were beginning to be sharply pressed, that he might be suddenly assailed, and that it was time to unmoor the bridge, and put an end to this unparelled resistance. He would listen to nothing, as long as he saw any relic to be saved on the river side. Going about in all directions, he assured himself with his own eyes that he was not leaving behind one wounded man, one cannon, or a single object of any value to gratify the pride of the enemy. He had search made again for any muskets or cuirasses that might be lying about; and he had all the wounded and straggling horses driven into the river and forced to swim across it. At last, when there was no further duty to be performed, and the bullets of the enemy's sharpshooters were whistling round him, he embarked last of all, as gallantly as when he quitted Genoa in an open boat under the fire of the English squadron. He ordered the cables to be cut; the bridge was soon swept by the stream to the other bank, and in a few minutes he was in Lobau, the Austrians contenting themselves with watching the voluntary retreat of their adversaries.

Thus ended this battle of two days,—one of the bloodiest of the age, and the first in the series of those abominable carnages of the latter times of the empire, in which numbers equal to the population of a great city were destroyed in one day. The amount of killed and wounded cannot easily be determined with accuracy; but it may be estimated at 26,000 or 27,000 on the side of the Austrians and 15,000 or 16,000 on that of the French. The want of surgical appliances in the island of Lobau necessarily rendered the wounds of our men extremely dangerous. What accounted for the enormous difference in the losses sustained on either side was, that the Austrians had always fought without cover, whereas we had been sheltered during part of the two days by the conformation of the ground. As for prisoners, none were made on either side, except a few hundred taken in Aspern and Essling and sent to Lobau. It was a battle without other result than an abominable effusion of blood, greater on the enemy's side than on ours, and which left us all our means of passage, since the island of Lobau remained ours. The worst consequences of those days at Ess-

ling were what the world would say of them. Our enemies would not fail to publish in Germany and all over Europe that the French were beaten, cut to pieces, and in full retreat. Now Napoleon, fighting in the midst of the continent, which was ready to rise against him, obliged to maintain himself in the enemy's capital, where 400,000 inhabitants were only awaiting the signal for insurrection, and needing secure roads in his rear for the arrival of his reinforcements, could not dispense with the *prestige* of his invincibility. Physically, he was the stronger, since he had lost less than his adversary, and had steeled the courage of his young army in a formidable trial; morally, he was weaker, since his enemies were about to boast over his alleged defeat, which was in reality a victory. As for his conduct as a general, it was impossible not to admire his choice of Lobau, which rendered possible an operation in any other case impracticable, and enabled him to come off by the easiest of retreats from a position from which the only probable issue seemed to be drowning or captivity. But Napoleon deserved blame for his haste to cross the river in such a season before he had got together adequate means. Still there were so many motives to prompt his impatience to occupy both banks of the Danube, that he may be pardoned for having relied too much on fortune in his wish to save time. His real fault, his stupendous fault, was that unbridled policy which, after having carried him to the Niemen, whence he had only returned by dint of miracles, had next carried him to the Ebro and the Tagus, whence he had returned in person, leaving his best armies behind him, now hurried him to the Danube, where he contrived to maintain himself only by other miracles, the series of which might cease at any moment, and give place to disasters. This, we say, was his capital fault, for the general committed no errors except under the constraint exercised over him by the most imprudent of politicians.

As for Archduke Charles, whose conduct has since been severely criticised, and especially by his countrymen, he displayed great energy, whatever may have been said to the contrary; and if it is thought strange that he did not hurl the French army into the river, those who thus talk forget the strength of the positions chosen by his adversary, and the impossibility of wresting Aspern and Essling from 60,000 Frenchmen, commanded by Lannes and Massena, and reduced to the necessity of conquering or perishing; and they forget the advantages of Lobau, to which retreat was easy while Aspern and Essling remained to us, and which then became an inviolable asylum. To attempt to force the small arm of the Danube, in face of Massena, without a bridge, or even with one, would have been a rash enterprise, for not venturing upon which the Austrian commander has been blamed by men who would have been incapable of executing it. What has been alleged against the archduke with more reason by certain impartial judges is, that during the battle he extended a great deal too much the semicircle round the French, so as to expose himself to the risk of having his line broken; and that by greater concentration on his right, and by employing all his forces to cut his way through at Aspern, he

might, perhaps, have had more chance of cutting us off from the Danube. On the other hand, it must be observed, that if he had acted in this way, he would probably have been met at Aspern by all the forces, which in that case would have not been required elsewhere. After so tremendous a battle, and such heroic efforts, we must admire such gallantry and be silent, whatever may have been the result, before deeds of such energy as men have rarely equalled.

It was during the days following the battle that Archduke Charles might have executed things he did not even attempt. The French army was then in a critical position, being partly in the island of Lobau, partly on the right bank of the Danube, with the principal stream dividing its two positions. This was an opportunity such as Napoleon would not have failed to seize. Admitting that it was impossible for the archduke to cross over to the island of Lobau in the teeth of Massena and his 45,000 men, there was infinitely less reason why he should not attempt one of those passages above or below Vienna which Napoleon regarded with so much apprehension, and against which he took so many ingenious precautions.

Had Archduke Charles marched to Presburg, crossed the Danube there, and gone up the right bank to attack Marshal Davout, who had not 40,000 men to act against him, he would no doubt have had a fair chance of doing us a mischief. But he would also have run some risk, for he would have needed not less than two days to go down the Danube, and two to go up on the opposite side, and there was much probability that in those four days the temporary repair of the great bridge would have enabled the French army to return to the right bank. In that case, Archduke Charles would have had 80,000 men to fight, with but 70,000 at the most on his side, for the battle of Essling had cost him 28,000 or 27,000. He might, therefore, have been cut to pieces or driven with great loss into Hungary. There remained another operation to be tried, as hazardous as this one, but still more decisive had it succeeded. This was to go up the course of the Danube, fall in with Kollowrath's 25,000 men, and, with a force thus raised to 95,000, cross the river at one of the points between Krems and Lintz, forcing a passage against Bernadotte's Saxons or Vandamme's Wurtembergers, and debouch on Napoleon's rear. In this case the passage would be less certain, since it would be disputed, but by troops whom there was a great chance of beating; it would be effected with an additional 25,000 men; it would bring about a concentration superior to any Napoleon could at that moment accomplish; it required only a space of two or three days; it afforded opportunity for beating in detail before their junction the Saxons, the Wurtembergers, and Davout's divisions, dispersed between St. Polten, Vienna, and Ebersdorf; lastly, in case of success, it would place Napoleon in the position of General Melas after the battle of Marengo. But also, by placing such an adversary and such an army in such an extremity, it would provoke them to extraordinary efforts, and be consequently attended with immense danger. This plan, then, the more decisive but

the more hazardous of the two, was the less likely to be adopted by the archduke.

The archduke adopted neither of these courses. It was not until the 23d of May that he knew whether he was victorious or not; and though he sent off despatches in all directions declaring that he was so, his conviction of that fact was by no means well assured. His army, diminished by one-third, was exhausted with fatigue. For himself, he was not disposed to recommence the conflict. For the first time in his life he had stood before Napoleon without being beaten, and, quite astonished at this unusual triumph, he wished to enjoy it before he ran fresh risks. His losses, the insufficiency of his remaining forces, and the entire consumption of his ammunition, were motives for waiting and enjoying in quiet the pleasure of an unexpected success. It must be owned, too, that there were some weighty considerations in favour of this line of conduct. It might, in fact, be argued that his advantage lay in gaining time, that not to perish was a positive success for an army fighting in its own country within reach of all its resources, and surrounded by all the sympathies of Germany, which waited only an opportunity to declare themselves. It might be argued that Napoleon, on the contrary, at a distance of several hundred leagues from his frontiers, living in the midst of a hostile population, in a conquered and exasperated capital, and maintaining himself there only by the *prestige* of his invincibility, had need of a constant succession of dazzling exploits, and of hastening matters to a close; that to pass the Danube was for him an indispensable condition towards any ultimate success, and that to have failed therein was a moral as well as a physical check; consequently that it was better to persist in opposing to him the only sort of obstacle which had stopped him until then, and to persevere in a system of tactics which had succeeded, than to go and offer oneself to his blows, and risk the dubious chance of battle by attempting a hazardous passage above or below Vienna. Thus argued Archduke Charles with much reason; and he would have done wisely if, in adopting such a plan, he had followed it out to all its consequences, and employed the time afforded him in reinforcing the Austrian army, rendering the Danube more and more difficult to cross, and raising up around Napoleon the resistances of all kinds which an advantage gained over him would naturally provoke. This, at least, is what he seemed at first bent on doing, applying himself to increase the strength of his position opposite Vienna, striving to augment the difficulties of any future attempts to cross the Danube, concentrating all the forces he could at that point, sending orders to Archduke John to join him as soon as possible, and, above all, singing psalms in Germany, and writing word everywhere that the French had been beaten, destroyed; talking of thirty or forty thousand killed and wounded, and as many prisoners, so that, had all these stories been true, Napoleon would not have had one soldier left; talking, moreover, of an inevitable retreat of the French on Linz, Passau, and even Strasburg, and promising to all a general and sure deliverance of Europe, and particularly if Germany would second Austria with a single effort. Fortunately for Napoleon, what the archduke could

do best toward turning his victory to account, was to boast of the success he had achieved; and, vanity apart, it was something useful, as we shall soon see, to boast a great deal, and even beyond all bounds of truth or probability.

In fact, Napoleon had much less reason to be concerned about the physical than the moral consequences of the battle of Essling. He did not, however, make himself more uneasy than was needful about the matter; only he wrote everywhere to set opinion right with regard to the two days' engagement at Essling; and, above all, he took vigorous measures to repair that apparent or real check, so as even to derive from it unexpected and decisive results at no distant day.

The first danger to be provided against was an attempt on the part of Archduke Charles to force a passage into the island of Lobau. Napoleon did not fear this much, provided the 45,000 men there under Massena had victuals, ammunition, and hospital supplies. His first care, as we have seen, was to send them these on the night of the 22d and the following day; and in thirty-six hours Massena had plenty of cartridges for large and small arms, and biscuit enough to keep his soldiers from hunger. The deer which abounded in the island would furnish them with meat; and thus they had all that was necessary for defence and subsistence.

The second danger to which he had to direct his immediate attention was the possibility of a passage at Presburg, the only one which Napoleon regarded as at all probable, as being that which required least boldness. But, to provide against this, it was necessary to have previously overcome a great difficulty; for unless the bridge over the main arm was re-established, at least in a temporary manner, Marshal Davout might have to resist Archduke Charles with only two of his divisions and that part of the guard and the heavy cavalry which had not crossed the river. Davout's third division, stationed between St. Polten and Vienna, would evidently be indispensable to keep the capital in awe whilst the other two were fighting. It is true that Davout had pledged his head for it that, with 25,000 to 30,000 men, he would stop any force coming from Presburg, and the fulfilment of this promise might be confidently expected of the stubborn victor of Auerstädt; but the position was a very critical one, and it was of vast importance to have the means of promptly assembling the whole army, if necessary, on the right bank. Napoleon applied himself to this task without ceasing. Fortunately the seamen of the guard had arrived from Strasburg. They were employed to accelerate the re-establishment of communications between the island and the right bank, a service which they performed with their usual zeal and ability. Part of the infantry of the guard was carried over in boats from the island to Ebersdorf. On the 25th, by means of the pontoons which had served for the passage of the small branch, and of the boats picked up in the river, a bridge was constructed, which would not have served for offensive operations, but was solid enough for the purpose of a retreat: to be effected at successive intervals. Every detachment conveyed to the right bank put Marshal Davout in a condition the better to resist an attack from Presburg; and as for that which might have been directed

against; the island of Lobau, it was manifestly not to be feared, since it had not been attempted on the 23d or 24th.

After the guard, the Demont division crossed over to the main land; then the light cavalry, which was to be sent to reconnoitre round Presburg; then the heavy cavalry; and, lastly, Lannes's whole corps, which since his death had been put under the command of General Oudinot, and could not be in better hands. This business having been effected on the 27th of May, all cause for uneasiness was removed, for Davout had at least 60,000 men at his disposal, and no attempt of Archduke Charles upon the right bank could have had any chance of success. Napoleon ordered Lasalle and Marulaz to Haimburg, with nine regiments of cavalry, to check any thing that might come from Presburg, whether it were the army of Archduke Charles, or merely the Hungarian rising, which was beginning to muster. He ordered Montbrun to Eidenburg, on the other side of the lake of Neusiedel, to watch the roads from Hungary and Italy by which Archduke John might present himself in his retreat before Prince Eugene. General Lauriston continued as before at Bruck, with the Badenens and General Bruyère's cavalry, to support Prince Eugene on his march through Styria. Napoleon stationed the heavy cavalry in the rear, as he had done before, to support the light cavalry. Lastly, Davout, with the Friant, Gudin, and Demont divisions, Oudinot's whole corps, and the guard, 50,000 or 60,000 men in all, was at Ebersdorf, ready to fall upon Archduke Charles, from whatever side he came.

Napoleon resolved to bring some more forces still to Vienna. Thinking that the Bavarians might suffice to defend their own country not only on the Tyrolese side but towards the Danube, he ordered Marshal Lefebvre to send a Bavarian division to Lintz to relieve the Dupas division and the Saxons stationed there under Bernadotte. General Vandamme was to remain with the Wurtembergers at Krems, while Bernadotte, with his 18,000 men, was to advance to Vienna to augment the forces accumulated there. Massena's corps, which we have not mentioned in this enumeration, was left entirely in the island of Lobau, to guard that spot, which, notwithstanding the use that had been made of it, still remained the most suitable for the passage of the Danube. Napoleon had already devised a means of using it in so novel a manner, that, although warned by a previous attempt, the enemy would be surely deceived by it. He had calculated that a month would be necessary to collect and employ the requisite *matériel*, and to let the flood season elapse, and that he should not be able to strike the blow that should end the war until the end of June or the beginning of July. The same space of time was also requisite to enable him to receive his reinforcements, organize his line of operation more completely, and bring Prince Eugene's army under the walls of Vienna. He set himself, therefore, to prepare the accomplishment of these several designs with imperturbable coolness, incredible activity, and as proud a bearing as he could have displayed on the day following a great victory.

His first business was to prepare materials everywhere. Vienna was full of timber, which

he ordered to be sorted and conveyed to Ebersdorf. The workmen of Vienna wanted work. he resolved to employ them, and to pay them with the Austrian paper-money, of which there was an abundance in the public coffers which had been seized. He had boat-builders sent to Lobau, and had others even brought by post from France, whom he employed in making boats of all forms and sizes, according to a plan we shall describe in its proper place. Lastly, without losing a single day, he gave the following orders for the recruitment of the army. As he had taken care to fill the dépôts by anticipating the conscription of 1810, or by a fresh call upon the anterior classes, he could now draw from them the men previously levied, with a certainty that their places would be filled up by the men last called out. In consequence of this, he had all the ready-trained conscripts put en route for Strasburg in marching battalions, bearing the numbers of the military divisions in which the dépôts were situated. But he had a still surer means of procuring trained men, namely, to take them from the provisional demi-brigades which had been organized in the north, on the frontiers of the Rhine, and even in Italy, and consisted of fourth and fifth battalions. From these he ordered numerous recruits to be taken for Massena, Oudinot, and Davout's corps, some of them being sent directly to their regiments, and others incorporated in regiments to which they did not originally belong. Napoleon had already had recourse to this last measure; he now persisted in employing it in consideration of the urgency of the circumstances, and he applied to three regiments which had returned a year before from Portugal, and since remained on the coast of Bretagne, where they had been largely supplied with young soldiers. He drew from them 3000 or 4000 men fully trained, who, being incorporated in other regiments, might serve to recruit those whose dépôts lacked conscripts. In this way he marked out from 20,000 to 25,000 conscripts to be furnished by the dépôts in France, and 6000 or 8000 by those in Italy. He adopted the same measures for the cavalry, which had considerable resources in its dépôts, seeing that they had not yet been much drawn upon; and he had numerous squadrons sent from the Rhine to the Danube. He took special pains to remount the cavalry, for it had lost still more horses than men. He ordered the formation of two dépôts, one in Bavaria for the purchase of German horses for heavy and medium cavalry, the other in Hungary for the purchase of light cavalry horses. He directed particular attention to the augmentation of his artillery. That of the enemy had done him so much mischief at Essling, that, to increase his own, he had recourse to a device which experience did not justify—which was giving the infantry regiments cannons, to be worked by men from their own ranks expressly drilled for that service. The difficulty of procuring a sufficient number of artillerymen in good time from the dépôts had induced him to adopt this expedient, which his superior tact would have rejected under any other circumstances; for it was easy to foresee that with regard to special arms, nothing could make amends for the want of long training, and that the infantry could never take such care of the *matériel* as a corps exclusively destined to it.

service. Napoleon resolved to give 200 guns to the infantry, at the rate of four to a regiment, employing for this purpose pieces of small calibre, such as 3 and 4-pounders. He determined also to raise the guard's reserve of artillery from the number of sixty pieces to eighty, by drawing the requisite companies of artillerymen from Italy and Strasburg. In this way he calculated on procuring 700 pieces of cannon—an overwhelming mass of artillery, equivalent to about four pieces for every thousand men, and surpassing all proportions previously admitted. These various calls would bring about 40,000 men from France and Italy within a month or two; a reinforcement more than equivalent to all the losses of the campaign—one which was not absolutely necessary in order to fight a decisive battle, for the recruitment called for after Ratisbon was now coming in—but which at any rate would enable Napoleon to continue the war, happen what might.

As to the imperial guard, Napoleon had with him the grenadiers and the chasseurs forming the old guard, and the fusiliers and tirailleurs forming the new. There were two regiments of conscripts of this force at Augsburg, one of grenadiers and one of chasseurs, undergoing instruction, and at the same time serving as a reserve against the movements in Tyrol and Swabia. Napoleon ordered these two regiments to be marched to Vienna, and to be replaced at Augsburg by two which were in the act of formation at Strasburg, so that the reserve at Augsburg might not be diminished. This reserve was of much interest to Napoleon, with a view to what might happen in his rear in consequence of the commotion caused by the battle of Essling. It consisted of the detachments sent to recruit the army which halted in succession at Augsburg; of the 65th, reorganized, since its misadventure at Ratisbon, both with conscripts and with prisoners of that corps recovered by exchange; and of six provisional regiments of dragoons, formed of the third squadrons of the regiments serving in Spain. Such of the provisional demi-brigades as were not to be dissolved and draughted into the army, assembled with the same view at Wurzburg, Hanau, and Mayence. The 85th, surprised at Pordenone, and which had behaved so gallantly on that unfortunate occasion, was recomposed in the same way as the 65th. Counting 7000 or 8000 men, with their *matériel*, to be furnished by the dépôts in Italy, Napoleon sent General Lemarois to Osopo, to superintend their movements, knowing that for want of some responsible individual to have special charge of them, the most essential matters often fail to receive due attention, and that the neglect of a single detail sometimes leads to grievous catastrophes. A column of conscripts having been already taken prisoners in Tyrol, he directed that fresh columns, at least 4000 men strong, should be sent, under a general of brigade, to meet Prince Eugene on his march to Vienna.

The viceroy had taken the road through Carinthia in pursuit of Archduke John, and General Macdonald had taken that through Carniola in pursuit of the ban of Croatia. This pursuit had continued during the days immediately preceding and following the battle of Essling, with the same advantage for the French

and the same losses for the Austrians. On the 16th of May, Prince Eugene arrived at the entry of the gorges of the Carnic Alps, before the fort of Malborghetto, which barred all passage of his artillery, while Archduke John encamped on the other side, in the position of Tarvis.

Our troops entered the village of Malborghetto at the point of the bayonet, and contented themselves with blockading the fort which barred the high road. The infantry and cavalry went on to Tarvis, where they arrived without artillery in presence of the Austrians, who had a great deal. Out of this awkward situation Prince Eugene extricated himself by a bold stroke. After a careful search round Malborghetto, a position was discovered in which it was found possible to erect a battery of several guns. After the fort had been well battered, it was stormed, our men gallantly scaling its regular fortifications under grape, with a loss of not more than one or two hundred men. Irritated by the difficulty they encountered, our soldiers put part of the unfortunate garrison to the sword, took the rest prisoners, and planted the French flag on the summit of the Carnic Alps, on the 17th of May. The prince marched the same day against Tarvis with his artillery. The Austrians, thinking us without cannon, attempted to defend the escarped banks of the Schlitz; but they were soon undeceived by the showers of grape that fell upon them; and being impetuously attacked by our troops, who were flushed by their recent successes, they lost 3000 men and fifteen pieces of cannon. At the same time, General Seras, who had been detached on the route to Cividale, took the fort of Predel in the same vigorous style.

Thus pursued, Archduke John could not throw himself into Upper Austria, as he had intended, and as he had been ordered to do when there had been hopes of a junction of the brothers at Lintz or St. Polten. The rapid march of the French left him no choice but to retreat into Hungary, where he might possibly do good service, either by reinforcing Archduke Charles, or by hindering the junction of the army of Germany with Prince Eugene, Macdonald, and Marmont. The latter course was the one which better suited his inclination to isolate himself, and acquire a glory apart in this war. But his brother, the commander-in-chief, who wished to make all things concur towards the main action, was of a different opinion, and desired him to take up his position behind the Danube, at Presburg, leaving the Hungarians rising and the Ban Giulay to deal with Prince Eugene, Macdonald, and Marmont. Thus placed between his own desires and his brother's instructions, Archduke John retired to Grätz, to await the fresh orders he had solicited. Having lost nearly 15,000 men in the campaign, and given 10,000 or 12,000 to the ban, he had hardly more than 15,000 left when he marched to Grätz; but he relied on various junctions to furnish him again with an army. Thinking there was not much to be expected of the Tyrolese after the battle of Worgel, he had deemed it right to withdraw Chasteler, with his 9000 or 10,000 men, and Jellachich, with his 8000 or 9000, from the Tyrol, ordering them both to cut their way through the army



of Prince Eugene by falling unexpectedly on his van or his rear, so as to debouch by Leoben on Grätz. Supposing these two generals to leave some detachments in Tyrol, to serve as a support to the insurgents, they could bring some 15,000 men into Hungary; and these, added to the remains of his own force, would form for him an excellent corps of about 30,000 men. With Giulay's 10,000 or 12,000, the Hungarian and Croat risings, and some battalions of landwehr, he hoped to procure a further muster of 50,000 or 60,000, and to keep the field against all the French forces of Italy and Dalmatia.

This was a dream like all the rest with which Archduke John had continually beguiled himself during this campaign; and it took no account of all the difficulties to be overcome in order to effect so many junctions in presence of the forces of Prince Eugene, Macdonald, and Marmont. In obedience to orders, General Jellachich quitted the Tyrol in all haste, and on the 25th of May, three days after the battle of Essling, he arrived at the position of St. Michel, in advance of Leoben, while Prince Eugene was a little to the right, in the direction of Grätz, observing Archduke John's march towards Hungary. The cavalry patrols on either side soon discovered each other, and Jellachich had no means of avoiding battle. He took a position on the heights of St. Michel, near Leoben, hoping that the nature of the ground would enable him successfully to resist much superior forces. But Prince Eugene's army of 32,000 or 33,000 men, all in high spirits, were not to be stopped by a force not equal to a third of their own numbers. They had to cross a river and climb mountains to reach Jellachich's 9000 men. This was done with extraordinary boldness, in spite of grape and musketry, and in a few hours Jellachich lost about 2000 killed and wounded, and 4000 prisoners. It was with great difficulty that, by dispersing his men in all directions through a country devoted to Austria, he saved 3000, whom he led to Grätz to Archduke John.

The chances were still less in favour of a junction with General Chasteler, who could only bring with him 5000 or 6000 men, after leaving detachments in Tyrol, and was to find the route through Carinthia and Styria in the occupation of the French. Archduke John then found his forces raised at the most to but 18,000 men by his junction with the wreck of Jellachich's corps, and knew not yet what would become of the Ban Giulay, who, with his detachment and the Croat levies, had to do with Macdonald and Marmont. Thinking it prudent to approach Hungary, he stationed a garrison in the fortress of Grätz, and moved in the direction of Raab, still waiting for orders from his brother, and leaving Prince Eugene to march victoriously to Vienna, whither no obstacle could hinder his arrival, since General Lauriston's detachment was waiting for him at Bruck. In the environs of that town the two French advanced guards met and embraced, and the important fact of the junction of the armies of Italy and Germany was consummated.

General Macdonald's march from Udine to Laybach with his 16,000 or 17,000 men had been not less happily accomplished. He had

crossed the Isonzo, turned and taken the fort of Prevald, and debouched on Laybach, taking prisoners a whole battalion encountered on his route. During this time one of his detachments occupied Trieste. On arriving at Laybach he found there a vast entrenched camp, constructed at great cost, and defended by a strong body of troops, that rendered its capture almost impossible. Macdonald hesitated to attack it with such a force as he possessed, fearing lest he should weaken himself by a fruitless attempt, and be afterwards unable to keep the field. He was, therefore, about to pass on, when he received from the panic-stricken commandant an offer to capitulate. He accepted the offer; and thus he had made, *en passant*, between 4000 and 6000 prisoners, got possession of the fine works of Laybach, and regained the road to Grätz, where he hoped to fall in with the main body of the army of Italy. He arrived there on the 30th of May, having prosperously traversed a large extent of country, and increased the number of his prisoners to 7000. He halted at Grätz, to wait the viceroy's orders, and sent out patrols along the roads of Carniola, to procure news of General Marmont, who, however, having with him 10,000 of the best soldiers, had no reason to fear the troops of the ban, or the insurgent musters scattered along his line of march.

This junction, which yielded Napoleon a reinforcement of 45,000 to 50,000, and to the enemy not more than 15,000 to 18,000, supplied him with a sure means of revenging himself for the battle of Essling. Wishing to indemnify his adopted son for the hurt done to his reputation at Sacile, and to recompense him for his victorious march from Verona to Leoben, and deeming it of much importance to proclaim the vast advantages that would result from the junction of all the French armies, he published a glowing order of the day, in which he paid a just tribute of praise to the army of Italy, and set forth its exploits with a certain exaggeration which was not, after all, very far from the truth; for, since their departure from Verona, the Prince and Macdonald had taken from the enemy, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, not less than 20,000 men, against 4000 or 5000 fatigued or wounded, whom they had left behind on their route.

Supposing that Prince Eugene could furnish 30,000 men present under arms, and General Macdonald 15,000, this would be (without counting General Marmont, who might be left, if needful, in Styria or Hungary) a force of 45,000 men, and of 40,000 at least, added to the French army at Vienna. Adding to these the 100,000 which would be made up by the junction of Davout, Massena, Oudinot, the cavalry reserve, the imperial guard, and the Saxons, Napoleon would have at hand, even before the arrival of his reinforcements, the enormous mass of 140,000 men—quite sufficient for a decisive battle beyond the Danube. Archduke Charles was not in a condition to bring together an equal number of troops, or of as good quality, even had he Napoleon's art of concentrating his forces on the day of battle. Napoleon had then the means of finishing the war as soon as his immense preparations for crossing the Danube should have been completed. However, as he

was resolved this time to make sure work, he was unwilling to come to a last decisive action until the Danube should have been surmounted with works of infallible solidity, and until Prince Eugene, Macdonald, and Marmont were ready to co-operate, directly or indirectly, in the operations before Vienna.

To this end were directed all his instructions to Prince Eugene, whom, now that he had him within reach, he guided as a son and a pupil, whose talents he was as anxious to display in the best light as to secure his co-operation in the great events impending. "You have now," he said to him, in a series of admirable letters, "various ends to propose to yourself; first, to finish the pursuit of Archduke John, so that there may remain on the right bank of the Danube and on the frontier of Hungary no gathering capable of annoying us during our manœuvres round Vienna; secondly, while forcing the archduke back against the Danube, to compel him to cross the river at Komorn rather than Presburg, so that the arc he shall describe being the longest possible, he may have less chance than you of being present at the approaching battle; thirdly, to separate Archduke John from Chasteler, Giulay, and all those who might increase his strength, while you, on the other hand, will be joined by Macdonald and Marmont; fourthly and lastly, to occupy the river Raab, which falling into the Danube near Komorn, forms a barrier, with which you may cover yourself against Hungary; and for that purpose to secure the fortress of Raab, which commands the river at its mouth, and that of Grätz, which commands it at its source, so that this line may be defended by a few detachments, while the army of Italy is arriving by a stolen march under the walls of Vienna to form one of the wings of the grand army." Such were Napoleon's chief instructions to Prince Eugene. He also recommended him to make good use for himself and for the grand army of the vast resources of Hungary, in grain, forage, cattle, horses, and materials for navigation.

For the execution of these designs, Napoleon directed him, after allowing his troops some rest, to leave detachments at Klagenfurth and Leoben, and proceed to Ebdenburg, west of the lake of Neusiedel, where he would find General Lauriston with 8000 men of the Baden infantry, and 4000 cavalry under Colbert and Montbrun; to proceed thence to Raab, and push his *reconnaissances* beyond that river in order to ascertain what route Archduke John was taking, and, once clear on that point, to manœuvre continually, so as to place that prince between Marshal Davout, who was at Presburg, and the army of Italy, in order to hinder his falling upon Macdonald or Marmont; to keep his forces together so as to have 80,000 men at hand (36,000 with Lauriston) when he again encountered Archduke John; to expedite the taking of the citadel of Grätz, and the junction with Macdonald and Marmont; to keep a careful look-out in his rear, so as to catch Chasteler as he had caught Jelachich; to send on to Vienna or back to Osopo all his wounded and invalids, and others incapable of active service; to lay up vast stores of provisions, and send his empty ammunition-wagons half-way to Vienna to be filled; and in fine, to be always ready, either to fight another battle with Archduke John, or to co-op-

rate along with Macdonald and Marmont in the grand final battle which was to be fought on the banks of the Danube against all the forces of the Austrian monarchy. Napoleon enjoined Prince Eugene to treat the Hungarians well, if they were peaceable and well-disposed to the French, but otherwise to subject them to the ordinary consequences of war; that is to say, to live at their expense, but in any case to deal more tenderly by them than by the Austrians. The Hungarians, indeed, deserved this difference of treatment, for they did not display the same animosity against the French as did the other subjects of the house of Austria. Though they had given many proofs of attachment to that house, they were yet opposed to its direct authority, and they beheld in Napoleon the representative of the French revolution, which had excited much sympathy among them. A rumour had soon spread all over the country that Napoleon contemplated the enfranchisement of Hungary as well as of Poland, and those among the Hungarians who were inclined to the new order of things, manifested a sort of liking for him, distinct from the admiration excited by his prodigious career. Nevertheless, the urgent efforts of the Archduke Palatine, the presence of the court and its influence with the higher nobility, had counterbalanced the opposite influences, and Hungary had risen in response to the call of the archdukes, but rather, as many reports alleged, from interested motives than from enthusiasm for the imperial cause. Under pretext of the *levy en masse*, it was said Hungary sought to exempt herself from the regular contributions in men and horses she would have had to make, had she been treated like the other provinces of the monarchy. It must be owned she had not furnished by the *levy en masse* more than a score thousands of men, 7000 or 8000 of whom were gentlemen cavalry, and 12,000 indifferent infantry, composed of Germans, whom the nobles paid as substitutes for themselves in the rising.

Aware of these doubtful dispositions of the Hungarians, Napoleon addressed to them friendly proclamations, promising them independence at the peace, and exemption from all charges during the war, if they forbore to take up arms against him. The effect of these proclamations had not been to detach them from the house of Austria, but to cool their zeal for the Austrian government, and to dispose them to receive the French with less hostility. Napoleon's instructions to Prince Eugene with respect to Hungary had reference to this state of things. The prince followed those instructions to the best of his ability, and almost as well as Napoleon could desire for the general result of the campaign.

The prince having learned that Archduke John was at Kormond, on the Upper Raab, waiting for orders, marched to Guns, and then to Stein am Anger, to give him battle, at the same time sending word to General Macdonald to join him. The latter had halted at Grätz, to wait for Marmont, and was endeavouring to take the fortress which commanded the town, and, through it, the district. But the fortress was well armed, advantageously situated, and could only be besieged with heavy artillery, of which Macdonald was entirely destitute. He tried to batter the walls with shells, and then to intimi-

date the commandant, but all in vain. He was master, then, of the town of Grätz, and obliged to blockade the citadel, which formed its chief strength. On receiving Prince Eugene's despatches, Macdonald set out to join him with the Lamarque division, Pully's dragoons, two battalions of the Broussier division, and the greater part of the artillery. He left General Broussier before Grätz with eight battalions only, two regiments of light cavalry, and ten field-pieces, leaving him to do the work that ought to have been done by the whole corps—namely, to take the citadel of Grätz, effect a junction with the army of Dalmatia, and hinder Chasteler from escaping from Tyrol into Hungary. Fortunately the troops were excellent, and soon showed that they could resist vastly superior forces.

General Macdonald arrived on the 8th of June at Kormond, where he and Prince Eugene were delighted to meet once more safe and sound, after a month of divergent and perilous movements through hostile countries. Their most natural course would have been to hold together thenceforth until they had finally beaten Archduke John. But Prince Eugene, feeling confusedly the impropriety of leaving General Broussier alone at Grätz, thought to make up for it by leaving General Macdonald alone at Papa, that he might be within reach of Broussier and Marmont; an arrangement which aggravated the fault committed, since the force was now about to be broken up into four detachments—viz., Marmont, with 10,000 men; Broussier, with 7000; Macdonald, with 8000; Prince Eugene, with 80,000. General Macdonald was sent to Papa, while Prince Eugene marched down the valley of the Raab in pursuit of Archduke John.

The latter, who had been, meanwhile, moving about between the Muhr and the Raab, had at last returned towards the Danube, in obedience to the reiterated orders of his commander-in-chief that he should leave to General Stoichevich, Ban Giulay, and Chasteler the task of harassing the French in Hungary, throw a garrison into Presburg, and then post himself with the best part of the troops from Italy behind the Danube, in order to take part in the battle that was again to be fought there sooner or later. In accordance with these orders, he had marched along the Raab, by Kormond, Sarvar, Papa, and the town of Raab, situated not far from the confluence of the river with the Danube, between Komorn and Presburg. Raab was a fortified town, but had been long neglected, and was then in but an indifferent state of defence. There was an entrenched camp connected with it, which afforded a good position on the river. Archduke John was joined there by his brother, the Archduke Palatine, and the Hungarian rising; and the two princes, with their combined force of 40,000 men, resolved to give battle to Prince Eugene before they abandoned the right bank of the Danube.

On the 12th and 13th of June they had been closely followed up by Prince Eugene's advanced guards, and on the evening of the 13th they were posted round Raab, with a certainty of a very hot engagement on the following day if they did not consent to retreat. As the position seemed to them advantageous, they established themselves on a plateau, with their

right resting on the Raab, their back to the Danube, which flowed at the distance of some leagues in the rear, and their left to marshes of considerable extent. They employed the evening of the 13th and the morning of the 14th in rectifying their position, and in mingling the regular troops with those of the rising, in order to impart some of the firmness of the former to the latter. In this respect they acted upon a specific order from Archduke Charles—an order which was very judicious, but which made them lose much time on the present occasion. They were not ready for battle before eleven in the forenoon of the 14th.

Fortunately for them, Prince Eugene, though he had pursued them with right good-will, was himself not prepared to attack them before eleven or twelve o'clock.

He had marched, like the Austrian princes, along the banks of the Raab, with his left to the river, where the Austrians had their right, and his right to the marshy plain where they had their left. He marched in several *echelons*, the Seras division forming the first on the right, the Durutte division the second on the centre, and Severoli's Italian division the third on the left. The Pachthod division and the Italian guard formed a double reserve in the rear. The cavalry was distributed on the wings. This arrangement was dictated by the nature of the ground and the distribution of the enemy's forces on the plateau about to be attacked. In the marshy plain on our right was seen the Hungarian cavalry, 7000 or 8000 strong, making a very brilliant appearance, but not so formidable as they were handsome to behold. They were supported by regular hussars of less brilliant aspect, but proved in the Italian campaign; the whole being under the orders of General Mecsery. A little less to the right, inclining towards the centre, behind a muddy stream, was seen the infantry under Jellachich and Colloredo, occupying the very solid buildings of the large farm of Kismegyer and the village of Szabadhegy. Lastly, from that village to the Raab, that is to say, towards our left, was Frimont's infantry, forming the right of the Austrians towards the river and the entrenched camp. The latter was defended by 4000 or 5000 of the least serviceable troops, and blockaded by General Lauriston with the Badeners.

After conferring with Generals Grouchy, Montbrun, Grenier, Seras, and Durutte, Prince Eugene made the following arrangement. While Montbrun's cavalry deployed so as to mask the movements of our infantry, the Seras, Durutte, and Severoli divisions, advancing in *echelons*, were to attack the farm of Kismegyer and the village of Szabadhegy successively on both sides. The Pachthod division and the Italian guard, stationed as a reserve, were to support whichever of the three *echelons* had need of aid. Grouchy and Montbrun on the right were to assail the enemy's cavalry, while on the left Sahu was to connect the army with Lauriston's detachment. Perceiving then, but rather late, the wisdom of Napoleon's principles, Prince Eugene sent aide-de-camp after aide-de-camp to General Macdonald to bring him from Papa the 8000 men who would be so welcome to him at that moment, for he had only 36,000 against 40,000 established in a

strong position. Fortunately, Macdonald, foreseeing that he might be useful at Raab, while at Papa he was doing nothing either for Broussier or Marmont, had set out of his own accord, and was already visible in the distance, preceded by Pully's dragoons.

Towards noon the army was put in motion to attack the enemy's position. Montbrun deployed his four regiments of light cavalry, and executed his evolutions under a violent fire of artillery, and with admirable coolness, just as if he was exercising on a parade-ground. Then, when the Seras division, forming the first *echelon*, was in line, he put his regiments to the gallop and dashed in upon the noble cavaliers that had come hesitatingly to the aid of the house of Austria. However brave a nation may be, nothing can supply in it the want of experience in war. In an instant the glittering force dispersed before Montbrun's light horse, which was accustomed to cross swords even with cuirassiers, and left the left of the Austrians uncovered. There remained the regular hussars, which were worthy of measuring their strength with ours. They charged Montbrun, who immediately returned the brunt, and forced them to fall back on their *corps de bataille*.

During this time Seras's infantry, formed in two lines, had attacked the farm of Kismegyer. Before arriving at it the muddy stream had to be crossed, and this was more difficult than had been expected; for the stream was deep, and defended by brave and skilful sharpshooters. They succeeded, however, in crossing it, and marched against the large square farm-house of Kismegyer, the walls of which were loopholed, and defended by 1200 of the best infantry. Meanwhile the second *echelon*, under Durutte, having also crossed the stream, attacked the village of Szabadhegy on the right, while the Severoli division assailed it on the left. The action was now going on along the whole line, and the Austrian artillery and musketry poured a most destructive down-hill fire on our troops. Prince Eugene rushed from one end of the field of battle to the other, prodigal of his life, like a valiant officer, who panted to compensate by his bravery for his deficiencies as a commander.

General Seras encountered such a tremendous fire of musketry from all the openings of the farm-house, that in a few minutes he had 700 or 800 men laid low, sixty of whom were officers. He made the first line fall back on the second, to enable his men to recover themselves; and when his brave soldiers had taken breath, he led them back, sword in hand, burst open the doors with the axes of his sappers, and, rushing in with bayonets lowered, put to death some hundreds of the defenders of the farm, and took the rest prisoners. He then marched against the left of the Austrian line, which, falling back on the summit of the platform, still maintained a bold bearing. All this time the fighting had been equally obstinate at the village of Szabadhegy. The Austrians defended themselves stoutly behind the houses, and made us pay dearly for our conquest of the village. They fell back for a while, but to return to the charge. The bulk of the troops composing their centre and their right charged into the village, and drove out Durutte on the

one side, and Severoli's Italians on the other towards the stream. The first line of these two divisions retreated through the intervals of their second line, which, far from giving way, advanced against the village, bringing back the first line with it, and, with the help of the Pachod division, finally drove the Austrians out of Szabadhegy. Our army now advanced right and left beyond the two *points d'appui* of the enemy's line which we had taken. It was the moment for the cavalry to act. Montbrun, Grouchy, and Colbert dashed after the Austrians to cut off their retreat. Montbrun broke several squares and made many prisoners, but was stopped by the firm bearing of the Austrian army, which retired in good order. On the left, the 8th regiment of chasseurs of Sahuc's division, being more in advance than the rest, rushed with extraordinary impetuosity on the Austrian right wing, just when it was withdrawing from Raab, and bore down all before it. It had already made several thousand of the enemy's infantry lay down their arms, and taken a great deal of artillery, when the Austrians, perceiving it was not supported, recovered from their confusion, fired upon it, and would have handled it severely, if the rest of the division, brought tardily up by its general, had not rescued it. This brave regiment retained, nevertheless, 1600 prisoners, and some cannons and flags.

The archdukes, seeing that the battle was totally lost, at last ordered a retreat, which, under favour of the ground and of the night, was not so disastrous as they might have feared, and was effected by St. Yrany towards the inundated lands of the Danube. This battle, which, gloriously for Prince Eugene and the army of Italy, repaired the defeat of Sacile, cost us 2000 killed and wounded, and the Austrians about 8000 men *hors de combat*, 2500 prisoners, and 2000 soldiers missing. It extinguished the Archduke John and the Archduke Palatine, secured the junction of Generals Broussier and Marmont, and left us no longer exposed on the left to any thing more formidable than some incursions of hussars, which might be sufficiently counteracted by a few detachments of cavalry. General Macdonald arrived on the field of battle towards the close of the day to embrace the young prince, in whose success he was strongly interested.

While at this point Napoleon's plan was executed, with the exception of some slight faults of detail, in a manner so conformable to his intentions, the junction between Marmont and Broussier was also taking place. The latter general, left alone at Grätz, would have suffered severely if his troops had not been of the steadiest kind. After having begun by cannonading the citadel of Grätz with howitzers without avail, he had made several excursions into Croatia to distances of twelve or fifteen leagues in the direction by which Marmont was approaching, and each time, with 5000 or 6000 men, he had fought little battles with Ban Giulay, in which he had completely beaten him. But in these frequent departures from Grätz he had not been able sufficiently to guard the roads from Tyrol, and General Chasteler had passed between the posts of the army of Italy, and reached Hungary much more fortunately than General Jellachich. Just then General

Marmont had advanced to the vicinity of Grätz, and sent word of his approach to General Broussier, who immediately proceeded down the valley of the Muhr in hopes of meeting him at Kalsdorf, leaving two battalions of the 84th in a faubourg of Grätz to guard the town. But while he was marching down the right bank of the Muhr, the Ban Giulay marched up the left bank at the head of 15,000 men, half regular troops, half belonging to the Croat rising, and suddenly fell upon the two battalions left in Grätz. Though attacked by a whole army, the two battalions held out for nineteen hours with heroic courage under Colonel Gambin. They killed 1200 of the enemy, made 400 or 500 prisoners, and gave General Broussier time to come to their succour. That general, hearing of Giulay's movement, returned in all haste, fell upon the ban's troops, routed them, and rescued the two battalions. Marmont's advanced guards at last appeared at a distance of one or two marches. So that corps of 10,000 men, the best in the army after Davout's, was come to join the belligerent masses; all the forces of Italy and Dalmatia were now available for Napoleon; the corps of Stoichevich and Giulay were entirely dispersed; and the two archdukes (John and the Palatine) were finally driven beyond the Danube.

There was enough in this to indemnify Napoleon for the battle of Essling; and he had need of it, for, encouraged by that famous battle, his enemies were busier than ever, and were again striving to raise the Tyrol, Swabia, Saxony, Westphalia, and Prussia. On hearing of the alleged defeat of the French at Essling, Hofer, the Tyrolese, and Major Teimer had descended from the summits of the Brenner, although they were much incensed against the Austrian government, which had taken from them the two corps of Jellachich and Chasteler. Their hatred to the house of Bavaria made up for what their love for the house of Austria had lost in warmth. The Bavarian General Deroy, having been left alone to defend Inspruck, had found himself attacked from all the neighbouring heights by a swarm of mountaineers—bad soldiers in the plain, but excellent sharpshooters in the mountains, and very formidable adversaries for one who was forced to retreat. Having been obliged to make head against them for several days, General Deroy had exhausted nearly all his ammunition, and fearing, moreover, that he should be deprived of provisions in consequence of the strict blockade of Inspruck, he had retired with his division to the fort of Kufstein, abandoning the capital of Tyrol for the second time. This event, of slight importance in itself, had made a deep impression throughout Bavaria, and especially upon the court, which was greatly afraid of being compelled again to evacuate Munich. The inhabitants of the Vorarlberg were also very much aroused. On the banks of lake Constance, on the Upper Danube, and throughout all Swabia, the agitation was manifest, and it was evident, that if we sustained a defeat more real than that of Essling, our rear would be seriously threatened.

The Austrians, who had produced this state of things, had recently aggravated it by a measure extremely dangerous for us. They had given the Duke of Brunswick Oels, son of the

famous Duke of Brunswick, the means of raising a corps composed of refugees from all the German provinces, particularly Prussians; besides which, they had given him some regular troops and some landwehr, the whole forming about 8000 men, and had despatched him from Bohemia towards Saxony, sending on before him the most unfounded rumours about the alleged victory over the French at Essling. They had at the same time sent another corps of about 4000 men, half regular troops, half landwehr, towards Franconia, and heralded its march with the same tales. The first corps marched from Prague, and entered Dresden without a blow, the court flying before it to Leipsic. The second marched from Egra to Bayreuth, taking advantage of the unguarded state in which the war on the Danube had left our allies of Bavaria and Wurtemberg. Their plan was to push on to Thuringia, combine there in one body under General Kienmayer, and enter Westphalia to drive out King Jerome. The latter, terrified at the impending danger, urgently applied at Paris for means of help which did not exist there, and by his cries of distress produced at last a sort of panic in the French capital.

The apparition of these columns excited a lively agitation in Germany, but called forth no insurrectional movement there, notwithstanding all the hopes of the kind with which the Austrians had flattered themselves, because Napoleon's *prestige* was still entire, and those even who spread the news of his defeat were not so well assured of it as to venture to take arms against him. Major Schill's fate was no encouraging example. That bold partisan, thinking that in disobeying the open orders of his government he obeyed its secret wishes, left Berlin, as we have seen, with a corps of Prussian cavalry, and took to scouring the country, in hopes of being seconded by the army and the people. Welcomed by everybody, but followed by none, and disconcerted even by the severe declarations issued from Königsberg, he fled to Mecklenburg, and thence to Pomerania, and surprised the ill-guarded fortress of Stralsund, with the intention of sustaining a siege there. But soon assailed by a Dutch corps, and even by a Danish corps that volunteered to give Napoleon this proof of its attachment to him, he was unable to defend the fortress with cavalry, and endeavouring to escape by one gate while the assailants were entering by another, he was cut down by a Dutch horseman, and his troop was taken, destroyed, or dispersed. As yet this had been the sole fruit of the German insurrections. Great was the exasperation against us, nevertheless, and there needed but one defeat, not fictive but real, to cause an explosion of the nations against us from one end of the continent to the other.

In Poland, Prince Poniatowski's able management of the campaign had produced unexpected, but not very decisive results. The Archduke Ferdinand was forced by Prince Poniatowski's operations to make a rapid retreat, which might be interrupted and rendered disastrous by crossing over to the left bank of the river. A Polish corps of 6000 men, under General Dombrowski, proposed to adopt this plan, but was unable to execute it alone; the

Russians, however, who had arrived in line towards the end of June, whereas they should have arrived in April, might execute this manoeuvre, and not allow a single Austrian to return into Galicia. Prince Poniatowski entreated them to do so, but found in them a manifest want of alacrity, which was not to be accounted for either by the weather or the overflow of the rivers, or by the imperfections of Russian administration. The true reason of their inaction was, that their aversion to destroy the Austrians for the benefit of the Poles was such as to make them even disobey the orders of their own government. Prince Gallitzen was severely reprimanded by Alexander, and showed somewhat less coldness to Prince Poniatowski, but did nothing to overcome the resistance of his lieutenants, one of whom, Prince Gortschakoff, even stated in a letter that he came with the hope of joining the Austrians, not the Poles. The latter having intercepted the letter, sent it to St. Petersburg with many others. Wherever the Russian and Austrian advanced posts met, they shook hands, and promised each other that they should soon be serving together. In short, the Russians seemed to have entered Galicia only for the purpose of putting down the insurrection there. Under pretext of taking possession of the country, they everywhere suppressed the new Polish, and reinstated the old Austrian, authorities.

While the Russians were thus breaking their word, probably against the will of their sovereign, the Poles, on their part, were likewise, against the will of Napoleon, violating the pledge which had been given to the Russians, and were announcing in all their proclamations the approaching restoration of Poland. Yet Napoleon had strictly enjoined them to speak only of the grand-duchy of Warsaw, and not to alienate the Russians from him by imprudent language. He had told them, again and again, that the day would come when, without breaking his engagements or bringing down upon himself more enemies than he could fight at once, he would complete their reconstitution by gradually enlarging the duchy of Warsaw; that he could not do every thing at a blow; that he must have time and opportunity for the accomplishment of his work; and that to manifest their hopes prematurely at that moment would be uselessly exposing themselves and him to danger. In giving this advice, Napoleon was no more hearkened to by the Poles than Alexander was by the Russians. It must be owned, however, that had Alexander applied himself sincerely to command the obedience of his subjects, he might have been much more successful with them than Napoleon could have been with the Poles. But he was himself a Russian, and to work for the re-establishment of Poland, by helping the Poles against the Austrians, was almost as repugnant to him as to his soldiers. He was himself unconsciously the ringleader of the revolt against his own policy.

Such were the perplexities of all Europe while the Archduke Charles and Napoleon were contending under the walls of Vienna. But the latter gave little heed to them, and cared only for what was passing around him between Lintz, Leoben, Raab, Presburg, and Lobau.

For all the rest he contented himself with a few well-devised precautions. He sent General Cafarelli, war-minister of the kingdom of Italy, to Milan, to fill the place left vacant by the absence of Prince Eugene, and ordered him to employ all the detachments that could be spared for the purpose in blockading the Tyrol, by occupying the passes of the mountains. He directed Prince Eugene to leave the Rusca division at Klagenfurth to effect the same blockade on the Carinthian side. The Bavarian General Deroy was to do the same on the Bavarian side, by occupying Rosenheim and Kufstein, so as to hem in the fire as it were, and prevent its spreading, leaving it for a future day to take more active measures against the Tyrolese, when he should have finished with the Austrian grand army. As for Swabia and the Vorarlberg, he had the means of keeping them down in the forces stationed at Augsburg. He ordered General Beaumont to post himself with some of these troops at Kempten, Lindau, and along lake Constance, in order to drive back any force that might attempt to issue from the mountain passes.

General Bourcier commanded the general dépôt of the cavalry at Passau. He had there all the dismounted men, the detachments of recruits, the saddlery workshops, and a market for the purchase of horses; and he took charge of the fatigued men and invalids until they were again fit for service. Napoleon ordered him to leave the dépôt for a while to a competent deputy and advance to Bayreuth, taking with him two regiments of dragoons, 2000 strong, the horse regiment of Berg, and 2000 or 3000 Bavarians, draughted from the fortresses of the Palatinate. General Ribaud, stationed at Wurzburg, at the head of two provisional demi-brigades, was to join General Bourcier at Bayreuth, and march with him against the small force who had issued from Bohemia. After finishing that short expedition, General Bourcier was to return to Passau and resume the command of the cavalry dépôt. General Ribaud was to join four demi-brigades at Hana, under Marshal Kellermann, and proceed to Saxony to act against the Austrians who had entered Dresden. Napoleon wrote to Paris to Clarke, the minister of war, and to Fouché, the minister of police, severely reproaching them for the fears they had too easily conceived on the occasion of the events in Dresden and Bayreuth. "If some insignificant incursions alarm you to this degree," said Napoleon, "what would you do should serious events occur—such events as may occur in war without one being beaten? I am very far from pleased to see men in my service display so little force of character, and themselves setting the example of the most ridiculous terrors. There can be no serious events except on the theatre where I am operating, and there I am present to control them."

Prince Eugene being victorious at Raab, Archduke John and the Archduke Palatine being driven beyond the Danube, and the junction of the armies of Italy and Dalmatia being secured, Napoleon had but one object to engage his attention before his last battle, and that was to hinder the two archdukes from recrossing the Danube at Presburg or Komorn, and following the French armies of Italy and

Dalmatia when the latter came to fight under the walls of Vienna. To this end it was necessary to hinder the Austrians from using the bridge at Presburg, and to occupy the line of the Raab, so that it might stop the Austrians for three or four days, which would be quite time enough for the armies of Italy and Dalmatia to move to Vienna. The Austrians had a bridge at Presburg, and a *tête de pont* at the village of Engerau; and they had retained the fortress of Raab after Prince Eugene's victory on the river of that name.

Napoleon assigned to Marshal Davout, who was before Presburg with one of his divisions, the task of taking Engerau, destroying Presburg bridge, and even if possible that of Komorn, situated much lower down. To Prince Eugene he prescribed the taking of the fortress of Raab, which he regarded as the true consummation of his recent victory. He had all the artillery-horses, that were not employed on the works in the island of Lobau, *echeloned* on the road to Presburg and Raab, to convey heavy cannon thither, and bring back the corn with which Hungary abounded. Though no general was less cruel than Napoleon, he was nevertheless inexorable in the accomplishment of his designs, and he ordered all the means of war to be used with the utmost rigour against Presburg and Raab, in order to get possession of those two points. The means prescribed were terrible, but the safety of the army and of the empire required them.

Towards the end of May, Marshal Davout began by attacking with the Gudin division the intrenchments of Engerau, which served to cover a bridge of boats thrown across the river before Presburg, and resting on several islands. These intrenchments consisted of earth-works connected with the village of Engerau, and defended with many pieces of artillery. Marshal Davout attacked them with the vigour which his soldiers displayed on all occasions; but the Austrians, who appreciated the importance of the position, defended it with equal energy. They lost 1500 or 1800 men, and we 800 before that mere *tête de pont*. The works being carried, Marshal Davout found himself on the margin of the river. The portion of bridge which abutted on one side was drawn back, but the remaining portions were fixed between intrenched islands, which it would have been necessary to take one after the other by an exceedingly difficult and tedious operation. All imaginable means were employed to destroy those portions of the bridge. Boats loaded with stones were sent down stream against them, and burning mills, as the Austrians had done at Lobau. But the Presburg bridge, which was no hasty structure, and which was guarded by boatmen who stopped the floating bodies carried down by the current, resisted all these attempts. Marshal Davout then, by order of the Emperor, set up batteries of howitzers and mortars, and let fall on the islands a horrible rain of fire and iron, in spite of which the Austrian soldiers remained at their posts with singular fortitude. Driven to extremities by this resistance, Napoleon gave orders that the town of Presburg should be summoned to surrender, and if it refused to do so, or at least to destroy its bridge, it should be ruined to its foundations. Marshal Davout, who was a per-

fectly honourable man, but a pitiless soldier, began this cruel execution without hesitation. After a summons to General Bianchi, the commandant of Presburg, he gave the word to fire, and in a few hours cast innumerable bombs into the unfortunate town. After having set it on fire in several places, he again summoned the commandant, requiring from him what he was bound to insist upon—the destruction of the bridge. General Bianchi replied that the preservation of the bridge being necessary for the defence of the Austrian monarchy, the town of Presburg would endure the last extremities rather than consent to the conditions proposed. Marshal Davout recommenced his fire, but seeing that it would remain ineffectual, for the Austrian general persevered in his resistance, he yielded at last to an impulse of humanity, and had recourse to other means in order to annul the communications between one bank and the other. After all, what was requisite in order to attain the end in view? To stop any Austrian corps which should appear in those parts for three or four days—a space of time sufficient for the concentration of the French troops under the walls of Vienna. The marshal therefore threw up a series of intrenchments connected with the fortified castle of Kittsee, the very extensive isle of Schutt, and the river and fortress of Raab. A few thousand men, with light cavalry to scour for them the isle of Schutt and the banks of the Raab, defending the intrenchments of Engerau, and falling back if these were forced on the castle of Kittsee, while the fortress of Raab likewise defended itself, might detain the enemy for the necessary number of days, and delay his arrival until all was decided under the walls of Vienna. These measures, approved of by Napoleon, were adopted, and rendered it unnecessary to continue the destruction of Presburg.

Meanwhile, General Lauriston, seconded by General Lasalle, had begun the siege of Raab, being covered by the army of Italy, which was thus enabled to rest from its fatigues. There was a want of large cannons, but Napoleon sent some from Vienna, with howitzers and 12-pounders. Fortunately, the places being in bad condition, and garrisoned by not more than 2000 men, could not long hold out. Immediately after the battle of the 14th the works were begun. The trenches were opened, besieging batteries built, and a breaching fire begun. In a few days the garrison offered to capitulate, and were granted easy terms, and the besiegers entered Raab on the 22d of June, without having damaged its works or spent much ammunition, or lost many men in taking it.

The fortress of Raab was put in a better state of defence, in accordance with Napoleon's precise and very detailed orders. War stores and victuals were laid up in it; a garrison was formed for it of all the fatigued men and invalids of the army of Italy; the necessary repairs were made in the works, and Napoleon bestowed on it an illustrious commandant. This was the Count de Narbonne, formerly minister of war under Louis XV!—one of the last survivors of the old French nobility, and distinguished alike for his courage, his wit, and the elegance of his manners.

Napoleon had all the artillery that was use-

less at Presburg and Raab brought back to Vienna, and despatched the wounded men of the armies of Italy and Dalmatia to the hospitals of Lombardy and Upper Austria, not choosing to leave a single cannon or man as a prize for the enemy. He ordered Prince Eugene, and Generals Macdonald, Broussier, and Marmont to prepare to march at the first signal, to retain in the ranks no maimed or sick men, to have their artillery well horsed and well supplied, to spend a week in making biscuits for their troops, to procure cattle to accompany their march for the supply of meat; and in short to make all arrangements for reaching Vienna in three days at the utmost. Generals Marmont, Broussier, and Macdonald were *echeloned* so as to accomplish the distance in the same space of time. Marshal Davout had but two days' march to make. It was settled that Prince Eugene should leave General Baraguay d'Hilliers with an Italian division before Engerau, to guard the approaches to Presburg, while the army of Italy moved bodily to Vienna. Napoleon, not choosing to employ such troops as those of Montbrun and Lasalle on a mere *surveillance* of distant posts, *echeloned* them so that he might have them by him in forty-eight hours, and placed instead of them on the line of the Raab 1200 or 1600 horses belonging to the marching regiments recently arrived. General Lasalle, who during the month of June had been incessantly inspecting the line from Presburg to Raab, and who knew its most minute details, had orders before he marched to place the posts himself, and give their commandants the requisite instructions for guarding themselves well.

Every thing being thus prepared on this line, Napoleon took his measures on the Upper Danube. He had already drawn to him Marshal Davout's corps, spread out at that moment from Vienna to Presburg, the Saxon corps of Prince Bernadotte, and the French division of Dupas. He had left on the Upper Danube, to occupy St. Polten, Mautern, Mölk, Amstetten, Enns, and Lintz, only the Wurtembergers and Bavarians, both greatly reduced by this short but active campaign. The Wurtembergers under Vandamme were distributed between Tulln, Mautern, St. Polten, and Mölk. The Bavarians commissioned to defend Bavaria were General Deroy's division at Munich, Rosenheim, and Kufstein, and the two divisions of General De Wrede and the prince royal at Lintz. Though this force was not too much to guard Bavaria under existing circumstances, it was rather a strong muster at the particular point of Lintz, since Archduke Charles, wishing on his part also to concentrate his troops, had brought Count Kollowrath before Vienna, leaving only 6000 or 7000 men upon the Danube between Passau, Lintz, Krems, Tulln, and Klosternenburg. Suspecting this circumstance from several *reconnaissances* made beyond the Danube by General Vandamme, Napoleon ordered Marshal Lefebvre to keep De Wrede's excellent division in readiness to march with four-and-twenty guns. The divisions of General Deroy and the prince royal and the Wurtembergers, together with all the troops *en route*, and all those remaining in Augsburg, Passau, and Ratisbon, would be enough to maintain the security of our rear for some days.

At Ratisbon was the Rouyer division, composed of the contingents of the minor German princes. There was evidently nothing to be feared on that side if the last battle was gained. If, contrary to all probability, it was lost, precautions were tolerably well taken at St. Polten, Mölk, Amstetten, Lintz, and Passau, that our sick and wounded might not be endangered, and the army should find everywhere in its retreat provisions, ammunition, and perfectly solid *points d'appui*.

Besides devoting the month of June to preparing the concentration of his troops on Vienna, Napoleon employed it also in preparing the passage of the Danube, and rendering it this time so sure that the accident which had happened to his bridges during the battle of Essling could not possibly occur again. This is the place to make known by what gigantic works he had almost annulled the difficulty of crossing a vast body of running water, in presence of the enemy, with masses of men such as till then no commander, ancient or modern, had ever had to move.

The bridge of boats over the principal arm of the river, and serving to communicate with the isle of Lobau, had been re-established some days after the battle of Essling, and had been consolidated with fresh boats picked up on the banks of the river by the seamen of the guard, and fixed with better moorings. It had, however, been again broken two or three times by the June floods, and it was not with uncertain though much better-established means of communication, that Napoleon chose to venture beyond the Danube. He resolved then to connect the isle of Lobau with the mainland, so that it should make one piece with the right bank, which was to be our point of departure. This could only be effected by erecting a bridge on piles, which Napoleon resolved to do, however laborious such an operation would be on a river like the Danube below Vienna. Cæsar had executed a similar work eighteen hundred years before on the Rhine, but the difficulties were greater in our age, in consequence of the increased means of destruction possessed by the enemy. The engineer service was employed on this work, while the artillery had the construction of all the bridges of boats. There were in Vienna large accumulations of timber, carried down from the summits of the Alps by the confuents of the Danube. All the engineer soldiers, all the carpenters out of work, and all the artillery-horses left idle by the cessation of fighting were employed in preparing or carrying this timber to the river, to be floated down to Ebersdorf. There were numerous pile-driving machines in Vienna, river works being frequently executed there. These also were taken to Ebersdorf, and after three weeks' work, sixty wooden piles were seen rearing themselves above the highest flood-mark, and on them lay a broad platform capable of giving passage to any quantity of artillery and cavalry. Twenty fathoms below this fixed bridge was the old bridge of boats, much strengthened, and intended for the infantry, so that the passage of the several arms might be effected simultaneously, and the communication with the isle of Lobau might be so much the more prompt.

Though these two works protected each other



Napoleon desired to secure them entirely from the shock of floating bodies, and he tried all sorts of means to that end. His first expedient had been to take from the arsenal of Vienna a huge chain which the Turks had used in the siege of 1683, and which had been preserved as one of the triumphal spoils. Now that our vessels are furnished with these enormous chains, we should not be so much astonished at the dimensions of that which the Turks left at Vienna; but at that time it was regarded as one of the most wonderful works of its kind. It was resolved then to stretch it across the large arm, in order to stop the bodies thrown in by the enemy for the purpose of damaging our bridges. But this scheme was to be given up for want of machines to stretch the chain sufficiently. Napoleon then conceived the idea of constructing a vast wear, consisting of a series of large piles deeply imbedded, and planted obliquely to the stream, so as to give less prise to the force of the current. This work, not less extraordinary than the fixed bridge, was executed almost as quickly. But its efficacy did not appear to be certain, for it happened several times that the line of piles was forced by boats laden with materials which had escaped from the hands of the workmen. Napoleon then had recourse to another system, and established a constant look-out by means of the seamen of the guard, who, moving about continually in wherries about the wear, hooked the boats that floated down and drew them to the shore. By means of this combination of precautions the communications between the right bank and the isle of Lobau were rendered certain and infallible.

But it was not enough in Napoleon's eyes to have put his bridges out of the reach of all danger from the river. A surprise by the enemy, a sudden incursion into the isle of Lobau, a retreat, it might be, in disorder, after the loss of a battle, might expose them to unforeseen and inevitable destruction. Napoleon resolved to protect them by a vast *île de pont* erected on the isle of Lobau, so that, if that isle were taken from us, some battalions might defend them, and the army might thus retain the means of retiring in safety to the other side of the river.

This series of works indissolubly connected the isle of Lobau with the right bank and with the little town of Ebersdorf, now become our base of operations. There were works also to be executed in the island in order to make of it an intrenched camp, spacious, secure, commodious, salubrious, and provided with every thing necessary for living there some days.

There were in the isle of Lobau low and marshy grounds, often exposed to inundation. There were also small channels which were dry when the waters were low, and became real rivers when they were high. We had had an example of this during the great floods of May 21st, 22d, and 23d. Napoleon had raised causeways made in the low parts of the isle to enable the troops to move about in all weathers, and he had several wooden bridges thrown over each dry watercourse, so that there might be no difficulty in passing them in any state of the waters. Intending that the isle should become a grand *dépôt* which should suffice for itself, happen what might, he had a powder-magazine built on it, and supplied from the arsenals of Vienna.

Ovens were erected by his orders, stores of Hungarian flour were laid in, and several thousand oxen from the same country were turned out to pasture. He sent wine also in abundance, and of such quality as the French army had never drunk anywhere but in Spain. The Austrian aristocracy and the convents of Vienna, which possessed the best cellars in Europe, supplied that choice beverage. Desiring that the isle should be as easy to traverse by night as by day, Napoleon had all the roads lighted by lamps, hung on posts, just as in the streets of a great town.

The last and most difficult preparatory measure was to provide for the passage of the small branch, which was to be effected by force in the face of a powerful enemy, kept on the alert by our presence in the isle of Lobau. Whatever advantages were presented by the site of the old passage, it was not likely it could be used again. Indeed, the Austrians had in a manner walled up that door, by erecting a line of intrenchments, thickly planted with artillery, from Essling to Aspern. Another objection to the old landing-place was, that it was not spacious enough for the deployment of a considerable army. The enemy was so well aware that it was by the isle of Lobau we should make our descent on the left bank, that we might expect to find him drawn up in order of battle immediately before us; whereas on the former occasion our several corps had time to defile one after the other, and to deploy without impediment. This could not be expected to happen again, so that now we had to prepare to debouch almost *en masse*, and to fight at the very moment we touched the ground.

For these reasons, Napoleon looked about for a new passage, only making a feint of still preferring the old one. The small arm of the river, on reaching the extremity of the island, turned off at a right angle, and ran 4000 yards in a straight line along the right flank of the island to meet the main stream. If a point on that line was chosen for the crossing-place, the descent would be upon a smooth plain, very commodious for the deployment of a numerous army. On that plain, then, Napoleon resolved to debouch. It is true there was nothing in the conformation of the ground to afford the enemy any protection; but if it passed over *en masse*, it would be protected by that very circumstance; besides, it was not impossible to make up for the exposed character of the ground by a judicious arrangement of artillery.

On the left bank, just at the abrupt bend of the small branch, was situated the inconsiderable town of Enzersdorf, covered with defensive works and artillery, like Essling and Aspern; then a little lower down was the open plain just mentioned; and lastly, thick woods covering the ground to the confluence of the two arms of the river. It was between Enzersdorf and these woods that Napoleon determined to cross the stream.

But he took all possible pains to convince the enemy that he would cross at the old place on the left of the island, where he erected numerous works, not only for that reason, but also because he deemed it expedient to have bridges in all directions, so as to increase his facilities for crossing the river and deploying rapidly. But the most important works were





*[Handwritten signature]*  
Hessena

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Another characteristic of Napoleon's was to throw a column of infantry to debauch on the front, and as quickly as the advanced guard is carried over in the flat boats. To this end he constructed a bridge of a novel description, the construction of which he intrusted to Captain Leves, a very intelligent officer. To construct a way of bridge making is to pour a series of beams, said by some, after the other. Napoleon conceived the idea of having a bridge in the middle of the river, composed of boats fastened together head and stern. It was to be floated down the stream to the spot chosen for its erection, and then to be fastened to the shore. The sterns, being buttressed, would be carried by the force of the current to the opposite bank, which it was to be fixed by mooring with ropes, and it was that purpose. This being accomplished, no more would be required to float or secure an anchor, in order to prevent the river boat. It had been considered that, possibly, it might not succeed, but experience would be sufficient for this purposeous operation.

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and unexpectedly at each point of passage. Now it was not likely that the enemy, who did not know exactly where the operation was to be performed, could confront us with advanced posts so considerable as these. A hawser was to be immediately attached to a tree and stretched across the stream, and the boats



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accumulated on the right side of the island, along the line from Enzersdorf to the junction of the two branches of the river. Some islets in the small branch, to which the army gave names of their own choosing, such as *île Massena*, *île des Moulins*, *île Espagne*, *île Pouzet*, *île Lannes*, *île Alexandre*, were joined to Lobau by fixed bridges, and covered with batteries of large calibre. These batteries, mounting 100 pieces of ordnance, including 24-pounders, howitzers, and mortars, were intended to cast projectiles to a great distance, and cover every spot at which the enemy presented themselves. Those of the *île Massena*, *île des Moulins*, and *île Espagne* were to fire upon Aspern, Essling, and the works raised in that direction. Those of the *île Pouzet* were in two hours to reduce the unfortunate town of Enzersdorf to ashes. Lastly, those of the *île Alexandre* were to sweep the plain chosen for the deployment of the French, and were to pour upon it such a mass of grape that no hostile force should be able to remain on it. As there was no want of time, they were planted with the utmost care and provided with earthworks, platforms, and small powder-magazines. The heavy guns, which an army never takes with it, had been procured from the arsenal of Vienna, and the carriages had been constructed by the workmen there.

In order to render the passage of his troops simultaneous and crushing, Napoleon had recourse to arrangements unknown before. It was his design, that in some minutes several thousand men should have crossed the small branch, and surprised and taken the Austrian advanced posts; that in two hours 50,000 others should have deployed on the enemy's side of the river to fight a first battle; and that in four or five, 150,000 soldiers, 40,000 horses and 600 guns should have passed over in order to decide the fate of the Austrian monarchy. Never had such operations been projected or executed on such a scale.

When a river is to be crossed, the operation is begun by suddenly conveying some determined men to the opposite side in boats. These men proceed to disarm or kill the enemy's advanced posts, and to fix the moorings to which the boats are to be attached that are to carry the bridge. The army then passes over as quickly as possible; for a bridge is a long narrow defile, which masses of infantry, cavalry, and artillery cannot traverse without greatly extending their length.

The first of these operations was the most difficult one in presence of an enemy so numerous and so well prepared as were the Austrians. To facilitate it, Napoleon had large flat-boats constructed, capable of carrying 300 men each, and having a movable gunwale to protect the men from musketry, which, being let down, would serve instead of plank for landing. Every *corps d'armée* was provided with five of these flat-boats, which made an advanced guard of 1500 men carried over at once and unexpectedly at each point of passage. Now it was not likely that the enemy, who did not know exactly where the operation was to be performed, could confront us with advanced posts so considerable as these. A hawser was to be immediately attached to a tree and stretched across the stream, and the boats

were to ply along it to and fro. The construction of the bridges was then to begin. All the boats being prepared, all the tackle arranged, the places selected, and the men instructed as to what they had to do, there was reason to believe that two hours would suffice for the completion of a bridge sixty fathoms long—an operation which used formerly to occupy twelve or fifteen hours, if every thing was ready—from twenty-four to forty-eight, if it was not so. Napoleon decided that four bridges at least should be formed—two of boats, one of pontoons, and one of large rafts for the cavalry and artillery, so that three *corps d'armée* might debouch simultaneously—those, namely, of Massena, Oudinot, and Davout. Thus several thousand men, ferried over in boats in a few minutes, would suffice to overwhelm the enemy's advanced posts. Fifty to sixty thousand debouching in two hours, under the protection of formidable batteries, would make head against the forces which the enemy might bring together on becoming aware of the passage. Lastly, in four or five hours the whole army would have debouched, ready to give battle, and provided with means of retreat as secure as if it had not a great river behind it. It was probable, even, that the operation would be ended before the enemy could disturb it, for the fire of powerful batteries and the simultaneous passage of our troops would naturally throw it into extreme confusion.

Another contrivance of Napoleon's was to enable a column of infantry to debouch on the instant, and as quickly as the advanced guards carried over in the flat-boats. To this end he invented a bridge of a novel description, the construction of which he intrusted to Captain Dessales, a very intelligent officer. The common way of bridge-making is to moor a series of boats side by side, one after the other. Napoleon conceived the idea of having a bridge in one single piece, composed of boats fastened together beforehand. It was to be floated down the stream to the spot chosen for it; one end was then to be made fast to the shore, the other, being left free, would be carried by the force of the current to the opposite bank, to which it was to be fixed by men who were to run along it for that purpose. This being accomplished, no more would be requisite than to drop some anchors, in order to steady it in the middle. It had been calculated, and rightly, as the result showed, that some minutes would be sufficient for this prodigious operation.

Lest the place where this bridge was constructed might betray the secret of its destined site, the following precaution was taken. The isle of Lobau was covered with yards and docks for boat-building, as though it had been one of the great ports of France. The docks were connected by canals with the small branch of the river, and there the numerous boats, pontoons, and rafts to be used in constructing the bridges, were built without indicating the place where the passage was to be effected. There was behind the *île Alexandre*, on the right flank of the large island of Lobau, a long, wide, and rather deep channel, in which each piece of work was to receive the last finish. In that channel the bridge in one piece was stowed away, ready to be floated into the small

branch of the river at the last moment. But as this channel formed a bend at its extremity, Napoleon took the precaution of having several joints made in the bridge, so that it might accommodate itself to all the sinuosities of the channel.

Clearly foreseeing that at the actual moment of the operation the need of rapid communications between the two banks would be strongly felt, and wishing to repair even to excess the imprudence of his first passage of the Danube, Napoleon had timber, rafts, and pontoons laid ready in those interior channels, so that four or five additional bridges might be thrown across to hasten the deployment of the army as much as possible, and render retreat as easy in case of defeat as on an ordinary field of battle.

While thousands of workmen of all kinds were labouring with incredible activity in the isle of Lobau, the seamen of the guard were incessantly cruising about in boats armed with howitzers to protect those immense works, and to explore the islands and every nook of the river, so as to acquire a knowledge of the localities that would be very useful on the day of the grand operation. Napoleon had recovered a valuable remnant of General Dupont's army; this was the brave Captain Baste, commander of the marines of the guard in the Andalusian campaign, alike able as an infantry and a naval officer, and the only man whom Napoleon had pardoned for the Baylen catastrophe; for he had given him promotion while he was implacable towards his companions in misfortune. Captain Baste, now a colonel, still commanded the marines of the guard, and was to be present everywhere at the hour of peril.

Napoleon galloped every day from Schönbrunn to Ebersdorf, to see to the progress of the works, and at every visit some new idea occurred to him. The Viennese, under whose eyes and with whose aid in some instances this prodigious enterprise was performed, thrilled with indignation in secret, and would have revolted but for the powerful army that kept them down. But Napoleon took extreme pains to quiet them. Discipline was rigorously observed. Not one offensive act or expression was allowed, and every breach of good conduct was punished on the spot. Provisions failing, Napoleon had considerable quantities of grain and herds of cattle brought from Hungary, so that the cost of living was not extravagantly high at Vienna. He consented to employ the *bourgeoisie* for the maintenance of order, because our troops were not so well adapted for that service, being foreigners and enemies. But he limited the numbers of the burgher force to 6000, and he allowed them only 1500 muskets, a number equal to that of the men who mounted guard every day. He exercised, moreover, a strict *surveillance* over the inhabitants. Knowing that many soldiers of the old garrison were concealed in the city in plain clothes, ready to second the first popular outbreak, he dictated some acts of severity, confining himself, however, to what was indispensable. As for the lower classes that wanted work, he furnished it to them at a reasonable rate of wages, and not always for the service of the army, but often, on the contrary, for the use or embellishment of Vienna, so that the bread he afforded them might not seem too bitter.

Such was the aspect of the isle of Lobau during the month of June. On the 1st of July, every thing being ready, Napoleon gave orders that the troops should begin to assemble in the isle on the 8d of July, that they should be all there on the 4th, and cross the small branch that night, in order to give battle on the 5th, if they met the enemy immediately on landing, or on the 6th, if he did not present himself immediately. On the 1st of July he quitted Schönbrunn, and established his head-quarters in Lobau. Marshal Massena's corps being there already, Napoleon ordered into it successively General Oudinot's corps, the guard, Marshal Davout's corps, the light cavalry, the heavy cavalry, and the immense mass of field artillery. The deffling of the troops was under the superintendence of General Mathieu Dumas. The position of each corps *d'armée* was marked out with stakes. Orders had been forwarded that the army of Italy should arrive at four in the morning, the army of Dalmatia and the Bavarians at five at the latest. The Saxons who had been some days at Vienna, and Dupas' French division, passed over with the first troops. The several corps were rested, well fed, and in the best spirits. Their losses had been partly repaired by some marching battalions and squadrons which had arrived in June, and by the return of a great many men from the hospitals. The guard was superb, complete in all arms, but especially in artillery. Adding together the troops of Massena, Oudinot, Davout, Bernadotte, Prince Eugene, Macdonald, Marmont, De Wrede, and the guard, there appeared to be 150,000 men; of whom 28,000 were cavalry, and 12,000 artillerymen serving 550 guns—an enormous force, such as Napoleon had never yet mustered on a field of battle; and, indeed, if we rightly consult the history of the world, we shall find that such a host had never been brought into action by any leader. Besides this vast force, Napoleon had with him the invincible Massena, who was suffering from a fall from his horse, but was capable of mastering all physical sufferings on a day of battle; the stubborn Davout, the impetuous Oudinot, the intrepid Macdonald, and a multitude of others, who were ready to purchase the triumph of our arms with their blood. The heroic Lannes, mortally wounded at Ebersdorf, was the only man missing. Fate had forbidden him to witness a victory to which he had powerfully contributed by his conduct in this campaign; but his death was happy, since he fell in the course of the last of our triumphs.

When arrived in the isle of Lobau, Napoleon was seized with a sudden uneasiness: some indications made him fearful that the Archduke Charles had given him the slip by descending the Danube to Presburg. It is certain that the archduke might have had recourse to that manœuvre, and the proof that it would have been well conceived on his part was that his adversary was very apprehensive of it. It is true that by quitting the position he occupied opposite Vienna, on the heights of Wagram, he would have left the French free to cross the Danube without a battle; but with the means contrived by Napoleon there was but little chance of hindering that passage, and by advancing into the heart of Hungary, he would have obliged the French to weaken themselves

by lengthening out their line of operation, and to leave a corps to guard Vienna, while the Austrians would have been reinforced by Archduke John and the Hungarian rising. There were grounds, therefore, for suspecting such a design; and Napoleon, to end his doubts, made a bold feint, which, while enlightening him as to the designs of the Austrian commander, would deceive the latter as to the real point fixed on for the passage of the river.

The Legrand division of Massena's corps was stationed near the site of the former passage, and Captain Baillet, a brave and able officer of pontonniers, was ordered to form a bridge of boats there. Towards night the artillery was planted right and left of the bend of the river. The voltigeurs of the Legrand division embarked in boats under the command of Massena's aide-de-camp, Sainte Croix, crossed the small branch, and secured a landing in spite of the Austrian advanced posts. In less than two hours the bridge was complete, the Legrand division crossed it, then traversed the little wood beyond it, and debouched between Essling and Aspern. After having taken some prisoners and killed some men, it drew upon it a brisk cannonade from the enemy's redoubts, and when day broke it perceived a display of forces which left no doubt as to the presence of the main Austrian army in those parts. Napoleon thus became assured that he had the enemy before him, and that he might soon terminate the war on the vast plain of Marchfeld.

Archduke Charles was in fact on the opposite heights of Wagram, vacillating between a multitude of projects, not knowing which to choose, and as usual not applying himself to execute any of them. He had spent the days immediately succeeding the battle of Essling in receiving congratulations on his victory, but he had done nothing to secure an incontestable triumph after that doubtful one. Certainly it was not for having abstained from invading Lobau that he derived blame, nor for not having tried above or below Vienna a passage which might have brought about the deliverance of Austria, but also its total ruin; but without imposing complicated and hazardous plans on the Austrian commander, why, since he was so well pleased with the battle of Essling—why did he not profit by that lesson, and derive from it another battle of Essling more complete and more decisive? That event, so much vaunted by the Austrians, was the expression of the military difficulty Napoleon had to overcome, and which consisted in crossing a great river to give battle with that river at his back. The archduke should therefore have left nothing undone to increase that difficulty, and even to render it insurmountable if possible. This was a simple, safe, and tried course, and, without performing any prodigy, it would have been enough to stop Napoleon once more on the banks of the Danube in order to insure his speedy expulsion from Austria. There were two very simple measures to be taken towards that end: first, to give to the battle-ground, which was known beforehand, all the strength which a defensive position could receive from the efforts of art; secondly, to concentrate there all the armies of the monarchy. Of these two measures the archduke fortunately had adopted neither

Napoleon had accumulated redoubts over the whole extent of the isle of Lobau, in order to debouch under the protection of a powerful artillery of large calibre: was it not natural, then, to erect redoubts on the opposite bank which should render it inaccessible? A power which was fighting on its own soil, and which was one of the best provided with *matériel* in Europe, could not be in want of heavy artillery. Now the archduke had intrenched Aspern, Essling, and Enzersdorf, because there had been fighting at those three points; but from Enzersdorf to the confluence of the two arms along the whole right side of Lobau, on the plain which Napoleon selected to debouch upon, he had contented himself with constructing only a single redoubt, mounted with six cannons, near a place called Maison Blanche, and posting some troops in the little castle of Sachsengang, situated in the wood. The possibility of our debouching on our right, which Napoleon had pondered during a space of forty days, had never once occurred to Archduke Charles, and it was only from Aspern to Essling, and from Essling to Enzersdorf that he had constructed really formidable works; and even these were not of a strength sufficient to resist soldiers so impetuous as the French.

The archduke's next care, after having rendered the passage of the Danube as difficult as possible, should have been to form for himself a defensive position, the most favourable possible, on the plain of Marchfeld. Now supposing the enemy had succeeded in crossing the Danube, if he was beaten in a defensive battle, the archduke might have passed from the defensive to the offensive on the following day, or even on the same day, and tried, with a great probability of succeeding, to throw him into the river. The ground presented many advantages in that respect. The plain of Marchfeld rose with a gentle inclination for two leagues, up to a small chain of hills, extending from Neusiedel to Wagram, and washed by the Russbach, a large, deep, and marshy stream, behind which the archduke had encamped his chief forces. He had stationed there three of his *corps d'armée*, the first under Bellegarde, the second under Hohenzollern,<sup>1</sup> the fourth under Rosenberg, making together about 75,000 men. It would have been easy, by taking advantage of the hills and the stream, to erect formidable works, against which no impetuosity, even of Frenchmen, could have prevailed. This position was connected with the Danube by a second line of hills, of a semicircular form, passing by Aderklaa, Gerarsdorf, and Stammersdorf, the approach to which was not obstructed by a deep stream, but which did not require that protection, since it was on that side the Austrians ought to have assumed the offensive, while in the other they should have stood obstinately and invincibly on the defence. The archduke had still 65,000 or 70,000 men, consisting of the third corps under Kollowrath,<sup>2</sup> the fifth under the Prince de Reues,<sup>3</sup> and the sixth under Klenau.<sup>4</sup> This last guarded the

<sup>1</sup> It was Kollowrath who commanded it in the beginning of the war.

<sup>2</sup> Previously commanded by Hohenzollern.

<sup>3</sup> Previously commanded by Prince Louis.

<sup>4</sup> Previously commanded by General Hiller.



banks of the stream. The reserve of cavalry and grenadiers cantoned between Wagram and Gerarsdorf connected the two masses of the Austrian army. That on the left, encamped between Neusiedel and Wagram, might have obstinately defended the hills, and during that time the mass on the right, which extended from Gerarsdorf to Stammersdorf, should have assumed the offensive, taken the French in flank, cut them off from the Danube, or thrown them into the river. The archduke did actually think on proceeding in this manner, but without having constructed any of the works which would have rendered the position between Wagram and Neusiedel unassailable.

The last precaution which the Austrian commander ought to have taken was to concentrate his forces so as to be superior in number to his adversary on the field of battle. The concentrating movements which brought the French corps one after the other under the walls of Vienna, were partly known to the Austrian commander, although the principal manœuvre, by which the army of Italy was to be made to take part in the great battle, was skilfully concealed from him. This manner of acting ought to have served him as a lesson, and have induced him to muster between Lobau and Wagram all the troops that were not indispensable elsewhere. But he had very imperfectly followed the instructive example of his adversary. He had, indeed, called from Lintz to Wagram Kollowrath's corps, which had reinforced him by a score thousand men; but he had left on the Upper Danube at least 12,000, part of whom he might have called up to him, the French having evidently no project in that direction. He thought of sending for Archduke John, whereas he ought already to have had him by him, since the town of Presburg could defend itself with 3000 or 4000 men for garrison. He might have made General Chasteler join him with 7000 or 8000 men, Ban Giulay sufficing to contend with the French posts left on the Raab; and this would have raised the reinforcement brought him by Archduke John from 12,000 to 20,000. Lastly, Archduke Ferdinand was making a useless campaign in Poland, and was employing from 30,000 to 35,000 excellent soldiers in ridiculous expeditions from Thorn to Sandomir. Had 15,000 men been left in that part of the theatre of war, another 20,000 men might have co-operated towards saving the monarchy under the walls of Vienna.

Thus, had he manœuvred like Napoleon, with the art which consists in leaving in each place only what is there indispensable, and accumulating on the decisive point all that can be spared elsewhere, Archduke Charles might have brought 20,000 men from Presburg, 9000 or 10,000 from Lintz, and 20,000 from Cracow, which would have added 50,000 men to his forces, and perhaps have decided the question in his favour. What, indeed, would have been the result if the French, debouching with 140,000 or 150,000 men, had encountered 200,000, 80,000 of these being in an impregnable position, and 120,000 assailing them in flank while they were attacking that position? It is probable that in that case, in spite of all his genius the term of Napoleon's grandeur would

have arrived three or four years sooner, on that plain of Marchfeld.

The archduke, who surmised but did not foresee with certainty that all would be decided between Wagram and the isle of Lobau, did none of those things we have just mentioned. He encamped his troops on the heights from Neusiedel to Wagram, made them manœuvre in order to train his recruits, fed them plentifully enough, with bread and meat supplied by the Jews, but let them want straw, fodder, and water, (except the corps stationed near the Russbach,) although he was in his own country and backed by the patriotism of the whole population. He had scarcely done any thing towards remounting the cavalry, though Austria abounded in horses, and he did not obtain from a devoted country what Napoleon drew from it, who was abhorred as a foreign conqueror. His six corps, with the two reserves of grenadiers and cuirassiers, might be estimated at about 140,000 men, with 400 pieces of artillery; and he reckoned besides on Archduke John's 12,000, which would give him a total of about 150,000, whereas he might have brought together nearly 200,000. His troops were very much attached to him, but though they esteemed his courage and military knowledge, and preferred him to his brother, they had not sufficient confidence in his genius, and they dreaded seeing him confronted with Napoleon almost as much as he dreaded it himself.

Archduke Charles, who had been kept on the alert by the successive accumulation of French troops towards Ebersdorf, put his troops in motion on hearing the cannonade provoked by Legrand division, in the belief that the passage was about to be repeated at the same point as before. An advanced guard, under General Nordmann, already occupied Enzersdorf, the plain on the right of the island, the little redoubt of Maison Blanche, and the wood at the confluence of the two branches of the Danube. While this, the most menaced point, was protected merely by an advanced guard, General Klenau, with the whole sixth corps, occupied the works between Aspern and Essling, before which it was supposed the French army would again offer battle. Archduke Charles descended from the hills of Wagram to the plain of Marchfeld with Bellegarde, Hohenzollern, and Rosenberg's corps, (the 1st, 2d, and 4th,) to support Nordmann and Klenau. He also made Kollowrath's corps (the 3d) descend from the semicircle of hills, which formed his right, from Wagram to the Danube, leaving the Prince de Reuss in position at Stammersdorf, opposite Vienna, to observe if the French made any attempt on that side. The reserve of infantry and cavalry remained behind in the environs of Gerarsdorf. He remained thus in position on the 1st and 2d of July; then, seeing no signs of the French, imagining that the passage would not take place immediately, and disliking to remain in the plain with his army exposed to a suffocating heat and to all sorts of privations, he led it back to its usual camping-ground on the hills.

On the 3d, Napoleon did nothing but continue in secret behind the screen of the woods to perfect his means of passage, while his troops were incessantly arriving in the island by the great bridges. Their constantly increasing

agglomeration could even be discerned at a distance, and, on the 4th, Archduke Charles ordered the artillery at Aspern, Essling, and Enzersdorf, to fire upon Lobau, where it seemed likely that every ball would tell upon such an accumulation of men. Never before, indeed, had there been packed together in a space of one league in diameter and three leagues in circumference 150,000 soldiers, 650 guns, and 40,000 horses. Fortunately the island was too broad to allow of the shots doing mischief. This would have required guns of large calibre, like those which Napoleon had had the foresight to mount on his batteries, while the archduke had only field-pieces in his works. Massena's troops, however, that were nearest to the enemy, lost some men.

On the 4th, at the close of day, Massena, Davout, and Oudinot, screened by the woods, approached the right of the island and took their stations, Massena opposite Enzersdorf, Davout a little lower down, opposite Maison Blanche, Oudinot lower still, facing the coppice wood at the confluence. Colonel Baste of the marines moored near the latter place, with his armed boats, ready to convoy the troops. At nine o'clock Oudinot's corps began its passage. The Conroux brigade of the Tharreau division embarked on board the flat-boats before mentioned, and escorted by Colonel Baste's flotilla, quitted the ports of the isle of Lobau, and proceeded towards the wood at the confluence. It was a dark night, and heavy clouds portended a tempest, which could not but favour our enterprise. The small arm was crossed in a few minutes, though it widened as it approached the large one. Our men landed on the opposite bank, took the enemy's sentinels belonging to General Nordmann's advanced guard, then seized the redoubt of Maison Blanche, all within a quarter of an hour, and with the loss of only a few men. The hawser was immediately fastened to the tree previously fixed upon, and the rafts, plying to and fro, rapidly transported the rest of the Tharreau division. At the same time, Captain Larue, seconded by Colonel Baste, brought into position the materials of the bridge which was to be established at the confluence of the small branch with the large one, and completed his task in two hours. During this time, the Tharreau division kept up an irregular fire in the dark against the Austrian advanced posts, which it repulsed without difficulty, and the Grandjean (late St. Hilaire) and Frère (late Claparède) divisions, which completed Oudinot's corps, were drawn up in close columns, waiting for the bridge to be thrown over to enable them to cross the stream and join the Tharreau division.

Marshal Massena had orders not to begin his passage until General Oudinot should have already set foot on the enemy's side of the river. At eleven o'clock he put himself in motion with the Boudet, Carra St. Cyr, and Molitor divisions, Legrand's having already crossed over between Aspern and Essling. Fifteen hundred voltigeurs, led by the brave aide-de-camp Sainte Croix, and escorted by Colonel Baste, crossed in five flat-boats from the channel of the île Alexandre, and landed on the opposite bank, under the fire of the Austrian advanced posts, whom Oudinot's fusillade had put upon the alert. As the rafts could not easily

reach the shore, the soldiers jumped into the water up to their middle, some to fight hand-to-hand with the enemy's sharpshooters, others to drag the rafts to land. The hawser being made fast to a tree, the rafts began to ply, and the voltigeurs engaged with the enemy were succoured. Meanwhile the bridge in one piece issued from the same channel under the direction of the Commandant Dessalles, and was floated a hundred yards down the current, in order to leave a clear passage for the materials of the other bridges. Some intrepid pontonniers, advancing in a wherry under the enemy's fire, dropped an anchor and brought up the bridge to its position. While they were firmly securing one end of it on our side of the stream, the troops of Boudet's division ran along it to fasten it at the other end. Fifteen or twenty minutes sufficed for this fine operation. The rest of Massena's troops immediately passed over and took possession of the left bank, before the Austrians had time to bring down their masses to oppose the deployment of the French army.

The pontoon bridge, and then the bridge of rafts, next issued from the channel of the île Alexandre, but in separate pieces, and were fixed above the bridge in one piece, at two hundred yards from each other. The pontoon bridge was intended for Davout's infantry, the raft bridge for Davout and Massena's artillery and cavalry. The former was to be completed in less than two hours and half, the second in four or five. The pontonniers worked at them without intermission under a continual fire.

His projects being unmasked, Napoleon ordered the artillery of the redoubts to open their fire, first in order to demolish the little town of Enzersdorf, so that it might not serve as a *point d'appui* for the enemy, and then to sweep the plain below with such a deluge of grape that it would be impossible for Nordmann's troops to remain there. He gave the same order not only to the batteries on the right side of the isle, but also to those on the left towards the old passage, in order to bewilder the Austrians by these simultaneous attacks. At once 900 guns of the largest bore rent the air with their detonations. Colonel Baste, cruising with his armed boats both above and below the isle of Lobau, directed a cannonade against every point where firing was perceived, in a manner sufficient to distract the coolest and most determined enemy. The heavens soon mingled their thunder with that of Napoleon's artillery, and poured down torrents of rain and hail on both armies. The forked lightnings flashed, and when their glare had ceased it was succeeded by that of thousands of bombs and shells falling on the unfortunate town of Enzersdorf. Never had war in its mightiest furies presented so fearful a spectacle. Napoleon, riding up and down the bank on which the prodigious enterprise was being executed, directed every thing, with the calmness and security which accompany projects long meditated. His officers, all of them prepared like himself, felt that night neither confusion nor embarrassment. Every thing proceeded with perfect regularity, in spite of the hail, the rain, the bullets, the balls, and the rolling of the thunder and the cannonade. Vienna, awakened by these sinister sounds,

learned at last that its fate was in the balance, and that Napoleon's design, so long threateningly impending, was near being accomplished.

At two o'clock in the morning the army had already three bridges; that at the confluence, that in one piece below the île Alexandre, and the pontoon-bridge opposite that island. Oudinot passed over the first, Massena over the second, and immediately after him Davout. The troops defiled rapidly and in close columns. On the right, General Oudinot soon carried the wood at the confluence, repulsed some of Nordmann's posts, crossed a small branch, that of Steigbieghl, on planks, and carried his left to the Maison Blanche, his right to the little hamlet of Muhlleiten. In these various engagements he took three pieces of cannon and some hundreds of prisoners. A little to his right was the fortified castle of Sachsengang, garrisoned by an Austrian battalion. He surrounded it and riddled it with shells. During this time Massena had defiled with his whole infantry; but not yet having his cannons, he kept near the margin of the river, in order to be covered by the artillery of the redoubts, under the long range of which, the plain having become untenable, Nordmann's troops gradually retired.

When day dawned on the banks of the river about four o'clock in the morning, a most imposing spectacle presented itself to the eyes of both armies. The storm had cleared away and the rising sun glittered on thousands of bayonets and helmets. To the right, General Oudinot was marching up the plain, while his rear-guard was bombarding the castle of Sachsengang. To the left, Massena was bearing on the town of Enzersdorf, which continued burning without being able to return the fire that was poured upon it, its artillery having been silenced in a few minutes. The interval between these two corps was filled up by that of Davout, the whole of which had passed over. Part of the artillery and cavalry had crossed the pontoon-bridge; the rest was thronging to the bridge of rafts, followed by the imperial guard. Seventy thousand men were already in line of battle on the enemy's side of the river, capable by themselves of making head against the forces of Archduke Charles. Bernadotte with the Saxons was making ready to defile after the imperial guard. The armies of Italy and Dalmatia, and the Bavarian division, which had all been moved into Lobau during the night, were advancing on their side. The whole mass marched with admirable and irresistible *ensemble*. The soldiers, who had been forbidden to light fires during the night, in order not to present a mark to the enemy's artillerymen, and who were dripping from the rain, warmed themselves in the first rays of a July sun. Some quitted the ranks to embrace relations and friends whom they had not seen for years; for corps which had come, some from the heart of Dalmatia, others from the confines of Poland and Spain, met together on this new battle-field after having separated at Austerlitz to repair to the opposite extremities of the continent. Bavarians, Badenese, Saxons, Poles, Portuguese, were mingled with French in this rendezvous of nations, ready to fight for a policy which concerned them not. The joyous spirit of our soldiers

broke out in all directions, though before evening very many of them would have ceased to exist. The sunshine, their confidence in victory, and the hope of signal rewards enlivened their spirits. They were, above all, delighted to see the Danube overcome, and they admired the resources of the genius that had transported them so rapidly and in such imposing masses from the one bank to the other. Seeing Napoleon ride along the front of the lines, they raised their chakos on the points of their bayonets, and saluted him with shouts of *Vive l'Empereur!*

By Napoleon's orders, possession was to be taken of the town of Enzersdorf on the left, and the castle of Sachsengang on the right, that no enemy might be left in his rear when he deployed on the plain. Some trifling field-works cowered the gates of the little town, now half reduced to ashes. An Austrian battalion defended it, but had almost exhausted its ammunition, and was about to be relieved by another when Massena ordered the attack. His two aides-de-camp, Saint Croix and Pelet, assailed one of the gates of Enzersdorf with the 46th, while Lasalle, enclosing the town with his cavalry, prevented any succour from reaching it. The infantry carried the gate-works at the point of the bayonet, entered the burning streets, and captured all that remained alive of the Austrian battalion. The men who endeavoured to escape from the town were cut down by Lasalle's cavalry.

General Oudinot, after cannonading the castle of Sachsengang, summoned it to surrender; and the commandant yielded without resistance, seeing himself drowned, as it were, in a flood of a hundred and fifty thousand men. The army had nothing now to molest it on its wings. It could deploy in the plain opposite Archduke Charles, and offer him battle at the foot of the hills of Wagram. That prince at that moment beheld all his anticipations miserably deceived. After such a mistake as he had made in the disposal of his advanced guards, they had no alternative but to retreat; for if they held out, Klenau would inevitably be taken aback in the redoubts of Essling and Aspern. After all, the archduke was not aware that matters were so serious as they really were. He supposed that the passage had been effected only in part, that the French army would employ at least four-and-twenty hours in crossing the river and deploying, and that he should have time to assail it before it was in a condition to defend itself. Standing on a hill beside his brother, the emperor, who was questioning him as to the state of affairs, he told him that the French indeed had forced the Danube, but that he was letting them pass over in order to throw them into the river. "Very good," said the emperor, shrewdly, "but do not let too many of them pass over." Archduke Charles, who had no choice left, directed Klenau to fall back in good order on the main body.

Napoleon, having three-fourths of his army beyond the river, now thought only of gaining ground in order that he might put himself in order of battle. Marching always with ex-

\* This remarkable saying remained traditional among the military men of the time.

treme prudence, he ordered several precautions before he advanced farther. Though he had bridges enough to convey his troops from one bank to the other, he wished to receive his *matériel* more rapidly, and above all, to have numerous means of retreat in case of ill success. In consequence, he had three more bridges laid down, which, with the four established in the night, made seven. All the materials being ready, his commands would be obeyed in a few hours. He likewise gave orders for an equal number of *îles de pont*,—some made of fascines, others of bags of earth prepared beforehand, so that in its retreat the army might not be deprived of its means of passage by a sudden irruption upon its rear. Lastly, he intrusted to General Regnier, an excellent officer, very skilful in defensive war, the keeping of the isle of Lobau. He left him seven battalions; two of which were to guard the large bridges, one the bridge at the confluence, one the bridges over the small branch, and three were to form a reserve in the centre of the isle of Lobau. Orders were given to let no one pass from the other side of the river except the wounded.

These precautions taken, Napoleon began to deploy on the plain, his left remaining stationary near Enzersdorf and the Danube, his right marching towards the heights of Wagram, performing, consequently, a movement of conversion. He had formed in two lines: in the first line were Massena on the left, Oudinot in the centre, Davout on the right; in the second line were Bernadotte on the left, Marmont and De Wrede in the centre, and the army of Italy on the right. The guard and the cuirassiers formed a superb reserve in the rear. The artillery advanced on the front of the several corps, mingled with some detachments of cavalry. The bulk of the cavalry, husars, chasseurs, and dragoons was spread along the wings. Napoleon was in the centre, counting on a certain and decisive victory.

He continued to gain ground, pivoting constantly on his left, the corps in the first line separating from each other to make room successively for those in the second, and the whole army thus deploying after the manner of a fan before the enemy, who fell back on the hills of Wagram. Our artillery fired as it marched. Our cavalry charged the Austrian cavalry when it could come up with it, or the rear-guards of infantry when they remained within its reach. Davout's corps, finding on its way the village of Rutzendorf, against which cavalry could not be employed, attacked and carried it with the infantry. Dupas's French division, marching with Bernadotte's Saxons, in like manner took the village of Raschdorf. At that point, the Austrian cavalry, having attempted to support its infantry, was sharply repulsed by the Saxon cuirassiers, who behaved gallantly under *aide-de-camp* (afterwards marshal) Gerard. Massena, slowly moving up the bank of the Danube, encountered first Essling, then Aspern in his movement, took them reversely, and entered without resistance. Klenau's sixth corps retired by Leopoldau on Stammersdorf and Gerarsdorf. At six o'clock on the evening of the 5th we lined the chain of the Wagram hills in its whole extent, after having lost in executing

this magnificent operation only some hundreds of our soldiers, while we had put nearly 2000 Austrians *hors de combat*, and made about 8000 prisoners at Sachsengang, Enzersdorf, Raschdorf, and Rutzendorf.

The French army, which had deployed in marching, now formed but one long line of about three leagues, parallel to that of the Austrians, which was almost straight from Neusiedel to Wagram, but curved at the centre towards Aderklaa, and continued in a semicircle by Gerarsdorf and Stammersdorf to the margin of the Danube. From Neusiedel, a village commanded by a square tower, to Wagram, ran the gently sloping hills on which was encamped the left wing of the Austrian army to the number of about 75,000, protected by the swampy stream of the Russbach. It was there, as we have said, that invincible intrenchments might have been made with the help of art; but, fortunately, nothing was seen there but the camp barracks. At Neusiedel, that is to say, at the extreme left of the Austrians, was Prince Rosenberg with Nordmann's advanced guard and a numerous cavalry; less to the left, towards Baumersdorf, was Hohenzollern's corps; and towards the centre, at Wagram, Bellegarde's corps, with Archduke Charles's head-quarters. It was about this point that the line of battle began to bend back to meet the Danube, and that the useful protection of the Russbach ceased. The Austrians had in their very centre the reserve of grenadiers and cuirassiers, extending in a semicircle from Wagram to Gerarsdorf. They had on their right the third corps under General Kollowrath, the sixth under General Klenau, which had just retreated from Essling and Aspern, and the fifth under Prince de Reuss, between Gerarsdorf, Stammersdorf, and the Danube.

The French followed exactly the contour of the enemy's line. Before the Austrian left wing we had our right, that is to say Davout, established in the village of Glinzendorf, facing Rosenberg's corps, and Oudinot, established in the village of Grosshofen, facing Hohenzollern's corps. In the centre was the army of Italy confronting Bellegarde. Bearing to the left, opposite Wagram, was Bernadotte with the Saxons, over against the reserve of grenadiers and cuirassiers; and, quite to the left, from Süßenbrunn to Kagan, were Massena's four divisions, appointed to act against Kollowrath, Klenau, and De Reuss. In the centre, behind the army of Italy and the Saxons, Napoleon had kept in reserve Marmont's corps, the imperial guard, the Bavarians, and the cuirassiers. Thus, in this vast line of battle, straight, as we have said, from Neusiedel to Wagram, and curved from thence to Stammersdorf, the Austrians had their greatest strength in their wings and their least at their centre, since the reserve of grenadiers and cuirassiers formed the sole connection between the two principal masses. We, on the contrary, possessed a sufficient force on our right wing from Glinzendorf to Grosshofen, where Davout and Oudinot were, a very moderate one from Süßenbrunn and Kagan, where was Massena alone, but a considerable one between Grosshofen and Aderklaa, since in that place, besides the army of Italy and the Saxons, there

was the army of Dalmatia, the imperial guard, the Bavarians, and all the heavy cavalry. This arrangement was assuredly the best; the one which allowed of the most rapid measures to meet the various chances of the battle, by moving right or left as occasion may require, and which also made it possible to strike the Austrian army in its weak place—namely, the centre of the line. In fact, on this occasion as at Essling, wishing to envelop the French army so as to hinder it from debouching, Archduke Charles had weakened his centre and made himself vulnerable at that point by the sword of his potent adversary.

This state of things, which could not escape so practised an eye as Napoleon's, tempted him to bring matters to an end that very night by a decisive act, which would have dispensed him from shedding torrents of blood on the following day. All reports agreed in stating that the enemy nowhere stood his ground, but retreated with singular readiness. Surprised, in fact, by the sudden apparition of the French army, Archduke Charles had made no arrangements for attacking, and had only instructed his advanced guards to fall back. Trusting too easily to the report of some officers, Napoleon hoped, that by making an abrupt attack at nightfall on the plateau of Wagram, he should break the enemy's centre before the latter had sufficiently provided for his defence, and that the Austrian army, being thus severed, would retreat of its own accord, so that nothing would remain for the end of the campaign but an active and destructive pursuit of its two moieties. In this instance was manifested the inconvenience of acting with enormous masses of men and over immense spaces. The commander-in-chief, being unable to see or direct every thing in person, was obliged to rely on lieutenants, who observed with too little accuracy, and often even acted without concert.

Napoleon then, with an imprudence that did not correspond to the admirable forethought displayed on these days, gave orders to storm the plateau of Wagram. Those who could act against it were Oudinot, by attacking Baumersdorf; the army of Italy, by passing the Russbach between Baumersdorf and Wagram; and Bernadotte, by assailing Wagram itself through Aderklaa. Accordingly, Bernadotte with the Saxons and the Dupas division, Macdonald and Grenier with two divisions of the army of Italy, and Oudinot with his whole corps, advanced at nightfall against the Austrian position. Oudinot marched against Baumersdorf, cannonaded it, set fire to it with shells, and endeavoured to take it from Hohenzollern's advanced guards, who had in the Russbach a potent means of resistance. On the opposite side, Bernadotte and the Saxons fell upon Wagram, which was defended by a detachment from Bellegarde's corps, and nearly mastered it, but not enough to advance beyond it. While Oudinot and Bernadotte were thus prosecuting the attack at the two extremities, in order to seize the enemy's two *points d'appui*, Dupas and Macdonald, in the middle, proceeded to cross the Russbach. The stream was not wide, but it was deep, and formed an impediment not very easily overcome. Dupas, with the 5th light infantry and the 19th of the

line, dashed into it, shouting, "*Vive l'Empereur!*" Some soldiers, who in their haste had rushed into the part where the water was deepest, were drowned; the rest got safe over, rallied, and ascended the hillside under a fire of grape and musketry. The Austrians, thus suddenly attacked, had formed in square behind the camp barracks, under cover of which their sharpshooters kept up a very brisk fire. Dupas's two brave French regiments dislodged the sharpshooters, of whom they captured about 300, passed the line of the barracks, and fell upon the squares. The 5th, which headed the column, broke one of these squares, took its flag, and made it prisoner. The 19th seconded this vigorous exploit, as did also the Rudlof and Melsch grenadiers, two Saxon battalions under Dupas. The Austrian line was just on the point of being broken when the assailants received a volley in their rear, which extremely surprised and disconcerted them. The two columns of the army of Italy, the one commanded by Macdonald, the other by Grenier, after having crossed the Russbach, were ascending the plateau to join Dupas, when, perceiving the latter's Saxons, and taking them for enemies, they fired upon them. The Saxons, thus unexpectedly attacked in the rear, returned the fire, and the troops of Macdonald and Grenier, believing themselves charged in front, while at the same time they were attacked in flank from Baumersdorf, which was still occupied by Hohenzollern's corps, were thrown into a state of confusion, which the night soon converted into a panic. They rushed down from the plateau, followed by the dismayed Saxons, and took to flight in incredible disorder. Dupas, left alone with his two French regiments, and assailed on all sides by Bellegarde's corps, which Archduke Charles himself had rallied, was obliged to give way and quit the plateau under reiterated charges of horse and foot. Oudinot broke off the attack on Baumersdorf, and Bernadotte, abandoning Wagram, which he had almost conquered, fell back on Aderklaa.

This panic cost the Dupas division a thousand men by the dispersion of its two Saxon battalions, which had been in too great haste to surrender to the Austrians, and the army of Italy some thousands strayed and missing. Fortunately, the cavalry, being sent out in all directions, soon brought back the scattered soldiers to their respective corps. Our army, though still as brave, was yet less experienced than that of Austerlitz or Friedland, and too numerous, compounded of too many various elements, to be as firm, solid, and apt at manœuvres as formerly. After all, this was a check of little moment, between the marvellous passage which had just been accomplished and the victory, which there was reason to look for on the morrow.

Napoleon directed that every corps should bivouac on the position it had occupied during the day, his centre being still in great force, and capable of affording aid to whichever of his wings might require it. There was no wood on the plain, and the soldiers could make no fires, which was a painful privation, for though it was July, the night was very cold. Every man laid down in his cloak. The soldiers had biscuits and brandy. Napoleon had only a fire

fed with a few trusses of straw to warm him in his bivouac. Having spent several hours in conference with his marshals, that they might be well acquainted with his intentions, he sent them all away before day, except Davout, whom he kept with him until dawn. It was the third night he had passed on foot or on horseback.

During this time Archduke Charles had at last arranged his plan of battle. He had always entertained the thought, suggested by very old study of that field of battle, to oppose the offensive movement of the French with his left wing, encamped on the heights from Neusiedel to Wagram, and while the French were busied before that sort of intrenched camp, to assume in his turn the offensive against them with his right wing bent forward, fall upon them in flank, separate them from the Danube, and, once he had reduced them, to stand on the defensive, to bring down his left upon them from the hills of Wagram, in order to drive them into the river with all his combined forces. He hoped, moreover, that while his left was defending the banks of the Russbach, and his right was attacking the French in flank, Archduke John would come up from Presburg and assail them in the rear, and that they would be unable to withstand such a combination of efforts. All this would have been possible, nay probable, if, manœuvring like Napoleon, the archduke had brought to the field 30,000 or 40,000 more men; if he had notified Archduke John in good time; and if, availing himself of the fact that the field of battle was known beforehand, he had accumulated between Neusiedel and Wagram, works which would have rendered that intrenched camp impregnable. In that case an attack in flank upon the French, already exhausted by a fruitless effort, would have produced infallible results. But Archduke Charles had done none of these things, as we have seen; he had erected on the ground he had to defend only barracks for his troops, and it was not until the evening of the preceding day, the 4th, that he had sent orders to his brother to join him. The obstacle which those barracks presented in the night affair and on the following day, sufficiently showed what might have happened if considerable works had been added to the configuration of the ground.

Be that as it may, in one of the half-burnt houses of the village of Wagram evacuated by Bernadotte, Archduke Charles dictated his orders. He directed his left not to enter into action until his right, put in motion that very night, should have begun to make the French waver by the attack in flank it was to make upon them. That wing, consisting of Klenau and Kollowrath's corps, was to march immediately—that is to say, at one or two o'clock in the morning—fall upon our left, which consisted only of Massena's corps, and drive it from Kagram to Aspern, and from Süssenbrunn to Breitenlee. Immediately afterwards the reserves of grenadiers and cuirassiers, connecting the right wing with the centre between Gerarsdorf and Wagram, were to advance on Aderklaa, and the combine with part of Bellegarde's corps, come down for that purpose from the plateau of Wagram. This movement having been effected, the left wing, composed of the corps of Hohenzollern and Rosenberg,

was to descend on Baumerdorf and Neusiedel, cross the Russbach, take the villages of Grosshofen and Glinzendorf, occupied by Marshal Davout, and thus complete this double manœuvre in flank and front, which, in the opinion of the commander-in-chief, was to bring about the sweeping of the French into the Danube.

As regards this plan, we cannot tell why the corps of the Prince de Reuss, which was nearer the Danube than Klenau's corps, and which terminated the right wing of the Austrians near Stammersdorf, had not orders to take part in the operations of that wing, and thus render more irresistible the attack it was appointed to make. The need of observing the road from Vienna was not great enough to paralyze a whole corps, for it was evident, from the passage of the French across the isle of Lobau, that they did not contemplate another elsewhere. Moreover, the orders issued ought to have been calculated with reference to distance and time, so as to make each corps act at the fit moment.

The commander-in-chief's orders, despatched from Wagram in the night, arrived in less than an hour at the left wing, which was at the distance of a league, and required more than two hours to reach the right wing, which was more than two leagues off, and which had to be sought for in the midst of extreme confusion. As ill-luck would have it, in the retreat effected that evening, Klenau's corps had approached too near Gerarsdorf, and had taken up the ground intended for that of Kollowrath. More time, therefore, than had been calculated at headquarters was requisite to combine in the dark the corps composing the right wing, and to make them take up their position in order of battle, and it was near four o'clock when they were barely beginning their movement. On the other hand, at that very moment, the left wing, which had had earlier notice, and was not obliged to lose time in seeking its position, was about to come first into action, whereas it ought not to have done so until long after the night.

While all was movement in the Austrian camp, and the troops, instead of going to rest, were fatiguing themselves in rectifying positions wrongly taken, deep stillness prevailed among the French. They lay asleep on the ground they had occupied on the preceding day, for Napoleon, having well reinforced his right, on account of the possibility of Archduke John's arrival, but still more his centre, where he had accumulated considerable forces, had nothing more to do but to keep quiet until the enemy should have unmasked his designs. He had, therefore, ordered his marshals to be under arms by daybreak, but to let the Austrians declare themselves before they moved, in order that they might ascertain with certainty the point where their blows would be mortal. He inclined, however, to have the heights from Neusiedel to Wagram carried by Davout and Oudinot, and, at the same time, to make an irruption through the centre with the army of Italy, the Saxons, and Marmont's corps, while Massena with his four divisions should only act against the Austrian right wing from Aderklaa to the Danube. Napoleon reserved to himself the Bavarians, the imperial guard, and the heavy cavalry, to meet unforeseen con-

lingencies. These designs were subject to the control of events.

At four o'clock on the morning of the 6th of July, a day for ever memorable, the fire began first on the left of the Austrians and the right of the French. Prince Rosenberg, in consequence of erroneous instructions naming four o'clock as the hour for entering into action, descended from the heights of Neusiedel, crossed the Russbach at the village of Neusiedel, and moved in two columns on Grosshofen and Glinzendorf, which he attacked with extreme vigour. Marshal Davout had at his disposal his three ordinary divisions—Morand, Friant, and Gudin—the small Puthod division, (formerly Demont,) six regiments of light cavalry under General Monthron, three of dragoons under General Grouchy, and the four Espagne regiments of cuirassiers under General Arrighi, (since duke of Padua.) General Friant's left and General Gudin's right sent detachments to the defence of the village of Glinzendorf, whilst the Puthod division undertook the defence of the village of Grosshofen, behind which it had bivouacked. Large banks of earth extended from the one to the other of these villages. Our soldiers, judiciously placed behind this natural intrenchment, kept up a well-sustained fire of musketry, which did vast mischief to the Austrians, without the latter doing us much in return. On hearing the firing, Napoleon sent General Mathieu Dumas with orders to his lieutenants not to hazard any offensive movement, but to content themselves with firmly keeping their ground, until he should have given them his final instructions; and he galloped to the right wing, where Marshal Davout was stationed. On his way he saw very distinctly the two Austrian columns attacking the villages of Glinzendorf and Grosshofen. He was accompanied by a brigade of Nansouty's cuirassiers, with some batteries of light artillery, and he directed them to take the attacking column at Grosshofen in flank. This diversion came very *à propos*, for it enabled General Puthod to recover possession of the village which the Austrians had taken at the point of the bayonet. The latter were forced to retreat to the Russbach. The same thing happened to the column which, having debouched from Neusiedel on Glinzendorf, found in front of them Gudin's right and Friant's left, and on their flank the light artillery of General Arrighi's cuirassiers. This column, too, was compelled to fall back on the Russbach. Prince Rosenberg was about to renew these attacks, when Archduke Charles countermanded the movement, seeing that his left wing was beginning the battle prematurely.

The fire of musketry and cannon was now general on that vast front of three leagues, along which 800,000 men and 1100 pieces of cannon were arrayed against each other. Napoleon, who saw everywhere a sort of simultaneous attack on the enemy's part, without any clearly defined plan, deemed it necessary, nevertheless, in any case to seize the hills of Neusiedel, in order to occupy the point at which the Archdukes Charles and John might come to a junction. The aspect of the ground pointed out the way in which this was to be done. The heights forming the plateau of Wagram ran parallel with the Russbach as far as Neusiedel and the square tower, where they make a bend

backwards, and presented a much gentler slope of very easy access. All that was requisite, then, was to cross the Russbach a little more to the right, away from the enemy's fire, in order to take the Austrian position in flank. Monthron's light cavalry and Grouchy's dragoons were ordered rapidly to prepare the means of crossing the stream. Then the Morand and Friant divisions had orders to cross the Russbach and advance at right angles to the Gudin and Puthod divisions, and attack the plateau on the side while the latter were attacking it in front. As soon as the angle, of which the square tower formed the apex, was taken, Napoleon proposed to have Baumersdorf assailed by Oudinot, and Wagram by the army of Italy. When these several points had been carried, Archduke John might appear on the field of battle, but it would be only to witness a disaster.

Napoleon had but just made these arrangements with Marshal Davout, when several aides-de-camp arrived from Massena and Bernadotte, announcing a bad beginning of the day on the left and the centre, and requesting his presence and aid.

The events in question were serious, but quite reparable. Bernadotte, who had been obliged to evacuate Wagram on the preceding night and fall back on Aderklaa, remained in that position in the morning, presenting a point to the concavity of the curved line described by the Austrians. He saw on his right Bellegarde descending on Aderklaa with the most considerable part of his corps; and on his left the reserve of granadiers and cuirassiers advancing on Süssenbrunn. He resolved, therefore, to fall back on a small plateau behind Aderklaa, in order to be nearer the army of Italy on the one side, and Massena on the other. No sooner had he executed this movement than Bellegarde's advanced guards fell upon him. The Saxons were unable long to resist such an assault, and he was driven back to a considerable distance.

At the same time, Massena's four weak divisions, amounting to but 18,000 men, against the 60,000 of Klenau, Kollowrath, and Lichtenstein, had been obliged to retrograde, in order to take up a less extended position on our left. Massena, though suffering from a recent fall from his horse, was present at the battle, as he had promised Napoleon, and gave his orders from an open carriage, in which he lay all swathed in compresses.

It appeared to Massena, that if a vigorous stand was not made at the point which Bernadotte had just quitted, not only the left wing, but even the centre would be endangered. He therefore ordered the Carra St. Cyr division, consisting of the 24th light and 4th of the line, to march on Aderklaa. These two brave regiments dashed headlong into the village, and took it in spite of the impediments offered by the garden-walls and houses. But instead of halting there and securing their position, they too impetuously advanced beyond it, and placed themselves uncovered in the position in which Bernadotte had with reason declined to remain, and received Bellegarde's fire on their right flank and front, and that of the grenadier reserve on their left. After a heroic resistance, they were constrained to yield to numbers and

fall back on Aderklaa, deprived of their two colonels. General Molitor then came to the support of Carra St. Cyr; but Legrand and Boudet, left alone with 10,000 men against Klenau and Kollowrath with 15,000, were constrained to retreat to the left, and abandon a considerable extent of ground.

Such was the state of things reported to Napoleon at nine A. M. Satisfied as to his right wing, where he left Davout thoroughly instructed as to what he had to do, he galloped off, followed by his staff, to go to a distance of nearly two leagues, and repair the mischief. He found Bernadotte greatly agitated, tranquillized him, and rode on to Massena's carriage, round which the cannon-balls were raining. At that moment the Aspre grenadiers, excited by the presence of Archduke Charles, who had put himself at their head, were advancing victoriously through Aderklaa, from which they had driven out the Carra St. Cyr division.

Little moved by that spectacle, and relying on the vast resources at his command, Napoleon conversed for a while with Massena, and settled with him his plan of conduct. Already it might be inferred, from the direction of the firing, that Boudet had been forced back a long way, and that the archduke was in contact with the Danube on his right. Some officers even brought intelligence that Boudet had been driven back to Aspern after losing all his artillery. With troops as steady as those of Austerlitz, and who had not the recollection of Essling so fresh in their minds, Napoleon might have allowed his left to be forced, provided his centre stood fast, and have victoriously assumed the offensive on his right. As Davout was soon to carry the plateau of Wagram, and as Aderklaa could not fail to be retaken, it would have been altogether for our advantage to have the right wing of the Austrians between us and the Danube. We should have taken it wholly, and the house of Austria would, perhaps, have fallen that day. Napoleon thought of adopting that strategy, as he made known some days after. But with young troops, who had not forgotten Essling, it would have been running a great risk. The news that the enemy was at the bridges might alone throw them into a state of consternation. He rejected this idea, however, and thought only how he might put a direct stop to the progress of the Austrians towards the centre and the left, by a prompt disposal of the troops he had in reserve.

And here he reaped the fruit of his profound foresight. It was a principle of his, that it was by concentrating on one point the action of certain special arms that grand effects were to be produced, and therefore it was that he had bestowed an immense reserve of artillery on the guard, and had kept under his hand a reserve of fourteen regiments of cuirassiers. So he ordered the whole of the artillery of the guard, together with all that could be spared by the several corps, to advance at a gallop. Just then, General de Wrede arrived on the ground with twenty-five pieces of excellent artillery, and solicited the honour of taking part in that decisive movement, to which Napoleon consented. He sent also for General Macdonald, with three divisions of the army of Italy,

the fusiliers and mounted grenadiers of the guard, and General Nansouty's six regiments of cuirassiers. His design was to shake the Austrian centre with a hundred guns, and then to pierce it with Macdonald's bayonets and Nansouty's sabres. He decided at the same time that Massena, with the Carra St. Cyr, Molitor, and Legrand divisions, formed in close columns, should wheel to the right, and then move forward perpendicularly to the Danube to the aid of Boudet, thus performing a flank movement under the fire of Kollowrath and Klenau. After all, the numerous *étés de pont* he had constructed afforded him a sufficient security; and in this instance, again, his forethought was rewarded. But he did not choose that his young troops should bear the cannon in their rear, and be rendered uneasy about the communications of the army with the Danube.

These orders were obeyed on the instant. Massena's three divisions defiled in one long column towards the Danube, receiving in flank, with heroic impassibility, the fire of Klenau and Kollowrath. Lasalle and Marulaz covered them during their march, charging and repulsing the Austrian cavalry. Meanwhile Napoleon, impatient for the arrival of Macdonald and Lauriston, sent officer after officer to hasten them, and, mounted on a Persian horse of dazzling whiteness, rode under a hail of cannon-balls about the ground quitted by Massena. The cannonade had by this time acquired the frequency of musket-firing, and everybody shuddered at the thought of seeing the man, on whose life so many destinies depended, struck by one of those blind messengers of death. But up came at last at a gallop, making the earth tremble beneath them, the sixty pieces of artillery belonging to the guard, and forty others, French and Bavarians, all directed by the illustrious Drouot. The hundred guns were ranged in a line, and instantly began the most tremendous cannonade ever known in our long wars. From Wagram to Aderklaa, and from Aderklaa to Süssenbrunn, the Austrian line presented an open angle, one side of which was formed by Bellegarde, the other by the grenadiers and the cuirassiers. The hundred cannons, firing incessantly on that double line, pierced it with balls, and soon dismounted the enemy's artillery. Napoleon observed with his glass the effect of that formidable battery, and was satisfied with the correctness of his own conceptions. But artillery was not sufficient to break the Austrian centre; bayonets, too, were requisite, and the army of Italy came up at double-quick step. The intrepid Macdonald, recently recalled from disfavour, marches at the head of his corps, astonishing those who did not know him by his costume of the fashion of the republic, and preparing to astonish them still more by his behaviour under fire. He deploys part of the Broussier division and a brigade of the Séras division in a single line, and ranges in close columns on the left wing the remains of the Broussier division, on the right Lamarque's division, and thus presents to the enemy an oblong square, which he closes with the twenty-four squadrons of Nansouty's cuirassiers. As a support to him, Napoleon places in his rear the fusiliers and tirailleurs of the imperial guard, to the number of eight battalions, under



General Reille. To these he adds the cavalry of the guard, to fall at the right moment upon the enemy's infantry, and then, with his eyes fixed on that grand spectacle, he awaits the success of the manoeuvres he has ordered.

Macdonald advances under a deluge of fire, leaving the ground covered at every step with his dead and wounded, still closing his ranks without wavering, and communicating his own gallant bearing to his soldiers. "What a brave man!" Napoleon exclaims several times, seeing him march thus under grape and bullets. Suddenly Prince John de Lichtenstein advances to the charge with his heavy cavalry. Macdonald halts, and orders the two columns which form the sides of his square to face the enemy, who is thus met with three lines of fire. The ground shakes under the gallop of the Austrian cuirassiers, but they are received with such volleys of musketry, that they are forced to halt and retreat upon their infantry, whom their flight throws into great disorder. It is now the moment for our cavalry to charge and make thousands of prisoners in this confusion. Macdonald gives the order to Nansouty, but the latter, being obliged to bring up his troops from the rear to the front, unavoidably loses some precious time. When he is ready, the disorder of the Austrian infantry is partly repaired. He charges, however, and breaks several squares. Macdonald, in his impatience, addresses himself to the cavalry of the guard, which was near him, and was commanded by General Walther. But the latter could only receive orders of Marshal Bessières, and he had just been struck by a cannon-ball. Macdonald was sorely vexed at seeing the fruit of his victory thus escape him; but, though he made few prisoners, he had at least forced the Austrian army to retrograde, and frustrated their attempt on our centre and left. The archduke's troops gradually withdrew from Aderklaa on the one side, and Süssenbrunn on the other.

The serious danger that had threatened the army was now removed. Massena's column had arrived near the river towards Aspern, had faced to the right, and, preceded by its cavalry, had resumed the offensive against Kolowrath and Klenau. Boudet was brought back into line, and, all marching forward, drove the Austrians back upon Breitenlee and Hirschatzen. Lasalle and Marulaz made brilliant charges at the head of their cavalry, but the former was struck by a musket-ball, and ended his glorious career in seeing the enemy fly.

Thus the archduke's centre, shaken by the fire of a hundred pieces of ordnance, and arrested by Macdonald, retreats, as does also his right. If Marshal Davout, in accordance with his orders, carries the position of Neusiedel on the left wing of the Austrians, it is all over with them. That position being taken, the line of heights from Neusiedel to Wagram will be no longer tenable, and Archduke Charles will be cut off from the route to Hungary, separated from Archduke John, and forced into Bohemia. Accordingly, Napoleon's gaze is now constantly turned to the right, towards the square tower which commands the village of Neusiedel, and he waits only the progress of the fire on that side to let loose Oudinot's corps on Wagram. He has still left, in case Archduke John should come up, half the army of Italy, Marmont's

corps, the old guard, and the Bavarians. Happen then what may, he has resources to meet every chance of the day.

The confidence Napoleon placed in Marshal Davout was fully justified on this as on all other occasions. Montbrun and Grouchy prepared the passage of the Russbach on our extreme right for themselves and the infantry. The Morand and Friant divisions crossed the stream after the cavalry, and, ranging themselves on the flank of the position of Neusiedel, formed a right angle with Gudin and Puthod's divisions, which remained before the Russbach from Neusiedel to Baumersdorf. When the signal to attack was given, Morand, who was on the extreme right where the ascent was easiest, advanced first. Friant, placed between Morand and Neusiedel, where he formed the apex of the angle, waited until Morand should have gained ground upon the extremity of the enemy's line to attack the hill in his turn. For the present he confined himself to a violent cannonade, which he maintained with sixty pieces detached from several divisions. Morand, seconded on the left by this cannonade, and on the right by Montbrun's cavalry charges, coolly ascended the rising ground. In order to face this attack in flank, Rosenberg makes his line fall back. Morand continues his ascent under a plunging fire of the whole of that part of the Austrian line, and then attacks the enemy in column. Rosenberg assails his left, formed by the 17th of the line, and compels it to give way for a moment, until Friant sends to its aid Gilly's brigade, consisting of the 15th light and 33d of the line, which charge up the hill, and drive back Rosenberg's troops at the point of the bayonet. Puthod and Gudin's divisions now come into action. Puthod forces his way into the village of Neusiedel, and, after a severe conflict with the Austrian troops, compels them to retire upon the hill in the rear. At the same moment Gudin daringly scales the plateau under a murderous fire, whilst Friant has already gained ground in Rosenberg's rear. The square tower is at this moment passed by both Friant and Gudin. All is not ended, however. Hitherto they had had to fight only Rosenberg, favoured by the position; but Hohenzollern, who had remained stationary above Baumersdorf, opposite Oudinot, who had not yet been engaged, moved half his troops towards the square tower, to assail Gudin's right and plunge it in the Russbach. Vainly did Arrighi's cuirassiers endeavour to defile between the camp barracks in order to charge the hill which terminates in the plateau. Assailed in the narrow lanes of the camp by a most vehement fire, they could not charge with advantage, and retreated in disorder. The 85th of the line of Gudin's division was nearly brought to a halt by the violence of the fire. The other regiments of the same division came to its aid, and the whole body gradually succeeded in repulsing Hohenzollern, while Morand and Friant gained ground on the rear of the plateau in closely pursuing Rosenberg's troops.

While Marshal Davout thus accomplished his task, Napoleon, seeing his fires passing beyond the square tower, no longer had any doubt of the day's success. "The battle is won!" he exclaimed; and he sent the news

to Marshal Massena, Prince Eugene, and General Macdonald. Then he ordered Oudinot's corps to march on Baunersdorf and Wagram, and carry that portion of the heights. Oudinot's troops dashed into the village, which they had been unable to carry on the preceding evening, traversed it, ascended the plateau, and joined Gudin's division on their right. The impulse then became general. The Austrian line was everywhere driven back; and Gudin's division ranging evenly at that moment with those of Friant and Morand, Davout's whole corps formed one long oblique line, which swept the whole extent of the plateau of Wagram.

The Tharreau division of Oudinot's corps marched on Wagram, charged several battalions, took two and the village, in which it made several prisoners. The Frère division (Oudinot's second) passed the village on the right. The Grandjean division (formerly St. Hilaire) followed that movement, repulsed the Austrian infantry, and sharply assailed them when they attempted to make a stand. The 10th light infantry fell upon a battalion which had formed in square, and took it. Napoleon, seeing the Austrian army retreating in all quarters, and our line extending and even weakening itself in some points as it advanced, sent succours where they were needed, and particularly to General Macdonald, who was separated from Massena on his left, and Bernadotte on his right. He ordered to his aid De Wrede's Bavarian infantry and the cavalry of the guard. On arriving at Süssenbrunn he found the enemy's infantry still in possession of the village, which he took, and, charging with his light cavalry, he made four or five thousand prisoners at one stroke.

It was now three o'clock. Our left had driven back Klenau on Jedlersdorf; our centre had forced Bellegarde on Helmhof; our right had made Hohenzollern and Rosenberg fall back upon Bockfitts. Archduke Charles then gave orders for a retreat, fearing that he should lose the road to Moravia, and be forced towards Bohemia, far away from the centre of the monarchy. One hundred and twenty thousand Frenchmen pursued the same number of Austrians, engaging with them here and there in a multitude of partial conflicts, and collecting at every step prisoners, cannons, and colours.

Such was that celebrated battle of Wagram, begun at four in the morning and terminated at four in the afternoon. Napoleon had still in reserve Marmont's corps, part of the army of Italy, and the old guard—in all, 30,000 men—in case Archduke John should come and take part in the battle. That prince did at last approach the plain of Marchfeld, and showed himself to the right on our rear towards Siebenbrunn. His scouts, encountering ours, produced a sort of panic. The *vivandières*, and the long files of soldiers carrying off the wounded, thought that a second army was coming to recommence the fight, and they ran away uttering cries of terror. Among these fugitives were many young soldiers, exhausted by the heat of the day, and who, as usual, quitted the ground under the pretext of picking up the wounded. Such was the tumult, that the reserved corps had to stand to their arms, and

Napoleon, who had dismounted and was resting in the shade of a pyramid made of drums, was obliged to get into the saddle again. He believed that Archduke John was debouching in good earnest, and he was preparing to receive him with the forces he had kept intact for that purpose, when he saw the danger passing away, and the heads of the column which had shown themselves for a while disappearing below the horizon. The order to repair to Wagram had been despatched to Archduke John on the evening of the 4th; he received it on the morning of the 5th, started that day at noon, passed the night at Marchegg, marched again rather late on the morning of the 6th, and arrived when the battle was ended. He had certainly not intended to betray his brother, but he marched as might have been expected of a man of undecided character, who knew not the value of time. Had he come sooner on the ground, he would have added to the effusion of blood without changing the fortune of the day, since, to meet the 12,000 men he brought with him, there were Marmont's 10,000, the 10,000 remaining with Prince Eugene, and, if necessary, the old guard. He had badly obeyed a chief who had badly commanded.

The results of the battle of Wagram, without being as extraordinary as those of Austerlitz, Jena, or Friedland, were very great nevertheless. The Austrians had lost in killed or wounded about 24,000 men, among whom were Generals Nordmann, d'Aspre, Wukassovich, Vecsay, Rouvroy, Nostiz, Hesse Homburg, Vaccquant, Motzen, Stutterheim, and Merville. We had taken from them 9000 prisoners, who, with those of the preceding day, made a total of 12,000, and a score pieces of cannon. We had thus weakened the Austrian force by 38,000 men. On our part we had lost from 15,000 to 18,000 men, 7000 of whom were mortally wounded. It was, then, a memorable battle, the greatest in respect to numbers which Napoleon had fought, and one of the most important in its consequences. Its most wonderful characteristic was not, as on former occasions, the prodigious quantity of prisoners, flags, and cannons taken during the day; it was, that one of the broadest rivers in Europe had been crossed in face of the enemy with admirable precision, concert, and security; it was, twenty-four hours fighting along a line three leagues long and backed against that river, with all the perils of such a situation annulled; it was, that the position by which the commander-in-chief held the French in check was carried, and the army that defended the Austrian monarchy was beaten, and put out of condition to keep the field! These results were immense, since they terminated the war. In a military point of view, Napoleon had, in the passage of the Danube, outdone any thing ever before achieved in that way. On the field of battle, he had with rare promptitude moved from the centre to the left the reserve he had skilfully made, and had solved the question by one of those decisive movements which belong only to great captains; and if he had deprived himself of one important result by too soon stopping the Austrians when about to place themselves between him and the river, he had done so from highly prudential motives, which deserve to be admired. If there was any thing

to object to in what related to these prodigious events, it was certain consequences of Napoleon's policy, such as the extreme youth of his troops, the immoderate extent of the operations, the mistakes arising from the assemblage of men of so many different nations, and an incipient confusion imputable, not to the mind of the commander, but to the diversity and the quantity of the elements he was obliged to use. His genius was ever extraordinary, and the more extraordinary for that he strove against the nature of things; but it was already visible, that if that strife were prolonged, it was not the nature of things that would be vanquished.

As to the adversary, he had been brave, devoted to his cause, ingenious, but undecided. Without considering all the plans, more or less specious, which he had been blamed for not having adopted, such as assailing the isle of Lobau after the battle of Essling, or crossing the Danube above or below Vienna, it is unquestionable that there are certain simple things, of infallible effect, which he ought to have done, and which, fortunately for us, he did not do; such as multiplying the impediments to the passage of the river all about the isle of Lobau; intrenching the camp which was to be the field of battle, which would have enabled him, after making head against the French, to take them in flank and drive them back upon the river; giving his orders with precision enough not to have the left wing entering into action before the right; and gathering together for that decisive day all the disposable forces of the monarchy, whereof 40,000 men at least remained idle in Hungary, Bohemia, and Gallicia. It is commonly simple things, dictated by good sense and imprudently omitted, which decide the fate of the most important operations, especially in war. There seem grounds, too, for saying that the Austrian prince, gave the word to retreat a little too soon, for he was still capable of making a stand against the French, and, had he done so, Archduke John's appearance on the field of battle would not have been too late. On the other hand, it must be owned that longer resistance might have rendered the defeat so complete, that nothing would have remained of an army on the preservation of which depended the weal of the monarchy. Further resistance would have increased the chances of victory, but also greatly increased the chances of perishing beyond recovery. But whatever we may think of those various judgments which have been pronounced on these memorable events by all historians during the last half-century, it is not the less true that there is glory even in being mistaken, when one fights heroically for one's country, and takes part in such grand things. The war, besides, was drawing to an end, for it was not with Archduke John's 12,000 men, and the 80,000 men remaining to Archduke Charles, that it was possible to save the monarchy. Though the latter had lost in action only thirty and some odd thousands, an equal number belonging to the landwehr had quitted the ranks and were returning home. To retire into one of the provinces of the monarchy, recruit the army as fast as it was possible, and by holding out threats of indefinitely prolonging the war obtain better conditions of

peace, was the only hopeful course yet remaining.

It was thus Napoleon appraised the result of the battle of Wagram, and while he regarded the end of hostilities as at hand, he would have that end be such that the peace should depend absolutely upon himself. If, instead of sending the old army of Boulogne into Spain, to perish uselessly against natural obstacles, he had kept it between the Rhine and the Danube, he might have overwhelmed Austria with it, and expunged that power from the map of Europe for the remainder of his own reign. But, obliged to contend with hastily collected forces against the immense armaments of Austria, he had done wonders in subjugating her in three months; and if he succeeded in imposing peace upon her, punishing her for this fourth war, by free sacrifices of territory, population, and money; that was enough for his personal glory, and for the maintenance of his greatness. He had already, therefore, abandoned the idea of dethroning the house of Hapsburg, which he had conceived in the first impulse of his anger, and after the prodigious triumphs of Ratisbon. To punish that house by lowering it still more, and by the same blow to extinguish the resistances that had threatened to break out in Europe, was to be the sole, but great and brilliant enough prize, of that last campaign—a campaign not less extraordinary than the others, especially if the means were compared with the results.

Napoleon, then, had no other intention in pursuing the Austrians than to bring them finally to submission. But it was no longer possible for him to act as he used to do in former days; that is to say, after having fought a whole day, to resume his march immediately, so as to reap all the consequences of victory. His army was too numerous, he had too many points to look to, he had too many newly officered regiments, and too many young soldiers in the regiments with old officers, to be able to march again the same evening or the following morning, without caring about what he left behind him. There were regiments, in fact, in which a multitude of the soldiers were either marauding or occupied in the transport of the wounded. Some there were of 2500 men that had 500 men *hors de combat*, 1000 detached, and only 1000 present under arms. The heat was excessive, wine was plentiful in the villages, the soldier was somewhat disorderly in the enjoyment of victory, and it needed Napoleon's immense ascendancy over him to maintain obedience, presence with the colours, and attachment to duty. Already every thing was become more difficult at this period, and Napoleon knew it without owning it.

The next day, July 7, he repaired to the imperial residence of Wolkersdorf, from which the Emperor Francis had watched the battle of Wagram, and established his head-quarters there. He granted that day to the several corps to convey their wounded to the ambulances in the isle of Lobau, rally the detached or missing soldiers, revictual themselves, renew their stock of ammunition, and put themselves in a condition to perform a long and rapid march. Meanwhile, he despatched the troops that had not been brought into action on the

route on which it was probable they would find the enemy. Moravia seemed the most likely place of retreat to be chosen by the Austrian commanders, because, being situated between Bohemia and Hungary, it allowed of communication with either, of drawing from them what resources they could, and of choosing the one or other as the theatre of a prolonged resistance. Napoleon first despatched Montbrun's cavalry along the Nikolsburg road, and sent after it, on the evening of the 7th, Marmont's fine corps and the Bavarian troops of General de Wrede, whose artillery alone had been engaged. Assigning to them Moravia as their common destination, he left them free to turn right or left, into Hungary or Bohemia, as Montbrun's *reconnaissances* should indicate the one or the other as the direction in which the enemy had retreated. He directed Massena to rally his forces as soon as possible, and with such of his divisions as had suffered least, particularly those of Legrand and Molitor, to march along the Danube and observe the route to Bohemia by Korneuburg, Stockerau, and Zuzim. He left him the St. Sulpice cuirassiers and Lasalle's cavalry, which after that general's death had been commanded by Marulaz, and, the latter having been wounded, by General Bruyère.

The next day, the 8th, Napoleon being as yet very imperfectly informed as to the march of the Austrians, whom the light cavalry discovered on both roads, the Moravian and the Bohemian, and still judging that of Moravia as the most naturally indicated, he sent Davout, whose *corps d'armée* was quite recovered from the fatigues of the 6th, to Nikolsburg, after Marmont. He had left him Grouchy's dragoons and Arrighi's cuirassiers. These troops, with Marmont's, made a total of at least 45,000 men, capable of making head against the whole army of Archduke Charles. At the same time, Napoleon sent the Saxons to the March, to watch Archduke John, and compel him to remain beyond that line. He left Prince Eugene under the walls of Vienna with part of his army, to quell the capital if it stirred, and to stop Archduke John, if, quitting the left bank of the Danube, which he had just conquered, he made an attempt on the unguarded right bank, to which Chasteler and Giulay might possibly lend their aid. General Vandamme was also moved to Vienna with the Wurtembergers. Napoleon sent Macdonald after Massena, and he himself remained twenty-four hours longer at Wolkersdorf with the whole guard, Nansouty's cuirassiers, and Oudinot's young troops, in order to learn on which of the two routes, that to Moravia or that to Bohemia, he should be certain of finding the enemy.

Though he did not believe in the possibility of a prolonged resistance on the part of the Austrians, yet not wishing to leave any thing to chance during his absence from Vienna, Napoleon took measures for putting it in a state of defence. He ordered the hundred and nine guns of large calibre, which had protected the passage of the army, to be carried back to the capital and planted on the walls; to close all the bastions, so that the garrison might be safe against foes within or without; to collect provisions and ammunition for 10,000 men for

three months; to send up to the capital the boats that had been employed in the various operations of the isle of Lobau; to establish a temporary bridge of boats on the site of the Thabor bridge, until it could be reconstructed on piles, and to protect it on both banks with vast *têtes de pont*. The isle of Lobau might thenceforth suffice for itself with the bridges on piles over both branches of the river, since it was become only a place of dépôt, and a receptacle for prisoners and wounded men. With an assured communication at Vienna, and another at the isle of Lobau, Napoleon had means of passage sufficient for all imaginable contingencies of war. He gave orders at the same time to complete the arming of Raab, and to finish the works at Mölk, Lintz, and Passau, which were still intended to secure his line of operation. Lastly, having taken all the precautions in case of a prolonged struggle, he resolved to derive from the victory of Wagram one of its most essential consequences—an immediate increase of his financial resources—and he imposed on the provinces of the monarchy a war-contribution of two hundred-millions, which, being once decreed, could not be brought in question in any subsequent negotiation for peace. In this way he employed the 7th, 8th, and part of the 9th of July at Wolkersdorf, while waiting the result of the *reconnaissances* prosecuted in all directions.

Archduke Charles, there is no telling why, had adopted Bohemia as the place of retreat. Whether fearing that he should not reach the road to Moravia in time, or wishing to preserve the important province of Bohemia to the monarchy, and to remain in communication with the centre of Germany, which was still expected to rise, he had retreated on the Znaïm road, which leads to Prague by Iglau. This was a strange resolution on his part, for, except the satisfaction of separating from his brother, the Archduke John, and leaving it to him to raise Hungary, while he himself proceeded to turn to account all the resources of Bohemia, it is hard to know what advantages he hoped to derive from it. By entering Bohemia, he shut himself up in a sort of close field, which his adversary might traverse entirely in a few marches, and without moving far from the Danube, and thus every thing was made to depend on a final encounter, which would take place soon, and the issue of which could not be doubtful. On the contrary, had he marched into Hungary, he would have rallied all the forces left to the house of Austria, drawn his adversary into the heart of the monarchy, where the Austrian army would have gone on continually increasing and the French army diminishing; where he would, perhaps, have found opportunity to fight another battle less unfortunate than Wagram, and raised up against Napoleon the only difficulty by which he could be beaten—the only one by which he was beaten subsequently—that of distances. The inconvenience of losing the resources of Bohemia was not very considerable, for, on the one hand, that province had scarcely any thing left to supply, and on the other, Napoleon had not forces to devote to its occupation. The archduke's choice, then, can only be explained by the trouble and perplexity attendant on defeat, which almost always leads to the worst mea-

tures, and makes one misfortune engender others still greater and more irreparable.

Well, then, the archduke had taken the road to Prague by Znaim, having with him Bellegarde, Kollowrath, and Klenau's corps, and the grenadier and cavalry reserves; altogether not more than 60,000 men. The corps of Prince de Reuss, which had wasted the day of the 6th in observing the Vienna road, not having suffered in the battle, brought up the rear. On the way to Moravia, by Wilfersdorf and Nikolsburg, Archduke Charles allowed Hohenzollern and Rosenberg's corps to retire, to flank the main army—a fact which suggests that there was in this circumstance something worse than a bad resolution, namely, absence of resolution, and that each corps took the route on which the lost battle had cast it. The left, in fact, composed of Hohenzollern and Rosenberg's forces, had been forced upon the route to Moravia; while the centre and the right had been driven on that to Bohemia. Thus it is, that frequently where history exhausts itself in search of motives, there had been none at all.

The double march, however, which removed from Archduke Charles some 20,000 or 25,000 of his best forces, had one momentary advantage. It left Napoleon in complete uncertainty as to the enemy's route, and exposed him to mistake the direction in which he should send his columns. Thus, along the Moravian road, by Wolkersdorf and Nikolsburg, he had sent Monthurn, Marmont, De Wrede, and Davout, (that is to say, 45,000 men against 25,000,) and on the route by Znaim, Massena, Macdonald, Marulaz, and St. Sulpice, (28,000 men against 60,000.) It is true that as he himself kept in the middle with the guard, Nansouty, and Oudinot, he could in a few hours afford the aid of 80,000 men to whichever of his lieutenants had need of it.

Massena on the one side, and Marmont on the other, pursued their respective routes. On the 8th of July, Marmont was close upon Rosenberg's rear-guard, and picked up many of its wounded and fatigued soldiers, most of them belonging to the landwehr. Arrived at Wilfersdorf on the 9th, he learned, through Monthurn's skilful and daring *reconnaissances*, that Rosenberg had turned off to the left. The fact was, the two lieutenants of Archduke Charles had quitted the road to Moravia, and were making again for Bohemia, to join the main body of the army; therein obeying a will, the strange vacillations of which will be presently seen. General Marmont, having been left free by Napoleon to act according to circumstances, turned off likewise, and marched, by Mistelbach and Laa, in the direction of Znaim. But, not knowing whether the body he was pursuing was the main army or a detachment, he only informed Marshal Davout of his *détour* to the left, without doing any thing to hinder the latter from continuing his march to Nikolsburg and Moravia.

On the 9th, when half-way to Laa, he came up with 1200 horse and two infantry battalions of Rosenberg's, routed them, and took some hundred of prisoners. He arrived in the evening at Laa, on the Taya—a stream which, after passing through the heart of Moravia, falls into the Morava. The heat was stifling, that province being sheltered on the north by the moun-

tains of Bohemia, Upper Silesia, and Hungary. The wine-cellars of the country were well stocked, and Marmont's troops, tired, heated, and too confident from recent victory, took to straggling, so that when he arrived at Laa he had not a fourth of his effective in the ranks. He assembled the officers, pointed out to them the danger of hazarding the result of a grand campaign by culpable negligence, shot two of the soldiers by way of example, and was able to rally his men, and march by daybreak against Znaim. Again another *détour* of the enemy went near to perplex him. Rosenberg's corps, which had turned off to the left to reach the road to Znaim, now turned to the right, to get back to that to Brünn. Hohenzollern's corps still continued its march to Bohemia, but Archduke Charles sent Rosenberg's back towards Moravia; there is no telling why, for that corps was not strong enough to defend the province if the French cared to occupy it. This was a further proof that these two corps had been left, without reflection, on the route to Moravia, and that they had been, again without reflection, ordered now towards Znaim, now towards Brünn. Puzzling as were these divagations of the Austrian forces, Marmont, with remarkable military sagacity, persisted in his march on Znaim, leaving Rosenberg to make a fresh *détour* to the right, while he himself continued in the direction which led, as he rightly surmised, to the enemy.

Towards the middle of the same day, Marmont, having reached a position in which he had the Taya on his left, and in front a deep ravine falling into the Taya, saw beyond the ravine the basin in which the town of Znaim was situated, in the form of a amphitheatre. The Austrians were crowding on the bridge over the Taya, and hastily traversing the town to reach the Bohemian road in time. Far from being in a condition to place himself across that road and bar it, he was himself in great danger, having but 10,000 men against 60,000. The Austrians occupied the banks of the ravine, which he took from them by a vigorous attack of the 8th and 23d of the line. He also seized the village of Teswitz, situated below, from which point he could cannonade the bridge, besides two farms on his right, to serve him as *points d'appui*; and a wood further still to the right, which he filled with his *tirailleurs*. Having his front thus covered by the ravine of which he was master, his left by the Taya, and his right by farms and a wood, both strongly occupied, he could harass the Austrians with his cannon during their passage over the bridge, without too much exposing himself to their reprisals. Meanwhile, he despatched aides-de-camp to inform Napoleon of the singular position in which he was placed.

To relieve themselves from Marmont's severe and perilous cannonade, the Austrians made a determined attack on the village of Teswitz. Seeing their preparations for this attack, Marmont sent Bavarian troops to baffle it. As the assailants redoubled their efforts, it was necessary to employ against them the whole of De Wrede's division, and at last the 81st of the line. That French regiment put an end to the conflict, and kept the Austrians at a great distance. The day ended without any other event. Towards the close of it, a distant cannonade

on the left announced Massena's march on the Bohemian road. Napoleon, too, could not fail to arrive soon on the right. Marmont, therefore, passed the night quietly, in full confidence in his position. Another circumstance tended to increase his sense of security. M. de Fresnel, a Frenchman in the service of Austria, presented himself, on the part of General the Count de Bellegarde, to request an armistice. General Marmont not having power to conclude such an act, and hoping, too, that it would be possible to surround the Austrian army on the following day, despatched the envoy to the Emperor's head-quarters, without taking upon himself to suspend hostilities.

The French were now coming up by both roads with the Austrians. Massena had been constantly on the heels of Prince de Reuss's rear-guard, and had taken from it many prisoners. On the 9th he came up with it at the foot of the Mallebern hills, and on the 10th at Hollabrunn, where he fought, while Marmont was establishing his position before Znaim. Archduke Charles, on hearing of the presence of a French corps at Laa, had sent the grenadiers and the cavalry reserve to take possession of the bridge over the Taya, and had followed them himself with Bellegarde, Kollowrath, and Klenau's corps, leaving Reuss to hold out at Hollabrunn as long as he could. He it was, then, with the corps we have mentioned, whom Marmont saw crossing the Schallersdorf bridge, as that over the Taya before Znaim was called. While these things were taking place on the right, Napoleon marched to Laa on the 10th, hoping to have the guard at Znaim on the 11th. About the middle of that day he arrived before his troops at Marmont's head-quarters.

On the morning of the 11th, the Austrians continued to defile in sight of Marmont, who cannonaded them from the village of Teswitz as they passed the river; and Massena, pursuing Prince de Reuss, drove them in the middle of the day on the Taya, after a sharp engagement. On coming up to the Schallersdorf bridge, which was barricaded, Massena made the gallant Legrand division attack it. Its commander, leading his soldiers under fire with his usual bravery, assailed the bridge in front, while Massena's artillery played on it obliquely. Scaling the barricades, he made himself master of the bridge, and, after that act of daring, he marched his division into the little plain which formed the basin of the Taya, in presence of the troops of Prince de Reuss and the Austrian grenadiers backed against the town of Znaim. From the summit of the hills to the right, on the other side of the Taya, General Marmont watched this spectacle, impatient to second Massena effectually.

The latter, not content with one act of hardihood, resolved to attack the Austrians, drive them into Znaim, follow them through it, and chase them beyond it, in hopes that Marmont's troops would bar the way against them to Bohemia. But he had with him only Legrand's division, the Carra St. Cyr division, the same which had been so imprudently heroic at Adersklee, not having yet come up. Yet with his one division he assailed De Reuss's troops and the grenadiers, his artillery seconding him from the hither side of the Taya. Having crossed

the bridge, he entered the long village of Schallersdorf, took it, seized a large convent on the left, called Kloster Bruck, and launched his cuirassiers into the plain on the right, where they made several vigorous charges against the Austrians. Massena with 7000 or 8000 men, was then engaged with more than 30,000, without reckoning the 30,000 others drawn up beyond Znaim, in the plains through which lay the road to Bohemia. A frightful storm having come on, the battle was almost suspended by the impossibility of firing. Availing themselves of this circumstance, the Austrian grenadiers advanced in silence through the village of Schallersdorf, surprised our soldiers, who could not use their muskets, and for a while made themselves masters of the bridge. Massena thought to set the cuirassiers at them, but the ground had become too slippery to support them. Matters were assuming an alarming aspect, when fortunately the Carra St. Cyr division came up, recaptured the bridge, cut its way through the whole length of the column of grenadiers, took 800 of them prisoners, and debouched victoriously on the plain of Znaim. At that moment Marmont had debouched from Teswitz, and joined Massena in driving the Austrians on Znaim, whence they would soon be constrained to retreat in disorder; but the guard not having yet come up, there was no hope of surrounding them. Three thousand horse of that corps had indeed already appeared, and these, with Montbrun's cavalry and St. Sulpice's cuirassiers, might make the retreat of the Austrians singularly calamitous.

But Napoleon, who had meanwhile arrived, had met Bellegarde's envoy and received Prince John de Lichtenstein himself, who came to ask for a suspension of arms, and promise, in the name of military honour, the opening of a negotiation for the immediate conclusion of peace. Napoleon conferred awhile with Major-general Berthier, M. Maret, Duke of Bassano, and the Grand-marshal Duroc, as to the course to be taken. He might, if he kept the Austrians engaged for some hours longer by an obstinate combat, have gained time enough perhaps to turn them, or, at the very least, to let loose after them 10,000 horse, who would have thrown them into horrible disorder. But without having recourse to that measure, there was a certainty of obtaining the most advantageous conditions of peace, and his pride being gratified at seeing the most brilliant and most noble officer of the Austrian army come and humbly implore him to put an end to the war, he was inclined to stop in his victorious march. Opinions differed on this subject. Some were for extinguishing the house of Austria and all coalitions with it, so that they might not be revived when we turned to Spain to finish the war there. Others alleged the danger of prolonging a struggle begun with extemporized means and ended in three months by a miracle of genius, but which, if continued, might provoke a rising in Germany, rouse even the Russians, who were not disposed to see the house of Austria destroyed, and thus set the whole continent in flames. Napoleon, feeling confusedly that he had already greatly abused fortune, and hoping that this fresh lesson would for the future hinder Austria from mo-

leaving him in his struggle with Spain and England, exclaimed, "Enough blood has been shed! Let us make peace!"

He exacted from Prince John of Lichtenstein a promise that plenipotentiaries should be sent forth with power to negotiate, and left Berthier on the part of France, and M. de Wimpffen on that of Austria, to stipulate the conditions of an armistice.

While they were thus engaged, Colonel Marbot and General D'Aspre were despatched to the advanced posts to put an end to hostilities. They arrived between Schallersdorf and Znaïm while Massena's troops were engaged with the Austrian grenadiers. Such was the eagerness of the combatants, that the cry of "*Peace! peace! Stop firing!*" repeated a thousand times, was not enough to separate them. Colonel Marbot and General D'Aspre were even slightly wounded in their endeavours to put an end to the fight. They succeeded at last, and a profound silence, broken only by the joyous acclamations of the victors, succeeded to a frightful cannonade. The day cost us about 2000 killed and wounded, and the Austrians more than 8000, with 5000 or 6000 prisoners. It was a final victory, that worthily closed this grand campaign.

Taking the field at the end of April, with troops hardly formed and still scattered, against Archduke Charles, who marched with an army long organized and already brought together, Napoleon succeeded in some days in completing his own, concentrating it in presence of the enemy, cutting in two that of Archduke Charles, and casting one moiety into Bohemia, the other into Lower Austria. Such had been the first act of the campaign which ended at Ratisbon. Next, pursuing the Austrians dispersed over both sides of the Danube, Napoleon marched so rapidly and so surely, that he never allowed them to rally before Vienna, and entered that capital a month after the opening of the campaign, thus repairing the defeat of the army of Italy, and stopping at their source all schemes for stirring up the continent against France. Wishing to cross the Danube to end the war by a decisive battle, and having been interrupted in that operation by a sudden flood, he sustained, by prodigies of energy in the two days of Essling, the very dangerous enterprise of fighting with a river at his back, thanks to the admirable choice of the isle of Lobau as a ground of passage. Having returned to the right bank, he devised magnificent works to annul almost entirely the obstacle that separated him from the Austrians, brought up the armies of Italy and Dalmatia, thus concentrated all his forces for a decisive battle, and then, performing in a few hours the miracle of crossing a broad river in presence of the enemy, with 150,000 men and 500 pieces of artillery, he terminated, in one of the greatest battles in the history of the world, that fourth Austrian war—a war not less memorable than all those he had directed, and one in which his genius, surmounting its own faults, had made up by marvels of industry and perseverance for all the deficiencies which an insensate policy had accumulated around him; a war in which the warnings of fortune were once more renewed, as if to put the great captain on his guard

against the errors of the imprudent and wildly ambitious politician.

In stipulating the terms of the armistice, Napoleon was most careful to insure his military position in case of a renewal of hostilities, should it be found impossible to agree on the conditions of peace. He insisted, in the first place, that he should be allowed to occupy, in a permanent manner, all the provinces he had only traversed with his troops: these were Upper and Lower Austria, half Moravia, consisting of the districts of Znaïm and Brünn, the part of Hungary extending from the Raab to Vienna, Styria, Carinthia, and a portion of Carniola necessary for communicating with Italy and Dalmatia. In this way the line of separation between the belligerent armies was to pass through Lintz, Krems, Znaïm, Brünn, Göding, Presburg, Raab, Grätz, Laybach, and Trieste. Moreover, as supports to this line, the citadel of Brünn, the town of Presburg, and the fortresses of Raab, Grätz, and Laybach, were to be left to him, or delivered to him immediately. He thus occupied more than a third of the Austrian empire. Established in its centre, supported by the capital and the principal fortresses, he might, in case of prolonged hostilities, take Vienna for his basis of operations, and push his conquests into the most remote provinces. He allowed a month for the duration of the armistice, and stipulated for a fortnight's previous notice in case of rupture. A month would suffice for the negotiation, if there was a real desire to come to terms, and for the arrival of reinforcements from France, if there was not. Hard as were the conditions of this armistice, the archduke's troops were in a situation that made any thing preferable to the continuance of hostilities. It was agreed unanimously at head-quarters that the armistice should be accepted, and it was signed by M. de Wimpffen in the name of the generalissimo, and by Major-general Berthier in the name of Napoleon. The Austrian grand army had fought bravely, and, in spite of its misfortune, it might say that it rather raised up the Austrian power than suffered it to fall, though painful sacrifices must be made if peace was to be obtained from a victor justly elated with his advantages.

The armistice was signed at Znaïm on the 11th, at midnight, and was dated the 12th. After exchanging complimentary messages with Archduke Charles, Napoleon set off for Schönbrunn, to use every means either to have peace or to end the war by a last brief and decisive effort. In the course of the month of August negotiations might have been concluded, or all the means might have been collected for recommencing, in September, a last campaign, which should put an end to the existence of the house of Austria. Napoleon therefore ordered fresh preparations, as though he had done nothing yet, and as though he had not victories to be turned to profit diplomatically, but defeats to repair.

In the first place, he distributed his troops between Vienna and the circle traced by the armistice, so that they had ample room, and yet could be rapidly concentrated on any one point of the circle. He stationed General Marmont at Krems, whence he could pass by St.

Poltien into Carinthia when he had to return to Dalmatia; Marshal Massena at Znaïm, the scene of his late victory; Marshal Davout at Brünn, the point towards which his march tended; the Saxons on the line on which they were already, between Marchegg and Presburg; Prince Eugene on the Raab, where he had been victorious. General Grenier was also to occupy the Raab; General Macdonald, Grätz and Laybach. General Oudinot was to station himself with his own corps and the young guard on the plain of Vienna. The old guard bivouacked in the fine imperial residence of Schönbrunn. As one of the advantages of the armistice was to allow of employing July and August in bringing the Tyrol to submission, the whole Bavarian contingent was sent into German Tyrol, and Prince Eugene's Italian troops were marched into Italian Tyrol. Fresh forces were sent into the Vorarlberg and Franconia.

Having a large proportion of young soldiers who might suffer in their health from a town life, and in their military spirit from the inactivity of an armistice, he ordered them to be encamped. The weather was fine, the country beautiful; wine, meat, and bread were in plenty. The contributions levied on the Austrian provinces, and payable either in paper or in kind, furnished means of payment for whatever was taken without ruining anybody, and burdening only the finances of the state. Workshops were established at Vienna, Lintz, Znaïm, Brünn, Presburg, and Grätz, to make clothes, shoes, linen, and clothing appurtenances, materials and workmanship being always paid for. In a month the army, well fed, clothed, rested, and trained, would be again in excellent condition. Its numbers, too, were to be augmented. A reinforcement of 30,000 men was on its way from Strasburg. This was more than the losses of the campaign, particularly after the slightly wounded (those curable in three or four weeks) should have returned to the ranks. Napoleon gave orders for 50,000 men in addition to these, so as to raise to the number of 250,000 Frenchmen and 50,000 allies the army acting at the heart of the Austrian monarchy—a force double what Austria could raise on the most favourable hypothesis. To arrive at this result, Napoleon adopted a means singularly well adapted for recruiting the corps. Many regiments in the army wanted men, whereas in the dépôts there was an abundance of conscripts, and even more than could be offered. Napoleon sent to their respective regiments under Davout, Marmont, and Massena, the soldiers of the third and fourth battalions that formed Puthod and Barbou's divisions and Oudinot's corps, and sent the officers to Strasburg to reconstruct their battalions with ready-drilled soldiers, and then return with them to the army. At the same time, they were to perform another service, by conducting to Strasburg 20,000 prisoners, whom it was not thought advisable to leave in the isle of Lobau, lest hostilities should be renewed.

Napoleon, as we have often said, had created provisional demi-brigades with the fifth and fourth battalions of certain regiments which were in a more advanced state of organization than the rest. He dissolved eleven of these

demi-brigades, comprising at least 20,000 men, who had orders to proceed to Strasburg, where they were to be used in reconstructing the fourth battalions. He made a fresh review of the dépôts that had not draughted off all their men into the demi-brigades, and he required them all to furnish marching battalions, distinguished by the numbers of the regiments to which they belonged. On arriving at Ratisbon they would be conveyed thence to Vienna by the Danube. Napoleon moreover made a demand on Italy for 10,000 men. He had not much need of additional cavalry soldiers, for, as usual, he had lost few men of that arm, but many horses, to replace which he established new horse-markets at Passau, Lintz, Vienna, and Raab. Lastly, satisfied with the services of the artillery, he resolved further to reinforce it, and to raise it from 550 to 700 guns, by augmenting, not the regimental artillery, (a return to old practices which experience had not justified,) but that of the several corps, and particularly that of the imperial guard. The latter had done excellent service at Wagram, where it counted for sixty pieces. He resolved to raise it to 120. Eighteen companies of artillery taken from the dépôts—those of Italy especially—supplied the *personnel* of this augmentation. All the calibres were raised. The naval artillery was to relieve the land artillery in the guard of the coasts, and the companies of the latter were to take the places of those sent from the dépôts to the army. The defensive works at Raab, Vienna, Mölk, Lintz, and Passau, were pushed forward with increased activity. The wounded were divided into three categories: those who had undergone amputation were sent to Strasburg; the severely wounded were distributed between Mölk, Lintz, and Passau, so that they might rejoin their regiments in two or three months; the slightly wounded were sent to each camp. By this arrangement the movements of the army were secured from any embarrassment in case hostilities were resumed.

Rewards were duly distributed, beginning as usual with the leaders of the army. General Oudinot, who had well replaced Marshal Lannes at the head of the second corps; General Marmont, who had made a bold and judicious march from Dalmatia to the middle of Moravia; and General Macdonald, who had displayed throughout the Italian campaign profound experience in war, and the rarest intrepidity at Wagram, were named marshals. Presents were bestowed on the several corps, and especially on the wounded. One act of severity was mingled with these manifestations of gratitude and munificence. Marshal Bernadotte, who, through his own fault or that of his corps, had been unable to keep the post assigned to him between Wagram and Aderskias, nevertheless published an order of the day addressed to the Saxons, in which he thanked them for their conduct on the 6th and 6th of July, and attributed to them, as it were, the winning of the battle. This manner of distributing to himself and his soldiers praises which he ought to have waited to receive from Napoleon, greatly offended the latter, because it offended the army and its leaders. To punish it, Napoleon wrote a most severe order of



the day, which was communicated to the marshals only, but which was a sufficient reprimand for such an extravagance of vanity, for, being addressed to rivals, it was not probable it should remain secret.

Lastly, Napoleon went in person to visit his camps in upper Austria, Moravia, and Hungary, knowing that, by such significant vigi-

lance, he better insured the conclusion of a peace than by all the efforts of his negotiators. The town of Altenburg was appointed for this meeting-place. Thus was the time employed during the armistice of Znaim by that indefatigable genius, who comprehended every thing except this simple truth, that the world was not so indefatigable as himself.

## BOOK XXXVI.

### TALAVERA AND WALCHEREN.

*Operations of the French in Spain during the Year 1809—Plan of Campaign for the Conquest of the South of the Peninsula—Want of Unity in the Command and consequent mischiefs—The War in Austria awakens all the hopes and passions of the Spaniards—England multiplies her Expeditions against the Continental Coasts, and sends a fresh Army to Portugal—Opening of the Campaign of 1809 by Marshal Soult's March on Oporto—Fruitless Effort to cross the Minho at Tuy—Detour to Orense and March across the Province of Trás-os-Montes—Series of Engagements in order to enter at Chaves and Braga—Battle of Oporto—Difficult Situation of Soult in the North of Portugal—His Entry into Portugal being known at Headquarters in Madrid, Marshal Victor is sent to Estremadura, and is supported by a Movement of General Sebastiani on La Mancha—Passage of the Tagus at Almaraz, and arrival of Marshal Victor and General Sebastiani on the Guadiana—Victories of Medellín and Ciudad Real—The Favourable Passage of these two Victories in the South is soon counterbalanced by Misfortunes in the North—General de la Romana, whom Soult had left in his rear when passing through Orense, passes between Galicia and the kingdom of Leon, raises the whole North of Spain, and threatens the communications of Marshals Soult and Ney—Fruitless efforts of Ney to put down the Insurgents in Galicia and the Asturias—In lieu of Marshal Mortier, detained by his instructions at Burgos, six or eight thousand men are sent under General Kellermann to re-establish communications with Soult and Ney—Events at Oporto—Project to erect the North of Portugal into a kingdom—Divisions in Marshal Soult's Army, and relaxation of Discipline—Secret communications with the English—Sir Arthur Wellesley lands near Lisbon, and heads a fresh Army to Oporto—Which he surprises in broad day, thanks to Confederates within the walls—Marshal Soult obliged to fly, leaving his Artillery behind—Retreat to Galicia—Intervall between Soult and Ney at Lugo—Plan concerted between the two Marshals, but not executed in consequence of Soult's movement on Zamora—Disastrous discord between these two Marshals—Order issued from Schönbrunn before the events at Oporto were known, to combine under Marshal Soult's command the three Corps of Marshals Ney, Mortier, and Soult—Unforeseen consequences of this order—Soult firms at Salamanca a Plan of Campaign, based upon the supposition that the English would remain inactive until September—This supposition is soon belied by the event—Sir Arthur Wellesley, after having expelled the French from Portugal, falls back upon Abrantes—He concerta with Don Gregorio de la Cuesta and Venegas a Plan of Action on the Tagus—His March in June and July to Plasencia, and his arrival before Talavera—King Joseph, having recalled Marshal Victor to the valley of the Tagus, joins him with General Sebastiani's Corps and a Reserve drawn from Madrid, at the same time ordering Marshal Soult to debouche by Plasencia on the rear of the English—Joseph attacks them too soon, and without sufficient *ensemble*—Battle of Talavera, July 28—Retrograde movement on Madrid—Dilatatory Appearance of Marshal Soult on the rear of the English—Precipitate retreat of the English Army into Andalusia, leaving behind them their Sick and Wounded—Character of the Events in Spain during the Campaign of 1809—Napoleon's displeasure that better use had not been made of the vast means collected in the Peninsula, and the importance he attaches to these events on account of the Negotiations at Altenburg—Efforts of the English to afford the Austrian negotiators the aid of a grand Expedition on the Continent—Project to destroy the Naval Armaments prepared by Napoleon in the Roadsteads—Expedition to Rochefort—Prodigious quantity of Fireships launched simultaneously against the Squadron at the Isle d'Aix—Four Ships and a Frigate wrecked on the Palles Rocks are burned by the Enemy—After Rochefort the English turn their naval Forces against the Establishment of Antwerp, expecting to find it destitute of all means of Defence—Thirty Ships, thirty-eight Frigates, and four hundred Transports disembark forty-five thousand men at the Mouths of the Scheldt—Descent of the English upon the Island of Walcheren, and Siege of Flushing—The French Squadron contrives to fall back upon Antwerp, where it is out of all Danger—What is thought of the English Expedition at Paris and at Schönbrunn—Napoleon, foreseeing that Fever will prove the most formidable Adversary of the English, gives orders for Entrenchments, to shelter behind them all the Troops that can be collected, and not risk a Battle—He proscribes the Levy of the National Guards and appoints Marshal Bernadotte General-in-chief of the Troops assembled at Antwerp—Surrender of Flushing—The English, having wasted their time in taking Flushing, are informed that Antwerp is in a state of defence, and do not venture to advance—The Fever attacks them with extraordinary violence, and obliges them to withdraw after enormous losses—Napoleon's joy on hearing this result, particularly on account of the Negotiations at Altenburg.*

It was not alone on the banks of the Drave, the Raab, the Danube, and the Vistula, that the French shed their blood during this year of 1809, but also on the Ebro, the Tagus, the Douro, the Scheldt, and on the most of the seas of the globe. Everywhere, and almost simultaneously, they were seen lavishing their lives in this terrible conflict between the most ambitious of men and the most vindictive of nations. Whilst, with soldiers scarcely beyond the age of boyhood, Napoleon terminated the Austrian war in three months, his generals, left without his guidance, or obtaining from him only a partial attention, and, unhappily, at discord among themselves, could not with the first-rate soldiers get the better of some undisciplined bands, and a handful of well-led English. Thus the Spanish war was endlessly protracted to the detri-

ment of our power, and sometimes even of our glory, and to the confusion of the imperial dynasty.

After having made his troops in Spain perform a winter campaign, and fight, in December and January, the battles of Espinosa, Burgos, Tudela, Molins del Rey, Coruña, and Ucles, Napoleon resolved to grant them one or two months' rest, as necessary for the health of the men and the repairs of *matériel*, after which they should march from the points they had won to the south of the Peninsula, to complete its subjugation from Lisbon to Cadiz, and from Cadiz to Valencia. The plan he left behind him when he left Valladolid on his way to Austria, and which, however well conceived, could not supply the place of a good general, has been already described; but a brief repetition of it

in this place is requisite for the understanding of the operations of 1809.

Marshal Soult, with the Merle, Mermet, Delaborde, and Heudelet divisions, the Lorge and Lahoussay dragoons, and Franceschi's light horse, making together seventeen regiments of infantry, ten of cavalry, and fifty-eight pieces of artillery, was, after resting in Galicia from the fatigues endured in the pursuit of the English, to put himself again in motion, cross the Minho at Tuy, advance by Braga to the Douro, take Oporto, and proceed thence to the conquest of Lisbon. Napoleon had hoped that this *corps d'armée*, the nominal strength of which was 46,000, would actually furnish about 36,000 fighting men. This calculation was, unfortunately, erroneous; for, in consequence of losses in wounded, sick, and fatigued, and numerous detachments, it was impossible to bring together more than from 23,000 to 24,000. The orders were to march in February, and arrive at Lisbon in March, so as to take advantage of the mild weather of the early springtide of those regions. Behind Marshal Soult was Marshal Ney, with the brave Marchand and Morice Mathieu divisions, reckoning only 16,000 fighting men, out of a nominal effective of 33,000. His instructions were to remain in Galicia, complete its subjugation, and thus cover the communications of the expeditionary corps in Portugal.

Whilst Marshal Soult was invading Portugal, Marshal Victor, vanquisher at Espinosa and Ucles, was to quit Madrid with the first corps, consisting of the fine Villatte, Ruffin, and Lapierre divisions, and with twelve regiments of cavalry, and was to advance by a movement to his right, from Talavera to Merida, from the Tagus to the Guadiana, in order to execute in Extremadura and Andalusia a march corresponding to that of Marshal Soult in Portugal. As soon as he was assured of Soult's entry into Lisbon, he was to march to Seville, where he would, if necessary, obtain the support of one of Soult's divisions. A besieging apparatus, consisting of short 24-pounders, was prepared for him in Madrid, in order that he might batter the walls of Seville and Cadiz, if those capitals were defended. At the time Marshal Victor had at hand only two of his three divisions, that of General Lapierre having remained at Salamanca since the concentration of troops which Napoleon had effected in the north against General Moore. Whilst Soult was moving from Tuy to Lisbon, Lapierre had orders to move from Salamanca to Alcantara, join his superior at Merida, and accompany him into Andalusia. It was supposed that this corps, reinforced by Leval's excellent German division, and nominally amounting to 40,000 men, would bring 30,000 into the field, and would be sufficient, with such reinforcements as could be sent to it from Madrid, to command the south of the Peninsula.

King Joseph having Marshal Jourdan for his chief of the staff, was authorized to retain under his immediate orders the five French divisions of Dessoles and Sebastiani, Valence's Polish division, Melhaud's dragoons, and some brigades of light cavalry, forming altogether eleven regiments of foot, seven of horse, and an actual force of 36,000 men for a nominal one of 60,000. In this total were included King Joseph's body guard, the general park, and a multitude of

depôts. With this central force the king was to keep Madrid in subjection, afford aid at need to Marshal Victor, and, in short, provide for all unforeseen contingencies. General Junot's corps, which had terminated the siege of Saragossa, and was then under the orders of General Suchet, having only 16,000 men available out of 30,000, was to remain at rest in Arragon, keep watch over that province, and finally, if events took a favourable turn, quit it, and advance by way of Cuenca to Valencia. There remained behind, to support it or to guard Arragon, the corps of Marshal Mortier, which had not suffered much during the siege of Saragossa, and which, out of 23,000 men, numbered 18,000 fit for service. Not having been able to foresee from the very outset what course the war in Germany would run, Napoleon had forbidden that Mortier's corps should be actively employed, and had ordered that it should be kept intact at the foot of the Pyrenees, between Saragossa and Tudela, ready to move to the south of Spain, or back to the Rhine, according to circumstances. General St. Cyr, victorious over the Spaniards at Cardedeu and Molins del Rey, was, with a nominal force of 48,000 men, 40,000 in reality, to complete the conquest of Catalonia, by besieging its fortresses. Lastly, the north of Spain, constituting our line of operations, was intrusted to a body of cavalry and a multitude of separate corps, which formed the garrisons of Burgos, Vittoria, Pampeluna, St. Sebastian, Bilbao, and Santander, and which might, in case of need, furnish some movable columns. Since the departure of General Bessières, it was General Kellermann and General Bonnet who commanded these corps, the one in Castille, the other in Biscay. This medley of soldiers of all arms, borrowed from every corps, appointed to do duty in our rear, amounted to 33,000 or 34,000 men, from 15,000 to 18,000 of whom were capable of full service, and completed a total of 200,000 fighting men out of the enormous mass of 300,000 devoted to the war in the Peninsula. They were, in a great measure, the best troops of France, those that had made the campaigns of the revolution and the empire, and had vanquished Italy, Egypt, Germany, and Russia! To such a pass as this had we been brought by this conquest of Spain, which had been regarded in the beginning as a thing to be settled by a mere *coup de main*. It had lost us our reputation for fair dealing, the prestige of our invincibility, and we were sending to it, to perish man by man, admirable armies formed by eighteen years of wars and victories.

Napoleon calculated that these 300,000 men, whom he did not suppose so much diminished as they really were by fatigue, sickness, and dispersions, would be more than sufficient to subjugate Spain, even though reduced to 200,000, since the English would naturally have lost all relish for aiding the Spaniards since the campaign of Coruña. Under vigorous command, these 200,000 would certainly have been sufficient, although the passion of a whole people in arms against the foreigner is capable of working many miracles; but the authority left by Napoleon at Madrid to interpret his instructions, and cause them to be executed, could not supply the place of his genius, or of his will, or of his ascendancy over men; and the most powerful means were destined to be wrecked, not by the

resistance of the Spaniards, but by the military anarchy resulting from his absence.

King Joseph, in fact, though good tempered, rational, and of tolerably well-regulated habits, possessed, as we have said, none of the qualities of a commander, though he had a strong ambition for military glory as a family patrimony. But he had neither activity nor vigour, nor any experience in war, nor, in lieu of experience, any of those superior qualities of mind which make up for want of it. He had, as we have also said, taken for his Mentor the worthy and discreet Marshal Jourdan, to whose judgment he submitted his military plans, but most frequently without hearkening to his advice; and after long oscillating between the marshal and his familiar councillors, he would make up his mind as he could according to the impressions of the moment.

Napoleon, who had discerned his brother's pretensions during the last campaign, derided them at Madrid, and still derided them at Schönbrunn, with those who were going to Spain, or who had arrived from it. He did not like Marshal Jourdan, on account of his past opinions, and his present ones too, erroneously suspecting him of being the instigator of the somewhat severe judgments passed upon him in the new court of Spain. He saw, in the sadness and coldness of that grave person, an entire censure upon his reign; and whilst he jeered at his brother, but could not jeer at Marshal Jourdan, who offered no mark for the shafts of ridicule, he openly depreciated him. Jourdan was the only officer of his own rank and length of service on whom Napoleon had not bestowed one of those opulent recompenses which he lavished on his servants. Sarcasms cast upon the king, and a visible aversion for his major-general, were not the means to raise either in the eyes of the generals who were to obey them. How, indeed, was it to be expected that marshals, accustomed only to obey Napoleon, in whom they recognised a genius equal to his power, should obey a brother whom he himself declared to be no soldier, and an old marshal in disgrace, whose talents he denied?

The arrangements made for insuring the gradation of command, were themselves very ill conceived. Napoleon had certainly stated in his instructions that King Joseph should fill his own place at the head of the armies in Spain; but each of the leaders of corps, marshals or generals, was to correspond directly with Clarke, the minister of war, and receive the orders of the latter for all their operations, so that they considered the authority of King Joseph as purely nominal, and that which had its seat in Paris as alone real. Napoleon, usually so precise in all things, had not been able to bring himself to intrust the effective command to a brother whom he did not deem capable of exercising it, and had therefore given him only the form of command, retaining the substance for himself. And however likely it might appear that a command prompted by himself would be preferable to any other, it is not the less true that Joseph's orders, though given without knowledge of war, and without vigour, yet, inasmuch as they were given on the spot, and better adapted to the actual circumstances of the war, would have produced better results than Napoleon's orders, given at a distance of six

hundred leagues, and no longer answering, when they arrived, to the actual state of things. The best course would have been, for the emperor to have himself determined the general plan of the campaign, which he alone was capable of conceiving, and then to have left to Joseph's staff the task of commanding, with sovereign authority, the details of the execution. But mild, indulgent, fatherly, and confiding as he showed himself towards Prince Eugene, whom he found modest, submissive, and grateful, he was stern, sarcastic, and distrustful towards his brothers, who manifested vanity, indocility, and very little gratitude. He had delegated then only a nominal authority to Joseph, and had thus unintentionally laid the foundation for a pernicious military anarchy in the Peninsula.

Besides these causes of discord there were others equally injurious. The Spanish war, besides being ruinous in men, was so likewise in money. Napoleon, having found that he could not meet the cost, had decided that the army should live upon the country occupied by it. Now Joseph, like King Louis in Holland, and King Murat in Naples, would gladly have made himself popular with his new subjects; and in order to gain their affections, he defended them against the French army, which was engaged in the task of conquering them for him. That army, conscious that it had made kings of its general's commonplace brothers, was astonished and indignant to see one of these prefer revolted subjects to soldiers to whom he owed his crown, and who, besides, were his own countrymen. Generals, officers, soldiers, and all talked in the freest manner of the royalties created by their hands; and, on the other hand, Joseph's courtiers talked of the French army and its leaders in such terms as the Spaniards themselves might have used. Napoleon had for his representatives at Madrid, M. de Laforêt, ambassador of France; General Belliard, Governor of Madrid; and M. de Tréville, agent of the treasury for the management of the confiscated wealth of the proscribed families. These several authorities lived in a state of perpetual conflict with the agents of King Joseph. Napoleon, for example, had ordered the incarceration of all the members of the old council of Castille: Joseph had released them, saying that they were prosecuted only in order to get hold of their property. Napoleon had appropriated, by way of war indemnity, the possessions of ten of the greatest families in Spain, as we have seen elsewhere, and had, moreover, seized the wools belonging to the highest grandees in the conquered provinces. The total value of these confiscations did not fall far short of 200 millions of francs. "As for the ten great families," said Joseph, "I must abandon their properties to the Emperor, who has assigned them to himself; but as for the other more numerous families prosecuted for revolt, their property ought to be left to me, either to restore it to their former owners, if they submit, or, if they do not, that I may reward with it those who shall attach themselves to me." As for the wools, Joseph laid claim to a portion of these also, on grounds more or less disputable, alleging, moreover, that he had nothing to give to anybody, that he could not even pay the officers on his household, and that there were in Madrid six thousand domestics of the old grandees and of

the old court, part of whom he might attach to him, and who, for want of the means of subsistence, were exciting the population of the capital against him.

His distress, indeed, was extreme. The French armies in the provinces which they occupied, and the insurrection in those of which it had remained in possession, absorbed the whole produce of the taxes. What the French armies took directly was not sufficient, however, for their support; for, if they managed to victual and clothe themselves by taking every thing in the conquered provinces, there remained the general services of the artillery and engineers, both very costly and very important, which could not be provided for without seizing the cattle or the standing crops. Money should have been forthcoming for these services, and none entered the treasury but what was raised in Madrid. By laying hand on all the resources which proscription or confiscation might furnish, Joseph was deprived, as he alleged, of the means of making partisans and of providing for the most indispensable services. He asked that he should at least be allowed to complete a loan begun in Holland on his own account, which promised 15 or 20 millions for the Spanish treasury. On this point alone Napoleon granted his request; but on every other point he replied to him with refusals, bitterly reproaching him for some acts of munificence to favourites who had not merited anything; computing, with manifest regret that he had undertaken it, all that the war in Spain had already cost him, and was to cost him further; for, though the French soldiers were maintained in that country, he had to send them thither clothed, armed, and organized, and to provide them, moreover, with *matériel*, which could not be done without great expense, independently of that incurred for the war in Austria, which was the sequel of that in Spain, and was destined to entail many other burdens on the finances of the empire. Napoleon, therefore, declared he was ruined by his brothers, and reduced to the necessity of availing himself of every possible resource. Besides all this, having other wars to occupy him at a distance of six hundred leagues from Madrid, he left the task of settling these disputes to his agents, who behaved with unparalleled insolence, believing themselves, as representatives of the Emperor Napoleon, vastly superior to the mere representatives of King Joseph. Things had been carried to such a pitch as regarded the sequestered estates, that M. de Fréville, having got hold of the keys of the palaces in dispute, refused to allow the agents of the Spanish treasury to enter them, declaring that he was ready to have recourse, if necessary, to the French army to support him in that refusal. To this arrogant declaration, King Joseph replied that he would have M. de Fréville put into a post-chaise and sent back to France. It may be conceived how much discredit must have been brought upon the new royalty by squabbles such as these, known to everybody in Madrid. Hated by the Spaniards and despised by the French, it was very difficult for it to make itself obeyed by either, and scarcely could the best plans prove successful when executed under the direction of an authority so feeble and so contested.

Though the French forces were immense both

in quantity and quality, the resistance was daily becoming more serious. Nowhere had the Spaniards stood their ground in line. At Espinosa, Tudela, Burgos, Molins del Rey, and Ucles, they had thrown away their arms in their flight. The English themselves, orderly and steady soldiers as they were, had been involved in the common defeat, and had been obliged to abandon the Spanish soil in all haste and seek a refuge in their vessels. But neither nation desponded in consequence of the disaster they had sustained. The Spaniards, in their inordinate pride, were incapable of appreciating all the power of the French army, and their ignorance saved them from discouragement. Running away almost without fighting, they suffered little; for it is only defeats in strongly contested engagements that are deeply felt, and they were ready to recommence indefinitely a war which was disastrous only to the towns, which gratified their intense activity, and corresponded with all their religious and patriotic sentiments. Besides, if they had been for a moment discouraged by their numerous defeats, they had taken heart again on becoming aware of Napoleon's departure and the war in Austria. The junta having retired to Seville, where it was more deeply immersed in the ignorance and fanaticism of the nation, continued to fan the flames of the popular fury. Composed of a mixture of old statesmen incapable of understanding the new circumstances, and of young fanatics incapable of understanding any, and thwarted in countless ways, it directed the war in such fashion as is possible in times of disorder. But it animated exertion, and urged to arms the populations of Valencia, Murcia, Andalusia, and Estremadura, corresponded with the English, and sent incessantly fresh recruits to the armies of the insurrection. England supplied it largely with arms, ammunition, and subsidies. It had reformed the army of the centre, commanded since the battle of Tudela by the Duke of Infantado, and since the battle of Ucles by General Cartojal. The army of Estremadura, beaten at Burgos, Somosierra, and Madrid, and having avenged itself by the murder of the unfortunate Don Juan Benito, had been recruited and put under the command of old Gregorio de la Cuesta, who seemed to have resumed a certain ascendancy among the Spanish generals, solely because, not having yet fought a battle, he had not lost one. These two armies, echeloned, the one on the roads to La Mancha, from Orafia to Val de Peñas, the other along the roads of Estremadura, from the bridge of Almaraz to Merida, were to harass Madrid, and withstand the French troops that should attempt to march southwards. In the north of Spain, General de la Romana, who had accompanied the retreat of the English but had taken the route by Orense, in order to leave that of Vigo open to them, had remained on the frontiers of Portugal, along the Minho, between the Portuguese, elated by their recent deliverance, and the Spaniards of Galicia, the most obstinate of all the insurgents of the Peninsula. In this way he kept up a dangerous focus of excitement in the north. In fine, where the French armies were not, there the junta publicly levied soldiers; and where they were, bands of adventurers, hiding in the mountains and the defiles, awaited our convoys of sick and

wounded, or of munitions, to slaughter the former and carry off the latter. In the Asturias, General Ballesteros ventured to show himself within a few leagues of General Bonnet. In Arragon, the terrible example of Saragossa had impressed only the unfortunate town itself. In Catalonia, the battles of Cardedeu and Molins del Rey had affected only the army of General Vives, and the miquelets stopped our troops at all the passes, or harassed them at the sieges of Hostalrich, Girona, and Tarragone, which they had to execute one after the other. Though but two months had elapsed since Napoleon's generals, led by himself, had recovered half Spain in half a score of battles, and conquered all before them from the Pyrenees to the Tagus, the news of the war in Austria, propagated and commented on in a hundred ways, had rekindled all hopes, all passions, and converted a momentary terror into an excitement as great as that which had followed the battle of Baylen. It was thought that after having been obliged to quit Spain in person, Napoleon would soon be forced to withdraw his best troops from it, and that it would be easy to dispose of the remainder.

The English, who had been beaten in company with the Spaniards, had, like them too, recovered confidence, and flattered themselves that the withdrawal of our best troops, to meet the exigencies of the war in Austria, would allow them to recover the ground they had lost during the two months of Napoleon's presence in the Peninsula.

The army of General Moore, which ought to have perished in its retreat through Galicia, and which, though feebly pursued, had lost its horses, a part of its *matériel*, and a fourth of its effective, had been carried back to the shores of England. There it was recruited with volunteers from the famous militia which had been destined to resist the expedition from Boulogne, but which, since that had ceased to be thought of in England, furnished ample materials for recruiting the regular army. Thus by agitating the whole world, Napoleon had everywhere called soldiers into existence. England, rightly thinking that the war in Austria was a last opportunity presented to it by fortune, which should by no means be allowed to pass, had resolved to make the greatest efforts in this campaign, to attack Napoleon at all points, and prepare obstacles and perils for him in all quarters. It was her design, not only to send another expedition into the Peninsula, notwithstanding the ill success of that under General Moore, but also to organize a formidable one against the coasts of France, Holland, and Hanover. The unprotected state in which Napoleon had been forced to leave the continental coasts, from Bayonne to Hamburg, offered many chances of destroying the great fleets constructed at Rochefort, Lorient, Brest, Cherbourg, and Antwerp. The idea of assailing the Scheldt, and giving to the flames the magnificent dockyards on its banks, particularly occupied the British cabinet, and singularly excited its zeal. The least, indeed, it could do for Austria and for itself was to sweep the European shores with fire and sword, in order to divert from Vienna and Madrid a part of the forces directed against those two capitals. But, pending the deliberation on these vast projects of destruction, the most ur-

gent object of attention was Spain, which should be succoured promptly lest it should be prostrated before Austria had succeeded in effecting a diversion in its favour. Of the English troops which had taken Portugal from General Junot, and which, being afterwards recruited, had taken part in General Moore's expedition into Castille, a part had remained in the environs of Lisbon, between Alcobaza and Leiria, under the orders of General Cradock. They had been promptly reinforced by detachments from Gibraltar and England; and it was intended further to reinforce them, so as to make of them an army capable of contending with Marshal Soult for possession of Portugal. Sir Arthur Wellesley, who had been the real liberator of Portugal, having been subsequently cleared of all blame with reference to the convention of Cintra, by the court appointed to try its authors, could now be employed without difficulty. His rising fame and his incontestable ability pointed him out as the natural leader of the new expedition. He undertook, he said, with 30,000 English, 30,000 Portuguese, and some 40,000 Portuguese militia, which would cost the British exchequer about 70 or 80 million francs a year, to find occupation for at least 100,000 enemies, preserve Portugal, and by that means render the situation of the French in Spain for ever precarious. Having weighed the events of the last two campaigns with singular good sense, he had clearly perceived how the English should proceed in the Peninsula; and, in spite of the opinion of those whom the fate of Moore's expedition had deeply dismayed, he affirmed that it would always be possible to re-embark in time, with the sacrifice, at most, of the *matériel* of the army. He even went so far as to point out, almost prophetically, a position in which, protected by the sea and by intrenchments, he would be certain of holding out for several years against the victorious armies of France. The confidence inspired by the sagacious and decided character of this general, overcame the repugnance of his government to risk fresh armies in the interior of the Peninsula, especially as his plan consisted in keeping as close to Portugal as possible, and rendering the situation of the French in Madrid precarious, by reason of the mere presence of the English in Lisbon. It was therefore decided that he should be sent, with forces which would raise the British army in Portugal to the number of 80,000 men, and with resources, in munitions and money, which should make it possible to levy a numerous Portuguese army. The insurrectional enthusiasm of the Portuguese, which had reached the highest pitch since the expulsion of General Junot, gave reason to hope for every thing on their part. They hailed the advent of the English with delight, and submitted to their military lessons with a zeal which nothing but the liveliest passion could have inspired.

Such were the changes which had supervened in the Peninsula at the mere announcement of the war in Austria. Submissive as Spain had seemed to be when Napoleon left that country, it now rose up again; forsaken as it had been thought to be by its allies, it was about to be succoured by the English, and again occupied by them, not to be quitted again until the end of the war.

Napoleon's instructions had fixed the month

of February as the fit time for Marshal Soult's entry into Portugal. He had calculated that the marshal, having arrived at Lisbon in March, would aid Marshal Victor to occupy Seville and Cadiz almost at the same time, and that the conquest of the south of the Peninsula would thus be completed before the heat of summer. But events were soon to show that it was easier for him to master Vienna than for his marshals to pass beyond the line of the Tagus and the Douro. Marshal Soult's corps, but just recovered from the fatigues of its march to Corufia, had been collected between St. Jago de Compostello, Vigo, and Tuy, to repair its damages and refit its artillery, to which had been added several pieces of large calibre, to be used if there should be any town-wall to breach. In spite of the impatience at head-quarters and Soult's own zeal, the army destined for Portugal could not be made ready to march before the middle of February. It was composed of the Merle, Mermet, Delaborde, and Heudelet divisions, taken from the old corps of Marshal Bessières and General Junot, Franceschi's light cavalry, and the Lorge and Lahoussaye dragoons. It amounted to not more than 26,000 men present under arms, though thirty and some odd thousands had been reckoned upon. Its nominal force had been upwards of 40,000, but fatigues, battles, and detachments had reduced it to its present numbers. Every thing being ready, Marshal Soult marched from Vigo on the 16th of February. His purpose was to cross the Minho, which forms the frontier of Portugal, forcing a passage a little below Tuy, very near the mouth of the river, and to advance by the great coast road from Braga to Oporto. But insurmountable obstacles prevented this march, which the nature of the localities pointed out as the most obvious one.

The Portuguese, who shared the aversion of the Spaniards for the French, and were most highly encouraged by the expulsion of Junot, had all risen in arms, under the influence of their nobles and their priests. They had barricaded the villages and the towns, blocked up the passes, and appeared resolved to defend themselves to the last extremity. The tocsin was heard in all directions, and the roads were thronged with troops of the populace, led by priests bearing crucifixes in their hands, and nobles brandishing old swords that had long been hung up on their manorial walls. Expecting the arrival of the French, the Portuguese had taken care to collect all the boats on the Minho, and bring them over to their own side of the river. Our light cavalry, scouring the country in all directions, did not find a single boat.

Seeing this, Marshal Soult resolved to march down the course of the Minho to the sea, and seize the numerous fishing-boats belonging to the village of Garda, near the mouth of the river. He found there a quantity of boats, which the Portuguese had not had time to remove, and of these he took a number sufficient for the transport of about two thousand men at a time, whom he attempted to send across the river, hoping they would be strong enough to make good their footing against the Portuguese, and establish a communication between the two banks. But as the passage was to be effected over that part of the Minho which was near the

sea, the spring gales allowed only three or four boats to cross. Some fifty men at most reached the other side, where they fought bravely, in hopes of being succoured; but they were soon obliged to lay down their arms and place themselves at the mercy of a ferocious populace.

After this unfortunate attempt, Soult saw no alternative but to ascend the course of the Minho to the mountains, and cross at Orense. He began his march in that direction on the 16th. But in going up the right bank of the Minho he was sure to find in his way La Romana's army, which, as we have seen, had established itself at Orense on separating from the English. That army was not very formidable in itself, but its presence had fired the minds of the whole population on both sides of the frontier, and the two nations so long at enmity with each other exchanged pledges of mutual support and joint resistance to the foreign invaders. The villages on the banks of the river and on the hills had all been barricaded, and were occupied by a fanatical populace. Marshal Soult was preceded in his advance, by Lahoussaye's dragoons along the river, and by Heudelet's division of infantry on the hills. The dragoons were several times obliged to dismount, in order to clear a way for themselves, and to force barricades. General Heudelet had many formidable positions to carry, and terrible executions to make. Thus, marching in the midst of obstacles of all kinds, it was not until the 21st that Orense was reached, after having burned, destroyed, and slain a great deal, and also sustained such considerable losses as gave reason to fear that the army would arrive at Lisbon with but half its forces, if at all. In that case it might expect the same ill fate as Junot's, in 1808, for the English could not fail in 1809, as in 1808, to appear soon in the waters of Lisbon.

Had Napoleon inspired his lieutenants with a less blind submission, it would now have been the marshal's duty to foresee the disaster to which he was about to expose himself, and ask for fresh orders before venturing into a wild country, where at every step he would have to fight with a bloodthirsty population, and so arrive, spent and enfeebled, before the English army, one of the finest regular armies in Europe. He would, no doubt, have much displeased Napoleon by thus contravening his projects, but much less, assuredly, than by bringing him back, two months afterwards, a beaten and disorganised army.

Be this as it may, after having driven La Romana's partisans before him beyond Orense, Soult resolved to turn to the right, cross the Minho, and enter Portugal by the province of Tras-os-Montes. His intention was to direct his march to Chaves, and thence to Braga, so as to arrive, after a long detour, upon the high road from Tuy to Oporto, which he had before been unable to reach. As for the Spanish General de la Romana, driven back from Orense on Villafranca, he conceived the design of extricating himself by a stolen march, worthy of a partisan leader. Upper Galicia, which is contiguous with the kingdom of Leon, was open at that moment, Marshal Soult having evacuated it to invade Portugal, and Marshal Ney having quitted it to sweep the coast. It might be reached by passing through the French chain of advanced posts, which connected the troops

of the two marshals with those of Old Castille. La Romana resolved to do so, were it only for the sake of the great confusion to be thereby caused in our line of communication, purposing to take refuge afterward in the Asturias, if Marshal Ney came back to pursue him.

While the Spanish general was about to cause the French this disagreeable surprise, Soult made his arrangements for crossing the province of Tras-os-Montes. He had already more than 800 sick and wounded in consequence of his first operations. A part of his artillery horses were in a bad state, from the severity of the roads and want of fodder. He resolved, therefore, to disencumber himself of whatever would too much impede his march; and he sent his sick and wounded and his heavy artillery to Tuy, of which he was master, purposing, when he should have reached Braga, to have them conveyed thither by the direct and very short road to that town from Tuy. He sent then to Tuy 86 pieces of artillery, and about 2000 men, and took with him 22 guns, well horsed and provided with the necessary ammunition. On the 4th of March he crossed the frontier of Portugal, and intimated, in his despatches to Madrid, that he should soon be at Oporto.

The population of that part of Portugal was gathered round Chaves, with some militia and some detachments of regular troops under Generals Sylveira and Bernardin Frère. These generals, whose instructions had been dictated from the English head-quarters, had orders not to give battle, but to harass the French incessantly, and kill as many as possible in every defile and at the passage of every village. In consequence of these instructions, after having disputed the road from Orense to Chaves, the two Portuguese generals would rather not have stopped in the latter town and uselessly endangered a part of their forces for its defence; but they were forced to obey the wishes of the insurgent populace, and to leave a detachment in Chaves to garrison it along with the latter. They then retired to Braga.

Arriving before Chaves after many conflicts, Marshal Soult beheld a furious multitude, composed of peasants, priests, women, and soldiers, bellowing threats and curses from the top of the town walls. Such a fanatic mob might suffice to surprise a convoy, or cut the throats of wounded men, but was incapable of stopping 24,000 French soldiers, led by able officers. Marshal Soult having threatened to put to the sword all who resisted, the town of Chaves was given up to him half-depopulated. He found in it artillery without carriages, and a considerable quantity of ammunition. A small citadel, useful as a security against the populace, adjoined the town. He took advantage of it to leave, under the protection of a small garrison, the sick and wounded whom the march from Orense to Chaves had already disabled from proceeding farther. Such is the sad condition of every offensive operation in the midst of insurgent populations, when these are fierce and resolved to defend themselves. Every sick or wounded man requires an able-bodied soldier to guard him; and a war of posts being that which puts the most men *hors de combat*, it may easily be conceived what soon becomes of regular armies in an invasion of some extent and duration.

Marshal Soult proceeded from Chaves to Braga, descending toward the shore through as long a space as he had ascended toward the mountains, in his march from Tuy to Orense. During the march, the Franceschi cavalry and the Mermet infantry, which formed the head of the army, had many impediments to overcome. In many narrow passes, where the columns were forced to lengthen themselves out in order to defile, and where the artillery had the greatest difficulty in making its way, they were assailed by swarms of insurgents from the adjacent mountains, and exposed to be cut off and destroyed before the rear of the columns could succour the van. The divisions were constantly separated from each other on their march by dense masses of enemies. At last, killing insurgents all the way, and burdened with more and more wounded, the invading army arrived before Braga on the 17th of March. General Frère was in possession there with 17,000 or 18,000 men, partly regular troops, partly armed peasants. Wishing to fall back on Oporto, according to his instructions, without risking a battle, he was assailed by the populace, and murdered, with several of his officers, *to serve as an example to traitors*, as his soldiers said. A Hanoverian officer who succeeded him, made some arrangements for battle for the next day, the 18th; but the populace that murders is not apt to defend itself against old soldiers. Marshal Soult attacked and carried the post of Braga without difficulty, and with a loss of not more than 40 killed and 160 wounded. We lost more men in storming the villages along the march. Our soldiers made few prisoners, thanks to the excellent legs of the Portuguese; but all who were caught before they could run away were killed on the spot. Some thousands of dead and dying strewed the environs of Braga. The war thus assumed an atrocious character; for, in order to disgust that ferocious population with cruelty, it was necessary to become almost as ferocious as themselves.

Master of Braga, Marshal Soult had won only a town; but he had acquired something better: viz. the direct road from Tuy, by which he might bring up the *matériel* left behind. The whole population around him was up in arms, and more furious than ever. Some Frenchmen, who had fallen into the hands of the insurgents, had been horribly mutilated by women, and their torn remains polluted the road from Braga. At the same time it was ascertained that the dépôt left at Tuy was blockaded, and in danger of being taken if not properly succoured. After availing himself of the resources of Braga, which the fugitive population had not been able to carry off or destroy, Soult pursued his march to Oporto, leaving General Heudelet's division to garrison Braga, guard the wounded, *échelon* the road, and succour the dépôt at Tuy.

Some resistance was encountered at the passage of the river Ave, but it was overcome, and our men drove the Portuguese before them, who there again, by way of avenging themselves on a victorious enemy, murdered one of their generals, the Brigadier Vallongo. They then fell back on Oporto, with the intention of sustaining a general battle under its walls, where they assembled to the number of 60,000, including regular soldiers, peasants, and others of the populace. Their general-in-chief, well worthy of

such an army, was the Bishop of Oporto, who commanded in his episcopal vestments. The insurgent populace, much more alarming to the peaceful inhabitants than to the enemy, had made themselves absolute masters of Oporto, which they oppressed, obeying none but the bishop, and him only when he commanded in accordance with the popular passions. They had thrown into prison a number of French families, whose houses they had pillaged, and whom they threatened with death if Marshal Soult attempted to enter Oporto. General Foy, whose excessive temerity had caused him to be taken in a *reconnaissance*, was among the prisoners thus exposed to extreme peril. Much more occupied in committing cruelties than in erecting defensive works, the Portuguese had hastily thrown up some redoubts in the form of a semicircle, which embraced the town of Oporto, and abutted at each extremity upon the Douro. A bridge connected the town, situated on the right bank by which we arrived, with the faubourgs on the left bank. The Portuguese works were badly devised, but mounted 200 guns of large calibre, and presented an obstacle not easily to be surmounted, if defended even by middling troops. But though reckoning 60,000 men, including soldiers and volunteers, and though protected by intrenchments and 200 pieces of cannon, the Portuguese army, with its bishop-general, was not capable of withstanding the 20,000 Frenchmen that remained to Marshal Soult.

The latter having arrived on the 27th of March before Oporto, was struck, but not intimidated, by the difficulties he had to overcome. He had no doubt he should surmount them all with the soldiers and the officers he commanded; but he foresaw that the opulent town of Oporto, the most commercially important in the country, would be sacked, and he would fain have spared Portugal, humanity, and his own army that calamity. Accordingly, he summoned the place by means of a letter, in which he appealed to the reason of its leaders, and he awaited a reply, regardless of the balls cast into his bivouacs by the heavy artillery of the town.

His overtures, as might have been expected, were of no avail, and he resolved to make the assault on the 29th of March. With such an enemy as he had before him, he had but to make one brisk and vigorous attack to carry the intrenchments of Oporto, formidable as they seemed. Having formed his troops out of range of the artillery, the marshal marched rapidly in three columns; the right under General Merle, the centre under Generals Mermet and Lahoussaye, the left under Generals Delaborde and Franceschi. The word being given, the cavalry galloped forward and swept away the enemy's advanced posts; then the infantry assailed the intrenchments, covered with a furious multitude that did not obey, and whom the cannon filled with rage but not with valour. The intrenchments were all rapidly carried, and our columns drove the fugitive multitude before them at the bayonet-point into the streets of Oporto, which soon presented but a scene of frightful confusion. General Delaborde, traversing the streets at quick step, reached the bridge of boats over the Douro, which connected the main town with the faubourgs. The enemy's cavalry, mixed up with the fugitive population, crowded to the bridge, and encountered the fire of grape,

which the Portuguese discharged from the opposite side to stop the French. The bridge gave way under the pressure, and sank with all it carried. The French suspended their march for awhile, in presence of this horrible spectacle, then re-established the bridge, and galloped over it in pursuit of the fugitives. On the right, a body of Portuguese, driven by General Merle to the Douro, plunged into it, hoping to escape by swimming, but perished almost to a man. Another body having attempted to defend themselves in the bishop's mansion, were all destroyed there. Ere long, the hot blood of the French being stirred up by the fight, they gave way to those excesses which usually follow the taking of a place by storm, and spread themselves through the town to plunder. They behaved at Oporto as they had done at Cordova; but in the former place, as in the latter, our officers humanely exerted themselves to the utmost to restrain the fury of the soldiers, and strove to save the drowning wretches in the river. Marshal Soult did his best to restore order, and to give his conquest the character that becomes a civilized people. This important attack cost him but 300 or 400 men, while the killed, wounded, and drowned on the Portuguese side amounted to 9,000, or 10,000. The marshal captured also 200 pieces of cannon.

The stores found in Oporto were considerable, and of great value to the army. They included abundance of provisions and ammunition, a vast *materiel* of war brought by the English, and innumerable boats laden with choice wines. Marshal Soult immediately took measures for the orderly disposal of this booty, so that the army might want for nothing, and that the population might gradually recover confidence and become accustomed to their victors. But their rage against us was at its acme. The whole rural population beyond the Douro had joined the beaten people of Oporto and the English, who then occupied the road to Lisbon. Our army, reduced to a bare 20,000 men, had already detached one of its divisions to Braga; it was now obliged to detach another to Amarante, above Oporto, in order to guard the upper course of the Douro. Thus it was forced to divide itself, while it needed all its combined strength to resist the English. The position was becoming so critical as to require great ability on the part of the general-in-chief, whether to maintain his ground in Portugal, if that were possible, or to quit it without disaster, if he should have to retreat before greatly superior numbers. Marshal Soult declared himself governor-general of Portugal, did what he could to appease the people, gave orders to his rear to march from Braga, and raise the blockade of the *dépôt* in Tuy, and sent several officers to Madrid by the route he had traversed, to make known the critical position in which he was certain to find himself ere long. It was probable—and this was precisely one of the dangers of this situation—that none of the officers he had despatched could reach his destination. General La Romana was the cause of this interruption of communications. Neglected by Marshal Soult, who had not thought of destroying him before entering Portugal, and favoured by the absence of Marshal Ney, who had been constrained to descend to the coast to hinder the communications of the English from Ferrol to Vigo, the Spanish



general had invaded the mountain region which forms Upper Galicia and the frontier of the kingdom of Leon. By his personal influence, and by spreading news from Austria, he had roused the people of the north, whom the campaign of November and December had terrified for a while. The departure of the imperial guard, which had now begun its march to the Danube, was a further encouragement to the revival of the insurrectionary spirit. Thus, Ney on the coast, and Soult in Oporto, were separated as it were from the rest of Spain by a vast insurrection, which did not grow into an army, but which sufficed to slaughter our sick and wounded and our couriers, and often to stop the best escorted convoys.

Since the 24th of February, nothing was known at Madrid of what had become of Marshal Soult; but relying on the strength of his *corps d'armée*, and on his military experience, they had no doubts at head-quarters of his success, and they calculated in what places he was likely to be from the number of days that had elapsed. Having received word from him that he should arrive at Oporto in the beginning of March, whereas he had not been able to reach it before the 29th of that month, it had been supposed that he would soon be at Lisbon, that he would of course be surrounded there with many difficulties, and the necessity of at last sending off Marshal Victor to the south of the Peninsula was talked of, in order that he might draw off a portion of the enemy, who would otherwise fall *en masse* on the army in Portugal. Certainly nothing could be more reasonable under all contingencies, for the English and the Portuguese, as the event proved, could not be indifferent to the march of a French army on Merida and Badajoz.

Orders were therefore repeated from Joseph's head-quarters to Marshal Victor to execute that part of the imperial instructions which concerned him. To this he offered some objections, founded upon the dispersed state of his corps. He had, in fact, at hand only the Villatte and Ruffin divisions. Lapisse's was still at Salamanca, and he saw that before it could cross all Estremadura to rejoin him, it would perhaps be detained for the service of Castille or Portugal; that he would then have, including even Leval's German division, at most 23,000 men, which would be too small a force to invade Andalusia, where General Dupont had been defeated with at least an equal number of soldiers. He was told in answer, that express orders had been sent to the Lapisse division to follow him, and that with the cavalry which had been given him, and with Leval's division, he would have 24,000 men—a force sufficient to begin his offensive movement; the more so as he was sure to have the Lapisse division soon with him, and to be seconded by a *corps d'armée*, which was about to march from Madrid through La Mancha to the Sierra Morena. There were good grounds for being peremptory with Marshal Victor; for, besides the necessity of effecting a movement to the south, parallel with that of Marshal Soult, there was another motive of not less urgency for acting in that direction, namely, to hinder the Spanish General Gregorio de la Cuesta from establishing himself on the left of the Tagus, opposite the bridge of Almaraz. Having been for a month past left too much at liberty in that

quarter, Gregorio de la Cuesta had occupied the left of the Tagus, destroyed the main arch of the bridge of Almaraz, and posted himself strongly on the steep hills bordering the river, whence it would be impossible to dislodge him, if steps to that end were not taken in time.

Pressed by these considerations, and by the reiterated orders he had received, Marshal Victor began his movement in the middle of March. The old fourth corps, placed the preceding year under the orders of Marshal Lefebvre, was partly reconstituted under General Sebastiani, and directed towards Ciudad Real, in order to effect a movement in La Mancha corresponding to that of Marshal Victor in Estremadura, and draw after it the army of Cartojal, while the marshal himself was to deal with that of Gregorio de la Cuesta. The fourth corps, previously composed of the Sebastiani divisions, Leval's Germans, and Valence's Poles, was formed of the same divisions, with the exception of the Germans, who had been transferred to Marshal Victor. Milhaud's dragoons made up its numbers to 12,000 or 13,000 men.

The first thing Marshal Victor had to consider, was how to cross the Tagus. The Talavera and the Arzobispo bridges could not serve his purpose, since they did not abut on the main road of Estremadura, by Truxillo and Merida. The right point was Almaraz, and the old bridge, a vast and magnificent structure of ancient times, had had its main arch, of more than a hundred feet span, broken down. Materials being everywhere deficient in Spain, for want of internal trade, Marshal Victor knew not how to set about constructing a bridge, and he was no further advanced in that part of his task in the middle of March than in the beginning of February. Some help was sent him from Madrid, and also General Lery and Senarmont, who, after great efforts, succeeded in making a bridge of boats fit for the passage of heavy artillery. On the 15th of March, Marshal Victor marched from Talavera with his corps, which, previously to the arrival of the Lapisse division, comprised the French divisions of Villatte and Ruffin, Leval's German division, Lasalle's light cavalry, and Latour Maubourg's dragoons, forming a total of 23,000 or 24,000 men, of whom 15,000 or 16,000 were infantry, 6,000 cavalry, and 2,000 artillery. To facilitate the operation, the marshal crossed the Tagus in three columns. Lasalle and Leval passed over the Talavera bridge, Villatte and Ruffin that of the Arzobispo, while Latour Maubourg, with the heavy artillery, descended the left bank of the river to Almaraz, where the most cumbrous part of the *matériel* was to cross. The first two columns, composed of light cavalry and infantry, were to dislodge Gregorio de la Cuesta from his position on the cliffs, and having done so, rejoin the cavalry of the line and the siege artillery before Almaraz.

These arrangements were executed with as much judgment as they were conceived. Leval's Germans, behaving like allies worthy of the French under whose eyes they fought, arrived on the other side of the Tagus before cliffs of difficult ascent, where the dexterity of the Spanish infantry, and their obstinate valour when fighting behind any cover, enjoyed the greatest advantages. They dislodged them, nevertheless, drove them from rock to rock, as far as the

Mesa de Ibor, took from them seven pieces of cannon, and killed and wounded a thousand of them. During this time, the brave Villatte division, debouching after the Germans by the bridge del Arzobispo, supported their movement, taking up a position at Fresnedoso and Delaytosa, after several sharp and successful conflicts. This combined march having cleared the main road of Estremadura Latour Maubourg's dragoons were enabled to present themselves before the bridge of Almaraz, the restoration of which was just on the point of being completed, and rendered practicable for the heaviest burdens. This was a necessary precaution, for, by Napoleon's orders, some 24-pounders and mortars had been annexed to Victor's corps, in order to batter the walls of Seville, if they were defended.

General Gregorio de la Cuesta, who had counted on the natural impediments on the left bank of the Tagus for resisting the movement of the French, retreated to Truxillo on the 19th of March, and from Truxillo to Merida, intending to make another stand behind the Guadiana. Marshal Victor followed him with his light cavalry and his infantry, though his dragoons and his heavy artillery had not yet entirely crossed the Almaraz bridge. The Duke del Parque brought up the enemy's rear-guard with cavalry. The brave and intelligent Lasalle,\* vigorously pursuing the Spaniards, charged them wherever he had an opportunity, and took 200 horse from them in one encounter. Unfortunately, the 10th chasseurs suffered themselves to be surprised next day, and lost sixty-two men, whom the Spaniards, after having killed them, mutilated in the most atrocious manner. Finding on their way these sad proofs of Spanish ferocity, our soldiers swore to revenge their companions in arms, and fearfully did they keep their words some days afterward, as we shall see.

So long as the passage of the bridge of Almaraz was not completed, Marshal Victor could not advance resolutely to the Guadiana. That operation having been terminated on the 25th of March, and Latour Maubourg's dragoons having come up with the marshal, he moved to the banks of the Guadiana and crossed it at Medellin. At that point he was obliged to detach some infantry and cavalry to guard his rear, and check the gatherings formed behind him in the wild mountains he had traversed. He left at Truxillo some Dutchmen detached from the Leval division, and deprived himself of two regiments of dragoons; the one to observe the Merida road, the other to watch the mountains of Guadalupe, which were infested with guerrillas. These detachments being sent away, there remained to him not more than from 18,000 to 19,000 men; but these were such choice troops that there was no reason to be uneasy at the smallness of their numbers.

Don Gregorio de la Cuesta, who affected a superiority over the junta and his companions in arms, which the latter had not acknowledged at first, but which was now conceded to him in consequence of the disasters which had befallen the other generals, could not prolong his re-

treat without being put on a level with those he assumed a right to despise. Besides, one step more would have lost him the line of the Guadiana after that of the Tagus, and would have uncovered Seville, the capital of the insurrection, the last asylum of Spanish fidelity. Being informed that Marshal Victor had weakened himself on the march, being himself reinforced by the Albuquerque division, which had been detached from the army of the centre, and thus being at the head of 86,000 men, the best organized in Spain, he thought himself in a condition to give battle, for he had just double the force of his adversary. Accordingly, he posted himself behind the Guadiana, a little beyond the small torrent of the Ortigosa, in a tolerably advantageous position, to receive the French. He could not have done any thing that was more favourable to them, or which better suited their tastes or their interests.

Master of Medellin, which he entered without impediment, Marshal Victor had assured possession of the Guadiana, and proceeded beyond it without inconvenience. Having crossed that river on the morning of the 28th, he soon discovered on his left the Spanish army, partly concealed by the form of the ground, and appearing rather disposed to advance than to retreat. He rejoiced greatly at this, and resolved to meet it forthwith. To do this it was necessary to cross the torrent of the Ortigosa, which falls into the Guadiana a little above Medellin, which he did with two-thirds of his army. He left the Ruffin division on the hither side of the torrent, at the bridge, to confront a strong detachment which appeared on that side, and advanced with Lasalle, the Germans, what remained of the Latour Maubourg dragoons, the artillery, and the Villatte division; the whole amounting to about 12,000 men. Beyond the Ortigosa was discovered a very extensive plateau, somewhat elevated on our right, sinking down toward the left, and ending in a plain near don Benito. Nothing was discerned but the very edge of the plateau, and the part of the Spanish army stationed on it. The rest was hidden by the declivity of the ground. Marshal Victor promptly made his arrangements.

To the right he sent forward Latour Maubourg, two German battalions, and ten pieces of cannon, supported by the 94th of the line of Villatte's division. These troops were to carry the plateau, and rout the portion of the Spanish army seen on it. Toward the left, where the ground sank down to don Benito, and where also very dense masses of Spaniards were perceived, the marshal contented himself with despatching Lasalle with his light cavalry, and the two German battalions which remained with him. In the centre he placed the 68d and 95th of the Villatte division in close columns, and the 27th light infantry a little to the right to connect them with Ruffin. He then gave Latour Maubourg the word to advance, waiting the result of this first attack before making further arrangements.

The Germans steadily ascended the plateau, followed by their ten guns and Latour Maubourg's five squadrons of dragoons. No sooner had these troops reached the top of the plateau, than they discovered the ground in its whole extent, and the Spanish army covering it in the distance. On our right was seen a certain por-

\* The same we have seen in the preceding volume figuring with distinction, and meeting a glorious death on the banks of the Danube. He left Spain at the end of March, after the passage of the Tagus and the battle of Medellin.

tion of infantry and cavalry, but on the left was perceived the bulk of the Spanish army marching *en masse* against Lasalle's small force, with the evident intention of cutting us off from the Guadiana.

At this sight our troops on the right dashed forward to the attack. The Germans, after driving back the Spanish sharpshooters, brought forward their ten pieces of cannon, which were calculated to produce much effect on the even slope of the plateau. As soon as the Spanish infantry saw our artillery, they opened upon us a hasty, but confused and ill-directed fire. Our brave artillerymen coolly advanced to within thirty or forty paces of the Spanish infantry, and swept it with grape; a sort of treatment it was not much accustomed to. Gregorio de la Cuesta then ordered his cavalry to charge our cannoniers and sabre them at their guns; but such things were not to be done by Spanish cavalry against French artillery. The Spaniards, already shaken by the grape, and intimidated by the sight of Latour Maubourg's dragoons, advanced sluggishly, and with a foreboding of defeat. No sooner had they approached our pieces, than a charge in flank by a squadron of dragoons sufficed to make them wheel round, and ride down their own infantry in their headlong flight. Gregorio de la Cuesta, who had more pride than ability, but whose bravery equalled his pride, threw himself into the midst of his troops, and made ineffectual efforts to keep them on the field of battle. Latour Maubourg's five squadrons, overthrowing all before them, put to flight the infantry as well as the cavalry, and followed up the left of the Spanish line along the declivity to don Benito. The brave Latour Maubourg, knowing that the only way of dealing effectually with the Spaniards was to make them feel the point of the sabre, pursued them relentlessly, being supported by the 94th of the line.

But while all was ended on the right, so that not a single enemy was left standing, it was not so in the centre and the left; things were even becoming critical there. While the Spanish left was running as fast as their legs could carry them, their centre and their right, at least 27,000 or 28,000 strong, were advancing *en masse* against Lasalle's 3,000 or 4,000 men, consisting, as we have said, of some regiments of light cavalry and two battalions of German infantry. Lasalle, behaving with equal coolness and intelligence, checked with timely charges the detachments of Spanish infantry which showed more boldness than the rest, and thus retarded the movement of the mass. But with their customary audacity, when they believed themselves victorious, the Spaniards marched resolutely, shouting and threatening with certain annihilation the handful of French before them, and deeming the destruction of our army infallible if they succeeded in making themselves masters of the Guadiana. Though such a hope was very presumptuous, since we had the whole Ruffin division in our rear guarding the line of the Ortigosa and the town of Medellin, nevertheless the battle might be lost if decisive measures were not promptly taken. It was certainly too much to have left the Ruffin division on the hither side of the Ortigosa, to withstand some insignificant skirmishers, but with the three remaining regiments of Villatte's division, and the troops

which Latour Maubourg had not taken with him in his adventurous pursuit, there were still means at hand for inflicting a heavy blow upon the Spaniards. Marshal Victor, with great presence of mind, took all the measures likely to conduce to that end. He ordered two of Villatte's regiments, the 63d and the 95th, to move to the right, and deploy there, in order to stop the mass of the Spaniards. He ordered the Germans to perform the same manoeuvre, and Lasalle to charge the Spaniards after they had been stopped by the infantry. Two German battalions, and the ten cannons which had not accompanied Latour Maubourg, remained on our right on the platform. He ordered them to throw themselves, by a sudden conversion from right to left, against the flank of the Spaniards, and pour upon them a double fire of grape and musketry. Lastly, he ordered Latour Maubourg and the 94th to suspend their pursuit, and avail themselves of the too precipitate movement which placed them on the rear of the enemy, to attack them on that side and complete their destruction.

These measures, ordered *à propos* and vigorously executed, were completely successful. The Spaniards, who were advancing with blind confidence, were surprised by the deployment of Villatte's two regiments. This movement, steadily executed, although in presence of troops very superior in numbers, and followed by a well-sustained fire, checked the Spaniards, who, not being able to discover whether they had before them the whole French army, or two regiments only, began to march less rapidly, and to fire awkwardly, confusedly, and without effect. Taking advantage of their hesitation, Lasalle charged them, and flung several of their routed battalions in disorder one upon the other. At the opposite wing, at the same moment, the ten pieces of cannon of our right opened their fire, which being pointed from above, downwards on a dense mass, did terrible havoc. Much less would have been sufficient to put to flight those raw troops, which had more impetuosity than steadiness under fire. They quickly gave way; and presently being surprised in their rear by Latour Maubourg, whose error thus became a happy incident in the battle, they were seized with a panic impossible to describe. In an instant they broke their ranks, and fled in immense disorder. But Lasalle and Latour Maubourg were so placed as to do such execution as could be done on Spaniards only by hindering them from flying. Charging the dense mass with 3000 horse in opposite directions, they sabred them without mercy; and full of the recollection of the sixty-two chasseurs butchered a few days previously, they gave no quarter. The cavalry was not the only arm in a position to touch the Spaniards. The 94th, placed far in their rear, was able to reach a good number of them with their bayonets, and did not spare them. In less than an hour 9,000 or 10,000 dead or wounded lay on the ground. Four thousand prisoners remained in our power, with sixteen pieces of cannon, forming the whole Spanish artillery, and a great quantity of flags.

This battle, subsequently designated that of Medellin, did equal honour to our soldiers and to their general. It was in reality fought by 12,000 men against 36,000, and it remained one of the most bloody *souvenirs* of that period,

for never had more decisive results been obtained. The unfortunate Gregorio de la Cuesta could not have got together a single battalion in the evening. This fine exploit filled the commander of the first corps with confidence; and whereas a fortnight previously he hesitated to advance from the Tagus to the Guadiana, he immediately wrote to King Joseph that he was ready to advance from the Guadiana to the Guadalquivir, from Merida to Seville, provided the movement of the Lapisse division to join him was accelerated. He sent his prisoners to Madrid; but of the 4,000, not more than half reached their destination. He encamped his infantry on the banks of the Guadiana, from Medellin to Merida, that it might live the more at ease, and sent his cavalry abroad to disperse the guerillas, and keep the region around him in awe. The season was then superb, (March 28.) The country was not yet exhausted, and our soldiers were able to enjoy the fruits of their victory quite at their ease.

While Marshal Victor was gaining this important victory on the road to the south, General Sebastiani, performing a similar movement through la Mancha, obtained corresponding advantages, proportioned to the strength of his corps. With his fine French division, General Valence's Poles, and Milhaud's dragoons, he had from 12,000 to 18,000 men against Cartojal's 16,000 or 17,000, representing the old army of the centre, beaten under Castafios at Tudela, and under the Duke del Infantado at Ucles. He had advanced beyond the Tagus by Ocaña and Consuegra to Ciudad Real, at the same time that Victor had marched from Almaraz to Truxillo and Medellin. Having arrived on the 20th at the Guadiana, he sent General Milhaud, who was considerably in advance of the infantry, across the river. Milhaud having made himself master of the bridge, drove the Spanish army some leagues beyond it up to the walls of Ciudad Real. Perceiving that Milhaud was not supported, and that he had only his dragoons with him, the Spaniards plucked up courage and retraced their steps. General Milhaud fell back ably and steadily on the Guadiana, vigorously charging those that pressed too closely upon him. Having made his way back without loss to the bridge which he had rashly crossed, he blocked it up, and stationed on it some dismounted dragoons to defend it.

General Sebastiani, having arrived on the following day, the 27th, at once resumed the offensive. He pushed forward the dragoons and the Polish lancers across the bridge to make the Spanish army evacuate the ground. He then defiled with his whole infantry, and forming it into an attacking column at the moment it passed the bridge, he assailed the Spaniards before they were well recovered from the charges of the French cavalry. In the twinkling of an eye they were routed by the magnificent regiments of the Sebastiani division, which had made the campaigns of Austria, Prussia, and Poland, and which no soldiery was capable of withstanding. The Spaniards fled in disorder to Ciudad Real, leaving behind them their artillery, 2,000 killed and wounded, and nearly 4,000 prisoners. General Milhaud passed beyond Ciudad Real, and pursued them to Almagro. Next day the French advanced to the Sierra Morena, to the mouths of those same de-

files which had witnessed General Dupont's disaster, and took another thousand prisoners and 800 wounded. Thus, on those days of the 27th and 28th of March, which were those of Marshal Soult's arrival before Oporto, we inflicted a loss of 7,000 or 8,000 men on the army of the centre, and 18,000 or 14,000 on the army of Estremadura; and we should have deprived them of all confidence, had not the Spaniards been possessed with that singular presumption which makes men lose battles, but hinders them also from feeling that they have lost them.

The two brilliant victories we have narrated filled the court of Madrid with joy, and somewhat brightened the sombre picture it drew of its situation. Joseph hoped soon to become master of the south of Spain by Marshal Victor's march on Seville, and by that of Marshal Suchet on Valencia, which he never ceased urgently demanding. He renewed the order to General Lapisse to move from Salamanca to Merida, for the junction of his division with Marshal Victor was indispensable to any further success on the part of the latter. Joseph even supposed that Marshal Victor's appearance in the southern provinces would be sufficient to bring them all under subjection. He had with him the famous M. de Morla, so arrogant toward the French at the period of Baylen, so humble at that of the taking of Madrid, unjustly accused of treachery by his countrymen, guilty only of interested versatility, and now seeking under the new royalty a refuge against the injustice of the partisans of the old. M. de Morla had numerous connections in Andalucia, who encouraged King Joseph to hope for the speedy submission of that province, which they represented as disgusted with the government of the junta, and weary of the domination of the generals, the tyranny of the populace, and the overwhelming burdens imposed on it by the war. Filled for awhile with such illusions, Joseph wrote to Napoleon that he hoped to be able soon to give him back 50,000 of his fine troops to be employed in Austria.

It is certain that in any other country two battles like those of Medellin and Ciudad Real would have decided a campaign, and perhaps a war. But the Spaniards were not so easily discouraged. The junta voted rewards to all those who had fought well or ill, did not disgrace Gregorio de la Cuesta—for the system of repairing defeats by disgracing generals was beginning to be discredited—sent him reinforcements, and again addressed a manifesto to Spain and all nations, denouncing what it called the criminal enterprise of the French against the legitimate royalty. The people, responding to its zeal, was not less prompt to rise wherever it was not immediately under the hand of the French; so that, in reality, the advanced movement of General Sebastiani and Marshal Victor on the Guadiana was rather an aggravation of difficulties than an advantage. Several posts were actually taken on the road to Ciudad Real. The town of Toledo, seeing Marshal Victor within twenty or thirty leagues of it, was near rising. The inhabitants of the mountains, from Salamanca to Talavera, flooded the banks of the Tietar and the Tagus with guerillas, so as even to menace the bridge of Almaraz. But a few days had elapsed since the two victories of Medellin and Ciudad Real, when it became necessary to

send the Adjutant-commandant Mocquery from Madrid with 500 men to keep down Toledo, and the Adjutant-commandant Bagneris with 600 men to guard the bridge of Almaraz. Lastly, it was necessary to repair the little forts of Consuegra and Manzanares, in order to *échelon* General Sebastiani's line of communication with Madrid. Thus, in that strange country, victories, by multiplying the points to be guarded, and by producing only a moral effect soon forgotten, weakened rather than strengthened the victor.

It was in the north, especially, that the evil began to be seriously felt. Marshal Ney, always active and energetic, had conceived the desire and the hope of subduing Galicia, never imagining that his two fine divisions, which had vanquished the Russian armies, could be beaten by fanatic mountaineers, who could do nothing but run away, so long as they had not some defile or some house where they could fight under cover. He was soon undeceived. Having more than a hundred leagues of coast to guard, from Cape Ortegal to the mouth of the Minho—having to defend points like Ferrol and Coruña, to hinder the English from communicating with the inhabitants, and to keep down centres of population, such as St. Jago de Compostello, Vigo, Tuy, and Orense—he had been obliged to descend with his whole corps to the coast—consequently, to abandon his communication with Old Castille, and even to ask for aid, instead of being able, as had been hoped at first, to master the whole north of Spain by himself alone. Certainly this was not what might have been expected of a corps so inured to war, and so well commanded as his; nor was it that he had been deficient in ability or energy; but difficulties had multiplied round him without end. Marshal Soult, having had a passing brush with la Romana's corps, and having given himself no more concern about it, that general had traversed the country between Galicia and Leon, surprised a French battalion left at Villa Franca, and roused the people to arms wherever he appeared. At last he threw himself into the Asturias, which General Bonnet could not keep in order with only two regiments. It was to make head against these difficulties that Marshal Ney had been obliged to rush hither and thither, nowhere finding insurgents, however fanatic they were, who could resist his terrible impetuosity, but always seeing them reappear in his rear when he had beaten them in front. Thus, while he had detached General Maurice Mathieu to Mondonedo, to make head against the Asturias, he had been compelled to send General Marchand to St. Jago de Compostello, to destroy 1500 insurgents who had established themselves there. He had then been obliged to hurry to the ports of Villa Garcia and Carcil, and burn them, to keep off the English. Then, learning that the Portuguese insurgents were besieging the *dépôt* of artillery left by Marshal Soult at Tuy, he had hastened thither, and had some severe fighting to raise the blockade, which was effected just when General Heudelet was preparing to march thither. In these various encounters Marshal Ney had killed more than 6000 Spaniards, and taken 22 pieces of cannon, and an immense quantity of *matériel* furnished by the English, without sensibly diminishing the hostile tendencies of the popu-

lation. What will appear still more strange was, that Marshal Ney, though placed on Marshal Soult's line of march, had received no news of him, except through the column he had sent to Tuy, which had there met with that of General Heudelet, and thus learned that Soult's force had not been able to enter Oporto until the 29th, by torchlight. As for Marshal Ney himself, nothing was known of his proceedings at Madrid, except that he was fighting victoriously against the insurgents, and that, although he beat them in all directions, he was not able to secure his means of communication with Old Castille.

Thus, in spite of the victories of Medellin and Ciudad Real, Madrid was soon saddened by the apparition of a multitude of guerilla bands in the north of Spain, by the capture of couriers on all the roads, by the absolute impossibility of having news of Marshals Soult and Ney, and by the certainty that all the means of communicating with them were broken. The movement of General Lapisse, who had quitted Salamanca, traversed Alcantara, crossed the Tagus, and rejoined Marshal Victor, fighting all the way, had but still more favoured the insurgents of Old Castille, who had now no force to keep them in awe. Accordingly, General Kellermann, who commanded in Old Castille, hastened to send word to Madrid that all the north of Spain was on the point of escaping from the grasp of the French, if vigorous measures were not taken against the guerillas that swarmed there in all directions. Though Marshal Victor had been reinforced by General Lapisse, yet, when so much uneasiness was felt for the whole north of Spain, when it was not known what had become of Marshal Soult, and whether or not he would be able to force his way to Lisbon, it was no time to push forward the armies of Estremadura and la Mancha to the south, and add to the difficulty of intercommunication by increasing the extent of territory occupied. It was resolved, therefore, before pursuing the execution of the plan laid down by Napoleon, to await the pacification of the northern provinces and news from Marshal Soult.

The idea occurred very *à propos* to King Joseph and Marshal Soult to send Marshal Mortier from the environs of Logrono, where he had been stationed by Napoleon's orders, to Valladolid to reopen communications with Marshal Ney, and succour Marshal Soult if the latter's position was precarious, as began to be feared. Nothing could be better than such a measure, since it was one for which Napoleon himself sent orders from Germany on receiving despatches from Spain. But until his recent wishes, conceived and expressed on the Danube, were known in the Peninsula, Marshal Mortier, whose orders were to remain at Logrono, durst hardly venture to disobey, and he would not. Such is the inconvenience of operations directed from too great a distance. King Joseph having written to Marshal Mortier to repair to Valladolid, the latter was greatly embarrassed between the orders from Paris and those from Madrid. By way of compromise, however, he consented to proceed to Burgos. But it was not enough to repress the insurgents in the north and reopen communications with Soult and Ney. There were detached from the army of Arragon, by way of a temporary loan, two

regiments, which it was thought might be spared since the taking of Saragossa, and they were sent to General Kellermann. A Polish and a German battalion were taken from Segovia and the surrounding posts, and their places were supplied by troops from the garrison of Madrid. Some other detachments were taken from the garrison of Burgos, and with the whole there was formed for General Kellermann a corps of 7000 or 8000 men, with which he was to proceed to Galicia, to re-establish the communications interrupted in the northern provinces.

These several musters were not completed until the 27th of April, and it was not until the second of May that Kellermann reached Lugo, after skirmishing all the way with the peasants of the district. He found General Maurice Mathieu at Lugo, whither he had been sent by Marshal Ney to reopen his communications with Old Castille. It was agreed between these two generals that the main cause of the evil was the descent on the one side into Portugal, on the other to the coast of Galicia, without having previously destroyed the Marquis de la Romana; they resolved, therefore, to pursue him in the Asturias, and endeavour to destroy him there, which would have the twofold effect of pacifying those regions and of extinguishing the author of all the agitation in the north of Spain. It was further settled that Marshal Ney should march into the Asturias by the route from Lugo to Oviedo, and General Kellermann by that from Leon, so that coming upon la Romana from two opposite directions, they might hem him in between them. The two corps then separated, with a sincere determination to contribute to the best of their ability to each other's success.

The whole month of April was passed in wretched tentative efforts, in consequence of the uncertainty at Madrid as to Marshal Soult's fate, and also of the inability at head-quarters to direct at will, and according to the requirements of the moment, the movements of the French generals operating in Spain. Not knowing what had become of Marshal Soult, the central authorities durst not send Marshal Victor's corps against Badajoz and Seville. Not having the complete disposal of the generals, they could not send Marshal Mortier in the track of Soult and Ney. Thus was lost the most important month in the year, the month in which the most decisive advantages might have been obtained over the Spaniards and the English. The only operation executed during that precious time in Estremadura, was to recall Marshal Victor's corps from Medellin to Alcantara to drive the Spanish and Portuguese insurgents out of the latter town, of which they had taken possession. King Joseph and Marshal Jourdan were at first opposed to this retrograde movement on the part of Marshal Victor, fearing the bad effect it would produce in Andalucia. But they decided on letting it be executed on the report of a spy from Oporto, who announced that Marshal Soult's position was in the highest degree critical, and that the English had again landed at Lisbon. The possibility of unpleasant events in that quarter rendered the possession of Alcantara indispensable, for it was by the Tagus and Alcantara that succour could be sent most directly to the army in Portugal. Alcantara was therefore retaken, the insurgents

put to the sword, and immediately afterwards Marshal Victor returned by Almaraz to Truxillo, in order to hinder Gregorio de la Cuesta from reoccupying the positions from which he had expelled him when marching to Medellin.

The news which had been received indirectly from Oporto was unfortunately but too true. Soult's position in Oporto had really become most difficult during the month of April; and for this both men and events were in fault. As soon as he had entered the town the marshal proceeded to establish himself there firmly, thinking he had done enough in arriving on the Douro, and leaving it to circumstances to determine whether he should retreat, or, on the contrary, should push his conquest further. Of all the courses he could have adopted this was the most dangerous, for remaining in Oporto without any settled purpose could evidently lead only to disasters. It was of itself a great danger to be with twenty and odd thousand men in the midst of an insurgent country, in which the popular frenzy against the French had reached the last degree of violence; still, with such a brave army and with such excellent officers, it was possible to maintain one's ground in the north of Portugal. But there were about 17,000 or 18,000 English in Lisbon, and there was every likelihood that double that number would soon arrive in the fleets which had sailed from England. Under such circumstances, to defend oneself behind the line of the Douro against a regular army placed beyond it, and an army of insurgents within it, would be almost impracticable. The probability of this might be inferred from two recent events. The little garrison left at Chaves to guard our wounded had been captured by the Portuguese. The dépôt left at Tivy would also have been taken if the Heudelet division and Marshal Ney had not come from Braga and Galicia, and raised the blockade. And, after all, a part of that dépôt, which had been sent to Vigo, was captured. It must be added, that they were no weak posts to which such accidents had happened; for the Tivy dépôt, reinforced successively by troops on the march, had been raised to 4,500 men, and that which had been taken at Vigo amounted to 1,800. Marshal Soult had, therefore, to apprehend at one and the same time both the English army, which could not fail to repair soon from the Tagus to the Douro, and the thousands of fanatical insurgents he had left behind him, from the Douro to the Minho. Succours of any kind he could scarcely expect, for Ney's corps was wholly occupied in Galicia; and as for the armies which might have come from the centre, (that is to say, from Madrid, by Alcantara or Badajoz,) Napoleon's instructions provided for the case, in which Marshal Soult, after making himself master of Lisbon, might be required to second Marshal Victor at Seville, but did not advert to the possibility that Marshal Victor, when master of Seville, might be called on to succour Lisbon. There was, therefore, the greatest danger in remaining at Oporto, in the midst of thousands of insurgents swarming in all directions, in presence of an English army ready to assume the offensive, and without any hope of aid against so many enemies; and Soult ought at once either to have retrograded to the Minho, or to have gone up by Braganza toward Old Castille, so as

to be backed by the principal mass of the French army operating in the centre of Spain, thus putting spaces not easily to be traversed between him and the English, and reserving to himself the alternative of being useful in Spain, or of re-appearing in Portugal with sufficient forces to maintain his ground. With the English especially he ought to have conducted himself in a way to incur no defeat, nor even to sustain an engagement with doubtful success.\* But to retrograde *à propos* needs as much resolution as to advance boldly: and in war, as in other affairs, this is only the privilege of steadfast and sagacious minds.

Once in Oporto, Marshal Soult, who durst neither march to Lisbon, which the English guarded with 18,000 men, nor disobey Napoleon, who had prescribed the conquest of Portugal, contented himself with remaining where he was, leaving to fortune the determination of his future conduct. Unfortunate illusions, which arose in his mind out of purely local circumstances, contributed also to mislead him, and make him lose valuable time. He had, as we have seen, sent General Heudelet to Tuy, to raise the blockade of his dépôt, left a detachment at Braga to guard that important town, and distributed important posts on his left, at Penafiel and at Amarante, to secure the roads to Chaves and Braganza, and thus effect the double purpose of keeping the country quiet and occupying the roads. At Amarante on the Tamega he had placed a few thousand men under General Loison. These measures were well conceived, though insufficient, and by seizing the country on all sides at once, they put it for a short interval into a state, not of submission, but of inaction.

When the French were established in Oporto there was manifested in a part of the population a disposition which had more than once exhibited itself before, and which an interval of quiet rendered still more evident. The violent populace, who had been let loose from all restraint, and who rendered existence insupportable to everybody who had some humanity and civilization, was regarded with horror, we will not say by the enlightened classes, but by those in easy circumstances, who loved peace and quiet. These classes were not duped by the zeal which the English affected in behalf of Portugal. They saw clearly that ruling the commerce of that country in peace, and desiring in war to make it their field of battle, they thought only of using it for their own ends: as they proved, indeed, very clearly, by letting loose for their service a ferocious multitude, which had become the terror of all well-disposed people. So, without liking the French, who in their eyes were still foreigners, they were ready, if compelled to choose between them and the English, to prefer them as a lesser evil, as a means of ending the war, and as holding out the hope of a more liberal rule than that under which Portugal had lived for ages. As for the House of Braganza, the classes in question were inclined, since the regent's flight to Brazil, to consider it as an empty name, which the English made use of to upset the land from top to bottom.

The presence of Marshal Soult and his encouraging declarations did but confirm the more discreet inhabitants in their pacific inclinations. It was particularly in Oporto, a rich trading town, less exposed than Lisbon to the old court influences, and very intent on its own interests, that the disposition we have described was most obviously manifested, in spite of the patriotic and fanatical bishop who swayed the rabble. The middle classes responded with no little satisfaction to Marshal Soult's assurances, and seemed resolved to remain quiet if he kept his word, maintained good discipline among his soldiers, restrained the populace, and procured for every man liberty to attend to his business. This feeling was particularly manifested by the Jews—men who are everywhere very numerous, active, and rich, but especially so in countries of backward civilization, where trade is left in their hands, the rest of the inhabitants not understanding it. There were more than two hundred thousand in Portugal, living under harsh oppression, and delighted at the prospect of enjoying under the French a civil equality, which seemed to them the most desirable form of government. After having entered into relations with the French administration for the sustenance of the army and the collection of revenues, they soon came to make political overtures as to the manner of establishing a regular government in Portugal. Many merchants of the country joined them; and it appeared that the idea of erecting Northern Lusitania into a separate kingdom, as a treaty made by Napoleon in October, 1807, had arranged, would be very acceptable to the province of Oporto. It was declared that such a resolution, publicly announced and accompanied by an equitable and mild administration, would cause the French to be looked upon, not in the light of invaders who devour the countries through which they pass, but of friends who deal carefully by a country in which they intend to establish themselves permanently. It was for Napoleon to nominate as soon as possible the French prince who should wear the new crown of Oporto, perhaps ere long of Oporto and Lisbon. But as circumstances were pressing, were it not well to move as fast as circumstances; and since it was a time when kings were made out of generals, was it not quite natural to make a king of Northern Lusitania of Napoleon's lieutenant? Whether this thought was suggested by the little military court of the marshal to officious intermediaries, or by the latter to the former, is a fact which remains unknown, and as to which assertions varied much, when all the details of this singular adventure were afterwards laid before Napoleon. Be this as it may, the idea of making Marshal Soult a king of Portugal soon spread through Oporto and the towns of the province of Entre Douro e Minho. It was thought rather absurd by the more rational, received with insulting jests by the army, but accepted by the trading classes, who wanted a protector; by the Jews, who wanted a representative of civil equality; and by those military intriguers who always flatter generals-in-chief, and are their most dangerous enemies. The latter affected to consider this arrangement as profoundly politic, for it would serve, they said, to attach the Portuguese to the French, and detach them from

\* This opinion is not mine, but that of Marshal Jourdan, chief of Napoleon at Schönbrunn, expressed in a very detailed correspondence.

the English and the House of Braganza. What chiefly encouraged them to the audacity of making, or at least preparing a king without the express consent of the Emperor, was his absence in a distant part of the continent, where he was engaged in events of uncertain issue. All the ambitious excited by his example, being thus emancipated by distance, allowed themselves free course; and there were not wanting those who said to themselves that, since they were condemned to waste their blood in a corner of the world for the grandeur of an insatiable family, it was time they should think of themselves, and take advantage of the opportunity to settle well where they were. Napoleon, perhaps, would take it amiss, but every day's experience showed how much his power was diminishing from the Rhine to the Pyrenees, from the Pyrenees to the Tagus; besides, he had so much need of those he sent so far to conquer kingdoms, that they might well retain some part of what they conquered for him, to say nothing of the very probable chance that his death or defeat on the Danube would leave them free to keep whatever they should have taken on the Douro or the Tagus.

It was not every one, indeed, who went so far in this line of speculation, but there were some exceedingly rash spirits about the marshal, and they so beguiled his judgment as to induce him to put forth a strange circular, addressed to the generals commanding divisions, which, after recounting the offer made to the marshal to accept a king from the Emperor's family, or from among the persons of his choice, proceeded to say that the population of Oporto, Braga, and several neighbouring towns, had requested Marshal Soult to invest himself with the attributes of sovereignty, and to exercise royal authority until the arrival of Napoleon's answer; and that, meanwhile, they swore to be faithful to him, and defend him against all enemies—English, insurgents, and others—who should seek to resist the spontaneous act they solicited on his part. The circular concluded with a request that the generals would call forth the expression of a similar desire on the part of the several populations under their command.

Though this circular was in some degree confidential, it could not remain secret. It afforded matter for laughter to some, offended others, and alarmed the best men. Much ridicule was cast upon the marshal, who had so far forgotten his extreme reserve at the fallacious prospect of a crown as to manifest the most imprudent desires. A part of the army was highly incensed, especially the old officers, who remained at the bottom of their hearts the feelings of independence peculiar to the army of the Rhine, and who fought from a generous devotion to duty, but, in secret, were indignant at seeing their blood lavished in every corner of the world, in order to make kings who were weak, or incapable, or dissolute, and, in general, not very faithful to France. There were many officers in the army of Portugal who entertained these sentiments, and one who did so in a pre-eminent degree, namely, General Delaborde, who had so well discovered the art of beating the English, and had done this in so brilliant a manner at the battle of Rolicca. He was a man of high spirit, intelligent, and brave, and he held a language which was soon re-

peated by everybody round him. Men of more reserved temper, who were interested only in the maintenance of discipline, were deeply distressed at the moral effect which they foresaw would be produced by the commander-in-chief's example among officers and soldiers already too much inclined to emancipate themselves from all rule, and to indemnify themselves by license for the sufferings they endured in distant lands. Such proceedings were equivalent to a direct invitation to disorder, and, what was worse, they tended inevitably to divide the army, which, in its perilous position, had more need than ever of union, force, and good conduct. These sensible men were also curious to know what the Emperor would think of all those who lent themselves more or less to acts so strange, involving so striking though involuntary a censure of the imperial policy.

General Quesnel, commandant of Oporto, addressed some observations to Marshal Soult, who received them very ill, and replied, haughtily, that the approbation to be obtained from the Emperor was his own affair, and did not at all concern the officers under his orders. "The fate that has befallen General Dupont's lieutenants," replied General Quesnel, "proves that the Emperor can, on occasion, make the responsibility of the general-in-chief extend to those who have participated in his faults."

Three parties were immediately formed in the army—that of the officers who, actuated by no other motive than their sense of duty and fidelity to the Emperor, would not lend themselves to an assumption of royal power which he had not sanctioned; that of the officers who had formerly been republicans, and whom the excesses of the imperial policy were bringing back to their primitive opinions; lastly, that of some more audacious malecontents, who cared little about disobeying the Emperor, and felt no regret for the republic, but who were simply royalists—though perhaps they did not admit the fact even to themselves—and who regarded the republic, the consulate, the empire, and all that had happened in France for the last twenty years, a series of frightful convulsions, all destined to end ill. The language of the old royalists was already heard from the lips of some officers, and notoriously from those of the colonel of the 47th regiment of the line, subsequently well known as General Donnadieu. What is most singular is, that this small party, which was beginning to make itself heard in the army, (especially in Spain, where the sufferings were horrible, and the end for which they were endured too apparent,) was not composed of old royalists, (scarcely any of those men were of an age to come under that designation,) but of ex-republicans of the army of the Rhine, disgusted at toils that no longer had for their object the greatness of France, but that of a family. Glory had for a while concealed the emptiness or the selfishness of this policy. The first reverses induced reflection, and reflection induced disgust.

No sooner had these divisions broken out than the language of the army became incredibly audacious, and equalled in imprudence the acts that had provoked it. Nothing less was talked of than arresting the commander-in-chief if he acted upon his circular, deposing him, and putting the oldest of the lieutenants-general in his place. It may easily be conceived how danger-



ous was such a disturbance of discipline in the midst of an enemy's country, and in presence of an English army, led by an able commander. The effects were soon felt. The service was performed with a laxity and negligence that had deplorable consequences. Our soldiers, obliged to enter every inhabited place by force, and authorized to exercise there the right possessed over every place taken by storm, had contracted a taste for pillage; and, unfortunately, many of them were loaded with gold since the sack of Oporto. To wean them from such habits was urgently needful; yet this could hardly be done in the state of indiscipline into which the whole army had fallen. If attempts were made to bring them into order, they complained that they were sacrificed to a population whose sufferings were to be won at that price. The officers who had been the first to set the example of this sort of language, were unable to put it down among the soldiery, and in a short while the mischief made rapid progress. A sad proof of this was seen in a strange incident which, some months afterward, conducted an officer to a disgraceful death.

Assiduous attention to duty no longer prevailing, the officers often quitted their posts without any inquiry being made about them. A captain of the 18th dragoons, very intelligent, brave, and enterprising, having obtained the favour of his superiors by good means and bad, by bravery and complaisance, was among those who said openly that the consulate, at first so glorious, afterward converted into the empire, was but the sacrifice of all the interests of France to a boundless ambition. Born in the south, a royalist region, he had been brought prematurely to the sentiments which flashed up in 1815, when France, wearied by thirty years of revolution, threw herself into the arms of the Bourbons. This officer had frequented the colonels and generals who complained the most openly of the commander-in-chief, and, forming an exaggerated estimate of their thoughts from their language, he fancied he discerned in their discontent evidences of a conspiracy, which might be forthwith made use of to bring about the overthrow of Napoleon and his empire in 1809! Like all those restless spirits who rush headlong into conspiracies, he had wants fully as much as opinions; and a craving for money, no less than an inordinate activity, prompted him to go and treat with Sir Arthur Wellesley, who was then at Coimbra.

That celebrated general, the victor of Vimeira, recalled to the command of the British army after the death of Moore, had been sent from England with a reinforcement of 12,000 men, which raised the English forces in that country to a total of about 80,000. His temporary predecessor, General Craddock, had not ventured to oppose Marshal Soult's movement against Oporto, in consequence of Marshal Victor's appearance toward Merida, and General Lapiesse's toward Alcantara, and he had remained at the environs of Leiria, on the road to Lisbon. Sir Arthur Wellesley was not a man to remain inactive; and he was resolved, without exceeding his instructions, which enjoined him to confine himself to the defence of Portugal, to shake the power of the French in the Peninsula as much as possible. He proposed, in the first place, to make Marshal Soult evacuate Oporto, and, after

delivering the north of Portugal, to proceed to the south, and see what he could do to baffle King Joseph's designs against the south of Spain. He had established his head-quarters at Coimbra, where he was at the head of twenty and odd thousand men, and he had pushed forward an English and a Portuguese division to Abrantes, to observe the movements of the French in that quarter.

Captain Argenton, the officer whose criminal intrigues we are recounting, in consequence of the incredible irregularity which had crept into the army, could withdraw from his duty, repair in disguise from Oporto to Coimbra, and present himself clandestinely to Sir Arthur Wellesley. The complaisance of the French authorities toward the inhabitants of Oporto who had business in Lisbon, and who were allowed to come and go notwithstanding the state of war, contributed not a little to facilitate communications of this kind. Argenton saw the English general, talked to him of the divisions in the French army, of the parties that had grown up in it, exaggerated, as usual with men of his kind, the too sad reality, made out of mere male-content conspirators, out of people who murmured, people who wished to act, out of men who yielded to different impulses because they were sincere, men who had all one common desire, namely, to overthrow a power ruinous to France, and to revolt against the authority of the Emperor. True in all points to the usages of the too sanguine spirits that play such parts as his, Argenton ascribed to himself a mission he had not received, and calumniously naming a host of generals and colonels, he pretended that he was deputed by them to present himself to the British commander and to treat with him. It was a falsehood, of a kind unfortunately too common in similar circumstances, and too often believed, though often unmasked. The plan this intriguer proposed was as follows:—Marshal Soult, he said, would not fail, if the people of Oporto lent themselves to his design, to proclaim himself king, or at least, as the circular announced, to assume provisionally all the attributes of sovereignty. Such a step would be sufficient to produce a revolt in the army. The marshal would then be deposed, and, after that first explosion, the generals would go still further. They would proclaim the dethronement of Napoleon himself, and then, if the English army would treat with them and not pursue them, they would retreat by appointed marches to the Pyrenees. Their example would be immediately imitated by the 800,000 men who were serving in Spain; and the old army of the republic and the empire, remembering what it had been, and incensed at being sacrificed to the projects of one ambitious man, would quit the Peninsula, retire to the Pyrenees, and there proclaim the deliverance of France and Europe, provided always the English accepted the proposals made to them, namely, that they should follow without molesting those who were going, by this spontaneous movement, to re-establish the peace of the world.

These were wild exaggerations. What was true in them was, that the army, which can judge as well as the nation what passes under its own eyes, while remaining faithful to its duties, had rightly appreciated the policy of Napoleon, and secretly blamed it, though serv-

ing it heroically; that such were its sentiments, especially in Spain, and that a few days' disruption of discipline would have been enough to produce in the seven or eight *corps d'armée* serving in the Peninsula the same chaos of sentiments as prevailed in Oporto. But this state of things was as remote from the project talked of by Argenton as the inventions of conspirators commonly are from the reality.

The English general exhibited on this occasion the good sense which was his most distinguishing quality, and estimated the possible truth involved in Argenton's assertions. He saw clearly that Napoleon's conquering policy was condemned even in the French army, that that army was divided, that the bonds of discipline were much relaxed in it; that, great as was the valour in its ranks, its military duties could not but be ill performed; and without believing a revolt which, beginning with the deposition of Marshal Soult, was to terminate in that of Napoleon himself, he hoped for something more probable, and unhappily more practicable, namely, that he might surprise the French in the very town of Oporto, and make them suffer an humiliating disaster.

Though he put no more faith in Argenton's overtures than they deserved, he did not repulse him, but invited him to return, and supplied him with the means of doing so. But he refused to treat with the French army, or to induce the inhabitants of Oporto to proclaim Marshal Soult King of Portugal, which, according to Argenton's showing, would have precipitated the crisis. On all these weighty matters he said he must refer to his government. But seeing what facilities the French army offered him for a surprise, he resolved to march upon Oporto, taking care previously to fill that town with his spies, who, in the character of inhabitants of Oporto or Lisbon, and under pretext of commercial business, obtained from the complaisance of the French authorities free leave to come and go.

Having returned to the camp without notice taken of his absence, which was attributed to amorous motives, Argenton frequently repeated his criminal excursions, again saw the English general, and tried to convert him to the idea of favouring Marshal Soult's advancement to royal station, in order to precipitate a movement in the army, and of treating subsequently with its authors; but with all his efforts he only succeeded in more fully enlightening him as to the moral condition of the French troops, and confirming him in his design of surprising Oporto.

On his return from his last excursion, Argenton passed through General Lefebvre's brigade, which furnished the French advanced posts on the left bank of the Douro, and finding that brigade exposed to the assault of the English army, which he had left on its march, he was seized with a desire to preserve General Lefebvre, whom he liked because he had served under him, and also to affiliate him to the pretended conspiracy of which he himself was the sole artificer. He told General Lefebvre that his position exposed him to the greatest dangers. The latter wishing to know what these were, Argenton ended by revealing them to him. He told him that the English army was approaching and to confirm the statement, he

confessed that he had just come from it, adding, untruly, that he had gone to it by deputation from the majority of the generals, who were indignant at being sacrificed to the ambition of the Bonaparte family, and he besought him to join his comrades, and contribute to the salvation of the army of France.

General Lefebvre was deeply agitated by these revelations, and though it pained him to denounce Argenton, he disclosed what he had just learned, to Marshal Soult, begging him not to destroy a wretched man, who, criminal as he was, had yet a claim on his gratitude, inasmuch as he had sought to warn and save him. Marshal Soult had Argenton arrested instantly, and thus became aware of all that was passing in the army. The discontents excited in it had not escaped his notice; but refusing to attribute them to their real cause, he was weak enough to believe in a conspiracy, about which, however, he made little noise, knowing that the situation was one of difficulty for everybody, for there was no one whose conscience was quite whole. The news of this arrest spread as that of the projected royalty had done; and then began a storm of mutual accusations, one party being charged with conspiring against the safety of the army, the other with meditating a usurpation. The disorder and confusion were but the more augmented.

Marshal Soult had been more than a month in Oporto, occupied in cultivating a good understanding with the inhabitants, but coming to no decision as to military operations, whether to advance or retreat. To advance was almost impossible; for, besides the Portuguese population, he would have had to beat the English army, and although with 20,000 veteran French troops and an able general this was within the limits of possibility, it would have been supremely imprudent to attempt it. To remain was quite as impracticable; for, in this case, too, it would have been necessary to beat the English army, while there was the insurgent population to be kept down on our right, our left, and our rear. To retreat by the roads leading to Old Castille—that is to say, by Amarante, Chaves, and Braganza,—or better still, by the roads which led back to Galicia, by Braga and Tuy,—so as to return to our point of departure, was, though not very brilliant, yet the only feasible course. Not to adopt it was to prefer a disaster to an unpleasant alternative.

Unfortunately, Marshal Soult did not think of this. Intent on pacifying the new kingdom of Northern Lusitania, he had abolished certain taxes, founded perpetual lamps for certain Madonnas, and received addresses from the several towns which had been induced to call for the establishment of a French dynasty. Deputations from Braga, Oporto, Barcellos, Viana, Villa do Conde, Feira, and Ovar, came in state and entreated him to give a king to Portugal. All these ceremonies had the aspect and the form of the Spanish *besamanos*. The army laughed and jeered at them without end, held language capable of shaking all military authority, and was but the more disposed to neglect its duties. In the midst of these idle occupations, Marshal Soult learned that Sir Arthur Wellesley had landed, on the 22d of April, with a reinforcement of 12,000 men: that 30,000 English, followed by the whole Por-

tuguese insurrection, were about to march on Oporto; and at last he owned that his only course was to abandon the capital of his projected kingdom. It would have been far better to have admitted this unpleasant necessity much sooner; but having done so at last, the marshal should have acted with the promptest decision, in order to leave nothing behind him: neither his *matériel*, nor his sick and wounded, whom it was impossible to leave at the mercy of a ferocious people. He had to choose for his line of retreat either that by Amarante to Zamora, or by Braga to Tuy. To retreat by Amarante would have the appearance of a manoeuvre, which would spare the vanity of the general-in-chief, for he would seem to be making a move to the left of the English without entirely quitting Portugal, whereas to retire by Braga was simply to return to the spot whence he had come, and by the very same road. But the retreat by Amarante was difficult, and required much time; it was to be effected upon a road not one point of which was in our possession, in a long column, which the sick and wounded would make still longer, the head and middle of which would have to be protected against the insurgents, and the tail against the English. The road by Braga to Tuy was short; every point of it was in the hands of the French, and by concentrating the best troops in the rear guard to make head against the English, their mass would serve to cover all that was sent forward before them. This, then, was the only sure, facile, and admissible line of retreat, though it was the least capable of veiling the fact of the forced abandonment of Portugal.

Be this as it may, whatever line was preferred, no time was to be lost. It was imperative that a considerable force should be sent to Amarante, if that direction was adopted, to hinder the English from crossing the Douro on our left, and cutting off our retreat. It was, above all, requisite that the sick, the wounded, and the heavy *matériel*, should be sent away. Marshal Soult, though made aware on the 8th of May of Sir Arthur Wellesley's movements, did no more than concentrate his posts at Braga, Viana, and Guimaraens on Amarante, and order General Loison to make an excursion beyond the Tamega, in order to secure the passage of that small river. But in Oporto he made no preparation for departure, which was unfortunate, for it was evident that the longer the retreat was delayed the more difficult it would be. He had proposed at first to march on the 10th of May, after having occupied Oporto forty days; then he delayed until the 11th, and finally chose to wait until the 12th. But that day was destined by Providence for one of the strangest events of this disastrous war.

Having sent, as we have said, an English brigade and a Portuguese division to Abrantes to observe the movements of the French on the Tagus, Sir Arthur Wellesley resolved to march in person to the Douro, and present himself before Oporto, being thoroughly informed of what was passing there, and of the incredible disorder into which every thing had fallen. General Beresford, who specially commanded the Portuguese, was ordered by him from Coimbra to Lamego by Nisen. The English general's intention was to intercept the Braganza road, and at the same time to withdraw atten-

tion from Oporto, which was to be his main object. At the same time he sent forward his two principal columns: the one to the left by the coast road from Aveiro to Ovar, the other to the right by the interior road from Agueda to Bemposta. The left column having arrived at Aveiro had to cross long lagunes parallel to the coast, and which were navigable. Sir Arthur Wellesley embarked upon them a strong detachment, which on landing at Ovar would be placed in the rear of the French advanced guard, commanded by General Franceschi. Sir Arthur Wellesley ordered the right column to attack Franceschi in front, as soon as the troops landed at Ovar should be ready to fall upon his rear.

It was on the 10th of May this movement was effected. The brave General Franceschi, surprised and assailed in all directions, behaved with singular coolness, charged now the English infantry, now their cavalry under a fire of grape, killed as many men as he lost, and extricated himself from his awkward position with extreme good fortune. This surprise was the sad result of a state of things in which we let the English know every thing, without ourselves knowing any thing about them. On the 11th our detachments, recalled to the faubourgs of Oporto on the left bank of the river, recrossed the river and brought over all the boats to the right side.

It seems that being warned on the 10th and 11th by the presence of the English army, Marshal Soult ought to have had all his sick and wounded, not in the hospitals of Oporto, but on the road to Amarante, and should have assured himself positively of the possession of that town. But on the 11th none of the wounded had been removed, and the possession of Amarante was taken for granted, without certain proof. Marshal Soult again postponed till the 12th his departure from Oporto, from which he was loth to tear himself. The only precaution taken was to throw into the water the powder that could not be carried away, to separate from the heavy artillery, which could not be dragged with the army, the field artillery, which there were means of conveying, so as to have of the latter a movable park of twenty-two pieces. The departure was to take place on the 12th. The bulk of the army was echeloned on the road leading to Amarante by Balthar, and the Mermet division was distributed in the interior of Oporto to cover the retreat.

But on the night of the 11th, Sir Arthur Wellesley had conceived a project which would have been one of extravagant daring had he not been so well informed of the real state of things: this was to cross the Douro in presence of the French army, and seize Oporto before their eyes. On that night he sent two battalions to Avintas, two or three leagues above Oporto, with orders to cross the Douro unknown to the French, collect all the boats they could find, and float them down before daybreak to Oporto. He himself took post with the bulk of his troops in the faubourgs of the left bank, completely concealed by the houses, and waiting the proper moment to execute his plan, the secret of which he had imparted only to the two lieutenant-generals who led the attacking columns.

On the 12th, very early in the morning, the two battalions sent under Sir John Murray to

Avintas, having collected a sufficient number of boats and sent them to Oporto, they were used before daybreak to land some battalions under Lieutenant-General Paget, suddenly and with the utmost secrecy, at the upper extremity of Oporto. He hid his troops in a building belonging to the bishop, which commanded the right bank of the river. This point being well occupied, the rest of Hill's brigade was carried over, detachment by detachment, and it was already broad day ere any thing was known at the French head-quarters of what was going on, and they refused to believe the warnings given them by several eye-witnesses. The general-in-chief, instead of going and ascertaining the truth with his own eyes, trusted at first to the negative report of his lieutenants, whom he afterwards accused of having deceived him, and who were culpable, no doubt; but less so than himself, for in such cases the responsibility increases with the rank. This incredulity having allowed the English to throw some thousands of their men on the right bank of the Douro, they had time to establish themselves in the town of Oporto, and soon they even took no pains to conceal themselves. But General Foy, having at last gone in person to the spot, and convinced himself of the danger, ran to the barracks, put the troops under arms, and directed the 17th light infantry against the building occupied by the English. The latter, unfortunately, being once in possession, were not easily to be dislodged, and musketry was used against them without effect. General Mermet, who formed the rear guard with his division, brought his troops to bear upon the point seized by the English, with the intention of driving them into the river. But in moving to the upper part of Oporto he left the centre uncovered; and Lieutenant-General Sherbrooke, taking advantage of the unguarded state of that part of the town, rapidly landed his brigade there, so that in an instant Oporto was filled with English. The brave General Delaborde, at the head of the 4th light infantry and the 15th of the line, charged and drove them to the edge of the river, but could never wrest from them the buildings which served them as a support. He was wounded, as was also General Foy, without succeeding in avenging the honour of the army for this unparalleled surprise.

In the existing state of things, resigned as we were to quit Oporto, it was almost useless to contest, at the cost of an immense effusion of blood, a town which we should have had to reconquer, street by street, from troops who were not to be driven, like the Portuguese, from the possessions they had seized. It is true that here remained a thousand sick and wounded in Oporto, a sacred deposit it behoved us to save. But, to effect their removal, it would have been necessary to possess the town for several days longer, and this was quite impossible. It was this consideration that decided the retreat of the French, after a strenuous struggle on the part of General Delaborde, and a loss of some hundreds, subsequently estimated at an exaggerated figure by Marshal Soult and Sir Arthur Wellesley. The most vexatious thing was to leave our sick and wounded in the power of the enemy, and with them the honour of the army, for such a surprise was without a precedent in the annals of war. Fortunately we

were succeeded in Oporto by the general of a civilized nation, and our sick, who would have been in danger of being murdered had they remained in the power of the insurgents, were exposed only to the risk of being neglected.\*

The French then retreated on the evening of the 12th to Balthar, greatly incensed against each other, the generals accusing the commander-in-chief of having suffered every thing to fall into a state of neglect and disorder, which had rendered the surprise of Oporto possible, the commander-in-chief accusing his lieutenants of having left him in ignorance of the fact that the English had begun to cross the Douro. Argenton, the culpable author of the communications with the English, whom the marshal had put in arrest in order to bring him to trial, was brought away with the army. The marshal wished to commit him to General Delaborde's custody; but things were come to such a pass that the general refused to take charge of him, saying that there was no other intention than to favour the escape of that intriguer, in order to cast a veil over what had happened, and that for his own part, as he desired light, he had no notion of being responsible for such an evasion. Argenton, who was full of dexterity, did in fact succeed in escaping, and fled to the English, without its being possible, reasonably, to accuse any one of conniving at his escape, though there was no end of such accusations in the army.†

Having arrived at Balthar in the evening, Marshal Soult had tidings of another accident, still worse than that which had befallen in the morning at Oporto. General Loison, not having sufficient troops to force his passage across the Tamega, and fearing he should be cut off from Oporto by the great number of enemies that presented themselves, had evacuated Amarante, and thus surrendered the road to Braganza to the English. This was disastrous, for, in order to come upon the direct road from Oporto to Tuy by Braga, which it would have been far better to have adopted from the first, it was necessary to go back very near to Oporto; and it was natural to expect that the English army would be found barring our way. In that case, how were we to break through them, and reach the road to Braga? There were many reasons for regarding this as hopeless in the existing state of the army, and Marshal Soult hardly knew what to do. But, with a little more presence of mind, he might have made the somewhat obvious reflection that, notwithstanding the surprise of the morning, it was not to be supposed that the English general had already transported his army from one bank of the Douro to the other. Such operations are but slowly effected when the means have not been prepared a long time in advance. Even if he had done so, it was not probable that he had already concentrated all his troops in the rear of the French, so as to bar their way from the Amarante to the Braga road. At the most, there could only be an advanced guard at the intersection of those two roads, and then there would be a probability that we might force a

\* The Duke of Wellington behaved generously on this occasion. He applied to the French army for its own surgeons to attend their invalid countrymen, and granted those surgeons safe conduct to come and return.

† He was retaken some months afterwards, tried, and shot.

passage. It is true that in such situations one is more apt to surmise the worst than the best, and that, after having relied too much on fortune, one ends by trusting to it too little. In the present instance, Marshal Soult would have succeeded better had he been more confident; for it was not until the morning of the 18th that Sir Arthur Wellesley sent a mere advanced guard to occupy Valongo, the first point beyond Oporto, and it was only on the 14th that he appeared there himself at the head of his army. But as Marshal Soult could not foresee this circumstance, he adopted a desperate course.

He had before him a chain of steep hills, beyond which lay the road to Braga, and what was more to the purpose, the road from Braga to Chaves, into which he might strike directly without descending to Braga, and so reach Chaves before General Beresford's troops. Not having ordered preparations beforehand at Tuy for crossing the Minho, he was obliged, as on the former occasion, to go up to Chaves, in order to cross the river in the mountains towards Orense.

But to cross the mountain chain, called the Sierra da Santa Cathalina, the army had to march along goat-tracks, where the horsemen had to dismount, and the artillery-men to abandon their cannons. The marshal had, therefore, to resign himself to the loss of all his artillery, the most humiliating of all sacrifices for an army, next to laying down its arms, for there is none more pernicious. But this resolution once adopted, Marshal Soult had the merit of executing it without loss of time. He had his artillery and his ammunition chests immediately collected to be blown up. Care had been previously taken to load the soldiers' backs with as many cartridges as they could carry; and even a portion of the army treasure was offered to their cupidity, but this was useless, for most of them had their bags filled already. The greater part of the contents of the army chest was abandoned to the explosion that destroyed the artillery.

Having accomplished this painful sacrifice, the French marched to the escarped flanks of the Sierra da Santa Cathalina, towards which a *tête de colonne* had preceded them, and the whole day of the 18th was employed in crossing it. The soldiers suffered much on the march, for they were very heavily laden, and had to climb very difficult paths. At last they arrived in the evening at Guimaraens, where they found the corps of General Loison, which had fallen back on that town on quitting Amarante, and also the several detachments under General Lorge, which had evacuated the coast. The whole army was thus reunited, and capable of passing anywhere in consequence of the sacrifice of its artillery.

This was an advantage too dearly purchased not to be made good use of. Expecting to evade the pursuit of General Beresford, who after occupying Amarante might push forward directly to Chaves and again intercept our line of communication, the march was continued without halting to Salamanca and Ruivaens. For the greater safety the marshal even avoided passing by Chaves, where he was sure of encountering the Portuguese who had forced the garrison left in that town, and he proceeded towards Monte Alegre, whence a shorter road led to Orense.

But it soon became known that in order to give General Beresford time to overtake the French, the insurgents were breaking down the bridges and shutting up the passes. In particular, it was known that the bridge called Puente Novo had been broken down by the peasants, and that they were in ambush near it to defend the passage. This obstruction was to be overcome at all hazards, or else we should have been taken in flank by General Beresford in twenty-four hours, and in the rear by Sir Arthur Wellesley in forty-eight. Major Dulong, of the 81st light infantry, undertook the task. With 100 picked men he marched in the dark to the bridge, which he found cut down and guarded by the peasants. Fortunately the latter had left two planks for their own use, and, moreover, to shelter themselves from the weather, which was frightful, had shut themselves up in a hut, where they thought of nothing but warming themselves. Taking advantage of their negligence, Major Dulong passed over the planks with his brave men, attacked the hut, killed all the Portuguese in it, and having got rid of them, made haste to restore the bridge with the timber he found at hand. At daybreak on the 16th the army found the bridge repaired, and defied over it, being thus saved from the consequence of the faults of its leaders by the bravery of an officer and by a favour of chance. It soon met with another obstacle at the Misarella bridge near Villa da Pontê. In the heart of a narrow gorge, where two men could hardly march abreast, and from the heights overhanging which numbers of peasantry fired upon our soldiers, there was a bridge guarded by a breastwork of timber, and which the Portuguese had begun to destroy. At the same time was heard in the distance the firing which was begun to be exchanged between our rear guard and the advanced guard of General Beresford. There was no need of so many circumstances to excite the temerity of our soldiers. They dashed boldly into the gorge, carried the breastwork, killed the Portuguese who defended it, and crossed the bridge. But in the rear guard there was some disorder, and some remaining baggage which was carried on the backs of mules was lost. This loss was very lightly borne, and our men joyfully reached the road to Orense, where they arrived on the 19th of May, spent with fatigue, shoeless, and almost without clothes, having marched, often without food, under the spring rains, which in that region are horrible. The greatest subject of sorrow, besides the loss of the *matériel*, was to have left in Oporto many sick, who, indeed, would be protected by English honour, and to have left besides, on the route, many wounded and crippled men, whom Portuguese honour did not protect at all, for the insurgents killed them as they followed us. Whatever may have been said afterward, the capitulation of Cintra after the battle of Vimeiro, bravely fought though lost, did less damage to the renown and the effective strength of the army than the surprise of Oporto, the destruction of our artillery at Penafiel, and the precipitate march through the gorges of the province of Traz-os-Montes. The moral condition of our troops corresponded to their physical condition. The soldiers, though their bags were full, were dissatisfied with their leaders and with themselves, and while persisting

in their indiscipline, they were severe, as they always are, in their judgment of those who had suffered them to fall into that state. Their jeers at the vanished royalty of Oporto deepened the sadness of the spectacle.

No sooner was Soult arrived at Orense than he had to repair to Lugo to rescue that town, which the absence of Marshal Ney exposed to the enterprises of the Gallician insurgents. Ney, as we have said, feeling it necessary to rid the Asturias of La Romana, had resolved to make with General Kellermann a joint expedition into that province, the one moving by Lugo on Oviedo, the other by Leon. The first was consequently to march along the coast, the second was to traverse the mountains separating Old Castille from the Asturias. They had kept word with each other like gallant men. Ney, starting from Lugo with 10,000 fighting men on the 13th of May, the day after the surprise of Oporto, had reached the sources of the Navia, and leaving the Spaniards posted along the shore, had outflanked them by making his way over tremendous mountains which had separated them from Oviedo, entered that town in the midst of their dispersed bands, and had been unable to save it from a sort of sack, the result of a street-fight between the Spaniards and the French. The Marquis de la Romana, after having brought down all sorts of calamities on that unfortunate region, had taken refuge with some officers on board the English vessels, to go and recommence elsewhere his wretched system of war. Considerable stores of wealth had been found at Gijon. General Kellermann on his side had set out from Leon, crossed the mountains of the Asturias, and descending on Oviedo, had formed a junction there with the troops under Marshal Ney.

It was during these combined operations that the Gallician insurgents, availing themselves of Marshal Ney's absence, had assailed Lugo and St. Jago de Compostello. Marshal Soult marched thither and dispersed them, and was joined by Marshal Ney, who, after delivering the Asturias, had returned in all haste to relieve the threatened towns. When the two corps met, the details of the Oporto expedition were related by the one to the other, and were severely criticized by that of Marshal Ney. His old soldiers, poor, orderly, and disciplined, ridiculed the younger, richer, and very indocile soldiers of Marshal Soult, who had no victories to allege in excuse for their behaviour. The latter exculpated themselves by throwing the blame on their leaders, whom they accused of causing all the misfortunes of the army. It was evident that peace might be disturbed if the two corps remained long together. Marshal Ney, however, impetuous, but full of good faith, behaved to his colleague with the courtesy of a generous companion-in-arms. He opened his magazines to furnish Marshal Soult's troops with part of what they had lost, and did what he could to replace the artillery they had been obliged to abandon.

Satisfied with each other, the two marshals conferred together as to the conduct they should pursue for the best interests of the Emperor's arms, as the phrase ran in those days, and with reason, for Napoleon's greatness was much more considered than that of France, which was much compromised by these remote wars. After campaigning for several months in Galicia and the

Asturias, Marshal Ney had about 12,000 men present under arms, and Marshal Soult about 17,000, though their respective nominal forces were twice as great. Their strength would soon be increased by the return of men discharged from the hospitals; and with such a force, frankly employed, without any feeling of rivalry, they might complete the subjection of Galicia and the Asturias, exterminate the insurgents, and, if the English persisted in remaining on the banks of the Minho, or even dared to cross it, they might rout them too, and drive them back to the sea. If, on the contrary, as was probable, Sir Arthur Wellesley returned from the north of Portugal to the south, to make head against the French on the Tagus, one of the two marshals, or both of them, might quit Galicia, skirt along the confines of Portugal by Old Castille, move from Lugo to Zamora and Ciudad Rodrigo, fall in conjunction with Marshal Victor on the British army, and cure it for ever of any desire to reappear in the Peninsula.

This was certainly what Napoleon would have ordered had he been on the spot, (his instructions testify it,) and this was what the people at head-quarters in Madrid would have prescribed, if they had possessed the art of making themselves obeyed. For the present the two marshals could spontaneously execute the first part of this plan by clearing the coast of Galicia in a few days of the insurgents who had established themselves there, and cutting off those communications with the English fleet which furnished the chief aliment of the war. General Noruña had created a formidable establishment at Vigo with about 12,000 men and the crews of some English vessels. The Marquis de la Romana, who had been carried from the Asturias to Galicia, with his officers and some select troops, had established himself at Orense since Marshal Soult's movement on Lugo, and was making himself formidable there. It was indispensable, if the two marshals were not to remain together, to expel the insurgent chiefs from their positions, after which they might proceed wherever they should think it more useful or more conformable to their instructions. Those given to Marshal Soult allowed him great latitude, for they amounted only to this, that he was to conquer Portugal, and then go to the support of Marshal Victor in Andalusia. Now, instead of being at Lisbon or Badajoz, he was at Lugo, the point from which he had started. This case had not been foreseen or provided for by Napoleon, and therefore he was wholly free to act for the best. But he had a visible inclination to move into Old Castille toward Zamora and Ciudad Rodrigo, along the eastern frontier of Portugal; whether it was that in thus skirting along the country he was to have conquered he felt himself a little less remote from his aim, or that remaining confined in Galicia to accomplish a task which was properly that of Marshal Ney, was not very flattering to his ambition, or that the very acrimonious and sometimes scandalous language, elicited by the contact between the two corps, was disagreeable to him. He therefore intimated to Marshal Ney his intention of proceeding to Zamora, to effect, as he said, in Castille, a movement corresponding to that which the English seemed to be meditating toward the south of Portugal, by passing from

the Minho to the Douro, and thence to the Tagus. There was some reason in this, though nothing was yet positively known of the supposed movement of the English toward the south of Portugal, and what was most immediately requisite was to beat the enemy who were at hand, for otherwise they would secure for themselves an exceedingly strong position on the coast of Galicia. At the rate the English were marching they could not be on the Tagus before a month or two, as the event afterward proved. There would be time enough in that interval to destroy their establishment in Galicia, and then to proceed all together to the Tagus by Zamora and Alcantara. There would also be time to rest for a few days, and refit.

In order, however, to respond to the wishes of his comrade, Marshal Soult agreed with him, by a written stipulation, that they should make an expedition into Galicia, and destroy the two musters of insurgents; after which Soult was to separate from Ney, and proceed to Old Castle by Puebla de Sanabria and Zamora. They agreed that Soult, who was at Lugo, should descend by the valley of the Minho to Montforte de Lemos, Orense, and Ribadavia, until he had overtaken and destroyed the Marquis de la Romana; that Marshal Ney, protected on his flank by this movement, should compel the enemy to evacuate St. Jago de Compostello, and should then go down to the coast and attack the formidable works erected at Vigo by the English and the Spaniards. Marshal Soult having, by the destruction of the Marquis de la Romana, rendered practicable the very difficult operation which they had to attempt upon Vigo, might then go up by the valley of Ores to Puebla de Sanabria and Zamora. After having signed these arrangements at Lugo, on the 29th of May, the two marshals separated, to begin, as soon as possible, the operations they had resolved on.

Marshal Soult quitted Lugo on the 2d of June, after having made all his preparations for a march to Zamora, and advanced to Montforte, whence the Marquis de la Romana fled to Orense. Having arrived on the 5th at Montforte, Soult halted, and instead of continuing to descend the valley of the Minho to Orense, as he had agreed with Ney, he directed his reconnaissances to the upper course of the Sil, one of the confluent of the Minho, towards Puebla de Sanabria and Zamora. That was not the way to Orense. However, he stopped at Montforte in a sort of immobility.

Ney, on his part, marched from the environs of Coruña, with 18 battalions, to St. Jago de Compostello, which the insurgents evacuated at his approach. On the 7th of June he repaired to Pontevedra, on the seaboard. To arrive at Vigo he had to pass along a series of small gulfs, covered with English gun-boats, and to defile under their fire. The intrepid marshal was not a man to stop for this; but on arriving near Vigo he encountered a position which nature and art had rendered formidable. He had to cross a small river without bridge, and without cannon-shot of the sea, and then to scale intrenchments mounting 60 guns of large calibre, and behind which were several thousand English seamen, with 12,000 Spaniards. Such a position might have been carried by the impetuosity of the marshal and his soldiers, but his

loss would be great. Besides, he ran the risk of failure; and, moreover, it was necessary to be assured that, during the daring attempt, he should not be subjected to a sudden attack on his flank or his rear by La Romana, who, though not to be feared in an ordinary situation, might do much mischief when the marshal was engaged in carrying the English redoubts. Knowing, therefore, that Soult was at Montforte, and La Romana at Orense, Ney awaited a movement of the former against the latter before beginning his perilous enterprise. In this position he continued until the 10th, expecting Soult to fulfil his engagement, rightly desiring that La Romana's force should be dispersed before he attacked Vigo.

But at last he received from General Fournier, whom he had left at Lugo for certain details, a despatch which filled him with distrust of his colleague, and circumspection as to the enemy—two feelings not familiar to his confident and daring nature. General Fournier had seen in the hands of General Rouyer, who had remained at Lugo in charge of the sick and wounded of the army of Portugal, very secret orders from Marshal Soult, enjoining him, as soon as the invalids were in a condition to march, to send them straightway to Zamora, and to keep those orders concealed from everybody, above all from Marshal Ney. On being made aware of this order, which would have been quite natural if it had been avowed, since Zamora was Soult's definitive destination, Ney thought he was betrayed. Seeing, moreover, that instead of descending upon Orense, to drive out La Romana, Soult remained at Montforte, he felt assured that his colleague wilfully broke his word to him. Before coming to an open rupture with him, he wrote him a letter on the 10th, informing him of his very perilous situation, telling him he still counted on the execution of the plan agreed on; but adding, that if, contrary to all probability, that plan was abandoned, he begged to have notice of the fact, because a longer stay in the face of Vigo, with the road to Orense open on his flank, would be infinitely dangerous.

Marshal Ney waited some days for a reply to this letter, but received none. Struck by this silence, seeing the position of the English at Vigo becoming every day stronger, fearing, if he weakened himself in taking it, that the insurgents would all fall on him together, and that his return to Coruña would become difficult, he retreated to St. Jago de Compostello, scarcely able to contain his anger. There he learned that Marshal Soult, far from descending the Minho, had on the contrary gone up its confluent, and proceeded by Puebla de Sanabria to Zamora. The fact was that Soult, impatient to quit Galicia for Old Castle, after having remained until the 11th at Montforte, had set out to cross the mountains that separate those two provinces. La Romana having attempted to oppose his march, he repulsed him, and thought that in so doing he had fulfilled his engagements, which was not at all the case, for by beating the Spanish general on the upper confluent of the Minho, he only drove him toward the lower part of the river, toward Orense, the very place where it had been agreed that he should not be allowed to remain. Believing he had discharged his obligation to his

colleague, he went on to Zamora without replying to Ney's letter. The latter considering this silence, the march to Zamora, and the injunction of secrecy laid on General Rouyer, as proofs of bad faith toward himself, gave way to the most violent anger. He was in a most difficult position, for no sooner had Marshal Soult re-entered Castille than La Romana returned to Orense, and as he might join Noruña, it became very dangerous for Marshal Ney to remain before Vigo. His communications with Leon and Old Castille having been frequently interrupted while he was occupied on the coast, Ney might expect that the case would be much worse, now that the insurgents, excited by the approach of the English, and the retreat of Marshal Soult, would overrun the whole country, and probably go up from Orense to Lugo in great strength, and occupy that decisive position which completely bars the way from Coruña to Benavente. If, when there were only some scattered insurgents, it had required Maurice Mathieu's whole division, co-operating with General Kellermann, to reopen the communications with Leon and Old Castille, what would happen when Noruña and La Romana together were established in strength at Lugo? Another danger might arise, one that might lead to another Baylen. The English on arriving at the Minho had two courses open to them: they might recommence Sir John Moore's campaign and enter Old Castille, or they might return to the south of Portugal to the Tagus. If they entered Castille, Marshal Ney, with 10,000 or 12,000 French against 20,000 English and 40,000 or 50,000 Spaniards, was lost. Now, the idea of capitulating, like General Dupont, or of saving himself by the sacrifice of his artillery, like Marshal Soult, was equally insupportable to him, and he resolved to evacuate Galicia. This was a very serious step, and would have momentous consequences; but there were good reasons for it, and moreover it accorded with instructions frequently repeated to him; for Joseph and Napoleon had written to him, blaming him for his haste in descending to the coast when his rear was not sufficiently secure, and telling him that before he devoted himself exclusively to the subjection of the seaboard, he ought to make sure of his communications with Old Castille. When Marshal Soult was in Portugal, it was a comrade's duty to guard Orense and Tuy; but now that Soult had evacuated Portugal, there was no longer any reason for remaining in Galicia, exposed to all sorts of danger, especially to that of being surrounded by the English and the Spaniards together.

Ney's only regret on evacuating Galicia was on account of Coruña and Ferrol. But the Spaniards were too jealous of their maritime establishments to give them up to the English; and moreover, for the more security, he left a French garrison well provisioned in the forts of Ferrol. Then sending his whole *matériel* on before him, not leaving behind one sick or wounded man, he returned slowly to Lugo, cutting off to the last man all the insurgent posts that ventured to approach him. At Lugo he picked up Marshal Soult's invalids, and took them with his own to Astorga, where he arrived in the beginning of July, without having lost one man or one cannon. Then he applied himself to reorganizing and refitting his corps. At

the moment he reached Astorga, Marshal Soult was entering Zamora.

Marshal Ney's soldiers participated in the indignation of their commander to such a degree, that the aides-de-camp of the minister of war who were sent to the spot, reported that there would be danger in leaving the two corps near each other. The most insulting language was current in Astorga about Marshal Soult and his army, who were accused of all the misfortunes of the campaign; for on departing, said they, he had passed on to Orense without destroying La Romana, whom he had thus thrown on the rear of Marshal Ney; and when he came back, while a hand was lent him to destroy La Romana if he would, he retired clandestinely into Castille, leaving Marshal Ney in Galicia exposed to every danger. Ney wrote both to King Joseph and to Marshal Soult letters most damnnatory to the latter. "Had I chosen," he said, "to make up my mind to quit Galicia without my artillery, I might have remained there longer at the risk of being shut in there; but I did not choose to expose myself to quit it in that fashion, and I effected my retreat, carrying off my sick and wounded, and even those of Marshal Soult who had been left to my care." As for that marshal, he declared, that whatever might be the Emperor's orders, he was resolved never again to serve with him.

These painful details are indispensable to a right conception of the manner in which the war in Spain was conducted, and to show how Napoleon, by extending his operations beyond the limits to which his own superintendence would reach, surrendered them to the hazard of events and of men's passions, and exposed to useless destruction heroic soldiers, who would ere long be missed for the defence of our unfortunate country. While Marshal Ney was at Astorga, expressing the anger he felt with all the vehemence of his nature—an example that was but too well followed by his soldiers—Marshal Soult, at a short distance thence, at Zamora, appeared devoured with grief, deeply cast down, and constantly immersed in thought. It was thus, at least, that the officers commissioned to report to the minister of war depicted the state of mind of the two marshals.

King Joseph, who always learned news late, and did not know of the evacuation of Portugal and of Galicia, and the quarrel between the two marshals until a month after the event, was deeply grieved, for he could easily foresee the consequences of that threefold misfortune. He at once gave up all thoughts of pushing Marshal Victor forward into Andalusia, and detained him on the Tagus between Almaraz and Alcantara, to act against Gregorio de la Cuesta, if the latter attempted to recross the Tagus, or against the English, should they be inclined to go up from Lisbon to Estremadura. The brilliant dreams of the month of April, inspired by the victories of Medellín and Ciudad Real, had vanished; the most that could be hoped for now was a victorious resistance to the assaults of the enemy. The news of the battle of Esling, which arrived just then, was not of a nature to enliven the sombre state of feeling at Madrid. However, as the three corps of Marshals Ney, Mortier, and Soult, could muster more than 50,000 men, after they had rested from their fatigues, they were enough, if well



led, to drive all the English in the Peninsula into the sea. But to this end it was necessary that they should be well led, above all by a single hand; and, under existing circumstances, this was not to be expected.

Such was the state of things when there arrived most unexpectedly from Schönbrunn a despatch issued by Napoleon himself, which afforded another illustration of the consequences of directing military operations from such a distance. While the last intelligence in Spain comprised the evacuation of Portugal and Galicia, at Schönbrunn Napoleon knew nothing subsequent to Soult's entry into Portugal, and Ney's descent to the coast of Galicia. Napoleon, a better judge than Joseph, had, like him, disapproved of what was passing, and the best remedy he knew was to combine the three corps of Marshals Soult, Ney, and Mortier under one command. Accordingly, he wrote the following despatch to the minister of war:—"You will send a staff-officer to Spain with orders that the corps of the Duke d'Elchingen, the Duke de Treviso, and the Duke de Dalmatie shall form but one army under the command of the Duke de Dalmatie. These three corps are to manoeuvre only together, march against the English, pursue them without remission, beat them, and sweep them into the sea. Putting aside every consideration, I give the command to the Duke de Dalmatie as senior to the others. These three corps ought to amount to from 55,000 to 60,000 men, and if their junction takes place promptly, the English will be destroyed and the affairs of Spain terminated. But they must combine, and not march in small parcels; this is a general principle for every country, but especially for a country in which communications cannot be had. I cannot nominate the place of junction, because I do not know the events that have happened. Send this order to the king, to the Duke de Dalmatie, and to the two other marshals by four different ways." When this despatch arrived in Spain at the end of June, it caused extreme surprise; not because the junction of the three corps under one commander was disapproved of, but because it seemed impossible that Marshals Ney, Mortier, and Soult should serve together, and, above all, that the two former should serve under the latter. Had Napoleon been on the spot, he would certainly have made a different arrangement. He would—as Joseph suggested to him with much good sense—have left Soult to guard the north of Spain, and sent Mortier and Ney to the Tagus to reinforce Marshal Victor, who was about to require considerable aid against the combined forces of Spain and England. And if Marshal Ney, whose high standing and impetuous character unfitted him for serving under any other leader than the Emperor himself, could not have been employed under Marshal Victor, he would have placed him in La Mancha, to act against the Spanish army of the centre, and he would have put General Sebastiani and Marshal Mortier under Marshal Victor, to fight the English. Marshal Mortier's modesty allowed of his being employed anywhere, no matter in what post, provided there were services he could render. The three corps of Mortier, Sebastiani, and Victor would, beyond a doubt, have been enough to beat the English. But Napo-

leon was far off, and Joseph durst not give orders for fear of not being obeyed. Thanks, however, to a certain military good sense with which he was endowed, and to the advice of his chief of the staff, Marshal Jourdan, he conceived the happy idea of relieving Ney from the false position in which he was placed, and calling him to Madrid to take command of General Sebastiani's corps, which was operating in the province of La Mancha. Ney, however, chose to remain at Benavente, for he could not bring himself to quit his soldiers, whom he loved, and who loved him; and such was his deportment there towards Soult, that it was much to be doubted whether he would render obedience to that marshal when he came to be under his orders.

Ney, however, knew his duty too well to refuse to obey Soult until such time as Napoleon should be better informed; and some satisfactory results might still be expected from the combination of the three corps. But whereas their separation had damaged the first part of the campaign of 1809, their junction, effected at a fatal moment, was destined to spoil the second part, so that torrents of blood should have flowed uselessly in Spain from February to August. Sad proof of this will be found in the sequel.

The following was the situation of the belligerent forces in consequence of the late events. The evacuation of Galicia by Soult and Ney had left the whole north of Spain to the insurgents, excepting the Asturias, where the brave General Bonnet, with a few thousand men, was making head against the mountaineers of that province. All Galicia, the Portuguese provinces of Trax-os-Montes, Entre Douro e Minho, the verge of Old Castille, as far as Ciudad Rodrigo, and part of Estremadura, from Ciudad Rodrigo to Alcantara, were in the hands of the Spaniards, the Portuguese, and the English, without counting the south of the Peninsula, which belonged to them exclusively. The Spaniards were making great efforts to arm the fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo.

The detachment of Portuguese sent against Abrantes by Sir Arthur Wellesley, had marched to Alcantara, been repulsed thence by Marshal Victor, and re-entered it again, the marshal not having chosen to leave a garrison there, for fear of weakening himself. Victor having fallen back on the Tagus on receiving intelligence of Soult's discomfiture, and the arrival of a strong English army in Portugal, the Spanish General Gregorio de la Cuesta had moved back from the Guadiana to the Tagus, to the pass of Mirabete, opposite Almaraz. In La Mancha, General Venegas, who had succeeded Cartojal in the command of the army of the centre, had advanced against Sebastiani's corps, and seemed disposed to attack it. King Joseph had then quitted Madrid with his guard and a portion of the Dessoles division to attack Venegas; but the latter immediately retreated to the Sierra Morena, after which Joseph returned to the capital, leaving Sebastiani's corps between Cordoba and Madridejos, and Victor's corps on the Tagus, from Toledo to Talavera. These troops had not been engaged since the battles of Medellin and Ciudad Real, they had done nothing in April, May, and June, but performed some marches from the Guadiana to the Tagus, and

they were well rested, well fed, and in superb condition. As for the provinces of Aragon and Catalonia, which we have not had occasion to mention since the siege of Saragossa and the battles of Cardedeu and Molins del Rey, General Suchet was fighting in the former against the insurgents of the Ebro, whom the siege of Saragossa had not discouraged; and in the latter, General St. Cyr had begun the sieges he had orders to effect, and was obliged to fight fresh battles every day to cover them.

Such was the spectacle which the war in Spain then exhibited. Every thing was to depend on what the English would do. Would Sir Arthur Wellesley march into Old Castille, as General Moore had done, to threaten the line of communication of the French, and oblige them to evacuate the south of the Peninsula, in order to succour the north? Or would he, after having cleared Portugal and driven Marshal Soult beyond the Minho, move to the Tagus, to stop the enterprises which were to be apprehended on Marshal Victor's part since the battle of Medellin? Such was the question which could hardly be solved in Madrid, the English general's instructions not being known, though Marshal Victor at Talavera, and Marshal Jourdan at Madrid, rightly surmised, from certain indications, that Sir Arthur Wellesley would return to the Tagus. They supposed, with good reason, that he would not march into Galicia, and thereby inordinately elongate his line of operation, and open the road to Lisbon by Alcantara to the French, but prefer marching on the Tagus, and advancing thence, with all the forces of Spain, against Madrid. Under such considerations, Joseph did not think proper to accumulate forces in Old Castille, which were useless in that province; and acting on his own royal authority, until Soult should be in a condition to take the general command of the three corps, he moved Mortier from Valladolid to Villacastra, on the summit of the Guadarrama, so that he might be upon the Tagus in one or two marches, either at Toledo or at Talavera.

\* I quote the Duke of Wellington's own words in their original language. This is the only way to tell the truth without offending a noble nation, which has often accused us of having devastated Spain, and which will permit us to remark that we were not the only ravagers of that country:

"To the Right Honourable J. Villiers.

"Colimbra, 31st May, 1809.

"MY DEAR VILLIERS,—I have long been of opinion that a British army could bear neither success nor failure, and I have had manifest proofs of the truth of this opinion in the first of its branches in the recent conduct of the soldiers of this army. They have plundered the country most terribly, which has given me the greatest concern.

"They have plundered the people of bullocks, among other property; for what reason I am sure I do not know, except it be, as I understand is their practice, to sell them to the people again. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will mention this practice to the minister of the Regency, and beg them to issue a proclamation, forbidding the people, in the most positive terms, to purchase any thing from the soldiers of the British army.

"We are terribly distressed for money. I am convinced that 300,000*l.* would not pay our debts, and two months' pay is due to the army. I suspect the ministers in England are very indifferent to our operations in this country.

"Believe me, &c.,

"ARTHUR WELLESLEY."

"To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

"Colimbra, 31st May, 1809.

"MY DEAR LORD,—The army behave terribly ill. They are a rabble who cannot bear success any more than Sir John Moore's army could bear failure. I am endeavouring to tame them; but if I should not succeed, I must make an

These measures adopted at head-quarters were happily adjusted to the intentions of the English general. His instructions, dictated under the impression made by Sir John Moore's disasters, imported that he was not to venture into Spain. He was to attach himself exclusively to the defence of Portugal, and limit to that defence the aid promised to the Spaniards. He was to abstain as much as possible from crossing the Portuguese frontier, and to take such a step only in case of urgent necessity, or upon the surest prospect of success. So rigid were his instructions in this respect that he had been obliged to procure a modification of them, in order to be less crippled in his movements. For this reason he had halted on the banks of the Minho, and, learning that the French were assuming a very menacing aspect about Alcantara, he had moved by forced marches from the Minho to the Douro, and from the Douro to the Tagus, setting off against the earnest remonstrances of La Romana, who wanted him at Orense, those of Gregorio de la Cuesta, who summoned him to Merida. By the middle of June he was at Abrantes, preparing to recross the valley of the Tagus, when he should have revictualled and recruited his army, which had great need of this, after its recent campaign on the Douro. He complained loudly of wanting money, *matériel*, and clothes; for, notwithstanding its wealth and its immense means of transport, the English government did sometimes make its soldiers wait for necessities. Sir Arthur complained especially of his army, which he accused in very strong terms of being no more able to support good fortune than bad, and of shamefully pillaging the country it had come to defend. It pillaged, he said, not for want of subsistence, but to make money by selling to the inhabitants the cattle of which it had robbed them.\* He remained at Abrantes awaiting two regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, and Crawford's whole brigade from Gibraltar. With these reinforcements, which would make his force amount to from 26,000 to 28,000 men present under arms, he intended

official complaint of them, and send one or two corps home in disgrace. They plunder in all directions. . . .

"Believe me, &c.,

"ARTHUR WELLESLEY."

"To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

"Abrantes, 17th June, 1809.

"MY DEAR LORD,—I cannot with propriety omit to draw your attention again to the state of discipline of the army, which is a subject of serious concern to me, and well deserves the consideration of his majesty's ministers.

"It is impossible to describe to you the irregularities and outrages committed by the troops. They are never out of the sight of their officers—I may almost say never out of sight of the commanding officers of their regiments—and the general officers of the army, that outrages are not committed; and notwithstanding the pains which I take, of which there will be ample evidence in my orderly books, not a post or a courier comes in, not an officer arrives from the rear of the army, that does not bring me accounts of outrages committed by the soldiers who have been left behind on the march, having been sick, or having straggled from their regiments, or who have been left in hospitals.

"We have a provost-marshal, and no less than four assistants. I never allow a man to march with the baggage; I never leave an hospital without a number of officers and non-commanding officers proportionable to the number of soldiers; and never allow a detachment to march unless under the command of an officer: and yet there is not an outrage of any description which has not been committed on a people who have uniformly received us as friends, by soldiers who never yet for one moment suffered the slightest want or the smallest privation. . . .

"Believe me, &c.,

"ARTHUR WELLESLEY."

to go up the Tagus to Alcantara, where he expected to arrive in the beginning of June, and form a junction with Gregorio de la Cuesta, while General Beresford, who was engaged in organizing the Portuguese army, would guard the north of Portugal with the new levies and the English detachment under his orders.

The concentration of the French forces in the middle of the valley of the Tagus, on the suspicion of the approach of the English in that direction, was, therefore, a very wise resolution of those at head-quarters in Madrid. Unfortunately, the combination of the three corps under Marshal Soult was about to become a fatal obstacle to that measure; and while there had been reason to regret that they had not been combined three months before, the time was at hand when it would be bitterly regretted that they were combined at the present moment. Though the supreme command had been bestowed on Marshal Soult before the events at Oporto were known, and although he had still to fear the effect which the information sent to Schönbrunn might produce on the mind of Napoleon, he was yet very well pleased at having his rivals under his orders; and, elated with pride at the part assigned him, he devised a vast plan, ill adapted to existing circumstances, which he communicated to King Joseph, begging him to give orders for its immediate execution. As this plan was not carried into effect, it would not deserve mention here, had it not been the cause of subsequently hindering the junction of the French forces on the field of battle on which the issue of the campaign was decided. The plan was briefly this:

Marshal Soult supposed that the English, fatigued by their expedition to the Douro and the Minho, would halt and remain inactive until the completion of the harvest should enable the Spaniards and Portuguese to join them, so that they might resume military operations in September. There was, therefore, time enough, as he thought, to prepare for that event; and as he was more specially commissioned, by the union of the three *corps d'armée* of the north under his command, to expel the English from the Peninsula, he intended to operate by the line from Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida on Coimbra, which was, in his opinion, the true route for penetrating into Portugal. To this end it was requisite forthwith to begin the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, then that of Almeida, and to employ in operations against those two places the interval of leisure on which he had reason to count. He undertook to make himself master of them with the 50,000 or 60,000 men who were about to be under his orders, and, after they had fallen, he proposed to enter Portugal. But in order to be able to operate surely, three new concentrations of forces, he said, were necessary—one formed with the troops of Aragon and Catalonia, (where we know that generals Suchet and St. Cyr maintained their ground with difficulty,) in order to furnish him with a corps of observation in the north; another formed with a part of the troops assembled in the valley of the Tagus, (where they were quite indispensable,) to cover his flank toward Alcantara; the third, formed with the reserve at Madrid, (where there remained but a very weak garrison when Joseph quitted the capital,) to serve him as a rear-guard when he should have advanced into the heart of Por-

tugal. Soult, moreover, required a park of siege artillery, and a considerable sum of money to prepare his *matériel*. So then, in order to take a place which might, some time or other, be of use in the operations against Portugal, and to make head against the English in September, in a province where there was no certainty of meeting them, we were forthwith to abandon to them the Tagus, on which they were marching, and leave Madrid, Aragon, and Catalonia without troops. King Joseph and Marshal Jourdan, regarding such a plan as inadmissible, replied that not a man could be withdrawn, either from Aragon or Catalonia, without immediately losing those provinces; that the forces remaining in Madrid were barely sufficient to reinforce the corps of General Sebastiani and Marshal Victor from time to time; that the presence of those two corps on the Tagus sufficiently protected Marshal Soult's flank toward Alcantara; that, moreover, the English, instead of postponing their operations until September, would march without delay to the Tagus, and there it was the marshal should think of acting, not on the line of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida; that money there was none; the king was living on his plate, which had been melted down at the mint; and lastly, since the marshal wished to begin with the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, the *état major* would do its best to procure him a park of heavy artillery.

The most vexatious part of these projects was the order given to Marshal Mortier to quit Villacastin for Salamanca. Joseph remonstrated against this order, rightly thinking that by a move to Salamanca, Mortier would be drawn into the sphere of action of an army which, according to its leader's plan, was to remain useless for a long while; whereas, at Villacastin, he might render decisive services on the Tagus, while waiting until Soult's forces were ready to act. But Soult insisted, and Mortier was removed from the place where his presence might have been of immense advantage, as we shall soon see.

Contrary, in fact, to Soult's surmise, it was not in September that the English and Spaniards were to reappear on the theatre of war, but immediately, in the beginning of July, as soon as the resources of all kinds which they expected should have arrived. Sir Arthur Wellesley, as was to be anticipated, was at issue with the Spaniards as to the manner of operating on the Tagus. Gregorio de la Cuesta, always haunted by the fear of finding himself alone in presence of the French, insisted that the English army should come and join him on the Guadiana, and thus make a very long *détour*, which would oblige it to descend as far as Badajoz in order to go up thence to Merida. Sir Arthur Wellesley, believing that Marshal Victor was still between the Tagus and the Guadiana, wished to follow the better and much more natural plan of going up the valley of the Tagus, by Abrantes, Castello Branco, and Alcantara, so as to turn the marshal's position, by occupying that valley in his rear, and arrive, perhaps, at Madrid before him. For the success of this plan, it was enough that Gregorio de la Cuesta should detain Marshal Victor on the Guadiana by some feint, and should not be afraid of exposing himself alone for some days to the encounter of the French. But the return of Mar-

shal Victor from the Guadiana to the Tagus cut short all these disputes. It was agreed that the English general, proceeding from Abrantes to Alcantara by the old route which Junot had taken, and the Spanish general, moving from the Guadiana to the Tagus, by Truxillo and Almaraz, should effect their junction on the banks of the Tagus, between Alcantara and Talavera, and should then take measures for turning their junction to the best account.

In consequence of this arrangement, Sir Arthur Wellesley having received the troops he expected from Gibraltar, and the money and *matériel* of which he had urgent need, set out on the 27th of June from Abrantes, and advanced by Castello Branco, Rosmanifal, and Zarza Major, into Estremadura. He was at Zarza Major on the 3d of July, on the 6th at Coria, on the 8th at Plasencia. On arriving at the latter place he wished to concert measures with Gregorio de la Cuesta, and repaired to his head-quarters at Puerto de Mirabete on the Tagus. He had orders to have as little communication as possible with the Spanish generals, on account of their extremely braggart dispositions, and to communicate with the ministers of the Junta only through the English ambassador at Seville; in a word, to abstain, except in cases of imperious necessity, from an intercourse which was always disagreeable and generally led to disunion. His interview with the proud and intractable Gregorio de la Cuesta afforded him proof of the wisdom of the instructions given him by his government. Don Gregorio being just then in favour with the fickle Spanish revolutionists, assumed the airs of a master, and behaved with singular arrogance to the insurrectional Junta, which everybody wished to see give place to the Cortes. He even declared his intention of anticipating the public wishes by dismissing the Junta and creating a government of his own fashion. His haughtiness toward his allies was proportional to these pretensions. Many a debate was necessary before a tolerably rational plan could be arranged with such a person. That which presented itself at the first glance, and on which it was impossible not to agree, was that the three generals, Wellesley, La Cuesta, and Venegas, should unite their forces between Almaraz and Talavera, or between Talavera, and Toledo, and march together on Madrid. The forces of Venegas in La Mancha were estimated at 18,000 men, those of Cuesta at 36,000 men, those of Sir Arthur Wellesley at 26,000, setting aside all exaggeration. It was an imposing force, and one which would have been overwhelming for the French if more than two-thirds of it had not consisted of Spanish troops. The junction being agreed on, the manner in which it was to be executed was next to be considered. In accordance with the judicious advice of Sir Arthur Wellesley, it was agreed that towards the 20th or 22d of July, Venegas should make a strong demonstration against Madrid, by attempting to cross the Tagus in the neighbourhood of Aranjuez; that while the French were thus drawn to the upper course of the Tagus, the English army should seize the opportunity to join the principal Spanish army, that of Gregorio de la Cuesta; and that the two armies should march up both banks of the Tagus and join Venegas in the environs of Toledo. Great difficulties arose on one point. The cap-

ture of the brave General Franceschi by the famous guerilla leader El Capuchino, who horribly maltreated his prisoner, had furnished the English general with certain proof of the arrival of Marshal Soult at Zamora. But Sir Arthur believed that Soult had occupation for a long time in repairing his damage, and was not aware of the general command conferred upon him. He thought, therefore, that by guarding the two passes from Old Castile into Estremadura, those namely of Perales and Baños, full security would be obtained against any danger from that quarter. He undertook to have the pass of Perales, which was the nearest of the two to Portugal, kept by detachments of Beresford's force; but that of Baños, which lay nearest to La Cuesta, ought, he thought, to be kept by Spanish troops. He had an excellent motive for acting thus, namely, to avoid dispersing the English troops, which could alone be depended upon when the day of battle came, and to employ in accessory services the Spaniards whose numbers mattered little in a decisive engagement, where they were rather an encumbrance than otherwise. After much contention, it was settled that General Wilson should be sent with a few thousand Spaniards, a few thousand Portuguese, and a thousand English, along the mountains which separate Estremadura from Castile, to cover the flank of the combined armies. Next there was a dispute respecting the victuals and transports, which the Spaniards had promised to furnish to the English for payment, and which they did not supply even when the money was tendered. Things had reached such a pass that Sir Arthur Wellesley, seeing the Spaniards well provided and his own soldiers condemned to all sorts of privations, threatened to withdraw if his wants were not more regularly supplied. To this the Spaniards replied that the English never had enough, they could do nothing but grumble, and where they complained of starvation, they, the Spaniards, would consider themselves living in plenty. The contradiction was easily accounted for by the difference in the habits and way of living of the two nations.

Having concluded these arrangements in the best way he could, Sir Arthur Wellesley returned to Plasencia on the 13th of July. After allowing time for some detachments, which were still behind, to arrive, he marched to the Tietar, which he crossed without difficulty on the 18th of July. Advancing to Oropesa, he joined Gregorio de la Cuesta by the Almaraz and Arzobispo bridges, and drove back the rear-guards of Victor's corps on Talavera, which he entered on the 22d. Sir Arthur was for attacking the French at once, knowing that they were not concentrated, and expecting that with the combined army, which was more than 60,000 strong, (26,000 English and 36,000 Spaniards,) he should beat the 22,000 French under Marshal Victor. But Gregorio de la Cuesta declared that he was not ready, and Victor's corps was allowed to retire unmolested behind the Alberche, a small stream which descends from the mountains and falls into the Tagus a little beyond Talavera.

It was at this moment that the French at last had accurate intelligence of the march of the collected generals and the junction of the English and Spanish armies. They had been aware

for a fortnight of Sir Arthur Wellesley's movement toward Abrantes and Alcantara, but they were still in doubt as to his ulterior direction, his intended junction with the Spaniards, and his plan for the campaign. That plan was now evident, and on the 20th and 21st of July Marshal Victor made it known at Madrid. Not knowing whether or not he should be supported, he had recrossed the Alberche, and was resolved to retreat farther still to the Guadarrama, another small confluent of the Tagus, which issues from the hills of the same name.

By the advice of Marshal Jourdan, King Joseph immediately decided on moving forward all his forces to meet the combined army. He certainly could not have done better. He had at his disposal the 4th corps, General Sebastiani's, which still mustered 17,000 or 18,000 excellent soldiers, after detaching 3,000 to guard Toledo. He had that of Marshal Victor, which, after all deductions, numbered 22,000 quite as good. He could take from Madrid a brigade of the Dessoles division, his guard, and a small body of light cavalry, forming a reserve of 5,000 men and fourteen pieces of cannon—altogether 45,000 first-rate troops. In the hands of an able general, such a force would have been more than sufficient to beat the combined army, which amounted to from 66,000 to 68,000 men, including General Wilson's detachment in the mountains, but of which only 26,000 were real soldiers. Nor would there even have been any doubt as to the result, whoever was the general commanding our troops, if Marshal Mortier had remained at Villacastra, so as to be able to reach Toledo in two days' marches. A reinforcement of 18,000 or 20,000 veteran soldiers would have given the French army such a superiority as the Anglo-Spanish army could not have withstood. This precious advantage had unfortunately been sacrificed to the idea of fusing together the three corps of the north; an idea conceived by Napoleon at the distance of six hundred leagues from the theatre of war, and three months previously to the events which were to be accomplished. Nevertheless, it was still possible to repair the disadvantages of this unseasonable junction, by ordering Marshal Soult to march from Salamanca to Avila, in order to descend between Madrid and Talavera; and if it was not possible to combine his three corps, immediately to push forward that one of the three which was ready first, leaving the others to follow in succession. If only that of Marshal Mortier arrived—and it had long been ready—it would have sufficed to secure King Joseph a decided superiority. Joseph and Marshal Jourdan did not conceive this idea, but being of opinion that to bring Marshal Soult's forces to Madrid would occasion a considerable loss of time, and that by making him debouch directly from Salamanca on Plasencia, he might on the 80th or 31st of July come upon the rear of the English, they preferred giving him this latter order rather than have him debouch by Avila, between Talavera and Madrid. This course lay under the disadvantage of presenting our forces to the enemy in two masses; the one descending the valley of the Tagus from Toledo to Talavera, the other ascending it from Almaraz to Talavera, and of affording Sir Arthur Wellesley, who would be placed between them, an opportunity of beating them one after the other,

as General Bonaparte had so often done round Verona. But Sir Arthur Wellesley, though an excellent commander, was not General Bonaparte, and his soldiers did not march as did the French soldiers. He had but 26,000 Englishmen under him, and with these could not beat in succession Joseph's 45,000 and Soult's 50,000. If the latter, receiving on the 24th the order despatched on the 22d, marched on the 26th, which was possible, he might be at Plasencia on the 30th, and the English army, attacked in front and rear, must have been defeated. If Soult could not bring up Ney's corps from its position near Benavente, his own corps, which should then be about 20,000 strong, with Mortier's 18,000, would be enough to give the *coup de grace* to Sir Arthur Wellesley, who had but 26,000 men, who by that time would probably have been already beaten, or at least separated from the Spaniards, and forced to retreat. King Joseph sent General Foy to Marshal Soult with the instructions we have mentioned, and with most pressing entreaties to put himself *en route* forthwith. On his return from Soult's camp, General Foy repeatedly averred that the marshal could be where he was wanted at the appointed time. Joseph then ordered General Sebastiani to march by Toledo to Talavera to the aid of Marshal Victor; and he himself set out for the same rallying point, on the night of the 22d, with his reserve of 5,000 men. He left General Belliard in Madrid with Dessoles's second brigade, and a number of invalids and convalescents, who could all, in case of emergency, throw themselves into the Retiro, and defend themselves there for several weeks. A regiment of dragoons was to sweep the banks of the Tagus above and below Aranjuez, to give notice of the first appearance of Venegas. The 3,000 men detached from Soult's corps were to guard Toledo, so that from the sources of the Tagus to Talavera the necessary measures were taken on the left of the French to check the march of Venegas, while a stand was made against Gregorio de la Cuesta and Sir Arthur Wellesley. These arrangements, which marked the advice of an experienced soldier, (Marshal Jourdan,) and did honour to the judgment of King Joseph, who had adopted them, promised, if well executed, to bring about the total destruction of the English, who, upon the least favourable supposition, would be assailed by 45,000 men in front, and 88,000 in their rear. What could 66,000 men, but one-third of whom were real soldiers, do against such a mass of forces?

Joseph marched out of Madrid to Illescas on the night of the 22d July, and arrived on the 25th at Vargas, a little behind the small stream of the Guadarrama, on which Marshal Victor had fallen back in order to effect his junction with General Sebastiani. That same day the three corps (Victor's 22,542, Sebastiani's 17,690, Joseph's 5077) were in conjunction at Vargas, a little beyond Toledo. Had they relied less on the prompt arrival of Marshal Soult, it would have been more prudent not to advance too far, but keep within reach of Madrid, to cover it from any attempt on the part of Venegas, and at the same time, to choose a good defensive position, so as to lead the English into that kind of warfare they least understood—offensive war. This course would have given Soult time to prepare and to appear on the theatre of war

But trusting too easily to his speedy arrival at Plasencia, and not taking sufficiently into account the unexpected delays which often baffle the best calculations in war, the French leaders did not hesitate to urge the Anglo-Spanish armies away from Madrid by marching straight against them, and pushing them upon Oropesa and Plasencia, where their destruction was expected. It was resolved, therefore, to advance on the following day, and vigorously resume the offensive. The news from Marshal Soult was excellent. Undeceived at last as to the time when the English were to enter into action, and abandoning his first plans, he wrote word on the 24th that Mortier's corps and his own could quit Salamanca on the 26th; so that even leaving Ney's corps behind, there would be a sufficient force in the rear of the English on the 30th or 31st.

Don Gregorio de la Cuesta, who on the 28d was not ready to attack Marshal Victor, whose force was then isolated, became full of spirit on seeing the French retreat, crossed the Alberche after them, hotly pursued them, and wrote to his ally, Wellesley, that there was no overtaking those despicable French, so fast did they run. Having marched on the 24th and 25th to Alcabon and Cebolla, he found them on the 26th at Torrijos, resolved to let him have his wish and come up with them. He had been warned by Sir Arthur Wellesley, that if he marched in that way he would get himself beaten. The event showed the good sense of the English general.

Merlin's light cavalry, belonging to General Sebastiani's corps, marched with Latour-Maubourg's dragoons in the advanced guard. Don Gregorio de la Cuesta, who so much regretted the headlong flight of the French, stopped short on seeing them prepared to resist, and hastily retreated to seek support from the English. Between Torrijos and Alcabon he had to pass a defile, and to cover himself during the passage, he presented 4,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry under General Zayas in order of battle. General Latour-Maubourg, who commanded the advanced guard, after having debouched in a field of olives, deployed his squadrons in a line parallel to the enemy. The Spaniards kept their ground at first when they saw only cavalry before them; but as soon as they perceived the head of the column of infantry, they began to fall back in all haste, and threw themselves into Alcabon. General Beaumont then dashed after them with the 2d hussars and a squadron of the 5th chasseurs. General Zayas tried to oppose him with Villaviciosa's dragoons; but our hussars and chasseurs charged them in every direction, hemmed them in, and put them to the sword. Very few of them escaped. Our cavalry then charged the advanced guard, which fled in disorder with the main body. If the 1st corps (Marshal Victor's) had then been in a condition to act, the whole Spanish army would have been routed. But the troops were fatigued with the heat, the ground was very broken, and Marshal Victor did not choose to risk a fresh action, though strongly pressed to do so by Joseph's staff.

The French halted for the night at Santa Olalla. On the following day, the 27th, they set out at two in the morning to take advantage of the cool hour, and marched toward the Al-

berche in order to arrive the same day at Talavera, with the intention of driving the Anglo-Spanish army on Plasencia. The 1st corps, preceded by Latour-Maubourg's cavalry, still formed the head of the column. On approaching the Alberche, they saw on the left the Spaniards passing that confluent of the Tagus in disorder in their retreat to Talavera, and on the right a column of English, who had come to Cazalegas to aid Don Gregorio de la Cuesta. From the summit of a plateau which commands the course of the Alberche, they perceived on the other bank a vast wood of oaks and olives, and further on a series of prominent hills, very strongly occupied, connected on one side with a high chain of mountains, on the other with Talavera and the Tagus, which flows through that town. The greatest part of the English army was in position on the series of hills, having before them a large quantity of artillery, fascines, and solid redoubts. The dust that rose above the forest of oaks and olives, showed that the Spanish troops we had beaten the day before were retreating through it, and we might hope to come up with them before they had reached the intrenched position of the English. Marshal Victor, who had great confidence in his old soldiers, and who thought he might take much upon himself in consideration of his high rank, hastily forded the Alberche with his three divisions. He advanced with the Ruffin division on his right, Villatte's in the centre, Lapisse's on the left, and flanked by Latour-Maubourg, and he sent word to King Joseph to support him with Sebastiani's corps and the reserve. Being well acquainted with the ground, which he had often gone over, he flattered himself, that if circumstances proved favourable, and he was well seconded, he should be able to carry the position by a mere *coup de main*.

The troops crossed the Alberche in close column, with the water up to their middles, and dashed into the forest. Lapisse's division on Marshal Victor's left became engaged near Casa de las Gallinas, with Mackenzie's brigade, which formed the English rear-guard. The 16th light infantry pressed close upon the English, and attacked them wherever the ground permitted it. On coming to a glade that allowed of the deployment of the troops, General Chaudron Rousseau ordered a charge with the bayonet. The brave soldiers of the 16th, eager to prove that they no more feared a solid and regular army than the unwelcome troops of the Spaniards, rushed upon the two English regiments opposed to them, (the 31st and the 87th,) broke them, and caused them a considerable loss. The English retreated hurriedly upon their main body, which was in position, as we have said, near Talavera, between the Tagus and the mountains. Marshal Victor wished to follow them, but he had to wait for the Villatte division, which had not quite crossed the Alberche, and the cavalry and artillery, which were still on the other side; especially it was necessary that Sebastiani's corps, which was still in the rear, should have come up. If, instead of a king personally brave, but without experience, and obliged to consult an old marshal, the army had been led by a real general, who personally inspected the ground at the head of his advanced guard, and formed his resolutions in good time, we should have had

tened to cross the *Alberche en masse*; and by taking advantage of the check dealt to the English, and the confusion in which the Spaniards were retreating, we might perhaps have carried the enemy's position. But every one took his own course, or waited for the word of command, which did not come until the occasion was gone by.

It must be owned that it was rather late to crown the day by so decisive an act, for Marshal Victor himself did not arrive in front of the English position until toward the close of the day. On emerging from the forest beyond the *Alberche*, our troops advanced along a sort of plateau, whence they distinctly perceived the position of the English. It was, as we have said, a series of hills, the highest of which was seen on our right, covered with English troops and artillery; and the others on our left, gradually declining toward *Talavera*, were likewise covered with troops and artillery, belonging to the Spanish army. In the centre of this position was a large redoubt, bristling with cannon, and jointly defended by the troops of both nations. Further on our left, clumps of oaks and olive-trees, felled timber and enclosures, extended to *Talavera* and the *Tagus*, and served to support the courage of the Spaniards, which never showed in much lustre, as we have often had occasion to remark, except when it was sustained by the nature of the ground. There might have been in position 25,000 or 26,000 English, thirty and some odd thousand Spaniards, besides Wilson's division, which was distinguished on the mountains on our right, making haste to rejoin the main body: there were then 65,000 or 66,000 enemies, whom we had to fight with 45,000; but the excellence of the latter made amends for their inferiority in number.

Besides that the position of the English and the Spaniards was strong, it accorded with their principal military quality, which consisted in making good use of a defensive post. To reach them it was necessary to cross a rather deep ravine which separated them from the plateau, on which we had debouched on issuing from the forest, and then to ascend a series of steep hills under their fire. It was possible, however, to turn these hills on our right, in consequence of a feature of the ground which we might have used with advantage. The hill which formed the extreme point of the position of the English was divided by a wide valley from the lofty chain of mountains which borders the valley of the *Tagus*. By descending into the ravine above mentioned, marching straight toward the enemy, and ascending again to the right, we might have entered the valley and turned the hill in question, on which Hill's division was encamped. A considerable portion of the French forces should have been brought round in this way unperceived by the English, and then by a vigorous attack in front and rear, their position would very probably have been carried.

Marshal Victor, who had remarked a great confusion in the retreat of the enemy, imagined that by a brisk attack at the close of the day, he should carry the hill on our right, after which the position would no longer be tenable for the English, and he would have the sole honour of gaining the battle. Extreme zeal and brilliant valour dictated this resolution;

but it was one that would not have been taken under a general-in-chief who commanded with authority and vigour. A great battle would not have been begun unknown to him, by a wing, at so advanced an hour of the day, without his having appointed the time and the manner of entering into action; and, above all, without his having decided whether or not a battle was to be fought at all.

Carried away by his courage, and not knowing what troops he had to do with, Marshal Victor launched the Ruffin division against the hill between nine and ten at night. This division, one of the best in the grand army, consisted of three accomplished regiments, the 9th light, and the 24th and 96th of the line. It was led by two officers of great merit—divisional-general Ruffin and brigade-general Barrois. Marshal Victor ordered the 9th to attack the hill in front, the 24th to turn it by the valley, and the 96th to advance to the left, to the direct support of the 9th. The marshal kept the *Villatte* and *Lapisse* divisions in reserve to hold the enemy in check on the left. The artillery on the plateau might have fired over the ravine upon the English, but it was not used for fear of firing upon our own men in the dark.

Our troops advanced bravely. The 9th, which led the way, descended from the plateau into the ravine, and marched straight toward the hill. The English having perceived the movement, opened a murderous fire, though aimed in the dark, upon our men, but did not succeed in checking them. The latter climbed the slopes of the position, drove in the enemy's first line with the bayonet, and still under fire made their way to the summit. Some companies of the 9th reached the top of the hill, and had even beaten back some of the English, when General Hill, seeing that these bold assailants were not supported either on the right or the left, directed a part of his troops against their flank. The 9th, attacked in front and on its left, was compelled to retreat, leaving many of its men dead or wounded on the summit of the plateau. The cause of this discomfiture was the delay of the 96th, which, encountering unexpected obstacles in the ravine, had spent more time in crossing it than had been calculated, and the delay also of the 24th, which had lost its way in the valley on the right. These two regiments arriving on the scene of action, found the 8th retreating, but not routed, and maintaining an unshakable steadiness under the fire of the English. It had lost 300 men in that abortive attempt. Its colonel, Meunier, had received three musket shots. Marshal Victor did not think proper to continue this nocturnal engagement, but thought him of allowing some rest to troops which, having left *Santa Olalla* at two o'clock in the morning, were fighting at *Talavera* at ten o'clock at night. Our men bivouacked where they were, on the plateau facing the English. On the left, the cavalry connected Marshal Victor's troops with those of General Sebastiani and of the reserve, which had at last crossed the *Alberche*, and deployed opposite the enemy's centre. *Milhaud's* dragoons, on the extreme left, watched the high-road to *Talavera*. On that side the Spaniards, whom our cavalry had thrown into extraordinary confusion, were taking up their position as they could. In their bewilderment, they believed

themselves attacked when they heard the musketry of Ruffin's division, and they began to fire without knowing against whom or wherefore. So the next day they alleged that they had had to repulse a violent night attack. What was less pardonable, the English stationed in the same quarter repeated this falsehood.

On the next day, the 28th, a memorable day in our Spanish wars, eager to repair the very accidental discomfiture of the preceding night, Marshal Victor was ready to begin the action at daybreak, confident of succeeding this time, if the attack on the hill was made with suitable *ensemble*. Seeing, as he rode over the ground, the English army posted on the series of hills, the chief of which he had assailed, and the Spanish army behind walls, felled timber, and woods, he was confirmed in his opinion that the hill opposite our right was the key to the position, and if it was taken, the combined army would be driven back on Talavera, and probably into the Tagus. He therefore determined to attack it at once with all his might, and sent word to King Joseph immediately to direct Sebastiani's troops and the reserve against the enemy's centre, that the English might not fall upon him *en masse* while he was occupied against the extremity of their line.

To give the Ruffin division an opportunity of revenging its defeat of the preceding night, he ordered it to attack the hill with its three regiments together. He placed the Villatte division in reserve in the rear, and ordered the Lapisse division and Latour-Maubourg's dragoons to make a feint to the left of attacking the enemy's centre. But something more than a feint was requisite, if they were to be hindered from falling in a mass on Ruffin's division.

At daybreak that brave division put itself in motion with only one change in its order of march. The 9th, which had already been decimated in its first attempt, was to make its attack on the right by the valley; the 24th, which had not fought, was to attack in the centre and in front; the 96th, on the left, as on the preceding night. The three regiments descended into the ravine, and traversed it under the fire of Hill's whole division with a steadiness that excited the admiration of the English army. They mounted the first slopes and arrived on a ground that formed as it were the first stage of the hill, sustaining with incomparable coolness the enemy's grape and bullets. But Sir Arthur Wellesley, placed in the midst of his army, discerned, with the glance of a real general, that the Lapisse division on the left of Ruffin's was not near enough to act, and that the rest of the French army was still less so. With the utmost celerity he then directed a part of his centre, composed of General Sherbrooke's troops, against Ruffin's division. The latter, taken in flank, while it sustained a tremendous fire in front, just as the 9th had been in the night, was compelled to give way. It retreated slowly, leaving the English without the courage to pursue it; but it paid for its daring attack and its fine retreat by an enormous loss. About 500 men of each regiment, making a total of 1500 men for the division, strewed the terraces of that fatal hill, against which two successive attacks, made with rare heroism, had been unsuccessful.

Marshal Victor, who had not spared himself, was forced to own that against such troops a

position was not to be carried by a *coup de main*. Still confident, however, of victory, he postponed the decisive attack until such time as the whole French army should be able to act together. It was ten o'clock in the morning. Joseph, who had galloped up to the first corps to take upon him his functions as commander-in-chief, held a council of war with Marshal Jourdan, Marshal Victor, and General Sebastiani. The first question to be discussed was whether or not they should give battle. Opinions were divided on this essential question. Marshal Jourdan threw the weight of his great experience into the negative scale. He supported his opinions with excellent reasons. According to him, the opportunity had been lost for carrying the enemy's position, which he had just reconnoitred, and of which he now knew the strong and the weak points. The proper course would have been, while the English were as yet ignorant of the real point of attack, to move a considerable part of the French army into the valley, keeping the rest of the line to mask that movement, then suddenly to make a vigorous and well-combined attack on the principal hill before the enemy should have had time to bring up sufficient forces for its defence; and when the hill was carried, to drive back the Anglo-Spanish army on Talavera and the Tagus, where it might have been beaten with great havoc. But it was no longer time to operate thus, because Sir Arthur Wellesley was made aware, by two successive attempts, of the real point of attack, because it was daylight, and so the least movement would be perceived, and the English general would not fail to move up to his left as many troops as we moved to our right. Moreover, in executing this change of front, we should have no other way of retreat in case of failure than the impracticable roads leading to Avila; and the retreat, if it became necessary, could only be effected by sacrificing the artillery and the heavy baggage of the army. In this state of things, the attack in front being a doubtful proceeding, and the attack in flank too late, and moreover perilous for the retreat, it was advisable to temporize, fall back behind the Alberche, take up a defensive position, and wait until Marshal Soult, with his three corps, should have debouched on the rear of the Anglo-Spanish army.

Marshal Victor, eager to indemnify himself for his two fruitless attempts, and confident in the energy of his troops, maintained that it was for want of support toward the centre that his attack had not succeeded; and if Sebastiani's corps and the reserve were directed against the English centre, he undertook with his own corps alone to take the hill, which was the key to the position. Again and again he declared that he ought to give up the trade of war, if, with troops like his, he did not take the enemy's position. Perplexed between Marshal Jourdan's cool prudence and Marshal Victor's impetuosity, Joseph knew not which course to take, when a despatch arrived from Marshal Soult, announcing, that notwithstanding his promise, he could not be in the rear of the English before the 3d of August. Yet Marshal Mortier's corps was at Salamanca on the 26th; Marshal Soult's corps was on the same day half at Salamanca, half at Toro, and there seems no reason why he should not have been on the 29th or 30th at Plasencia with 38,000 or 40,000 men. Be this as it may, it was now the



28th, and Soult was not to be expected before six days. Now, would it be possible during those six days to make head against Sir Arthur Wellesley and Don Gregorio de la Cuesta on one side, and Venegas on the other, the latter already menacing Toledo and Aranjuez? These considerations and Marshal Victor's eagerness to fight prevailed, and it was resolved that the attack should be made forthwith. It was further agreed that this time it should be made simultaneously by our whole line from right to left, so that the enemy, being obliged to defend himself at all points, should not be able to carry reinforcements to any. Marshal Victor was to proceed otherwise than as he had done at night and in the morning. Instead of ascending the hill directly, he was to make the Ruffin division file off into the valley which divided the enemy's position from the mountains, pass along that valley where Wilson's force was beginning to show itself, and not climb the hill until it had completely turned it. During this time, the Villatte division was to have one of its two brigades at the foot of the hill to threaten it and keep the English there, the other in the valley to support Ruffin's division against a mass of cavalry which was seen in the distance. The Lapisse division, forming Victor's left, was with Sebastiani's corps to make a vigorous attack on the centre, so as to draw thither the enemy's greatest forces. When that attack on the centre had produced its effect and Ruffin had gained sufficient ground in the valley on the left of the English, General Villatte was to assail the hill in front with his two brigades. It was reasonable to expect that the attack thus made would be successful. Latour Maubourg's dragoons and Merlin's light cavalry were to follow the Ruffin division in the valley, where, as we have said, there was a good deal of English and Spanish cavalry. Milhaud's dragoons were to act on the extreme left, and occupy the Spaniards in the direction of Talavera. Joseph's reserve was posted in the rear of the centre to afford aid wherever needed. Lastly, Marshal Victor's artillery, ranged on the plateau opposite the English position, was to fire upon it across the ravine.

The small extent of the field of battle allowed of these orders being rapidly conveyed, yet it was not until two in the afternoon they began to be executed, in consequence of the many movements of troops to be effected. Ruffin's division, entering the valley by a lateral opening, marched up it in close column along the flank of the English, while Villatte's two brigades took up a position in the ravine which divided us from the enemy, one of them facing the valley, the other the hill, ready to join Ruffin's division, or to return and assail in front the position so obstinately disputed since the preceding evening. During this time the artillery, under Colonel d'Aboville, threw its fire upon the English across the ravine. Lastly, the Lapisse division made ready to charge the enemy's centre, and Sebastiani's corps was marching upon the redoubt at the point of junction of the two combined armies. But while these movements were taking place in good order, an accident occurred to disturb them. Leval's German division, which had recently been transferred from Marshal Victor's corps to General Sebastiani's, had been placed on the left of the

latter, to flank it with Milhaud's dragoons in case the Spaniards should debouch from Talavera. Being ordered to keep abreast with General Sebastiani, and not clearly discerning his post through the oaks and olives that covered the ground, it found itself suddenly under the fire of the central redoubt, and assailed on the right by the English, on the left by the Spanish cavalry. The Germans formed square, received the cavalry with a fire at point-blank distance, defeated it, and marched forward. In their offensive movement they turned an English regiment that attacked them in flank, surrounded it, and were about to make prisoners of it, when General de Porbeck, who commanded the Baden troops, was shot dead. This accident having left the Badense without a leader, the English had time to retrieve themselves and escape. Joseph's staff seeing the premature action, wished to stop the Germans, lest being engaged too soon they should be missed at a later moment when their services were required on General Sebastiani's flank, and so orders were sent to General Leval to fall back. It would have been better to follow up the attack with vigour, and to use the reserve in case of a sudden appearance of the Spaniards on Sebastiani's flank, than to retreat in the face of the enemy. Be this as it may, the Leval division fell back, but its artillery horses having been killed by the fire of the redoubt, eight pieces which it could not drag back through the wood, were left behind, and fell into the enemy's hands.

After having repaired this accident as well as they could, Generals Sebastiani and Lapisse both advanced. With the 16th light and the 45th of the line both deployed, followed by the 8th and 54th of the line in close columns, Lapisse assailed the heights which flanked the principal hill and connected it with the plain of Talavera. In spite of the fire of the English he gained ground. Sebastiani, with his fine French division of four regiments, advanced on Lapisse's left. The English fell furiously upon him. His right brigade, commanded by General Rey, and composed of the 28th and 32d, repulsed them. The left brigade, commanded by General Belair, was assailed by the Spaniards and the English together, but stood its ground, not less firmly than General Rey's. The 75th and 58th stopped the charges of the Spanish cavalry, while Leval's Germans again advanced in several squares. Here, too, as well as in the direction of Lapisse's division, we were slowly gaining ground. While these events were taking place on the left and the centre, to the right, in face of the famous hill, the artillery continuing to fire across the ravine, produced a murderous effect on Hill's division; General Villatte was still in the ravine, awaiting the signal to attack, and Ruffin's division was advancing in the valley against the English left. At that moment, Albuquerque's Portuguese cavalry, joined with the English cavalry, attempted to bar the way against Ruffin's division, and galloped down upon it. The division, seeing the charge approach, drew aside to let it pass, and the Anglo-Portuguese horse, dashing on at full speed, received the fire both of Ruffin and Villatte. A part wheeled round, but the English 13th dragoons were unable to pull up. General Strolz's brigade of light horse, skilfully manoeuvring, waited till they had passed, then

charged them in flank and rear, while the Polish lancers and the Westphalian light-horse assailed them in front. The unfortunate regiment, surrounded on all sides, was cut down or taken to a man.

Such was the state of things toward our right, when, in the centre, General Lapisse, who led his division in person, and had already climbed the heights occupied by the enemy, was killed by a shot. His death caused some confusion in the division, which, being immediately charged by Sherbrooke's troops, was driven back. Informed of this occurrence, Marshal Victor galloped up to rally the troops, and bring them back into line; but the enemy, following up his success, fell *en masse* on the Lapisse division. At the same moment, General Sebastiani's corps, uncovered by the retrograde movement of the Lapisse division, was briskly attacked on its right. The 28th and 32d behaved with their usual bravery, stood firm under General Rey, and yielded no more ground than was necessary to put them in line again with the troops which had retreated.

This was the moment to act with redoubled energy, to bring up the reserve to the aid of the Lapisse and Sebastiani divisions, and to set on Villatte's two brigades against the hill which Ruffin had succeeded in turning. Every thing, in fact, gave reason to hope for victory. The English, cut up by the grape from our batteries on the plateau, seemed to be wavering; their artillery was dismounted, and their fire nearly extinct. Their usual tenacity must have given way to a vigorous simultaneous movement at that moment. But Joseph, who, while he yielded to Marshal Victor's ardour, had also been much impressed by Marshal Jourdan's reasoning, now seeing the day far advanced, and the victory still doubtful, thought proper to suspend the action, with the intention of renewing it next day. Certainly there was no reason for discouragement, for the battle was on the point of being won. Nevertheless, he countermanded the attack. It was about five o'clock, and at that hour of the day, in the month of June, he had still several hours' daylight before him. Marshal Victor immediately galloped up to him, urged the certainty of success if Ruffin, who had advanced to the necessary extent in the valley, attacked the rear of the English while Villatte assailed them in front; pointed out that the English were visibly wavering, and set forth all the reasons that existed for persevering and pressing upon Sir Arthur Wellesley with a steadfastness equal to his own. Moved by the marshal's arguments, Joseph was about to adopt his advice, when several officers came up with information that some Spanish detachments, going up the banks of the Tagus, seemed to be approaching the Alberche; and other officers, coming in all haste from Toledo, brought the alarming news of the appearance of Venegas before Aranjuez and Madrid. Joseph's irresolute nature could not withstand the effect of these reports; he was afraid of being turned; and being confirmed in his apprehensions by Marshal Jourdan, who disapproved of the battle, he sent orders to Marshal Victor to retreat, and to acquaint General Sebastiani with the exact moment when he would begin his backward movement, in order that the latter might effect his at the same time.

Not daring to disobey this time, Marshal Victor sent word to General Sebastiani that he would begin to retreat at midnight; but he reiterated his entreaties to Joseph to be allowed to continue the battle the next day. Joseph passed part of the night in sore perplexity, surrounded by officers,—some of whom said that we were outflanked,—others, on the contrary, that the English appeared to be motionless in their position, and not in a condition to make a step in advance. While thus distracted between the fear of being turned if he persevered in fighting, and that of being accused to the Emperor of weakness if he ordered a retreat, he suddenly learned that the army was quitting its position, and was thus relieved from the state of irresolution by the events themselves, which he no longer controlled. The fact was, that General Sebastiani, having received the intimation which Marshal Victor had sent him in obedience to orders, had concluded he was to fall back, and had done so accordingly. Thereupon Victor, who would fain have retained his position in order to begin again next day, seeing General Sebastiani retreat, followed his example, and at daybreak on the 29th, the whole army was in motion to recross the Alberche. Thus did chance put an end to the battle which chance had begun. Our army recrossed the Alberche without being pursued, carrying off all its wounded, its baggage, and its artillery, except the eight pieces left by the Laval division in a grove of olives. The English, glad enough to be rid of us, had not the least desire to pursue us. They had had several generals killed or wounded, and 7,000 or 8,000 men put *hors de combat*,—5,000 of whom were from their own ranks, the rest from those of the Spaniards. It was our artillery especially that had committed this havoc among them. Our losses were scarcely less; we had a thousand killed, and about 6,000 wounded. General Lapisse, an officer greatly to be regretted, had been killed. Several other generals and colonels had been killed or wounded. This battle, which was left undecided, would have been won if Marshal Victor had not attacked too soon, and at a single point, both on the eve and in the morning; if, when the action had become general, time had been given to the right to second the left; if our forces had not been withdrawn too soon; if the action had not been ended, as it had been begun, by chance; and lastly, if every thing had not been given up to confusion, for want of concert and decision of purpose. The battle of Talavera is one of the most important in the history of the war in Spain, and one of the most instructive; for it presents a complete picture of what took place in that country, where heroic soldiers lost the fruits of their heroism for want of good leading. Assuredly, King Joseph and Marshal Jourdan, if they had acted solely upon the dictates, the one of his natural good sense, the other of his experience, would have done much better than it was possible for them to do when placed between insubordinate generals, on the one hand, and the too remote authority of Napoleon, on the other,—between a disobedience which disconcerted all their plans, and a will which, at such a distance, paralyzed without guiding them. Talavera presented a complete epitome of this sad state of things.

Joseph, whose return toward Madrid was, above all, prompted by his fear of the dangers that threatened that capital, fell back upon Santa Olalla; by no means, it must be allowed, with the precipitation of a beaten general, for he was not so, but, on the contrary, with the slowness of a formidable enemy who retreats deliberately with a view to ulterior objects. The spirits of his brave soldiers were as undaunted as ever, and they desired nothing better than to be again confronted with the English. But the attitude of the latter showed that there would be no pursuit; and besides, it was expected that they would soon be in a very bad plight in consequence of Soult's arrival on their rear. Nevertheless, Joseph left Victor on the Alberche to watch them, and act as circumstances should require on Soult's arrival. Then, in order to intercept Venegas and cover Madrid, he marched to Toledo and Aranjuez with Sebastiani's corps and the reserve, which were more than sufficient, notwithstanding their losses, to match the army of La Mancha, which General Sebastiani alone had already beaten.

Though Sir Arthur Wellesley was reinforced on the day after the battle of Talavera by the Crawford brigade, amounting to 8000 or 4000 men, he had been so very roughly handled that it was impossible for him to fight another battle. Most of his guns had been dismounted, and his ammunition had been exceedingly diminished. It was absolutely necessary, too, that his soldiers should have time to recover from the effect of the violent efforts they had made. There was no fear, therefore, that he would imitate a manoeuvre of Napoleon's, which he has since been blamed for not having practised; viz. that after his encounter with King Joseph he should go and fall upon Marshal Soult, and thus beat them one after the other. In every age, when certain modes of procedure have been successful, they are erected into standard types, to which all things must conform, and by which the acts of all the men of the time are to be judged. Napoleon subsequently blamed Marshal Jourdan for having brought Marshal Soult to Plasencia, instead of to Madrid by Villacastin, and thus placed Sir Arthur Wellesley between the two French armies, thereby affording the latter a fine opportunity; and Sir Arthur Wellesley's critics have blamed him for letting that opportunity escape him. But in neither instance were these censures well grounded. To bring Marshal Soult to Madrid by Villacastin, and from Madrid to Talavera, would have required eight or ten days more; and such a delay could not have been admitted without peril, so beset were the French by the three armies of Sir Arthur Wellesley, Don Gregorio de la Cuesta, and Venegas. Moreover, in debouching with 50,000 men on Plasencia, Marshal Soult was strong enough not to fear singly encountering the English army. The more natural course certainly would have been to send Marshal Mortier's corps to Talavera by Avila, and afterward let Marshal Soult march by Plasencia, and fall on the rear of the English after they had been beaten. But it was the orders from Schönbrunn that hindered this natural manner of acting by placing Mortier under Soult's orders. Marshal Jourdan, therefore, was not at all in fault. As for Sir Arthur Wellesley, his soldiers

did not march like those of General Bonaparte in Italy; and with the 18,000 English remaining to him after the battle of Talavera, augmented perhaps to the number of 22,000 by the arrival of Crawford's brigade, what could he have done against Marshal Soult's 50,000? Evidently nothing, except to expose himself to be cut to pieces. There are no grounds, therefore, for accusing him on this occasion of having missed the opportunity of a great victory.

Sir Arthur Wellesley had barely had twenty-four hours to recover from the effects of this severe engagement when he was informed by the people of the country that provisions were being collected at both extremities of the pass of Baños, on the road from Castille to Estremadura. The reports spoke only of some 12,000 men, which was not very alarming. Leaving Don Gregorio de la Cuesta in his rear to watch Marshal Victor, he immediately marched to Oropesa, on the road to Plasencia, to meet the French, who were advancing from that direction, and who he conjectured could only be Marshal Soult's corps, already beaten in Portugal.

At last that marshal was arriving, but three or four days after the moment when his presence might have produced immense results. On the 26th he had Marshal Mortier's corps under his hand at Salamanca, and his own at one day's march in the rear. Had he marched on the 26th or 27th, he might in three or four days have debouched on Plasencia, and have been upon the rear of the English on the 30th or 31st. Coming upon them with 38,000 men, while they were exhausted by a great battle, he must have driven them in disorder upon the Tagus, and have made them pay dear for their half victory at Talavera. But not venturing to advance without all his forces, Marshal Soult waited for Marshal Ney, who promptly obeyed his call, but came from too great a distance to join him at the appointed time. He also wished to supply some parts of the artillery he wanted, and he was not able to arrive with his advanced guard until the 8d of August at Plasencia, a fact which justifies our assertion that the combination of the three corps of Marshals Ney, Mortier, and Soult, did as much mischief at the end of the campaign as their separation had done at its commencement. But for this junction, as we have frequently remarked, Marshal Mortier, being free in his movements, and left at Villacastin at Joseph's disposal, would have accompanied him to Talavera and decided the battle. Had the British army been beaten that day, there is no knowing how it could have passed the Tagus, or got back to Alcantara, pursued by French soldiers, marching twice as fast as the English.

Be this as it may, Sir Arthur Wellesley having learned at Oropesa that the intelligence forwarded to him from the pass of Baños was incomplete, for, instead of 12,000, 40,000 or 50,000 were arriving by that pass, he thought he could not do better than shelter himself behind the line of the Tagus—a step which, from the condition of a victor, which he boasted to be, would bring him into that of the vanquished, with all the consequences of the most complete defeat. He could not afford to lose a moment, placed as he was between Victor who might return upon him, and Mortier who was coming on in all haste in advance of Soult. He resolved to cross the

Tagus by the Arzobispo bridge, which was the nearest to him, although that would oblige him to go down the left bank as far as Almaraz, by almost impracticable roads, in order to get upon the high road to Estremadura. Fortunately for him, Marshal Victor, whom Joseph had left on the Alberche to watch the English, having taken alarm at Wilson's skirmishers on the mountains, and seeing them advance on his right toward Madrid, had fallen back in the direction of that capital. Had he been on the Alberche, the Anglo-Spanish army, assailed when passing the river, might have suffered enormously. Sir Arthur Wellesley then recrossed the Arzobispo bridge, leaving at Talavera 4,000 or 5,000 wounded, whom he commended to the humanity of the French generals, and a great quantity of *matériel*, which he could not carry away. The wounded were so many prisoners he surrendered to us, and who procured us all the trophies of victory, as though we had gained the battle of Talavera. Sir Arthur took up a position opposite Almaraz, on the heights commanding the Tagus, where he waited until his artillery should have traversed the horrible roads on the left bank of that river from the Arzobispo bridge to that of Almaraz. La Cuesta's Spaniards were to defend the Arzobispo bridge, and oppose the march of the French.

Marshal Mortier, who headed the march, having debouched from the mountains, was opposite the Arzobispo bridge on the 6th and 7th of August, and was soon followed by Marshal Soult with the main body. The army which arrived so late naturally desired to signalize its presence, and could not let the enemy escape without trying to do him some great damage. It was consequently resolved to carry the bridge. This was a demonstration of force much rather than an operation of serious consequence. It was executed by Mortier on the 8th of August. The Spaniards had barricaded the bridge, stationed infantry in two towers situated on the middle of it, erected strong batteries right and left on the opposite bank, and drawn up the bulk of their army on the hills in the rear. Thus covered, they believed themselves invincible. Marshal Mortier looked for a ford, and found one a few hundred fathoms higher up, by which cavalry and infantry could pass. While the French artillery played upon the bridge and the batteries beyond it, General Caulaincourt's dragoons crossed the ford, protected by parties of voltigeurs, and followed by the 84th and 40th regiments. Don Gregorio de la Cuesta opposed them with his infantry, formed in several squares. These were successfully charged by the dragoons; but the latter were soon assailed by the whole Spanish cavalry, three or four times more numerous than themselves, and would have been in serious danger if they had not manœuvred with much ability and coolness, supported by the infantry which had followed them. Fortunately, while this sharp conflict was waging, the 40th, marching along the bridge in spite of the fire of the Spaniards, forced the barricades, and opened a passage for Mortier's infantry, which took the Spanish batteries in flank and carried them. From that moment the Spaniards could hold out no longer, and fled, leaving us thirty pieces of cannon, a great number of horses, and 800 wounded as prisoners. This

gallant exploit showed what were the corps of the old army and the officers who commanded them.

The question was now whether the French, having made themselves masters of the bridges over the Tagus, would pursue the now fugitive Anglo-Spanish army, which called itself victorious a few days before. They had at their disposal the bridges of El Arzobispo and Talavera. But to reach the high road to Estremadura, the only one practicable for heavy artillery, it would be necessary for them to go down to the bridge of Almaraz, the principal arch of which had been broken down, and which had been replaced for a while by a bridge of boats, now destroyed. The English had lost five days in conveying their artillery by the left bank as far as the high road to Estremadura, opposite Almaraz, though they had the arms of all the people of the country to help them. It would be necessary, then, to follow them almost without artillery, and to fight them in almost inexpugnable positions, or to erect a bridge at Almaraz, no materials for which were at hand. Hence it was scarcely advisable to pursue them, unless the whole country was to be occupied from the Tagus to the Guadiana, from Almaraz to Merida, or unless the march into Andalucia was to be immediately commenced. But the former of these operations was of little utility, the country between the Tagus and Guadiana having been ruined by the presence of the belligerent armies in it for many months. As for the latter, the season was manifestly too hot and provisions too scarce to undertake it just then. It was better to await the harvest, the termination of the hot season, and the arrival of Napoleon's instructions, which were becoming indispensable after the entire derangement of that year's plan of campaign. The army halted, therefore, at the Arzobispo bridge, after the brilliant exploit which had put it in our hands. For the present the king's staff distributed Marshal Soult's troops along the Tagus, and moved a portion of them back in Old Castille. The fifth corps (Marshal Mortier's) was stationed at Oropesa to watch the Tagus from Almaraz to Toledo. The second (Marshal Soult's) was established at Plasencia to watch the passes from Portugal. Lastly, Marshal Ney, whom it was very desirable to keep aloof from Marshal Soult, was moved back to Salamanca to destroy the bands of the Duke del Parque, which infested Old Castille. The intrepid marshal, setting out on the 12th, traversed the pass of Baños, fighting and dispersing Wilson's bands, and proved, by the execution of this difficult march in less than four days, that more speed might have been made to arrive in the rear of the English.

During this time Sir Arthur Wellesley had arrived at Truxillo, whence he proposed to march to Badajoz. Reduced to 20,000 men, obliged to leave his sick and wounded to the French, at variance with the Spanish generals about provisions, about the operations to be executed, about every thing, in short, he had not succeeded better than Sir John Moore in his expedition into the interior of Spain. He returned, therefore, more than ever convinced that he should confine himself to the defence of Portugal, and only enter Spain in case of urgent emergency and with almost certain pros-

pects of success. Nothing could be gloomier than his despatches to his government.

On parting from the Spanish generals, he strongly advised them not to risk a battle, but to content themselves with defending the mountainous country of Estremadura, between the Tagus and the Guadiana, behind which barrier they might reorganize their forces, and even receive the co-operation of the British army, if they deserved that it should be continued to them. But they were incapable of appreciating and following such good advice.

The first among them who ought to have acted upon it was Venegas, who had moved upon Madrid, while Sir Arthur Wellesley and De la Cuesta were combining at Talavera, and against whom Joseph and Sebastiani were marching at that moment by way of Toledo. After having detached some skirmishing parties across the Tagus, he had promptly fallen back behind it on learning the return of the French army, and had halted at Almonacid, opposite Toledo, in a strong position, where he believed himself able, with 30,000 men, to brave the forces which Joseph could send against him. He would certainly have done better to follow Sir Arthur Wellesley's advice; but he paid no heed to it, and resolved to await the French on the heights of Almonacid.

He had his left stationed on a lofty hill, his centre on a plateau, his right on the escarped heights of Almonacid, themselves commanded by a more escarped position, above which rose an old Moorish castle. General Sebastiani, marching in advance of King Joseph, arrived in front of Venegas by the Toledo bridge, on the evening of the 10th of August. His force amounted to not more than 15,000 men since its losses at Talavera. The king was bringing him 5,000. On the morning of the 11th he made the Reval division assail Venegas's left. The Poles were the first to ascend the hill on which the Spaniards were posted. Venegas threw a part of his reserve upon them. But the Germans coming to the aid of the Poles, withstood the shock, and carried the left of the Spaniards, while the four French regiments of Sebastiani's division, the 28th, the 32d, 58th, and 76th, attacked their centre and their right, followed by the Godinot brigade, which belonged to the Dessoles division. Every point was carried, and the Spaniards were forced to fall back on the castle of Almonacid. That position might have been turned, but Sebastiani and Dessoles's old regiments did not want to have difficulties smoothed down for them. Up they went, under the fire of an almost inaccessible position, and completed the rout of all the remaining enemies. The Spaniards had 3,000 or 4,000 men killed or wounded, a nearly equal number taken prisoners, and lost sixteen pieces of cannon. The French lost more men than usual, in consequence of the nature of the positions attacked. They had more than 800 killed, and about 3,000 wounded.

The English army being in retreat on Badajoz, La Cuesta's army obliged to follow it, and that of Venegas quite dispersed, Joseph had nothing to do but to return to Madrid, which he re-entered, after having sent Marshal Victor into La Mancha, and left General Sebastiani at Aranjuez. He appeared there triumphant in the eyes of the Spaniards, for Gregorio de la

Cuesta, Venegas, and Sir Arthur Wellesley, (the latter with more reserve, as became his great merit,) had announced their approaching entry into Madrid and the deliverance of Spain. Far from being able to fulfil these pompous promises, they were all retreating upon the Guadiana, the English disheartened, the Spaniards not disheartened but dispersed. Joseph could therefore present himself in his capital under all the appearances of victory. It was only for good judges, for those who knew the means accumulated in Spain, and the hopes conceived for this campaign, that it was possible, by comparing the results expected with those obtained, to appreciate the operations of this year. With 800,000 old soldiers, the best France ever possessed, giving 200,000 present under fire, King Joseph's military counsellors had promised themselves to be in July at Lisbon, Seville, Cadiz, and Valencia: and yet they were not at Lisbon, not even at Oporto, but at Astorga; not at Cadiz, not at Seville, but at Madrid; not at Valencia, but at Saragossa! The obstinacy of the Spaniards, their patriotic and savage fury, their presumption which saved them from discouragement, the efficacious co-operation of the English, the disunion of our generals, the remoteness of Napoleon, and his instructions, which, given from too great a distance, hindered the plain good sense of Joseph and Jourdan from seizing the opportunities which fortune offered them, were the general causes of the profound differences between what had been expected and what had been accomplished. Passing from general causes to particular, we must add that, if instead of despatching Marshal Soult with his own corps only into Portugal, he had been sent along with Marshal Mortier; if Marshal Soult, when he consented to attempt that expedition with insufficient means, had not left La Romana in his rear without destroying him; if, on arriving at Oporto, he had not wasted his time there, had not suffered himself to be surprised, or had made a better retreat; if, on his return to Galicia, he had better seconded Marshal Ney; if, having obtained a combination of troops, desirable in March, to be regretted in June, he had not detained them uselessly at Salamanca; if Joseph, then having it in his power to bring up Mortier's corps, had presented himself at Talavera with irresistible forces; if, not having those forces, he had temporized and waited for Marshal Soult, or, not waiting for him, had made the attack at Talavera with more *ensemble* and steadiness; and if, even though none of these things had been realized, Marshal Soult had marched with more speed to Plasencia, the English would have been victoriously repulsed from Spain, and severely punished for their intervention in the Peninsula. One or two of these errors the less, and the fortune of the war had been changed!

When Napoleon, who was at Schönbrunn, engaged in negotiating and in preparing his armies of Germany in case of a resumption of hostilities, was informed of the events in the Peninsula, he was deeply affected by them, for, in order to negotiate advantageously, and not be obliged to fight again, it was necessary for him that every thing should go on well in all quarters, and that Austria should not find any encouragement in the events which were occurring

elsewhere Not acknowledging to himself his own share in the faults committed, and, great as he was, retaining so much human weakness as to wish to see only the faults of others without admitting his own, he severely blamed everybody. He keenly regretted having so soon settled the question between Marshals Ney, Mortier, and Soult, by uniting the three corps under the command of the latter; he blamed Marshal Soult for having marched into Portugal without having destroyed La Romana, for not having taken any definite course at Oporto, for not having reopened his communications with Zamora, and for having made a wretched retreat. He conceived strange suspicions as to what had taken place in Oporto, and for awhile his anger was so great that he thought of having the marshal brought to trial. But he had already on his hands the prosecution of General Dupont, which was becoming a serious difficulty; he had been obliged to reprimand the Prince of Ponte Corvo, and too many acts of severity at one time had the double inconvenience of making him appear harsh to companions in arms, whom he daily called upon to shed their blood in his behalf, and of revealing the necessity for such harshness. How many cankers in his state would be revealed if he publicly gave vent to his displeasure! Some of his lieutenants breaking down at last before the immensity of the dangers; others trying their hands at insubordination; others again becoming ambitious in their turn, and dreaming of such fortunes as those of his brothers! Napoleon, however, came to no final determination: he sent for the principal officers who had figured in Oporto, and ordered that evidence should be collected with the greatest strictness against Captain Argenton and his accomplices, if any he had. He authorized Marshal Ney to return to France, to relieve him from the false position in which he had been placed; and he kept silence toward Marshal Soult, leaving him for several months in the greatest perplexity. Nor did he spare Joseph; still less the chief of his staff, Jourdan, toward whom he was habitually unjust. He bitterly blamed them both for having made Soult debouch by Plasencia and not by Avila, a reproach which was not deserved, as we have elsewhere shown. He blamed them, with more reason, for having given battle without waiting for the arrival of Marshal Soult, then for not having given battle with *ensemble*, and not having persisted more energetically in the attack on the enemy's positions; in a word, when they had, with Victor, Sebastiani, Soult, Mortier, and Ney, nearly 100,000 men, for having gone into action with 45,000 against 66,000! all reprehensible faults, of which the arrangements ordered at Schönbrunn, without knowledge of the facts, were partly the cause. His criticisms, after all, though characterised by that precision and that superior penetration which belonged only to him, repaired nothing, and had only the poor advantage of easing his own dissatisfaction, while they deeply distressed his brother. He expressed, in particular, great anger at having been left ignorant of the loss of the artillery of the Laval division, and said, with reason, that as soon as he could go and pass some time in Spain, he would soon bring matters there to a conclusion. He gave orders to wait for the end of the hot season to resume

operations, and, above all, to wait until the negotiations at Altenburg were closed, because he proposed, when peace was signed, to send back to the Peninsula the forces he was at that moment drawing to Austria. Now, while he wrote to Joseph that Talavera was a battle lost, he said at Altenburg that it was a battle won, (both which assertions were false,) and he made those about him relate in detail the pitiable state in which the English army was retiring into Portugal, for events now interested him only in so far as they might influence the negotiations pending with Austria.

But he was not at the end of the difficulties the English had in store for him,—whether to help Austria, which they had again left in jeopardy, or to gratify their maritime ambition. They had never ceased, since the opening of the campaign, to promise the court of Austria some great expedition against the coasts of the continent, meaning thereby the northern coasts; for an expedition to Spain, however highly serviceable to the maritime policy of Great Britain, was at that moment almost a matter of indifference to Austria. An English army, more or less in Spain, could not make one French regiment enter or quit the Peninsula. It was otherwise with a descent upon the coasts of France, Holland, or Germany. A descent on the coasts of France or Holland would draw off thither the reinforcements destined for Austria; on the coasts of Germany it might occasion a national explosion. Hence, Austria had never ceased, since the opening of the negotiations, to press the English for a fulfilment of their promise. Moreover, as the work to be done was to destroy ports, burn dockyards, and commit all kinds of maritime ravages, their zeal might be relied upon; and if there was delay, it was only to be imputed to the nature of things, or to the incapacity of their government, which, rancorous and powerful as it was, was not conducted with the genius which then presided over the operations of the French government. They had lost Nelson and Pitt: they had still, indeed, Sir Arthur Wellesley, superior to both; but he was restricted to a narrow stage, and the existing administration was far from able.

The English scheme, in addition to their efforts to rid Spain of the French, consisted in destroying Napoleon's immense maritime preparations along the whole coast of the empire. We have already seen that Napoleon, though unable to keep the sea against the British navy, had not renounced the intention of fighting England on her own element, but had devised grand measures to that end. Wherever he had sway or influence, he had prepared countless naval constructions, and crews proportioned to them, as far as that was possible, intending, as soon as his armies should be disengaged, to form camps within reach of his vessels, in order to despatch on a sudden, now from one point, now from another, great expeditions for the East and West Indies, Egypt, and perhaps Ireland. At Venice, Spezzia, Toulon, Rochefort, Lorient, Brest, Cherbourg, Boulogne, (where the idle flotilla was beginning to rot,) and Antwerp, above all—Napoleon's favourite creation—armaments of all kinds existed, and were regarded with extraordinary anxiety by the English, (thereby justifying the views of Napoleon,) and with an ardent desire to ward off from themselves dan-

gers which were the more alarming, because their scope was unknown.

Two points had engrossed their whole attention during the year whose history we are relating: these were Rochefort and Antwerp. At the former, had been effected by Napoleon's orders a combination of squadrons, which moored in the roads of the Ile d'Aix. At Antwerp, was prepared an immense establishment, which, by its position opposite the Thames, kept the Londoners in a state of actual insomnia. The aid which the English, with a keen eye to their own interests, intended to afford Austria, was to destroy Rochefort and Antwerp, whatever efforts it might cost them. Seeing the greater facility of acting against Rochefort, where there was only a fleet to be burned, they had been early in a condition for this exploit. The longer, vaster, and more costly preparations against Antwerp were, as yet, but an unexecuted threat, while the belligerents were contending at Wagram and Talavera.

The expedition against Rochefort was ready for sea in April. At that time there were in that port two fine naval divisions, under Vice-admiral Allemand. They were stationed there in pursuance of a very ingenious plan of Napoleon's, but a very perilous one, like all those he was obliged to have recourse to at sea. By his orders, Rear-admiral Willaumez was to have quitted Brest with a fleet of six ships and several frigates, picked up on his way the divisions at Lorient and at Rochefort, sailed for the West Indies with supplies of victuals, ammunition, and men, returned thence to Europe, passing through the straits of Gibraltar, and cast anchor at Toulon, where a grand naval force was gradually preparing, either to join Sicily to Naples, provision Barcelona, or menace Egypt, which Napoleon had not renounced the hope of some day recovering. Willaumez sailed in February, missed the Lorient division, being afraid to stop there too long, and, not finding the Rochefort division ready for sea, had been obliged to stop in that port, thereby raising to the number of eleven ships and four frigates the naval force there. The brave Vice-admiral Allemand, who had so successfully passed the straits of Gibraltar to meet Ganteaume in 1808, and had accomplished the expedition to Corfu with him, had been appointed to the command of the Rochefort squadron. His instructions were to take the sea at the first opportunity. His fleet was a fine one, though far from being well manned,—as always happens when a fleet has to be formed in roads. The English had conceived the design of destroying the Rochefort fleet by the most terrible means imaginable, though they should exceed in barbarous cruelty all that war allows.

They had no thought of going up the Charente and presenting themselves abreast of Rochefort. It was elsewhere they intended to make an attempt of that kind, for it required an army, and they had not two at their disposal. But at Rochefort they proposed to destroy the fleet in its moorings. Admiral Gambier was therefore sent with thirteen ships, a great number of frigates, corvettes, brigs, and gun-boats, to the Ile d'Aix, and boldly moored in Basques Roads, those important waters not yet being sufficiently defended at that period. Fort Boyard was not yet in existence. The English had resolved to

convert a great number of vessels into fire-ships, and to sacrifice them, regardless of the cost, for the chance of burning the French squadron. The lawfulness of employing this measure in war is questionable, because it is atrocious, like the bombardment of fortified towns without absolute necessity. Usually, when recourse is had to it, old vessels are used, which are loaded with combustibles, sometimes with explosive machines. After being thus converted into floating volcanoes, they are brought before a fleet, and the moment being chosen when the wind and current are favourable, they are set on fire and sent adrift, the crews only leaving them at the last moment when the flames compel them to take to their boats. A single fire-ship is often enough to cause immense destruction. This practice is particularly dangerous when the fleet attacked consists of many vessels lying close to each other, and when the fire-ships are sure of doing mischief wherever they fall. The danger of course increases with the number of the fire-ships. The English determined to have thirty, such a number as never before had been seen together, and as could only be furnished by an immensely powerful marine, which had abundance of old hulls to throw away. To devote thirty vessels to the destruction of perhaps three or four, was to act with a fury which takes no account of the mischief it sustains, provided it inflicts some on the enemy. So far did the English indulge the passion to destroy, as to place among these fire-ships, frigates, and even ships of the line, so that the impulsive force might be the greater against the obstacles which the French might oppose to them. The English remained twenty days at anchor, preparing this unexampled flotilla, and loading it with its terrible freight.

Seeing them moored so long in the Basque Roads, Vice-admiral Allemand could not doubt the existence of an incendiary design against the port and the fleet. He placed his eleven ships and four frigates in two lines, very close to each other, backed on the right by the guns on the Ile d'Aix, and on the left by those on the river bank. They lay in a direction, not opposed, but parallel to the current, so that the floating bodies launched against them should not come athwart them, but pass before them. He also protected them with a double range of booms, the one at 400, the other at 800 fathoms distance, formed of floating beams strongly bound together, and fixed by means of heavy anchors dropped at certain intervals. As the critical moment approached, he formed the ships' boats into several divisions, armed them with cannons, and manned them with intrepid seamen, who were to lay hold on the fire-ships with hooks, and turn them aside. The boats mounted guard every night alongside the booms. He had all the useless sails taken down and stowed away with all other inflammable matters in the holds, and had every thing removed that could increase the danger of the fire-ships, by forming projections upon which they might be caught, and so become fixed to the vessels they encountered. There were many things he wanted which the port of Rochefort could not supply him with, because there is almost always a lack of them after a long and unsuccessful war; but with such materials as he had, he did every thing in his power to guard against the catastrophe, which he be-

lived to be formidable, but which he was far from imagining so terrible as it actually proved to be.

On the night of the 11th of April, the wind blowing freshly from the N. N. E. upon our line, and at an hour when the tide ran in the same direction, the English appeared in several divisions of large and small vessels, with the manifest intention of surrounding our squadron. A division of frigates and corvettes then advanced toward the boom, escorting the fire-ships. Vice-admiral Allemand, judging from all known precedents, expected to see some four, five, or six fire-ships, and had ordered the boats to be constantly at their stations along the booms, when suddenly was beheld a blazing line of thirty fire-ships, borne along by wind and tide against the French squadron. Never had such a spectacle been witnessed. Three of these horrible machines blew up near the booms, and broke them. The others, darting forth fireworks of all kinds like volcanoes, swept away the remains of the booms before them, and were floated along around our ships. The attempts to hook them were fruitless; they were too bulky to be held against wind and tide by boats, and dragged these along with them whenever the crews were rash enough to grapple them. Beholding these thirty blazing machines, there were few hearts but quailed, not at the danger, to which seamen are inured, but at the thought of seeing all our vessels destroyed without a fight. In the horrible confusion, amid frightful explosions and hideous glares, that showed the danger without serving to throw light on the defence, it was impossible to give or receive orders. Every captain had to act for himself, think only of his own ship, and how he could save it. The first impulse of them all was to get rid of the fire-ships that had fastened on their hulls. The admiral's ship *L'Océan* alone had three of them. The surest means of escaping was to cut their cables, and run where they could. Another was to fire upon the fire-ships and sink them; and in doing this, they fired upon each other as well, in the confusion into which they had fallen after losing their positions in line. By singular good fortune, however, our ships escaped without excessive damage to various parts of the coast; such of them as had taken fire succeeded in extinguishing the flames. The fire-ships ran ashore here and there on the neighbouring islands, and at daybreak we had the satisfaction of seeing all the thirty blown up, or burning to the water's edge, without having consumed any of our ships. So far English rage had only been destructive to English wealth.

But the scene was not ended. Our ships, as we have said, had cut their cables, and run aground at the *embouchure* of the Charente, from Fort Fouras to the Ile d'Enett. Unluckily, four of them, caught by the ebb tide, had stuck fast on the points of a chain of rocks called Les Palles, which forms one of the two sides of the mouth of the Charente. The ships were *Le Calcutta*, *Le Tonnerre*, *L'Aiglon*, and *Le Varsovie*. Almost all the captains had thrown their powder into the sea, for fear of blowing up if they took fire. Others had lost their boats and boats' crews in the confusion. They were therefore scarcely in a condition to defend themselves. Exasperated by the ill success of their atrocious scheme, the English resolved to indemnify themselves by taking or destroying the four ships on

Les Palles. *Le Calcutta*, attacked by several ships and frigates, cannonaded in all directions and hardly able to use her guns, was defended for some hours, and then abandoned by Captain Lafon, who, having but 280 men, believed that as it was impossible to save his ship, it was his duty to save his crew. The unfortunate man knew not to what severities he was exposing himself! *Le Calcutta* blew up some minutes after it was abandoned. *L'Aiglon* and *Le Varsovie*, unable to defend themselves, were obliged to strike their colours, and were burned by the English. Two fresh explosions told the squadron what was the fate of these ships. *Le Tonnerre* having sprung a leak, made its way with difficulty to near Ile Madame. Captain Clément Laroncière threw overboard his guns, ballast, and every thing he could to lighten her, but without any avail. After enormous efforts, continued under the fire of the English, foreseeing that he must sink at high water, he landed his men on a point of rock, whence they might reach Ile Madame when the tide was out. Being the last to quit the ship, he set fire to it with his own hand, and so it went down under French colours.

Thus, out of eleven ships, four perished, not from encountering the fire-ships, but from the wish to avoid them. The brave Admiral Allemand was in despair, though he had saved seven, without counting the frigates, which, with only one exception, were all preserved. His despair became converted into so great an irascibility, that it was impossible to leave him the command of Rochefort. The minister Decrès sent him to Toulon with his crews, who went by land, to man the vessels in the Mediterranean. New works were requisite at Rochefort before another fleet could be formed there. Admiral Gambier returned to the shores of England with the dubious glory of an atrocious expedition, which had cost England much more than France. Its most solid advantage for the former, was the deep dread impressed on all our fleets moored in roads, and a sort of hallucination that possessed most of our commanders of squadrons, who were continually haunted with visions of fire-ships, and made the strangest contrivances to guard against them. The minister Decrès, in spite of his rare discernment, was not himself quite free from this perturbation, and proposed to the Emperor to send back to Flushing the fine fleet constructed in the dockyards of Antwerp, and then moored at the mouths of the Scheldt. But Admiral Missiessy, a cool, clear-headed, determined man, refused to do this, alleging that at Flushing it would be exposed to perish by the bombs, or the fever of Walcheren, in dishonourable inactivity. He pledged himself to manœuvre in the Scheldt, so as not to lose either his honour or his fleet, and obtained a freedom of action, of which he soon made glorious use. The only measure commanded by the Emperor was the trial of the unfortunate captains who had lost their ships in the Rochefort Roads.

The Rochefort expedition was not the one the English had most at heart. They ought, no doubt, to have been very well satisfied with destroying one of our principal fleets at its moorings; but they longed, above all things, to free themselves from the inordinate uneasiness caused them by Antwerp. They were always



possessed with the idea that in process of time there might issue from that port, not the ten ships then moored at Flushing, but twenty or thirty, which Napoleon had the means of building there, and a flotilla far more dangerous than that of Boulogne, for in one tide it might convey an army from the mouth of the Scheldt to that of the Thames. That grand expedition, which they had promised Austria they would send out before the end of the hostilities, and which, since the armistice of Znaim they promised to send out before the negotiations were ended, they were at that moment completing, not for the purpose of raising up Germany in revolt, but for the purpose of destroying the naval establishments in the Netherlands.

They had two reasons for selecting Antwerp as the point to attack: the importance of that port, and the hope of finding it without any preparation for defence. Spies had reported to them that there were but seven or eight thousand men on both banks of the Scheldt to Bergen-op-Zoom. With a little boldness they might even go further, commit immense destruction, and shed woful light on the policy which carried all our forces to Lisbon, Madrid, and Vienna, and left none to guard our own coasts. Their eagerness for an expedition to the banks of the Scheldt was therefore extreme, and they were resolved to devote to it 40,000 men at least, and from 1200 to 1500 sail. Nothing so considerable would have been seen in any age if they were able to carry out their intentions to their full extent. But the time employed in preparing such an armament was of course proportioned to its vastness. Proposed in March, resolved on in April, just when Napoleon was setting out for Austria, it had not sailed on the day of the battle of Wagram, nor arrived on that of the battle of Talavera. Sir John Moore's army, which had been proved in service, was to be employed in the expedition; but it had need to be largely recruited to reach the total of 40,000 men; and as, moreover, there was a great siege apparatus to be shipped, the means of transport required amounted to the enormous sum of 100,000 tons. Of these the royal navy could furnish 25,000, the remaining 75,000 were to be procured, either from the government arsenals, or from the merchant service. But many vessels had already been sent to the coast of Spain on Sir Arthur Wellesley's account, and it was not advisable to deprive him of that indispensable means of retreat, a reverse of fortune being always to be provided against in the Peninsula. The whole 75,000 tons were then to be procured from other than government sources, and so passionately was the British cabinet bent on this object, that for a moment it thought of pressing all the neutrals in the Thames into its service, and paying them afterward. But this project was abandoned on account of the disturbance it would have caused to trade, and instead of it, the government offered enormously high rates for freight. The *matériel* was prepared, the army was recruited with volunteers from the militia, and so the time wore away from May to June, from June to July. It was not until the end of the latter month that all was ready. No time was to be lost, for if nothing was done before the treaty of peace had been extorted from Austria, the French armies would have returned from the

banks of the Danube, and then any expedition of the kind would be a folly, not to mention that England would again have left her surest allies in the lurch.

By the 24th or 25th of July, the expedition was ready for sea, consisting of 38,000 infantry, 8000 artillerymen, 2500 cavalry, (in all about 44,000 men,) 9000 horses, 150 twenty-four pounders and large mortars, the whole embarked on board 40 ships of the line, 30 frigates, 84 corvettes, brigs, and bombards, 400 or 500 transports, and countless gun-boats. Nothing like it had ever been seen. It was to sail from Portsmouth, Harwich, Chatham, Dover, and the Downs. Having command of the sea, the English could choose any points of departure that suited their own convenience. Sir John Strachan commanded the fleet, the Earl of Chatham the army. Their orders were to take Flushing if they could, to destroy the Scheldt fleet at the same time, then to burn the dockyards of Antwerp, and close the channels of the Scheldt, by sinking large masses in them, which should render them unfit for navigation. The end and the means were commensurate in their vastness.

Dutch emigrants and English officers who had made the campaigns of Flanders in 1792 and 1798, had long been consulted as to the best course to be pursued. Two principal plans had been proposed: to land at Ostend, and march to Antwerp by Bruges and the Sas of Ghent, or to sail up the Scheldt. To march five-and-twenty or thirty leagues through the French territory, in presence of a nation so warlike as ours, appeared too perilous; and yet it was the only plan that offered some chance of success, for the invaders would barely have found on their way 8000 or 4000 men dispersed all over Flanders. By beginning their march before succours could be sent, (a process requiring from fifteen to twenty days at least,) they would have arrived at Antwerp without firing a shot, burned the dockyards and the fleet, and have re-embarked in their transports at Antwerp when the French troops were beginning to show themselves. But the idea of traversing such an extent of the territory of the empire was a bugbear that caused the plan to be abandoned. The next to be considered, and it was one that gave rise to much debate, was the plan of sailing up the Scheldt to Batz and Santvliet, the point where the estuary of the Scheldt changes into a river.

Ten leagues below Antwerp the Scheldt divides into two branches. One of these, called from its direction, the Western Scheldt, continues to flow due west, and falls into the sea between the guns of Flushing and Breakens; the other turns northward at Santvliet, passes between the fort of Batz and the fortified town of Bergen-op-Zoom, empties itself to the northwest, and is called the Eastern Scheldt, only because it flows less directly to the west than the other branch. Both of them are wider and shallower than the river above its bifurcation; they flow over a series of shoals which present many obstacles to navigation, and wash a province called Zeeland. This is the lowest province of Holland, the greater part of it being below the level of the sea, from the irruption of which it is only preserved by lofty dikes. In summer it presents to the eye only verdant

meadows, beautiful willows, and tall poplars; but hideous death lurks beneath this smiling aspect, for pestilential miasmata are exhaled from the mud, which the tide leaves uncovered twice a day. Among all known fevers, there is none more deadly than that which bears the inauspicious name of Walcheren.

Of the two branches of the Scheldt, the western alone is navigable for ships of the line. It was the one chosen by Napoleon for the passage of his fleet from Antwerp to the sea, and was protected by the fortifications of Flushing in the island of Walcheren, and by those of Breskens in the island of Cadzand.

Supposing that Antwerp was to be reached by water, whether was the eastern or the western Scheldt to be preferred? Here, again, the bolder plan was the better, for when a surprise is to be effected, the quickest route affords the greatest likelihood, not only of success, but also of safety. The best course would have been boldly to enter the West Scheldt in defiance of the fires of Flushing and Breskens, at the risk of often running aground, for the buoys that marked the channel would of course have been removed, to have then advanced, with small vessels going before to take soundings, destroyed the French fleet if met with, landed the army at Santvliet, and marched straight to Antwerp. This would have cost more time and trouble than the land route, but the invaders would certainly have arrived in ten days, and in that space of time Antwerp would not have received the succours necessary for its defence, as we shall presently see. This time, again, the decision was in favour of the more timorous way of executing a daring expedition, and, as commonly happens, a plan was adopted which, containing something from each of the plans proposed, ran the chance of combining the defects of them all.

It was settled that a naval division, under Rear-admiral Ottway, should land 12,000 men on the island of Walcheren, with whom the second in command, Sir Eyre Coote, should take Flushing; that a second division under Commodore Owen should put a few thousand men on shore on the island of Cadzand, with whom the Marquis of Huntley should take the fort of Breskens and the batteries on that island; that the enemy's fire being thus extinguished right and left by the capture of the two islands which form the entrance to the Western Scheldt, the bulk of the expedition should sail up it under the orders of Rear-admiral Keates, Lieutenant-generals Hope, Rosslyn, Grosvenor, and the two commanders-in-chief, Strachan and Chatham. They were to land near Santvliet with 25,000 men, and then march to Antwerp.

Such was the plan ultimately decided upon at the departure of the expedition, the greater part of which was under sail on the 25th of July at Portsmouth, Harwich, Dover, and the Downs. The rest was to follow as it could. On the 29th, the lowlands of the Scheldt were in sight. But the troops could not be disembarked at once in consequence of the state of wind, which made it dangerous to attempt landing in boats. The two divisions which were to proceed respectively to the Island of Walcheren, north, and to the Island of Cadzand, south of the embouchure of the Western

Scheldt, stationed themselves off those islands, and kept the sea as well as they could in rather rough weather. The main body, which was to go up the Scheldt under Rear-admiral Keates and Sir John Hope, waited also under sail for more favourable weather.

But as the wind did not change, and as unexpected intelligence arrived that the French fleet, instead of having gone up to Antwerp, were still at Flushing, the plan agreed on at the departure of the expedition was changed. In the first place, to avoid the bad weather, it was resolved to pass round the Island of Walcheren northwards, to the entrance of the eastern Scheldt, to get into the inner branch of the Weere Gat by the Roompot channel, and there land the troops under shelter from the surf that threatened to destroy the boats on the outer side. Considering also the news that had been received of the fleet, it was thought dangerous to attack it amid the batteries that protected it, in channels well known to it; and it appeared better to turn it by the Isle of Walcheren, instead of coming upon it in front. A large portion of the expedition was therefore to proceed as far as possible up the Eastern Scheldt, while the other attacked the islands of Walcheren and Cadzand; the troops were to be landed on the islands of North and South Beveland, and were to be led by land to the forts of Batz and Santvliet to the junction of the two Scheldts, which would afford means of intercepting the French fleet and hindering its return to Antwerp. It would then be soon captured; and even if the expedition should not be able to reach Antwerp, it would have done very well indeed when it had taken the islands of Walcheren and Cadzand, the fortress of Flushing, and the French fleet. Orders were immediately given in conformity with this plan, which was the third. The last division, under Rosslyn and Grosvenor, was to be disposed of according to circumstances when it arrived. Admiral Gardner was placed at the entrance of the Western Scheldt to oppose the French fleet, should it choose to offer battle, succour Flushing, or act against the division detached to Cadzand.

Accordingly, while Admiral Gardner kept the sea with his ships of the line, and Commodore Owen was preparing with his frigates and light craft to land the Marquis of Huntley's troops on the island of Cadzand, Rear-admiral Ottway's strong division, which was to put 12,000 men ashore at Walcheren, went up the north side of the island on the 29th and 30th, and, entering the Eastern Scheldt, moored at the opening of the Weere Gat. Once out of the open sea, and within the inner channels of Zeeland, the weather was no longer an impediment. Immediate preparations were made for landing. The English had such a quantity of boats, that the simultaneous landing of a great number of troops was for them the easiest of operations.

A more favourable moment could not have been chosen for insulting the French territory with impunity. No preparation for defence had been made, either in the island of Walcheren, or in the adjacent region; not that there had been no warning, but that the intelligence received was not treated with the attention it deserved. It was certainly impossible that so

vast a muster of forces should have taken place on the English coasts without something of it having been known on those of France, in spite of the interruptions of communications. In fact, some France prisoners who had made their escape, and some well-paid spies, had warned the coast authorities, who, in their turn, had informed the ministers of marine and of war. But the minister of marine, too full of the recollection of Rochefort, had thought only of an expedition of fire-ships to burn the Scheldt fleet, and had wanted, as we have said, to shut that fleet up in Flushing, which Admiral Missessy had refused to do, for reasons which were justified by the event. As for the minister of war, having nothing to send to Antwerp against an army of 40,000 men, and not venturing to take upon himself to divert from the Danube to the Scheldt the torrent of men and *matériel* which continued, even since the armistice, to flow toward Austria, he did nothing, and chose rather to believe, with the minister of marine, that the threatened expedition would prove an affair of fire-ships, which were to be guarded against by obstructing the several channels of the Scheldt. There was nothing then within reach of Antwerp but the camp at Boulogne, some companies of national guards employed under the Senator Rampon in watching the coasts, and some provisional demi-brigades; but all dispersed, without organization, without artillery, cavalry, &c. In the Island of Walcheren especially, no preparation had been made for sustaining a siege. The island had been for several years divided between France and Holland. The French occupied the fortified town of Flushing, on account of its port and its command of the Western Scheldt, and the Dutch retained the territory of the island with its capital, Middleburg, and the small forts commanding the Eastern Scheldt. General Monnet, a brave man, who had distinguished himself in the wars of the revolution, reposed from his past campaigns as commandant of Flushing. He had for the defence of the island neither flying artillery, nor cavalry, nor any one constituent of a corps adapted for keeping the field; his sole means of defence was a handful of odds and ends of troops, made up of an Irish battalion, a colonial battalion, two battalions of Prussian deserters, and some hundreds of French, making together about 3000 men. The Dutch commandant had some hundreds of veterans in Middleburg and the fort on the shores. The fortifications of Flushing consisted merely of a bastioned wall surrounded by a ditch, which was everywhere fordable. It had no strong batteries, except on the side next the sea. Nothing then was easier than to take the Island of Walcheren and the town of Flushing, when the invaders came upon them with 45,000 men and 600 or 600 sail.

As soon as the English were seen obstinately stationing themselves at the mouths of the Scheldt, it was easy to guess the object of the expedition. General Monnet, not wishing to absent himself from Flushing, immediately sent General Osten with 12,000 or 15,000 men, that is to say, with half the garrison, to the northern shore of the island, to oppose the landing as well as he could; and with the remainder he himself set about preparing to defend Flushing. Some field artillery was procured

for General Osten, by taking from the fortifications two 8-pounders and two 6-pounders, and harnessing to them untrained horses of the country, mounted by peasants. General Osten, who was very brave, advanced with his small force, and stationed it from right to left, from the fort of Den Haak to Domburg, along the dikes, to fire on the English as soon as they should touch the shore.

The latter landed, to the number of some thousands, protected by the guns of more than sixty vessels. General Osten's soldiers, without discipline or national spirit, did not stand a moment against the fire from the ships, although they were covered by the dikes, but retreated in disorder, in spite of the heroic efforts of their officers to rally them. General Osten's four pieces, if well served, might have stopped the advance of the English, or at least retarded it. But the untrained horses reared and plunged, the peasants cut the traces and fled. Two of the four guns were thus left on the ground. After ineffectual efforts to maintain his position, General Osten led his troops back to Serooskerke, in the interior of the island, and sent word of what had happened to General Monnet.

While General Osten was deprived by the bad spirit of his soldiers of the honour of disputing the dikes with the English, Bruce, a Dutch general, surrendered to them the forts of Den Haak and Terweere, and the town of Middleburg, not having the least desire to be killed for the sake of the French—in which respect he shared the feelings of all his countrymen. He might, moreover, allege, in his own justification, that he had not sufficient means to resist the enemy.

On the 31st of July, the English spread 15,000 men over the Island of Walcheren, and surrounded it with several hundred sail, for they placed themselves, with the greater part of their naval forces, in the Weere Gat and Sloe branches, which part the Island of Walcheren from those of North and South Beveland. They marched to Middleburg, and thence to Flushing. General Osten made the best retreat he could, disputing the ground foot by foot when the courage of his troops corresponded to his own; and though he did not obtain from his soldiers all he could have wished, he honourably covered his retreat with the loss of 200 or 300 men, and the destruction of a greater number of the enemy.

General Monnet received him on the glacis of Flushing, and they effected their junction under the guns of the place, and resolved to defend its approaches before they shut themselves up within its narrow limits. General Monnet occupied several posts on the exterior, and particularly one to the right towards Rameskens, in order to be able to break the dikes and inundate the whole island, when all other means of resistance had failed. He hastened to organize his garrison somewhat better, to supply his want of artillerymen from the ranks of the infantry, to form the population into legions of firemen, to counteract the effects of a bombardment, and to write to the Island of Cadzand for French troops, while the Western Scheldt was still open. The distance thence was but three or four cannon-shots, the passage was easy and still possible, if the necessary forces were to be found in Cadzand.

That island was commanded by General Rousseau, an active and gallant officer belonging to the department of the Scheldt, which was included in the twenty-fourth military division. The moment he was aware of the presence of the English, he had sent notice to General Chambarlhac, who commanded the twenty-fourth military division, and had called in the troops stationed in the vicinity. He began by distributing among the coast batteries the few hundred men he could immediately dispose of, and getting ready some pieces of field artillery. Two fourth battalions, one of the 66th, the other of the 48th, having then been sent to him, he put himself at their head along the shore, ready to fall upon the first troops of the enemy that should land.

These prompt and determined measures were perfectly visible from sea, for the land was a low plain, and level as the sea itself, and they might give reason to suppose that there was a considerable body of troops in the rear. Commodore Owen and the Marquis of Huntley, who commanded the forces acting against Cadzand, perceiving General Rousseau's troops from the Viengen channel, where they were struggling against the bad weather, did not dare to land. They saw 1200 or 1500 men, whom they took for 3000 or 4000; and having only boats enough to land 700 men at a time, they were afraid they should be thrown into the sea if they attempted to touch the shore. Had Admiral Strachan and Lord Chatham carried to the Island of Cadzand all the forces, and all the means of disembarkation uselessly employed in the Eastern Scheldt, they would infallibly have got possession of the island, with all the batteries on the left of the Scheldt, and have arrived at La Tête de Flandre, a suburb of Antwerp, before any succours. Fortunately, it was not so. Commodore Owen and the Marquis of Huntley, intimidated by General Rousseau's attitude, sent to Rear-admiral Gardner, who commanded the ships in the great Deurluo channel, for the boats he could spare, in order to land more men at a time; but he wanted them for his own operations, besides which, the stormy weather prevented their arrival, and the attack on the Island of Cadzand, which ought to have succeeded, was not made on the 29th, nor on the 30th, nor on the 31st. The leaders of the expedition, content with having had it in their power to land at Walcheren, finding themselves quite safe from the bad weather within the Eastern Scheldt, and always full of the idea of taking the islands of North and South Beveland, which divide the two Scheldts, and the possession of which would allow of their turning the fleet, recalled Owen and Huntley. The whole expedition, including the last portion, which had just arrived under Lieutenant-generals Grosvenor and Rosslyn, thus filled the Weere Gat and Sloe arms. All the troops that had not landed on Walcheren were then put on shore in North and South Beveland, to march to the fort of Batz, the point of junction of the two Scheldts, and thus turn the French fleet, while the rest of the army was besieging Flushing.

Fortunately at that moment there were two energetic men on the spot—General Rousseau and Admiral Missiessy. The former, seeing the departure of the naval division that threatened the Island of Cadzand, ceased to have much fear

for the left bank of the Scheldt, and, without hesitation, sent away the two battalions of the 66th and 48th by water, from Breskens to Flushing. They had to cross the Western Scheldt, which was some hundred fathoms wide at that part, and he sent over all the detachments that came to him, one after the other, thinking more of his neighbour, whose danger he perceived, than of himself.

Admiral Missiessy, who had asked not to be shut up in Flushing, where he would have perished by the enemy's shells and the fever, crowned the wisdom of his counsels by the firmness and ability of his conduct. His steadiness in remaining before Flushing, without shutting himself up in the port, had already sufficed to give the English expedition a different course, —the most dangerous for it, the most advantageous for us, as we shall soon see: that, namely, into the Eastern Scheldt. He had now to keep himself from being taken at the junction of the two Scheldts, toward Batz and Santvliet. So, like a man of sense and determination, who knew what he had to do, he weighed anchor on the 31st, and took advantage of the favourable wind to run up the Scheldt. By the evening of that day he had passed the fort of Batz, and entered the Upper Scheldt, above where the river divides. At that place two of the vessels ran aground on a soft mud-bank, but were soon got off. Next day he was again under sail, and, at high water, all his ships passed between the forts of Lillo and Liefkenshoek, which close the passage of the river by their formidable cross-fires. All these forts (Batz and Santvliet, Lillo and Liefkenshoek) were as neglected as they might have been in a time of profound peace among a heedless nation. Admiral Missiessy, who saw in them the means of his own safety, occupied himself about their defence. He placed a frigate athwart the channel of Bergen-op-Zoom, which joins the Western Scheldt with the Eastern, and is commanded by the forts of Batz and Santvliet. He landed 100 Dutch gunners in Batz, and put French garrisons into Lillo and Liefkenshoek, taking care to supply them with the necessary stores. He then had several booms constructed, as a defence against fire-ships; and, instead of shutting himself in Antwerp, he remained free to move about the river and bring the thousand guns of his fleet to bear upon the defence of the surrounding points. He had under him a flotilla formerly detached from that of Boulogne and stationed in the Scheldt.

It was well for him he had so opportunely made his retreat into the Upper Scheldt, for, two days later, the English would have turned him, by placing themselves between Batz and Santvliet, and thus have struck a grand first blow, by the capture or destruction of a whole new fleet. The troops of Hope's division, which had been put on shore on the islands of Beveland, had marched with all speed, and arrived on the 2d of August before Batz, which was occupied by a Dutch garrison and by General Bruce, who had already surrendered the entrenched posts of the Island of Walcheren. The fort mounted thirty guns, level with the water, and very dangerous for ships attacking it, but it had no great means of defending itself on the land side. With a garrison, however, and a brave commandant, it might have held out for

some days. The one it had, but not the other. General Bruce was no more disposed at Bats than at Middleburg to resist to the uttermost, in a small fortress without casemates or blind-age, exposed to an overwhelming force, and that for the sake of the French; so he evacuated the fort, into which the English entered without firing a shot. From that moment they were masters of the passage from the one to the other branch of the Scheldt, and had they forthwith brought up their whole army, as they had brought Hope's division, by the way of North and South Beveland, they might in a few days have arrived before Antwerp, which was, indeed, a closed fortress, but closed by old works, half destroyed, where there were at most 2000 men, without a cannon on the ramparts, and where there prevailed as much confusion among the authorities, surprised by the appearance of the enemy, as disaffection among the Flemish population. Fortunately, the two leaders of the expedition (Sir John Strachan and Lord Chatham) thought it necessary, in the first place, to finish the siege of Flushing, which would give them the means of introducing the whole of the fleet into the Western Scheldt, and arriving by sea at Bats and Santvliet, whence the land forces could march to Antwerp. This decision of theirs gave the French government some days to organize the first means of defence.

The telegraph had announced on the 31st of July, at Paris, the landing of the English in the Island of Walcheren, and on the 1st of August the whole government was informed of the serious nature of the danger. In Napoleon's absence the government consisted of the ministers under the presidency of the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès. Three only of the ministers could take part in the proceedings on this occasion: the ministers of war and marine, Clarke and Decrès, because the safety of the territory and the fleet were their special concern, and Fouché, the minister of police, because he was the only one who had preserved a sort of political importance since the retirement of M. de Talleyrand. He had seen his existence threatened at the time of the latter's disgrace, and had become, in consequence, more busy than ever, whether to regain favour if he succeeded in signaling his zeal in a moment of difficulty, or in order to become a principal personage if the affairs of the empire fell into perplexity, as many people began either to fear or to hope. Signs of the decline of Napoleon's power were in fact beheld by many in the Spanish war, which seemed as though it would never end, in the Austrian war, the issue of which had for a while seemed doubtful; in the gradual spread of uneasiness among the populations of the empire; and in the dissatisfaction excited by the affairs of the church, the sequel of which we shall soon set forth. For a restless person, therefore, not very trustworthy, and wishing to be at the head of all changes of fortune, the present was an opportunity to bestir himself.

Though he flattered the Emperor greatly, M. Fouché was the secret ally of all the disaffected, groaning *sotto voce* with them over their grievances, or over the maladies of the empire, the glory of which he extolled in public. Thus Admiral Decrès, a minister of great talent, but so unlucky in his administration, was dissatisfied

because the Emperor, unjustly visiting upon him the defeats of the navy, and offended at his caustic and bold language, had not been forward to make him a duke. M. Fouché had forthwith become the confidant and friend of M. Decrès. Marshal Bernadotte having been sent away from the army on account of his order of the day to the Saxons, had carried his pride and his resentment to Paris. M. Fouché hastened to press his hand, consoled with him on the ingratitude he had met with, and in public assumed the part of a Mentor, who strove to moderate the prince-marshal's anger and hinder him from committing fresh faults. The Walcheren expedition was an occasion for bringing these latent dispositions into prominence; and if any thing indeed could already disclose the failing strength of the throne, it was that under such a master as Napoleon any one should aspire to a political rôle of any kind whatever.

No sooner had the news of the landing arrived than M. Decrès hastened to the minister and the arch-chancellor and called for extreme measures. He displayed extreme ardour in his proceedings, because ever since the Rochefort business he had known no rest. He wanted that all the workmen that could be procured should be marched from Paris, that the national guards should be levied *en masse*, that a marshal of France, Bernadotte for example, should be placed at their head, and that the enemy should be awed by a great display of force, apparent, if not real. M. Decrès spoke with the sincerity of a minister alarmed for the safety of his department. M. Fouché, who, by a singular concurrence of circumstances, occupied provisionally the place of M. Crétet, minister of the interior, who was on his death-bed, found in the functions which had casually devolved upon him a very sufficient reason for busying himself a great deal about the Walcheren expedition. To call out the national guards, almost in his own name and on his own account, to write proclamations, put a great number of men in motion, and appoint a military leader of his own choice, all this suited his twofold purpose of appearing at Schönbrunn very zealous, and at Paris very influential. He fully approved of M. Decrès's ideas, which he strongly supported in a council held on the morning of the 1st of August. Possessed by the dangers that threatened Antwerp, the minister of marine vehemently urged the convocation of 100,000 national guards and the nomination of Marshal Bernadotte to command them. These propositions, which might have appeared excessive under the most urgent circumstances, startled Clarke, the minister of war, whose character was not more trustworthy than Fouché's, but who had much sense and shrewdness, and very much doubted Napoleon's approval either of the national guards or of the Prince of Ponto Corvo. He laid his doubts before the council, and then enumerated the means he had at his disposal without having recourse to the national guards, means which consisted in the provisional demi-brigades instituted by Napoleon, the gendarmerie, the national guards *d'élite*, under the Senator Rampon, and the troops of the camp at Boulogne. The whole might form some 30,000 men, under the Senator Sainte Suzanne, an ex-officer of the army of the Rhine, whom Napoleon had appointed to the command

of the coast from Picardy to Holland, in case of an English expedition. Sainte Suzanne, though ill, had declared himself ready to take his command. Lastly, there was the King of Holland, who was marching with some men to Antwerp, and who as constable had already been invested by Napoleon, in 1806, with the command of the coasts. Here was enough to supersede the necessity of levies *en masse*, and a leader in disgrace, like the Prince of Ponte Corvo.

The arch-chancellor, who on the one hand distrusted Fouché's zeal, and on the other feared lest enough should not be done under the circumstances, did not declare himself very openly, but calmed the vehemence of M. Decrès, and seemed to incline to the opinion of the minister of war. Thereupon M. Fouché, abating the warmth of his advocacy of his new friend's views, contented himself with whispering in the ear of M. Decrès, that he was of his opinion, and that after all he would do upon his own responsibility what the council would not resolve. The council adjourned without adopting the propositions of MM. Decrès and Fouché, the measures devised by M. Clarke being considered sufficient for the moment, until orders should have arrived from the Emperor, to whom despatches had been sent by extraordinary couriers.

The minister of war immediately issued orders in conformity with the ideas he had promulgated in the council. There were in Paris two demi-brigades, composed of fourth battalions, the 8d and 4th; he sent them off with all speed. There was in the north a battalion of the Vistula, some squadrons of Polish lancers, and several batteries of artillery, destined for the Danube; there were the 6th, 7th, and 8th demi-brigades stationed between Boulogne and Brussels, and four battalions of various regiments cantoned at Louvain; all these he sent to Cadzand and Antwerp. General Rampon had, as on other occasions, been appointed to command about 6000 national guards *d'élite*, the organization of whom had already begun. The minister Clarke ordered them to Antwerp. He directed Marshal Moncey to collect all the mounted gendarmerie of the departments of the north, amounting to about 2000; and he desired that, as soon as Boulogne was considered out of danger, all the troops that could be spared should be sent thence to Antwerp. The three demi-brigades of the north, the two of Paris, the four battalions of Louvain, and the battalion of the Vistula, made up about 10,000 foot, and the national guards *d'élite* 5000. With the gendarmerie, the artillery, and the dépôts from the vicinity, a force of 20,000 men might be reckoned upon, to which was to be added the camp at Boulogne, and a division of Dutchmen advancing under King Louis. This was a total of 30,000 men, sufficient to protect Antwerp from a *coup de main*. The only difficulty was to bring them up in time, for the chief danger of the moment lay in the promptitude with which the English should conduct their operations. At least fifteen days were requisite to enable these forces to assemble at Antwerp with the horses, the officers, and the necessary *matériel*, and in fifteen days the English might easily have taken Flushing and laid siege to Antwerp. Quantity of forces was therefore of less moment than celerity, seeing that behind the walls and

inundations of Antwerp the number and valour of the troops would be of secondary importance. General Clarke gave the necessary orders that all these movements should be executed as quickly as possible. He sent to Antwerp an officer of engineers of the highest merit, M. De-caux, subsequently minister, and he wrote to the King of Holland, hinting, that if he desired the command, it rested only with himself to assume it in the capacity of constable.

Meanwhile M. Fouché, on his part, began the grand movement which had not found favour with the council, and wrote to all the departments on the northern frontier, requiring them in the Emperor's name to levy the national guards. The letter addressed to the prefects, and intended for publication, appealed to the honour and patriotism of the population, told them Napoleon relied on them when he quitted his own frontiers for Austria, and that doubtless they would not suffer a handful of English to insult the territory of the empire. This letter, which was a sort of proclamation, savoured of the declamatory style of 1792, and was evidently intended to rouse public feeling. Administrative circulars, subjoined to the minister's letter, indicated the means by which the men were to be called out, clothed, and mustered. The zeal of the prefects was challenged to act with the utmost celerity.

While these showy measures were being announced, the quieter and more effectual measures of the minister of war were receiving their execution, but unfortunately not so fast as they ought. Extreme confusion prevailed in Antwerp, where there were barely a few hundred soldiers and some workmen to man the ramparts. The King of Holland, with laudable zeal, repaired thither in all haste, at the head of 6000 Dutchmen, the only troops at his disposal, whom he had stationed between Bergen-op-Zoom and Antwerp. Having turned thrifty to please the Dutch, he had on foot only these 6000 men, besides four regiments in Germany and one or two battalions in Spain. He had allowed his army and his fleet to dwindle away, in order to conform to the spirit of his new subjects; and in leading all the forces he had to the succour of Antwerp, he exposed Holland to the attempts of the English. That country, formerly friendly to France and hostile to England, had completely changed in that respect since the French alliance had closed the seas against its commerce. It hailed the arrival of the English almost as liberators. All Belgium shared the same feeling for the same reason, and still more from motives of religion. Any success of the English might easily have called forth a popular insurrection in that country. The clergy, whose influence there was so great, had been eager against the French rule since the rupture with the Pope, and all its members, except the Archbishop of Malines, who owed his appointment to Napoleon, directed all their efforts in favour of the English.

On arriving at Bergen-op-Zoom, King Louis stationed his troops between Santvliet and Antwerp, so as to be able to succour the latter. Upon the mere hint in Clarke's letter, he assumed the general command, and, giving way to his very lively imagination, he proposed measures which would have prematurely thrown the country into confusion, and done much hurt

to the establishment of Antwerp. He wanted to have the whole country flooded from Antwerp to the lower Scheldt, to have hulls of vessels sunk in the channels, and that, in short, in order to keep off the English, the country should do itself as much mischief as the invaders themselves could have inflicted upon it. The commandant Decaux, a very sensible man and a skilful engineer, succeeded in cooling down the King of Holland's effervescing spirits, put the forts of Lillo and Liefkenshoek in a better state, spread the inundation round them so as to render them inaccessible, postponed it round Antwerp, arranged with Admiral Missiesy for the establishment of several booms on the Scheldt, repaired the walls of Antwerp, and brought the measures for defence into some degree of order. Some thousand men of the 8d, 4th, and 6th demi-brigades having already arrived, and being followed by the customs men, the gendarmerie, and the national guards, there were, about the 10th or 12th of August, in Antwerp, 8000 or 10,000 men, ill organized, but sufficient to garrison the place. Fortunately, too, the English persisted in the siege of Flushing. General Monnet had received about 2000 men before the closing of the Western Scheldt; and if it was not to be expected that he should hold out to the end, still he would secure time for organizing the defence of Antwerp. General Rousseau, on his part, having received the 8th demi-brigade and some national guards *d'élite*, continued to occupy the left bank of the Scheldt, in the Island of Cadzand. The progress of the enemy was thus delayed, and that was enough to cause their failure. The fleet had escaped the English; Antwerp was hourly becoming more difficult of access for them; Flushing alone was in danger of falling into their hands; and in any case it might be hoped that it would be their sole trophy.

When Napoleon learned, by extraordinary courier, the news of the Walcheren expedition, he was not surprised at it, for he had expected some descent upon the coasts, and for that reason had left in France the two provisional demi-brigades of Paris, the three of the north, and a certain number of artillery companies, of which he was not in absolute need. If the news did not surprise him, still less did it trouble him, for from the first moment he judged the import of the expedition, and was convinced that, except some expense entailed on himself, all the evils of it would fall upon the English, who would perish uselessly by the fever, without taking Antwerp or the fleet, unless the latter was ill managed. Had he, however, more impartially considered his own position, he would have seen that this expedition did his government a very serious kind of mischief—that of strikingly revealing the dangers of a policy which, having 300,000 men in Spain, 100,000 in Italy, and 300,000 in Germany, and not a soldier to guard Antwerp, Lille, and Paris.

At first, strange to say, he was not of the opinion of those who had thought themselves of his, namely General Clarke and Arch-chancellor Cambacérès. Both had supposed he would not approve either of the mustering of the national guards or of the nomination of Marshal Bernadotte. They had guessed wrong. Though Napoleon did not like to have recourse to reasoning populations who put conditions upon their

services, and though he surmised how much rancour the Prince of Ponte Corvo cherished against him, still he could waive all such considerations when his interest required it. In the first place, he was not exactly informed as to the importance of the Walcheren expedition, and though with his transcendent sagacity he foresaw its ultimate result, he was yet not free from all uneasiness when he heard of 40,000 or 50,000 English soldiers—soldiers whose valour Spain had showed him. He did not think that such a force was to be despised, and by no means wished that the French should remain indifferent to its appearance. He could then have wished that at the first signal the nation had risen up in eager indignation to fall upon the audacious foe that dared to violate the soil of the empire. This would have been to unite the enthusiasm of 1792 with the profound order of 1809; but things so contrary are not to be allied at will. Nevertheless, as it gathers years, authority becomes singularly self-complacent, however great it may be intellectually. This is a weakness of time. Though he began to weary the nation, though the evidence of his ambition gave his wars a meaning unfavourable to him, Napoleon thought that every thing was due to him; that at the first danger occasioned by his fault, every Frenchman ought to start to his feet; and he had, moreover, contracted the false notion of a man of genius, that a government, when it will, may make a nation do whatever it pleases. He was, therefore, dissatisfied that on the first appearance of the English on the soil of the empire, his ministers had not appealed to France, roused her enthusiasm, and demanded her devoted efforts. He believed they ought to have done this, that they could have done it, and he blamed their coldness. He thought it especially desirable (and in this he showed no weakness, but the highest good sense) to disgust the English with similar expeditions, by setting the mass of the people upon them. He regarded it as a great advantage for the moment, to prove to Austria, with which he was in negotiation, that France was ready to unite with him; and, if the reader would know his last motive, frankly expressed in his letters, he desired, as matter for recruiting was beginning to fail him, to procure fresh, by deriving from a strong commotion from 60,000 to 80,000 young national guards, whom, once raised, he would retain in arms, and convert into the best of conscripts, for they would all be from twenty to thirty years old. He therefore bitterly blamed General Clarke and Arch-chancellor Cambacérès for their excessive prudence, and MM. Fouché and Decrès for not having persisted in the opinions they had put forth, still more than MM. Clarke and Cambacérès for not having acquiesced in them. He wrote to both parties that he could not understand their hesitations; that at the first signal they ought to have raised 60,000 national guards, convoked the senate, employed it to speak to France, and proved that behind the armies engaged at a distance, there remained the nation itself, ready to support them and supply their place at every point. If these ideas be compared with those which have been attributed to him in all contemporary narratives, it will be seen how rarely history is well informed.

Far from being displeased with Fouché for having agitated the nation Napoleon blamed

him for not having sufficiently stirred it up. As for the choice of the commander-in-chief, he here showed how much his judgment was superior to his passions when a great interest required it. He entertained a deep aversion for the vanity, the ambition, and the whole character of Marshal Bernadotte, and he perfectly divined what treachery, present and future, was latent in his heart; and yet, deeming him, of all men within reach of the British expedition, the only one capable of taking the command, he deeply regretted that he had not been nominated general-in-chief of the troops assembled in the north. He therefore reproached his ministers for not having chosen him, and ordered them to confer the command upon him if there was yet time. He no less strongly condemned them for conferring the command on King Louis. He was beginning to conceive an extreme impatience at seeing his brother govern Holland in a narrow interest, tolerating smuggling, favouring clandestine relations with England, feebly seconding and often abandoning the cause of the continental blockade, and abounding in a system of economy pleasing to the Dutch, but destructive to their army and their marine. Exaggerating even his brother's sins regarding the imperial policy, he went so far as to entertain distrust of him, and he reproached his ministers for not having seen that on this occasion King Louis would prefer the interests of Holland to those of France, and, to preserve Amsterdam, would let Flushing be taken and Antwerp burned. Nothing was more unjust than such a supposition, for King Louis was at that moment hastening to the defence of the French territory, and was uncovering Amsterdam to cover Antwerp. But, irritated by a correspondence with his brother, which was daily becoming more acrimonious, Napoleon blamed the confidence that had been placed in him, and in his letters he sarcastically asked his ministers, "Is it because he bears the title of constable that you have chosen Louis? But Murat bears that of grand-admiral: what would you say if I gave him a fleet to command?"

These points settled, the convocation of the national guard being adopted, and Bernadotte being designated for the chief command, he gave admirably prudent, able, and provident instructions as to the conduct to be pursued. Make no attempt, he said, in his letters to his ministers, to come to action with the English. *A man is not a soldier.\** Your national guards, your conscripts of the provisional demi-brigades, led pell-mell to Antwerp, almost without officers, with an artillery scarcely formed, opposed to Moore's soldiers, who have had to do with the troops of the grand army, would get themselves beaten, and would supply the English expedition with an object which they will soon lack, if they have not taken the fleet as I hope, and if they do not take Antwerp, as I am sure they will not. The English must be opposed only with the fever, which will soon have devoured them all; and with soldiers shut in behind intrenchments and inundations, to be organized and instructed. In a month the English will depart covered with confusion, decimated by the

fever, and I shall have gained from this expedition an army of 80,000 men, which will render me many services if the war with Austria is to continue.

In accordance with these views, Napoleon ordered General Monnet to defend Flushing to the last extremity, so as to keep the English as long as possible in the fever district, and give Antwerp time to complete its defences. He formally enjoined him not to lose a minute in breaking the dikes and laying the whole island of Walcheren under water. He then gave orders to have the fleet taken up to Antwerp, or even higher, if that had not yet been done; to let in the water only where inundations were necessary; by no means to sink hulls of vessels in the channels, for he did not wish to have the Scheldt destroyed by way of defending it; to muster at Antwerp, under Marshal Bernadotte, the provisional demi-brigades, General Rampon's national guards *d'élite*, the disposable dépôt battalions, Marshal Moncey's gendarmes, and King Louis's Dutchmen, the whole forming possibly an army of 25,000 men, to be stationed round Antwerp behind the dikes and inundations, so as to render the place inaccessible, without, however, giving battle, but leaving the fever alone to work for him upon the English; to form after that first army a second, composed exclusively of national guards, distributed into five legions, commanded by as many veteran officers of the senate, and to be spread from the Tête de Flandre (a suburb of Antwerp) to the Island of Cadzand, to guard the left bank of the Scheldt, in case the English should attempt a descent upon it; to organize that new army as well as possible, and summon to it, not retired officers, old servants of the republic, but officers from the infantry dépôts, particularly the majors, who were almost all excellent; to get together the *matériel* and *personnel* of eighty pieces of artillery, the means for which he afforded by leaving in France ten companies of artillery out of those he had demanded; lastly, to place that second army under the command of Marshal Bessières, who was cured of the wound he had received at Wagram, on whose devoted zeal he relied, and whom he was not sorry to place by the side of Prince Bernadotte to second and watch the latter. To these two armies Napoleon (knowing that one never obtains more than half what one orders and pays for) desired to add a third on the Meuse, which was to come from the Rhine, and be composed of some demi-brigades at first destined for the Danube. He had already received from the hospitals, the dépôts of Italy, and the demi-brigades which had come by Strasburg and down the Danube, a considerable mass of soldiers, who had been incorporated with the army of Germany, and raised its effective amount to a most satisfactory point. He could, therefore, dispense with part of the resources he had called for, and consequently he gave orders to stop at Strasburg every corps that was organized—such for example as the demi-brigades—and send them down by the Rhine to the Meuse; to continue to send to Vienna mere detachments, suitable for recruiting the battalions; to commence at Maestricht, under Marshal Kellermann, a muster of 10,000 men, complete in all arms, in order to flank Marshal Bernadotte at Antwerp. Estimating

\* Napoleon's own words. What follows is a faithful abridgment of a hundred admirable letters on the Walcheren expedition.



Bernadotte's corps at 80,000 men, that of Bessières at 40,000, and that of Kellermann at 10,000, Napoleon hoped to have in Flanders an army of 80,000 men, including 50,000 at least passably organized, who, moreover, would become trained in a little while, and of whom, perhaps, at some future time, he himself would suddenly come and take the command, if there was any good snare to be laid for the English. Detaining the latter in a labyrinth of islands, marshes, and arms of the sea, he did not despair of seconding the effects of the fever by some sudden piece of strategy, which would make them pay dear for their immense expedition; so that instead of being distressed by an attempt, which in reality as we have said revealed one of the bad sides of his policy, he was delighted at it, because he discerned the probability of a signal retaliation, and the creation of an army the more added to those he already possessed.

When these instructions arrived in Paris they filled Fouché with pride, and Clarke and Cambacérès with embarrassment. But each went to work to fulfil Napoleon's intentions to the best of his ability. Fouché had already rung a veritable tocsin for the levy of the national guards. He had in the first instance addressed a call to ten departments: he had recourse to twenty after the letters from Schönbrunn, and prepared even to address a still greater number. L'Escaut, la Lys, la Meuse Inférieure, Jemmapes, les Ardennes, la Marne, l'Aisne, le Nord, le Pas de Calais, la Somme, la Seine Inférieure, l'Oise, Seine et Oise, la Seine, Seine et Marne, l'Aube, l'Yonne, le Loiret, Eure et Loire, and l'Eure, were put under contribution to furnish contingents of national guards. The prefects called together the mayors, and organized a sort of conscription, which was to be voluntary in appearance, but forced in reality, and from which escape was to be effected by paying so much a day to the unemployed workmen, or the vagabonds whom the authorities did not know what to do with. There were, in fact, very few zealous citizens who offered to serve in person, for this muster of national guards was looked upon as a new form of conscription. People did not believe much in the danger of the British expedition, and such as it was, they imputed it to the policy which left our own frontiers uncovered to invade those of others. In the Belgian departments, which were ill-disposed, and in those of the centre and the south, where distance caused the danger to be more coolly regarded, the inhabitants did not lend themselves freely to the new levies. But in the old departments near the northern frontiers and the coast, where the hatred of the English has always been very strong, people came forward with some alacrity. These latter departments had already furnished General Rampon with picked companies, consisting of old soldiers; they again supplied men for the new corps, of which Napoleon had ordered the formation. M. Fouché, acting in a revolutionary manner, did not hesitate to charge the budget of the minister of the interior with considerable expenses for clothing the national guards. Partly from zeal, partly from ostentation, he displayed an activity which was soon to end by exciting suspicion, for it exceeded the bounds of what was natural and useful. In Paris especially he displayed an ardour that appeared strange. In

that great capital, accustomed to pass so rapidly from enthusiasm to sarcasm, there had been a change of feeling toward Napoleon since the war in Spain. To have the English so close upon one at home, while one was at Madrid and Vienna; to keep the Pope prisoner at Rome, when he had been so caressed at Notre Dame; all this displayed an inconsistency which no one took the trouble to disguise. Paris, according to the bulletins of the police, was not like itself for a year past, and—sad result of the abuse of war!—Napoleon had so wearied out patriotism, that the mendacious bulletins of the Archduke Charles, denying the success of the French army, were secretly circulated; not that the Parisians were already so culpable as not to desire that success, but because without doubting Napoleon's genius they began to doubt his fortune, and thus he had revived the dangerous propensity to be critical. For these reasons Fouché had with difficulty succeeded in moving the young who loved horses and uniforms, and organizing some battalions of national guards in Paris. He had been obliged to talk of a guard of honour, which should escort the Emperor's person without going very far abroad; and to fill up its vacant ranks, he had even been obliged to pay men without work. He had then indulged in the pleasure of reviewing them—a dangerous pleasure, which was afterward to cost him dear. As for the minister of war, M. Clarke, his occupations were more serious. On receipt of letters from Napoleon, he had summoned the Prince of Ponte Corvo, and sent him to Antwerp. The disposable demi-brigades were on their way to the Scheldt; the gendarmerie, collected by Marshal Moncey, had furnished two thousand horses; the artillery withdrawn from the roads to Alsace were on those to Flanders, and, though with much confusion, the means of defence were beginning to accumulate on the previously unguarded points of Antwerp, la Tête de Flandre, le Sas de Gand, Breskens, and the Island of Gdazand.

Fortunately the English had profited little by the time elapsed. They had finished by collecting all their land and sea forces in the Eastern Scheldt. Their fleet was spread over the various channels that divide Walcheren from North and South Beveland; their troops were stationed in the Island of Walcheren, round Flushing, and in South Beveland, round the fort of Batz. They did not think they could march safely until they had opened to their fleet the passage of the Western Scheldt, by the capture of Flushing, which would allow them to bring up their whole army by sea before Batz and Santvliet. In consequence of this determination, they had spent the first days of August in making works of approach before Flushing, and had employed their best troops upon them. General Monnet, who, as we have seen, had received 2000 men from various regiments, particularly two French battalions—the one from the 48th, the other from the 65th—had used them to dispute the ground more vigorously than had been done in the beginning. The new troops sent to him, though young, were full of honour, and did their duty better than the medley of foreigners of whom the Flushing garrison had at first consisted.

After having lost 12,000 or 15,000 men, he, was by the 10th of August entirely pent up within the town, and communicated only by his right with the post of Rameskens, where he had endeavoured to break down the dikes, in compliance with Napoleon's urgent orders. But whether it was that the tide was too low, or the ground not formed to receive the inundation, but little water had entered the island, and the English, lodged on the causeways, had been able to remain before Flushing, where they were at work to establish batteries to reduce the town. This was the critical moment for the besieged; for General Monnet had no casemates to shelter his troops. He had in the town a population (like all maritime populations) ill-disposed toward the French; he had in the garrison one-third French, unused to war, but trustworthy, and two-thirds foreigners, downright bandits, who took advantage of the disorder of a siege to plunder and exasperate the inhabitants. The condition was, therefore, one of the very worst for resisting the frightful extremities which were in preparation.

In conformity with the true principles of siege operations, the English had resolved to employ all their artillery simultaneously, and not otherwise. On the one hand, they laboured at the erection of their incendiary batteries; on the other, to introduce into the Deurloo channel a portion of the Gardner division, which consisted of ships of the line and frigates, so as to cannonade the town by land and sea. Already even they had succeeded in turning it on the inner side, by passing through the Weere Gat into the Sloe.

On the 11th of August, after some difficulty for want of pilots and in consequence of the removal of the buoys, the frigates began to pass along the Deurloo channel before Flushing, discharging upon its walls a cannonade, which was vigorously returned. They effected their junction with the smaller craft, which had come down by the Sloe to before Rameskens. On the 12th the ships followed the frigates into the channel, and the English general having summoned Flushing to surrender, began to cannonade it simultaneously by land and sea. Never had so many guns sent forth their thunders in so small a space. The land-batteries numbered more than sixty pieces of large calibre—24-pounders and mortars. The guns of the naval division were from 1000 to 1100, and poured out incessant broadsides of shot and shells. After twenty-four hours of this horrible cannonade, the town was found to be on fire; all the houses were shot through, all the roofs demolished. The inhabitants howled in despair. The batteries on the side next the sea replied with vigour, and caused the British squadron some serious damage. But the latter was numerous enough to bring fresh vessels into line, in the place of those that were injured; and, in consequence of the freedom of its movements, it was able to throw its fire athwart our batteries. The contest could not long be continued, without ending in all our gunners being put *hors de combat*. By the 14th most of them were killed or wounded. Endeavours were made to fill their places with soldiers of the line, but the latter, having no experience, were very bad substitutes; and besides, the cannons were almost all dismantled.

On the 14th, the English general, finding the guns of the town almost silenced, granted it a respite while he again summoned it to surrender. Not receiving an immediate reply, he reopened his fire. This fresh cannonade put Flushing in such a state that it was no longer possible to resist. No return was made to the besiegers' fire, for our batteries were every one destroyed. The troops, with the exception of the French minority, refused to serve, and employed themselves only in pillaging. The despairing inhabitants insisted on surrendering, for several breaches in the walls exposed them to the horrors of storming. Under these circumstances, General Monnet consented to capitulate, and signed articles of surrender on the 16th of August. Though capitulations are never to be excused, it must be owned that in this case a longer defence was impossible, and would have retarded the surrender only one day, while it exposed the garrison and the inhabitants to all the consequences of a storming. After all, General Monnet, by detaining the enemy seventeen days before Flushing, and General Rousseau, by preventing their landing on Cadzaand, had ruined the English expedition.

Flushing taken, an immediate advance ought to have been made upon Antwerp; but here the operation was becoming more delicate and more perilous, since the invaders had to march over French territory, through vast inundations, to lay siege to a considerable fortress already filled with reinforcements, which had been sent to it from all parts. The simplest course—if there had been as much resolution at that time as when the expedition started—would have been to have landed all the troops with their *matériel* on the islands of North and South Beveland, to have crossed those islands on foot, as the Hope division had previously done, and gone straightway to Santvliet, without losing time in bringing all the way up the two Scheldts such an enormous quantity of ships, frigates, and transports. A keen dispute arose on this subject between the naval and the military commander, as always happens in expeditions of this kind in which such dissimilar forces co-operate. The admiral, who was for landing the troops at once, and marching them to Batz, urged the difficulty of working through the two Scheldts under the fire of the batteries still remaining to the Dutch and the French, and through channels the soundings of which were unknown, a multitude of ships of war and transports, amounting, with the gun-boats, to 1200 or 1500, and towing these against the stream, which would require an indefinite number of days, while, if the troops were landed where they were, they would reach Batz in forty-eight hours. The commander of the land forces, on the contrary, wished to have all his *matériel* deposited at Batz or at Santvliet, alleging the impossibility of traversing with such encumbrances, ground intersected by so many arms of the sea, canals, and dikes, to reach the upper extremity of the two Scheldts. He urged above all the necessity of having means to cross the channel of Bergen-op-Zoom, and from the Island of South Beveland to the mainland, on which Antwerp stands. It is probable that the general, on whom rested the responsibility of the land operations, was not displeased to protract an expedition which frightened him,

now that he had to march over the soil of the empire.

After a keen altercation, the Earl of Chatham, with whom it rested to decide how he would employ his army, having insisted that his troops and his *matériel* should be conveyed by water to Batz and Santvliet, the admiral had only to submit, and undertake the introduction of that immense armament into the two Scheldts. This he tried to do, introducing the smaller craft into the eastern branch, and the larger, such as frigates and ships, into the western. But the fleet had to wait every day for the tide, and, when the wind was not favourable, the vessels had to haul upon their cables or be towed from the shore. From the 16th of August all the seamen in the fleet were employed in this severe labour.

During this time the Prince of Ponte Corvo had repaired to Antwerp, which he entered on the 16th, bringing thither very opportunely the authority of his rank. King Louis who, amid the confusion of dismayed civilians and scarcely organized troops, knew not which way to turn for advice, gladly resigned the command to the prince-marshal, and retired to Bergen-op-Zoom, and thence to Amsterdam, to take care of his own dominions. He left, however, his 5000 Dutchmen between Santvliet and Bergen-op-Zoom at the disposal of Marshal Bernadotte, who had the power to combine them with his own forces.

The marshal found on his arrival three demi-brigades already mustered, several fourth battalions taken from the 24th military division, a Polish battalion, 3000 or 4000 national guards *d'élite*, about 2000 mounted gendarmes, 1000 horses from the dépôts, and several companies of artillery, making altogether twenty and odd thousand men present under arms, 12,000 or 15,000 of whom were capable of appearing in line, with nearly 24 pieces of cannon, badly horsed. This medley of troops would have made a bad figure before the English army, especially if it was commanded like its countrymen in Spain; but behind the inundation of the Scheldt and the walls of Antwerp, under the command of a marshal practised in war and inspiring confidence, it was enough to frustrate the impending attack. It is true that the confusion in Antwerp was great, and that the moment would still have been favourable enough for a daring enemy, who, after taking Flushing, should have marched on Antwerp, which he might have reached on the 17th, when the marshal, but just arrived, knowing neither the place nor his army, had not yet been able to grasp the command. Success would have been easy on the 1st of August, if the English had not waited to take Flushing; but on the 16th, after Flushing had fallen, it became difficult, there being already in Antwerp a considerable though ill-organized muster of men, supplies, and a commander; and day by day the difficulty was about to rise into impossibility, for besides that the forces in the town were to be incessantly augmented, they were about to be organized, which was still better than being augmented.

Marshal Bernadotte, in concert with two able men, Admiral Missiessy and the Engineer-commandant Decaux, completed the measures devised in anticipation of the march of the English upon Antwerp. The forts of Lillo and Liefkenshoek were put completely in a state of de-

fence and surrounded by vast inundations. Behind these forts two sets of booms protected the fleet. Within the booms a numerous flotilla, ranging along the banks of the Scheldt, was to sweep them with raging fires; and the ten ships of the fleet, free in their movements, and having nothing to fear from fire-ships, could second the defence of Antwerp with 800 or 900 large guns. Antwerp itself was covered with intrenchments, palisades, and cannons; it was filled with troops, and its defenders were ready to encompass it with inundations. Marshal Bernadotte reviewed the troops, organized them, prepared them to look the enemy in the face, inspired them with an incipient confidence in themselves, and completed the mounting of their artillery; while in the rear, from the Tête de Flandre to Bruges, national guards were mustering in large numbers to form the army of Marshal Bessières. The brave General Rousseau, with one of the demi-brigades sent him, guarded all the approaches to the Island of Cadzand and the left bank of the Scheldt.

After having spent seventeen days in taking Flushing, the English employed ten more in working their 1200 or 1500 sail up the two branches of the Scheldt. On the 25th, they had between Batz and Santvliet 200 or 300 frigates, corvettes, brigs, and gun-boats, and were in a condition to cross the channel of Bergen-op-Zoom, which forms the junction of the Western with the Eastern Scheldt. They could do so either in their countless boats, or by fording it at low tide with the water up to their shoulders. But beyond it they had to brave the territory of the empire, an experienced general, and an army magnified by the exaggerations of the French and the fears of the English, and reputed to be 40,000 strong. This was not all; the epidemic which had spared the corps engaged before Flushing, because activity generally protects armies from fever, had not only attacked the troops landed in South Beveland, but also the division which, after having completed the siege of Flushing, was resting in Walcheren. The effects of their want of occupation, and the bad marsh water they drank, had been the more violent from the numbers assembled. From the 16th of Aug., the date of the surrender of Flushing, to the 26th, when the naval forces arrived off Batz, 12,000 or 15,000 men had been attacked by the fever, and in many of them it had assumed a malignant character. They were dying by thousands, and there was scarcely a place to lay them; for there were few buildings on the always half-inundated islands of Zeeland, and Flushing had not a roof left standing. After having left some thousand men in Flushing, there remained, exclusive of the sick and wounded, but 24,000 or 25,000 out of 44,000 to march to Antwerp.

Lord Chatham, seeing this state of things, and further intimidated by what was reported of Bernadotte's strength, held a council of war on the 26th of August, at Batz, to determine what was to be done. All the lieutenant-generals were present. It was evidently impossible to cross the channel of Bergen-op-Zoom, either by fording it or on shipboard, and then march on Antwerp, without incurring a disaster. In fact, there would be found invincible difficulties on the way, if the French had the prudence not to give battle, but trust to the obstruction

caused by the waters, which could not fail to stop the English army, while the fever would reduce their numbers from 24,000 to 20,000 or perhaps 15,000. And if they failed before Antwerp, as every thing foreboded, how should they effect their retreat before the French, who would immediately sally out from their intrenchments and pursue them. It would be the utmost if they could get back safe and sound across the channel of Bergen-op-Zoom.

These arguments were quite valid ; for whereas on the 1st of August there was every chance of success, and on the 16th some still remained, on the 26th there was none whatever, and it would have been madness to pursue the object of the expedition further. Its leaders, then, had to content themselves with the conquest of Flushing ; a conquest, it is true, that would not be retained, though costing enormous expenses, 15,000 or 20,000 invalids, and the shame of seeing the greatest maritime expedition of the age appear ridiculous. But there was no help for it. The decision of the council of war was immediately transmitted to England, whence a reply could arrive in forty-eight hours. The interval was spent in retrograding and embarking the sick for England.

On the 2d of September the British cabinet approved of the decision of the council of war, and ratified the abandonment of an expedition which had cost so many efforts and promised such vast results. The English began again the difficult operation of hauling along the Scheldt 1200 or 1500 vessels of all forms and sizes, and embarking their men, horses, and cannon. A great number of vessels sailed for the Downs. But the army could not be left where it was. Already there were 15,000 or 18,000 soldiers on the sick-list. These were embarked as well as could be done, and vessels to convey them home were continually passing to and fro between the Island of Walcheren and the Downs. To avoid acknowledging the complete failure of the expedition by immediately evacuating Flushing, it was resolved to leave there a garrison of 12,000 men, and the water drunk being the principal cause of the fever, 800 tuns a day were to be sent from the Downs to Flushing. The transports, therefore, were constantly coming and going, bringing water and taking away the sick. Four thousand had already perished in Walcheren. Twelve thousand had been carried to England, where many died on their arrival, and as the garrison of Flushing diminished daily, it was resolved that only the number of troops strictly necessary for its defence should remain there. It was even intended to evacuate it altogether after blowing up the works, if the peace which was soon to be signed brought back the French armies from the Danube to the Scheldt.

When the French perceived the retrograde movement of the English, (and they were not slow to perceive it,) they were in a tumult of delight at their easy victory. The happy result was due exclusively to the firm attitude of General Rousseau, who had preserved the Island of Cadzand, to General Monnet's resistance, which had made the English lose valuable time,—and to the coolness of Admiral Missiessy, whose skilful manœuvring had saved the fleet. Nevertheless, Marshal Bernadotte, always prompt to sound his own praises, addressed a

new order of the day to his troops, applauding himself for the victory they had obtained over the English. This order of the day did not find more favour at Schönbrunn than that which he had addressed to the Saxons after the battle of Wagram.

It was now time to stop the levy of the national guards, who filled the country with agitation from Lille to Ghent, from Ghent to Antwerp, deserted for the most part on the march, or arrived in undisciplined tumult. This was the opinion of General Clarke, but Fouché, who had received the Emperor's approbation for the first levy, and found means of exalting his own consequence through the reviews in Paris and the general movement of the population, continued the levies and extended them to the whole coast of the empire, even to Toulon and Genoa, under the pretext that the English, being forced to quit Zealand, might very possibly go and revenge themselves in Guyenne, Provence, or Piedmont, for their disaster in Flanders.

All these events were made known to Napoleon in the beginning of September. Great was his joy and his pride, for he attributed this success to his lucky star. Having seen that star near waning two or three times since the affairs of Spain began, he thought he now beheld it shining with fresh lustre. "It is," he said in his letters, "a piece of the good fortune attached to present circumstances, this same expedition, which reduces to nothing the greatest efforts of England, procures us an army of 80,000 men, which we could not have procured otherwise." He gave orders to continue organizing the army of the north, to muster five legions of national guards under five senators, selecting for them only young and vigorous men, disposed to serve ; and to complete the horsing of the artillery, in order that it might drive the English out of Flushing if they attempted to remain there, or return to Germany if hostilities with Austria were resumed. Lastly, being again displeased with Marshal Bernadotte for his propensity to vaunt after the simplest operations, and seeing him with distrust at the head of an army composed of old republican officers and national guards, he had him thanked by the Minister Clarke for his services, and ordered Marshal Bessières to take command of the army of the north.

Such had been this year the efforts of the English to dispute the Peninsula with Napoleon, and destroy his vast maritime armaments on the coasts. In Spain, with a few soldiers and a good general, they had stood their ground against admirable troops feebly commanded ; and in Flanders, with excellent troops lacking a general, they had failed ignominiously before the recruits that filled Antwerp. But on the one theatre and the other Napoleon's fortune still prevailed. Sir Arthur Wellesley, pursued by the mass of the French armies, retreated into Andalusia, dissatisfied with his Spanish allies, and scarcely having any more hopes of that war. Lord Chatham returned to England, covered with confusion. Napoleon might then extort from forsaken Austria a brilliant peace, and save his own greatness and ours, if he profited by the lessons of fortune, which once again seemed to have used him roughly for a moment to warn rather than destroy him.

## BOOK XXXVII.

## THE DIVORCE.

Course of the Negotiation at Altenburg.—Napoleon would have desired the separation of the three Crowns of the House of Austria, or their transference to the head of the Duke of Wurzburg.—Not wishing yet to make a campaign for the purpose of effecting that object, he contents himself with new acquisitions of Territory in Italy, Bavaria, and Poland.—Reluctance of Austria to make the sacrifice required of her.—Intentional delays of M. de Metternich and General Nugent, the Austrian Plenipotentiaries.—M. de Bubna carries a letter from the Emperor Francis to Napoleon.—The negotiations removed from Altenburg to Vienna.—Last discussion and signing of the treaty of peace on the 14th of October, 1809.—Napoleon's *ruse* to insure the ratification of the treaty.—His orders for the evacuation of Austria, and for sending into Spain all the forces set free by the peace.—Attempt to assassinate him in the court-yard of the Palace of Schönbrunn.—His return to France.—Affairs of the Church during the political and military events of the year 1809.—Intolerable situation of the Pope in Rome in presence of the French troops.—To put an end to it Napoleon issues the decree of the 17th of May, uniting the States of the Church to the French Empire.—Bull of excommunication issued in reply to that decree.—Arrest and removal of the Pope to Savona.—State of feeling in France consequent upon the political, military, and religious events of the year.—Deep change in public opinion.—Arrival of Napoleon at Fontainebleau—his abode there, and new habits.—Assemblage in Paris of Princes, Relations, or Allies.—Napoleon's return to Paris.—The resolution to be divorced matured in his mind during the late events.—He confides that resolution to the Arch-chancellor Cambacérès and to Champagny, Minister for Foreign Affairs.—Napoleon sends for Prince Eugene to Paris, that he may prepare his mother for the divorce, and solicits the hand of the Arch-duchess Anne, sister of the Emperor Alexander.—Arrival in Paris of Prince Eugene.—Grief and resignation of Josephine.—Forms adopted for the divorce, and consummation of that act on the 16th of December.—Josephine retires to Malmalou and Napoleon to Trianon.—Reception given at St. Petersburg to Napoleon's demand.—The Emperor Alexander consents to give his sister, but wishes to attach to the marriage a treaty against the eventual re-establishment of Poland.—Intentional delays of Russia, and impatience of Napoleon.—Secret communications making known the desire of Austria to bestow an Arch-duchess on Napoleon.—Council of the Grand Dignitaries of the Empire, in which the choice of a new consort is discussed.—Tired of the procrastinations of Russia, Napoleon breaks with that power, and abruptly determines to marry an Arch-duchess of Austria.—On the same day he signs, by Prince Schwarzenberg's mediation, his contract of marriage with Marie Louise, copied from Marie Antoinette's marriage-contract.—Prince Barthier sent to Vienna officially to demand the hand of the Arch-duchess Marie Louise.—He is eagerly welcomed by the Court of Austria.—Marriage celebrated at Vienna on the 11th of March.—Marriage celebrated at Paris on the 2d of April.—Temporary change for the better in public opinion, and last illusions of France as to the duration of the Imperial reign.

WHAT Napoleon most regarded in the Walcheren expedition was its influence over the negotiations at Altenburg. He had employed the time elapsed since the armistice of Znaim in putting his army in Germany into the most flourishing condition, so as to be able to prostrate the Austrians if the conditions of the peace they proposed were not agreeable to him. His army, encamped at Krems, Znaim, Brünn, Vienna, Presburg, Eidenburg, and Grätz, well fed, well rested, largely recruited by the arrival and dissolution of the demi-brigades, remounted in cavalry-horses, and provided with a numerous and splendid artillery, was superior to what it had been at any period of the campaign. Napoleon had formed under General Junot, with the garrisons left in Prussia, some demi-brigades under General Revaud, the reserves assembled in Augsburg, the provisional regiments of dragoons, and some Wurtembergers and Bavarians, an army of 30,000 foot and 5000 horse, to keep guard over Swabia, Franconia, and Saxony, and hinder the forays of the Duke of Brunswick (Els), and of General Kienmayer. Marshal Lefebvre with the Bavarians was battling in the Tyrol. Lastly, there was the new army of Antwerp, the numbers and efficiency of which he no doubt greatly exaggerated, but which was, nevertheless, a force the more added to all those he already possessed. He was, therefore, in a condition to treat advantageously with a power which, though likewise making great efforts to reorganize its troops, was not in a condition to raise itself up again. Yet, notwithstanding the immense resources at his command, Napoleon sincerely desired peace, and for excellent reasons.

At the opening of the war, flattering himself that he should crush Austria at a blow, and too much forgetting the greatness of the means she had prepared, Napoleon had been surprised by the resistance he encountered: and though his confidence in himself had never been shaken, he

had come to believe somewhat less in the facility of overthrowing the house of Habsburg. As he had now no thoughts of destroying it, war was for him without an object; for having taken the Venetian states and the Tyrol from that power in 1805, there remained nothing which he could detach from it for himself. To wrest from the empire of Austria two or three more millions of inhabitants, in order to enlarge the Duchy of Warsaw toward Gallicia, Saxony toward Bohemia, Bavaria toward Upper Austria, and Italy toward Carniola, was not worth a new campaign, however brilliant it might be. What would have completely fulfilled his wishes would have been to separate the three crowns of Austria, Bohemia, and Hungary, put them upon three several Austrian or German heads, and thus bring down for ever the old house of Austria; or else to make his irreconcilable enemy, the Emperor Francis, abdicate in favour of his brother the Duke of Wurzburg, who had been successively sovereign of Tuscany, Salzburg, and Wurzburg, a good-natured and enlightened prince, formerly the friend of the general of the army of Italy, and still the friend of the Emperor of the French. In that case Napoleon would not have exacted any sacrifice of territory whatever, so much would his pride have been satisfied by dethroning an emperor who had broken word with him; so much would it have conduced to the security of his policy to see the throne of Austria occupied by a prince on whose attachment he counted. But to separate the three crowns would be to destroy the house of Austria, and to do that required two or three more great victories, which Napoleon was very likely to gain, but which would probably make Europe desperate, alarm Russia, and disgust her with our alliance, and cause a general rising of the nations. As for a change of sovereigns, it was not easy to bring the Emperor Francis to abdicate, though he was said to be weary of the throne. Besides, it was not seemly to make

such a proposal. The suggestion ought to come from the Austrians themselves, in the hope of escaping territorial sacrifices. Thus the second plan was not much more feasible than the first. To weaken Austria in Galicia for the benefit of the Grand-duchy of Warsaw, in Bohemia for the benefit of Saxony, in Upper Austria for the benefit of Bavaria, and in Carinthia and Carniola, in order to procure a large continuity of territory from Italy to Dalmatia, and a land route toward the Turkish empire, was therefore the only practicable project. Napoleon resolved then to demand as much as possible in these several respects, and even to demand more than he was bent on obtaining, in order that he might exact payment in money for so much of his claims as he should abate at the end of the negotiation. Should he find the court of Vienna too fractious, and still too much possessed with the notion of its own strength, he would then resume his first destructive intentions, whatever all Europe might think of it, Russia included.

Toward the latter power Napoleon intended to continue to behave amicably and as an ally, but still giving it to understand that he had perceived the coolness of its zeal during the last war, and that he no longer relied on it for difficult cases. Feeling certain that it was not disposed to recommence war with France, and believing that it would not expose itself to that contingency for the sake of ameliorating the lot of Austria, he did not wish to brave it beyond what was necessary to weaken Austria sufficiently, and for ever deprive England of her alliance. Nevertheless, as he was always ready for extreme resolutions, he was determined, if the negotiations with Austria failed, to dare every thing against everybody, in order, as soon as possible, to close that long career of hostilities which the gigantic extent of his ambition had brought upon him. In consequence, after having maintained a long and even disdainful silence toward Alexander, he wrote to acquaint him with his victories, announce to him the opening of negotiations with Austria, and invite him to send to Altenburg a plenipotentiary furnished with his instructions as to the conditions of peace. Without naming any of those conditions, he asked that the person sent should be one who was friendly to that alliance which had already procured Finland for Russia, and which promised it Moldavia and Wallachia. Whether Alexander acceded to the proposal or not, whether or not he sent a negotiator to Altenburg, Napoleon's purposes would be equally served. A Russian negotiator might complicate the negotiation; but as he should be forced to side with the French, he would once more engage his court against Austria should hostilities be resumed.

Such were Napoleon's arrangements when the conferences for peace began. It was his intention, as we have said, to demand much more than he would be content to take, that he might exact payment of the difference in war contributions, which was fair enough, the expenses of the campaign having been enormous.

M. de Champagny set out in consequence for the little town of Altenburg, situated between Raab and Comorn, some leagues from the castle of Dotis, to which the Emperor Francis had retired after the battle of Wagram. M. de Champagny had orders to place the negotiation

on the basis of *uti possidetis*—that is to say, the surrender to France of those territories which our armies occupied, subject to such exchanges as might suit the convenience of Austria. Thus we held Vienna and Brünn, points which it was evident we could not retain; but, under the system of *uti possidetis*, Austria would cede in Bohemia, Galicia, and Illyria, as much territory and population as were restored to her at the centre of the monarchy. While she was offered this facility in distributing her losses, a demand was made on her for nearly nine millions of inhabitants; that is to say, more than a third of her dominions, which was equivalent to destroying her. But this was only a first demand, thrown out by way of beginning business.

The negotiations opened at the moment when it was beginning to be known in Austria that the Walcheren expedition would not be very successful; and they naturally languished until it was positively known that the expedition would have no other result than to make England lose some thousand men and much money, and to procure Napoleon an army the more. The Emperor Francis, forced, in spite of himself, to treat for terms, appointed M. de Metternich to negotiate with M. de Champagny. M. de Metternich was to supersede, as prime minister, M. de Stadion, who had made himself the representative of the war policy, not so much of his own impulse as that of his brother, a hot-headed priest, and who, after the battle of Wagram, had felt the necessity of resigning, and making way for the partisans of peace. M. de Metternich, however, had consented to become M. de Stadion's successor only when the two powers should have formally made their election between peace and war, by the conclusion of a definitive treaty. Until then, M. de Stadion was to remain with the army at Olmütz, and direct affairs *ad interim*. The emperor had come to Dotis in Hungary, and M. de Metternich, whose triumphal entry into the cabinet would be the result of peace, had undertaken the task of negotiating at Altenburg. With him was joined M. de Nugent, chief of the staff of the Austrian army, for all military details, and for the discussion of points concerning the demarcation of frontiers. While the negotiations were pending, the Austrians strove (like Napoleon on his side) to excite the zeal of the provinces still belonging to the monarchy, to recruit the army, and reconstruct its *matériel*.

The first conferences took place at the end of August, more than a month after the battle of Znaim and the signing of the armistice: so much time had it taken to bring the plenipotentiaries together and give them their instructions. This prolongation of the armistice, which was only to have lasted a month, was readily consented to, for nobody was in a hurry, neither Napoleon, because he was living at the expense of Austria, and had his reinforcements to receive; nor Austria, because, although she defrayed the cost of our stay, she wanted to repair her forces, and to know the result of the Walcheren expedition.

From the first, M. de Champagny was good-tempered and calm, as usual, but proud of the sovereign he represented; M. de Nugent was gloomy, captious, and displayed the soreness

-f wounded military pride; M. de Metternich was cool, subtle, and formal, prolixly argumentative and careful, as became his part, to repair the faults of his petulant colleague. After a while, the awkwardness of the first days began to wear off. M. de Nugent became less bitter, M. de Metternich less formal, and M. de Champagny remained unchanged and peremptory, not from his natural disposition, but in obedience to his instructions. M. de Metternich saw there were two ways of concluding a peace: the one, large, generous, fruitful in good results, consisted in restoring to Austria all the prisoners just taken from her, and leaving her such as she had been before hostilities began. Touched by such generosity, she would become for France a much surer ally than Russia, because she was less changeable; and an ally at least as powerful, as might have been perceived in the last battles. Such a result would be better than a new dislocation of her territory, for the advantage of ungrateful, impotent, insatiable allies like Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Saxony, that strove to promote war for the purpose of enriching themselves, and were not worth what they cost. This, he said, was one way in which peace might be conceived; and then there was another—narrow, difficult, insecure, cruel to the power from which fresh sacrifices were to be extorted, unprofitable to the power that was to obtain them; one after which both parties would be rather more dissatisfied with each other, and resigned to peace only so long as they could not recommence war. This way of treating consisted in computations of territory; it was a market job. If that was what the French preferred—as he much feared it was—they must speak first, and declare what they wanted; for, after all, it was not for Austria to despoil herself.

M. de Champagny replied that the first system of peace had been tried after Austerlitz, but to no good purpose; that at that period Napoleon, victorious over the Austrian and Russian armies, had received the Emperor of Austria at his bivouac, and, upon a pledge that war should be made on him no more, had restored the whole Austrian monarchy, with the exception of some slight dismemberments; that after having preserved an empire which he might have destroyed, he had a right to count upon a durable peace; and yet, no sooner was he engaged with the English in Spain, than all promises had been forgotten, and war had been resumed, without any regard to plighted word; that after such experience it was no longer possible to be generous; and those must suffer for the war who had so readily and unscrupulously recommended it.

M. de Metternich alleged, in his rejoinder, the thousand grievances for which it was so easy to find matter in Napoleon's ambition. He alleged, and with reason, the destruction of the house of Spain, the alarm caused in all courts by that audacious measure,—an alarm which was any thing but allayed by the establishment of a close intimacy with Russia, which gave reason to apprehend the most formidable designs against the security of all states; and, lastly, the refusal to admit Austria, if not into that intimacy, at least into a knowledge of what Russia and France were preparing for the world. After the long enumeration of all these

grievances, which occupied more than one official conference, and more than one private interview, it was necessary to come to a specific intimation of what was required, the Austrians persisting in it that the French, who demanded sacrifices, ought to speak first. Though conscious of the enormity of what he was about to put forth, M. de Champagny, in obedience to his master's orders, claimed to stand on the basis of *uti possidetis*, according to which each party was to keep what it had, saving the exchange of certain portions of territory for others. M. de Metternich replied, that if such a proposal was meant in earnest, both parties must prepare to fight, and fight with fury, for what was demanded was nine millions of inhabitants, a third, at least, of the monarchy: it was, in fact, its destruction; and that being the case, there must be an end to all negotiation.

After this first opening, both parties were silent for some days. A precaution taken by Napoleon threw a fresh chill upon the negotiation. Lest, with reference to Gallia, and the aggrandizement of the duchy of Warsaw, language should be imputed to him which he would not utter, and he should have attributed to him, in order to involve him in a quarrel with Russia, a design of re-establishing Poland, he required that minutes should be taken of the conferences. The precaution was not without utility, but it tended to make the negotiations interminable. "We are no longer negotiators, we are mere machines," observed M. de Metternich. "Peace is impossible," he repeated incessantly; and thereupon, with an air of sadness and despondency, he avowed to M. de Champagny that he considered the negotiation as illusory, for it resembled all those which France had entered upon with England; and in reality, he believed the Emperor Napoleon was resolved to continue the war. M. de Champagny, who knew the contrary, declared it was not so, that Napoleon desired peace, with the advantages he had a right to expect from the results of the war. "But then," retorted M. de Metternich, "wherefore a principle of negotiation that cannot be accepted? Wherefore these interminable formalities, which destroy all confidence?"

Things could not be left at this dead lock, and Napoleon, satisfied with the result already visible for him of the Walcheren expedition, and wishing to derive from it, not the means of continuing the war, but that of concluding an advantageous peace, ordered M. de Champagny to make a first step toward a compromise. If Austria, for instance, manifested a disposition to consent to sacrifices, such as those to which she had consented at Presburg, and which had consisted in the surrender of about three millions of subjects, he should respond to this concession with another, and take a middle term between nine millions and three, that is to say, four or five, and then it would be for both parties to try and come to a mutual understanding as to details.

This overture, made confidentially to M. de Metternich, confirmed his previous surmise, that Napoleon was willing to abate his first exorbitant demands; but while so much was still claimed, he would not explain himself in the name of his court. The essential declaration that it was ready to make fresh sacrifices of territory, he was reluctant to utter, for hitherto

It had always stood upon this principle, that it would give money but not territory. M. de Metternich, however, consulted his court, which was at Dotis, some leagues from Altenburg. Meanwhile the two Austrian diplomatists required a formal statement as to what Napoleon proposed to keep, and what he was willing to give back. They required that those general principles of negotiation should be laid aside, such as *uti possidetis*, and what were called the sacrifices of Presburg, which signified nothing, or signified things inadmissible.

Napoleon, who desired peace, determined then to take another step, and drew up with his own hand a very brief note, in which he began to speak clearly, and demanded, on the Danube, Upper Austria as far as the line of the Enns, to join it to Bavaria, leaving it for a future day to declare what sacrifice he should think fit to require in Italy. This demand involved a loss of 800,000 inhabitants, of the important town of Linz, and of the line of the Traun and the Enns, together with the advance of the Bavarian frontier to within a few leagues of Vienna. The Austrian diplomatists received this note without any remark, taking it *ad referendum*, that is to say, to be communicated to their court. M. de Metternich contented himself with saying, in conversation, to M. de Champagny, "It seems your master does not wish that the Emperor Francis should return to Vienna, since he places the Bavarians at the gates of that capital." It is certain that, if Napoleon's demand had been conceded, there would only have remained the position of St. Polten to cover Vienna, and that the Emperor Francis would have had to transfer his capital to Presburg or Comorn.

After a pause of two days, the Austrian diplomatists replied, on the 27th of August, that so long as they did not know what was demanded in Italy, it would be impossible for them to explain themselves, and they begged the French negotiator would be good enough to state the desires of his government in full. Napoleon thereupon drew another note, which was read at Altenburg by M. de Champagny. He intended, he said, on the Italian side, to reserve to himself Carinthia, Carniola, and the right bank of the Save from Carniola to the frontiers of Bosnia. Thus Napoleon reserved to himself—first, the slopes of the Carnic Alps, the upper valley of the Drave, Villach, and Klagenfurth; secondly, the slopes of the Julian Alps, the upper valley of the Save, Laybach, Trieste, and Fiume, which would give him a large and rich province connecting Italy with Dalmatia, and lead him by an uninterrupted contiguity of territory to the frontiers of the Turkish Empire. This new sacrifice would uncover Vienna on the Italian side, as the former one would have uncovered it on the side of Upper Austria; since it would put into our hands the position of Tarvis, Villach, and Klagenfurth, and nothing would remain for the defence of that capital but the positions of Leoben and Neustadt, that is to say, the prolongation of the Noric Alps. In point of population, the loss would amount to between 1,400,000 and 1,500,000 inhabitants.

This second note was, like the former, received in gloomy silence by the Austrian diplomatists, and again accepted *ad referendum*. M. de Metternich, who saw M. de Champagny every evening, merely said to him that he was dismember-

ing the Austrian Empire bit by bit, uncovering the capital on all sides, and taking away its defences both on the German and the Italian routes; that evidently his master did not wish for peace; but he was mistaken if he thought the Austrian power destroyed: the provinces still left to the empire displayed extraordinary zeal, and the war, if continued, would be a war of despair. To this M. de Champagny replied, that the sacrifices actually demanded, with the addition of those intended to be claimed in Bohemia and Gallicia, did not amount to the half of what could accrue to France on the principle of *uti possidetis*. As for war, Napoleon did not fear it; he had employed the two months of the armistice in doubling his forces; without withdrawing a single man from his armies in Spain, he had 300,000 on the Danube, besides 100,000 on the Scheldt, owing to the happy issue of the Walcheren expedition; and with one month more of war, the house of Austria would be destroyed. These declarations drew from M. de Metternich expressions of grief, which showed that his opinion was not very different from that of the French negotiator.

On the 1st of September came a fresh intimation from the Austrian plenipotentiaries that they desired to know the whole extent of the French claims. Was the surrender of Upper Austria, Carinthia, Carniola, and a part of Croatia, all that was required? Was nothing wanted elsewhere? They must know this before they could explain themselves.

Napoleon, who directed the whole negotiation from Schönbrunn, alternating his diplomatic labours with excursions on horseback to the cantonnements of his troops, replied on the 4th of September by another note under his own hand. In it he said that the city of Dresden, the capital of his ally the King of Saxony, being within a day's march of the frontier of Bohemia, the danger of which situation had been revealed by the last campaign, he claimed three circles of Bohemia, in order to make the Austrian frontier so much the more distant. This was a fresh sacrifice of 400,000 inhabitants, and one which, while covering Dresden, of course uncovered Prague. Lastly, to make known the totality of his demands, Napoleon intimated in a general way that in Poland the negotiators would have to arrange separately a sort of *uti possidetis*, which, without express mention of details, implied the surrender of half Gallicia, that is to say, of 2,400,000 inhabitants out of the 4,800,000 constituting the population of the two Gallicias. Napoleon would not enter into any details on this subject, for fear of being compromised with Russia by any mention of the re-establishment of Poland. The sacrifices demanded in the various provinces of the monarchy amounted then to a total of 5,000,000, instead of the 9,000,000 implied by the principle of *uti possidetis*. In Germany, in exchange for Upper Austria, some Bohemian circles, Carinthia, and Carniola, Napoleon was willing to give back Styria, Lower Austria, and Moravia, superb provinces, which contained Vienna, Znaim, Brünn, and Grätz, and formed the centre of the monarchy. But however speciously reasoned, however soft in its tone was the note of the 4th of September, and however careful it was to set forth the difference between the claims it embodied and those which had been propounded in the first



instance, it was not less painful to those to whom it was addressed. The Austrian legation again kept silence, only M. de Metternich in private interviews continued to deplore the system of peace adopted by Napoleon, which he called the close-handed peace, the cruel peace, the hard-bargaining peace, in lieu of the generous peace, which would have procured a long repose and a definitive pacification.

Meanwhile the French having fully explained themselves, the Austrians were now bound to do so in their turn, or break off the negotiations. The case was too plain to admit of any misconception. Napoleon's forces were augmented daily; the only consequence of the Walcheren expedition had been to authorize the levy of additional troops, (the German diplomatists wrote to that effect to their court;) and Russia had just declared herself, by sending M. de Czernicheff with a letter for the Emperor Napoleon and another for the Emperor Francis. The czar declared that he did not choose to have a plenipotentiary at Altenburg, because he left the conduct of the negotiation to France alone; a course which left Russia free to accept or reject its result, but which also left Austria without support. He advised the Emperor Francis to make the promptest sacrifices, and the Emperor Napoleon to be moderate in his demands; and the only formal request he made of the latter was not to create him a Poland under the name of Grand-duchy of Warsaw. Provided he abstained from that infraction on the alliance, Napoleon might evidently do what he pleased. It even appeared from the language of the Russian letter that Napoleon's pretensions in Germany and Italy would be regarded with a more favourable eye than his pretensions in Galicia. Under such circumstances the Austrians could not choose but come to terms. The emperor just then recalled M. de Stadion to give him final instructions, and with him he had summoned the principal personages of the Austrian army, such as Prince John de Lichtenstein, M. de Bubna, and others, to give their opinions as to the resources remaining to the monarchy, and if necessary to go on a mission to Napoleon. They all agreed that peace must be made; that the prolongation of the war, though possible with the means in preparation, would be too hazardous; that nothing was to be expected either from the Walcheren expedition or from the intervention of Russia, and that consequently Austria must resign herself to sacrifices, but not so great as those claimed by Napoleon. Among these men,—some of them M. de Metternich's rivals, like M. de Stadion, others inclined as military men to make light of diplomatists, to think them slow, formal, and tiresome,—there was a disposition to think that it was the Austrian legation that mismanaged the negotiation; that it wasted valuable time; that it would end by disgusting or incensing Napoleon; and that a military man, who should go to him with a letter from the Emperor Francis, speak frankly to him, and ask him to be content with moderate sacrifices, would probably succeed better than all the diplomatists with their cumbrous and tortuous proceedings. This suggestion was adopted, and it was resolved to send to Schönbrunn M. de Bubna, aide-de-camp to the Emperor Francis, a soldier and a man of talent, who should address himself to certain

qualities in Napoleon's character, his good-nature and facile humour, qualities which were easily awakened when the right way was taken. Thus, on the one hand, to reply by protocol to protocol, the Austrian legation was to offer Salzburg and some sacrifices in Galicia, vaguely indicated; on the other, M. de Bubna was to make a personal appeal to Napoleon, quiet him as to the smallness of the offer made him, and bring him to prefer territories in Galicia to others in Germany or Italy; a thing which Austria much desired, for she had found Galicia not well affected toward her, and she would fain have thus flung an apple of discord between France and Russia. Lastly, M. de Bubna was to hint to Napoleon that he had been mistaken as to the character of M. de Stadion, and that with that minister, peace would be more prompt, more sure, and more easily accepted in its hard conditions by the Emperor Francis.

M. de Bubna set out on the 7th of September for Napoleon's head-quarters. The latter was abroad visiting his camps. He received M. de Bubna on his return amicably and graciously, as was his wont when recourse was had to his good feelings, and spoke with an extreme frankness which might even have been deemed imprudent had he not been in a position to render diplomatic dissimulation almost useless. M. de Bubna complained of the tediousness of the negotiations, and the exorbitant demands of France, throwing all the blame, however, on M. de Metternich, who, he said, conducted the conferences badly. Then he invoked the victor's generosity, and repeated the ordinary theme of the Austrians, that Napoleon had nothing to gain by aggrandizing Saxony and Bavaria, and appropriating to himself one or two ports on the Adriatic; that it was better for him to increase the new Poland, come to an understanding with Austria, attach her to him, and forget his dislike of M. de Stadion, who was quite cured of his warlike notions. Excited by M. de Bubna, Napoleon threw off his reserve, and disclosed all his thoughts with a sincerity which was in reality the more adroit, as it had the appearance of an involuntary impulse.\* "You are right," he said, "we must not tie ourselves to what our diplomatists are doing. They conform to their trade by losing time, and asking more than we both want. If you are determined to act frankly with me, we may bring matters to a conclusion in forty-eight hours. It is very true that I have no great interest in procuring a million more inhabitants for Saxony or Bavaria. My true interest, would you know what it is? It is either to destroy the Austrian monarchy by separating the three crowns of Austria, Bohemia, and Hungary, or to attach Austria to me by a close alliance. To separate the three crowns we should have to fight again; and though we ought, perhaps, to end matters in that way, I give you my word that I have no wish to do so. The second plan would suit me. But how is a close alliance to be expected of your emperor? He has good qualities, no doubt, but he is weak, swayed by those about him, and he will be led by M. de Stadion, who will himself be led by his brother, whose animosity and violence are notorious. There would be one

\* There are in the imperial archives accounts of this interview, made both by Napoleon himself and by M. de Bubna.

sure way of bringing about a sincere, complete alliance, and one for which I would pay a very handsome price, as you shall see; this would be, to make the Emperor Francis abdicate, and transfer the crown to his brother the Grand-duke of Wursburg. The latter is a wise, enlightened prince, who likes me, and whom I like; who has no prejudices against France, and who will not be led either by the Stadions or by the English. For him do you know what I would do? I would withdraw forthwith, without demanding either a province or an *écu*, notwithstanding all the war has cost me, and perhaps I would do better still; perhaps I would give back the Tyrol, which is so hard to keep in the hands of Bavaria. But handsome as these conditions would be, can I institute a negotiation of this nature, and insist on the dethronement of one prince and the elevation of another? I cannot." As Napoleon accompanied these words with his searching and enquiring look, M. de Bubna hastened to reply, though with the hesitation of a faithful subject, that the Emperor Francis was so devoted to his house, that if he supposed such a thing, he would abdicate on the instant, for he would rather insure the integrity of the empire for his successors than the crown on his own head. "Well," said Napoleon, with marked incredulity, "if that be so, I authorize you to say that I will give up the whole empire on the instant, with something more, if your master, who often declares himself disgusted with the throne, will cede it to his brother. The regards mutually due between sovereigns forbid me to propose any thing on this subject, but you may hold me as pledged should the supposition I make be realized. Nevertheless I do not believe this sacrifice will be made. In that case, not wishing to separate the three crowns at the cost of prolonged hostilities, and not being able to secure to myself the close alliance of Austria by the transfer of the crown to the Archduke of Wurzburg, I am forced to consider what is the interest which France may preserve in this negotiation, and to maintain it. Territories in Galicia interest me little, in Bohemia not more, in Austria rather more, for they would serve to remove your frontiers farther from ours. But in Italy, France has a great and real interest, namely, to open for herself a broad route toward Turkey by the coasts of the Adriatic. Influence over the Mediterranean depends on influence over the Porte. I shall not have that influence otherwise than by becoming the neighbour of the Turkish Empire. By hindering me from crushing the English as often as I have been on the point of doing so, and obliging me to withdraw my resources from the ocean to the continent, your master has constrained me to seek the land instead of the sea route, in order to extend my influence to Constantinople. I am not thinking, then, of my allies, but of myself, my own empire, when I demand from you territories in Illyria. Let us, however, meet each other halfway. I will consent to fresh sacrifices in favour of your master. I had not yet formally renounced the *uti possidetis*; I do so now, and will say no more about it. I claimed three circles in Bohemia; there shall be no more question of them. I insisted on Upper Austria to the Ens; I give up the Ens and even the Traun; I restore Lintz. We will find a line which, while giving

you back Lintz, shall not place you under the walls of Passau, as you are at present. In Italy, I will forego a part of Carinthia; I will retain Villach, and give you up Klagenfurth. But I will keep Carniola and the right bank of the Save as far as Bosnia. I demanded of you 2,600,000 subjects in Germany; I will not require of you more than 1,600,000. There remains Galicia: there I must round off the grand-duchy, and do something for my ally, the Emperor of Russia, and I think that you, as well as ourselves, may be facile on that side, since we do not set much store by those territories. If you will come back in two days," said Napoleon in conclusion, "we shall settle all in a few hours, while our diplomatists, if we leave them alone at Altenburg, will never have done, and will set us on again to cut each other's throats." After this long and amicable interview, in which Napoleon treated M. de Bubna so familiarly as to pull him by the moustaches, he made the latter a superb present, and sent him away fascinated and grateful, and prepared to advocate at Dotis the cause of peace, of immediate peace, at the cost of greater sacrifices than had at first been decided upon.

He had to pass through Altenburg on his way to Dotis. Being by profession of the party of the military men, and not of the diplomatists, he related at Altenburg the part of the interview which concerned the two legations, and the jocularly Napoleon had indulged in at the expense of them both. This annoyed the Austrian legation, and increased the belief at Dotis that it was expedient to dispense with diplomatists and continue to employ the intervention of military men.

M. de Bubna took pains to reassure the Emperor Francis as to Napoleon's intentions, and his wish to evacuate Austria, and Vienna in particular, as soon as peace should have been signed. He spoke to him of what concerned change of reign, only with the reserve which befitted such a proposal, and as an offer to which no great importance was to be attached. As for the new conditions obtained from Napoleon, it was not easy for him to make them acceptable, for the Altenburg legation took pains to depict them as disastrous; and, besides, the Emperor Francis, being kept by those about him in continual illusions, could not conceive that, in order to have peace, it was necessary to abandon his finest provinces, and particularly the ports on the Adriatic, where alone the Austrian territory was in contact with the sea. He had habituated himself to the idea that, with Salzburg and the portion of Galicia most recently detached from Poland, he might pay the cost of the war; or, at most, that he might have to add some money thereto. So habituated was he to the notion that this would be the utmost extent of the sacrifices he should have to submit to, that he could not be very well content with the offers brought him by M. de Bubna. A decision, however, was necessary one way or the other; and it was resolved that M. de Bubna should return to Napoleon with another letter from the Emperor of Austria, thanking him for his pacific intentions, but telling him that the concessions he had made were almost nugatory, and asking others of him in order to render peace possible.

It was on the 15th of September M. de Bubna

returned to Dotis; he reappeared at Schönbrunn on the 21st, with the new letter from the Emperor Francis. On receiving it, Napoleon could not restrain a burst of impatience. He inveighed against those who represented the state of things to the Emperor Francis in a manner so completely untrue, and said that none of them knew even the geography of Austria. "I had not yet," he said, "renounced the basis of *uti possidetis*, and I renounced it at the desire of your emperor. I had demanded 400,000 souls of the population of Bohemia, and I have ceased to demand them! I wanted 800,000 souls in Upper Austria, and I content myself with 400,000! I had demanded 1,400,000 souls in Carinthia and Carniola, and I gave up Klagenfurth, which is, again, a sacrifice of 200,000 souls! I restore, then, a population of a million of subjects to your master, and he says I have conceded nothing! I have retained only what is necessary for me to keep off the enemy from Passau and the Inn; what is necessary for me to establish a contiguity of territory between Italy and Dalmatia; and yet he is told that I have not abated any of my claims! And it is thus they represent every thing to the Emperor Francis; thus they enlighten him as to my intentions! By deceiving him in this way they have led him to war, and finally they will lead him to his ruin." Napoleon kept M. de Bubna with him to a very late hour; and, under the influence of the feelings that possessed him, he dictated a very bitter letter to the Emperor of Austria. When he grew more calm, however, he abstained from delivering it to M. de Bubna, remarking that it was not becoming of one sovereign to tell another in writing, "*You do not know what you say.*" He sent for M. de Bubna, repeated before him all he had said on the preceding night, again declared that his last propositions were his ultimatum; that, short of their acceptance, there was war; that the season was advancing, he wished to make an autumn campaign, and must, therefore, have a prompt answer, otherwise he would break off the armistice; that his first impulse had been to write a letter which would not have been agreeable to the emperor, but he decided not to send it, that he might not offend that monarch; but he charged M. de Bubna to report at Dotis all he had heard, and return as soon as possible with a definitive reply.

But what he would not write directly to the emperor he caused to be said to the negotiators at Altenburg, to whom he addressed, through M. de Champagny, a most vehement note, wherein he vented all those feelings the expression of which he had thought proper to spare the emperor himself.

This controversy had entirely changed him; and, though he did not consider the few leagues of territory and the few thousands of subjects in dispute as worth a new war, the idea of all the ill-will he perceived in the court of Austria took strong possession of his mind, and his inclination to destroy that power began to revive by degrees. In fact he gave formal orders for resuming hostilities. His army had increased every day since the opening of the negotiations. His infantry was completed, rested, and as fine as ever. All his cavalry was remounted; he had 500 pieces of flying artillery, and 300 well-appointed pieces on the walls of the Austrian

fortresses he occupied. He had reinforced Junot's corps in Saxony, and intended to join it to the forces of Massena and Lefebvre in Bohemia, which would make up a mass of 80,000 men in that province. He proposed, with the corps of Davoust and Oudinot, largely recruited, with the guard at that time 20,000 strong, and with the army of Italy, about 150,000 men in all, to debouch by Presburg, where he had executed great works, enter Hungary, and there deal the house of Austria the finishing blows. He had employed the materials in the Isle of Lobau in constructing four portable bridges for the purpose of crossing all the rivers which the Austrians should attempt to put between him and them. He had put Passau, Lintz, Mölck, Krems, Vienna, Brünn, Raab, Grätz, and Klagenfurth in a complete state of defence, and he had thus a formidable basis in the very heart of the monarchy. Although the English had no longer a garrison on Walcheren, he had ordered that the organization of the army of Flanders should be completed, by uniting into divisions the demi-brigades collected there, completing the horsing of the artillery, and reducing the national guards to the men disposed to serve. Lastly, he had taken a decree for levying upon the old conscriptions (a recent resource he had opened for himself) a last contribution of 86,000 men, who were to be draughted into the fourth battalions sent to France. These 86,000 conscripts, aged from 21 to 25 years, would furnish him with a good reserve if the war continued, or, if peace was signed, would contribute to recruit the army of Spain. He therefore ordered the Arch-chancellor Cambacérès immediately to present this decree to the senate, that it might be voted before the end of the negotiations.

At the head of this imposing force, he awaited the reply from Dotis, as well inclined for war as peace, in consequence of the bad disposition he thought he perceived in the court of Austria. In anticipation of renewed hostilities, he even went and visited in Hungary and Styria positions he had not yet seen, and which he wished to see for himself in case he should have operations to direct in those countries.

Upon M. de Bubna's reappearance at Dotis, it was felt to be necessary to decide either for war or for making the sacrifices demanded by Napoleon. The anger he had manifested, and which he had rather unjustly vented on the Altenburg legation, which after all wished for peace, though it had very much decried the concessions obtained by M. de Bubna, made it scarcely possible to leave the sequel of the negotiations in the hands of MM. de Metternich and Nugent. Prince John de Lichtenstein, a brave soldier, with no great head but plenty of heart, whom Napoleon liked for his frank and soldiery humour, was assigned as a colleague to M. de Bubna, and both were sent to Schönbrunn, through Altenburg, with power to consent to the principal bases laid down by Napoleon, but with injunctions to resist strongly as to the sacrifices demanded in Upper Austria, the war contributions which it was foreseen would be demanded, and all other details of the treaty, so as to render it as little disadvantageous as possible.

As this purely military legation completely neutralized the legation left in Altenburg, M.

de Metternich did not choose to prolong his stay in a place where the plenipotentiaries were of no use but to mask the real negotiation going on at Vienna, and he retired to Dotis by no means pleased with the part which M. de Stadion or the emperor had made him play. He was soon to be indemnified for this by taking into his hands the direction of the affairs of Austria, to hold it for forty years. He foresaw, too, that the military negotiators would be very unskilful tacticians on the new field of battle they had entered upon, and would soon be beaten by Napoleon; he therefore warned them to be thoroughly on their guard, but his advice had rather the effect of alarming them at the task before them than of fortifying them against Napoleon. After all, it was much better for him that the officers who had the glory of figuring at Essling and Wagram (and victor or vanquished, this was glory) should alone bear the responsibility of the severe sacrifices about to be incurred perforce. Hence, when M. de Lichtenstein, alarmed by his advice, seemed almost inclined to hang back, M. de Metternich strongly encouraged him to persist in his intention of going to Schönbrunn.

M. de Lichtenstein and de Bubna arrived on the 27th of September, and were most graciously received. M. de Lichtenstein had already obtained unsolicited and very flattering marks of favour from Napoleon. Orders had been given to spare his property around Vienna, and not to billet a soldier in his châteaux. The two plenipotentiaries gave Napoleon to understand that they were authorised to accept his principal conditions, with the exception of certain details which they were instructed to object to. Seeing, then, that he was master of them, and that to make an end of the matter he had only to forego a few square miles, a few thousand inhabitants, and a few millions of francs, he was willing to spare himself needless expense, and he ordered the minister of war to suspend all the movements of troops to Austria, which had begun again, since the Walcheren expedition ceased to cause any uneasiness.

On the 30th, after a theatrical performance, he sat down in his cabinet with the negotiators, and settled with them the principal bases of the treaty. With regard to Italy both parties were agreed: we were to have the circle of Villach without that of Klagenfurth, which still opened to us the Noric Alps; and we were to have Laybach and the right bank of the Save to Bosnia. Toward Bavaria Napoleon had at first wanted the Enns, and then the Traun for a boundary, but to facilitate the negotiation, he again consented to forego some portions of territory and some thousands of subjects in that quarter. He consented to a line taken between Passau and Linz, starting from the Danube near Efferding, consequently leaving a territory around Linz, touching Schwanstadt, abandoning the territory of Gmünd at that point, and finally connecting itself by the Kammersee with the country of Salzburg which was ceded to Bavaria. On the Bohemian side he contented himself with some detached portions of territory which Austria had in Saxony, close to Dresden, and not comprising a population of 50,000. In fine, instead of 1,600,000 subjects in Italy and Austria he had demanded previously, Napoleon did not insist on more than 1,400,000 or 1,500,000.

In Gallicia the question was more difficult, because it was newer, Napoleon having postponed explaining himself as to that country on account of Russia. The province consisted of Old Gallicia, which Austria had obtained upon the first partition of the Polish provinces, and which bordered the whole of north Hungary, and of New Gallicia, obtained at the last partition, and stretching along both sides of the Vistula to the gates of Warsaw. New Gallicia comprised on one side the countries between the Bug and the Vistula, on the other the countries between the Vistula and the Pilica. Napoleon had required to be ceded to him all New Gallicia in order to enlarge the Grand-duchy of Warsaw, besides two circles around Cracow to form a territory for that ancient metropolis, and three circles on the eastern side, those of Solkiew, Limberg, and Zloczow, to bestow on Russia as a gift which might console her for the aggrandizement of the Duchy of Warsaw. This would cut off 2,400,000 subjects from the 4,800,000 contained in the two Gallicias. Here, again, Napoleon gave up a population of 400,000 or 500,000 souls in order to facilitate the negotiation. He now only insisted on New Gallicia, from the Vistula to the Pilica on the left, from the Vistula to the Bug on the right, and the circle of Zamosze, with a smaller territory round Cracow, but one which should include the salt-mines of Wieliczka. Lastly, he waived his claim to the circle of Limberg, and contented himself with the circles of Solkiew and Zloczow for Russia, thereby reducing the total of his demands in Gallicia to about 1,900,000 souls.

On these bases there was a tolerable agreement. But two points of great importance remained to be settled: the one was the reduction of the Austrian army; the other, the war contribution required by Napoleon to indemnify him for his expenses. Prussia was bound by secret treaty not to have more than 40,000 men under arms, and to pay an enormous contribution. Napoleon intended, in like manner, to constrain Austria; not to reduce her effective to 40,000 men, but greatly to diminish her army, and to pay a part of the costs of the war. These matters had only been mentioned orally, and not at all in writing; so much did they implicate the financial credit of Austria. Napoleon intended that for the future Austria should reduce her force to 150,000 men, and that she should pay down 100,000,000 of francs, on account of the 200,000,000 of war contributions, of which he had as yet only received fifty. The two negotiators readily consented to reduce the Austrian army to the number of 150,000 men; the finances of Austria did not permit her to keep more on foot; but they required a limit of time, without which such a constraint would have become an intolerable vassalage. To give this condition a less humiliating import, it was settled that Austria should be bound to this restriction of her effective only during the maritime war, in order to deprive England of any ally on the continent. Lastly, Napoleon, in consenting to evacuate the conquered countries forthwith, and to leave a part of the contributions undischarged, demanded 100,000,000 within a brief period. On this point the two Austrian negotiators had no latitude; and, after a long evening spent in discussing it, both parties separated, without having been able to come

to an agreement. It was settled that on the following day M. de Bubna should go to Dotis, in order to smooth away the last difficulties.

Though it had been expected at first that the business would be concluded in three or four days, the time wore away until the 6th of October, in disputes over the map about certain contours of territory, some thousands of subjects to be taken or left here and there, and, above all, the millions demanded by Napoleon. The contribution became matter of seemingly insurmountable difficulty. On the 6th of October, Napoleon, beginning again to lose patience, left M. de Champagny a formal ultimatum, which allowed of no more tergiversations. The weather was still fine, and there were certain positions in Styria which he desired to revisit, from that instinct which prompted him to study with his own eyes places to which he might one day be called by war. On his return to Vienna, he expected to find the question of peace or war decided positively, and beyond all doubt, one way or the other. This time, however, he wished rather to intimidate than to break off; for the differences between Austria and him were certainly not such as he would have recommended war for, though he was much bent on obtaining the contribution, his finances having great need of immediate help.

The two negotiators referred for further instructions to Dotis; and, at the last moment, the Emperor Francis's intimate advisers hesitated much before resigning themselves to such sacrifices. To lose in Italy the frontier of the Alps, in Austria that of the Inn—to surrender Galicia, for the aggrandizement of the Grand-duchy of Warsaw, that germ of a new Poland—to lose thus 3,500,000 subjects—to pay 100,000,000 of francs, in addition to 50,000,000 already paid, and to submit to the humiliation of a limit imposed on the effective of the Austrian army—was a cruel punishment for the last war. Was there no hope of another battle of Essling, or of some help from one of the powers of Europe? But the military men were all agreed as to the impossibility of resisting, and the most painful intelligence was arriving from all parts of Europe. Spain, in spite of the boastings of its generals, was beaten, at least, for the moment. England had lost in Walcheren half of her best army; and that expedition had become an apple of discord thrown among all parties of her people. Prussia was trembling, on account of the imprudence committed by Major Schill. Russia alone was erect, and visibly dissatisfied at the rather brilliant figure made by the Poles in the war, and at the aggrandizement which their conduct would have earned for them. But being bound by the French alliance, she could not once more, as at Tilsit, set the example of a complete reversal of policy effected in twenty-four hours—as she had gained Finland through that alliance, and hoped, from it, Moldavia and Wallachia—she would not quit Napoleon for Francis; and as a continuation of the war could not but place her in the most extreme embarrassment, since, on the resumption of hostilities, she would have either to break with the French or to march with them, she explained herself categorically at Dotis, and declared, that in case of a prolongation of the war she would act decidedly with Napoleon. She expressed herself thus, in order the more certainly to put an

end to the war between France and Austria, and she succeeded: for the Emperor Francis, borne down by such a combination of circumstances, gave way at last, and authorised MM. de Lichtenstein and de Bubna to consent to the sacrifices demanded, excepting, however, the amount of the indemnity, as to which the negotiators had orders to press still for a reduction. At the most, they were authorised to assent to 50,000,000, in lieu of the 100 demanded by Napoleon.

On the 10th of October they met M. de Champagny, and the three following days were spent in shaping and retouching the articles of the treaty. On the evening of the 13th Napoleon used all his ascendancy over MM. de Bubna and de Lichtenstein, and brought them to assent to a war contribution of 85,000,000, exclusive of what had been already received on account of the 200,000,000 imposed after the battle of Wagram. Prince John, the greatest personage of the court of Austria, took upon him to exceed his instructions, in order to save his country from the disaster of a new campaign. His heroic bravery likewise authorized him to incline openly to peace. In order to prompt his decision, Napoleon told him that this treaty was subject to the ratification of his sovereign, who might reject it if the conditions did not suit him. At last, on the morning of the 14th of October, M. de Lichtenstein signed, with M. de Champagny, the treaty of peace known as the treaty of Vienna, the fourth since 1792, and destined, to our misfortune, not to last longer than the others. All the allies of France were included in the peace. Austria ceded all we have already stated: in Italy, the circle of Villach, Carniola, and the right bank of the Save, to the Turkish frontier; in Bavaria, the Innviertel, with a line from Efferring to the country of Salzburg; in Poland, New Galicia, with the circle of Zamosse for the Grand-duchy, and the circles of Solkiew and Zloczow for Russia. The secret articles contained an engagement not to raise the Austrian army above 150,000 men until the maritime peace, and to pay 85,000,000 francs, in discharge of what the Austrian provinces owed; 80,000,000 of which were to be paid down on the day of the evacuation of Vienna. Only six days were allowed for the ratification.

This double treaty having been signed, Napoleon, in great delight, dismissed MM. de Bubna and Lichtenstein with marks of high favour, and immediately had the act announced by cannon. It was a clever ruse, for the people of Vienna, who wished the war ended, being thus put in possession of the peace they so ardently desired, it would no longer be possible to deprive them of it by a refusal to ratify. Napoleon intended to follow it up with another ruse, still more subtle and hard to parry, which was to set out himself for Paris, leaving Berthier to manage the details incident to the evacuation of the conquered countries. He immediately issued, with his usual activity, the orders rendered necessary by the peace he had signed. He ordered Marshal Marmont to go and establish himself at Laybach, in Carniola, Prince Eugene to go back to Friuli with the army of Italy, Marshal Massena to move from Znaim to Krems, Marshal Oudinot to quit Vienna for St. Polten, and Marshal Davout to quit Brünn for Vienna.

The latter was to form the rearguard of the army with his magnificent corps, the cuirassiers and the artillery, while the imperial guard was to head the advance. A part of the artillery horses was to be sent to graze in Carniola, another was to accompany Marshal Davout into the provinces of Northern Germany, another was to go to Spain. It was settled that the evacuation should begin on the day of ratification, and should be continued *pari passu* with the liquidation of the war contribution.

Full of the idea of bringing matters forthwith to an end in Spain by sending thither a considerable mass of forces, without, however, withdrawing any thing from the organized corps which had executed the campaign in Austria, Napoleon turned toward the Pyrenees all the forces that were on their march to the Danube. General Junot's corps, with the addition of the troops in Swabia and the garrisons in Prussia, might amount to about 80,000 foot, and with the provisional dragoons, the marching regiments of hussars and chasseurs, and the artillery, to about 40,000 men of all arms. The army of the north, when Marshal Bessières should have retaken Walcheren, would comprise 15,000 soldiers of the line, without reckoning the national guards. The depôts of the centre, Bretagne and the Pyrenees, contained 80,000 fully trained conscripts. Eight new regiments of the guards (four of conscripts, four of tirailleurs) represented nearly 10,000 young soldiers eager to distinguish themselves. Lastly, the Rouyer division, composed of the contingents of the German petty princes, which Napoleon proposed to send into Spain, would give 5000. All these corps together made not less than 100,000 men, at whose head, after having despatched his affairs in Paris, Napoleon proposed to enter Spain toward the close of winter. So intent was he on bringing his continual wars to a close, that he gave orders for immediately directing to Spain the forces we have enumerated, so that on his arrival at Paris, the movement which would take a long time to execute should have already begun. He urged Marshal Bessières to make haste and retake Walcheren with the 15,000 or 20,000 troops of the line and the 30,000 national guards under his command. There had been levied 65,000 of these national guards, which had caused extreme confusion in the northern provinces, and occasioned considerable expense. Under pretext of guarding the coasts of the Mediterranean, M. Fouché went so far as to put all the departments of the south in motion. At the same time, several retired officers of the revolution had been called out, some of whom had been dismissed from service for incapacity, others for bad spirit. M. Fouché had not been sorry thus to flatter a certain number of them, and the Minister Clarke, for want of better, had not been able to dispense with their services. Napoleon, who was prompt to conceive suspicion, strongly blamed M. Fouché for thus throwing France into commotion for a danger very remote from the present moment, and from the provinces he disturbed by his unseasonable appeals. He said it was all very well to levy 30,000 or 40,000 men in the provinces of the north near the point where the English made their descent, and immediately after that event, but to call for as many as 200,000 men in Provence and in Piedmont.

three months after the date of the expedition, *was madness*. He even hinted that he saw in it something else than want of prudence and good sense. He ordered the discharge of the national guard of Paris, composed of young men who had the presumption to suppose that they were not to serve in the ordinary way, but were to guard the Emperor's person; and he desired they should be told that to enjoy that honour it was necessary to be able to show four quarters of nobility, that is to say, four wounds received in four great battles, and that he did not want men who disliked danger but were fond of fine uniforms. He desired that most of the officers who had been called out from retirement should be sent home again, and that fit persons should be sought for among the majors of regiments, who were all officers of merit. Lastly, having expressed in severe terms his displeasure at the agitation so rashly produced, he gave instructions that before his return every thing should return to its ordinary footing, and that a reflux of the disposable forces should take place from all parts toward Spain.

Having thus arranged every thing in twenty-four hours, he made ready for departure without awaiting the reply from Dotis, in order that he might render a refusal to ratify impossible, for it was not likely they would dare to run after him and tell him they refused the peace. An incident which occurred shortly before his departure caused a great sensation among those about him. On the morning of the 12th, he was holding one of his grand reviews at Schönbrunn, in which figured the finest troops in Europe, and which were flocked to with as much curiosity at Vienna, Berlin, Warsaw, and Madrid, as at Paris. There was an immense crowd of spectators from the capital, all eager to see their victor, whom they admired though they detested him. Besides, peace was announced as certain, and a sort of joy was beginning to succeed the just grief of the Austrian nation. Napoleon was quietly watching his troops defile past him with a smile on his lips, when a young man, dressed in a frock-coat, somewhat like a military undress, presented himself and said he had a petition to deliver to the Emperor of the French. He was repulsed, but returned again and again with an obstinacy which was observed by Prince Berthier and the aide-de-camp Rapp, and struck them so much as to induce them to give him in charge to the gendarmes. The officer of that body having felt something hard under the young man's coat when he laid hold of him, searched him and found a very sharp knife, manifestly secreted for a criminal purpose. With the quiet determination of a fanatic, the young man declared that in placing himself thus armed in the way of the Emperor Napoleon, his intention had been to stab him. The affair was made known to Napoleon, who sent for the prisoner after the review and interrogated him in presence of Corvisart, whom he had sent for to Schönbrunn, because he was fond of conversing with that celebrated physician, and wished to consult him as to his health, though it was in general good.

The prisoner, who had a mild and rather handsome countenance, and whose bright eye bespoke a mind preternaturally exalted, was the son of a Protestant clergyman of Erfurth, and was named Staaps. He had run away with

some money from his parents, giving them vaguely to understand that he cherished some grand design. He was going, he said, to deliver Europe from the conqueror who tormented her, and to emancipate his country. It was a divine mission he declared he had received, and for which he was resolved to sacrifice his life. He had no accomplices, but had brooded in solitary intoxication of mind over his criminal folly. Napoleon having questioned him mildly as to what had brought him to Schönbrunn, he confessed he had come to strike him a mortal blow. When Napoleon asked him why, he replied that it was to free the world from his insidious genius, and particularly Germany, which he was trampling under foot. "But this time at least," remarked Napoleon, "to be just, you ought to have struck at the Emperor of Austria, not at me, for he it was who declared war on me." Staaps proved by his replies that he was not aware of this, and that, yielding to the universal feeling, he attributed to the Emperor of the French alone all the woes of Europe. Looking on the young man with good-natured pity, Napoleon had him examined by his physician Corvisart, who declared that he was not ill, for he had a quiet pulse and all the signs of health. Napoleon then asked Staaps if he would renounce his criminal design in case he should pardon him? "Yes," he replied, "if you will give peace to my country; no, if you will not." However, on being taken to prison, the assassin appeared astonished at the mildness and benevolent loftiness of him he had intended to smite, and had to summon all his fierce patriotism to his aid to avoid feeling regret. He prepared himself for death by praying and writing to his parents.

Napoleon appeared little moved by this incident, and affected to say that it was difficult to assassinate a man like him. Besides the difficulty of gaining access to him, he counted on the prestige of his glory, and on his fortune, to which he had so often trusted his life with heroic carelessness. One reflection, however, haunted his mind, namely, that it was no longer the French revolution, but himself—himself alone—that was becoming the object of universal hatred, as the sole author of the woes of the age, as the cause of the incessant and terrible agitation of the world. Why did he not draw from the lips of that fanatic a deep and lasting lesson, instead of a passing impression—partly of pity for his intended murderer, partly of sadness for himself! A violent feeling was manifestly growing up against him, for the police took note of many an expression indicative of murderous thoughts; they even received the depositions of a soldier to whom proposals had been made, in the Island of Lobau, that he should kill the Emperor.

Napoleon began to feel his moral isolation, and promised himself that he would think of it; but he ordered that no noise should be made about this occurrence, and he had even thought for a while of pardoning the culprit. Recollecting, however, that it was necessary to strike terror into the young German fanatics, he delivered Staaps over to a military commission, and set out on the night of the 15th of October, leaving orders to make known to him at Passau, by means of signals, what was the determination come to at Dotis. A series of

flag-staffs was erected along the Danube from Vienna to Strasburg. A white flag was to be the signal that peace had been ratified; its rejection was to be indicated by a red flag; and in that case he would return forthwith, and resume hostilities. If, on the other hand, peace was ratified, the evacuation was to take place without delay. As the troops withdrew, they were to blow up the fortifications of Vienna, Brünna, Raab, Grätz, and Klagenfurth;—a rude way of bidding adieu to the Austrians, but one conformable to the rights of war.

While Napoleon was rapidly travelling up the valley of the Danube, through the columns of his guard, which were already on the march to Strasburg, and which hailed him with their acclamations, the court of Dotis had received, with a sort of despair, the treaty concluded at Vienna. Vainly did MM. de Lichtenstein and de Bubna plead how impossible they had found it to obtain better terms, and the certainty they had acquired that hostilities would be immediately resumed if they did not give way. They were assailed with harsh and violent reproaches. The diplomatists, so often laughed at by the military men for their slowness, revenged themselves by accusing the latter of having been duped. M. de Lichtenstein, in spite of the glory with which he had covered himself in the last campaign, and M. de Bubna, in spite of the favour he enjoyed, were in a manner disgraced, and were sent back to the army. The treaty, however, which was much abused, was accepted, in order not to have war with Napoleon, and not to snatch from the good people of Austria a peace of which Napoleon had put them in possession by an anticipated publication. A new negotiator, M. de Urbna, grand-chambellan to the emperor, was appointed to be the bearer of the ratifications, and to ask for some changes in the amount and times of payment of the war contribution. His remonstrances, listened to with politeness, but referred to the Emperor, were followed by the immediate exchange of the ratifications, which took place on the morning of 20th of October. Thereupon Prince Berthier, who waited only for that signal to commence the evacuation, ordered Marshal Oudinot to put himself in motion, and follow the imperial guard along the road to Strasburg; Marshal Davout to move from Brunn to Vienna; Marshal Massena to move from Znaim to Krems; Marshal Marmont, who was encamped at Krems, to take the St. Polten and Lillienfeld route to Laybach; and Prince Eugene to take that to Italy by Eidenburg and Leoben. At the same time he gave orders for springing the mines made under the ramparts of the capital; and while the Viennese were watching the departure of our troops, with looks no longer indicative of anger, repeated explosions told them of the destruction of their walls. They were keenly affected, and, perhaps, they might have been spared that last affliction; for as a measure of precaution the act was one of very doubtful utility.

Napoleon had gone first to Passau, to give orders for the works by means of which he intended to make that town a great fortress of the Confederation. The signals having informed him that nothing new had occurred, he proceeded to Munich, where he waited in the family of Prince Eugene for the despatches

which were to determine his return to Paris or to Vienna. A courier having at last brought him news of the ratifications, he bade adieu to his allies, who had once more been aggrandized by his protection, and set out for France, where an accumulation of weighty affairs demanded his attention.

The most serious and distressing in the list was the affair of Rome, the sad vicissitudes of which it is time we should make known. The reader doubtless remembers that when Napoleon resolved to break with the house of Spain and with the Pope, in pursuance of his desire to destroy the old order of things in Europe, he seized the legations, attached them to the kingdom of Italy under the title of departments, and caused Rome to be occupied by General Miollis. To justify that occupation, he alleged the necessity of connecting his armies of north and south Italy by the centre of the Peninsula, and also that of protecting himself against the hostile intrigues of which Rome was constantly the theatre. From that day the state of things became intolerable. The Pope having quitted the Vatican for the Quirinal, shut himself up in the latter as in a fortress, and gave occasion there to scenes as deplorable for the oppressing as for the oppressed power. General Miollis, condemned to a most uncongenial office, (for that intrepid soldier was a man of highly cultivated mind,) strove in vain to mitigate the harshness of his duty. Pius VII., indignant in the highest degree as a pontiff at the violence exercised against the church, and mortified as a prince by the ingratitude of Napoleon, whom he had gone to Paris to crown, could no longer restrain the feelings that wrought within him, and which, without diminishing the affectionate and religious interest he deserved, made him lose some portion of his dignity. When General Miollis proposed to visit him on New-year's day, at the head of his staff, he refused to see him. The cardinals on their part declined, on the plea of illness, the invitations sent them by the general, and the latter affected to send and inquire after their health. The Pope, no longer having the Roman exchequer at his command, and being resolved to solicit nothing, pledged the beautiful tiara which Napoleon had presented to him on his coronation. The relations subsisting between powers so dissimilarly great were already difficult enough without this ignoble complication. It was impossible but that such offensive proceedings should soon lead to acts of violence. As it had been ascertained that the Pope was addressing protests to foreign courts, his couriers were arrested, a fact which sufficiently proves the truth formerly so well understood by the First Consul, that to be independent the Pope ought to be sovereign of the territory in which he resided. Pius VII. then gave it out that he was a prisoner, and would not correspond with any one, least of all with the French government.

The Roman troops, adroitly flattered by General Miollis, who had persuaded them that by becoming incorporated with the French troops they would cease to bear the old nickname of *soldiers of the Pope*, had consented to this incorporation. The Pope wishing to punish them by denationalizing them, changed the uniform and the cockade of the Roman troops, and bestowed the new cockade only on the

troops that remained faithful to him, that is to say, on the noble guard, and the Swiss guard that occupied his palace. Ere long the young men of family, who formed the noble guard, irritated at the treatment received by their sovereign, braved the French with an arrogance which in their position was courageous and meritorious. The French general, in his turn, giving way to a feeling of offended pride, broke open the doors of the Quirinal, and disarmed the noble guard in the Pope's own palace. After such an outrage as this there was no act of violence which might not be expected. After the loss of Cardinal Consalvi, Pius VII. had successively taken for secretaries of state Cardinal Gabrielli and Cardinal Pacca. The French attempted to arrest the latter in the Quirinal, but the Pope displaying on this occasion all the majesty of his age and his supreme dignity, appeared in his pontifical vestments to protect his secretary, whom the French durst not seize in his presence. From that time he made him sleep in a chamber next his own, and he lived in the midst of some faithful domestics, who kept watch by turns day and night at all the issues of the palace, the doors and windows of which were constantly barred.

Napoleon, thus drawn into an obstinate conflict with the old European order of things, a conflict of which the deplorable catastrophe of Vincennes was the first act, the spoliation of Bayonne the second, the captivity of Pius the third, and not the least unhappy, forgot with regard to the pontiff all the respect due to his rank, his age, and his virtues, all the gratitude he owed him for his conduct, and the forbearance with which it became him to treat a power he had re-established, and which he could not overthrow without the most deplorable inconsistency. What occasion for ridicule did he afford, great as he was, to the few philosophers left in Paris, the associates of MM. Sieyès, Cabanis, and De Tracy, who had so much condemned the concordat! Rather, indeed, than come to such scenes as those witnessed in the Quirinal, they were unquestionably right in desiring that the two powers, instead of entering into reciprocal relations, and signing treaties, should forget each other altogether, and live on the footing of total strangers!

But Napoleon, blinded by passion, forgetting that after having made himself at Vincennes the rival of the regicides, after having made himself at Bayonne the equal of those who declared war against Europe to establish in it the universal republic, he made himself in the Quirinal the equal at least of those who had dethroned Pius VI. to create the Roman republic, forgetting that he had heaped contempt on all those parties, and that he had obtained the crown by affecting not to resemble them,—Napoleon soon put the climax to his monstrous proceedings by resolving to dethrone Pius VII., and take from him the sceptre, leaving him the tiara. That those who devised the civil constitution of the clergy, and created the Roman republic, should act thus, was quite natural, and admitted of the most honourable justification, since they acted upon their convictions. But the author of the concordat to act thus! It was on his part a proof of self-forgetfulness, most painful to the admirers of his rare genius, alarming to those who thought of the future of



France, impossible ever to be explained except by drawing from it the lesson, so often repeated in history, that the greatest man is but a child when passion seizes hold of him.

"There must be an end to this comedy," said Napoleon in one of his letters, and indeed it could not be endured any longer. To kill the pontiff, of which Napoleon's noble heart was assuredly incapable, would have been better than to leave him to fret and degrade himself in the Quirinal. Napoleon resolved, therefore, to suppress the temporal power of the Pope, and he waited to pronounce that sentence until he no longer needed to put himself under any restraint as regarded Austria. On the 17th of May, after the battles of Ratisbon and Ebersberg, and the entry into Vienna, he decreed at Schönbrunn the suppression of the Pope's temporal power, and declared the states of the holy see united to the empire. He nominated, for the administration of those states, *consuls* composed of Roman princes and citizens, proclaimed the abolition of entails, of the inquisition, of convents, and ecclesiastical jurisdictions, and applied to the Roman state all the principles of 1789. He left Pius VII. the palaces in Rome, a civil list of 2,000,000 of francs, and all the pontifical paraphernalia, saying that the popes had no need of temporal power to exercise their spiritual mission,—that that mission had even suffered from their twofold character of pontiffs and sovereigns, that he would change nothing in the Church, its dogmas or its rites, he would leave it wealthy and respected; only, as Charlemagne's successor, he withdrew the endowment of a temporal kingdom, which that emperor had bestowed on the holy see. All this was said in language imperious, lofty, specious, but very strange in the mouth of the sometime First Consul!

The decree was published at Rome on the 11th of June by sound of trumpet, amid a population divided in sentiment; the lower classes and clergy, indignant at the violence done to their pontiff; the middle classes, though much disposed to do without the ecclesiastical government, looking very suspiciously on what came from the man who had put down the French revolution. The Pope waited only to have recourse to the only arms that remained in his hands, those of excommunication. Many a time he had thought of employing them; but the fear of showing how blunted were weapons formerly so potent, or if they proved of some efficiency against a sovereign of new origin, the fear of driving him to the worst extremities had made the counsellors of the holy see hesitate as to that course. They agreed, however, that it should be adopted if the suppression of the temporal power was decreed; in anticipation of which event the bulls were all drawn up beforehand, transcribed by the Pope's own hand, and signed. They pronounced sentence of excommunication, not against Napoleon by name, but against all the authors and accomplices of the acts of violence and spoliation done against the holy see and the patrimony of St. Peter. No sooner had the publication of the 17th of May taken place, than some bold and faithful hands posted up in St. Peter's, and in most of the churches of Rome, the bull of excommunication that dared to strike Napoleon on his throne, and which, not having in its support the force of the religious sentiment, which had long

been on its decline, yet found one in the just feelings of mankind, which revolted against the acts of violence and ingratitude committed by the warrior upon the pontiff who had crowned him.

The French police took down those audacious placards, but the bull, being passed from hand to hand, could not fail soon to reach the extremities of Europe. These two acts, one of which corresponded to the other, would naturally exasperate to the last degree the two powers personified in the French general and the Roman pontiff, and it was impossible they should continue to confront each other without coming to physical violence. Napoleon corresponded for the affairs of Rome with General Miollis, and with his brother-in-law Murat, who, as King of Naples, was commander-in-chief of the army of occupation. Foreseeing what might happen, he wrote to the latter on the 17th and 19th of June that if the decree of the 17th of May encountered any resistance, the Pope was to be treated precisely as he would deal with the Archbishop of Paris, and that, if necessary, Cardinal Pacca and Pius VII. were to be arrested. These instructions, which he afterward regretted having given, reached Rome through Murat, at the moment when the greatest uneasiness prevailed there. There was an English fleet in sight of Civita Vecchia; but the importance of this fact was exaggerated, for it was only a demonstration of the British forces stationed in Sicily. The people of Rome were in great agitation. The abolition of the ecclesiastical government, and the substitution of a provisional civil authority, caused general confusion. Every moment it was said that the tocsin would ring, and at that summons the Trasteverini would fall upon the French, who were but 8000 or 4000, Murat having moved all his forces to the coast to watch the British fleet. It was expected that this would happen on St. Peter's day, the 29th of June, when, it was asserted, Pius VII. would issue forth from the Quirinal in pontifical robes, himself pronounce the excommunication, release all the subjects of the empire from their oath of allegiance, and give the signal for a general insurrection in Italy.

There was then at the head of the French police in Rome an officer of gendarmerie, Colonel Radet, a very cunning, bold man, just the person to execute a *coup de main*. Being quartered in the Rospigliosi palace, near the Quirinal, he had filled the Pope's palace with spies, and placed trusty hands near the belfry of the Quirinal to seize the bell that was to ring the tocsin. Though the rumours we have mentioned were not realized, they excited the imagination of the French authorities, and impressed them with the belief that there remained no safety in Rome, so long as they tolerated the presence there of the Pope and his minister, Cardinal Pacca, who was reputed to be the chief agent of the extreme ecclesiastical party. To arrest Cardinal Pacca without the Pope, from whom he remained inseparable, was impossible and insufficient, and it seemed absolutely necessary to arrest both. The French authorities, however, were loth to perpetrate this act of violence, the worthy consequence of that of Bayonne, when the letters so imprudently written by Napoleon to Murat, and communicated by the latter to General Miollis, removed all scruples

Nevertheless, General Miollis still hesitated, but as Colonel Radet insisted that Rome could no longer be governed unless they made a display of vigour, it was resolved to arrest the Pope, with suitable precautions, and transport him to Tuscany, where a decision should be come to as to what was to be done with that sacred personage, so very embarrassing at Rome, but destined to be embarrassing every where, because every where he would be the living evidence of an odious and useless violence.

Preliminaries having been arranged, and the gendarmes echeloned along the road from Rome to Florence, Colonel Radet assailed the Quirinal on the 6th of July, at 3 o'clock in the morning, the very time when our army was deploying to fight the battle of Wagram. The doors being fast, the garden-walls were scaled with ladders, the palace was entered through the windows, and the intruders arrived at the apartments of the Pope, who, on being informed of the assault, had hurriedly clad himself in his pontifical costume. Cardinal Pacca was beside him, with some ecclesiastical and civil members of his household. The pontiff was indignant. His eyes, naturally quick but mild in their expression, shot fire. Seeing Colonel Radet at the head of our soldiers, so odiously travestied into vanquishers of a defenceless old man, the Pope asked him what brought him there by such an entrance. Colonel Radet stammered out an excuse, alleging the orders he was bound to obey, and said he was directed to take him out of Rome. Pius VII., feeling that all resistance would be useless, asked that he might be accompanied by Cardinal Pacca and some of his household; this was granted on condition that he should set out forthwith, and that the persons he wished to have in his retinue should not join him until after the lapse of some hours. The pontiff having resigned himself to these conditions, he was put into a carriage, Colonel Radet mounted the front seat, and they passed through Rome and the first stages without being recognised. They travelled post, without stopping, as far as Radicofani. There, the Pope being fatigued, and his retinue not having arrived, he refused to go any farther: besides, he had rather a sharp attack of fever, and it was impossible not to grant him a little rest. After a delay of one day the journey was resumed; they drove through Sienna, through the midst of a kneeling but passive population, and arrived at 8 o'clock in the evening at the Carthusian monastery of Florence.

The Grand-duchess Eliza, Napoleon's eldest sister, who took intelligent pains to govern well her beautiful Duchy of Tuscany, and had some difficulty in curbing her subjects, who, like others, were tending to disown the ascendancy of Napoleon, was dismayed at the thought of having such a prisoner to keep, and feared that the mere suspicion of her being an accomplice in such an act of violence would quite alienate the affections of her people. She resolved, therefore, not to have the Pope in Florence. The promptness of the abduction having outstripped all the orders that might have been expected under such circumstances from Schönbrunn, everybody was free to shift the burden from his own shoulders to his neighbour's. The grand-duchess, consequently, ordered that the Pope should be taken to Alessandria, where he

would be in a fortress under the charge of Prince Borghese. He set out on the 9th for Genoa, under the escort of an Italian officer of gendarmes, of gentle deportment, likely to be agreeable to Pius VII. The grand-duchess gave her best carriage for the use of the august traveller, sent her own physician with him, and supplied all the comforts likely to render the journey less fatiguing. The noble old man, grieving at his removal from Italy, irritated by fatigue, and distressed at meeting new faces, passionately refused for a moment to acquiesce in what was required of him, but was forced, nevertheless, to depart for Genoa. By-and-by he grew calmer, on seeing the deference with which he was treated, and especially on perceiving on their knees around him the people of the country, who were allowed to approach his carriage. There was no great risk in allowing them to do so; for, though hatred was beginning to supplant affection throughout the empire, fear still remained entire; and, while all condoled with the Pope, no man would have dared to brave the imperial authority for his deliverance. On arriving, however, near Genoa, it became known that the people had turned out to salute the Pope. He was, therefore, put on board a custom-house boat, at some distance from the town, and taken by sea to San Pietro di Arenia, whence he was transferred to Alessandria.

Prince Borghese, Governor-general of Piedmont, alarmed in his turn at having such a prisoner to keep, and having no orders, sent the Pope on to Grenoble, where he arrived on the 21st with Cardinal Pacca, who, after a temporary separation, had joined him again at Alessandria.

At Grenoble, the Pope was lodged in the bishop's palace, treated with all respect, but kept prisoner.

When the Emperor learned at Schönbrunn the inconsiderate use that had been made of his letters, he blamed the arrest of the Pope, and greatly regretted that such an act of violence had been committed. But being as unwilling to have him in France as Prince Borghese had been to have him at Alessandria, and the Grand-duchess Eliza at Florence, and not being aware that the Pope was already at Grenoble, he named Savona, on the Gulf of Genoa, where there was a good citadel, and a tolerably large house, suitable for the reception of the Pope. On receipt of this letter, the minister of police sent off Pius VII. from Grenoble to Savona, a movement which Napoleon likewise blamed when he was informed of it; fearing that these repeated removals from place to place would seem a series of indecent vexations practised upon an august old man, whom he still loved while oppressing him, and by whom he was loved in spite of that oppression. He ordered that M. de Salmatoris, one of his chamberlains, should be sent from Paris with a troop of domestics and a considerable quantity of furniture, so as to provide a becoming establishment for the Pope. He ordered that he should be allowed to do what he pleased, perform all the ceremonies of religion, and receive the homages of the numerous populations that would flock to see him. At the same time he gave directions for the removal to Paris of the cardinals, the generals of the several religious orders, the members of the

Roman chancery, the members of the courts of the *Da aria* and *Penitenza*, and lastly, the pontifical archives; for he was meditating the design of placing the sovereign pontiff by the side of the head of the new empire of the west, and thus establishing at Paris the centre of all temporal and spiritual authority—singular indication of the degree to which his powerful judgment had already become distorted.

Such were the events of all kinds which took place during the short Austrian campaign, and every reader may easily imagine the effect they must have produced on men's minds. That effect had been great and rapid. For a year past, since the beginning of the Spanish business, discontent had continued to grow and feed upon the conviction universally entertained that all might have ended after Tilsit, and peace have prevailed on the continent at least, but for the imprudent act which had overthrown the Spanish Bourbons to put the Bonapartes in their place. Although the court of Vienna had been the first to assume the offensive, everybody referred the Austrian war to the Spanish as its certain and obvious cause. Those incessant wars were looked on with dismay, which perilled France, her greatness, her tranquillity, and her emperor himself; for even while they censured his insatiable ambition, his subjects clung to him as a saviour, and were as much displeased with him for hazarding his own person as for endangering France, as he did every day. Patriotism had almost sunk under the general feeling of weariness, and some of the disaffected, as we have before stated, secretly hawked about translations of the mendacious bulletins issued by Archduke Charles. The doubtful battle of Essling gave still more force to these feelings, which rose almost to a rancorous pitch when Major Schill took the field, and bands of insurgent Germans appeared in Saxony and Franconia. Wagram extinguished these discontents, but Walcheren revived them; and though the discomfiture of the English again effaced the alarm caused by their landing, one might have remarked the reluctance of the national guards to march, and their indiscipline, which was so great that General Lamarque was obliged to have some of them shot. The old officers, who had been called from retirement to active service, had not the less continued to play the part of malecontents in Paris, and had held most objectionable language. Round MM. Fouché, Bernadotte, and Talleyrand, had gathered many enemies of the empire who showed more than usual boldness. The old royalists had begun to bestir themselves in the Faubourg St. Germain, and the memory of the Bourbons seemed to be somewhat revived among them. They flocked to St. Sulpice to the sermons of a preacher, already celebrated, M. de Frayssinous, with an eagerness which was not owing entirely to religious motives. In those sermons were developed, greatly to their satisfaction, doctrines strongly at variance with those of the decree of the 17th of May, which had suppressed the Pope's temporal sovereignty. Their suppression by the police gave occasion to current remarks still more objectionable than the sermons themselves. The clergy were in consternation at the news that, after many scandalous scenes, things had been carried in Rome to the climax of a forcible abduction of the Pope.

Prayers were offered up for him in the churches: the concordat was laughed at in the *salons*, in which there still lingered some traces of the old philosophical spirit, and everywhere occasion was found for vituperating and depreciating Napoleon as a politician, though the great captain still commanded universal admiration. Reports of his assassination were even propagated several times, as though the same feelings which prompted some to meditate that crime prompted others to presage it. In short, it was evident that a revolution was already taking place in public opinion, and that the impulse which was arousing Europe against Napoleon was beginning to detach France from him. The late war, however, miraculously brought to a close in four months, the glorious peace by which it was followed, and the continent once more pacified, brought back hope, and with it content, admiration, and the desire to see the imperial reign tranquillized, consolidated, and mitigated, and perpetuated in an heir; and although, with all her known frivolity, Josephine was loved as an amiable sovereign, who represented goodness and grace by the side of might, the French desired, with regret for her, another marriage, which should give heirs to the empire. Nor did they confine themselves to wishes on this subject; the fact was indiscreetly announced as already resolved on, by persons who declared their pity for the victim of this sacrifice, and were ready, perhaps, to blame the Emperor for consummating it, and to see, according as his choice should fall, in a new union a new act of ambition.

Such was the state of public feeling which Napoleon thoroughly apprehended, but which he did not like to have represented to him in its true colours, preferring to surmise disagreeable things for himself, rather than hear them from the lips of others. During the war in Austria, Prince Cambacérès had remained silent, that he might not have to utter them; but Napoleon himself called upon his discreet arch-chancellor to speak out, and the latter told all, with extreme delicacy, but with honest sincerity. Anxious to speak with him above all men, and in the fullest detail, on these important matters, Napoleon ordered him to be at Fontainebleau on the 26th of October, the day he himself expected to arrive there.

On the 26th, Napoleon did reach Fontainebleau, before his household, the empress, his ministers, and everybody. The punctual arch-chancellor was on the spot at dawn. Napoleon received him with confidence and friendliness, but with a hauteur not usual with him. The more he felt public opinion lapse from him the more loftily he bore himself toward it, even with regard to those who represented it with so much good feeling for him. He complained to the arch-chancellor of the weakness with which those in Paris had borne the trials of the recent short campaign, the alarms they had so readily conceived on account of a few insignificant efforts made by Major Schill and some other German insurgents, and the commotion into which they had been thrown by the expedition to the Scheldt, which was, he said, an effect of his fortunate star; he expressed some scorn for the want of firmness displayed under these various circumstances, and complained especially that there had been so much hesitation about calling

out the national guards when they might have been of use, and so much indiscretion in calling them out when they could only serve to disturb the country. He manifested more than usual distrust with regard to the old republicans and royalists, and appeared even to extend that feeling to his own kindred. He affected to consider the affairs of the clergy as of minor importance, and talked of settling them now that he was returned, in concert with Prince Cambacérés. He spoke with great contempt of death, and of the dangers he had run, affecting to believe, and believing really, that for an instrument of Providence like himself there were no balls or poniards to be feared. He then came to the essential matter which most engaged his thoughts—the dissolution of his marriage with the Empress Josephine. He loved that old companion of his life, though he was not scrupulously faithful to her, and it wrung his heart to part from her; but as his popularity declined, he liked to suppose that it was not his faults, but the want of a future, which menaced his glorious throne with premature decay. To consolidate what he felt trembling under his feet was his engrossing thought, as if when a new wife had been chosen, obtained, placed in the Tuileries, and had become the mother of a male heir, the faults which had set all the world against him would have been disarmed of their consequences. It was well, no doubt, to have an indisputable heir, but better, a hundred-fold better, would it have been to be prudent and wise! However this may be, Napoleon, who, notwithstanding his want of a son, had been unable after Tilsit, at the zenith of his glory and power, to sacrifice Josephine, now at last resolved to do so, because he felt the empire shaken, and was about to seek in a new marriage the solidity which he ought to have derived from an able and moderate course of conduct.

He spoke then on this grave subject with Prince Cambacérés, declared that there was no prince of his family who could succeed him, cast a sad and searching glance upon the defects of that family, and showed that his brothers were incapable of reigning, intensely jealous of each other, and by no means disposed to obey his successor, unless direct descent constrained them to acknowledge in that successor the continuator of the empire. He manifested, however, a marked preference for Prince Eugene, praised his services, his modesty, his boundless devotedness, but declared that adoption would not suffice to make him accepted after his own death as the heir to the empire; and he added, that being certain of having children with another wife than Josephine, he had resolved to divorce her, but had not mentioned the matter to any one, least of all to her who was to be sacrificed, that such an avowal was most painful to him, that he expected the arrival of Prince Eugene, who was to prepare his mother, and until then he desired the matter to remain a profound secret. Prince Cambacérés learned with keen regret this momentous determination, for, like everybody else, he liked Josephine, and felt clearly that, in repudiating her, Napoleon was about to break still more with the tenour of his own early days, days of sound ideas and moderate designs, days in which were comprised all the men of the Revolution, and from the tradi-

tions of which he could not separate himself without breaking with these men too. The same prudence which had made Cambacérés condemn the conversion of the consulate into the empire, prompted him to condemn an alliance with any old dynasty, for he was well aware that length of possession was the surest consolidation, and that length of possession depended solely on discreetness of conduct. He made some diffident suggestions founded on the favour Josephine enjoyed in France, the affection borne toward her by the people, and above all by the army, who were accustomed to behold in her the benevolent wife of their general; on the revolutionary souvenirs connected with her, and on the new step he would seem to make toward the *ancien régime* in putting away the widow Beauharnais to wed a daughter of the Habsburgs or the Romanoffs. To all these remarks, offered with such extreme reserve, Napoleon replied in the tone of an absolute master, whose towering will had become as it were identified with destiny. He wanted an heir, and that heir obtained, the empire, he asserted, would be established for ever. The first consul's old counsellor, confounded by his master's hauteur, submitted in silence, and was indemnified by an extreme kindness for the inflexibility of the purposes he had endeavoured to bend.\* It was settled that silence should be observed until the arrival of Prince Eugene.

The unfortunate Josephine did not arrive until the afternoon at Fontainebleau, already alarmed at not having been the first to be received. Napoleon welcomed her with affection, but with the embarrassment caused by the weighty secret he durst not divulge. Without possessing talent, Josephine had exquisite tact, and the penetration which personal interest gives, and she felt as it were struck with death. Hearing on all sides the crowd of flatterers repeating how necessary it was to consolidate the empire, and seeing all things tend to what was called stability, the tears she had so often shed in anticipation of her sad lot began to flow afresh. Her daughter, the Queen of Holland, rendered unhappy by her husband's sombre jealousy, and separated from him, had come to comfort her mother, and finding her woe-gone, had at last come almost to wish, for her sake, that this dreadful secret, whatever it was, should be divulged. Fontainebleau was thronged with courtiers, who, the more they had been alarmed by the events in Spain, the more they affected to proclaim the invincibility of him they had thought so near being vanquished. To hear them talk, one would have supposed that nobody had feared, nobody had doubted, nobody had been uneasy. The English had been blunders— the Austrians madly presumptuous. The Spaniards were sure to be put down. Of the Pope, and the useless and odious violence he had suffered, not a word. Napoleon did not choose the affair to be talked of, so no one said

\* Cambacérés speaks of this conversation as follows:—"We were alone for several hours, as the Emperor had desired, in order that he might have leisure to talk with me on several matters. . . . During the interview, Napoleon appeared to me preoccupied with his own greatness: he had an air as though he were talking about *oward his glory*. There was a haughtiness in what he said that made me fear it should no longer prevail on him to use any of those delicate artifices that he himself had owned to be necessary toward ruling a free people, or one that wishes to appear such."

any thing about it, that it might be, as he commanded, a thing of no consequence—an affair of priests, not worth the serious attention of the nineteenth century. And then every conversation on public affairs ended with a whispered remark on the misfortune of seeing the throne occupied by a very engaging but barren female sovereign. No one could presume to fathom the thoughts of the omnipotent Emperor, but it was not possible he should not think of completing the edifice he had raised by giving an heir to the empire. All the thrones of Europe would be eager to offer the mother of that future master of the West, and when the child was born the empire would be eternal. In short, while Paris was beginning to talk and object, though still admiring, at Fontainebleau, people were silent, unless it was to say in servile, low, insipid language, what they had descried in the imperious looks of Napoleon.

His whole family had asked leave to come and expiate, some their failings or their partial disobedience, others certain sayings and doings of which they had been the involuntary cause. Jerome, King of Westphalia, had mismanaged the few military movements he had been required to execute; he had expended too much on his pleasure and not enough on his army. Louis King of Holland, not to indulge his own taste for luxury, but to gratify the parsimonious spirit of the Dutch, had not maintained troops enough, and he had favoured, or at least not put down, the contraband trade with England. Murat, removed from the army to reign in Naples, where he strove to flatter all classes of his subjects, had, probably without knowing it, given occasion for remarks which were transmitted by the police to Schönbrunn. People said, that in anticipation of a catastrophe on the Danube, fatal to Napoleon's life or fortunes, M<sup>r</sup>. Fouché and Talleyrand had turned their eyes on Murat, and arranged to have relays ready on the road from Italy, which were to bring him from Naples to Paris. After all, it was not so much to his own ambition as his wife's that these reports had reference. Napoleon received Jerome indulgently, though the sacrifice of business to pleasure was in his eyes the worst of all faults. But he could pardon a great deal in consideration of his brother's affection, and he allowed him to hope for an advantageous arrangement respecting Hanover. He was more severe with Louis, whom he esteemed, but whose sombre independence and extreme obsequiousness to the wishes of the Dutch were becoming an actual defection as regarded the policy of France. He gave the King of Holland reason to apprehend the most unfavourable resolutions relative to his territories. As for Murat, whom he had not seen for a long time, and whose name, present to the minds of all intriguers, offended him at times, he signified his displeasure not so much against him as his wife, whose restless mind presaged many a capital fault. Though friendly as ever toward his kinsfolk, he affected in a greater degree toward them the bearing of a master. As he advanced in life, he saw deeper in them, as in all around him, to the bottom of human affections; and in approaching, as he sometimes foreboded, the term of his greatness, he seemed to have conceived toward all the world some hidden bitterness, which the fortunate and

prompt termination of the war in Austria had not been sufficient to remove, and which manifested itself by an expression of more absolute authority.

Napoleon's family were not the only comers. The kings, his allies, having all some interest to discuss or thanks to offer, had begged permission to visit him: these were the King of Saxony, the King and Queen of Bavaria, and the King of Wurtemberg. The Emperor replied most courteously to their requests, and every thing announced for the end of autumn the most brilliant assemblage of crowned heads in Paris. Meanwhile a series of magnificent fêtes took place at Fontainebleau. Theatrical performances, balls, and hunting-parties followed one another without intermission. Hunting the stag seemed to be Napoleon's favourite pastime. He spent whole hours on horseback, and had the fact stated in the public journals, because, during the last campaign, rumour had questioned the stability of his health as well as his fortunes. The circumstance that he kept Corvisart, the physician, with him, as much to enjoy his conversation in his leisure moments at Schönbrunn, as to consult him about some obscure pains, the forerunners of the disease of which he died twelve years afterward, had given occasion to much idle talk about his health. To refute such rumours, he galloped from morning till night, boasting of his strength, which was still great, and wishing that it should be believed. His personal appearance had undergone a great change at that time. His face, which had been dark and thin, had grown open and full without becoming less handsome. From being taciturn he had become an abundant talker, always listened to with rapt attention by some, with cringing docility by others. Formerly abrupt and dry, he had become impetuous, voluble, sometimes stern, though always calm in danger, and kind when he saw others suffer. In short, his mighty nature had completely bloomed, and it was now about to fade, like his fortunes, for nothing is stationary. Amid the ladies who eagerly thronged his court, he had particularly distinguished one or two, and he took no pains to conceal his inclinations, in spite of the fits of jealousy of the Empress Josephine, whose feelings in that respect he mortified, as if he wished to prepare her to renounce him, or himself to draw from domestic disagreements the courage to break from her which he had not. Such was his life on his return from the war in Austria: and its lustre was not less than after Tilsit, for it seemed that every one sought by boundless obsequiousness to make him forget the doubts for a moment entertained as to his prosperity.

Always attentive to business, however, in the midst of pleasures, he issued orders from Fontainebleau upon a great number of matters. He accelerated the organization, mustering, and movement of the corps destined for Spain, which consisted, as we have seen, of that of General Junot, dispersed from Augsburg to Dresden, that of Marshal Bessières, employed on the recovery of Walcheren, the reserves prepared in the centre and west of the empire, the provisional dragoons, and the young regiments of the guard. The English having at last withdrawn entirely from the mouth of the Scheldt, after blowing up the docks and works at Flush-

ing, Napoleon gave the troops of the line of that corps the route for Spain, and dissolved the national guards, except some battalions composed of the small number of men who had taken a liking for the service. He had caused the evacuation of Austria to be continued step by step as the payments were made, and directed Marshal Oudinot's corps to Mayence, Marshal Massena's to Flanders, and Marshal Davout's to those parts of Germany which still remained to France, such as Salzburg, Bayreuth, and Hanover. He dissolved Marshal Oudinot's corps, consisting of fourth battalions, (excepting the old St. Hilaire division,) and sent those battalions to their several regiments. He reinforced the fine divisions of Massena's corps, to which he intrusted the costs of the continent from Brest to Hamburg. Marshal Davout's corps he reunited with the cavalry, and proposed to make it live in Hanover, either at the expense of that country, or at that of King Jerome, if he gave Hanover to him. He directed Marshal Marmont's corps to the camp at Laybach, to be quartered on Carniola. Thus he sought the best contrivances not to diminish his forces, and at the same time to render them less costly, for the Austrian war had not brought him in what he expected, (it had produced about 150,000,000,) and the Walcheren expedition had cost him much money for the equipment of the national guards. Finance was then the object of Napoleon's most anxious care, and the cause of most of his determinations. Wishing to bring the affairs of the continent to a close, he treated with Bavaria for the pacification of the Tyrol, the partition of the territories of Salzburg, Bayreuth, &c.; with Westphalia for the cession of Hanover; with Saxony for the gift of Galicia. Of some he demanded donations for his generals; of others, means to maintain his armies; of all, a definitive arrangement which should put an end to the extraordinary military occupations, and at last confer upon the continent an aspect of peace and stability. There was no difficulty in the way of any of these arrangements, for Napoleon was giving away territories, and might, therefore, name what conditions he pleased. The recipients could not fail in any case to be satisfied.

Napoleon had no serious difficulty except with his brother Louis. He was incensed to the last degree at the facilities afforded by the latter to the contraband trade, as a punishment for which he required from him the territory comprised between the Scheldt and the Rhine from Antwerp to Breda, hoping to guard himself better against smuggling when he should have that line, and threatening even to take all Holland if the abuses he complained of were continued. He organized the extraordinary domain, directed by M. Defermon and formed with the army treasury, and the properties of all kinds he had reserved in various countries, in order that the fortunes of his servants might rest on durable bases. Lastly, Napoleon gave his attention to the Church, and thought of a new establishment which would place its head in the position of the patriarchs of Constantinople with regard to the emperors of the East. He had caused the Pope to be very well treated, and to be surrounded with all the state of a sovereign. Pius, who had recovered his usual serenity after a few days' anger, but persisted in his resistance, remarked that mere necessities were enough

for him, and that pomp would be unbecoming in his new situation: sovereign he was no longer and as a prisoner, it would be mockery to surround him with magnificence; a moderate entertainment, such as was afforded to prisoners who were respected, would be enough for himself and his servants.

These objections were not attended to, and the Pope's establishment continued to be princely. As for the affairs of the Church, Pius refused to meddle with any of them so long as he was kept without a council of cardinals and a secretary of state of his own choosing. He was equally obdurate as to the institution of bishops, always a matter of great urgency. Previously, and even subsequently to the entry of General Miollis into Rome, Pius VII. had consented to institute the bishops nominated by the imperial government, on condition of the omission of a formality merely implying deference for the Emperor. Thus he had granted the bull which institutes the bishop accepted by the church, that which is addressed to the clergy, and that which is addressed to the faithful of the diocese; but he had refused that which is addressed to the temporal sovereign in whose dominions the new prelate is to exercise his functions. Napoleon proposed that things should remain on that footing for the future; but the Pope had even refused that compromise since his captivity at Savona. Dispensations and all ordinary acts were granted in Rome by Cardinal di Pietro, who had been left in the metropolis of the church to fulfil the functions of the spiritual governor, according to the usual custom in the absence of the Pope. Napoleon made light of these difficulties, and flattered himself he should remove them when he had Pius VII. near him. His project was to bring him to Fontainebleau, soothe and win upon him, and then make him accept a magnificent establishment at St. Denis, where the sovereign pontificate should be surrounded with as much splendour as at Rome itself. Convinced that with might on one's side one may do every thing, Napoleon imagined that after some resistance the Pope would yield when he saw that nothing was to be got by holding out; that the cardinals and high dignitaries of the church, brought after the Pope to Paris, and sumptuously treated, would likewise end by preferring an opulent and respected position to persecution; and that the Romans, for whom he destined a court the most brilliant in the world next to his own, (what that was we shall see by-and-by,) would freely forego a pontificate which subjected them to the government of priests: that the Catholics of France would be flattered at having the Pope among them; those of the rest of Europe, reduced to far other sacrifices, would resign themselves to his residence in France, and so there would be an end to those old Catholic habits, of all habits the most deeply rooted, inveterate, and unyielding among the European populations, just as to one of those frontiers which he changed at will by writing a new treaty article with the point of his sword on the day after a victory. He renewed the order for removing to Paris the cardinals sitting in Rome, of whatever nation they were, the generals of orders, Dominicans, Barnabites, Servites, Carmelites, Capuchins, Theatins, &c., and the members of the Dataria

and the Penitenza. He further ordered that the precious archives of the Roman court should be sent to Paris in one hundred wagons. The minister of public worship was sent to St. Denis to inspect the buildings, and have them fitted for the reception of a vast establishment. However, as the consciences of the faithful did not accommodate themselves so readily as Napoleon had anticipated to these innovations, and as the clergy, not venturing to resist openly, had recourse, as an indirect mode of exhaling its discontent, to extraordinary missions, which were flocked to by the royalists of the south and of Brétagne, he absolutely interdicted all missions both within and without the bounds of the empire. "For the service of religion at home," he said, "the ordinary clergy is sufficient. I presume enough upon its lights and its zeal to believe that it has no need of itinerant preachers to help out its deficiencies. As for foreign countries, I have no proselytizing zeal. I am content with protecting religion in my own dominions. I have no ambition to propagate it in those of others." Cardinal Fesch having represented that such an interdiction would alarm the faithful more than all besides, Napoleon enjoined him to abstain from all reflections, and to set the first example of obedience, for a mere appearance of resistance would be more severely visited on him than on any one else.

While Napoleon, mingling business with pleasure, the sage resolutions of a grand administration with the illusions of a blind policy, was reposing in the beautiful residence of Fontainebleau from the fatigues and perils of war, the arrival of the allied sovereigns in Paris called him thither to receive them. There were in the capital the King and Queen of Bavaria, the King of Saxony, the King of Wurtemberg, and the kings and queens of Holland, Westphalia, and Naples. Napoleon made his entry into Paris on horseback on the 14th of November. He had not appeared there since his departure for the army on the 12th of April. The rejoicings for peace coinciding with an unexampled assembly of sovereigns, Paris enjoyed a brilliant autumn, which was much wanted after a spring and summer which had presented only loneliness and gloom.

But amid these gayeties Napoleon was marring the grand resolution which was to be so painful to his heart, so pleasing to his pride, and of so little service to his power,—we mean the divorce, and the marriage by which it was to be followed. The scenes of jealousy which had grown worse in proportion as the unfortunate Josephine began to suspect that something more serious than an infidelity was concealed from her, irritated Napoleon, without giving him the courage to come to a rupture. He tried to do so by becoming colder, more reserved, and sterner. But this state of things was insupportable for him, and he was impatient to put an end to it. He sent off a courier to Milan with orders to Prince Eugene to come instantly to Paris, where he detained Queen Hortense, in order that Josephine might have her children about her at the trying moment. He sent for the Arch-chancellor Cambacérès and M. Champagny, and communicated to them separately, and to them only, the resolution he had finally adopted, and to the fulfilment of which they

were required severally to contribute. He conferred with Cambacérès about the form of the divorce. He told him that Josephine suspected what was coming, but that he awaited the arrival of Prince Eugene to avow all to her: until then he desired the most absolute secrecy, and he would finish the business immediately afterward. He repeated his reasons for the divorce, and declared his intention to surround the act with forms the most affectionate and the most honourable for Josephine. He would have nothing that could resemble a repudiation; nothing but a mere dissolution of the conjugal tie, founded on mutual consent—a consent itself founded on the interests of the empire. It was arranged that after a family council, in which the two consorts should express their intentions to the arch-chancellor, a *senatus consultum*, passed in due form, should declare the civil contract dissolved, and should secure a magnificent provision for Josephine. She was to have a palace in Paris, a princely residence in the country, an income of three millions of francs, and the first rank among the princesses after the future empress regnant. He intended to keep her near him as his best and most affectionate friend.

In all these arrangements Napoleon forgot the spiritual tie, the dissolution of which was likewise necessary to the completion of the divorce. He did not seem to attach much importance to it, counting that the secret had been kept by Cardinal Fesch and Josephine as to the religious consecration which had been given to their marriage on the eve of their coronation. But Cardinal Fesch had talked of it to Cambacérès, and the latter submitted to Napoleon that the foreign courts with which he thought of connecting himself might attach an importance to the religious question which he himself did not attribute to it; consequently, that the spiritual tie ought to be dissolved as well as the civil. Napoleon was very angry with Cardinal Fesch. He said that the ceremony performed without witnesses in the chapel of the Tuileries was of no value, that it had taken place solely to quiet the Pope's conscience, and that to think of raising up such an obstacle against him at that moment, was a perfidy on the part of his uncle the cardinal. It was settled, however, that as soon as there was no more need of secrecy, the arch-chancellor should get together some bishops, and find out some means of dissolving the spiritual union without having recourse to the Pope, from whom nothing was to be expected under existing circumstances.

The next question concerned the princess whom Napoleon would put in Josephine's vacated place on the throne of France, and on this point he made M. de Champagny his sole confidant. It was requisite that the new marriage should not only serve his policy as the founder of an empire by giving him an heir, but should also serve his foreign policy by consolidating his system of alliances. He might choose a consort either from among the lesser courts or the greater, as do the more powerful sovereigns. In taking their consorts from the great courts, they strengthen themselves by the good-will of the great states, but not for a long while, as experience proves, since great states are necessarily jealous of each other, and family alliances are but truces to their jealousies. In allying

themselves with the smaller courts they attach to themselves more firmly the only ones that can be faithful to them, if their interest is fully satisfied, since they have no reason to be jealous. If Napoleon would take his new bride from a secondary court, his choice might naturally and honourably fall on the daughter of the King of Saxony, the German sovereign who was most attached to him, who owed him most, and deserved the most esteem. The princess was of mature age, of a good constitution, and irreproachable character. Every thing was easy and sure in that union, though it had no brilliancy.

Among the great courts, Napoleon could only choose between Russia and Austria. Nothing could be nobler, nothing nearer to what is called legitimacy, than an alliance with Austria; and that alliance was possible, for the representatives of the court of Vienna had insinuated in a hundred ways that that court would desire nothing better than to be united with Napoleon. But the ill-will between them was very recent! To embrace and marry so soon after the battles of Essling and Wagram—would not this shock the good sense of both people? Besides, (and this was the main consideration,) it would be a renunciation of the Russian alliance, which had been the foundation of the policy of the empire since Tilsit. Napoleon had, during the last six months, many causes for coolness toward Alexander, especially in the last war, in which he had been so ill seconded by him; but he still regarded the Russian as his principal alliance, as that one which, even though it amounted to no more than neutrality, would yet enable him to keep the continent enthralled and England isolated. He wished, therefore, to preserve it, though he did not fail to tell the Emperor Alexander wherein he had reason to be satisfied with him or otherwise. A marriage connection with the court of Russia was naturally indicated by all that had gone before. At Erfurth, Napoleon had brought the Emperor Alexander to talk to him about his possible union with a Russian princess, the Grand-duchess Anne. The czar had appeared quite disposed, as far as he was concerned, to consent to the marriage, and seemed only to foresee difficulties on the part of his mother, an estimable princess, but proud, and filled with the prejudices of the European aristocracy. She had married the Grand-duchess Catherine, a princess remarkable for beauty and mental endowments, and of an age quite fit for marriage, to a plain Duke of Oldenburg, in order to avoid a demand which she foresaw and disliked. It was therefore to be feared that she would hardly be disposed to bestow her second daughter on Napoleon, after having disposed thus of her eldest to avoid a marriage contrary to her own wishes. Alexander, nevertheless, had promised his good offices, and held out almost a certainty of success, without, however, pledging himself, because he was resolved not to do violence to his mother's inclinations. Therefore, as we stated in its place, the two parties had separated in perfect mutual satisfaction. After this, it was impossible to think of any other union without breaking off the alliance, which Napoleon did not choose to do. He hoped, too, that such a marriage would restore to the Russian alliance all the warmth it had lost, and all the influence over Europe which he expected from it.

In consequence, he ordered M. de ('bampagny to write in cipher, with his own hand, a despatch to St. Petersburg, which M. de Caulaincourt was himself to decipher, and which was to be kept secret from everybody, even from M. de Romanzoff, and to be communicated only to the Emperor Alexander in person. In that despatch, dated the 22d of November, M. de Champagny said:

"Mention of a divorce had reached the ears of the Emperor Alexander at Erfurth, who spoke of it to the Emperor, and told him his sister, the Princess Anne, was at his disposal. His majesty desires that you enter upon the question frankly and simply with the Emperor Alexander, and that you speak to him in these terms.

"Sire, I have reason to think that the Emperor, urged by all France, is disposed for a divorce. May I send him word that he may count on your sister? Will it please your majesty to think over the matter for two days, and give your answer frankly to me, not as the French ambassador, but as a person passionately devoted to both families. It is not a formal demand I present to you, but a disclosure of your intentions I solicit. I venture, sire, to take this step, because I am too much accustomed to say to your majesty what I think, to fear that your majesty will ever compromise me."

"You will not mention the matter to M. de Romanzoff on any pretext whatever; and when you shall have had this conversation with the Emperor Alexander, and that which is to follow it two days afterward, you will forget entirely the communication I make to you. It will remain for you to make known to me the qualities of the young princess, and particularly the period at which she may be in a condition to become a mother; in the present calculations, a difference of six months is an object. I have no need to recommend to your excellency the most inviolable secrecy; you know what you owe in this respect to the Emperor."

This despatch having been sent off, and every thing being prepared for the dissolution of the marriage with the Empress Josephine, and the formation of a new alliance with a Russian princess, Napoleon was impatiently awaiting the arrival of Prince Eugene to disclose all to Josephine, when the terrible secret escaped, as it were, in spite of him. Every day the unfortunate empress becoming more sad, more agitated, and more importunate in her complaints, Napoleon lost patience, and cut short her reproaches, telling her that after all he must think of other ties than those which united them, that the welfare of the empire demanded a great resolution on their part, that he counted on her courage and her devotedness to consent to a divorce, to which he himself had the greatest difficulty in making up his mind. No sooner had he uttered these terrible words, than Josephine burst into tears and fell fainting. Napoleon immediately called M. de Beausset, the chamberlain on service, bid him help him to raise the empress, who was labouring under violent convulsions, and they both carried her in their arms to her apartments. Queen Hortense was sent for, and found the Emperor distressed and angry at the obstacles opposed to his designs. He told the young queen bluntly



and almost sternly that his determination was fixed, and neither tears nor cries could change a resolution which was become inevitable, and necessary to the welfare of the empire. He put on a stern demeanour, as if to stop the tears before which he felt his courage ready to give way. Queen Hortense, whose pride suffered at that moment both on her own account and her mother's, hastened to assure the Emperor that as for tears and cries he should have none to complain of; the Empress would not fail to submit to his desires, and descend from the throne as she had ascended it, in obedience to his will; while her children, content to renounce grandeurs which had not made them happy, would gladly go and devote their lives to comforting the best and fondest of mothers. The unfortunate wife of King Louis had many reasons to speak thus. But as Napoleon listened to her, the real emotion he felt at the bottom of his heart broke through the show of harshness he affected, and he began himself to weep, and to express to his adopted daughter all the grief he felt, all the violence he was obliged to do to his own nature, to pursue the course he had adopted, and all the cogency of the motives that had determined him to act thus. He entreated her not to quit him, but stay by him with Prince Eugene, to help him to console their mother, and render her calm, resigned, happy even while becoming a friend instead of a wife. Napoleon then recounted all he intended to do for her, so as to disguise as much as possible the change which her situation was to undergo. Palaces, chateaux, a magnificent income, the first rank at court after that of the empress regnant, all this, little as it was in lieu of a throne, was something, nevertheless, for a person of Josephine's light and frivolous mind. Queen Hortense, who tenderly loved her mother, tried what she could to console, or at least assuage her sorrow, and many were the tears they wept together. Josephine, however, was calmer on the following days. She expected her son; until his arrival, so long as no formal act had intervened between her and her consort, she still hoped; and, indeed, Napoleon's kindness toward her, now that the terrible secret was revealed, was such as almost to confirm her fond illusion.

Meanwhile, Josephine's lamentations being heard by the servants of the palace, the tale soon spread through the Tuileries, and thence through Paris. The Bonaparte family, too, always jealous of the Beauharnais, could not conceal their joy, the involuntary ebullitions of which would alone have been enough to reveal all. Already an ungrateful court forgot the dethroned Empress, and busied itself in curious conjectures about the future empress, whom it sought on all the thrones of Europe. Napoleon anxiously awaited the arrival of Prince Eugene to put an end to this painful state of things.

That excellent prince arrived in Paris on the 9th of December. His sister threw herself into his arms, and acquainted him with their mother's sad lot. Until then he had been in a state of uncertainty, and instead of foreseeing a misfortune, he had inclined to the opinion of his wife, the Princess Augusta, who told him he was perhaps sent for to be declared heir to the empire. His successes in the last war had conducted to this short-lived illusion. But he was

a prince of moderate desires; and, on learning the truth, he was grieved most on his wife's account, for it was evident that if Napoleon had a son to succeed him, he would not diminish the inheritance of that son by detaching from it the kingdom of Italy. He had, therefore, to renounce not only the throne of France, to which he had never aspired, but also that of Italy, which, from long possession, he had come to look on as his destined patrimony. He waited, however, on the Emperor, resigned to every thing, and grieving for those who were near and dear to him much more than for himself. Napoleon, who loved him, pressed him in his arms, explained his motives, showed him the impossibility of leaving him, Beauharnais, to reign over the refractory Bonapartes, and unfolded to him the plans he had formed for preserving to the Beauharnais an existence in accordance with the few years of greatness they had enjoyed. He then led Josephine's two children to their mother. The interview was long and painful. "Our mother must go away," said Eugene, as the Queen of Holland had said already; "and we must go with her, that we all three may expiate in retirement an ephemeral greatness which has troubled rather than embellished our existence." Napoleon, intensely affected, and shedding tears like them, told them that, on the contrary, they must stay with him, with their mother, in all the lustre of the position in which he wished to maintain them, in order to manifest that Josephine was neither repudiated nor disgraced, but sacrificed to a necessity of state, and recompensed for her noble self-sacrifice by the grandeur of her children, and the tender friendship of him who had been her consort. After many exaggerations—for exaggerations assuage sorrow just as tears do—some degree of tranquillity succeeded these violent agitations, but they left on Napoleon's noble countenance deep traces, which greatly struck those who thought him capable of conceiving in his imperious soul only strong volitions, but no tender affection. The sacrifice having been made, it was now to be rendered irrevocable. The 15th of December was the day chosen for dissolving the civil contract, according to the formalities arranged with the Arch-chancellor Cambacérés.

On the evening of the 15th of December, the whole imperial family assembled in the Emperor's cabinet in the Tuileries. There were present the Empress-mother, the King and Queen of Holland, the King and Queen of Naples, the King and Queen of Westphalia, the Princess Borghese, the Chancellor Cambacérés, and Count Regnaud de Saint Jean d'Angel, the two latter as *officiers de l'état civil* for the imperial family. Napoleon, standing up, holding Josephine by the hand, who was in tears, and himself having tears in his eyes, read the following speech:

"My cousin Prince Arch-chancellor, I sent you a closed letter of this day's date, ordering you to present yourself in my cabinet, that I might make known to you the resolution which I and the Empress, my very dear spouse, have come to. I was very that glad the kings, queens, and princesses, my brothers and sisters, my brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, my step-daughter and my step-son, become my adopted son, should be present at what I had to make known to you.

"The policy of my monarchy, the interest and the necessity of my peoples, which have constantly guided all my actions, require that I should leave after me to children, inheritors of my love for my people, this throne on which Providence has placed me. For many years, however, I have lost the hope of having children by my marriage with my well-beloved spouse the Empress Josephine: this it is that induces me to sacrifice the dearest affections of my heart, to hearken only to the good of the state, and desire the dissolution of our marriage.

"Arrived at the age of forty, I may conceive the hope of living long enough to bring up after my own mind and my own views, the children it shall please Providence to give me. God knows how much such a resolution has cost my heart; but there is no sacrifice too great for my courage, when it is demonstrated to me that it is for the good of France.

"I cannot conclude without saying, that far from having ever had reason to complain, I have, on the contrary, only encomiums to bestow on the attachment and tenderness of my well-beloved spouse. She has embellished fifteen years of my life; the memory of this will always remain engraved on my heart. She has been crowned by my hand; it is my desire that she retain the rank and title of Empress, but, above all, that she never doubt my sentiments, and that she always hold me for her best and dearest friend."

Napoleon having ended, Josephine, holding a paper in her hands, tried to read. But her voice was choked with sobs, and she handed the paper to M. Regnaud, who read as follows:

"With the permission of my august and dear spouse, I must declare, that retaining no hope of having children who may satisfy the requirements of his policy and the interests of France, I have pleasure in giving him the greatest proof of attachment and devotedness that was ever given on earth. I owe all to his bounty; it was his hand that crowned me, and on his throne I have received only manifestations of affection and love from the French people.

"I think to evince my gratitude for all these sentiments, in consenting to the dissolution of a marriage which is now an obstacle to the good of France, which deprives it of the happiness of being one day governed by the descendants of a great man, so evidently raised up by Providence to efface the evils of a terrible revolution, and to re-establish the altar, the throne, and social order. But the dissolution of my marriage will make no change in the sentiments of my heart: in me, the Emperor will always have his best friend. I knew how much this act, commanded by policy and by such great interests, has rent his heart; but we both of us glory in the sacrifice which we make to the good of the country."

After these words, the noblest ever uttered under such circumstances, for never, it must be owned, did vulgar passions less prevail in an act of this kind, the arch-chancellor drew up a minute of this twofold declaration, and Napoleon, embracing Josephine, led her to her own apartments, where he left her almost fainting in the arms of her children. He repaired immediately to the council-hall, where, conformably with the constitution of the empire, a private council had met to draw up the *senatus consulto*,

declaratory of the dissolution of the marriage between Napoleon and Josephine, which was to be taken to the senate on the following day.

That great body assembled by the Emperor's orders to receive the declaration of the two august spouses, and act thereupon. The sitting began with the reception of Prince Eugene as senator. He had been nominated at the time of his departure for Italy, and had not yet taken his seat. He delivered some becoming and simple words, which had been prepared for him, on the occasion of the new *senatus consulto*.

"My mother, my sister, and myself," he said, "owe every thing to the Emperor. He has been truly a father to us; he will find in us, at all times, devoted children and obedient subjects.

"It is important to the happiness of France that the founder of this fourth dynasty should grow old surrounded by a direct lineage, which shall be a guarantee to us all, as the pledge of our country's glory.

"When my mother was crowned before the whole nation by the hands of her august spouse, she contracted the obligation to sacrifice all her affections to the interests of France. She has, with courage, nobleness, and dignity, fulfilled this first of duties. Her soul has often been affected at witnessing the painful conflicts endured by the heart of a man accustomed to master fortune, and always to march with a firm step to the accomplishment of his great designs. The tears which this resolution has cost the Emperor, sufficiently proclaim my mother's glory. In the situation in which she is about to be placed, she will not be a stranger in her wishes and her feelings to the new prosperities that await us; and it will be with mingled pride and satisfaction she will behold all the happiness that her sacrifices shall have produced for her country and her Emperor."

The *senatus consulto* was passed in the same sitting. It pronounced the dissolution of the marriage contracted between the Emperor Napoleon and the Empress Josephine, maintained the latter in her rank as crowned Empress, assigned her an income of two millions of francs, and rendered obligatory on Napoleon's successors the appointments he should make in her favour on the civil list. These appointments were the gift of an annual pension of one million, payable by the civil list, independently of the two millions payable by the state treasury, and the absolute property of the châteaux of Navarre and Malmaison.

On the following day, December 17, all the documents were inserted in the *Moniteur*, and the dissolution of the marriage was known by the public. Josephine was pitted, for she was liked for her goodness, and even for her defects, which were in conformity with the national character. But the sympathy she excited was soon absorbed in curiosity to know who was to be her successor. Opinion was divided between a Russian and an Austrian princess, but generally inclined to the former rather than to the latter. As for the unfortunate Josephine, she retired to Malmaison, where her children stayed with her, and tried, with but little success, to comfort her. Napoleon went to see her the day after her arrival, and continued to visit her on the subsequent days. He thought he ought to invest himself in a kind of mourning, and quitting the illustrious guests who had come

to his court, he retired to Trainon, to hunt, attend to business, and wait the result of the negotiations he had begun. Fresh despatches were sent to St. Petersburg on the 17th, (the day the *senatus consultum* appeared in the *Moniteur*), pressing the court of Russia for an immediate reply, Yes or No. They stated that all the conditions would be accepted, even those relating to religion,—that the only point on which there could be any difficulty was the age and health of the princess, for before all things an heir was wanted. If, however, her age and state of health were such as gave promise of children, and if her family consented to the proposed union, the reply must arrive without delay, and the desired alliance must be celebrated immediately, as France could not be kept longer in uncertainty.

The Arch-chancellor Cambacérès had been instructed to procure the dissolution of the spiritual ties, in order to remove the scruples of the Catholic courts, if a princess of that religion were to be chosen. With regard to the spiritual as well as the civil tie, the annulling of the marriage on the grounds of informality or of great public interest, was preferred to an ordinary divorce, as more honourable to Josephine, and more conformable to the prevailing religious ideas. It was also resolved to do without the Pope's intervention. The arch-chancellor, who was very expert in these matters, and generally in all those which required knowledge, prudence, and a great fertility in expedients, assembled a commission of seven bishops, to whom he submitted the case in question. These were the Bishop of Montefascone, (Cardinal Maury,) the Bishop of Parma, the Archbishop of Tours, and the Bishops of Verceil, Evreux, Trèves, and Nantes. These learned men, after a searching investigation, concluded that, whereas for the dissolution of a regular marriage, in consideration of a great interest of state, the only competent authority was the Pope; the authority of the diocesan was sufficient to annul an irregular marriage like that in question. Now the occult ceremony which had been celebrated in the chapel of the Tuileries without witnesses,\* and without sufficient consent of the contracting parties, could not, whatever Cardinal Fesch might say, constitute a regular marriage. Its annulment on the ground of informality was therefore to be sued out before the diocesan court in the first instance, and before the metropolitan authority in the second.

In consequence of this opinion, canonical proceedings were instituted without noise at the instance of the arch-chancellor, representing the imperial family, to obtain the annulment of the religious marriage between the Emperor Napoleon and the Empress Josephine. Cardinal Fesch and MM. de Talleyrand, Berthier, and Duroc were heard as witnesses, the first-named as to the forms observed, the three others as to the nature of the consent given by the parties. Cardinal Fesch declared that he had delivered to him by the Pope dispensations for the non-observance of certain forms in the accomplishment of his functions as grand almoner, which,

in his opinion, justified the absence of witness and of *curé*. As to the title, he affirmed its existence, and thus rendered useless the precaution which had been taken to withdraw from Josephine's hands the certificate of marriage which had been delivered to her by Cardinal Fesch, and which her children had with much difficulty obtained from her. MM. de Talleyrand, Berthier, and Duroc affirmed that Napoleon had repeatedly told them he had consented only to a mere ceremony in order to reassure Josephine's conscience and the Pope's, but that his formal intention at all times had been not to complete his union with the Empress, being, unhappily, certain he should soon be obliged to renounce her for the interests of his empire. These witnesses related certain details which left no doubt on the matter.

The conclusion come to by the ecclesiastical authority was, that there had not been sufficient consent; but, from respect for the parties, it would not dwell specially on that ground of nullity, but upon others quite as important, derived from the fact that there had been no witnesses, and no *proper priest*—that is to say, no parish clergyman, (the only minister accredited by the Catholic religion to give authenticity to a marriage.) It declared that the dispensation granted to Cardinal Fesch in a general manner as grand almoner, could not have conferred on him the curial functions, and, consequently, the marriage was null, through defect of the most essential forms. The marriage was, therefore, broken before both the diocesan and the metropolitan jurisdictions, with suitable decency and the full observance of the canon law.

Napoleon was then free, without having had recourse to what has dishonoured in history the reputations of princesses, without having had recourse to the form of divorce, which is scarcely conformable to our habits, and with all the delicacy due to the unfortunate spouse who had so long shared and embellished his life, as he himself said. He now awaited with impatience the reply from St. Petersburg.

The communication with which he had commissioned M. de Caulaincourt was delicate and difficult, and though the great favour he enjoyed with the Emperor Alexander afforded him great facilities, yet the circumstances were not happily chosen for success. The last war had greatly deteriorated the alliance between the two courts. In the first place, although things had proceeded somewhat better this year in Finland, though a revolution we will speak of by-and-by had overturned the throne of Sweden, and brought about peace and the cession of Finland to Russia, the events in the East were less favourable to Russian ambition; and since the Emperor Alexander had been allowed entire freedom with regard to Turkey, he had scarcely made any progress on the Danube, so that Moldavia and Wallachia, though conceded by Napoleon, had not yet been won from the Turks. They were, therefore, not quite so well pleased at St. Petersburg with the French alliance, though they had only themselves to complain of, and not that alliance which had granted them every thing. Secondly, Napoleon, being dissatisfied with the little aid he had received from his ally, had treated him with some negligence during the campaign, had not written to him until it was ended, and had with marked haughtiness, but without complaining

\* It was on the erroneous authority of a contemporaneous manuscript memoir, that I stated in Vol. V. that MM. de Talleyrand and Berthier were present as witnesses at the religious ceremony of marriage secretly performed in the Tuileries on the eve of the coronation.

of it, pointed out the inefficacy of the Russian aid. Alexander, being obliged to confess either the insufficiency of his government, or his own want of good-will, and much preferring the former alternative, had suffered severely from mortified vanity. "What would they have had me do?" he often said. "My affairs in Finland and Turkey have not gone better than those of the Emperor Napoleon in Poland. Could I do for him what I have not done for myself?" And he alleged in excuse for the smallness of the services he had rendered Napoleon, the disturbances, the seasons, and the inferiority of the Russian administration as compared with the French. But what had most of all displeased him was the terms of the treaty of peace concluded with Austria, and the aggrandizement of nearly two millions of subjects granted to the grand-duchy of Warsaw. To him, and still more to others in St. Petersburg, this had appeared a certain presage of the speedy re-establishment of Poland, and for a fortnight the court of Russia rang with invectives against France, so that M. de Caulaincourt durst hardly show himself. The gift to Russia of a lot of 400,000 subjects had seemed but a lure intended to cover the re-establishment of Poland, which the opponents even said was completely realized by the junction of Galicia with the grand-duchy of Warsaw. Alexander had never ceased complaining since the last treaty of Vienna, and asking for guarantees against the future evils which those about him predicted.

He had received from Napoleon a very reassuring letter, which he communicated to the chief personages of the court of Russia, but the declarations it contained being, as they said, mere words, he had been obliged to ask for something official. His wish was complied with, and M. de Caulaincourt, at his urgent request, was authorized in a general way to sign a convention relative to Poland. He let himself be drawn into signing one which subsequently proved a most embarrassing tie upon Napoleon. In that convention it was stated that the kingdom of Poland should never be re-established; that the names of Poland and Pole should disappear in all acts, and be no more employed thenceforth; that the grand-duchy should not be enlarged at any future time by the addition of any part of the old Polish provinces; that the Polish orders of knighthood should be abolished; and, lastly, that all these engagements should be binding on the King of Saxony, as Grand-duke of Warsaw, no less than upon Napoleon himself.\* This strange convention, which put Napoleon in such a singular position with regard to the Poles, was wrung from M. de Caulaincourt by the importunities of the Emperor Alexander, who seemed resolved on breaking the alliance if it was not ratified.

It was in this situation, shortly before the final arrangement of the above-mentioned convention, and while its conditions were still under discussion, that the demand supervened which M. de Caulaincourt was commissioned to make to the court of Russia. Having received the first despatch from Paris on the 8th or 9th of December, he could not immediately see the Emperor

Alexander, who was absent from St. Petersburg, but he had an audience of him on his return. The Emperor Alexander, though rather surprised, did not deny the sort of engagement he had entered into at Erfurth, namely, to use his influence with his mother to obtain the hand of the Archduchess Anne. He expressed his desire and even his strong hope of succeeding, but he required time, and to be free to set about the matter in his own way. Whether he was sincere in the great deference he affected for his mother, or that it was a way of providing himself with excuses if necessary, he said he would not speak in the name of the Emperor Napoleon, but in his own; that he would not represent the demand as actually made, but as possible—probable, even—and that he would try to obtain his mother's consent by alleging his own political interests rather than the wishes of the Emperor of the French. With a profusion of polite messages for Napoleon he postponed his answer, promising to give it as speedily as possible.

That the Emperor Alexander, who loved his mother and was loved by her, though a certain jealousy on the score of authority subsisted between them, should make a mystery toward her of a matter so important to the imperial family, was not very likely. Probably he wished that, in case the family alliance with Napoleon should not be found suitable, the self-love of the two courts should be less implicated in the matter, his mother being supposed to have given a refusal to the Emperor Alexander, and not to the Emperor Napoleon, who would not have figured in the negotiation. It is probable, above all, that he wished to retain a greater degree of freedom, so that he might put a higher price on his consent, and that price was the convention as to Poland.

M. de Caulaincourt wrote to Paris on the 28th of December, that his overtures had been most favourably received; that he had every hope of success; but that there would be requisite a vast amount of finessing, and a little patience. Pressed by M. de Champagny's despatches, which followed each other without interruption, he availed himself of the latitude allowed him, and acquainted the court of Russia that all the conditions would be accepted, including even those relating to the difference of religion. He again saw the emperor, who appeared satisfied with the result of his first overtures, spoke of his mother's consent as almost certain, while that of his sister, the Grand-duchess Catherine, was already obtained, and would be soon followed by the general and official consent of the whole imperial family. Nevertheless, Alexander still demanded some days before he gave his final answer. It was evident he would consent at last, since he spoke of his mother and sister, the only persons about whom there was any difficulty, as acquiescent; it was evident that he would not venture to offer on his own account a refusal, which, by hurting the sensitive pride of Napoleon, would bring about a rupture of the alliance, a total change of policy, the loss of his dearest hopes with regard to the East, and an alarming alliance of France with Austria. The aristocratic objections that might be entertained to an alliance with a new dynasty, greatly attenuated, indeed, by the incomparable glory of Napoleon, were certainly not worth the sacrifice of the empire's best interests. There was no doubt,

\* These very important facts have never been known. We relate them from M. de Caulaincourt's authentic correspondence with Napoleon.

then, as to the ultimate consent; but the convention relative to Poland was the manifest motive which still made Alexander hang back. The terms of that convention had, after difficulties of all kinds, been at last agreed on, but, until it was ratified, he would not pledge himself to the marriage; he wanted first to have in hand the price he bargained for, namely, the convention which should relieve him from the danger of seeing a new kingdom of Poland erected upon his frontiers. At first he had asked for ten days, then he asked for ten days more, and promised that his answer should be forthcoming in the latter half of January. The first overture dated from the middle of December.

Napoleon, who had written on the 22d of November, and counted on a reply by the end of December or the beginning of January, (the couriers then took 12 or 14 days to go from Paris to St. Petersburg,) was very impatient to know the issue, and already somewhat offended at the delays he encountered. He regarded himself as superior to all the sovereigns of his time, not only in genius (about this there was no question) but by reason of the position that genius had won for him. He thought that his hand ought to be accepted as soon as he consented to offer it, and these affectations of difficulty about an old princess, who in reality depended on Alexander, put him in no good humour. What particularly disposed him to take amiss the real or pretended hesitation of Russia was the eagerness manifested by the other courts with which he might ally himself.

The house of Saxony, of course, desired nothing better. The old King of Saxony seemed actuated rather by personal regard than by political motives in consenting to give him his daughter, a princess of somewhat advanced years, but whose constitution gave promise of a healthy progeny. Her father had, indeed, conceived a real attachment for Napoleon.

The demonstrations on the part of Austria were not less favourable. Prince Schwarzenberg, who had quitted the embassy to St. Petersburg for that to Paris, had just arrived in France, and felt it an annoyance to represent there a beaten court, and one which would be still more so if the alliance of France with Russia became closer. It was that alliance which had frustrated the last levy of bucklers on the part of Austria; the continuance of that alliance would keep it in a state of complete nullity, if it did no worse. A marriage with France, though it should replace Austria in a very strong position, would at least put an end to the alliance between France and Russia, would secure the peace which was so much needed, and would dissipate the fears, whether well or ill founded, with which the event at Bayonne had inspired all the old dynasties. Hence all the Austrian negotiators, both civil and military, had thrown out hints in this respect which had not been accepted by Napoleon, who was then full of the idea of a Russian marriage, but which had dwelt in his memory. M. de Metternich now prime minister in the place of M. de Stadion, having been familiar at Paris with the princes and princesses of recent origin, and entertaining against them none of the prejudices of the old courts, would naturally have desired to inaugurate his ministry with a marriage of such great

political consequence, and Prince Schwarzenberg, knowing the prime minister's dispositions, was as desirous as he of substituting Austria for Russia. But on arriving in Paris he had the mortification of seeing Prince Kourakin caressed and flattered as the representative of the court with which the marriage was about to be contracted, and his own situation, which was unpleasant enough in consequence of the late war, made still more so in consequence of the approaching union. The Austrian ambassador's feelings became known through M. de Floret, the secretary of legation, who talked of them to M. de Semonville, and the latter, who busied himself as much as he could about every thing, repeated to M. Maret what he had learned from M. de Floret. There was, besides, a Frenchman very intimate with M. de Schwarzenberg: this was M. de Laborde, son of the celebrated banker of the eighteenth century, established in Austria during the revolution, and recently returned to France. M. de Laborde was very well known to M. de Champagny, who employed him to ascertain the exact disposition of Austria in this matter. Prince Schwarzenberg imparted to M. de Laborde his uneasiness, and his dislike of the post he occupied at Paris, which was becoming most disagreeable, especially as the marriage with a Russian princess was to all appearance a settled thing. M. de Laborde reported all this to M. de Champagny, who authorized him to insinuate that Napoleon's choice was by no means irrevocably fixed, that what was said in public was stated very much at random, and that it was not impossible the Emperor's policy would soon bring him back toward an Austrian alliance. These words repeated, without official character, but with much address, as rumours gathered from good authority, gave great satisfaction to Prince Schwarzenberg, who immediately wrote to Vienna to know what he was to do, should a demand in marriage be addressed to him.

During the negotiations with the court of St. Petersburg, and the secret communications with the court of Vienna, the belief in a Russian marriage was general in Paris, but the public desire was much divided between a Russian and an Austrian princess. Most of those about Napoleon formed their opinion in accordance with their own position, their past history, and their interests, some few in accordance with their disinterested forethought. All those who had any affinity with the *ancien régime*, like M. de Talleyrand, for instance, and who saw in an Austrian marriage another backward step, were for a daughter of the Emperor Francis. M. de Talleyrand, moreover, had an invariable leaning for Austria against the powers of the north, and he had connections with that court which had often been suspiciously regarded by Napoleon. M. Maret, whom M. de Talleyrand treated with extreme disdain, was this time in accord with him, and their language was the same. M. Maret had no other reason for this than that he had been the recipient, through MM. de Semonville and Floret, of the first confidential communications made on the part of Austria. In the imperial family the whole Beauharnais section inclined to Austria, and on a question which ought never to have elicited any opinion on their part, they hastened to have one, and to express it with strange vivacity. Their real

motive was the desire of a lasting peace in Italy and Bavaria, which was a matter of great interest to Prince Eugene and his father-in-law. Though the former was not destined to reign in Italy if Napoleon had a direct heir, he would have to govern that kingdom as viceroy during Napoleon's life, some twenty or thirty years, as he calculated, and he wished that there should be no danger of seeing the Austrians at Verona as in the late war. Josephine, who indemnified herself for her fall by her zeal in serving the interests of her children, made the most unseemly overtures on this subject to Madame de Metternich, who had not quitted Paris.

On the contrary, all who leaned to the revolution, all who disliked the *ancien régime*, all who feared a too complete return to the past, all likewise who had some military and political forethought, wished for a marriage with Russia. The Murat family, swayed by the Queen of Naples, feared that an Austrian princess would introduce into the imperial court a pride of birth injurious to the princes and princesses of the Bonaparte family, who had not, like Napoleon, their personal glory to uplift them. The Arch-chancellor Cambacérès, who, from inclination and good sense, had remained attached to what was fundamental on the revolution of 1789, fearing always Napoleon's ambitious propensities and the weaknesses concealed beneath his greatness, shared the dislike of the Bonapartes for an Austrian marriage, which was a sort of alliance with the old *régime*. Moreover, his peculiar tact in apprehending the spirit of the country, made him forebode no advantage for Napoleon in resembling in any respect Louis XVI., and his political sagacity enabled him to foresee that of the two powers that one whose alliance was rejected would soon become an enemy. If it was Austria, there would be nothing new or very formidable in this; if it was Russia, the matter would be more serious, for though the way to Vienna had been found twice, that to St. Petersburg had not been found yet. But strange to say, it already needed some courage to counsel Napoleon in favour of the Russian marriage, so much did a secret instinct tell every one that a marriage with an Austrian archduchess was the one which would most flatter the self-love of an Emperor who was not legitimate, (according to the language of those he wished to resemble,) and who desired to become so otherwise than by glory.

While these contradictory opinions prevailed around Napoleon, he himself remained in a state of uncertainty, which induced him to summon a privy council in the Tuileries, that he might hear what everybody had to say, desiring almost, he who was usually so resolute, to find in the opinions of others reasons for determining his own.

The council was suddenly convoked on Sunday, the 21st of January, immediately after mass. There were present the grand dignitaries of the empire, the minister of foreign affairs, Maret, the secretary of state, who acted as secretary of the council, and the presidents of the senate and the legislature, MM. Garnier and De Fontanes. Napoleon, grave, impassible, seated in the imperial chair, had on his right the Arch-chancellor Cambacérès, King Murat, and Prince Berthier; on his left, the Arch-treasurer Lebrun, Prince Eugene, M. de Talley-

rand, Garnier, and De Fontanes; M. Maret, closing the circle, was seated at the end of the council-chamber, opposite the Emperor.

"I have assembled you," said Napoleon, "to have your advice upon the greatest interest of state, upon the choice of the spouse who is to give heirs to the empire. Listen to the report of M. de Champagny, after which you will please to give me each of your opinion." M. de Champagny presented an elaborate report on the three alliances between which the choice lay: the Russian, the Saxon, and the Austrian. He affirmed that the three were equally possible, the three courts being equally well disposed, (an assertion somewhat exaggerated as regarded Russia, but near enough to the truth to be presented to the council.) He then compared the personal advantages of the three princesses. The Saxon princess was a model of all virtues, somewhat advanced in age, but of a fine constitution. The Austrian princess was eighteen years old, of an excellent constitution, an education worthy of her rank, and gentle and engaging disposition. The Russian princess was rather young, about fifteen, endowed, it was said, with qualities desirable in a sovereign, but of a religion not that of France, a circumstance which would occasion some trouble, particularly that of having a Greek chapel in the Tuileries. As for political advantages, M. de Champagny spoke without ambiguity. He saw none, he pointed out none, except in the alliance with the court of Austria. On this subject he spoke like an ex-ambassador of France to Vienna.

After the report there was a long silence, no one venturing to speak first, but each waiting a call from Napoleon to open his lips. Napoleon then resolved to take the sense of the council, beginning on the left, the side where lay the less weighty opinions, though M. de Talleyrand sat there. The arch-treasurer, Lebrun, an old royalist, who had remained such at the imperial court, though very much devoted to the empire, roused himself from a sort of dosing state that was habitual to him, to express an opinion that was not wanting in sense. "I am for the Saxon princess," he said: "that princess does not implicate us in anybody's policy, does not embroil us with anybody, and comes, moreover, of a good stock." The arch-treasurer said no more. Prince Eugene, speaking next after Prince Lebrun, stated in simple and modest terms the reasons alleged by the partisans of the Austrian policy, and these were repeated with more force, though with sententious brevity, by M. de Talleyrand, who next to the arch-chancellor was the most competent judge in such matters. He said that the time for securing the stability of the empire was come, that the policy which inclined to Austria had more than any other that advantage of stability; that alliances with the northern courts had a character of ambitious and changeful policy; what was wanted was an alliance which would make it possible to contend against England, and the alliance of 1756 was there to show that it was only in an intimate union with Austria that the continental security had been found which was necessary to a great display of naval force; and lastly, that the head of a new empire, wedded to an archduchess of Austria, would have no need to envy in any respect the honours of the Bourbons. The lordly

diplomatist spoke in a tone and style such as the French *noblesse* might have used had they to deliver an opinion on the marriage of Napoleon. The Senator Garnier gave his voice for that middle term which compromised no interest, the Saxon alliance. M. de Fontanes inveighed with literary warmth, and even with a sort of royalist bitterness, against northern alliances. He spoke as they used to speak at Versailles when Frederick the Great and Catharine the Great were seated on the thrones of the North.

Contrary to usage, M. Maret, a mere secretary, whose business was to hear and record the opinions of others, was allowed to give his own, which, however, was not regarded as of much importance by the council. He voted for the Austrian princess. On passing to his right, Napoleon encountered different sentiments. He heard, indeed M. de Champagny repeat what he had said in his report, and Prince Berthier, who liked Austria, declare in its favour, so that there was a strong majority for the archduchess. But Murat and Cambacérès remained to be consulted. Murat was extremely animated, and expressed in that council of the grandees of the empire all the old revolutionary sentiments that remained in the army. He maintained that this marriage with an Austrian princess could only awaken inauspicious recollections of Marie Antoinette and Louis XVI., recollections which were far from being effaced, far from being agreeable to the nation; that the imperial family owed every thing to the glory and power of its head; that it needed not to borrow any thing from foreign alliances, and its approximation to the *ancien régime* would alienate many hearts that were attached to the empire, without winning the hearts of the French *noblesse*. He inveighed against the partisans of the family alliance with Austria, affirming that such a scheme could not have been devised by the devoted friends of the Emperor. As he spoke, it seemed as though the Bonapartes stood behind him inciting him against the Beauharnais, and M. Fouché against M. de Talleyrand. After the fire of the King of Naples came the cool prudence of the Arch-chancellor Cambacérès, expressing itself in simple, clear, moderate, but positive language. He said, the first thing to be considered was the procuring of heirs for the empire, and it behooved to know was the Russian princess capable of bearing them; if she was, the course was obvious. As for what regarded religion, the court of Russia would certainly allow itself to be prevailed upon to forego conditions that might give offence to France; and, as for policy, a doubt was inconceivable. Austria, deprived in this century of the Netherlands, Swabia, Italy, Illyria, and lastly of the imperial crown, would be an enemy for ever irreconcilable; her natural inclinations, too, rendered her incompatible with a new monarchy, while Russia, on the contrary, had in that respect fewer prejudices than any other court, (which was true then.) She had in her territory and her remoteness reasons of all kinds for being the ally of France, and none for being her enemy. If rejected, she would not fail to become hostile; a war with her would be infinitely more hazardous than with Austria, and to neglect her would be to abandon a possible and facile alliance for a false and impossible alliance. He concluded

then, in a most formal manner, in favour of the marriage with the Russian princess.

These two opinions, the last especially, proceeding from the gravest man of his time, strongly counterpoised those in favour of the Austrian alliance. But as it was only a consultation Napoleon had required, the matter was not put to the vote. He himself, remaining calm and impenetrable, nothing in his countenance allowing it to be guessed which way he inclined, thanked the members of the council for their excellent advice. "I will weigh your arguments," he said, "in my mind. I am convinced that, whatever difference there may be between your views, the opinion of each of you has been determined by an enlightened zeal for the interests of the state, and by a faithful attachment to my person."

The council was immediately dismissed, and, in spite of the reserve which Napoleon imposed on all those about him, without however always observing it himself, all the opinions uttered in the council were eagerly canvassed in the palace. The Murat family even believed for a while that the cause of the Russian alliance was won, and said so to Prince Cambacérès with great signs of joy. But the decision of the question was to depend much more on events than on the personal opinion of Napoleon.

A courier from Russia was impatiently looked for. Then, on the 6th of February, came despatches from M. de Caulaincourt, calculated to prolong the uncertainty that had existed for six weeks. The last delay of ten days asked for by the Emperor Alexander expired on the 17th of January, and on the 21st he had not replied. Evidently he wanted to gain time, and obtain the ratification of the treaty relative to Poland before he pledged himself irrevocably. He had repeated to M. de Caulaincourt that the empress-mother did not refuse her consent, that the Grand-duchess Catherine likewise gave hers, and that things would go as Napoleon wished, but that he still required a little time before he gave his final answer. A more serious matter was the health of the young princess, which did not quite correspond to the impatient desire of an heir to the empire, and also the obstinacy of the empress-mother in insisting upon a chapel with Greek priests in the Tuileries. M. de Caulaincourt further stated that he expected a formal answer in a short while, and he doubted not it would be favourable. Napoleon's impetuous character could not accommodate itself to such a state of uncertainty. Whether the delay arose from the repugnance to a union with him, or from a wish to gain time in order to wrest from him a treaty, both irksome at present and imprudent with regard to the future, in either case it was disgusting to him. It was, moreover, supremely disagreeable to him to remain longer the common subject of gossip, like one of those rich heirs whom everybody provides with a wife. He therefore gave way to one of those impulses which he could not control, and which ended by deciding his destiny: he resolved to break with Russia, and to take the dilatory behaviour of that court for a refusal, which disengaged him with regard to it. He had not been insensible, moreover, to the arguments advanced in favour of Austria and against Russia, to the inconvenience of having a wife who would, perhaps, make him wait two

or three years for children, who would not be present at the ceremonies of the national religion, and who would have her own priests—a secondary consideration, but irksome among a nation like the French, which, without being devout, exhibits all the punctiliousness of the most lively devotion. He had conceived, too, a better opinion of the Austrian army since the last campaign, and considered it as serious a matter to have to do with it as with the Russian army. These reasons being backed by the most powerful of all, offended pride, he made up his mind at once with the incredible promptitude which formed the distinctive trait of his character. After having read M. de Caulincourt's despatches, he sent for M. de Champagny and ordered him to write to St. Petersburg, and declare that very day to M. de Kourakin that the delay to reply to him released him, not from an engagement, (there had not been any at Erfurth,) but from the preference he had thought due to the sister of a monarch, his ally and his friend; that to wait longer was impossible in the state of anxiety prevailing among the French; and that, moreover, the information conveyed to him regarding the health of the young princess did not correspond with the motive which had made him dissolve his old marriage to contract a new one. For these reasons he decided for the Austrian princess, whose family, far from hesitating, met him spontaneously with an alacrity to which he could not be insensible.

As to the convention relative to Poland, he explained himself still more energetically, and in a manner which showed more plainly how much the choice he had just made was influenced by the desire to escape from the importunate demands addressed him. "To enter," he said, "into an absolute and general engagement that the kingdom of Poland shall never be re-established, were an imprudent and undignified act on my part. If the Poles, taking advantage of favourable circumstances, should rise up of themselves alone, and hold Russia in check, must I then employ my forces against them? If they found allies, must I employ all my forces to combat those allies? This would be asking of me a thing impossible, dishonouring, and, moreover, independent of my will. I can say that no co-operation, direct or indirect, shall be furnished by me toward an attempt at reconstituting Poland; but I cannot go farther. As for the suppression of the words **POLAND** and **POLE**, it is a barbarism I could not commit. I can abstain from employing these words in diplomatic acts, but it is not in my power to expunge them from the language of nations. As for the suppression of the old Polish orders of knighthood, this can only be consented to upon the death of the existing knights, and by ceasing to confer new titles. Lastly, as to the future aggrandizements of the Duchy of Warsaw, I cannot bind myself against them except in consideration of reciprocity, and on condition that Russia pledges herself never to add to her dominions any portion detached from the old Polish provinces. On these bases," said Napoleon, "I may consent to a convention, but I cannot admit any others." He had a new draft of the convention drawn up in accordance with these observations, and ordered M. de Champagny to despatch it forthwith. All this eventually could

not fail sooner or later to prove the end of the alliance and the origin of a fatal imbroglío.

Having broken with one of the powers between which he had wavered, Napoleon desired to enter into a contract that same day with the other. Secret communications had been constantly kept up with M. de Schwarzenberg through M. de Laborde. It was known that in reply to his inquiries, his court had authorized him not only to accept any offer of marriage, but to do what he could, without compromising the dignity of the Emperor Francis, toward determining Napoleon's choice in favour of an archduchess. He was asked that same evening, February the 6th, if he was ready to sign a contract of marriage. On his replying in the affirmative, the articles were drawn up, and an appointment was made with him for the next day in the Tuileries. Napoleon again summoned a council of the grand dignitaries in the Tuileries, laid the question definitely before them—but for form sake only, since his mind was made up—and made every arrangement to the end that on the following day his lot might be definitely united to that of the archduchess of Austria.

Next day his purpose was accomplished. His contract of marriage was, with the exception of some difference of language which he thought the time and his dignity demanded, an exact counterpart of that of Marie Antoinette, which he had caused to be taken from the archives of the foreign office. Thus he would have no mention of a dowry, nor any security for its payment, and desired that every thing should be marked with the stamp of his own greatness. Berthier, his friend, the interpreter of his will in war, was to go to Vienna to demand the hand of the princess, and was to display the utmost magnificence. As it is the monarchical custom that when a sovereign marries by proxy that proxy must be a prince of the blood, Napoleon made choice of his glorious adversary the Archduke Charles to represent him in the marriage ceremony. Records were consulted as to what had taken place at the marriages of Louis XIV., Louis XV., the grand-dauphin father of Louis XVI., and Louis XVI., himself. The latter marriage was the model to which every thing was to conform, although the cruel fate of that monarch and his unfortunate spouse was a melancholy omen. But the more melancholy it was, the more did it enhance by contrast the advantages of the present. Napoleon would have the glory not only of having raised up royalty from martyrdom to the loftiest grandeur, but of having restored even its system of alliances. The measure of his glory and his services was the difference between the scaffold which Marie Antoinette had ascended and the dazzling throne to be mounted by Marie Louise. The oldest nobles of the old court were consulted, particularly M. de Dreux Brézé, formerly master of the ceremonies, as to how all things had been arranged at the marriage of Marie Antoinette, in order to reproduce them exactly, or with no other difference than increased magnificence. Mention was left, for form sake, of a mean jointure of some 100,000 francs in favour of the future empress, should she become a widow, and Napoleon ordered that the amount stipulated for her should be four millions of francs. The richest jewels were prepared. Se



impatience was Napoleon, that he arranged so that when the news of the consent arrived by telegraph in Paris, Berthier could set out that very day, demand the princess in marriage on the day of his arrival, celebrate the marriage on the following day, and bring home the new consort to Paris forthwith, so that the marriage might be consummated by the middle of March. Prince Schwarzenberg consented to every thing, and despatched his courier on leaving the Tuileries, after having taken upon him to sign for the Archduchess Marie Louise a literal transcript of the marriage-contract of Marie Antoinette.

The courier despatched from Paris on the 7th of February arrived on the 14th at Vienna, and caused the liveliest satisfaction there. The war party, defeated in the person of the Stadions, and confounded by the result of the last war, had given place to the peace party, headed by M. de Metternich. The idea of seeking tranquillity, security, and restored influence for the future, in an alliance with France, which would lead to the dissolution of the alliance of France with Russia, was eagerly welcomed in Vienna. M. de Metternich found the Emperor Francis perfectly well disposed to the marriage, both as a sovereign and a father. As a sovereign, he saw in it a happy arrangement for his policy, for the crown of the Habsburgs was guaranteed, and the union of Russia with France destroyed. As a father, he saw secured to his daughter the finest fortune imaginable, and could even hope for her happiness, for Napoleon had the repute of being facile and good-natured in domestic life, independently of all there was in him to excite the imagination of a young princess. M. de Metternich, who had lived in Paris among the imperial family, could perfectly reassure the Emperor Francis in that respect. The latter, however, loving his daughter much, and not wishing in any degree to constrain her, ordered M. de Metternich to go and speak himself to her on the subject, which he did. The young princess was eighteen, of a good figure, excellent health, and a fair German complexion. She had been carefully educated, had some talent, and a placid temper; in short, the qualities desirable in a mother. She was surprised and pleased, far from being dismayed at going into that France where but lately the revolutionary monster devoured kings, and where a conqueror, now mastering the revolutionary monster, made kings tremble in his turn. She accepted with becoming reserve, but with much delight, the brilliant lot offered her. She consented to become the consort of Napoleon, and mother to the heir of the greatest empire in the world.

All haste was now made at Vienna to satisfy Napoleon's impatience. The contract of marriage, signed in Paris by Prince Schwarzenberg on the 7th of February, was accepted, on condition of certain additions, containing sundry stipulations usual in the house of Habsburg. Napoleon's idea was adopted of copying in all points the forms observed upon the marriage of Marie Antoinette, only with greatly increased magnificence. But with every wish to satisfy him, it was impossible to proceed as rapidly as he desired without omitting many imposing ceremonies, which it would have been contrary to his design to neglect. The Archduke Charles

was accepted as Napoleon's proxy to wed the princess, and Berthier as his ambassador extraordinary to demand her in marriage. The ceremony was appointed for the beginning of March.

The news of the reception given to his proposals delighted Napoleon and his court. Gayety prevailed universally. The clouds raised by the late war dispersed as if by magic. Hope and enthusiasm returned. The old malecontent nobility of the Faubourg St. Germain were infected with the common feeling, and many of them came over to the new *régime*, thinking it no shame to serve under him whom the greatest reigning family in the world consented to adopt as a son-in-law. Such was the increase of these convertites, that their numbers gave rise to a danger of an opposite kind, that of obfuscating the recent *grandeurs* born of the revolution and the empire. Napoleon displayed consummate tact in forming the household of the empress, by choosing for her first lady of honour the Duchess of Montebello, widow of Marshal Lannes, killed at Essling by an Austrian cannon-ball! Everybody approved of this act of gratitude, and the person chosen, by her conduct and by her distinction, not hereditary but personal, deserved the high position assigned to her. Magnificent presents were ordered, and Berthier hastened his departure so as to arrive in Vienna in the beginning of March. The Queen of Naples also quitted Paris with a brilliant court for Braunau, there to receive the new empress on the frontiers of the Confederation of the Rhine.

Berthier arrived on the 4th of March, 1810, and made his public entry into Vienna on the following day, amid an immense concourse of nobles and people. The whole court went to meet him with the equipages of the crown, which were to convey him to the palace. The people of Vienna, in an excess of delight, wanted to take the horses from his carriage and draw it themselves, and there was much difficulty in preventing that tumultuous manifestation.

The 6th and 7th were spent in festivities. On the 8th, according to the usages of the court of Austria, and to what had been practised at the marriage of Marie Antoinette, Berthier made a formal demand of the hand of the Archduchess Marie Louise, which was accorded with the most pompous forms. The following days were devoted to fresh formalities and fresh rejoicings. On the 11th a marriage was solemnized amid a vast concourse, with a splendour which surpassed all that had ever been seen, and with a joy that equalled all the popular gladness. The Archduchess, wedded by the Archduke Charles, was immediately treated as Empress of the French, and even took precedence of all her family, by an excess of courtesy on the part of the Emperor Francis and the Empress his second wife.

The 18th was the day appointed for the departure of the Empress of the French. The people of Vienna followed her with acclamations and with affectionate feelings that were mingled with uneasiness at the last moment, for the thought of the unfortunate Marie Antoinette came upon them unbidden. The whole court accompanied Marie Louise.

The Emperor Francis, who loved his daughter, wished to embrace her once more, and he set off

secretly for Lintz, to surprise her there and bid her a last farewell.

She was at Braunau on the 16th of March. Every thing had been prepared there as it had been for the marriage of 1770. Three reception-rooms, connected together, the first reputed Austrian, the second neutral, the third French, had been erected to receive the young empress. She was taken from the Austrian into the neutral room by her father's household, and there delivered to Prince Berthier, the Emperor's representative, with her dowry, her jewels, and the contract of marriage; and lastly, she was led into the French room, where Napoleon's sister, the Queen of Naples, received and embraced her. From Braunau she was conveyed to Munich, from Munich to Strasburg, everywhere accompanied by the acclamations of the German and French populations, through which passed that strange spectacle of the daughter of the Cæsars going to wed the fortunate soldier who had conquered the French revolution and Europe. To the fever of war had succeeded a fever of joy and hope.

On the 23d of March the Empress Marie Louise entered Strasburg, hailed by the same popular enthusiasm. She passed through Luneville, Nancy, and Vitry. It was at Compiègne she was to see Napoleon for the first time, surrounded by his whole court; but to spare her the embarrassment of an official interview, Napoleon set out from Compiègne with Murat to meet her on the road. He took her in his arms, and seemed pleased with the kind of beauty and capacity he thought he perceived in her at first sight. A woman of good constitution, good tempered, simple, becomingly educated, was all he desired. He appeared perfectly happy on entering with her into the château of Compiègne on the evening of the 27th of March.

They remained there until the 30th, when he set out with his new empress for St. Cloud, where the civil marriage was to be celebrated. The ceremonies which had taken place in Vienna, in conformity with the usages of the old courts, sufficed to render the marriage complete and irrevocable. The repetition at Paris was only a formality due to the nation over which the new sovereign came to reign. It took place on the 1st of April, in presence of the whole imperial court, in the grand gallery of St. Cloud, through the ministry of the Arch-chancellor Cambacérès. The repetition of the religious marriage was to take place for the people of Paris on the 2d of April, in the Tuileries.

On that day Napoleon, preceded by his guard,

surrounded by his marshals on horseback, and followed by his family and his court in a hundred magnificent carriages, made his entry into Paris by the triumphal arch de l'Etoile. That monument, the foundation of which had but recently been laid, was erected in a temporary way, almost as it appears at this day. Napoleon passed through the arch in the coronation carriage, the glass panels of which showed him seated by the side of the new empress. He traversed the Champs Elysées through a double range of sumptuous decorations and an immense assemblage of people.

He entered the palace of the Tuileries by the garden. The nuptial altar had been erected in the grand saloon, where are now assembled the finest works of art, and which is arrived at through the longest and richest gallery of pictures in the world, which connects the Tuileries with the Louvre. All the opulent population of Paris, splendidly dressed, sat on two rows of benches along that gallery. Napoleon, leading the empress by the hand, and followed by his family, walked along it to the grand hall, where, in a chapel dazzling with gold and light, he received the nuptial benediction. Enthusiastic cries hailed the close of the ceremony. That day there was a nuptial banquet in the great theatre of the Tuileries. The following days were employed in elegant and magnificent fêtes. All classes took part in the joy which effaced the sombre impressions made by the late war. On seeing Napoleon again all-powerful and happy, people forgot for a while that he had nearly ceased to be so. Seeing him so well married, they believed him definitely established. They put aside the momentary forebodings that crossed their minds as importunate and baseless dreams. They began again to believe in the infinite and everlasting greatness of the empire, as though they had never doubted it. In fact, the victory of Wagram, though not equalling those of Austerlitz, Jena, and Friedland in the grandeur of its trophies—while it was yet on a par with them as to the genius displayed—the victory of Wagram, completed by the marriage with Marie Louise, replaced Napoleon at his highest degree of power, and if prudence gradually repaired the grand fault of the war in Spain, the last illusions sprung from that marriage might be realized. But that this should be so, something must have been changed which is less changeable than destiny—the character of a man must have been changed, and that man was Napoleon.

## BOOK XXXVIII.

## THE CONTINENTAL BLOCKADE.

*Situation of the Empire after the marriage connection between the Courts of France and Austria—Napoleon aims at peace—Distribution of Territory to his Allies—Distribution of the French armies—Financial difficulties—Continental blockade—Difficulties with America—Religious disputes—Affairs of Holland—M. de Labouchère—M. Fouché—Louis Bonaparte King of Holland—Insult to the French Embassy at Amsterdam—Abdication of Louis—Holland reunited to the Empire—New tariff for colonial produce—Commercial questions—America—Criticism of Napoleon's measures.*

NAPOLEON, the conqueror at Wagram of Austria and of the last commotions in Germany, enriched by new territorial spoils in Galicia, Bavaria, and Illyria, lavishing on his allies, Polish, German, and Italian, the provinces which he had taken from his enemies, having carried still farther toward the east his empire, already so extended towards the north, west, and south, the husband of an arch-duchess, seemed to have resumed the height of human greatness from which his enemies had hoped and his friends had feared that he would be thrown. The world, which judges of things by the outward appearance, was again dazzled, and with reason; for, except Russia, where also much deference was shown him, and Spain, where a vast popular insurrection disputed with him the extremities of the Peninsula, the whole continent was profoundly submissive, and the humility of the nations was as subject as that of the kings. England alone, protected by the ocean, continued free from this prodigious domination; and if in France they were somewhat galled by the maritime war, they were neither surprised nor alarmed, and they flattered themselves that the sea would not be always invincible.

Struck by this spectacle, the royalist and religious party, the most tardy to become enlightened and to yield, felt its strength decline. It showed some disposition to unite itself to the Imperial dynasty, and many of its members, hitherto the most contemptuous, had accepted places at court. They spread abroad the strangest rumours, either because they actually believed them, or because they wished in them to find an excuse for their weakness. According to them, Napoleon, allied to Marie Antoinette by his marriage with Marie Louisa, was about to return to the usages of the past, to reinstate with all pomp the memory of Louis XVI., to expel the regicides from the government, perhaps even from the empire, and to surround himself with the ancient court. To these reports was added another yet more singular, that Moreau, who was very popular among the friends of the Bourbons, was to be recalled from exile and raised to the dignity of Marshal, with the title of Duke of Hohenlinden.\* As to the republicans, it would have been difficult to learn any thing from them, for they seemed no longer to exist. Some of them barely survived, and concealed their errors and their excesses in oblivion and obscurity. But in their place arose a certain disposition to criticize and to blame, which presaged at no very distant time a totally different mental condition from that which then prevailed. These beginnings of independence, however,

were scarcely perceptible, and the prestige which had for a long time surrounded Napoleon seemed completely re-established.

However, under appearances still dazzling, reflecting minds beheld some distressing realities. Napoleon, by marrying an Austrian princess, had rendered much less probable the project he was supposed to entertain of dethroning the ancient dynasties, and in some slight degree quenched the violent hatred he had inspired in Austria; but he had not indemnified her for the losses sustained during 15 years; he had not consoled Prussia for her reverses, nor Germany for her profound humiliation. He had wounded Russia irremediably by his proceedings in connection with his marriage, and by the honourable but haughty refusal of the convention with regard to Poland; by his alliance with Austria he had prepared for himself a fruitful source of jealousy; he had wounded Italy by successively appropriating to himself Tuscany, the Legations, and Rome; in the Spanish war he had an ever-bleeding wound, and in the hatred of England a cause of hostility of which no one could see the end. Moreover, to meet these various difficulties, it was necessary to maintain innumerable armies in the north, the east, and the south, which, owing to the general peace, must be supported at the sole expense of France, and the recruiting for which had become a source of constant grief to many bereaved families. Finally, in his differences with the Pope, Napoleon had not merely a schism, but a network of controversies almost inextricable. All these circumstances, perceived by enemies who discern evil because they desire it, ignored by friends who conceal them from themselves because they are distressed by them, almost completely exposed to the wise, always so rare, and so little heeded, often very well perceived by Napoleon himself, did not, in deed, constitute dangers insurmountable by him, if a moderation to which his proud and passionate character was a stranger, and a patient and sustained endeavour to terminate certain designs before beginning new ones, had aided him in the resolution of the difficulties by which he was entangled.

If, for example, he had applied himself to extract from his recent union all the advantages which it could offer by gradually restoring hope and confidence to Austria, and by restoring to her, as the price of a sincere alliance, the Illyrian provinces, for which he had no occasion; if he had appeased Germany by wholly evacuating it; if he had checked instead of extending the continual additions to the imperial territory; if, while aiming to render the continental blockade more rigorous, he had not made it a pretext for new invasions; if he had brought into Spain an overwhelming force, commanded by

\* The police reports were for more than a month filled with such rumours as these.

himself in person, the greatest of all forces; if he had declined all war until that was finished; if he had prepared such checks to England in the Peninsula as to have compelled her to make peace; if he had been able to make a good use of religious creeds which he had so much flattered at an earlier stage, by bringing Pius VII. to an agreement which he heartily desired; if, while thus securing the empire from without by the establishment of general peace, he had known how to grant some liberty to those spirits within the empire which were ready to awake from their slumber, it would have been possible to prevent a great catastrophe, or at least to prolong the existence of the enormous edifice he had raised: I say to prolong, for in order to render it permanent it would have been necessary courageously to renounce those acquisitions which were forbidden by their own nature; to have renounced prefects at Rome, at Florence, at Laybach; to have confined himself within the Alps, the Rhine, and the Pyrenees, which Europe no longer thought of disputing with us; and how magnificent would have been the empire which even within these limits would have comprised Genoa, Mount Cenis, the Simplon, Geneva, Huningen, Mentz, Wesel, Antwerp, Flushing!

We might say that before reducing men to ruin, Providence, like an indulgent parent, warns them repeatedly, and invites them to reflect in order to amend. At Eylau, at Baylen, at Essling, Providence had clearly pointed out to Napoleon the limits which he ought not to endeavour to pass, and by granting him the victory of Wagram after the difficult campaign of Austria, and by giving a consort of the blood of the Cæsars to be the future mother of the heir of the new empire, Providence seemed to grant him a respite that he might retrace his steps and be saved. He appeared himself to be struck with this, pondered it, and wished to profit by it; and after his return to Paris showed himself wholly occupied with the care of restoring confidence to Europe, of appeasing Germany, terminating the war in Spain, disarming or conquering England, economizing the finances of France, putting an end to religious dissensions, and finally restoring repose to a world exhausted by fatigue. Unhappily, he brought to the solution of these difficulties the same character with which he had created them; instead of untying the knot he wished to cut it through; and from that time, his genius, though always vast, was no longer fortunate, and seemed less practical.

One of his first acts after his marriage was to address a circular to the diplomatic agents of the empire, in order that from it they might derive the subject of their communications with the several courts at which they resided. "This circular," wrote Napoleon to the minister of foreign affairs, to whom it belonged to draw it up, "shall not be printed, but it shall supply language to my agents. You will say in it that one of the principal methods employed by the English to rekindle the war on the continent is to give out that it is my intention to destroy dynasties. Circumstances having placed it in my power to select a consort, I wished to deprive them of this fatal pretext for agitating nations and sowing the discords which have deluged Europe with blood. Nothing seemed to me better calculated to remove anxiety than to ask in

marriage an arch-duchess of Austria. The brilliant and distinguished qualities of the Arch-duchess Marie Louise, which had been particularly mentioned to me, enabled me to act according to my views. The proposal having been made and accepted by the Emperor of Austria, the Prince of Neufchatel set out, &c. I have very gladly seized this circumstance to unite two great nations, and to give a proof of my esteem for the Austrian nation and for the inhabitants of the city of Vienna. You will add that I desire that their language should be consistent with the bonds of relationship which unite me to the House of Austria, without saying any thing to affect my intimate alliance with Russia."\*

The whole policy of Napoleon at that time is contained in these lines. To attach Austria to himself, to whom he was then united by bonds of relationship, without alienating Russia, on which he had never ceased to found his system of alliance, was for a time his principal study. He hastened the evacuation of the Austrian states; he was not urgent for the payment of the contributions for the war; he consented to a loan which Austria wished to open at Amsterdam, and even favoured it by direct intervention; he heard with complaisance some vague words concerning the ultimate destruction of the Illyrian provinces, recently assigned to France, and the restitution of which would have been an acceptable marriage-present to the Court of Vienna. He gave the most distinguished reception to Prince Metternich, whom the Emperor Francis had sent to Paris to establish the new relations that must ensue from the marriage.

M. de Metternich, on entering the Austrian ministry, in which he remained nearly 40 years, began a policy very different from that of his predecessors, viz.: that founded on a good understanding with France. In order to prepare it he wished to go to Paris, with a view, in the first place, of guiding the first steps of the young Empress in a court with all the intricacies of which he was well acquainted; and secondly, to satisfy himself whether the conqueror was about to form more pacific habits in the pleasures of a brilliant union, or else to use that as a point of departure for new and vaster enterprises. Some weeks devoted to this object were not lost time, and the Emperor Francis had consented that his future minister, before entering upon his duties, should go to Paris to fulfil this last important mission.

Napoleon, who had for a long time kept M. de Metternich about him, received him with eagerness, and used all his efforts to please him. He took special pains to let him see the happiness of the young Empress, in order that he might tranquillize the mind of the Emperor Francis with regard to the lot of his daughter. One day M. de Metternich having desired to see the Emperor at a time that he was with the Empress, the Austrian minister was immediately introduced into the interior of the palace. Napoleon, conducting him into the department of Marie Louise, said, "Come and see with your own eyes how unhappy is your young Arch-duchess, and particularly in what a state of terror she spends her whole life." Then quitting

\* Letter of Napoleon to the Duke de Cadore, existing in the dépôt of the Secretary of State.

him, after a short time, he added, "I will leave you with Madame; you will receive her confidential statements, you will hear her complaints, and you will be able to report them to the Emperor Francis." M. de Metternich, surprised, almost embarrassed, by so much freedom from reserve, remained with Marie Louisa, who seemed perfectly happy in her new condition, and said to him, with unwonted animation, "Probably they suppose at Vienna that I stand in great fear of my formidable husband. Well: you may tell my old companions that he is more afraid of me than I am of him." In fact, when Marie Louisa had been guilty of any inadvertency, very excusable among persons and things to which she was an entire stranger, Napoleon scarcely ventured to intimate it to her, and conveyed, through M. de Meneval or the arch-chancellor, the advice which he hesitated to address to her in person.

The conversation of M. de Metternich with Marie Louisa had lasted nearly an hour when he heard a knock at the door, and saw Napoleon enter, who said to him, with the same gayety, "Well, has Madame related every thing to you? has she opened to you her heart? Is there much to regret in this marriage for the happiness of the woman you have confided to me? Write all that you have learned to the Emperor Francis without scruple or reserve." He then led away M. de Metternich to treat of those grave subjects which must naturally be discussed between Napoleon and a personage destined to become the Prime Minister at the Court of Vienna. Unfortunately, in the midst of all this exhibition of courtesy, whenever Napoleon treated of serious affairs, and spoke of the various powers, of the future, or of his own projects, he gave way to bursts of audacity, rancour, pride, and ambition, which alarmed the very persons whose fears he wished to remove. Thus, this lion, soothed to rest for a moment, awoke suddenly in fury if any unexpected idea had roused his terrible passions.

The relations were more difficult with Russia, which had been hurt by the precipitation with which Napoleon had broken off the marriage contemplated for a time with the Grand-duchess Anne, and was, moreover, rendered uneasy by the manner in which he had behaved toward her as soon as he thought that he could count upon Austria, and was annoyed by his refusal to sign the convention respecting Poland. With regard to the marriage, broken off almost as soon as proposed, Napoleon had instructed M. de Caulaincourt to say at St. Petersburg that the hesitation of the Court of Russia, but especially the extreme youth of the Russian princess, had constrained him to accept of the Arch-duchess of Austria, who combined all the requisites of age, health, birth, and good education; that from this circumstance had arisen already certain very close relations between the Courts of Paris and Vienna, and still more close would probably be added hereafter; but that it had occasioned no change in the system of political alliance, which remained the same, founded always on the intimate union of the two Empires of the East and West; that Napoleon wished for the success of the Russians over the Turks, and the conclusion of the peace which should secure to the Emperor Alexander the left bank of the Danube—that is to say, Moldavia and Wallachia

—in conformity with the secret stipulations of Tilsit; that, with regard to Poland, he was always ready to sign the engagement not to favour any attempts to re-establish the ancient kingdom of Poland, being satisfied with the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, lately augmented; but that he could never enter into the general, absolute, and somewhat too presumptuous engagement never to re-establish Poland. This, said Napoleon, depends neither on the Emperor Alexander nor on me, however powerful we may be, but on God, who is more powerful than either. I can undertake not to hurry on, nor even co-operate with, the designs of God; I cannot promise to impede them. A modesty rare to him, which came powerfully to his aid on this occasion, and of which he made a skilful use in opposing the reasonings of his adversaries. But, as if he could never avoid showing the point of his sword even during the most marked demonstrations of friendship, he added, that although earnestly desiring a continuance of his connection with Russia, he should see with regret any attempt on her part to pass the line of the Danube, and to demand of the Turk either the whole or part of Bulgaria; that in return for concessions made to the Czar—in return for Finland, recently added to his territory, for Moldavia and Wallachia, which would soon fall to his share—he desired and expected a rigorous perseverance in measures against England, the absolute closing of the ports,—in one word, the faithful co-operation which had been promised once at Tilsit, again at Erfurt, and which he had bought at a great sacrifice. All this was said with a mixture of courtesy, friendship, and hauteur, which certainly would not have wounded a power which was conscious of no ground for dissatisfaction, but which could scarcely resuscitate the friendship of an ally which had already received a check.

M. de Romanzoff at St. Petersburg, M. de Kourakin at Paris, professed great satisfaction with these explanations; for Alexander, with a pride which can be easily understood, was unwilling to exhibit any displeasure, even though felt, at that time, lest it should be ascribed to mortification at the failure of the marriage, an event which, indeed, he had not been anxious should take place, and to the proposal for which he had only listened in order to make sure his acquisition of the left bank of the Danube. In order, therefore, more fully to meet his master's wishes, M. de Kourakin, who had been attacked with gout on the very day of the marriage ceremony, caused himself to be carried, all covered with gold, jewelry, and lace, to the chapel of the Louvre, exhibiting, in the midst of his acute pain, a ridiculous joy, lavishing compliments on the behaviour and beauty of the new Empress to such an extent as to embarrass even M. de Metternich, who, being unable to find any further reply to the reiterated compliments of the Russian diplomatist, said, "Yes, she is handsome, but not pretty."

Always eager in business, Napoleon then occupied himself in bringing to a close the different affairs which he had with Germany, in the very prudent intention of evacuating it. By the last treaty of peace he had retained the two Tyrols, German and Italian, the subjection of which had been completed during the negotiations of Altenburg; he had acquired Salzburg and some

districts on the right of the Inn. There remained to him of his former conquests the principality of Bayreuth in the High Palatinate, Hanau and Fulde in Franconia, Erfurt and several other places in Saxony, Magdeburg in Westphalia, Hanover in the north of Germany. He resolved immediately to distribute these various territories, and, after having exacted a part of their value in money or in donations for the advantage of his generals, to withdraw gradually his troops, except those which might be necessary to guard the new kingdom of Westphalia. Although he regretted remaining in Westphalia, exposed to German animosity and occasioning anxieties throughout Europe which it was his part to allay as soon as possible, the alteration was nevertheless useful, after having disposed of all the territories which remained in his gift, to bring back 100,000 or 200,000 men to this side of the Rhine, and to leave French troops only near a French monarchy, or on the coast of the Hanse towns, which these were neither able nor very willing to close against British commerce.

Napoleon, as was natural, resigned to Bavaria all his acquisitions on the Inn and in Upper Austria. He could not have made a wiser or more suitable use of them. He abandoned to it Inviertel, Salzburg, the German Tyrol, and part of the Italian Tyrol. But he reserved to the kingdom of Italy that part of the Italian Tyrol which was necessary to the correct definition of that kingdom. He granted, moreover, to Bavaria the principality of Ratisbon, which he took from the prince primate, (who was, as we shall see, to be portioned otherwise;) lastly, the principality of Bayreuth, previously conquered from Prussia. There was in all this abundant recompense to Bavaria for her efforts and expenses during the last war. Napoleon might, even without much deduction from this recompense, have demanded of her the surrender of 150,000 of her population to Wurtemberg, which had yielded 25,000 to Baden and 15,000 to Darmstadt. By means of these different exchanges the territories of these allies would be sufficiently aggrandized and more suitably bounded. Ulm was to fall to the share of Wurtemberg, while Ratisbon and Bayreuth should be transferred to Bavaria.

It is to be borne in mind that Napoleon required, in return for these territorial concessions, that they should demand nothing for the expenses of his armies during their abode in the countries of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, or Baden. The withdrawal of the troops was assigned to Marshal Davout, whose spirit of order and probity afforded sufficient guarantees for its correct execution. That marshal had brought successively the French troops from Vienna to Salzburg, from Salzburg to Ulm, from Ulm to Westphalia, and all that they had consumed during this retrograde march was thus defrayed. Napoleon required that Bavaria should ratify all the donations granted to French officers of every rank in the ceded provinces, unless she preferred to redeem them at a fixed price. He also decreed that she should pay a sum of 80 millions, in bills of a distant date, to free the treasury from the expenses incurred by this campaign. Even on these conditions the lot of Bavaria was very fair, and much superior to the sacrifices she had made. Napoleon recommended Bavaria,

when again restoring the Tyrol to him, to go to that country a constitution which might satisfy it, in the same manner as in ceding to Baden the different parts of the palatinate, he demanded suitable treatment for the Catholics; for it is remarkable that, when the conqueror was not misled by his passions, the statesman immediately showed himself wise and humane.

Our allies in the south of Germany having been satisfied, and their territories evacuated, Napoleon occupied himself with the centre and the north of that country. It was necessary to assign the portion of the prince primate, ancient Elector and Archbishop of Mentz, now Chancellor and President of the Confederation of the Rhine, whose share was derived partly from the principality of Ratisbon, recently accorded to Bavaria, partly from the navigation dues of the Rhine, which afforded a revenue doubtful at the time and subject to many vicissitudes in the future. Napoleon, who was anxious to treat a prince well who was devoted to his interests, disposed in his favour of the principalities of Fulde and Hanau, which had remained in his power, on condition that he should yield some portions of territory to the duchies of Hanau and Hesse-Darmstadt, Ratisbon to Bavaria, and the dues of the Rhine to the general expenses of the war. This grant was to contribute to the endowment of the principalities of Essling, Wagram, and Eckmuhl, assigned to the Marshals Massena, Berthier, and Davout, in return for their services in the last war.

In this arrangement Napoleon found a fresh advantage—that of securing the prospects of Prince Eugene, who had remained without any princely settlement in consequence of the marriage with Marie Louisa. There was no further prospect of his adoption, since there was every reason to suppose that Napoleon should have direct heirs. Moreover, the separation of the kingdom of Italy from the French Empire did not enter into the views of Napoleon, and at most he allowed that the direct heir of the Empire should in the interval be Viceroy of Italy, under the Emperor, so long as he was only heir-presumptive. In all these cases, Prince Eugene, endowed for life with the Viceroyalty of Italy, had nothing to transmit to his descendants. This mild and compliant prince, notwithstanding some errors committed at Sacile, had acquired a title to true military qualities during the last campaign; he was beloved by Napoleon, who was all the less willing to treat him with injustice, because he had recently caused him a severe affliction by repudiating his mother, Josephine. The Princess Augusta of Bavaria, who had become the wife of the viceroy, a princess worthy of his rank, and possessed of remarkable force of character, resolutely attacked Napoleon, reminding him of the duty he had contracted to her by going to seek her on one of the most ancient thrones of Europe, to give her to a husband without princely birth and without patrimony, and made him feel how much he was bound not to leave her, in this perpetual shifting of crowns, without any portion for her children. Touched by the remonstrances of the princess, and by the secret grief of Prince Eugene, Napoleon granted the reversion of the new endowment which he had just made in favour of the prince primate, under the title of the Principality of Frankfort. To this liberal

endowment was added an important office, that of President of the Confederation of the Rhine, always supposing that that fine edifice should prove lasting—a supposition which must always be borne in mind in relating the facts of this epoch, if we would form a correct estimate of their value. Moreover, the feeble health of the prince primate was not likely to delay very much the expectations of the family of Prince Eugene.

In his desire to hasten the distribution and evacuation of the German territories, Napoleon then occupied himself in regulating with King Jerome certain territorial and financial controversies still pending, and very disagreeable to the two brothers. King Jerome had by no means satisfied Napoleon in the late war. Not that when actually engaged he had shown himself weak; far from it: but he had been tardy in entering into the field; in his administration he had yielded more to the expenses of luxury than those which were useful; he did not govern his kingdom in a way to please the Germans, and he had allowed certain vexatious difficulties to be thrown in the way of those Frenchmen who had received territorial donations in Westphalia, which in his zeal for his soldiers he could not endure. However, as he perceived that Jerome alone of his brothers possessed a military character, and having always found him submissive and devoted, he continued to treat him with indulgence, though sometimes he exhibited toward him, as well as the other members of his family, extreme harshness.

He resolved to give up to him absolutely Magdeburg, and also Hanover, which formed a vast and beautiful territory in Germany, and was still to be disposed of. This would not much increase the difficulty of peace with England; for if for some years that power had accustomed herself to consider the Ionian Isles, Malta, the Cape, and several other conquests, as English property, though never surrendered definitely to her by any general treaty, she seemed to have also contracted a sort of habit in her contemplation of Hanover, and no longer to regard it as English. The royal family, it is true, held to it as their private patrimony; but one would have said that the nation could regard such a loss as an advantage. In return for this concession, Jerome was to undertake to pay, during the whole of the war, 18,500 French troops, destined to reside in Westphalia. He was also to pay, in bills bearing interest and payable after some years, the extraordinary contributions to the war not paid by Hanover, and to sanction all the donations given in that country to the French soldiers, which amounted to nearly 11 millions of revenue. On these conditions King Jerome was declared sovereign of Hesse, Westphalia, and Hanover; had Cassel for his capital and Magdeburg for his citadel, and became, after the King of Prussia, the first of the German sovereigns.

These arrangements being brought to a close, there remained in our possession only the town of Erfurt, with some districts destined to the King of Saxony, Grand-duke of Warsaw, after which the state of Germany should be definitely constituted for a period which should be equal to that of the French Empire itself.

In the preceding arrangements it is seen that the maintenance of a body of French troops was

the condition of the cession of Hanover. This condition was not in accordance with Napoleon's design of evacuating Germany in order to appease national animosities, but at that time two motives prevented his adherence to this wise intention: first, the state of Prussia, and secondly, the execution of the decrees of Berlin and Milan, which constituted what was called the continental blockade. Prussia had acted as a power at once unfortunate and inconsistent, for nothing produces so much inconsistency as the agitation occasioned by misfortune. While professing submission to the hard conditions subscribed at Tilsit with much resignation,—while exhibiting great eagerness to repress the revolt of Schill,—she had at heart completely shared the sentiments of the patriotic insurgent whom she pursued, and for a moment indulged without concealment the hope of being delivered from the yoke which oppressed Germany. Nothing was more natural, and, we may add, more legitimate, for we must learn to sympathize with hatred of a foreigner, even when we ourselves are the object of it. Unfortunately for her, to these natural sentiments Prussia had added some very serious acts of imprudence. She had recruited her regiments, bought horses, and caused certain mustering of troops, under pretext of preparing the contingent promised to France. Such a pretext could not deceive so penetrating a mind as Napoleon's; and, moreover, it had drawn largely on the Prussian finances. From this conduct of Prussia had resulted, besides disagreeable symptoms of her secret dispositions, a great delay in the payment of the contributions still remaining due; for scarcely had the war of 1809 commenced, than he had allowed to be protested bills of exchange to the extent of 22 millions, subscribed for the extraordinary expenses of the war. At first Napoleon had taken no notice, but after the peace of Vienna he had urged his demands with his accustomed vigour, and in a tone too peremptory to be disobeyed. Although the Court of Prussia resolutely remained at Königsberg from grief and also by design, it was no less, on that account, under the power of Napoleon. and if it could not pay all, it was necessary at least to pay a part. "You have lost the opportunity," said Napoleon, "of raising yourselves, by seasonably manifesting your good faith to France. If you could have foreseen that the last preparations of Austria could lead to nothing but defeats and additional loss of territory, you ought, without augmenting your troops or increasing your expenses, to have united yourselves to me, to have supplied me with the contingent of 16,000 men which you had promised, honoured your own bills, paid 2½ millions, proved to me that you would frankly return to the system which it was always your interest to maintain,—that of alliance with France. In that case, I should probably have exonerated you from the rest of your contributions, and I should have raised you, aggrandized you, and replaced you nearly in the position from which you had fallen. Perhaps Magdeburg or Hanover would have been the reward of this return to better feelings. But instead of aiding me, you have threatened me; instead of expending your resources in paying my due, you have expended them in arming yourselves against me. I am now victorious; you must expiate your

faults, not by fresh territorial losses, but at least by the payment of your engagement. By your delay, you oblige me to leave garrisons in the forts on the Oder, and, to support these garrisons of the Oder, to maintain troops on the Elbe. This occupation exposes me to expense, and, what I regret still more, to military demonstrations in the heart of Germany, which is opposed to my political views. You prevent the return of tranquillity, and thus injure me as much in a moral as in a material point of view. An end must be put to this state of matters in the course of one year, or I shall take the payment into my own hands by seizing one of your provinces—Silesia, probably—and giving it to one that will pay me."

Such was the language seriously addressed to Prussia, and which Napoleon accompanied with specific accounts, which he demanded should be defrayed. Prussia, even after the reduction of her debt, had remained a debtor to the extent of 86 millions. Napoleon required her to pay this at the rate of 4 millions per month, which would amount to 48 millions in one year. There remained 38 millions, which he agreed should be paid by means of a loan to that amount, to be contracted in Holland. He undertook, in behalf of Prussia, that this loan should be contracted by the Dutch by employing certain means at his disposal. Prussia, alarmed, had agreed to all his demands, but always with the mental reservation of eluding the execution of her engagements.

Napoleon, perceiving clearly that if he abandoned the strongholds of the Oder, Glogau, Custrin, Stettin, retained as pledges, his debt would never be paid to him, resolved to retain his occupation of them by garrisons composed of French and Polish troops. The Polish troops, taught war in our school, had become excellent; they had always been devoted. Though nominally belonging to the King of Saxony, Grand-duke of Warsaw, they were in reality at the disposal of France. Glogau, Custrin, and Stettin, each received a Saxon-Polish regiment. The artillery and engineers of these places consisted of French troops, and as these arms were not more than the fifth part of the effective force, the garrisons did not appear to be French. Napoleon did still more for Stettin, which was of greater importance, and was near the Baltic: he added a regiment of infantry, borrowed from the corps of Marshal Davout. Dantzic had become a sort of Hanse town, endowed with a fictitious independence, and destined by treaties, when maritime war made it necessary, to receive a French garrison. Under the very specious and feasible pretext that the English might be tempted to occupy a town valuable on account of its port, its situation on the Vistula, and its extent, he established there a garrison similar to those of the Oder, but stronger. Besides General Rapp, who was named the Governor, Napoleon placed there two Polish regiments and two French regiments, one of infantry, the other of cavalry, in addition to the troops of artillery and engineers, which were French, as were those at Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau. This was, then, in reality, a French force, which, under a Polish character, occupied these strong places, by means of which Napoleon was master of the Oder and the Vistula in a time of peace.

These military occupations were undoubtedly

in opposition to the system of tranquillization which at the time was Napoleon's policy; but they were a method of keeping Prussia in check, of exacting from her the payment of her debt, and they prepared a formidable base of operations against Russia, if ever war with that power should be renewed; so that, even when designing peace, Napoleon could not avoid anticipating and preparing for war. In addition to the debts of Prussia, the threatening presence of the English in the Baltic, and the necessity of occupying the shore of that sea in order to insure the execution of the laws of blockade, afforded a sufficient explanation of the presence of French troops, and caused the evacuation of the rest of Germany not to be entirely without advantage.

It was necessary, moreover, not only to support the garrisons left on the Vistula and Oder, but also to compel the Hanse towns to relinquish British commerce, and to constrain Holland to do the same; for that kingdom no more maintained the continental blockade than if it were ruled by a German or English prince. Even when the governments acted with good faith, the people, not readily entering into the views which had occasioned the continental blockade, gave themselves up to a contraband trade, which it was exceedingly difficult to check, even by the severest measures. That which took place in Holland, where, though a French monarchy, the English commerce was very little impeded, proved sufficiently the difficulty of the attempt. Napoleon was determined to set his hand to the execution of the continental blockade now, especially, when he had leisure and disposable troops, and to carry on in person that species of war, certainly one of the most effective that could be waged against England. None of the powers bound by treaty to that part of his policy could raise any reasonable objection to his having troops in Hamburg, Bremen, Embden, as he already had at Stettin and Dantzic.

Having effected his plan of evacuation as extensively as possible, Napoleon distributed his troops with profound ability in the different views of appeasing Germany, of supporting his garrisons in the Vistula and Oder, of occupying the shores of the Baltic, the North Sea, and Holland, of renewing the assembling of the camp at Boulogne, of forwarding considerable forces to Spain, and, finally, of effecting those retrenchments which his finances urgently required. He had sent to Laybach the army of Dalmatia, which had come from Zara to Vienna under the conduct of Marshal Marmont; and he determined that it should be maintained by the Illyrian provinces, which ought to yield annually about 12 or 13 millions, without reckoning a sum of 6 or 7 millions in alienable domains. He had sent back the army of Italy into the plains of Friuli, Venice, and Lombardy, where it had always been maintained by the French treasury, by means of an annual subsidy of 80 millions, furnished by Italy, included yearly in the Imperial budget, and representing only part of the expense. He had directed successively toward Spain all the reinforcements which had been at first directed to the Danube during the negotiations which were to terminate the war with Austria. There remained the three corps of Marshals Davout, Massena, Oudinot, whic



constituted the force of the grand army at Ratibon, Essling, and Wagram. Brought in succession from Lower Austria into Bavaria and Suabia, they had lived during the passage in the provinces destined to the allied monarchs, where their cost was found to be paid in advance in beautiful territories ceded to those monarchs. Napoleon ultimately adopted the following distribution. The corps of Marshal Oudinot, which was composed of a division of old regiments under the brave General St. Hilaire, killed at Essling, and of two divisions of 4th battalion, was broken up and scattered over the coasts of France. The regiments of St. Hilaire's division were divided among Cherbourg, St. Malo, and Brest, in order to threaten England. The two divisions of 4th battalions which belonged to regiments carrying on the war in Spain were placed on the coasts from Rochfort to Bordeaux, to direct themselves to the Pyrenees if the contingent of 100,000 men who had just been sent there should not prove sufficient. The corps of Marshal Massena, composed of the old divisions of Molitor, Legrand, Boudet, and Carra-Saint-Cyr, more valiant than numerous, passed from Suabia into Franconia, and descended the Rhine to occupy the camp of Boulogne, Brabant, and the frontiers of Holland. Of these four divisions, the principal one was placed at Embden, to be in communication with the Hanse towns.

The corps of Marshal Davout, the finest, the firmest, and the best organized, was to furnish the troops of occupation for the north of Germany. To this choice Napoleon was led by several considerations. By causing this corps to live always in northern countries, he wished to preserve its vigorous constitution and warlike manners and make it almost forget its native soil. Moreover, the troops of which it was composed, intelligent and honourable like their chief, were adapted to a species of service which exposed those who engaged in it to a dangerous species of corruption, for the contrabandists spared no sacrifice to violate the blockade. Finally, if it should at any time become necessary to apply the battering-ram to the great Empire of the North, the invincible third corps should be the head of the ram; for unhappily, it must be repeated, that in the midst of sincere projects of peace, Napoleon nourished by anticipations either of himself or others, thoughts of war, which sooner or later would render abortive his most pacific intentions.

Though the organization of the three divisions of Morand, Friant, and Gudin, was nearly perfect, they underwent some alterations. They were completed by one of the regiments of Saint Hilaire, and all raised to 5 regiments of infantry of 4 battalions each, without reckoning the artillery companies which served more than eighty pieces. To them were added General Bruyère's division of cuirassiers, General Jacquinet's division of light cavalry, and a vast park of siege-artillery. The expense of this superb corps d'armée was divided between the Kingdom of Westphalia, the Hanse towns, and the places held in pledge. General Gudin was to keep Hanover, General Morand the Hanse towns, General Friant Magdeburg and the Elbe. General Davout, residing at Hamburg, while his colleagues were to enjoy the repose of peace, was to occupy himself in the rude climate of the North in the

training of the troops and the rigorous enforcement of the laws of blockade.

The divisions of heavy cavalry which had habitually served with Marshal Davout returned to France, except the Bruyère division, which had been left in the North. The cuirassiers of Spain, now called the cuirassiers of Padua, were placed upon the footing of peace, and cantoned in Normandy, which was rich in forage. The carabineers and cuirassiers, formerly called of St. Germain, were distributed through Lorraine and Alsace. Those who had completed their service returned home with their rewards. The young soldiers whose training was scarcely finished were sent back to the dépôt soon to be detached toward the Peninsula. The cavalry regiments were thus reduced from the effective force of 1,000 men, to which Napoleon had wished to raise them, to about 600 men. The purchase of new horses was suspended, and those engagements which could not be broken served to furnish horses to Spain. The artillery horses, always so expensive to maintain, were sent partly into Illyria, where they lived at the expense of a conquered province, partly into Alsace and Lorraine, where it was designed to consign them to the peasantry, (a design which Napoleon had formed with a view to economy,) partly into Spain, where it was necessary to bring large parks of artillery to besiege the strong places. Finally, the unnecessary staffs were dissolved, and the only one preserved entire was that of Davout's corps, maintained, as we have said, on a war footing.

In order to afford some period of repose to the Empire, and to allow it to taste the pleasures of peace, Napoleon had resolved to raise no conscription in 1810. He reckoned upon deriving from this measure a double source of economy, the reduction of the effective force and the suppression for that year of the expense of a first equipment. Independently of the guard which he had intended to send entire toward the Pyrenees, he had proposed to order to Spain a reinforcement of 100,000 men, speedily followed by a reserve of 30,000. The levies of the preceding and present year might suffice for this double mission. We have seen that the provisional demi-brigades formed of the 4th and 5th battalions, directed first toward Suabia, Franconia, and Flanders, and then recalled toward Spain, had been finally ordered to the Pyrenees. Napoleon reinforced them with all that could be withdrawn from the dépôts, in order that the companies might arrive complete in the Peninsula. In the heavy cavalry he took all those men who had not been in a campaign to increase the 18th cuirassiers, which were serving in Aragon. He also took all those who were disposable in the dépôts of light cavalry, to recruit the twelve regiments of chasseurs and hussars, left in Spain. During the campaign of Austria, he had withdrawn from the twenty-four regiments of dragoons the 3d and 4th squadrons, in order to bring them to the Danube as provisional companies. Peace being concluded, he sent them back to the Pyrenees, enrolling among them all the conscripts of the latest levies who were able to serve in that war. In this manner all the dragoons were given up to Spain.

By these different methods, in the employment of which the skill of Napoleon was pre-eminent, while preserving in the North a strong

nucleus of an army, and surrounding the Hanse towns and Holland with a network of troops of observation, he had contracted as much as possible the expenses of his armaments, and directed all his disposable forces toward the Peninsula. He deemed it right that Spain should support the war of which she was both the theatre and the cause. The feelings with which he regarded this war in Spain, and all that he had been exposed to by that country, recoiled not only upon the country but even upon his brother. Joseph, always mortified at the state of subjection in which he lived, displeased with the French generals, with their arrogance toward himself and their excesses toward the Spaniards, affecting to believe, or actually believing, that if he were allowed to effect the pacification of Spain according to his own judgment, he would accomplish more by persuasion than Napoleon by force, had at length become the object of his suspicion, and even rebuke. Napoleon, irritated at vast expenses which did nothing to prevent the destitution of our armies, wrote to Joseph personally and by his ministers the most harsh and peremptory letters. "There is no doing impossibilities," said he; "the whole revenues of France would not bear the expense of the army of Spain, unless I set some limit to it. My empire is exhausted of men and money, and I must put a check. The last war of Austria cost more than it brought: the Walcheren expedition drew considerable sums from my treasury, and if I persist, my finances will soon be drained. It is necessary, therefore, that in Spain the war should support the war, and that the king should furnish the principal expenses of the engineers, artillery, supply of horses, of the hospitals, and the support of the troops. All that I can do is to send 2 millions a month for pay. I cannot go beyond that. Spain is very rich, and is well able to pay her own expenses. The king easily finds at Madrid the means of enriching favourites to whom he owes nothing; let him contrive to support my soldiers, to whom he owes his crown. If he cannot do this, I will undertake the administration of the Spanish provinces by my generals, and I shall know very well how to extract the necessary resources, as I have done in all the conquered countries where my troops have sojourned. Let these principles be acted upon; for my will is irrevocable, and it is irrevocable because founded upon invincible necessity."\*

Napoleon had good cause to be concerned for his finances, for, in order to keep well organized and supplied the numerous armies which he employed to hold Europe from the Vistula to the Tagus, from the Straits of Calais to the banks of the Save, money was as necessary as men, and by continuing in his present course he ran the risk of exhausting both his treasure and his people. In fact, according to the result of the existing imposts, which could not be augmented without rendering them burdensome, he was obliged to confine himself within a sum of 740 millions, which with 40 millions devoted to the departmental service, and 120 expended in the collection of the amount, made a total of about 900 millions, as we have frequently said. Every

year he exceeded this amount by 30 or 40 millions when not at war, by 80 or 100 when engaged. The last campaign of Austria had cost much beyond that sum, and it was always from the army treasury (thenceforward called *trésor extraordinaire*) that it must be supplied. Now, though considerable, this fund was much impoverished, for Napoleon drew upon it sometimes to remunerate his soldiers, sometimes to accomplish the great monuments of the capital and the canals, sometimes to assist cities that had run in debt or were in distress. This fund, as already said, was reduced to 292 millions at the time of the Austrian war. That war had augmented it by 170 millions,† the sale of Spanish wool by 10 millions more; the surrender of the treasure on Mount Napoleon had yielded 10 millions more, which raised the sum total to 482 millions. Napoleon had drawn upon it to the extent of 84 millions for the war in Austria, 28 for the Louvre and different monuments, 12 for gifts, 4 for certain extraordinary expenses of the crown, which reduced it to 354 millions.

It must be added that this sum was not wholly free, for it included many debts due by the conquered states, in particular one of 86 millions by Prussia, which Napoleon, as we have seen, had great difficulty in obtaining. The 84 millions borrowed from this fund for the Austrian campaign did not represent all the excess of expense occasioned by that war: it fell far short of it, for the troops had occasioned great expenditure in the places where they were, which was not reckoned, and the budget of the state, in which 850 millions were consecrated to the ordinary expenses of the war, would have furnished an excess of 46 millions, which made up a total of 480 millions for the campaign without the local expenditure.

It was necessary, then, to economize, this extraordinary fund which had received from the five wars which had given rise to it 805 millions, and which was already reduced to 354 millions by the expenses of the same wars. Napoleon, therefore, had firmly resolved not to draw upon it every year. In 1810, he had presented to the legislative body, very privately assembled, a budget provisionally limited to 740 millions of general expenses, 40 millions of departmental expenses specially mentioned, 120 millions known, but not stated, as the expenses of collection, forming a total of 900 millions of anticipated expenses, always exceeded, even under an absolute master and one very exact in his accounts. Napoleon knew well that with the armies which he maintained in Illyria, in Italy, in Germany, in Holland, and in Spain, though these were partly supported by the countries which they occupied, the sum of 350 millions granted to the two ministers of war would certainly be insufficient. He suspected that an excess of 80 or 40 millions, perhaps 50, would disturb the fictitious balance of his revenues and expenses during peace, and he had prepared several resources to meet it without touching the extraordinary fund. These resources were composed, first, of the goods of the distinguished Spanish families prosecuted as guilty of high treason, and possessing nearly 200 millions of patrimony; and secondly, of the

\* I here merely analyze a series of letters, the language of which is even still more forcible than that which I have adopted.

† Partly by contributions levied on the country, partly by a war contribution stipulated by the treaty of peace.

numerous seizures he had made of pretended neutrals, introduced into all the ports of the Empire or of the allied countries. These seizures might amount to several hundreds of millions. Napoleon hoped that by observing strict order in his expenses he would be able to support the vast armaments which the situation of Europe, pacified but not resigned, and the war in Spain, better conducted but not yet terminated, obliged him to maintain.

From what has been said we may form some idea of the projects which Napoleon had formed of terminating his long struggle with Europe. While his troops, though evacuating Germany, still kept the north of the continent in awe, and prohibited the coasts from British commerce, he wished to bring toward the Peninsula the young recruits which were no longer demanded by the Austrian war, and which, infused into the old companies of the army of Spain, should complete and renew them. To this he had just added his own guard, which he had set in motion from the spring of 1810, after having given it some months of rest; and he proposed to go himself into the heart of the Peninsula, there to gather 100,000 men under his own hand, to drive the English to the sea, and, by inflicting upon them a serious disaster, to incline the balance in the British Parliament in favour of the party who advocated peace.

In addition to this energetic method of inflicting a powerful check upon the English army, Napoleon, with a view to secure peace, projected the equally efficacious design of rendering thoroughly efficient the continental blockade, which had been rigorously enforced only in the ports of old France, only partially in those of new France, as Belgium, and not at all in the connected or allied states, as Holland, Hanover, the Hanse towns, Denmark. His zeal for this species of warfare was not less than for that which he so successfully waged in the field. It was necessary to keep from the continent not only cotton and different metals, if he would strike a great blow against England, but also their colonial produce, such as sugar, coffee, cotton, dye-stuffs, wood, &c., which constitute the return, from the East and West Indies, for the manufactures of Manchester and Birmingham. Not only their own colonies, but the French and Dutch, which they had successively conquered, and the Spanish, which they had succeeded in opening up since the war in Spain, remitted their payments merely in colonial produce, which they were then obliged to sell in Europe, in order to realize the price of their industrial and commercial operations. In order to introduce these articles to the continent, they had devised various ingenious methods. Thus, besides the great dépôt of London, where all neutral vessels were obliged to touch, in order to take in a part of their cargo, they had established other dépôts at the Azores, Malta, and Heligoland, where were accumulated immense quantities of merchandise, and where the contrabandists might derive the means of their clandestine traffic. At Heligoland, for example, they had created a singular establishment, which shows the point to which the art of smuggling had been carried at this period of commercial violence.

Heligoland is a small island in the North Sea, opposite the mouth of the Elbe, divided into two

parts,—the lower part where ships can land, and the upper part, the only communication with which is by a wooden staircase of 200 steps, which it would be easy to interrupt in a few seconds. Six hundred English, with a numerous artillery, defended this upper part, as well as the vast magazines therein constructed, and which contained three or four hundred millions worth of merchandise. The approaches were defended by an English flotilla, which constantly cruised about the lower part. To this point the contrabandists came to receive the merchandise which they might succeed in introducing to the continent notwithstanding the laws of Napoleon. The farmers who cultivated the land along the coast were the first depositaries of these goods: to them others repaired, during the night, in order to disseminate them as widely as possible; and this species of fraud had become established, not only in the Hanse towns, but also throughout all Holland, notwithstanding the close connection of that country with France. The population of these different countries eagerly seconded the contrabandists, and combined with them to attack, disarm, slay, or seduce the officers of custom.

Independently of these clandestine contrabandists, there were the false neutrals practising smuggling almost without concealment, and introducing in great quantities the prohibited articles into the French or allied ports.

In order to understand the part of these false neutrals, it is necessary to recall the English and French decrees so often mentioned in this history, and constituting at that time the maritime legislation. The English, by a first act of violence, had in 1806 declared the blockade of all the ports of France from Brest to the mouth of the Elbe, though they did not possess a power adequate to enforce it, as required by the laws of war. Napoleon, in virtue of his Berlin decrees, had immediately replied to this fictitious blockade by the general blockade of the British islands, had forbidden intercourse with them either by letters or vessels, and had forbidden access to his ports not only to every English vessel, but to any one that had touched either the soil or colonies of England. To this decree England had replied by her famous orders in council of 1807, according to which no neutral vessel might traverse the sea, whatever might be its origin or destination, unless it had touched at London, Malta, or certain places in the British dominions, in order to verify its cargo, pay enormous dues, and take out a license for navigation. It was to this extraordinary assumption of sovereignty of the seas that Napoleon responded in 1807 by his Milan decree, which declared outlawed, and therefore made a fair prize of, every ship, wherever found, which had submitted to such odious legislation.

Between these two tyrannies struggled the unfortunate neutral navigators, obliged to obtain from London the privilege of sailing, and exposed to being captured by France for having obtained it. Nothing can be said in justification of these two acts of tyranny: all that can justify the second is that it had been provoked by the first. The English pushed their exaction to such an extreme that every one in the Mediterranean was bound to go to Malta, and every one in the Ocean to go to London, in order to pay for the liberty of navigation or to

take a cargo of English merchandise. For example, the Dutch, who, for their salted provisions, should be going to procure salt on the coast of France, must first purchase at London the privilege of importing this first necessary of their commercial industry.

The Americans, disgusted at this double violation of the law of neutrals, which they ascribed wholly to the English as the original cause, had passed an act called the law of embargo, by which they had forbidden their ships to sail between France and England, or even to go into Europe. They had required them to limit their traffic exclusively to the American shores, and had even resolved to manufacture their own cotton. In return, they had declared seizable any English or French vessel which should venture to touch the shores of America, after they had had the courage to debar themselves from the shores of England and France.

The American privateers, however, less haughty than their government, had in general violated these laws, more honourable than judicious. Thus, since the embargo affected those only who had returned to port, the greater part had remained as adventurers at sea, considering, with reason, that such measures would not last more than a year or two, and lived by going from port to port at the risk of those who had fitted them out. Nearly all of them went to England, there took cargoes of the colonial produce, with which the London warehouses were crowded, transported them sometimes at their own risk, more frequently at that of the English, Dutch, Hanseatic, Danish, or Russian merchants, took out licenses, put themselves under the convoy of British fleets, entered Cronstadt, Riga, Dantzic, Copenhagen, Hamburg, Amsterdam, even Antwerp, Havre, Bordeaux, where they always presented themselves as neutrals, being Americans, affirmed that they had had no communication with England, gained ready credence in Russia, Prussia, Hamburg, and Holland, where the authorities desired nothing more than to be deceived, not quite so ready at Antwerp, Havre, and Bordeaux, but even there occasionally evading the vigilance of the imperial scrutiny, unable, after the minutest researches, to prove communication with England and submission to her laws.

In the Mediterranean, the Greeks, who were then entering upon commercial enterprises under the Ottoman flag, used to seek, at Malta, sugars, coffees, English cottons, which they brought to Trieste, Venice, Naples, Leghorn, Genoa, Marseilles, representing themselves as neutral, since they were Ottomans, and it was very difficult to detect the fraud in their case, as well as in that of the Americans.

To France it was of principal importance to check this contraband trade. If, in fact, the English could no longer sell in Europe those colonial products, which were either the actual growth of their own colonies or the price which had been paid for their manufactures in the colonies of other nations, their immense commerce would be at once stopped. The enormous quantity of bills advanced upon these goods and deposited in the bank of England for discount would be more or less protested; the credit of the bank would be affected; and the bank notes which (since the suppression of money payments) were the principal, if not the only, currency of England,

would immediately be discredited. They already lost 20 per cent. on cash: the exchange with England, which was already very low—for the pound sterling, commonly worth 25 francs, was now scarcely worth 17—would fall still lower, and it might soon happen that, the bank note losing 80 per cent., the pound sterling would fall to 15 or 14 francs on the continent, and that, in this case, all affairs, both public and private, would be almost inextricable. What was to be done to procure from without so many articles with which English luxury would not dispense even during war? How could the English armies in the Peninsula be supported, which could not obtain from their allies bread, meat, or wine, except in return for gold or silver? If it be remembered, moreover, that in England two political parties, whose forces, commonly unequal, were nevertheless nearly balanced in certain questions, were divided on the question of peace and war, it will be understood that to add to military reverses a new depreciation of the materials of commerce would be to give arms to the peace party, and to hasten the period when, peace being restored on land and sea, the design of Napoleon would be accomplished.

However violent may have been the means which Napoleon was constrained to employ, the importance of the end in view was so great that we can hardly fail to excuse them. We may even become convinced that his principal error consisted in not carrying out his views with sufficient perseverance. Aware, from the outset, of the difficulty of discerning whether the pretended neutrals had subjected themselves to the English laws or not, he adopted a radical method of cutting short the difficulty. He determined that neither Ottomans nor Americans should be received in the French or allied ports, and founded his resolution on very tenable reasons. As for the Ottomans, little watched over by their government, and only touching at ports wholly or almost French, as those of Marseilles, Genoa, Leghorn, Naples, Venice, Trieste, he allowed them to be received provisionally, that their papers should be sent to Paris, examined by the director of customs himself, and that they should be exempted from confiscation (the punishment of all fraud) only after a rigorous inquiry. No great inconvenience could arise from the maltreatment of these Greeks, for the Porte concerned itself very little about them, and France cared little for the Porte.

There was greater difficulty in acting with rigour toward the Americans. They came not only into France, but also into Holland, Germany, Prussia, Russia, countries where obedience was not secured by a mere command unless supported by plausible reasons and powerful influence. These Americans, moreover, belonged to a powerful government, which it was necessary to study, for there was a possibility by so doing of causing it to declare war against Great Britain. Napoleon prohibited the admission of Americans into the ports of France, or those virtually French, and insisted that they should be excluded from Prussia or Russia, on the very probable ground that they were not really Americans. Some among them in fact usurped that title; others were persons who, having expatriated themselves for a longer or shorter time, and adopted as their only country the British depôts, had no further claim on the sup-

port of their government. They might, therefore, call in question the protection of the American flag, and maintain that, in arresting these persons, they would check the English commerce itself, and reduce it to mere nightly smuggling, which was carried on along ill-guarded coasts.

Napoleon went even further with regard to them, and, not confining himself to debarring them from the ports of the continent, he ordered that they should be seized in the French ports or those dependent on France, and urged this demand with vehemence on Prussia, Denmark, and Russia. To execute this measure in his own country he alleged a reason with which he was affected more in appearance than reality, namely, the seizure which had been ordered in America of all the French vessels which had violated the law of embargo by touching at the ports of the Union. There were, in fact, three or four, which, having had the boldness to venture on the Atlantic ocean, had violated the American law, consciously or otherwise, and had been seized; three or four, I repeat, against hundreds of American vessels which had been brought into the French ports and confiscated. "It is a great loss," said the American minister at Paris charged with the defence of his countrymen, whose errors, nevertheless, he acknowledged, "in return for a very inconsiderable loss inflicted on the French." "The extent of the loss is nothing," replied Napoleon, "the honour of the flag is every thing. You have laid hands upon vessels protected by my flag, and a single such attempt would be sufficient to make me seize all the American marine if I could." This reason was a mere pretence, and Napoleon was not so enraged as he professed to be. He sought a specious pretext to seize the vast numbers of American vessels in Holland, France, and Italy, which were favouring England by their fraud, and which were within his reach. He had, indeed, confiscated a great number of them, and in their rich cargoes he found means of supplying his treasury with resources almost as abundant as those which were yielded by the war contributions imposed upon conquered countries. And, further, being well aware of the interest he had in attaching to himself the Americans in order to embroil them with England, he opened up a negotiation with General Armstrong, who represented at Paris the government of the Union, and did not hesitate to recognise in plain terms that his Berlin and Milan decrees were acts of violence, but called for by previous violence. He maintained that he had no other method of replying to the insolent assumption of Britain to levy a rate upon the seas, and declared that he was nevertheless ready to renounce his decrees in favour of the Americans on one condition, viz.: that they should resist British tyranny, and should oblige the British Cabinet to retract the famous orders in council, or else that they should declare war. On this condition he professed himself quite ready to restore to the Americans the rights of neutrals.

It was not difficult to execute this seizure of the Americans in France, nor even in the Hanse towns at the mouths of the Elbe and Weser, where the French troops were encamped; but it was very difficult in Holland, where King Louis resisted the wishes of his brother, and where a great number of ships had been known

to elude the decrees; likewise in Denmark, which readily presented a depôt for prohibited merchandise, and scattered them over the continent by the frontier of Holland; in the ports of Prussia, which had no great desire to vex their population in order to secure the triumph of Napoleon over England; and finally, in the ports of Russia, which, having great need of British commerce for the sale of her agricultural produce, the only fortune of her great lords, made up for the closing of the seas by continuing, under the American flag, a part of the traffic which she had engaged at Tilsit and Erfurt wholly to relinquish.

That he should experience some resistance in Denmark, Prussia, or Russia, Napoleon could allow, with vexation, it is true, and even anger, and with an urgency in his remonstrances little accordant with his conciliatory policy; but that in Holland, a country conquered by the arms of France and presented as a kingdom to his brother, he should find more determined resistance than in any part of the European coast, he could not endure, and he every moment threatened to fall upon those who so rashly ventured to oppose him. At the mere statement of his grievances we may recognise the motive which, in the recent distribution of his troops, had led him to place a part of the old division of Massena around the frontiers of Holland. Seeing that he could not deter the Dutch from contraband trade, he at first passed a decree to cut off all commercial intercourse with them. This would have been their death-warrant; for, separated from England on one side by war, if they were excluded from the continent by our laws, they would have been starved to death. King Louis, therefore, prostrated himself before his brother, and had obtained a revocation of the decree by the promise of a change in his conduct. His promises speedily proved vain, and the Americans, notwithstanding our protestations, had been admitted into all the ports of Holland. Napoleon, no longer able to contain himself at this new act of disobedience, had re-established the decree of separation, and openly announced his design of uniting Holland to France.

For some time, indeed, this project had engaged his attention. Perceiving that, even under the government of a brother, he could not derive from Holland either an effectual union of naval forces, or a sincere co-operation in commercial restrictions, he prepared to unite it to the Empire, whatever might be thought of such a proceeding. The melancholy and bitter language of Napoleon was not of a character to alter his opinion. However, some remains of affection and of family considerations, as well as the state of Europe, checked him for a while. Admiral Verhuel, an individual whose merit he had observed, and who had been very grateful to him without being less attached to his country, used every effort to prevent a quarrel, and urged the two brothers to meet. Napoleon was little disposed to do so, fearing lest he should be induced to yield when he found himself in the presence of his brother; and Louis was equally averse, fearing lest at Paris he should fall under too powerful a hand, and also unwilling to meet his queen Hortense, from whom he lived separate. However, at the instance of Admiral Verhuel, who had taken in behalf of each brother the step that he was unwilling to take himself,

King Louis had left the Hague and arrived at Paris, there to rectify a difference which might give rise to the most serious events of the time. At the time of which we are now speaking, they were entering on the subject, and, as the first act of submission, King Louis had consented to allow the Americans to be arrested who should introduce themselves into the ports of Holland.

Napoleon then occupied himself with the execution of his decrees in the other states of the North. To admit pretended neutrals in order afterward to confiscate them was very well suited to his disposition, at once crafty and very little scrupulous in the choice of means, especially in the case of barefaced impostors, who violated at once the laws of their own country and of those countries which consented to receive them. He had caused them to be seized by his own agents in the Hanse towns, and advised Denmark as well as Prussia to allow them to enter, and then to detain them, confident that they should only detain English under the assumed name of Americans. Denmark and Prussia timidly excused themselves, alleging that, though many Americans might be impostors, others might not be so, and that they closely examined these papers to assure themselves whether they had touched at any British port. But Napoleon said that it was impossible to make any distinction, for the least guilty could not have crossed the sea without at least violating the American law which forbid them to come to Europe. In reply, they stammered out some very poor reasons; they promised to obey his laws with the understanding that they should deviate widely from the execution of them and shield the smugglers by means of deceit on their own part. Denmark was inexcusable, for she had been treated by England as an implacable foe, while France had dealt with her as a firm and faithful friend; besides, her most precious rights were at stake, for no state was so much interested in resisting the dominion which the English wished to establish over the sea. But Prussia, which had been conquered and oppressed, which had no interest in maritime questions, was very excusable in not subjecting herself readily to the political designs of her conqueror, and in not being disposed to contribute to them by cruel sacrifices. Nevertheless, she did not absolutely refuse to conform to Napoleon's wishes, but she avoided examinations, and, in fact, admitted Americans without check. Napoleon, who read the correspondence with his consuls himself and maintained the quarrel personally, had made proposals to Prussia worthy of the smugglers whom he was opposing. Numerous convoys were announced, which, under the American flag, were to enter the towns of ancient Prussia, particularly Colberg, where we had not a single soldier. "Let them enter," said Napoleon. "and arrest them afterward; deliver the cargoes to me, and I will take them in part payment of the Prussian debt." In this strange negotiation he had almost succeeded.

Of all this Northern seacoast there remained open to the pretended Americans only Swedish Pomerania, which Napoleon had just restored to Sweden, in consequence of a sudden revolution, which might easily have been anticipated under a king whose continual extravagances

compromised at once the dignity and the security of his country.

We have seen the foolish direction which Gustavus IV. had given to his troops during the melancholy war of Finland. Enraged against Denmark, instead of occupying himself with Russia, with which he might long have disputed Finland, he had directed a considerable part of his forces toward Norway, with a view of invading that country, and toward the Sound to threaten Copenhagen. The Swedes, exasperated at seeing Finland snatched from them by an ill-judged employment of their brave troops, had revolted against a king who seemed to be destitute of reason. The revolt first broke out in the army of Norway. Led by a bold and active officer, that army had directed its course toward Stockholm. Some faithful servants of Gustavus IV., compelling themselves to enlighten him on the real state of matters, had in vain entreated him to make some necessary sacrifices to a nation justly incensed. He then became affected with a sort of frenzy, seized the sword of an aide-de-camp, (with what design is not known,) and, having been at length disarmed, was kept under observation as a person affected with furious insanity. In this extremity, the states, extraordinarily assembled, had declared him incapable of reigning, and had called to the throne his uncle, the duke of Sudermania, a mild and wise prince, who, during the minority of the dethroned king, had governed the kingdom with much prudence. In order to prevent greater evils, the new monarch had just concluded peace with Russia and France.

The peace with Russia had deprived Sweden of Finland: peace with France, on the contrary, had obtained the restitution of Pomerania and the port of Stralsund, taken by the French in 1807 and occupied by them till 1810. But Napoleon had granted this restitution on the condition of absolute interdiction of the English from the Swedish ports, especially that of Stralsund, the most important of all, being situated on the German mainland, and able by itself to nullify the vast apparatus of the continental blockade. Unfortunately, after the loss of Finland, no sacrifice could be more severe to the Swedes than that of her commerce with Britain. At this epoch almost all the people on the Baltic, being rich in agricultural produce and naval stores, such as iron, wood, hemp, pitch, tar, they could not dispense with either England or France, and at no time could they afford to lose the markets of both those empires. To be embroiled with France left them free access to England, and, moreover, made them the medium of a profitable contraband trade; but to be embroiled with England shut against them the ports of Britain without opening those of France, which were strictly blockaded, so that a rupture with England was equivalent to a rupture with both powers. The Swedes, after having promised Napoleon to break with the English, had in reality closed against them the great market of Gottenburg, so conveniently situated for smuggling. But they had immediately allowed them to transfer that market to the isles adjacent to Gottenburg, and, like all the minor settlements on the Baltic coast, they extricated themselves from difficulties with France by means of promises lavishly made and readily violated.

Napoleon, receiving exact information from his consuls, was much displeased to learn that he was imposed upon in Sweden, as elsewhere, recoiled the motives which had induced him to make war upon Gustavus IV. and to conclude peace with the duke of Sudermania, and gave out that he was about to reoccupy Swedish Pomerania, and even renew the war with Sweden, whatever might be thought of his conduct in the Northern cabinets, unless his requirements with respect to British commerce should be rigorously observed.

Russia alone, of all the Northern cabinets, half acknowledged a determination to resist. While concealing her displeasure at Napoleon's marriage, and his refusal to co-operate with her in the affairs of Poland, as well as the present intimacy between France and Austria, she had a reason for enduring a great deal at the present moment in her desire to terminate the war with the Turks and to deprive them of Moldavia and Wallachia. Such a motive might well induce her to suffer many annoyances without complaining. Besides, the idea of a new war with France could be gratifying to no sensible man in Russia. Nevertheless, though resolved to endure much, Alexander retained not merely a full sense of personal dignity, but also of that of a great empire. Though offended at the sway which Napoleon professed to exercise over all the northern coasts from Amsterdam, Bremen, Hamburg, to Riga, and even to St. Petersburg, Alexander submitted to it in consideration of the end at which he aimed in the East; but he wished Napoleon to exercise some degree of reserve in his own states, both from a sense of dignity, which might readily be acknowledged, and also from commercial and agricultural interests which could less openly be assigned. He therefore opposed the French cabinet with the argument advanced at the time by all the other states,—an argument which had no weight as long as the American law of embargo existed,—viz.: that the Americans were not all smugglers; that among them were some legitimate traders; that he would admit only these, and carefully arrest all the others; and that, having been deprived of the British commerce, he was anxious to retain that with America. The reasoning was unsound, for the law of embargo implied deception in every American vessel arriving in Europe, and it was well known that the English did not allow a single vessel to pass without paying the navigation dues or else taking an English cargo.

Unfortunately, Napoleon, by the immoderate desire of accumulating all advantages at once, had furnished those who were repelled by the continental blockade with very powerful arguments against himself, by having permitted certain *licensed* communications with Great Britain. The following statement will explain how he came to allow exceptions to his system which involved a very embarrassing amount of inconsistency.

The English had been in want of corn toward the end of 1809, and, at all times, of the naval supplies of the North. They had, therefore, allowed all vessels, even those of the enemy, to bring them corn, wood, hemp, pitch, and tar, on payment of a duty which, indeed, fell back upon themselves, since it enhanced the price of the materials which they wished to obtain. In

consequence of this self-interested toleration, there might be seen at the quays of the Thames vessels from Belgium, Holland, the Hanse towns, Denmark, Russia, all of which states were in actual war with Great Britain. Napoleon, perceiving the great need of the English of those articles which they allowed to be introduced in so unusual a manner, formed the design of availing himself of it by inducing them to admit French produce, and had granted free passage to the vessels which, in bringing wood, hemp, or corn, would at the same time complete their cargo with silk, cloth, wine, brandy, cheese, &c. He allowed them to import, in return, certain specified articles,—not the manufactures of Manchester or the hardware of Birmingham, not coffee, or sugar, but certain articles in which our manufacturers were deficient, as indigo, cochineal, fish-oils, logwood, leather, &c. As French vessels had been seen in English ports, so in return had English vessels been seen in French ports, each sailing under passports called licenses, in each country falsifying their origin, and aiding smuggling in a remarkable manner. The French, compelled to carry silks as well as corn, intrusted them at the mouth of the Thames to smugglers, who undertook to introduce them clandestinely. The English, in their turn, in order to pass freely from their ports, obliged to carry cotton goods prohibited in France, consigned them, when near our coasts, to smugglers, who undertook to introduce them, and presented themselves in our ports with only privileged articles. This was a species of traffic which corrupted commerce by habituating it to falsehood and even forgery, for there were in London persons who openly fabricated ships'-papers. These were great inconveniences for small advantages, for in France this species of commerce never rose above 20 millions of exports and imports from the year 1809 to 1810. But the greatest danger attendant upon it was that of exhibiting France essentially inconsistent with herself in the very sight of those from whom she demanded the rigorous execution of the continental blockade.

"You require," said Russia, "that I should cut off my subjects from all communication with England; that I should prevent them selling their cereal products and naval stores, for which they can find no market but with the English merchants; that I should condemn them not to receive in exchange the sugar, coffee, and manufactured goods, of which they stand in need; and you do not hesitate yourself to bring your silk, your cloth, your wine, into England, and thence to bring the sugar and coffee which your laws so strictly exclude from all the rest of the continent. Be not, then, so rigorous toward others while you are so indulgent to yourselves, especially while they have scarcely any interest in the universal adoption of the most rigorous system which to you is of the utmost importance."

It was impossible that Napoleon should not perceive the force of this argument, which he repelled with angry assertions for want of solid reasons. "All that is said of my licenses is false," he replied to Russia; "I do not myself introduce sugar and coffee into France, but, the English requiring our corn, I oblige them to take our silk, cloth, and wine, and I pay myself with articles indispensable to French industry,

especially with guineas brought from the Thames by smugglers, the exportation of which must ruin the exchange of England."

This reply was not destitute of truth, but that which it contained sufficed to prove how insignificant was this commerce by means of licenses at once the source of corruption and inconsistency, producing few advantages, much immorality, and furnishing the numerous opponents of the continental blockade with arguments very difficult to answer.

Nevertheless, Napoleon was not far from obtaining important results from persisting in his system, himself keeping a close scrutiny of the coasts of France and the allied countries, reading the daily accounts of the entry and departure of ships, enforcing the introduction of French troops and custom-house officers into Holland, consigning to Marshal Davout the charge of guarding Bremen, Hamburg, and Lubeck, preparing to resume the occupation of Swedish Pomerania, forcing Prussia to close Colberg and Konigsberg, pressing Russia, without driving her to extremities, to close Riga and St. Petersburg. No doubt there might remain some partial opening for the products of British industry; but these products, which were to be carried in vessels to the extremity of the North, and then brought back on Russian wagons to the South, reached the place of their ultimate destination exposed to such heavy charges that the sale was impossible. If the continental blockade thus arranged could be maintained with perseverance without provoking a war with the North, it could not fail, as we shall soon see, to reduce Great Britain to a degree of distress absolutely insufferable.

While seeking to force England to peace by a great reverse in the Peninsula and a ruinous system of commercial restrictions, Napoleon at the same time occupied himself with equal activity with the interior affairs of the Empire. He at length engaged in the great question of religious worship, by no means the least weighty of those which the eager impetuosity of his character had brought upon him.

The pope, having been conveyed to Savona, was there kept prisoner, and refused pertinaciously to discharge the duties of the apostolic chair. There was no schism, as in the last years of the revolution, when the clergy, divided among themselves, occasioned divisions among the laity, and avenged themselves by troubling the State for the persecutions which they had undergone from it. At the present epoch the clergy were united, tranquil, and submissive, everywhere practised the same rites, were ignorant, or professed to be ignorant, of the bull of excommunication issued against Napoleon, very generally blamed the pope for having recourse to that measure, by which he exposed himself either to confess the weakness of his spiritual weapons, or to shake a government which, notwithstanding its faults, was regarded as necessary to the general safety. However, those even who took this view greatly disapproved of the abduction of the pope, deplored his imprisonment, and desired the end of a state of things distressing to good Catholics, and possible, sooner or later, to issue in schism. The wish was almost unanimous that the pope should come to an understanding with the Emperor, that he should obtain from him an establishment

suitable to the head of the church, without hoping or wishing the re-establishment of the temporal power, then considered to be irrevocably destroyed. Singular state of affairs! Under the pressure of a despotic government, the church, forgetting for a moment the extent to which her temporal power was necessary to her spiritual, the church subsequently so exacting, inclined to allow that the pope ought to renounce his states and be content with an establishment, which, however magnificent, must still be merely equivalent to that of the ancient patriarchs residing with the emperors of Constantinople.

Such was the opinion of the great majority of the clergy. But a zealous minority which had rejected the concordat, partaking in all the prejudices of the old royalists, drew distressing pictures of the sufferings of the pope, eagerly spread abroad the bull of excommunication, and openly excited to schism. This party maintained that to appropriate the domain of St. Peter was to attack the faith; that the pope, being a prisoner, must of necessity relinquish every pontifical act; that the Catholic clergy, cut off from communication with their head, must soon themselves refuse to administer the sacraments. In one word, in the same manner as formerly the parliaments, in order to overcome the regal power, aimed at arresting the course of justice, these priests, in order to embarrass Napoleon, would have gone the length of suspending religious worship.

The very day of his marriage, Napoleon had had an example of the obstacles which might be presented by malcontent priests leagued with old royalists. He had, as we have already said, called to Paris the greater part of the dignitaries of the pontifical government, and he had already gathered about him twenty-eight cardinals of all nations, who attended almost every Sunday at mass in his chapel, notwithstanding his excommunication. On the day of his marriage, thirteen out of the twenty-eight were absent. The motive of this conduct, which they wished to be understood, though they dared not avow, was that, without the act of the pope, Napoleon could not be divorced, and that, therefore, the first marriage being still valid, the second was null. This motive was without foundation, for there had been no divorce, (which in fact, having been refused by the church, could be pronounced only by the pope,) but the annulment of the marriage with Josephine pronounced by the ordinary jurisdiction after all the degrees of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction had been exhausted. This motive, though false, and rather implied than acknowledged, amounted to nothing less than the assertion that the illustrious princess given in marriage to Napoleon by the Court of Austria was not really his wife, owing to the irregularity of the proceeding, and that the heir of the Empire, whom France anticipated with impatience, would be illegitimate.

Napoleon, whose eye nothing escaped, had perceived during the ceremony that the full number of the "red robes," as he called them, was not present. "Count them," said he to a prelate of his chapel; and having learned that thirteen out of the twenty-eight were wanting, he cried, in an undertone, with a vehemence which he could not restrain: "The fools! they are always the same! professedly submissive,



secretly factious! but they shall see what it costs to trifle with my power!" Scarcely had he retired from the ceremony when he called the minister of police, and gave orders to arrest the thirteen cardinals, to strip them of the purple, (from which they were afterward called the black cardinals,) to disperse them through the different provinces, there to keep them under surveillance, and to sequester not only their ecclesiastical revenues but their personal property.

It would have been impossible to meet with greater violence an opposition that had been still more imprudent and reprehensible. In the number of the thirteen cardinals was found Cardinal Oppizoni, whom Napoleon had created Archbishop of Bologna, cardinal, and senator, notwithstanding many blemishes in his private character. He called him before the viceroy of Italy, and threatened him with the severest punishment if he did not immediately resign all his ecclesiastical dignities. The ungrateful prelate, struck with terror, yielded to this demand in a shower of tears, and forthwith quitted Paris for the retreat assigned to him, half exile, half prison.

The day following this deplorable outbreak of passion, the secret instigators of the conduct which had provoked it rejoiced exceedingly at the charge of adultery advanced against a marriage which was to give birth to the heir of the empire, at the extravagant exercise of power which it had occasioned, and congratulated themselves on having strewed an infinity of evils in the path of a detested government, the wisdom of which unfortunately was not equal to its glory. That portion of the clergy which was not blinded by the spirit of party deplored alike the fault and the punishment, and earnestly prayed for the end of a state of things which might induce the most serious consequences. But it was difficult to prevail upon the Emperor to restrain himself, or upon the pope to resign, and yet this was the only method of effecting a union between the spiritual and temporal powers.

The pope at Savona, though under a close surveillance, concealed under the pretence of great respect, found means to communicate with the dissatisfied portion of the Catholics, and, understanding as well as they the policy suited to the time, pertinaciously refused to perform any pontifical act. He would neither institute the new bishops nominated by Napoleon, which ceased the vacancy of twenty-seven sees, nor continue to the bishops the power of distributing certain dispensations, particularly in connection with marriage. He thus interrupted, as far as lay in his power, the performance of public worship in France, which might turn either against the worship itself or against the government, according as people took part with the pope or with the Emperor. Pius VII., living in the episcopal palace of Savona, and saying mass daily, and giving his blessing to the faithful who often came from a great distance to obtain it, received the authorities politely but with sadness, and replied, when requested to discharge the most indispensable functions of the pontificate, that he was not free; in particular, that he had no council, since the cardinals were either prisoners or were collected at Paris around the imperial throne, and that in this

isolation he could perform no act that should be valid or even free from error, having near him none of the luminaries of the church.

Napoleon, informed of what the pope said and did by the well-meaning and conciliatory reports of the prefect of Montenotte, M. de Chabrol, was not behind in finesse, and said that he was himself in no hurry, and that, until the pope should adopt a reasonable course, he would continue to administer the church by certain means, provisional indeed, but sufficient for a considerable time. He had, therefore, enjoined silence on ecclesiastical affairs, and had abstained from that subject during a whole year, not only from design, but also because it was impossible that he should attend to every thing, for business constantly increased on his hands, especially since the termination of the Austrian war. He was desirous, however, of putting an end to the quarrel with the pope, wishing to extend to the church the peace which he had just given to Europe.

The pope, who, with all his piety, could not be insensible to the weight of his chains, who every day beheld the solution of many important questions, and a succession of treaties, divorces, marriages, and heard from the prefect merely counsels without hope of arrangement, though vested in most respectful terms, became at length impatient, almost enraged. "Every thing is thought of," said he, "except God! Every thing engages attention except the affairs of the church! Yet these are not without importance, even in a temporal point of view, and this will be felt if the chain of prosperity should ever be broken. They wish to drive me to extremity: well, I shall employ new arms; I shall make a new display; I shall have recourse to those means which God has put in my hands of saving his church." And, without further explaining himself, the unfortunate pontiff, passing from patience to passion, as is often the case with characters at once mild and sensitive, he gave out in threatening terms that he would provoke a schism by an appeal to conscience, and would place the imperial government in the same position of difficulty as the revolutionary governments, for schism is always closely allied to civil war. After these threats he fell back into his dejection and tranquillity, entered into long conversations with the prefect, and continually inquired how it was that General Bonaparte, whom he had so loved, whose elevation he had so greatly promoted, for whom he had braved so much opposition in coming to Paris to his coronation, could repay him with so much ingratitude, and oppress, debase, and endanger the church, after having so skillfully and courageously re-established it by the glorious act of the concordat? At the sight of such strange contradictions he appeared perfectly confounded. M. de Chabrol consoled and appeased him with the hope that all would be set right, without precisely saying on what condition, but leaving him to infer that it would be at the price of his temporal power. To this the pope gave no reply, professing to be concerned only for the interests of the spiritual power.

Such a state of matters, however, must be brought to an end by means of some arrangement. Of this Napoleon was well aware, for the provisional means employed for the government of the church independently of its head

were very insufficient, very liable to opposition, especially in their execution. Since the misunderstanding with Rome, twenty-seven sees had become vacant in the empire: now, every one knows that, if deprived of its bishop or his representative, every diocese is brought to a standstill, the clergy are without a ruler, certain acts of civil life are suspended, because with Catholics the whole course of civil life is consecrated by religion. An evil perhaps still more serious than the want of a bishop is the existence of a bishop not accepted by the faithful, because he wishes to command and is not obeyed, and the church is in revolt instead of being under rule. This was the danger actually present to the twenty-seven vacant sees, for Napoleon, who was not a man to let his prerogative lie idle, had hastened to provide them with new titulars. He had proposed to the pope to confer canonical institution on the prelates named, consenting that in the bulls of institution no mention should be made of the temporal sovereign whose acts he confirmed. Napoleon might exercise this degree of modesty without danger to his authority, but he was with reason unwilling that a form should be employed of which the pope makes use for sees, in regard to which he combines the double power of nominating and instituting the form entitled *de proprio motu*. This was precisely that employed by the pope, particularly for M. de Pradt, transferred from the see of Poitiers to that of Malines. Napoleon had rejected those bulls which implied not the omission but the negation of his authority, and had wished that the twenty-seven prelates named by himself, though not instituted, should take possession of the government of their dioceses. To furnish them with the means he had had recourse to an expedient suggested by the ancient usages of the church, and had ascribed to them the quality of vicars capitular.

When, in fact, a see becomes vacant by the death of its pastor, the chapter of the diocese elects, under the title of vicar capitular, a provisional administrator of the see, who discharges the functions of the episcopate until the installation of the new titular, but who confines himself to the functions actually indispensable, and enjoys no episcopal honours. The nominated bishops, even on previous occasions, had sometimes been elected vicars capitular, and thus entered into the immediate possession of their sees. Napoleon, not being able to obtain bulls such as he wished, had desired that the persons named by him should be invested with the rank of vicars capitular, but he had met with strong opposition from almost every quarter. The chapters had generally elected their provisional administrator before the nomination of new bishops by the Emperor. They, therefore, assigned the election that had already taken place, as a reason for not making a second; or else, with still greater boldness, they ventured to maintain that this manner of proceeding was only a circuitous way of annulling the canonical institution appertaining to the pope, and denied that the title of vicars capitular could be conferred on the nominated bishops consistently with the laws of the church.

Whether true or not, the doctrine suited their purpose, for they soon perceived that in supporting the provisional administration of the churches they deprived the pope of the surest

method of arresting the progress of Napoleon. But it was not without danger, for to arrest such a man as Napoleon was not easy, and to interrupt public worship for that purpose savoured of impiety. In vain did some enlightened priests, who remembered that Henry VIII. had been able, from disgraceful motives, to separate from the Catholic church one of the greatest nations of the world, assert that Napoleon, powerful in a manner very different from Henry VIII., and actuated by very different motives, might cause to the church still greater evils than the English monarch, especially in an age distinguished by indifference, from which more was to be feared than from hostility. But the instigators of clerical opposition, blinded by their passions, troubled themselves very little about the danger to which religion was exposed, and had made even Paris the theatre of this perilous war. The events which transpired in that important see presented the most striking picture of the state of the French church at that epoch, and of the relation of Napoleon to it.

Napoleon had nominated his uncle, Cardinal Fesch, to the vacant archbishopric of Paris. He immediately behaved himself in the heart of the clergy as the brothers of Napoleon had done in their several kingdoms, and became utterly forgetful of his debt of gratitude, and aimed only at securing his own popularity. Cardinal Fesch, as we have elsewhere said, suddenly changed from an army contractor into a devout Catholic and austere prelate, wished to render himself the idol of the clergy, as Louis was of the Dutch, Joseph of the Spaniards, Murat of the Neapolitans, and, though always submissive in the presence of his formidable nephew, never failed in his absence to frown hypocritically over the evils of the church, swore that he would rather meet martyrdom than submit to tyranny, and professed to despise a relationship of which he was himself more proud, and of which the clergy made more account, than of his very equivocal virtues. Napoleon, indignant at so much pride and ingratitude, treated him with harshness, especially when he displayed before him a newly-born theological lore, and was wont to ask whence he had acquired his information, if not in speculating on the soldier's bread. "Let me see," he would say, "the abbé Emery or M. Duvoisin: these know what they are saying, and are well worth being heard." The abbé Emery, a learned priest, full of zeal which did not exclude knowledge, having refused every diocese in order to remain superior of Saint Sulpice, was the beloved chief of an establishment which had supplied priests and prelates to almost the whole of France. He was in secret a royalist and opposed to Napoleon, who was well aware of the fact, but not much affected by it. M. Duvoisin, bishop of Nantes, was a prelate faithful to his duties, profoundly learned, and possessed of great wisdom. He thought that instead of undermining the power of the great Emperor they should rather moderate, direct, and bring it back to the church. Napoleon was willing to hear M. Emery, though he only deferred to the opinion of M. Duvoisin, but he would neither listen to the discourse of his uncle nor follow his counsels.

After having nominated Cardinal Fesch to the archbishopric of Paris, who was at the time

archbishop of Lyons, he wished his uncle to take possession of the see and govern it with full titular powers. The cardinal had resisted, first, to avoid displeasing the clergy; secondly, in order to remain at the same time archbishop of Lyons and archbishop of Paris; that is to say, possessed of the two greatest sees of the empire. This kind of plurality was not without precedent, but the pope, when consulted, refused his assent to what he considered an abuse borrowed from antiquity at a very unseasonable time, and had required the cardinal to choose between Lyons and Paris, but he declined to institute him any more than the other new titulars.

The cardinal, set upon retaining the see of Lyons, of which he was titular both by nomination and institution, continued to call himself Cardinal Archbishop of Lyons, but merely administrator of the diocese of Paris. More distinctly to indicate the position he had taken, he refused to occupy the archiepiscopal palace of Paris, and lived in a hotel of his own in the Rue de Mont Blanc. So long as Napoleon neglected the affairs of the church, he had tolerated this equivocal conduct. But having now determined to occupy himself seriously with ecclesiastical matters, and having by chance gone to Notre Dame to make some casual visitation of the place, he had not there met Cardinal Fesch. Struck with the inconsistency of the position assumed by his uncle, he had declared that, whenever he honoured the clergy of the metropolis with a visit, he wished to meet the archbishop of Paris at the foot of the towers of Notre Dame. After this apostrophe, transmitted by the minister of public worship, he required him to make an immediate selection between the two sees. Being obliged to determine, the cardinal deemed it more safe and more consistent with his ordinary policy to pronounce in favour of the orthodox clergy, and had chosen Lyons, the see to which he had been canonically appointed. A cry was immediately raised in every vestry of France in favour of a prelate so disinterested, so faithful to the church, and so self-sacrificing in her behalf, and his courage and self-denial were everywhere extolled. Napoleon had replied by a remarkable choice, calculated to excite the jealousy of his uncle to the highest degree, by nominating Cardinal Maury archbishop of Paris.

This illustrious defender of the church, who in the constituent assembly had displayed so much eloquence, wit, and courage, and by his sallies and his sang-froid had defended the clergy as a gentleman educated in the school of Voltaire might have defended the aristocracy, had then retired to Rome and lived fifteen years in exile, consoled by literature, had at length accepted with eagerness the opportunity of returning to his country, and because he had shown himself grateful to Napoleon, to whom he owed his return, he had lost in one day the fruit of the most glorious struggle, and from being the idol of the clergy and the royalists had become the object of their disdain, almost of their hatred. He had some defects which frequently attend talent and even piety: he loved society and conviviality,—faults which he had not corrected in Italy, which furnished the hypocritical mediocrities of the church with pretexts for detraction. On this account, notwithstanding his talent and reputation, his influence over the

clergy was not great. Cardinal Fesch, in particular, indulged the highest degree of jealousy against him; and Napoleon, who had been well pleased to vex his uncle in a twofold manner, both by the nomination and the selection of the person nominated, was scarcely an equal match to him, for all the talents of Cardinal Maury were unable to contend against the hypocrisy, pedantry, ingratitude, and even family connections, of Cardinal Fesch.

Scarcely had this nomination been signed when Napoleon required that Cardinal Maury should be invested with the administration of the diocese, which the chapter would not have dared to refuse, but which had become the occasion of continual trickery truly degrading to the cardinal, his clergy, and the imperial authority. They were willing that Cardinal Maury should administer the diocese and preside at ordinary ceremonies; but if, in certain solemnities, he caused the cross to be carried before him according to the privilege of his dignity, part of the chapter fled from the altar, leaving the inferior clergy and the laity in a state of amazement. In the evening there was great rejoicing in devout and royalist circles over the checks experienced by the ancient defender of the church, now the object of imperial favour.

Cardinal Maury had written to the pope to appeal to his former friendship, and to obtain from it, in defect of bulls, the entry into the provisional possession of the diocese of Paris. The reply was expected with very little hope of its being favourable.

We have seen what various difficulties were occasioned by this provisional administration of dioceses, but they caused little uneasiness to Napoleon, believing that he should soon come to some arrangement with the pope. In order to overcome him by resolutions already passed, which nobody could expect to repeal, he hastened to convert into an organic statute the union of the Roman states. He had already decreed the union of the duchies of Parma and Placentia under the title of the department of the Taro, and that of Tuscany under the titles of the departments of the Arno, the Ombrone, and the Mediterranean. He now united the Roman province under the titles of the departments of Thrasymene and the Tiber. In the senatus consult, one of the most remarkable of the time, he declared Rome to be the second city of the empire, he decreed that the heir of the throne (whose birth was announced as if he could penetrate the secrets of nature) should hold the title of King of Rome, and should be crowned successively at Notre Dame and at St. Peter's. He further decided that a prince of the blood should always hold a court at Rome, that the popes should reside near the Emperors, alternately at Rome and Paris, should enjoy a rich revenue, should take the oath to the empire, and should have around them the tribunals of the Penitentiary, the Datary, the Sacred College,—in one word, all the establishments of the Roman chancery, which were to be transported to Paris, and become supported at the imperial expense. In consequence of these decisions, Napoleon immediately ordered works to be begun at the palace of the archbishop of Paris, at the Pantheon, at St. Denis, there to receive the pontifical government and the pontiff himself. He likewise projected works at Avignon, in order

that the pope, though habitually residing at Paris near himself, might nevertheless also appear in the different ancient residences of the popes.

Such proposals appear like a dream now, and yet even the church at that time did not consider them impossible. Napoleon thought that after a few days of wonder men would become accustomed to the new state of things; that the pope would be more tractable when residing near himself; that the cardinal, by living in France, would imbibe the French spirit; and, finally, that before this prodigious spectacle, which so strikingly recalled the ancient Empire of the West, his astonished contemporaries would give utterance to the envied title of Emperor of the West,—a title to which Napoleon had sacrificed every thing, even his own empire.

In the persuasion that he so complacently indulged, he had but one care, which was to lose no time, in order that the arrangement with the pope, which he considered near, should embrace all that could affect the government of the church. He occupied himself with the immediate regulation of the ecclesiastical establishment, which it would be necessary to leave at Rome, with displacing the old and reconstituting the new, so that the pope, finding, on opening the conferences, that every thing was already settled, should be obliged to accept, as irrevocably fixed, the changes to which he might be most opposed.

There were, in the Roman provinces, thirty dioceses for a population of 80,000 inhabitants, many of which, under the title of suburban sees, furnished titles and endowments to the principal members of the Sacred College. There was besides a vast number of richly-endowed convents and livings which absorbed the revenues of considerable estates. Napoleon without hesitation abolished all the sees of the Roman State except three, each of which had a revenue of 80,000 francs, suppressed the convents for men and women, allowing life-annuities to the members of the suppressed orders, exacted an oath of all parish ministers under pain of exile to Corsica, and ordered a new arrangement of parishes, less divided and more economical. At the same time he ordered the suppression of the religious orders in Tuscany, Parma, and Placentia, leaving only some convents for women and some orders dedicated to works of charity, sequestrated all the ecclesiastical estates, amounting in Rome to 250 millions, devoting 100 to the Roman debt, hospitals, the new sees, and the retained parishes, and the remaining 150 to the profit of the domain of the state, to which he declared them united.

These decrees, which had been passed with incredible promptitude, were immediately forwarded to Rome, to be put into instant execution. Three columns of infantry were directed from Ancona, Boulogne, and Perosa, to Rome, to reinforce General Miollis with 9000 or 10,000 men, in case he should require their aid against a population greatly under the influence of the monks. This general received the order, on starting, not to spare the Romans any more than the Spaniards. "Owing to the peace," wrote Napoleon, "I have time and troops at my disposal, and I must employ them to terminate all affairs still unsettled. Besides, in two months I shall be in treaty with the pope, and it will be

necessary either that he should resist, which is impossible, or that he should come to an arrangement, which will force him to accept as already determined the changes which I have introduced into the state of the church."

His design was to send to Savona some cardinals and bishops, to convince the pope that it was time to come to an understanding, for the most sacred interests were suffering by these long dissensions; to assure him that the doctrines of religion were in no degree affected, that the temporal estate of the pope alone was concerned, and that a pope truly attached to the faith could not compromise its interests for those purely temporal; that France, and indeed all Europe, clearly understood the point at issue; that no one could fail to recognise in Napoleon the man raised by Providence first to elevate and then to protect the church daily, and to extend its influence either by the creation of new parishes or by the establishment of the religious element in education; that in his contest with the pope was to be seen not a religious but a political controversy; that Napoleon, in his desire to settle the condition of Italy, had found an adversary in the pope, as all preceding emperors had done; and that in a far-seeing policy he had been desirous of extricating himself, not from the pontiff, but from the temporal sovereign, in the person of Pius VII.; that apparently it was not in France that his ambition would be rebuked, for even there, where this might be expected, the pope would be blamed for sacrificing the faith to his own sovereignty; that the pope would, therefore, act more wisely, before Napoleon should be induced to play the part of Henry VIII., by consenting to be the chief of the church on the same conditions that his predecessors had been so under the Emperors of the West; by sacrificing his temporal power, henceforward lost, to his spiritual power, which was not even threatened; and then by exposing himself, by a foolish obstinacy, to the loss of at least two-thirds of the European territory of the Roman communion.

Such were the reasons which Napoleon wished to be addressed to the Holy Father, and they appeared the more plausible because the greater part of the European clergy, influenced, as all other men, by considerations of the present, often irresistible, regarded them as tenable and even conclusive. Napoleon chose the cardinals Spina and Caselli, who were supposed to be agreeable to the pope, to visit him, and, if they found him disposed to listen to them, to make a first overture. If, on the contrary, he appeared to be inaccessible, Napoleon thought of another expedient, very common in the ancient Empire of the West, which was to convoke a council, and then to collect the Christian church, nearly the whole of which he had under his authority or influence, and which he flattered himself he could direct at his pleasure. He would thus give peace to the church, as he had already given it to Europe, tracing its conditions with the point of his sword.

Such, at this time, were the efforts of Napoleon to impart greater activity to the war in Spain and the continental blockade; to obtain by both these measures a maritime peace, so eagerly desired as the complement of the continental peace; to appease religious quarrels; to perfect the organization of his vast empire; and, finally,

to occupy the throne of the west in peace, the acknowledged representative of Charlemagne.

In the midst of these various labours, his brother Louis arrived at Paris, and the grave question of Holland, which was soon to be the turning-point of peace in Europe, began to be agitated. King Louis arrived in France in a state of mind not likely to be benefited by what there presented itself. That singular prince, endowed with a distinguished intelligence, but rather active than accurate; loving the right, but forming a false idea of its nature; liberal in theory; despotic in disposition; brave, but in no degree military; simple, but at the same time eager to reign; deficient in self-confidence, but full of the most sensitive self-esteem; possessing the natural ardour of the Bonapartes, and employing it to torment himself incessantly; believing himself destined to misfortune; fancying that his whole family had conspired against him; confirmed in these melancholy ideas by a miserable state of health; and, finally, called to govern a country which, by its climate and its actual condition, was little calculated to improve him, must, sooner or later, lead to an outbreak, and give rise to the most fatal resolutions. Besides which, the country over which he reigned was in as sad a condition as himself. But the misfortunes of Holland were of an earlier date than the French revolution, the empire, or the continental blockade.

The Dutch, placed at the confines of sea and land, on a sandy shore, from which they had repelled the waters with admirable art, and on which they had been able to raise rich pasturage, had become, in turns, fishermen, agriculturists, graziers, and merchants. By salting the fish which they caught on their coasts, and the produce of their cattle, and by offering these valuable articles of food in all countries by means of their vessels, they had come into relation with the most different countries, and had made themselves the agents of all nations, transferring the products of one to another: from the north bringing wood and iron, corn and hemp, for the south, in exchange for wine and oil, silk and cloth, and extending their navigation to every sea, enriching India with the industry of Europe and Europe with the spices of India. They had thus become the first navigators, and, at the same time, the most skilful and wealthy merchants, in the world. Brave, and able to defend their prosperity by sea and land; republicans, free, independent, eloquent, and yet able to restrain their passions; loving the arts, and exercising them with characteristic originality, they had presented every spectacle of war, of liberty and civilization, and, after having shaken off the yoke of Spain, restrained the domination of France over Europe, struggled with Louis XIV. with alternate success, and finally, had given kings to England from those whom they only recognised in their own country as stadtholders.

But every thing is transient,—youth, glory, fortune, power,—with nations as with individuals. The salted fish and the cheese, which were the foundation of their commercial prosperity, could not render it permanent. The carrying trade was the most important part of their business, and Cromwell, who perceived this, had inflicted on them a mortal wound by introducing into the world, by his navigation act, the principle of bringing into foreign coun-

tries only the produce of our own. This principle was soon universally admitted, and the Dutch, whose cargoes were commonly foreign, beheld their commerce rapidly decline. While England was thus shut against them, the high duties in their own ports diverted the commerce of Germany to the cities of Bremen and Hamburg, less exacting and very favourably situated on the Weser and the Elbe. Finally, the wars of the 18th century being carried on between Frederick the Great and his powerful neighbours, without the participation of Holland, her importance had been much diminished, and she had seen the decline of her political as well as of her commercial power.

But, though every thing be transient, changes are not instantaneous. There remained to the Dutch, as to those rich men whose diminished fortunes still leave them opulent, abundant sources of prosperity. They retained numerous colonies, a great trade in colonial produce, and immense capitals, the fruit of economy. They carried on, for instance, a very particular commerce in sugar and coffee. Whoever had any to dispose of, and could not find an immediate sale, was sure to do so in the vast markets of Rotterdam and Amsterdam, where they paid in ready money, and could wait the turn of the market in order to sell with advantage. The Dutch had thus become the greatest speculators in colonial produce in the world. They had also set themselves to manufacture the materials of which they had in hand so great abundance, and they had acquired great skill in refining sugar and preparing tobacco. And, finally, from their gradually-accumulated superfluous capital, they undertook loans to all governments, and these loans became at last their principal source of gain.

By these different methods they had succeeded in maintaining themselves in great opulence until the period of the French revolution, which found them divided between the high burghers, who were devoted to the stadtholder and the English, whose manners they adopted, full of prejudice against France, which dated from the time of Louis XIV., and the lesser burghers, who detested stadtholders, had very little liking for the English, and inclined to the French, especially since they had escaped in 1789 from the double yoke of royalty and the church.

But the favour which the French enjoyed with the Dutch democracy had been of short duration, and had wholly vanished when they saw them pass so quickly from a sanguinary liberty to a military despotism, and especially when Holland became subject to them. All the various branches of industry of the country had almost fallen simultaneously. Navigation was nearly interdicted by the maritime war. The immense stores of Amsterdam and Rotterdam could be supplied only from the English, with whom no communication was possible except the contraband, and, therefore, the speculations in colonial produce and sugar-refining were struck down by the same blow. The traffic in tobacco had suffered equally by the establishment of the French regulation which claimed a monopoly in the manufacture and sale of that article. The fisheries, already ruined by the English, had been deficient in salt since it had been required to pay navigation dues on that article at London. And if, notwithstanding so many impedi-

ments, some vessels, really or professedly neutral, brought into Holland the produce of the Dutch colonies, they were arrested by French privateers at the entry of the Scheldt, the Meuse, and the Zuyder-Zee, who deprived the impoverished inhabitants of Amsterdam or Rotterdam of any profit on the discharging, transport, and manufacture of the scanty merchandise which had escaped the British blockade. Finally, the traffic in loans had also suffered from the universal distress. Spain had become bankrupt; Austria with difficulty paid the interest of her debts; England met hers with a depreciated paper currency; Prussia paid with difficulty; Russia with exactness, but not without loss to her creditors. There was not one Dutchman who did not lose 50 per cent. on his capital lent to foreign governments. The finances of the state, not less involved than those of private individuals, and involved in the service of France, showed 110 millions of revenue for 155 millions of expenditure, of which the debt alone amounted to 80 millions. In order to raise this sum of 110 millions, insufficient as it was, it had been necessary to have recourse to the most oppressive and vexatious taxes. The works in the docks were, therefore, abandoned; the workmen and the sailors had fled to England; the naval officers were in indigence. In such circumstances it is easy to understand the sudden resuscitation of those animosities which, since the time of Louis XIV., represented the French as fickle and inconsistent politicians, intolerant Catholics, unsuccessful seamen, whose alliance could lead to nothing but defeat,—troublesome neighbours, as encroaching by land as the English were by sea, and worthy of no greater confidence than they.

As soon as he had arrived in Holland, King Louis had acted as all the brothers of Napoleon who had been raised to the throne had done; he wished to reign for himself and his people, not for France and Napoleon: his aim was to supply the smallest possible number of soldiers and vessels, and especially to be subjected to as few commercial restrictions as possible. This was natural; and it was not without reason that Napoleon was addressed by Murat at Naples, Jerome at Cassel, Joseph at Madrid, and Louis at Amsterdam, in such terms as the following: "In making us kings, you surely intended us to do you honour, to render our several nations happy, and to found durable dynasties; for otherwise you would find yourself engaged in ruinous and interminable wars in our support." "Undoubtedly," said Napoleon in letters the import of which we here retain without their bitterness, "I made you kings in order that you might reign for the interest of your people, but also that you should take a correct view of those interests, and that, being raised to your high station by the blood of my soldiers, and not by your own services, you should be the faithful allies of France,—not her enemies. Every thing by France and for France," he constantly repeated to them. "You have all the highest interest in overcoming the English domination, for unless France obtain the advantage over England in this decisive struggle, you will all suffer loss; Murat will lose Sicily, Joseph America, and Louis the Indies. Besides the privilege of navigation, you will lose the honour of your flag. You must, therefore,

look upon the interests of your people in the light of my policy, and make them do the same; you must secure your own popularity, not by yielding to their weakness, but by your economy, your sobriety, your attention to business, your courage in war,—in short, by your virtues, and also by your study of the French party, which in every country is that of the democracy, and which is important everywhere to be secured. But, eager to surround yourselves with the great lords who hate France, the Bonapartes, and myself in particular, you have alienated the party which alone can love us, and which, thanks to your awkwardness, now hates us as much as the rest; so that not one of you could stand for a day or hour if I should lose a battle."

Napoleon would have been unquestionably right if he had only required of the allied nations subjected to his brothers moderate sacrifices, proportioned to their power and manifestly designed to promote the interest of the common policy; but when, from a desire of universal dominion, he condemned them to an interminable war, to the indefinite loss of all commerce, to a conscription by sea and land to which they were wholly unaccustomed, and which they would have borne with great difficulty, even in their own cause, and to ruinous expenses, he demanded what was impossible; and though he had reason on his side in opposing the weakness of his brothers, he gave them good ground of objection to his system of policy. It is at all times and in all places a matter of difficulty to secure from allies the efforts necessary for the common cause; but to injure that cause by an unbridled ambition, to impose unlimited sacrifices, to require foreign kingdoms, seldom cordial, even though not decidedly unfriendly, to enforce these sacrifices, is to aggravate beyond measure the ordinary difficulty of alliances, to convert the most natural national friendships into violent animosity, and, in fine, to insure the most distressing misunderstandings, of which a melancholy prelude was seen in the quarrels of Napoleon and his brother Louis with respect to Holland.

The complaints of Napoleon against his brother were the following: That Holland was of no advantage to him either in the maritime war or the repression of the contraband trade; that she rendered him much less service under the reign of his brother than under the republic and the grand-pensioner Schimmelpenninck: since at the latter epoch she maintained at Bologne a flotilla of 50 gun-sloops and 150 gun-boats; a squadron of the line at the Texel; an army on her coasts; while at the present time she had no fleet at the Texel, scarcely 70 gun-boats in the Eastern Scheldt, and at most a few thousand soldiers, quite insufficient to guard her own seaboard; that she kept open, as if in time of peace, a vast port for English commerce; that the Americans were received, contrary to his orders, under the false pretence of neutrality; that there prevailed in all classes a spirit hostile to France as little disguised as at London itself; that this spirit had been imprudently developed by favouring the aristocratic party and alienating the liberal party from him by re-establishing the old noblesse, and adding a new creation by charging the treasury with burdensome expenses for the formation of a royal guard wholly

aseless in Holland, and of marshals equally useless, and for the institution of unearned pensions in a country where not an individual had gained a victory.

In virtue of these grievances, Napoleon made no secret of his inclination to unite Holland to the empire unless he received ample satisfaction, which, he said, required them to maintain, besides a considerable flotilla in the two Scheldts, a squadron of the line at the Texel and 25,000 land forces on shore; to suppress the royal guard, the marshals, the pensions to the nobles; and, in addition to these retrenchments, to effect one which he regarded as indispensable, viz.: the reduction of the debt to the third of the existing capital; for this debt, being 80 millions in a budget of 150 millions, all public service was impossible. But this was not all: he demanded, further, that they should admit a system of energetic repression of contraband; that to secure the action of the French privateers they should defer to his own tribunal the judgment of the prizes that might be taken; and, finally, that they should give up to him, to be disposed of for his profit, all the American vessels that should enter the ports of Holland. Without clearly explaining himself, Napoleon added, that the recent expedition of the English to the isle of Walcheren disclosed certain defects in the definition of the frontiers of France and Holland which would call for some correction toward the two Scheldts, and perhaps even toward the Rhine itself.

To the complaints of his brother King Louis replied satisfactorily in some points, partially in others. He maintained that his flotilla was not less than at the time to which Napoleon referred; that the greater part of that flotilla was guarding the Eastern Scheldt, which it was necessary to observe, unless they were willing that the French troops stationed on the Western Scheldt should be outflanked, and that the rest occupied the numerous gulfs of Holland. He gave no satisfactory reply relative to the disarming of the fleet of the Texel. As to the army of the line, he professed to have more than the required number of 25,000 men; for, besides 8000 sent into Spain, several thousands in different strongholds, and several other thousands affected with the fever of Walcheren, there remained about 15,000 employed to guard the immense seaboard extending from the mouths of the Scheldt to those of the Ems. He assigned no specious reason for the expense of a royal guard, the nomination of marshals, and some other similar creations. As to the restoration of the old noblesse and the creation of some new titles, he replied that all the old aristocracy had attached themselves to his government, and he was, therefore, bound to reward them by restoring their titles; that he had contrived the new in order to please certain adherents personally devoted to him; that the pensions which had been granted occasioned a very inconsiderable loss of the public property; that if he had alienated the French party (so called) and attached to himself the professedly English party, this was simply because he had endeavoured to rally round him all the most considerable influences of the country.

He might have added that he had acted in no way different from his brothers at Cassel, Naples, and Madrid, and his uncle, Cardinal

Fesch, among the clergy, or even Napoleon himself in France. But from these disputes it was very evident that Napoleon by no means was disposed to allow his brothers the same latitude which he allowed himself, because in fact his line of conduct was more skilful, more elevated, and more characteristic, than theirs, and because, as he styled himself the lion, he wished to assume the lion's share and office.

It mattered little with which of the two brothers the truth might be found: the question was, whether the formally-expressed wishes of the strongest should be obeyed. King Louis made up his mind to grant, or at least to promise, besides the maintenance of the flotilla, the equipment of a squadron of the line at the Texel, the rigorous suppression of the contraband, the exclusion of the Americans from the Dutch ports, the return of the Batavian democrats to his favour, provided he should be able to execute these engagements. But, to reduce the debt to a third; to retract the decrees already passed concerning the old noblesse; to withdraw the titles that had been conferred; to revoke the nomination of the marshals; to abandon the rights of the Dutch sovereignty so far as to refer the adjudication of prizes to Paris; in fine, to give up to sequestration the Americans who had entered his ports under the sanction of his authority, seemed to him a series of humiliations worse than death: and he was right. However, Napoleon urged his demands with the most violent menaces, and the unfortunate King of Holland, already inclined to melancholy, became gradually so excited as to see in his brother only a tyrant, in all his connections only selfish relations kneeling before the head of the family, and in his wife only a faithless spouse, the accomplice of all the evils which he was forced to undergo. The praises of the Dutch, who knew his resistance, excited him still further, and he revolved the most extravagant projects in his feverish mind. At times he thought of raising the standard of rebellion against his own brother,\* of immersing Holland under water by breaking down the dykes, and of throwing himself into the arms of England, without whose assistance all opposition to Napoleon was manifestly impossible. He had even, on quitting his kingdom, secretly agreed with the minister of war, M. de Krakenhoff, to prepare the means of resisting France if they drove him to extremities at Paris; and he had ordered the commandants of the frontier fortresses of Brabant, such as Bois-le-duc, Breda, Bergen-op-Zoom, to refuse admission to the French troops if they offered to occupy them.

On arriving at Paris, King Louis had refused to reside with the queen, his wife, at the Tuilleries, or, in short, with any member of his family, and wished to alight simply at the hotel of the Dutch legation. But when it was shown to him that this would greatly augment the irritation of Napoleon, he consented to receive the hospitality of his mother, who occupied a large hotel in the faubourg St. Germain. Immediately on arrival, his first act was to demand a separation from his wife and to call a family council to decide upon it. He was brought to reason in this matter, and it was agreed that they should

\* He states this himself in vol. III. pp. 156, 157, of his Historical documents on the government of Holland.

live separately but avoid the disagreeable publicity of a formal separation. These family questions having been settled, they proceeded to the serious affairs of Holland.

The family of King Louis, his mother, and, still more, his sisters, anxious to allay his gloomy suspicion and to reconcile him to Napoleon, were careful to prevent the difficult question which had brought him to Paris from being discussed directly between the two brothers. Louis was melancholy, agitated, obstinate: Napoleon was energetic, naturally imperious, and had become so absolute from the habit of command that no one dared offer him any further resistance. A violent outbreak was to be feared if they should be brought together. Matters were, therefore, so arranged that Napoleon should see his brother in the family circle, should speak very little with him on business, and that every thing should be transacted between M. Roell, an enlightened man, a good patriot, though an Orangist, and the Duke de Cadore, (M. de Champagny,) minister of foreign affairs in France, a man as gentle as he was wise.

A person of some consequence, whose career was likely to be interrupted by these events, and whose talents were continually compromised by the foolish ambition of meddling with every thing,—viz.: M. Fouché, minister of police,—finding an opportunity of mixing himself up with the family feuds of the Emperor and the more serious affairs of state, frequented diligently the residence of the Empress-mother, in order to meet King Louis and become his channel of communication with Napoleon. But he had little prospect of being accepted in that capacity, for Louis, suspicious of men the most worthy of confidence, inclined little to repose in M. Fouché, and Napoleon, though above the indulgence of suspicion, gave little encouragement to the officious activity of a minister who was every moment found to interfere in matters not belonging to him. However, King Louis, from the want of support, and Napoleon, from a species of negligence which almost as often sprung from contempt as from respect, at length accepted this pertinacious candidate for their negotiations. He, therefore, along with M. de Champagny, became the daily medium of that tedious negotiation, carried on sometimes viva voce, sometimes by letter, though all the parties concerned were in Paris.\*

Napoleon was, as usual, very plain in the expression of his will, and instantly exhibited the determination to exact from Holland three things in particular, viz.: the energetic repression of the contraband, serious co-operation in the maritime war, and the reduction of the debt. He added that which could not fail to excite alarm, that he was fully convinced that he should never obtain from his brother these three requirements, nor others of great importance; that his brother would never embroil himself with the Dutch commerce, the only way of checking the contraband, nor with the capitalists, the only way of reducing the debt and meeting the expenses of the fleet; that he would promise every thing, and when returned to Holland would renew his

former course; that these troublesome explanations must then be recommenced, sure, sooner or later, to issue in the same result; that, it would be much better to stop matters at once, and unite Holland to France; that, since his brother was always speaking of the irksomeness of power and the charms of retirement, it would be better to gratify his tastes, and choose a retreat which the Emperor of France was now able to make honourable, wealthy, and pleasant; that he might be quite easy as to the state of Holland, which Napoleon undertook to revive by his administration, to draw forth in full panoply from her present difficulties, to endow with a new existence by her union with France, to whom he promised to assign a part glorious in war, immensely prosperous in peace; that for all these reasons it would be much better to treat immediately of the union itself,—the only solution at once simple, serious, and not exposed to the recurrence of difficulties.

The firm and calm expression of these determinations, when transmitted to King Louis, threw him into perfect consternation. Though he continually repeated that he was weary of the throne, and that his only wish was to quit it with honour, he had a strong desire to retain it. To this he was led not only by a very natural ambition of reigning, but by a feeling of self-respect, also very natural, which made him shrink from relinquishing it as a superseded prefect whose incompetence or infidelity had been clearly proved. Always regarding himself as a sacrificed man, as the only unfortunate member of the most fortunate family in the world, he beheld, in this design of dethroning him, a frightful completion of his destiny, and, especially, a withering condemnation by his own brother, a judge whom the world would always esteem equally just and well-informed. This humiliation was insupportable to him, and there was no extremity which did not appear preferable to it.

Thus, in the first moment, regretting that he had come to Paris to be entangled in a trap, he wished immediately to return to Holland, and there to declare war against his brother, and to summon the English to his aid. But he believed himself to be closely watched,—much more so than he really was,—and despaired of ever reaching the frontiers of the empire without falling into the hands of an irritated brother, who would learn his designs of resistance from the mere circumstance of his flight. He therefore reverted to other ideas, as it were throwing himself at the feet of Napoleon, and declared himself ready to do whatever he required, to yield all the contested points, provided he might retain his throne, promising every kind of satisfaction if his brother would give him another trial.

Napoleon replied that Louis would not keep his word; that, after having made the best and sincerest promises, as soon as he should return to Amsterdam he would fall into the hands of smugglers and Dutch capitalists, and would not have energy to fulfil any of his engagements. But moved by the sight of his brother's distress, and the prayers of his mother and sisters, all of whom interceded for Louis, and doing justice to his honesty, notwithstanding some faults which he could not fail to observe, Napoleon relaxed in some degree from his absolute views, and

\* These letters are numerous, particularly those of Napoleon and Louis, and it is upon their incontestable evidence that I found this rectal.



professed himself willing to send him back to Amsterdam, there to enjoy the kingdom for a while, on certain conditions which restored all the power to his own hands and left to Louis a royalty little more than nominal, at least during the war.

A certain degree of reconciliation resulted from these last explanations; the intercourse between the brothers became somewhat less indirect, and they met. Napoleon received Louis at the Tuilleries, explained to him his views, and repeated to him that his first wish, because his most urgent necessity, was to secure peace with England; without which he had effected nothing, his own establishment and that of his family remained in suspense, and the greatness of France disputed; that to gain this object no ally was more useful or necessary than Holland; that he daily reproached himself with having that country at his disposal without knowing how to make use of it; that, not wishing to deserve this reproach any longer, he had resolved to draw from it all the resources which it contained, either by his brother's hands or his own; that this motive alone sometimes led him to think of the annexation of Holland to France, but that he had not the slightest ambition of augmenting an empire already too vast. Developing this subject with his usual vigour of mind, and even with sincerity, for at the time he was more set upon conquering England than upon aggrandizement, he said, in one of his conversations with Louis, "See! I attach so much importance to the maritime peace and so little to Holland, that, if the English will open a negotiation and treat seriously with me, I will no longer think of either annexing your kingdom nor of imposing on you any restraints, the painfulness of which I acknowledge; I will leave Holland tranquil, independent, and entire;" adding, as if carried away by his subject, "The English are the cause of my perpetual self-aggrandizement; they are the cause of my uniting Naples, Spain, and Portugal, to my empire. I have been obliged to struggle and to extend my limits in order to increase my resources. If they continue, they will oblige me to take in Holland, then the Hanse towns themselves, then Pomerania, and perhaps even Dantzic. Of this they ought to be well aware, and of this you must take care to convince them. It is in your power to do so, for at Amsterdam are merchants associated with English houses; well! make use of them to teach the English with what they are threatened; let them know that the question at issue involves the annexation of Holland, which would be a great loss to England; and add, that if they are willing to open a negotiation and to make peace, they will save your independence and avoid a great danger." Thereupon Napoleon wished upon the spot to open a negotiation with England based upon the threatened annexation of Holland. The continent was pacified, the Dutch should say: Napoleon has just assumed his place among legitimate sovereigns by marrying an archduchess of Austria; he had covered with his troops all the coasts of the north; he was about to reform the camp at Boulogne, to bring into Spain an overwhelming force, probably to drive the English to the sea, to render the continental blockade absolutely impenetrable, perhaps to conquer Sicily, and by a natural conse-

quence of his plan to occupy Holland, to unite it to the French empire, in order more entirely to make himself master of its resources. Warned of these dangers by the frank declaration he had made of them, the Dutch had demanded some days to go to London, to open communications with the British cabinet, and to entreat that government to terminate a struggle which was desolating the world, and by means of peace to set limits to a power which gained strength in proportion to the means used to restrain it. After having conceived the idea of this discourse, Napoleon formed the design of immediately sending back M. Roell to Amsterdam, there to convoke the ministers, to combine with them some members of the Dutch legislative corps, to cause them to deliberate on the state of affairs, and then to forward in their name a confidential person to London to intimate what was going on to the British government, to entreat them to avert from Europe the misfortune of seeing Holland united to France.

Louis, dazzled by the project of his brother, wished it to be put in execution without loss of time. It was not possible to conceal these details from the Duke of Otranto, who, by his pertinacious interference, had made himself the confidant of the whole Dutch question, and it was therefore necessary to communicate them to him. The spirit of the minister immediately took fire like that of Napoleon himself, and he thought to contribute his share to the peace by working on his own account, and even urging on Napoleon, if necessary. Proud of having taken the initiative in arming the national guards on occasion of the Walcheren expedition, flattered by the reports then circulated, which represented him as a bold genius, whose personal influence was maintained even by the side of Napoleon, he thought that he should greatly add to his importance if he could gain part of the credit of securing a general peace, the object of the devout wishes of the whole world.

For some time past M. Fouché had constituted himself the protector of M. Ouvrard, had permitted him to leave Vincennes to arrange his affairs, and had the weakness to listen to him on all subjects. Nor did he listen only to M. Ouvrard, but also to certain other royalist writers, who addressed proposals\* to him, offering to devote themselves to the great man destined by Providence to change the aspect of the world. They said that it would be right to take advantage of the opportunity afforded by the marriage with Marie Louisa to conclude a peace which should embrace sea and land, the old world and the new; which, leaving the Napoleon dynasty on the thrones already occupied by that family, should yet take the part of the Bourbon family, both the branch which had reigned in Spain and also that which had reigned in France; should thus pacify all nations, dynasties, and parties, and should permit the skillful inventors of this combination to attach themselves to that restorative power which should have given satisfaction to all interests, even those of the Bourbons.

To effect these marvels it was necessary to divide the Peninsula, to leave the greater part

\* I have seen the manuscript of these proposals in the secret archives of the Secretary of State.

of it to Joseph, to restore the rest to Ferdinand VII., whom they should unite in marriage with a princess of the Bonaparte family; it was further necessary to consent to the separation already accomplished of the Spanish colonies, to grant them at once the independence which they were sure to conquer for themselves if refused, but to grant it under a monarchical form by giving them for a king—though the proposal seems incredible—Louis XVIII., at that time legitimate heir of the crown of France in the eyes of the royalists, and happy, they doubted not, to leave his retreat in order to ascend the throne of the New World.

Such were the speculations of the unemployed financiers and pamphleteers who gained the ear of M. Fouché,—puerilities not worthy of mention, had they not been attended with serious consequences.

Full of these thoughts, and anxious to contribute to the peace, M. Fouché had already sent a secret agent to London to sound the British government, without saying any thing to Napoleon of his having done so. As soon as he heard of the new project he hastened to take part in it, and sought to be made the medium of the secret negotiations that were about to commence. M. de Labouchère, the respectable head of the principal banking-house in Holland, partner and son-in-law of Mr. Baring, who was the head of the principal banking-house in England, was then at Paris on financial business. M. Ouvrard, who had sold him some piastres at the time of his great speculations with Spain, and had availed himself of his intervention to realize some millions in America, had put him into communication with the Duke of Otranto, who had received him with all the respect due to a wealthy, skilful, and honourable banker. Scarcely had they spoken of the negotiation with England when M. Fouché thought of M. de Labouchère, and proposed him as the agent. The selection was considered excellent, for they required an agent who, being without office, should not attract attention, and who, nevertheless, should have sufficient weight to secure attention.

They therefore despatched M. Roell and M. de Labouchère for Amsterdam, and in the meanwhile suspended all resolutions respecting Holland. Louis would gladly have taken the opportunity to return to his kingdom; but Napoleon, who was unwilling that he should leave while the affairs of Holland remained unsettled, retained him at Paris, and obliged him there to await the first replies from M. de Labouchère.

There had been some difficulty in determining the forms to be adopted in this negotiation, the authority in whose name they should present themselves in London, and the extent to which they should carry the overtures of peace. On mature reflection, it appeared scarcely possible to unite the Dutch ministers and the members of the legislative body without making public the whole affair, and very unsuitable to present the principal members of the Dutch government speaking of the annihilation of their country as an inevitable and almost natural measure unless speedily prevented by sacrifices on the part of England. It was therefore thought expedient to send M. de Labouchère, not in the name of King Louis, who could hardly enter into direct relation with England, but in the name of two

or three of the principal ministers, such as MM. Roell, Vander Heim, Mollerus, who professed themselves instructed by their king in all the secrets of the French cabinet. Such a man as M. de Labouchère could not fail to secure attention when he came from them to declare that the marriage of Napoleon had so far changed his position that peace might be obtained from him if sincerely desired, and thus a check might be put to fresh invasions, unfortunate for Europe generally, and much to be regretted by England herself. M. de Labouchère was authorized to declare, without making any express stipulation, that if England were ready to make some sacrifices, France, on her side, would make others, which should be of a nature calculated to satisfy the dignity and interest of each country.

Every thing having been definitely arranged, M. de Labouchère embarked secretly at Brielle, using those means which the English and Dutch employed for intercommunication, arrived shortly at Yarmouth, and thence immediately proceeded to London. We have already said that he was the partner and the son-in-law of Mr. Baring, the most influential member of the East India Company, was closely connected with the Marquis of Wellesley, formerly Governor-General of India, and brother of Sir Arthur Wellesley, commander of the English armies in Spain. He had, therefore, merely to show himself in order to be received, listened to, and believed. The actual success of his mission depended on the nature of the offers which he should be entitled to make and the situation in which he should find the British cabinet—a situation at the time beset with difficulties.

After the retirement of Lords Grenville and Grey, who had continued the alliance effected between Fox and Pitt,—a retirement occasioned by the Catholic question,—they had been succeeded by those who adhered to, or rather exaggerated, the policy of Mr. Pitt, under the old Duke of Portland; and, though they held their ground, they had encountered several checks. First, Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Canning,—the former firm, practical, skilful, but not eloquent; the latter, on the contrary, as far excelling in oratorical powers as the former in the execution of business,—from feelings of jealousy and affront, had resigned their places in the cabinet in order to settle their differences by a duel, and had not resumed them. After this, Lord Chatham had given way in consequence of the Walcheren expedition, and the Duke of Portland was dead. Mr. Perceval and the Marquis Wellesley had inherited their influence in the ministry. Mr. Perceval was an able barrister, possessed of some eloquence, of an inflexible character, and blindly attached to the Tory party. Marquis Wellesley, on the contrary, who had been called to fill Mr. Canning's place in the Foreign office, combined the most enlightened and unprejudiced mind with a remarkable power of simple and elegant expression. He had less influence over the Tory party than Mr. Perceval, because he was less under the dominion of feeling; but he enjoyed a very high degree of respect, which was daily augmented by the glory of his brother.

The position of the English ministry, though commanding a majority, was not very firm.

They had experienced an alternation of success and reverse. Though the victory of Talavera was of a doubtful character, and had been followed by a retreat into Estremadura, it had, nevertheless, yielded two advantages to the English: first, that of keeping the French army at a distance from Portugal, and secondly, that of enabling them to maintain their ground in the Peninsula in opposition to all the power of Napoleon. On the other hand, it was a great reverse to have failed before Antwerp with 40,000 men, of whom 16,000 were sacrificed,—some by death, some by almost incurable fevers.

The situation of the ministry was, therefore, doubtful, as was the judgment of the country on their policy. The opposition, headed by two eminent men,—Lord Grenville and Lord Grey,—assisted by the open favour of the prince of Wales, who might at any time be raised to the throne or the regency by the feeble health of the king, maintained that the war was unreasonably prolonged; that every year augmented the colossal power which they wished to destroy; that they had thereby lost, if not Portugal, at least Spain and Naples; that by continuing it they would lose all the seaboard of the north as far as the mouths of the Oder; that the war in the Peninsula was attended with particular danger, for, if Napoleon with 100,000 men should fall upon the English army, not one soldier would return, and thus would be destroyed the only force capable of defending the territory; that they were daily losing some new ally; lately they had lost Sweden, they were now threatened with the loss of America; that the finances were oppressed with a heavy burden; that the paper currency was becoming daily depreciated, and the exchange would share its fate; that they were drawing near the time when their foreign relations would become ruinous; and that to persist in such a policy simply to avoid the conviction of having been baffled was neither wise nor prudent. Such was the substance of the daily speeches of Lord Grenville and Lord Grey; and it must be acknowledged that there were many reasons for inclining those to peace who did not anticipate the errors into which Napoleon would soon be drawn. However, except the millions of annual expenditure occasioned by this protracted struggle, and the somewhat inconsiderable number of men who were lost in the army of Lord Wellington, and whose places were supplied by volunteers, the British people were very little affected by the war to which they had, as it were, become accustomed.

Nor did they suffer much in their commerce; for, if they had lost markets on the continent, they had found others of considerable value in the Spanish colonies lately opened to their produce. Their only serious loss would be occasioned by the total exclusion of their colonial produce from the continent by the enforcement of a rigorous blockade. Hitherto, notwithstanding the unfavourable exchange, they maintained extensive foreign relations; their manufactures had been prodigiously developed; they had become attached to the Spanish people; they were beginning to lose all uneasiness for their troops when they saw that they were so well able to maintain themselves in the Peninsula; and, finally, except some complaints occasionally uttered, rather against inconveniences than against the increase of the income tax, they

approved by their silence of the policy of the government, without, however, being convinced that the opposition were in error in demanding peace. Thus, the slightest circumstance might turn the scale.

It was otherwise with the ministers, and among them especially Mr. Perceval had resolved to prosecute the war with the blind fury of a Tory. Marquis Wellesley, on the contrary, enlightened and moderate, suffered no headstrong prejudice to influence his policy; and, although the war by its continuance would bring great glory to his family, it exposed it, as well as all England, to so much risk, that he could not avoid regarding it with anxiety. He would, therefore, have been inclined to peace if he could meet with a serious offer of peace, and, especially, an acceptable arrangement of the affairs of Spain. But he was resolved not to be guilty of the great imprudence of agitating the public mind by unmeaning interviews, which might turn men from the course which they quietly followed into an opposite course without the certainty of attaining any useful result, and divert them from the war without being able to promise them peace. He had acted in conformity with these ideas toward the secret agent recently sent by M. Fouché, and had given him a reply as evasive as the mission with which he had been intrusted. The envoy of the duke of Otranto, formerly an officer in the army of Condé, and having some connection with England, had caused himself to be introduced by Lord Yarmouth, with whom he was acquainted. The Marquis of Wellesley received him politely, and replied that England, without having determined on eternal war, would decline any overtures of peace until made by ostensible agents, fully accredited, and bearing proposals consistent with the honour of the two nations.

Mr. Baring having announced the arrival of M. de Labouchère as the bearer of important communications, Lord Wellesley hastened to receive him with great respect, and listened to him with much attention. But after having heard him he exhibited extreme reserve, and confined himself to general and vague assurances of pacific dispositions, repeating that, if France were sincerely desirous of peace, England would willingly meet her wishes.

But he expressed great doubt of the real sentiments of the French cabinet, and assigned as a reason the obscurity of the mission itself, entirely secret in its form, extremely vague in its propositions, and leaving every thing in absolute uncertainty. He did not conceal that he had already received a similar overture, through a much less respectable medium, indeed, than M. de Labouchère, but exactly similar in nature and form, for it expressed pacific intentions without exhibiting the most trifling proof of their sincerity. Marquis Wellesley repeated that no entertainment could be given to any clandestine mission or uncertain proposition which should not afford a well-grounded hope of arriving at an arrangement honourable to England. He expressed himself as little concerned about the state of Holland and its annexation to France. While Napoleon thought Holland too English, the British minister thought it too French, considered that it had given very little help to the English in the Walcheren expedition, and seemed to perceive little difference

between its actual state and its state if united to France. With respect to the commercial difficulties with which England was threatened, he formed no very clear idea of their nature or extent, and repeated that, at any rate, they had long expected every imaginable act of tyranny along the European coast, and had made up their mind in anticipation.

These explanations, as indefinite as the overtures brought by M. de Labouchère, were accompanied with expressions of affection for himself, and repeated assurances for the French government, that, whoever should present himself at London as the bearer of ostensible powers and acceptable propositions, would be sure of being well received and admitted to negotiation.

Marquis Wellesley, so discreet with M. de Labouchère, was more open with Mr. Baring, and told him almost the whole truth. He affirmed that neither himself nor his colleagues had vowed eternal war; they were little concerned about the re-establishment of the Bourbons on the throne of France; and they were ready to treat with Napoleon, but they doubted his sincerity; they suspected that he was laying a snare to disturb public opinion in England by a feigned negotiation,—a scheme to which they would not lend themselves. For all these reasons they refused to admit any other than a perfectly official negotiation. Resolved, moreover, not to leave Spain to Joseph, nor Sicily to Murat, nor yet to deprive themselves of Malta, they wished, as a preliminary step, that any negotiator should be furnished with such powers as might guarantee agreement on these essential points.

Conjecturing what was not avowed, Mr. Baring, a very sagacious man, communicated his personal observations to M. de Labouchère, and said to him that England was resigned to war, and even accustomed to it, and had not yet suffered enough to induce her to yield; that, although formerly very anxious about the army, she had at length seen it maintain itself in the heart of the Peninsula, which had restored her confidence; that nothing would determine her to peace but a reverse, now highly improbable; that she would by no means at present yield Spain to a prince of the family of Bonaparte; that on this subject it would be vain to cherish any expectation. Speaking with all freedom, and comparing together all conceivable combinations, Mr. Baring represented as possible, but by no means certain, and as emanating only from himself, an arrangement which should leave Malta to England, Naples to Murat, Sicily to the Bourbons of Naples, and should restore Spain to Ferdinand, saving the provinces of the Peninsula as far as the Ebro, which should be relinquished to France for the expenses of the war.

Well convinced that a longer stay in London would effect nothing, M. de Labouchère set out for Holland, which he reached by the ways he had already travelled, and brought to King Louis at Paris the result of his journey, which had remained absolutely secret. After these communications, it became evident that Spain was the real obstacle to a reconciliation, and that, having already obscured the glory of Napoleon and exhausted his armies and his finances, that country would, in every subsequent negotiation, be an insuperable obstacle to peace, unless some

decided advantages were gained over the English in the Peninsula.

Unfortunately, Napoleon had become habituated to the war in Spain, as England had to the maritime war which she maintained against the world. He resigned himself to it as to one of those serious maladies which we support by means of a strong constitution, at times suffering and at times relieved, which we carry about with us through life, glad to shut our eyes to their importance. As soon as he had received the reply of M. de Labouchère, he relinquished the idea that he could shake the resolution of England by threatening the annexation of Holland to France, and he determined to make a separate treaty, and to terminate immediately all the misunderstandings with his brother. But, not willing that all the indirect communications commenced by M. de Labouchère should fall to the ground, he dictated a note to the following purport:—If England had become habituated to war, and suffered little from it, France was equally habituated, and suffered less. France was victorious, rich, prosperous; condemned, it is true, to pay dearly for sugar and coffee, but not condemned to forego them altogether. In fact, she had in a great degree made up for her loss by the new sugars introduced by modern chemistry. The dearness of manufactures had given her fabrics an immense impetus, and thus a transient suffering had become the assured pledge of an unheard-of progress. Naples, Spain, and the Levant, bring sufficient quantities of cotton for her manufactures; and if the sea were closed against her ships, the whole continent offered a vast market for her silks, her cloths, her muslins, her printed goods. She could, therefore, maintain such a condition for a long time. As to Spain, the war had continued there for two years and a half, because Napoleon had not been able to give it sufficient attention, having been obliged to go once more to Vienna. But he had now done with Austria, and he was preparing a terrible vengeance for the Spanish, the Portuguese, and the English. On the whole, therefore, he was not sorry for the interruption of maritime relations which developed more fully the French manufactures, nor for the continuance of a war which, by attracting the English to the continent, would furnish him with the long-desired opportunity of meeting them hand-to-hand. If, in such circumstances, he inclined to peace, it was because, being married to an archduchess, and willing to assimilate himself to ancient Europe, he was desirous to terminate the struggle between the old order of things and the new. It was not to be expected that he should sacrifice any one of the kingdoms that he had created. He would never dethrone his brothers Joseph, Murat, Louis, Jerome. But the fate of Portugal and of Sicily was undecided: these two countries, Hanover, the Hanse towns, the Spanish colonies, might present the means of large compensations. But if it were difficult to come to an understanding on these different points, it was at least possible to impart to the war a little degree of humanity. England had issued the orders in council, to which Napoleon had replied by the decrees of Berlin and Milan, and thus the sea had been converted into a theatre of oppression. It was more the interest of England than of France to put an end to this state of things, for war with

America might be the result. If she thought this, she had only to relinquish her laws of blockade; France, on her side, would desist from hers; Holland and the Hanse towns would then remain free and independent; the sea would again be open to neutrals; war would lose its character of bitterness; and it was possible that this first return to more moderate measures should be followed by an entire reconciliation between the two nations by whose contention the world was divided, agitated, and distressed.

Such were the considerations that M. de Labouchère was charged to present to Mr. Baring, and through him to the Marquis Wellesley, through any medium that might appear most suitable to the two parties. M. de Labouchère was authorized either to correspond, or, if he thought necessary, to make another journey to London.

It was necessary to revert to Holland, and to adopt some line of conduct with respect to it; for the negotiation of which it had given the first suggestion, having been indefinitely deferred, could not furnish the means of resolving by peace the differences which had arisen. Napoleon was anxious for an immediate solution, in order to effect, without delay, the complete blockade of the coast of the North Sea; and, though he still considered the annexation of Holland to France the surest method of arriving at this result, yet when he saw the grief of his brother, and listened to the urgent solicitations of his mother and sisters, he was disposed to withdraw a part of his requirements. Already, from affection for Queen Hortense and the Empress Josephine, he had secured the condition of the eldest son of Louis, and transferred to him the beautiful duchy of Berg, which had become vacant by the elevation of Murat to the throne of Naples. Louis, far from seeing in this arrangement any proof of affection, persuaded himself that they wished to offend him by depriving him of the education of his son, who, having become, while in his minority, a sovereign of a principality dependent on the empire, came to be under the protection of the common chief of the Imperial family,—that is to say, of Napoleon himself. Notwithstanding these foolish interpretations, Napoleon, touched by the state of his brother, consented to listen to an arrangement different from the union,—an arrangement which, by changing the frontier, by assigning to French authority the guard of the coasts of Holland, and by obliging that power to maintain certain armaments, might produce some of the great results which he contemplated.

Hitherto, France having had Belgium without Holland, the frontier line had left the banks of the Rhine below Wesel, passed the Meuse between Grave and Venloo, leaving out Northern Brabant, and rejoined the Scheldt below Antwerp, thereby assigning to Holland not only the Wahal, but even the Meuse and the Eastern Scheldt, which had always belonged to her. While Napoleon was willing to leave Holland to his brother, he wished to correct the boundary-line, adopting as the line of separation the Wahal, which is the principal arm of the Rhine after that river has entered Holland, then to take Hollands-Diep and the Krammer for the extreme limit, which would bring under the sovereignty of France Zealand, the isles of Tholen and Schouwen, Northern Brabant, part of

Gneldres, the isle of Bommel, the important ports of Bergen-op-Zoom, Breda, Gertruidenberg, Bois-le-duc, Gorcum, Nimeguen; that is to say, a fifth part of the population of Holland—nearly 400,000 souls out of 2,000,000—and acquisitions more important by their position than even by their population.

Independently of these changes in the frontier, Napoleon wished that, until the end of the war, the commerce of Holland should be carried on in virtue of license obtained from himself; that all the seaboard entrances to Holland should be guarded by an army of 18,000 men, consisting of 6000 French and 12,000 Dutch, commanded by a French general; that every prize should be judged at Paris; that a squadron of 9 vessels and 6 frigates should be under sail at the Texel on the first of July in the current year 1810; that all the American cargoes introduced into Holland should be forfeited to the French; that the imprudent measures lately passed with regard to the noblesse should be immediately retracted; that there should be no marshals; and that the army on land should be never less than 25,000 men actually under arms.

Among these conditions, at least as painful as the loss of the throne, there were several which affected the unfortunate brother of Napoleon, now severely punished for a few years' reign, viz.: first, the loss of the territories on the left of the Wahal, which would sadly mortify the patriotism of the Dutch and impoverish their finances, already embarrassed; secondly, the adjudication of the prizes by French authority, which involved a kind of displacement of the sovereign power; and, lastly, the subjection of the Dutch army to a French general, which was both a displacement of the sovereign power and also a severe humiliation. Louis earnestly entreated that his throne should not be restored to him on such hard terms; and, recurring, in his vexation, to the idea of a desperate resistance, he had sent secret instructions to the ministers Krayenhoff and Mollerus to fortify Amsterdam and the parts of Holland most easily defended. He had also renewed the order to refuse the French admission to the Dutch fortified towns.

But, during the agitation of this unhappy prince, the troops of the old corps of Massena, under Marshal Oudinot, had descended the Rhine and invaded Brabant, under the pretext of defending the country from the English. General Maison having presented himself at the gates of Bergen-op-Zoom and found them closed, and having insisted on their being opened to him, had led the governor to show him the letter of the king, which required him to forbid the entrance of the French. Fearing to go beyond the intentions of the government by allowing a collision, General Maison halted under the guns of the fort to await further orders. At the same time orders came from Amsterdam to construct redoubts around the town and arm them with artillery.

As soon as these facts became known to Napoleon, he was filled with rage. He sent in rapid succession the Duke of Otranto and the Duke of Feltre to his brother, to demand the opening of all the gates of Holland, declaring that if any hesitation were shown he should force them. He made Louis and his ministers responsible for all the blood that should be shed,

and even required him to surrender the ministers who had given such orders.\*

The Dukes of Otranto and Feltre—in the last of whom Louis placed great confidence—described the irritation of Napoleon in such terms that the unhappy King of Holland yielded, in alarm, every point, gave orders to receive the French troops into all his strongholds, and consented to the degradation of the two ministers who had been accused of urging to resistance. "Sire," wrote he to his brother, "I forward, this night, a courier, to remove from office the minister Mollerus, and Krayenhoff, minister of war: these are the only persons who have given occasion for the preparations and for the note of which your majesty has spoken. If the removal of any other person be demanded, I am ready to obey the will of your majesty as soon as it shall be made known."

Broken down by grief and suffering, King Louis addressed his brother again in the following letter, which clearly shows the state of things at that time: "There never was any Empire of the West till now. . . . It seems likely that there will soon be one. . . . Then, sire, your majesty will be assured that I shall no longer be able to deceive myself and to alienate you." (Louis here refers to the state of well-defined vassalage which should ensue, and which would render obedience easy to all.) "Deign to consider that I am without experience, in a difficult country, living by the day. Allow me, when threatened with the immediate loss of your friendship and support, to entreat you to bury the past in oblivion. I promise faithfully to fulfil every engagement; I give my word of honour to do so with fidelity and loyalty from the moment that they are formed."

The submission of Louis being complete, there could be no further difficulty in the arrangement of the affairs of Holland. Every concession was made; the line of the Wahal as far as the Krammer,—i. e., the line of the Rhine in its greatest possible extent; the occupation of the coast by an army partly Dutch, partly French, under the command of a French general; the adjudication of prizes referred to Paris; the seizure and surrender to France of all American vessels; the armament of a fleet of 9 ships and 6 frigates by

the first of July; the abolition of the rank of marshal and certain creations of nobility; finally the removal of the ministers who had encouraged the king in his anti-French policy,—every thing was allowed and included in a treaty, in which Napoleon engaged, on his side, to maintain the integrity of Holland—at least, the integrity of all that remained of it. The only concession to King Louis was the reduction of the public debt to one-third; only, to spare him in the eyes of the Dutch, care was taken to express, in a secret article, all that related to the command of the army by a French general, to the seizure of the American vessels, to the abolition of certain dignities, and the recall of certain ministers. To this *procès-verbal* was added the singular condition that Louis should have no ambassador at Vienna or at St. Petersburg. Napoleon, suspicious of the relations which his brother might contrive to form in these capitals, essentially unfriendly to him, had imposed the same condition on Murat, under pretext of economy.

These sacrifices having been consented to, Napoleon wrote to Louis a letter, which indicates his real sentiments:—

"TO THE KING OF HOLLAND.

"PARIS, March 18, 1810.

"Every political reason suggests that I should unite Holland to France: the conduct of those who govern that country would render it obligatory on me; but I perceive that this would occasion you so much vexation, that, for the first time, I am about to make my policy give way to the desire of pleasing you. Yet I beg you to be thoroughly convinced that the principles of your government must be changed, and that on the first ground of complaint I shall do that which I abstain from now. These complaints are of two kinds, and involve either a continuance of the relations between Holland and England, or speeches or edicts of a reactionary character, contrary to what I have a right to expect from you. For the future, it is necessary that all your conduct should inculcate in the mind of the Dutch a friendly disposition toward France, and avoid every representation calculated to excite their enmity and ferment national hatred. I should not even have taken Brabant, and I should have added several millions to the population of Holland, if your conduct had been such as I might justly expect from a brother and a French prince. But the past cannot be remedied. Let it serve as a warning for the future. Do not suppose that I can be deceived, and do not commit yourself to any one. I myself read the documents, and you will not doubt that I understand the force of ideas and expressions.

"You have written to me for the isle of Java. This question is very premature; and, considering the power of the English at sea, it is necessary, before undertaking any enterprise, to augment our forces. I reckon on your assistance, shortly, and on the concurrence of your squadron with mine."

There followed, on these conditions, a kind of reconciliation between the two brothers. Napoleon was attached to Louis, whose youth he had tended, and was beloved in return when the suspicious mind of his brother was not the prey of gloomy thoughts. They spent together

\* We may here cite a despatch of Napoleon, indicative of his exasperation, but which must not be understood quite literally: &c. in his fits of passion—partly sincere and partly feigned—be often threatened more than he designed to execute.

"TO THE MINISTER OF POLICE.

"PARIS, March 3, 1810.

"I beg of you to read this letter," (that of M. de Larochefoucauld, announcing the intention of the inhabitants of Amsterdam to defend themselves against the French,) "and to repair to the King of Holland and make him acquainted with it. Has that prince altogether lost his senses? Were there nothing but the letter of M. de Larochefoucauld, I should be merely amused, and regard the matter as simply absurd; but I cannot say this after the reply of the Dutch minister. You will tell him that he has chosen to lose his kingdom, and that I will make no arrangements that can make those persons suppose that they have imposed upon me. You will ask him whether his ministers have acted by his orders or by those of their chief, and you will declare that, if it be by the orders of their chief, I shall arrest and execute them all. If it be by the order of their king, what can I think of such a prince? and how, after this, can he command my troops, since he does not abide by his own oaths? You will summon MM. Roell and Verhuel to be present at your conference with the king. You will be careful not to give up these documents, and to return them to me on its termination."

all the time of the marriage festivities, after which Louis left in April to explain to the Dutch the latest arrangements, and to show them that he had no other alternative than to submit to the sacrifices which he had actually made, or to the total loss of national independence, which left no room for hesitation. He had consulted their interests rather than his own; for, while Holland retained the essential principle of her existence, she might cherish the hope of one day recovering her present losses. Besides, the greater part of the stipulated conditions, excepting those concerning the frontiers, could only last until the peace. With respect to the territorial losses, Louis had entreated his brother to indemnify him by some grants in Germany, and Napoleon had not refused, always implying, however, that the treatment of Holland should be regulated by her deserts. In order that the appearance of reconciliation should be more complete, Napoleon required that Queen Hortense should conduct her eldest son, the Grand-duke of Berg, into Holland, and there spend some time with her husband. Her presence, even though merely temporary, would have a tendency to persuade the public that all difficulties had been removed. At a later period, when a separation should again occur, which indeed soon happened, her enfeebled health might be assigned as the reason for her absence.

Louis then set off for the Hague, as he had eagerly desired, and Napoleon lost no time in giving the orders consequent on the new arrangement. He ordered Marshal Oudinot to occupy Northern Brabant and Zealand as far as the Wahal, to take formal possession of those provinces, and immediately to take thence, by the aid of a detachment of custom-house officers, all the English merchandise and colonial produce which it was possible to seize. Holland having become the depository of these goods, and the frontier provinces recently acquired affording them the easiest access to France, it was probable that a great quantity might be there found.

Napoleon then ordered Marshal Oudinot to pass the Wahal, and to penetrate, with three regiments of infantry and two of cavalry, into the north of Holland, which had been left to Louis, while General Molitor, concentrating his division toward East Friesland, should be ready to enter by the East, if circumstances should require. Marshal Oudinot was to have his headquarters at Utrecht, there to be joined by a legion of French custom-house officers, and to occupy immediately the navigable passes. He was recommended to demand the surrender of the American cargoes, to direct them by the inland communication to Antwerp, where was to be established the dépôt and market of confiscated goods. Besides the effect which Napoleon wished to produce by these measures upon credit in England, and through credit upon public opinion, he reckoned on obtaining a large addition to the extraordinary funds, and thus combining financial with political advantages.

Thus engaged, Napoleon had reached the end of April, 1810, the most favourable season for military operations in Spain, and the proper moment for his departure, if still resolved to direct in person the campaign in the Peninsula, which he wished should this year be decisive.

But, notwithstanding his desire to do so, which he had evinced by sending almost all his guard across the Pyrenees, many reasons detained him in the heart of his empire. Married on the 2d April, it was not very suitable that he should so soon leave his young wife to take the command of armies. His own personal vigilance could alone secure the rigorous enforcement of the continental blockade, from which he expected such great results. The misunderstanding with his brother Louis, though checked for a time, required a sustained vigilance and firmness, to prevent the Dutch seas being re-opened shortly to British commerce. The commercial system, which had become very complicated since the introduction of licenses, necessarily demanded new regulations, with which Napoleon was much occupied, and which he would intrust to no other, for he hoped to conquer England as much by commerce as by arms. Finally, though he expected little from the negotiation confided to M. de Labouchère, he did not so entirely despair of it as to be willing wholly to abandon it by leaving Paris. A British commissioner had, indeed, recently arrived at Morlaix, to treat of the exchange of prisoners, and he was the bearer of instructions which indicated a notable change in the disposition of the English ministry, which might naturally be ascribed to the latest overtures.

There were, then, many reasons to detain Napoleon at Paris, independently of the unhappy war in Spain, which, though he continued in opposition to all, he wished to be conducted by any rather than by himself: not that he feared assassination, frequent threats of which were discovered by the police, but because he did not see in the Peninsula, as in Prussia, Poland, and Austria, the opportunity of terminating every thing by a skilful manoeuvre or a great battle; but, on the contrary, an interminable series of small combats risked in the pursuit of an enemy continually eluding his grasp; of sieges rather than battles; a systematic war, requiring patience rather than genius, and as easy to direct at a distance as on the spot. The English alone could give occasion to important operations; but among the marshals there was one who, combining with unusual energy the intelligence required in a commander-in-chief, and, having covered himself with glory in the last campaign, appeared to be equal to the task of opposing them. This was Marshal Massena; and on him, therefore, Napoleon fixed his choice. Besides, this campaign was to open by the siege of the fortresses which separate Spain from Portugal, and many months must elapse before the commencement of offensive operations. It would, therefore, always be in his power to repair to the scene of war at a later period, if he thought it necessary. He constrained the aged warrior, fatigued and ill, but grateful for the magnificent rewards which had been lavished upon him, to set out for Portugal, in order to direct the operations of the army against the English. He gave him the best staff that could be formed, placed under his orders the skilful Reynier, the brave Junot, the intrepid Ney, and to command his cavalry he gave him the best officer of that arm then living, General Montbrun. Besides these brilliant subordinates, he promised him 80,000 men, and dismissed him, scarcely recovered from his fatigues, loaded with expressions

of kindness, and followed by earnest prayers and well-founded hopes. Who, indeed, could doubt that Massena, the first of our generals after Napoleon, with a superb army, could overcome a handful of English, inferior to our soldiers in number and in military qualities, though equal to them in bravery? We are not shortly to see what turned the scale.

After having made these arrangements, Napoleon proposed to make a journey into Belgium, availing himself of the *trêve*, which was that year unusually *long*, in order to present his young wife to the people, who were impatient to see her; to influence, by his presence, the Belgians, whom it was important to attach to the French Empire by flattery; to examine personally the theatre of the last English expedition; to order works which should render impossible a similar expedition; to review the great works of Antwerp; to inspect the fleet of the Scheldt; to observe more closely the new course of his brother; and to bring himself into more ready communications with the negotiations with England. The arrangements for this journey were made with a view of consecrating to it the end of April and all the month of May.

The negotiation with England had just taken a turn so singular as to be incredible were it not proved by unquestionable documents.\*

Napoleon had intimated with much reserve the sense in which M. de Labouchère was authorized to continue the overtures which had been made to the British ministry. He had shown how long France might still carry on the war without suffering, forcibly indicated the points on which she would not treat at all, and those in which she might be disposed to make some sacrifices. In the present state of the English mind these intimations did not much further the continuation of the negotiations, still less did they promise ultimate success. M. Fouché saw this plainly enough: he had the good sense to wish for peace, and to consider it very acceptable, even on the conditions recognised as admissible in London. But, while his good sense led him to desire it, he was so foolish as to wish to accomplish it himself, if not contrary to the will of Napoleon, at least without his knowledge, promising himself that, after having prepared it secretly, he should be able to offer it to him in a complete state, and to lead him on by the charm of the speedy accomplishment of this great result. This would have been an unreasonable enterprise under any government, but especially under that of a master so absolute and so vigilant as Napoleon; and the conduct of so able a man as M. Fouché can be explained only by the passion to meddle with every thing, which had increased with age and with the importance he had acquired, and, it must be added in his excuse, with the evidence of the dangers to which the empire was exposed. In this path he was seconded and even urged on by the

authors of projects by which he was surrounded, and of which we have given some ideas, as that of restoring a portion of the Peninsula to the Bourbons of Spain, of assigning the Spanish colonies to the Bourbons of France, &c. To these ideas had been added some others. If, for example, Napoleon should not be willing to strip his brother Joseph, and to restore Spain, though mutilated, to Ferdinand, they had formed the design of giving the Spanish colonies to Ferdinand, reserving to the Bourbons of France a very strange indemnification—no less than North America—the United States themselves! This chimera was founded on the following considerations. The United States, by the law of embargo, had become embroiled at once with France and England: they were republicans ungrateful to France and hateful to England, whom Louis XVI. ought never to have liberated, and whom Napoleon, the corrector of all the faults of the Revolution, was to replace under a monarchical and European authority. England could not fail to rejoice at seeing the United States restrained in their territory, checked in their ambition, punished for their revolt.

M. Fouché had too much good sense to be deceived by such speculations; but he considered the conditions of Napoleon much too absolute, and thought it necessary to give M. de Labouchère instructions quite different from those which had hitherto been addressed to him, unless the negotiations were to be nipped in the bud, and peace rendered absolutely impossible. Urged by M. Ouvrard, whom he had imprudently made acquainted with so serious a business, he consented that he should set off for Amsterdam to see M. de Labouchère, and direct his correspondence with London in such a manner as to continue the negotiation, not to interrupt it. M. Fouché was persuaded that at length, by mild and patient perseverance, and in the supposition that the war in Spain did not offer any better results, they would induce Napoleon to sacrifice the regal position of Joseph, of which he was greatly disenchanted, perhaps also that of Louis, of which he was still more so, and that, if they took care, at the same time, so to manage the English as not to break off the negotiation, they might, at length, reach the point where a reconciliation with them would be possible and peace secured; but all this, according to M. Fouché, was to be prepared without the knowledge of Napoleon, though it was well known that it could not be concluded without him.

M. Ouvrard then set out, full, not merely of M. Fouché's ideas, but, which was still worse, of his own, enchanted at being mixed up with an affair of such importance, and hoping to recover, by a signal service, the long-lost favour of Napoleon. Immediately on his arrival at Amsterdam he spoke in the name of M. Fouché, whose letters he brought, and was considered by M. de Labouchère as the direct and accredited representative of that minister, and consequently of Napoleon himself. Hence, M. de Labouchère felt himself encouraged, by what he heard and read, to send to London new communications, of a character much more satisfactory to the British policy than those previously transmitted. M. Ouvrard, in fact, said that, with regard to Sicily, Spain, the Spanish colonies, Portugal, and Holland, the determination of Napoleon was

\* I relate these complicated affairs of Holland, of the negotiations with England, and the interference of M. Fouché in this negotiation, on the authority of authentic documents, which will permit me, I hope, to throw light upon events hitherto obscure. These documents are the letters of Napoleon, of Louis, of Champagne, of M. de Labouchère, of M. Fouché, and, finally, the interrogations to which all the persons involved in the negotiation were subsequently subjected. I have read all these papers repeatedly, and I do not advance a single fact of which I have not seen the incontestable proof.



not irreversible; that he sincerely wished peace; that his disposition was misunderstood in England; and, moreover, that, at the present moment, there was a common point of interest between himself and Britain, viz.: the desire to punish the conduct of the Americans. M. Ouvrard touched on all of the subjects with more or less minuteness, wrote several letters, continually urging M. de Labouchère to transmit them to London. M. Fouché, being so imprudent as to second this extravagant negotiation, had recourse to a strange method of securing credit for M. de Labouchère with the British government,—a method which might be regarded as a ruse of the police. A stranger, calling himself the Baron de Kolli, and who appeared to belong to the English police, had presented himself at Valençay, to contrive with Prince Ferdinand the means of escape. He had been arrested, and it was thought that an important capture had been made, which would greatly impede the British cabinet, whose proceedings would thus be made public. M. Fouché authorized M. de Labouchère to write to the Marquis of Wellesley that, if he wished it, the person should be given up to him. This would be at once a proof of good-will towards Britain, and a manner of powerfully accrediting M. de Labouchère.

The war as well as the state of the roads, at that time, rendered communication with England both difficult and infrequent. To send a letter from Amsterdam to London, and to receive a reply, required 12 or 15 days; so that this singular negotiation might continue still for a considerable time without leading to any decided explanations. In the mean while, M. Ouvrard, in writing to M. Fouché, assigned to the negotiation a progress which the truth did not sanction, and M. Fouché, in his turn, deceiving M. Ouvrard, represented Napoleon as acquainted with and approving of these conferences, which was absolutely false, for M. Fouché, delaying, as far as possible, a difficult avowal, deferred informing Napoleon until the affair should be sufficiently advanced to be safely acknowledged.

During this time the Emperor had left Paris with a brilliant court, composed of the Empress, the King and Queen of Westphalia, the Queen of Naples, Prince Eugene, the Grand Duke of Wurtzburg, uncle of Maria Louisa, Prince Schwartzberg, ambassador from the court of Austria, M. de Metternich, prime minister of the same court, and the greater part of the French ministers. Napoleon proposed to visit Antwerp, Flushing, Zealand, Brabant—provinces recently ceded to the empire—then to return to Picardy, and to return to Paris by Normandy.

The people, wearied of monotony, are always eager to throw themselves in the way of a prince, whoever he may be, and often crown him with applause on the very eve of a catastrophe. Whenever Napoleon appeared, curiosity and admiration sufficed to create a crowd; and the eagerness and enthusiasm were naturally increased at a time when he had just attained the height of his fortune by his marriage with an Austrian archduchess, and, accordingly, he was universally received with the liveliest transports. His presence was always the intimation of the commencement or continuance of immense works, and he was, therefore, applauded not only as a great man, but as a benefactor.

Leaving Compiègne on the 27th April, he arrived the same day at St. Quentin. This town owed to him, besides the re-establishment of the lawn-manufacture, the fine works of the canal of St. Quentin, resumed and finished since the Consulate. The tunnel through which the waters of the Seine are united to those of the Scheldt was illuminated, and Napoleon traversed it with all his court, as if in full daylight. On the way he granted to M. Gayant, the engineer of these beautiful works, a handsome pension and a grade in the legion of honour, and immediately left for Cambray and the castle of Laeken. He proposed to visit Brussels on the way back.

On the 30th April he embarked on the large canal which extends from Brussels to the Ruppel, and by the Ruppel even to the Scheldt. He was met by all the boats of the large fleet of the Scheldt, dressed out with a thousand colours, manned by the ships' crews, and by them transported, with the swiftness of the wind, to the waters subject to the Belgic power. The imperial flotilla was commanded by Decrès, the minister of marine, and Admiral Missiessy, whose sang-froid had been distinguished during the Walcheren expedition. They soon arrived in sight of the squadron of Antwerp, created by Napoleon, and recently rescued from the fire of the English. All the vessels, frigates, corvettes, gun-sloops, drew up in line, and Maria Louisa passed under the inoffensive fire of a thousand guns, which testified to the power of her husband.

The imperial court entered Antwerp in the midst of the Belgian people assembled for their reception, forgetful of every sentiment of hostility in so gorgeous a spectacle. Napoleon had much business at Antwerp, and he remained there several days. The continental peace allowed him to devote himself to his projects for the marine of the empire and of the allied states. He was this year to dispose of about 40 vessels:—9 at the Texel, promised by July 1st, 10 actually under sail at Antwerp, 2 at Cherbourg, 3 at Lorient, 17 at Toulon, 1 at Venice—42 in all. He calculated that he should have 74 in 1811, 100 or 110 in 1812, which, with the necessary quantity of frigates and corvettes, could embark 150,000 men for all destinations.

To make up this number, it was necessary to have 9 more at Antwerp in the space of a year. In order to this, it was indispensable to augment the docks, and to collect wood and workmen to that favourite port. Napoleon gave the suitable orders, and caused to be launched in his presence a vessel of 80 guns, which entered the Scheldt majestically, under the eyes of the Empress, blessed by the clergy of Malines, convoked for this naval fête. Napoleon kept with him Prince Eugene, to whom he wished to show all that he was doing in the Flemish waters, to induce him to attempt as much in those of the Adriatic. "When we have land, we may have sea," he was accustomed to say, "provided we wish it and have time to effect it." But time is precisely that which can be procured only by prudence, and of which Napoleon was soon about to deprive himself.

His brother Louis had come to see him, and, though less agitated, he was profoundly melancholy, on his own account and on that of his

people, borne down by so many afflictions at once. Napoleon endeavoured to cheer him by showing what he had performed at Antwerp, and what further he designed, recommended him urgently to have his fleet ready at the Texel by the first of July, exhibited his vast maritime projects, announced that his troops were soon to be brought to the coasts, that in a short time there would be at the mouths of the Scheldt, at Brest, at Toulon, large fleets capable of carrying entire armies; that Massena would march upon Lisbon with 80,000 men; that in two months they would closely press the English at all points, and thus render this war, to which they seemed to have become habituated, absolutely intolerable, especially if, by the rigorous observance of the continental blockade, they were severely cramped in their mercantile interests.

In connection with this subject, Napoleon spoke with his brother on the negotiation of Labouchère. By a singular chance he had met M. Ouvrard, who was repairing in all haste from Amsterdam to Paris, to carry on the strange communications between Holland and England. Napoleon, with his ordinary promptitude, had conjectured that M. Ouvrard, who enjoyed the favour of the Duke of Otranto, and was closely connected with M. de Labouchère in business, had come to meddle with things that did not concern him, to endeavour to detect some secret of the negotiation, perhaps to volunteer uncalled-for advice, perhaps to found some speculation on the probabilities of peace. Full of singular presentiments, he forbade M. de Labouchère to hold any intercourse with M. Ouvrard, demanded of him all the letters that had passed between Amsterdam and London, and ordered them to be sent to him while on his journey wherever he might be. Louis set out for Amsterdam, having refused to be present at any fête, especially at a time when Napoleon was about to enter a territory recently taken from Holland.

After having employed five days in prescribing the necessary works, and, in particular, the new defences which were to render Antwerp impregnable, Napoleon ordered the fleet to descend upon Flushing; and to allow time for this, he went to visit the new territories acquired between the Meuse and the Wahal, as well as the fortresses of Bergen-op-Zoom, Breda, Bois-le-Duc, and Gertruidenberg.

At Breda, he gave reception to the Catholic and Protestant clergy, as well as to the civil and military authorities. Although in these newly-acquired territories the Catholics were freed from all Protestant domination, they were far from being satisfied. While the principal Protestant minister presented himself in full costume, the vicar-apostolic, on the contrary, appeared in a simple black dress, as if afraid, on such an occasion, to assume his festal garments. Napoleon had divined their sentiments simply from their appearance, and, as he daily exercised less self-control, he gave himself up to a fit of anger, partly sincere, partly assumed. Pretending, at first, not to perceive the vicar-apostolic, he listened with much courtesy to the Protestant minister, who addressed to him, with much simplicity and modesty, some words of resignation, such as alone became citizens lately torn from their country to be allied to a new

country, great but foreign. "Sire," said the representative of the Protestant clergy, "you see in us the ministers of a Christian communion, accustomed to recognise the hand of Providence in every event, and to render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's." "You are right," said Napoleon, immediately, "and you will find it so, for I will protect every form of worship. But, sir, why do you appear in full canonical costume?" "Sire, that is our wont." "It is, then, the custom of the country," replied Napoleon; and then, turning to the Catholic clergy, "Gentlemen," said he, "why are you not here in your sacerdotal robes? Are you advocates, notaries, or physicians? What may be your quality, sir?" addressing the representative of the Romish church. "Sire, the vicar-apostolic." "Who named you?" "The pope." "He has no right to do so. I alone in my empire designate the bishops charged with the administration of the church. Render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's. The pope is not Cæsar; I am. It is not to the pope but to me that God has committed the sceptre and the sword. You Catholics, long under the domination of Protestants, have been set free by my brother, who has made all forms of worship equal; you are about to obtain from me a still more perfect equality, and you begin by an act of disrespect. You complained of being oppressed by Protestants; it appears by your conduct that you deserved to be so, and that it is necessary you should be subjected to a powerful authority, and this, you may rest assured, shall not be wanting. I have in my hand the proof that you will not obey the civil authority, because you will not pray for the sovereign. I have already arrested two disobedient priests, and they shall remain in prison. Imitate the Protestants, who, though constant to their faith, are obedient citizens and faithful subjects. Ah! you will not pray for me," he continued, with a tone of increasing anger. "Is it because a Roman priest has excommunicated me? But who gave him the right to do so? Who on earth can release subjects from their oath of obedience to a sovereign appointed by the laws? No one, you ought to know, if you know your religion. Are you not aware that your guilty pretensions drove Luther and Calvin to separate part of the Catholic world from the Roman church? If it had been necessary, and if I had not found in the religion of Bossuet the means of securing the independence of the civil power, I should myself have freed France from the authority of Rome, and forty millions would have followed me. I did not this act because I believed the true principles of the Catholic worship to be reconcilable with the principles of civil authority. But think not to put me in a convent, to shave my head after the example of Louis the Debonnaire, and submit yourselves, for I am Cæsar: otherwise, I will banish you from my empire, and will scatter you, like the Jews, over the face of the earth." In pronouncing these words, the voice of Napoleon was loud and his look piercing. The unfortunate priests who gave rise to this outburst were trembling. "You are of the diocese of Malines," he added; "go, present yourselves to your bishop; take your oath within his hands; obey the concordat, and I shall then see what order I shall give you."

This scene produced the effect which was designed. The words of Napoleon, taken down at the moment and repeated, with the permission of the police, in most of the journals of the country, made a powerful impression.

Forgetful of nothing, Napoleon rapidly passed to other objects. He visited Bergen-op-Zoom, Breda, Gertruidenberg, Bois-le-Duc; everywhere adopted useful resolutions, dictated by his profound knowledge of war and government. When he saw countries so fertile in flax and hemp, he decreed that a million should be granted to the inventor of a machine for spinning flax. He also formed in these provinces manufactories, in which was produced, at a low price, a common cloth very suitable to troops, and he determined to make it a considerable branch of trade. On the banks of the Wahal, which presents so powerful a frontier and so excellent a method of inland communication, he felt rekindled within him all the ardour of his ambition for France, and he devised a regulation for securing to the French boatmen exclusively the navigation of the Rhine. He decreed that every vessel, not French, on entering the Rhine should discharge at Nimeguen if it came from Holland, at Mentz if from Germany by the Mein, in order to transfer her cargo to French vessels, which alone might navigate that great river. Napoleon thus treated the waters of the river as the English had treated the ocean. Jealous of the timber for building destined to Antwerp, he ordered that all wood of that kind, navigating or floating on the Rhine, should be obliged to come to Belgium, instead of going to Holland, whither the Dutch, in virtue of their large capital, had been accustomed to attract it. At the same time, he made various regulations to bring from Brest, where little building was carried on for want of wood, the unemployed workmen, and to employ them at Antwerp.

After having visited the frontier fortresses and visiting in succession the islands of Tholen, Schouwen, South and North Beveland, and Walcheren, he determined, on account of the fatal fevers of these countries, that only the posts which were absolutely indispensable should be kept there, that the situation should be well chosen and every possible security adopted. At Flushing he ordered immense works to protect the garrison from the fire of the vessels, and to overwhelm with projectiles the enemy's squadron, should it attempt the great pass. At sight of the ruins of Flushing, he showed himself more just to the unfortunate General Monnet, who had lately yielded in the defence of the place, and gave the best-contrived orders to prevent a recurrence of what had taken place. Agreeably to the observation often made, that men of mature age and accustomed to the climate were less liable to the fever than young men and the newly-arrived, he planned an organization in virtue of which the guard of these isles should consist of battalions of veterans and of colonial regiments. He required a numerous flotilla of gun-sloops to be always joined to the fleet, and that the docks of Flushing should be prepared to receive twenty large ships of the line. While thus devoting himself to objects of utility, his court engaged in the lighter duties of the journey, in giving and receiving fêtes.

Having prolonged his sojourn in these parts till the 12th of May, he reascended the Scheldt, merely passed through Antwerp, introduced his wife to Brussels, then descended to Ghent and Bruges, to give orders for the necessary works on the left of the Scheldt, and thence repaired to Ostend, from which point an English army might march straight to Antwerp. He ordered the works necessary to afford that place a sufficient protection, then left for Dunkirk, where he ordered some repairs, reproved the inactivity of certain officers of engineers, visited the camp of Boulogne, the theatre of his first projects, now abandoned, then held some reviews to excite alarm in the English mind, devoted two days to Lille, and finally reached Havre, where he occupied himself diligently with the defence of that important seaport. On the evening of the first of June, he returned to St. Cloud, well pleased with what he had seen, and with the orders he had given, as well as with the reception universally given to the empress, and the hopes with which that young sovereign seemed to inspire the nation.

But, notwithstanding the various subjects of satisfaction afforded by this journey, he returned in a state of great irritation, of which the Duke of Otranto was the principal object. King Louis, in compliance with the requirement of Napoleon, had demanded of M. de Labouchère all the papers relating to the communications with England; and the latter, fully believing that in continuing the overtures, at the instigation of M. Ouvrard, he was acting upon the orders of the Duke of Otranto, and consequently of the emperor himself, had, without reserve, given up all that he had written to London, and all that he had received in reply. These papers, having been transmitted by Louis to Napoleon, were read by him on the journey, and convinced him that the negotiation had been carried on without his knowledge, and upon terms to which he could by no means accede. They did not give him full information of what had taken place, for the correspondence of M. Ouvrard with M. Fouché was omitted; but such as they were, they were sufficient to convince Napoleon that the negotiation had been carried on without his orders, and in compliance with other directions than his. He suspected, without being fully assured, that M. Fouché had had a great share in these singular proceedings, and he determined to clear up the matter at once.

On the 2d of June, the very day after his arrival, he summoned his ministers to St. Cloud. M. Fouché was present. Without any prelude, Napoleon demanded of him an account of the various journeys of M. Ouvrard to Holland, of the conferences with England, continued, as it appeared, independently of the government. He further demanded, as it were in a breath, whether he knew any thing of this mystery, whether he had sent M. Ouvrard to Amsterdam, and whether or not he was concerned in these unjustifiable manoeuvres.

M. Fouché, who had intended to speak with Napoleon, at a later hour, on the part he had taken, surprised by this sudden and unexpected disclosure, pressed hard by embarrassing questions, muttered out some excuses for M. Ouvrard, saying that he was a meddling intriguer, whose proceedings deserved no attention. These reasons did not satisfy Napoleon. "These are

not insignificant intrigues," said he, "that may be disregarded; it is a most serious crime for any one to negotiate with an enemy unknown to his own sovereign, on conditions of which that sovereign may be ignorant, and which he probably would not allow: it is a crime which would not be tolerated under the feeblest government." He added, that he considered the past transactions of so serious a character that he wished M. Ouvrard to be immediately arrested. M. Fouché, fearing that by such a step every thing would be discovered, vainly endeavoured to calm the anger of Napoleon, but with no other result than to increase his suspicions and direct them towards himself. Napoleon, who had resolved beforehand on the arrest of M. Ouvrard, took care not to assign that business to M. Fouché, lest he should allow his escape; and, therefore, leaving the council at the same moment, he committed it to his aide-camp Savary, who had been created Duke of Rovigo, and enjoyed his entire confidence. He had often been employed in services of this nature. In two or three hours, M. Ouvrard was cleverly arrested, and all his papers were seized. On the first examination, it was discovered that the negotiation had been carried on even further than was at first supposed, and that M. Fouché was chargeable with, at least, an equal share of the responsibility.

Napoleon had been much displeased with the restless spirit of that minister, who, on various occasions, had ventured to assume the initiative, or had pushed matters beyond the end proposed, as may have been remarked in the first suggestion of the divorce, in the arming of the national guard to an unprecedented extent, and finally, in the recent negotiation with England. Napoleon detected in him the greatest rashness, and, at the same time, an ambitious desire to make himself of importance, which, in certain circumstances, might prove highly dangerous. In particular, he discerned in the impatience to conclude a peace almost against his own will, an indirect censure on his policy, and the desire to gain credit at his expense. It is but just to add, that he began to entertain a vague suspicion of all his former co-operators, for all, and especially the most distinguished, seemed, each in his own way, to reprobate his proceedings. M. de Talleyrand by his sarcasms, the wise Cambacérès by his silence, M. Fouché by his movement to effect a peace, were so many dissentients, more or less open, from the ambitious and warlike policy of the empire. M. de Talleyrand had often been the object of his irritation. The silence of the arch-chancellor Cambacérès he had met by silence, sometimes severe, and injurious especially to himself, for he thus deprived himself of valuable counsels. He determined not to spare M. Fouché, who was not protected by any great respect, and who was left without defence by a recent error.

The correspondence found at the house of M. Ouvrard left no doubt on the part taken by the Duke of Otranto in the second negotiation conducted by M. de Labouchère. The next day, June 8d, was Sunday. The great dignitaries had all come to hear mass at St. Cloud, and to be present at the levée of the emperor. After mass, Napoleon summoned to his cabinet all the great dignitaries and ministers, except M. Fouché, and, addressing them, said, "What

would you think of a minister who, abusing his position, should, unknown to his sovereign, open up communication with the foreigners, enter upon diplomatic negotiations founded on bases devised only by himself, and thus compromise the policy of the state? What punishment is found in our code for such a crime?" On finishing these words, he seemed by his looks to challenge a reply from each of those present, which might facilitate the sacrifice of the Duke of Otranto, for, notwithstanding his great power, it was not easy to make M. Fouché the object of punishment. The flatterers, seeking in the eyes of Napoleon the answer that would be most agreeable to him, exclaimed that the crime was abominable. M. de Talleyrand, not on this occasion the object of imperial anger, smiled with indifference; the arch-chancellor, conjecturing that M. Fouché was the subject of inquiry, and persisting in his office of peacemaker even towards a declared enemy, replied that the fault was undoubtedly great, and deserved severe punishment, unless it had arisen from excess of zeal. "Excess of zeal," exclaimed Napoleon, "very strange and dangerous, which could lead any one to take such a step!" He then related all that he knew of the conduct of M. Fouché, and ended by announcing his irrevocable determination to displace him, and by asking the advice of those present in the choice of a successor.

Herein was great perplexity. In the first place, the choice was itself very difficult, the office of the minister of police had acquired so much importance, in consequence of the arbitrary nature of the power it exerted, and M. Fouché had contrived so greatly to increase that importance, and to render it personal. And further, every one feared lest he should not hit upon the same individual as Napoleon, and lest he should contribute, even indirectly, to the fall of a minister who was formidable even in his disgrace. Every one, therefore, repeatedly declared that it was necessary to think well before they could find a substitute for M. Fouché. M. de Talleyrand alone, who sat in silence with a slight expression of irony in his impassive countenance, leaning towards his neighbour, said, loud enough to be heard, "No doubt M. Fouché has been greatly in the wrong: and I will propose a substitute for him, viz.:—M. Fouché himself." Vexed at this meeting, which had afforded him little help, and had exposed him to a degree of railery, Napoleon left the council abruptly, taking with him the arch-chancellor. "A fine resource," he cried, "to consult these gentlemen! You see what good advice they can give! But you must not suppose that I consulted them without having already made up my mind. My choice is fixed, and the Duke of Rovigo shall be my minister of police." Napoleon had already, both at home and abroad, witnessed the boldness and dexterity of the Duke of Rovigo; he knew his devotion to himself, and was convinced that he would not imitate M. Fouché, and, in particular, that he would not assume the merit of every act of clemency, and lay every act of rigour to the charge of the emperor. He was, besides, calculated to inspire considerable fear, and this Napoleon did not regret. The choice, however, gave some uneasiness to the arch-chancellor. While doing all justice to the Duke

of Rovigo, and acknowledging that with him reality had more weight than appearance, he assigned as an objection the effect likely to be produced by a military man being at the head of the police, and intimated, without venturing openly to assert, that a police in military uniform was not well calculated to restore a failing popularity. To these observations Napoleon replied, "So much the better! The Duke of Rovigo is subtle, resolute, and not cruel. He will be feared, and from that very cause, he will find it more easy to exercise clemency than another." To this there was no reply; and it must be confessed, that of all those whom Napoleon, at this time, selected to replace the principal men of the earlier times of the empire, the Duke of Rovigo was far the best; he was intelligent, acute, bold, not very scrupulous, indeed, but not vicious, and able to speak the truth to his master, when devotion to his interests required it. He had done so on some occasions with a degree of soldier-like familiarity. But, unhappily, when truth is disagreeable to a sovereign, it is but an empty and fruitless sound, by whatever channel addressed.

The course of affairs had, then, in less than three years, removed the two most important ministers,—that of foreign affairs and that of police, M. de Talleyrand and M. Fouché. The office of minister of foreign affairs, though discharged by M. de Cadore with modesty, prudence, and discretion, seemed virtually vacant since the retirement of M. de Talleyrand. M. de Bassano, a man of polished manners and prepossessing exterior, devoted to the emperor, anxious to serve him well, but seeking his confidence by assentation and the assumption of enthusiasm, whereas M. de Talleyrand sometimes ventured on raillery, aimed at the office of foreign affairs, and, in order to prepare the way, wished to introduce a personal friend into the ministry of police. This friend was M. de Sémonville, a man of cynical disposition, bold in purpose, pliant in conduct, qualified for the office by unscrupulousness of principle, but not by soundness of judgment, tact, vigilance, or courage. M. de Bassano had contributed to the fall of M. Fouché, by circulating several unfavourable reports; and he prepared the way to M. de Sémonville's advancement by unmeasured boasting of some trivial services rendered by him during the marriage negotiations. But though a flattering mediocrity might sometimes gain access to Napoleon, as to all great men, his powerful mind was above the reach of petty artifices, especially in so serious a matter as the appointment of a minister of police. In short, while M. de Bassano had sent for M. de Sémonville to St. Cloud, that he might be at hand if Napoleon were gained over, it was heard that the Duke of Rovigo had been repeatedly summoned in haste to the emperor. The antechambers were filled with busybodies anxious to share in any revolution that might take place in the higher offices. When the Duke of Rovigo had arrived, he was astonished by Napoleon exclaiming, without any preface, "You are minister of police; come, take the oath, and set to work!" After vainly uttering some modest excuses, he took the oath, and crossed the imperial apartments, which echoed with the news of his own appointment and the disgrace of the Duke of Otranto, news which produced a

bad effect, both on account of him who left office and of him who entered upon it. M. Fouché, after having been very useful by his knowledge of men, his indulgence for all parties, his address in calming their irritation or gaining them by bribery, had, no doubt, much diminished the merit of his services by his indiscreet activity; but the people instinctively regretted in him one of those who had been the counsellors of Napoleon in his best years; they felt for M. Fouché regret similar to that which they entertained for M. de Talleyrand, and even for Josephine herself: in all of these they regretted the witnesses and the actors in a period which had been truly excellent, and which they could hardly hope to be equalled by the future.

Napoleon, wishing in some degree to atone to M. Fouché for his disgrace, named him Governor of the Roman States, where his tact and experience in revolutions might be employed with advantage. This resolution he preceded by two letters, one intended for the public, and replete with soothing assurances, the other secret and more severe. We quote the second as being more strictly in accordance with truth:—

"St. Cloud, June 3, 1810.

"Monsieur le Duc d'Otranto:—I have received your letter of June 2. I am fully aware of all your services, and am convinced of your attachment to my person and zeal for my interests; but I cannot, in justice to myself, leave you the portfolio. The office of minister of police requires the most perfect confidence; and this can no longer exist, since you have already in very important circumstances compromised my tranquillity and that of the State, which I cannot regard as excused even by the legitimacy of the motives.

"A negotiation has been opened with England; conferences have been carried on with Lord Wellesley. That minister knew that the communications came from you, and must have believed that they came from me; hence a total disturbance of all my political relations, and, if I permitted it, a blot upon my character which I cannot and will not endure.

"Your singular views of the duty of a minister of police do not square with the welfare of the State. Though I have no doubt of your attachment and your fidelity, I am obliged to maintain a most irksome and watchful surveillance, to which I cannot submit. This is rendered necessary by your taking upon yourself to do many things without knowing whether they accord with my will and my designs and do not oppose my general policy.

"I was anxious that you should know from myself the reason of my depriving you of your office. I cannot hope that you will change your line of conduct, since you have not been induced to do so by numerous expressions of my displeasure repeated through the course of several years; and, satisfied with the purity of your own motives, you will not understand that much evil may be done with the best possible intention.

"Nevertheless, my confidence in your talents and fidelity is unshaken, and I am desirous of finding opportunities of proving this, and of employing them in my service."

On quitting office, M. Fouché had taken care to burn all his papers, and maliciously to stir

mined to deliver up to his successor none of the threads composing the subtle web of the police. The Duke of Rovigo, suddenly introduced into this department, ignorant of its labyrinths and of its secret agent, was at first surprised and almost alarmed at his new situation. But it was not long before he recovered himself, and was able to disentangle that which at first sight appeared confused and inextricable. He soon perceived himself surrounded by those mysterious agents which are requisite for the information of a minister of police, less useful than are commonly supposed, but not without their use, rendering services proportioned not to their own capacity but to that of their employer, a species of timid and hungry animals, like all those which live in the shade, put to flight by the least alarm, but speedily returning, drawn by hunger, to the hand which feeds them. In a short time they made the new minister acquainted with all the secret plots, often more puerile than dangerous, which it was necessary to watch, but not with excessive anxiety, and thus placed him in a position to discharge all the functions of his office. He began, also, to inspire somewhat less fear, though he never attained the authority of M. Fouché, whose piercing eyes every one thought were fixed upon himself.

Of all the plots which were to be unravelled by the Duke of Rovigo, none attracted a greater degree of Napoleon's curiosity than the singular negotiation carried on without his knowledge. He was anxious to know the exact part that had been taken by M. Fouché, M. Ouvrard, and M. de Labouchère, in this intrigue. M. Ouvrard was frequently interrogated, and had observed the most rigorous secrecy. M. de Labouchère was sent for to Paris, with the order to bring all the papers which he might still have in his possession. On comparing these papers, which corresponded with those found in the house of M. Ouvrard, and on questioning M. de Labouchère, the truth was soon discovered to be as we have already explained it; M. de Labouchère was seen to have behaved with discretion, propriety, and sincerity; that he had only taken part in these overtures with the conviction that he was acting in accordance with the will of the government; that, with his natural reserve, he had always kept himself within what had been said to him, and most commonly had confined himself to the transmission of notes sent by M. Ouvrard; that M. Ouvrard, in order to regain connection with the government, and M. Fouché, to bring about peace, had resumed a negotiation which had been nearly abandoned, and had far surpassed the first instructions of Napoleon, by representing him as willing to sacrifice what he would not have relinquished at any price. Napoleon was particularly wounded by the possibility of England supposing that he wished to deceive her by double dealing,—especially that he was willing to found his transactions on the bases of kingdoms given to his brother; above all, that of Spain. Being resolved to estimate the full extent of the evil, it was necessary to penetrate all the intricacies of the affair. A newly-discovered circumstance increased greatly his alarm, and determined him to remove the veil from M. Fouché's disgrace, and to render it public and striking. It had been brought to

light that, independently of the communications established through M. de Labouchère, there were others, anterior to these, which implied a much greater degree of boldness; for they were not the resumption, or even exaggeration, of a negotiation already begun, but the spontaneous commencement of one by M. Fouché. From the month of December, M. Fouché had selected an agent named Fagan, formerly an officer in an Irish regiment, respectably connected in England, and the friend of Lord Yarmouth, by whom he had been introduced to the Marquis Wellesley. It could not be doubted that this transaction must have given rise to some written papers, which so forcibly impressed the mind of Napoleon that he instantly sent an order to M. Fouché to deliver up all papers remaining in his hands, on pain of the most serious consequences.

The above-named agent had brought from London a few unimportant papers, which had been burnt by M. Fouché, both on account of their own insignificance, and of his desire to destroy the slightest trace of so rash an undertaking. M. Fouché, taken by surprise in his chateau de Ferrières, declared that, little as there was to burn, he had burnt all; on which Napoleon resigned himself to the most violent outburst of anger, fearing that the obstinate dissimulation of M. Fouché concealed some formidable mysteries. He withdrew from him the government of Rome, and condemned him to exile in his own department,—that of Aix, in Provence.\*

But, in fact, it would have been easy to settle all alarms. The agent who had caused so much uneasiness was at Paris, and, being brought forward, he answered with frankness and simplicity all questions, declared that he had seen Marquis Wellesley, and gave up the only article he had received from him, which was a note in six lines, repeating the constant theme of the English ministers,—that they were willing to treat whenever a sincere and serious negotiation should be opened, which should include all the allies of England, and Spain in particular.

The whole result of the examination was to prove a strange degree of boldness on the part of M. Fouché, but nothing very serious as to possible or even probable consequences. The

\* On few subjects have more errors been stated by the authors of memoirs than upon this. It has been pretended that M. Fouché was disgraced for having refused to restore the letters of Napoleon, which greatly compromised him; an assertion without a shadow of truth. The letters from Napoleon to M. Fouché were not numerous, and not more calculated to compromise him than those addressed to all his agents, in which, giving way to his natural impetuosity, he often said, "I will deprive such a one of his head," without the least serious intention. He was also very careless of what he wrote, and little inclined to be ashamed of it, when he blushed so little for what he had actually done, as, for instance, for the death of the Duc d'Enghien. The truth is, that he was greatly irritated at the mission of M. Fagan to London, and believed himself more compromised than he really was. His orders and his correspondence prove that the second and most striking disgrace of M. Fouché was occasioned by his refusal to deliver up papers which he really did not possess, relating to the mission of M. Fagan. But the public, ever craving for mysteries, especially those of a sinister character, believed, and writers as puerile as the public repeated, that Napoleon demanded the restitution of certain letters of a frightful tendency, and their refusal led to a fresh outbreak on his part. For this there is no foundation: the whole truth is contained in the statements we have made.

danger was by no means that Napoleon should be considered at London too accommodating, but rather that he should be supposed too difficult, and that advantage should be taken of some puerile proposals to act in common against America, at a time when America seemed to balance between France and England. Napoleon did not then suppose that this last result would be the only one at all serious which was to be feared from an intrigue rather ridiculous than dangerous. Though speedily enlightened on the true nature and extent of this strange adventure, and consequently relieved from all anxiety on account of it, he did nothing to remove the disgrace of M. Fouché, who remained an exile in his department. But, fearing the accusation of lightly sacrificing his former servants, he collected the papers referring to this affair, and communicated them to certain of the ministers and high dignitaries who had witnessed his bursts of rage against the Duke of Otranto. "It is right," he said, "that they should see that when I punish my former servants it is not without adequate motives."

From this attempt at negotiation it manifestly appeared that without the sacrifice of Spain, to which Napoleon would not consent, peace was impossible, and that it only remained to continue the war with vigour, and to press the continental blockade as closely as possible. And, therefore, Holland, whose concurrence with the blockade was indispensable, deserved increased attention.

Had King Louis been sensible and reasonable, he would have regulated his future conduct consistently with the first; and, as he had consented to sacrifice part of his territory in order to save the independence of Holland, he would have endeavoured to secure the same degree of acquiescence on the part of his subjects,—the wisest of whom in reality wished nothing else. They were convinced that since they were in the power of Napoleon they must endeavour to convince Louis that his brother was not their enemy, though an exacting ally, imposing on them conditions which, though harsh, were designed to promote the common interest. Unhappily, the heart of Louis was sore. Softened for a time at Paris by intercourse with his family, he revived, on returning to Amsterdam, all his wonted feelings of suspicion and irritation,—feelings rendered still more acute by the sacrifices to which he had been driven. On returning to his capital, he thought he could read, in the countenance of his subjects, reproach for having abandoned the finest provinces of his kingdom; and, that he might not be behind them, he hastened to assume the appearance of still greater vexation than theirs. He was followed by his queen, who exhibited as much embarrassment as himself; and he presented to his subjects, who anxiously watched his countenance, an expression of distress, and held the language of one who felt the bitterness of his oppressed condition even more severely than his words implied. This was not the way to give satisfaction at Paris, nor to produce at Amsterdam the resignation which alone could prevent further acts of violence. And, unfortunately, his acts were still more imprudent than his language and manner.

He began by writing the most affectionate letters to the two ministers whom he had so

readily sacrificed at Paris, Messrs. Mollerus and De Krayenhoff, by giving titles of nobility to those who had just lost the rank of marshals, (an atonement suitable, perhaps, but contrary to the policy which he had engaged to follow,) and by deposing the burgomaster Vander Poll, who had been unwilling to put Amsterdam in a state of defence. To these acts he added another of a still more serious character. Having taken a dislike to the French ambassador, M. de Larochefoucauld, whom he regarded as a spy, he wished to avail himself of his absence, and to give reception to the diplomatic body, which would cause him to meet only M. Sérurier, simply a *chargé d'affaires*. M. Sérurier was a man of prudence and reserve, who confined himself to the exact and punctual execution of his orders, and deserved to be treated, at least, with politeness. The king passed him without addressing to him a word or a look, and loaded with attention the Russian ambassador at his side. This exhibition had attracted much notice; it produced great anxiety at Amsterdam, and could not fail to be reported at Paris by the French agent, who could not conceal from his government facts of public notoriety.

To these difficulties which arose from the personal character of the king were joined those which sprang from the nature of things themselves. The latest treaty imposed the severest sacrifices on the Dutch. In the first place, they were bound to deliver up the American cargoes introduced into Holland under the flag of the United States, and seized at the demand of the French government. But the greater part were either the property of Dutch houses which carried on the intermediate trade on their own account, or the property of English houses associated with Dutch merchants. All these houses offered resistance, some alleging that the cargoes were composed of Dutch merchandise brought under the American flag from the Dutch colonies; others that they contained only merchandise truly brought from America by American vessels. Instead of these cargoes, the king attempted to deliver up the prizes taken by our privateers and belonging to them. But the surrender of the American cargoes was one of the articles of the treaty to which Napoleon attached great importance, both as the means of attacking the principal source of the contraband trade, and also of enriching his *trésor extraordinaire* at the expense of the contrabandists. On this subject, therefore, were exchanged communications of the most angry character.

The establishment of French customs along the coasts of Holland was not less difficult. Great numbers of French officers of custom had come from Boulogne, Dunkirk, Antwerp, Cleves, Cologne, and Mentz, unable to speak Dutch, accustomed to an extreme rigour of surveillance, and exercising their functions with a species of military honour which rendered them somewhat abrupt and very hard to bribe. This species of officer is best for the governments who require to defend their frontiers, but the worst for the merchants. The Dutch were obliged to endure on their coasts and in their ports the presence of these foreign agents, and to undergo their minute examination, which was intolerable to a people almost exclusively naval and always accustomed to great commercial freedom; and

the annoyance though great, would have been less painful if they had been confined to the outer frontier. But the configuration of Holland rendered their presence necessary in the very heart of the country. Holland is, in fact, not merely crossed in all directions by a multitude of rivers and canals, but is, as it were, penetrated by a vast sea, called the Zuyder-Zee, which connects all parts of the country together by means of a very convenient and rapid inland navigation. If this sea, which is entered by the passage of the Helder and others more to the north, had possessed only one outlet, it would have been possible, by guarding it, to leave a perfect liberty of internal communication by sea and river. But, this not being the case, it had been necessary to scatter the officers of custom through the interior of the Zuyder-Zee; and Friesland, Overijssel, and Gueldres, could only introduce their produce into North Holland, in exchange for foreign produce, exposed to an intolerable surveillance. For instance, to make them discharge every vessel, even down to turf-barges, to be sure that they carried nothing contraband, was either impracticable or revolting. Add to this, that, in order to give a penal sanction to the measures employed, it had been found necessary to form commissions of French officers of custom and military officers with a power of summary judgment. At this interference with his sovereignty Louis could no longer contain himself, and he ordered the discharge of all persons arrested for contraband trade.

Independently of these difficulties, the military occupation presented one greater than all the rest, and which increased with the proximity of the French ports to Amsterdam. Marshal Oudinot, who commanded the combined forces which were to guard the entrances to Holland, had his head-quarters at Utrecht. He had stationed posts from Utrecht to the mouths of the Meuse, and along the coasts of North Holland from the mouths of the Meuse to the Hague. But it was necessary to go still higher, if they would close the Zuyder-Zee and Amsterdam against the contrabandists. But this Louis would not allow, whether on the dictates of his own mind or by instigation of the secret partisans of a revolt. He had consented that French troops should be at Utrecht, or even at the Hague, because a desperate defence was not absolutely impossible, by inundating the rest of the country and inviting the English fleets. There would have remained, in short, the rich peninsula of North Holland, wholly commanded by the waters rising from the sluices of Katwyk to the Texel, between the Northern Ocean on one side, the sea of Harlem and the Zuyder-Zee on the other, covered with green pastures, flowery gardens, and opulent cities, such as Leyden, Harlem, and Amsterdam. By intersecting this long tongue of land at Leyden, and submerging its borders, Louis might have rendered himself invincible, and might long have disputed the Batavian independence with Napoleon, as it had been disputed two centuries before with Louis XIV. But to render this possible it was necessary that the French troops should not be brought above Leyden.

Louis had another reason for thus acting, in his reluctance to admit foreign soldiers into the capital of the kingdom, which would give him the appearance of merely a royal prefect. He,

accordingly, continued to insist with Marshal Oudinot that the French troops should not advance higher than Leyden, alleging that his honour and dignity forbade the admission into his royal residence of troops which, however friendly, were nevertheless foreign. In short, an advanced guard having presented itself at Harlem, that city was closed against the French, and the imperial eagle was constrained to withdraw.

To all these acts, more or less contrary to the treaty, was joined the open neglect of an article to which Napoleon attached great weight,—viz.: the arming of the fleet at the Texel. Some vessels had been brought together under Admiral de Winter; but the crews amounted scarcely to 200 men instead of 700 or 800, and thus the article which was the most easy to fulfil, the best-adapted to soothe Napoleon, the most useful whatever part might be taken, even that of resistance, was, for want of funds, not executed. All who came from the Texel reported the ridiculous character of the armaments.

These various subjects of dispute were, naturally, known to the public, exasperated by those who wished to be thrown into the arms of the English, deplored by the wise who anticipated the speedy consequences of them, and regarded by the suffering masses as so many proofs of the insupportable tyranny to which they were to be subjected. Louis, partaking the spirit of the workmen who met daily on the empty and deserted quays of Amsterdam, instead of calming the minds of men, excited them by his manner and language, openly asserting that he would not allow the military occupation of his capital, and thus pledging every feeling of self-respect to engagements which it would be difficult or impossible to fulfil. He threw into despair the wiser part of the Dutch themselves, who feared the total annihilation of their country as the result of this conflict.

Matters had reached such a point that the slightest circumstance might occasion an explosion. On a certain Sunday, one of the domestics of the French embassy being in a public square, in livery, was recognised, abused, beaten, and only with difficulty rescued from the hands of the enraged populace.

At any other time such an incident would have been unimportant; at the present it could not fail to bring on a crisis. Though the facts we have mentioned were reported to Napoleon by Marshal Oudinot and M. Sérurier without any exaggeration, he could restrain himself no longer. His *chargé d'affaires* almost insulted, his eagles repulsed from Harlem, the livery of his ambassador treated with outrage, were affronts which he could not tolerate, especially when the essential conditions of the treaty were either imperfectly executed or not at all. He sent passports to M. Verhuel, the Dutch ambassador at Paris; and, though he esteemed him much, he urged him to use them without delay. He forbade M. de Larochefoucauld to return to his post, and M. Sérurier to appear again at the court of King Louis. He demanded the instant surrender of those who had insulted the livery of the ambassador; that the burghmaster of Amsterdam should be immediately reinstalled in his office; that the gates of Amsterdam as well as those of Harlem should be opened to the French troops; that Marshal Oudinot should enter these towns with drums beating and co-



lours flying; that the American cargoes should be given up without exception; that the French officers of custom should be everywhere received; and that explanation should be given in reference to the fleet promised by the first of July. Finally, he declared that if any one of the conditions of the treaty should remain unfulfilled, he would bring to a close the ridiculous farce, and take possession of Holland as he had of Tuscany and the Roman States. To threats he added acts. The troops of Molitor's division, which were at Embden, were ordered to enter Holland by the north, those which were in Brabant to enter it by the south; both were to reinforce Marshal Oudinot.

These astounding intimations, so easy to anticipate, reached Amsterdam in rapid succession, and were there interpreted in the most alarming sense by Admiral Verhuel, who had left Paris in obedience to the injunction of Napoleon, and who was perfectly acquainted with his intentions. He made all those at the head of affairs distinctly to understand that there was no further room for hesitation; that they must either decide upon resistance, which would probably be fatal, or absolute submission, which could alone put an end to their danger. King Louis had recourse to a general consultation, to which he summoned not only his actual but also his former ministers, and, in addition to these, the principal persons of the army and navy. With the exception of some wholly unreasonable enthusiasts, and of others selfishly devoted to England by the basest motives, all true patriots were unanimous. While detesting the yoke of Napoleon, they considered that of England, which was their only alternative, still more to be deprecated. Besides the necessity of sacrificing themselves at sea for the interests of England, which were not identical with those of Holland, they could dispute with Napoleon only the smaller part of their territory; the greater part must be abandoned to him after frightful ravages; the smaller saved by inundating it and by surrendering to the English the docks, the arsenals, and the fleets. No man of sense or patriotism could advocate such a step, which was supported merely by two or three fanatics blinded by hatred. The wiser part almost universally showed by their countenance and language that they regarded resistance as alike impossible and unjustifiable; so that King Louis found himself abandoned by those to whom he thought he had devoted himself. And although the common people, who ascribed their misery to us, and some important families allied to England in sentiment and interest, had contributed to direct the public opinion against the French, yet the *bourgeoisie*, formerly inclined to them in political tendencies though subsequently rendered averse by commercial sufferings, began now to perceive the danger which threatened Holland, and saw clearly that, if the struggle continued, it would be necessary to throw their country, ruined and wasted, at the feet of the English aristocracy; and therefore they declared against the imprudence of the government. King Louis, pledged by his public declarations not to tolerate the French at Amsterdam, and at the same time deserted by his subjects, whose passions he had too warmly seconded, knew not what step to take, and felt his mind in a state of hopeless perplexity.

In this painful situation, he resumed a design, which he had often cherished, though without fixed purpose, to submit to the will of his brother and to relinquish a struggle so manifestly unequal. He sent for M. Sérurier, the French *chargé d'affaires*, to whom he had given so cold a reception a few days before, met him with the greatest courtesy, begged his advice, which he promised closely to follow, offered to bring to justice those who had insulted the ambassador's livery, to reinstall the burgomaster of Amsterdam, though little anxious to resume his functions, to surrender the American cargoes, to admit the French officers of custom, to forward the arming of the fleet, all on the single condition of not being obliged to receive the French into his capital. This, he said, was a humiliation to which he could not submit. That unfortunate prince had so frequently repeated that he would not allow foreign troops in his place of his residence, that he thought he could not retract without disgrace. It should also be added, that his deep-seated and incurable suspicion led him to believe that Napoleon had resolved on his deposition, and that, if the French were once admitted to Amsterdam, he would be dethroned, without having the melancholy satisfaction of a voluntary abdication. He, therefore, urged delay in the admission of the French troops.

But the orders of Napoleon were so positive that neither Marshal Oudinot nor M. Sérurier dared to defer a measure which he had strictly commanded. M. Sérurier conjured the king not to be alarmed at the presence of French soldiers, who were his countrymen, who had raised him to the throne, who would always respect in him the brother of their emperor, and who had orders to behave towards him as towards a royal power, friendly, allied, and closely related. But he had no power to modify the military instructions which the marshal had received, and he was obliged to allow the French troops to approach, at the same time losing no time in conveying to Paris intelligence of the proceedings at Amsterdam.

Placed between the Dutch, who were averse to a resistance which must end in the ruin of their country, and the French soldiers, who were continually advancing towards Amsterdam,—perceiving no way of saving his dignity but by the relinquishment of his throne,—the king resolved to descend from it voluntarily, as the only method of resigning it not attended with dishonour. He assembled his ministers; announced to them, as a profound secret, his determination to abdicate in favour of his son, and to confide the regency to his wife; that a woman, and a mother, dear to Napoleon, resigned to all that he might demand, would disarm him by her very weakness, and might yield to all his wishes without incurring disgrace. His ministers heard his declaration in silence, expressed some regret at being deprived of a king so devoted to the interests of Holland, but made no opposition, well convinced that in the present state of affairs the royalty of a child under the regency of a woman was the very last form of government under which the independence of Holland could be prolonged. At the urgent solicitation of the king, they promised to observe the profoundest secrecy, in order that he might have time to abdicate, and to withdraw at liberty to whatever place he might select. This pre-

saution, inspired by his wonted suspicion, was superfluous; for neither M. Sérurier nor Marshal Oudinot being able to prevent his abdication, would have ever thought of laying hands on his person.

Not more than forty-eight hours were devoted to the preparations for this abdication. The French *chargé d'affaires* and the commander-in-chief knew nothing of it. It was agreed that the king should set off without attendants and under a close disguise; that the act of abdication should be immediately taken to the legislative body; that the ministers should be formed into a council of regency, and govern in the name of the young king till the return of the queen, who had remained only a few days in Holland: and that that princess should be invited to Amsterdam to assume the regency and the education of her son. All the acts were signed on the night of the 2d and 3d July, 1810, and, immediately afterwards, Louis, entering his carriage, departed without any of his ministers being acquainted with the place of his retreat. On the morning of the 3d of July, this final resolution of the brother of Napoleon became known, to the great surprise and uneasiness of the city of Amsterdam, and to the utter astonishment of the French embassy and army.

The ministers went to congratulate the child who had now become king, and who was intrusted for the time to the care of a suitable governess. They then went to the legislative body to communicate the event which had taken place. In the course of the afternoon, the French army, already at the gates of Amsterdam, was received by the former burgomaster, Vander Poll, who had been reinstated, and by the Dutch military authorities. Their reception was almost friendly. The common people made no resistance. The mass of the inhabitants, regretting the prince, who, somewhat imprudently, had devoted himself to their interests, thought that they must now place all their hope in Napoleon, and seek, in a union with the greatest empire in the world, an indemnification for the loss of their independence and the sufferings which must result from the rigorous application of the continental blockade. And all parties waited with calm but intense curiosity for the resolutions that might be adopted at Paris.

M. Sérurier had instantly despatched a member of the French legation to announce to Napoleon the singular abdication of Louis. But on the very day of his arrival—that is, July 6—a report had been presented to Napoleon by his own order, intended to lead to the union of Holland with France.\* His course had, therefore, been decided before the abdication of his brother. Nevertheless, decided as he was, Na-

poleon felt, at the moment of passing from the simple project to the execution, the seriousness of the act which he was about to effect. Indeed, the very day after the treaty of Vienna and the marriage of Maria Louisa, he had directed all his thoughts towards peace, and had distributed his forces with the view of evacuating Germany and reassuming the continental powers;—a strange method of removing the alarm of Europe, to seize in the course of three months, first, Brabant and Zealand, then the whole of Holland, and thus to annex 2,000,000 of souls to the empire, and to carry forward his frontiers from the Scheldt to the Wahal, from the Wahal to the Ems! Was not the incessant spirit of conquest always ascribed to France about to burst forth afresh in the most alarming manner? And would not England, who held in her hands the peace of the seas, the last and the most desirable of all, become more irreconcilable than ever, when called upon to put up with not only the annexation of Antwerp and Flushing to France, but also that of Helvoetsluys and Rotterdam, of Amsterdam and the Helder? Napoleon was well aware of these difficulties; but, exulting at the idea of joining such territories, gulfs, and ports to France, of closing such extensive markets against the British merchandise, and considering himself exonerated from the charge of usurpation by the situation in which he was placed by the abdication of his brother, he went further, and openly declared the union of Holland to the Empire. He occupied only two days in considering the conditions of this union, which was decreed on the 9th July, 1810, Napoleon having been informed of the abdication on the evening of the sixth.

The motive acknowledged to France and to Europe in general was, that Holland being without a king, Napoleon was obliged to subject it to the vigorous and vigilant administration of the empire to prevent it falling into the hands of the English, and that, united to France, Holland would contribute to the common cause important naval forces and a vast extent of coasts rigorously interdicted from British commerce. The motive expressed to the Dutch in particular was, that being situated between the sea which was closed by the English, and the continent closed by the French, they would soon be exposed to die of famine, and in any case condemned to the paralyzing influence of an enormous debt: that, on the contrary, if united to the greatest empire of the world, they would at least have the continent open to them during the war, and both land and sea during the peace; that their commerce would be more extensive than at the time of their most brilliant prosperity; that their navy, now reduced to nothing, would, when united to that of France, see those glorious days return when, commanded by Tromp and Ruyter, it disputed the sovereignty of the sea with Great Britain; that their citizens, placed on an equal footing with those of France, and joining in her councils with an equal title, would find in a new and powerful country the recompense for that which they had lost.

On these grounds, specious in themselves, and which time would have partly verified if matters had continued as they were, Napoleon decreed, with surprising boldness of expression, "that Holland was united to France." And

\* This report exists in the archives of foreign affairs, dated July 6, the day on which M. de Caraman, the bearer of the news of the abdication, arrived at Paris. It must, therefore, have been ordered, and even drawn up before the abdication of Louis was known. This is further proved by a phrase contained in it which says that H. I. M. had resolved to recall that august prince whom he had selected from his family to present to Holland. It is, then, certain that Napoleon had been determined by events to unite Holland to France, when his brother resolved to abdicate. The fact is of no great importance; but it should be stated for the sake of truth, which is the first thing to be sought in history, independently of any inferences that can be drawn from it.

further, that Amsterdam should be the third city of the empire, having four months before assigned the second place to Rome. Also, that Holland should have six members in the Imperial Senate, six deputies in the Council of State, twenty-five in the legislative body, two counsellors in the Court of Cassation. This was a powerful attraction offered to every form of ambition. He confirmed in their rank the officers of the land and sea service, added the Dutch royal guard to the French Imperial guard, and ordered that the Dutch regiments of the line should take rank in the French army after the existing regiments of the line, and in the order of their number. Nothing could more flatter the Dutch army than such an adoption.

The territory was divided into nine departments, two for the part already united under the title of the Departments of the mouths of the Scheldt and the mouths of the Rhine, and seven for Holland itself, under the title of the Departments of the Zuyder-Zee, of the mouths of the Meuse, of the Upper Yssel, of the mouths of the Yssel, of Friesland, of the Western Ems, and of the Eastern Ems. The taxes actually levied were continued till January 1, 1811, when the French imposts, much less oppressive than the Dutch, were to be established in the territory of the nine new departments.

The principal detriment arising to Holland from her state of isolation was felt in her finances and her commerce. It was manifestly necessary to take some steps with regard to the debt. In a budget of about 155 millions of expenses and 110 millions of revenue, the debt alone was set down at 80 millions. Such a state of things could not possibly be continued; and, in fact, it had not been found practicable to pay the interest of the debt for the years 1809 and 1808. The different public services were paid by Exchequer bills, which were discounted at considerable loss, and were an anticipation of the revenues. Thus it was that the Dutch navy had suffered such loss, and that three thousand sailors had determined, for a livelihood, to emigrate to England.

Napoleon, thinking that the first moment of disorder was the most suitable for an act that should be attended with distress to some parties, and regarding the situation of Holland as similar to that of France after the Revolution, announced in the very act of union the reduction of the public debt to one-third. But he ordered the immediate payment of the arrears of 1809 and 1808,—a measure which afforded very valuable relief to many small fundholders who had suffered greatly, and indemnified them a little for a reduction in their claims, which had been already anticipated. He hoped that, in erasing from the Dutch ledger the debts owing to various foreign princes, the enemies of France, such as the princes of Hesse and Orange, a sum of twenty millions would secure the annual payment of the debt after its reduction to one-third; that by the suppression of many offices, henceforward useless, as that of foreign affairs, of the civil list, &c., a sum of 14 millions would suffice for the different branches of administration; that 20 millions might then be consecrated to the army, 26 to the navy, which would make a total of 80 millions of expense, and would be an important relief to Holland, overwhelmed with taxes. Holland had always shown great pro-

dilection for her navy; but, contriving means for its restoration, and by immediately ordering works in the docks, Napoleon flattered himself that he should revive in their ports a degree of activity that would encourage the minds of men, and make them augur well of the union.

There remained the question of the Dutch commerce. The abolition of the line of Dutch custom-offices between Holland and France could not fail to be highly advantageous to it; but it was impossible to effect it until the French officers of custom had taken possession of the greatly-indented and irregular coast of Holland. Napoleon determined that the line should be continued until January 1, 1811, the period fixed for the entire fusion of the interests of the two countries. It was impossible, however, to grant without delay one source of satisfaction both to Dutch merchants and French consumers, by admitting into the interior of the empire the large quantity of sugars, coffees, cottons, and indigos, which had in the course of time been accumulated at Amsterdam and Rotterdam. While this would be highly advantageous to the Dutch commerce, it would facilitate the future surveillance. However, from the facility of introducing colonial produce into Holland, their price in that country was not one-fourth of that in France. To sanction their introduction, therefore, without any duty, would have been to confer an exorbitant benefit upon the Dutch merchants, on which they could never have reckoned, and to cause a serious loss to the French merchants, who had laid in their stock at much higher prices. Napoleon met this difficulty by imposing a tax of 60 per cent. on the colonial produce received into France from Holland, which still left the Dutch unexpected advantages, while it occasioned less dangerous inequality of price to the French merchants, and brought a considerable return to the revenue. To this measure he added several arrangements for the establishment of custom-offices on the coasts from Flushing to the Texel, ordered the seizure of sequestrated American cargoes which had been so frequently demanded, and their transmission to Antwerp, and finally promised to the Dutch, by extensive privileges, a commerce as wide as the actual state of the world admitted.

Such were the general measures which accompanied the decree of July 9. There were some others intended to diminish to the Dutch the certain disadvantages inseparable from the union of their country with France. In order that Amsterdam might not be immediately deprived of a court, Napoleon determined that at that city, as at Turin, Florence, and Rome, should reside a person of rank, who should maintain great state, and exercise the imperial authority with much dignity. Having none of his own family at disposal, (none of whom, indeed, could with propriety have taken the place of King Louis and have been at once equal to the financial and administrative details of the union,) Napoleon chose as his representative at Amsterdam the arch-treasurer Lebrun, a man of mild and conciliating disposition, very expert in finance, and able occasionally to suggest the truth to his master under the guise of refined and agreeable pleasantry. He could not have made a selection better adapted to the Dutch character. In spite of urgent reason

stances, Napoleon sent him off without delay, invested with extensive powers and considerable emoluments, associating with him M. Daru to take possession of the crown property, the arsenals and the magazines, M. d'Hauterive to seize the archives of foreign affairs, M. de Las Cases to collect the maps and plans which he required in the arrangement of his maritime plans, and the skilful engineer, M. de Ponthon, to inspect the roads, gulfs, and ports, from Flushing to Embden. He hoped in the course of fifteen days to have received the reports required, and to be able to give the necessary orders as well for the rigorous establishment of the continental blockade as for the defence of the new territorial acquisitions and the re-establishment of the Dutch navy. Finally, he sent off General Lauriston, his aide-de-camp, to take possession of the prince royal, and to bring him to Paris. He did not suppose it possible that they would venture to oppose his decree of the union by a shadow; of royalty but, in any case, he determined to guard against it by seizing the prince and consigning him to his mother, to whom were intrusted his care and education. The young prince was to bear the title of Grand Duke of Berg, in return for his loss of the crown of Holland.

General Lauriston, having left in haste for Amsterdam, arrived there on the 13th July, where he found every one in a state of eager curiosity, but resigned to a union which had been too clearly foreseen to occasion much emotion. To him was intrusted the prince royal, who had been treated with respect, but who had never been expected to reign. The arch-treasurer Lebrun arrived the next day, the 14th July, and was received with much state by the royal guard, national guard, and civil authorities at the gates of the city. The royal guard, well pleased at having become the Imperial guard, uttered some cries of "Vive l'Empereur!" The crowd remained silent. The functionaries who wished to retain their offices saluted their new master, as they do at all times and in all countries. On the next day they took the oath, and one of the new Dutch ministers reminded Prince Lebrun, always rather absent, that he had forgotten to appoint prayers in the churches for the emperor. The witty arch-treasurer himself announced this to Napoleon, pointing out that he was by no means the most devoted of his subjects in Holland.

The Dutch are calm, steady, reserved, and combine with real uprightness considerable finesse and calculation. In general they did not wish to embroil themselves with the inevitable master whom destiny assigned to Holland as to many other countries, and, besides, they were sensible that the union might yield them some advantages. They could no longer maintain the isolated and agitated existence which they had under Louis, more Dutch than the Dutch themselves. Condemned to the tyranny either of the English or the French, they consented to belong to the French, in the hope of becoming, at the return of peace, the commercial agents of the greatest empire in the world. This was the sentiment of the most intelligent men, whose heart indeed suffered, but whose reason acquiesced. Fundholders, it is true, were distressed by the loss of two-thirds of their revenue; but, in general, little interest is taken in those small

capitalists, not sufficiently rich to attract attention, nor sufficiently blended with the people to engage their interest. The extensive merchants, a much more influential body, were pleased at the admission of colonial produce. The people of Amsterdam and Rotterdam, accustomed to have great weight, and even to be regarded with some degree of fear, had been favourably inclined by the immediate opening of the docks. Admiral de Winter, wishing to guard his country from any new errors, and being much beloved by the sailors, laboured to inspire them with confidence in the intentions of Napoleon, promising them the speedy restoration of the Dutch navy. All classes, therefore, found some source of consolation; and it remained to be seen how they would afterwards submit to the imposition of troops, the conscription for the army and navy, the continued closing of the seas, and, finally, the inconvenience of subjection to a foreign power which issued its orders from a distance and in a foreign language.

Scarcely had Napoleon received the first reports from his agents than he passed his decrees relating to the navy. Rotterdam and Amsterdam were the two great ports of Holland, the two great centres of the working population; but they were ports for building, not for warlike equipment. The vessels built at Rotterdam went by inferior canals to Helvoetsluys; those which were built at Amsterdam went by the Zuyder-Zee to the Helder, just as those which left the docks at Antwerp went down to Flushing to be equipped for war. Napoleon determined on having three fleets towards the entrance to the Pays-bas, that of Flushing built at Antwerp, that of Helvoetsluys at Rotterdam, that of the Helder at Amsterdam. He ordered ships and frigates to be immediately begun both at Rotterdam and Amsterdam; that those which were still sea-worthy should be repaired; and that, without loss of time, there should be five ships under sail at Helvoetsluys, eight at the Helder, with a suitable proportion of frigates and corvettes. The following year the number of vessels built and sent to sea was to be doubled. Napoleon ordered a levy of sailors; and, though many had joined the English fleet, he hoped that, by paying them well, he should still be able to complete all the proposed crews. There was no want of naval materials; those which were not in Holland might be found in Switzerland, and consisted of timber cut, but not forwarded for want of money. Nor would the funds be more wanting than the materials; for the duty of 50 per cent. on merchandise to be introduced, and the sale of the American cargoes, would replenish the treasuries of the Dutch departments. While waiting these returns, Napoleon had at command the bills on the sinking fund, which were universally admitted at full value. Out of them he lent a sum of twenty millions to the treasury of Holland, and in return he surrendered to the sinking fund a magazine of cloves estimated at ten millions, in addition to ten millions of real property selected from the best of the national demesnes in the new departments. The twenty millions of bills from the sinking fund, which were readily accepted by the Dutch capitalists, who knew their value, took the place of ready money, and set every thing in motion in the ports and docks of Holland.

Thus the union was effected with unexpected facility, and the continental blockade might be extended without impediment as far as the mouths of the Ems. As for King Louis, who after the abdication had, as it were, taken flight, it was found that he had gone to the baths at Toplitz. Napoleon ordered his diplomatic agents to treat him with the greatest respect, always to ascribe the late events to the state of his health, and to place at his disposal whatever funds he might require. For the time, then, all the difficulties of the union were smoothed; but what steps to have taken in six months! After the peace and the solemnization of his marriage, Napoleon had thought only of appeasing Europe, of calming the uneasiness of the various cabinets, of evacuating Germany, of concentrating his forces, and confining his energies to the vigorous war which he wished to carry on against England by military and commercial means; and already, by the desire of more firmly closing his coasts, of better tracing his frontier, and of comprising within it the mouths of the rivers which he called French, and the gulfs which seemed adapted to his numerous fleets, he had allowed himself to be drawn on to extend his territory from the Scheldt to the Wahal, from the Wahal to the Meuse, from the Meuse to the Helder, from the Helder to the Ems! What limit could be set to such a career? And what could be said to the European powers to justify, in their eyes, such dangerous encroachments?

Napoleon, indeed, concerned himself little about the explanations which he could furnish. With a degree of mental activity which seemed to arise from the vivacity of his sensations, he had almost forgotten his recent desire of restoring confidence to Europe, in his great occupation with the continental blockade and the reorganization of the European navigation. Accordingly, he scarcely deigned to offer some insignificant considerations to the different cabinets in explanation of this vast addition to the territory of the empire. Through M. de Caulaincourt he said to Russia, in an off-hand manner, that by its union with France, Holland had not in reality changed her master, for she belonged to France while under Louis as much as then; that, in fact, he could not act otherwise, his brother having abdicated the throne from ill health; that in Holland there were only channels, ports, docks, disconnected with the continent, and able to injure no power but England, against which alone they offered points of offence; that the continental blockade would really only begin from the period of the union; that the naval forces of the allies would thereby be augmented; and that a general peace, so greatly desired by all, would thus be more promptly attained.

To Austria he did not even address so full a statement as this, and to the other states he scarcely said a word. The cabinets to whom he deigned to speak gave no reply, for there was nothing more to say; they watched, they pondered, and waited in silence the time when some unforeseen event should allow them to exhibit the sentiments which, though concealed, they deeply felt. And it may be remarked that Austria, though very jealous in the direction of Trieste, was indifferent in that of Amsterdam, and that Russia did not consider the Helder suf-

ficiently near to Riga to induce her to take part with Holland.

At this time M. de Metternich left Paris to be placed definitely at the head of the Austrian cabinet. It may be remembered that he had come into France after the marriage of Maria Louisa, with a secret mission from the Emperor Francis. Under the pretence of guiding the young empress in her new position, he was to observe Napoleon narrowly in order to discover whether his marriage calmed the spirit of the conqueror, or whether he only aimed at a temporary delay of his designs upon Europe; whether, in a word, they might rely on a durable peace, or merely on a short truce. M. de Metternich, in setting out, wrote to his emperor that the latter alternative was the most probable.

While awaiting the consequences of his aggressive policy, the true character of which he wished to conceal even from himself, Napoleon, wholly devoted to the continental blockade, thought only of his new territorial acquisitions, in their relation to that important object. Notwithstanding the most rigorous surveillance and the severest penalties on contrabandists, a certain quantity of colonial produce or English manufactures continually reached the continent. The prohibited articles were occasionally, though less frequently, admitted by a bribe of 40 or 50 per cent. But this, of course, occasioned great loss to the English merchants; their goods, accumulated in the British *dépôts*, must be rapidly deteriorated; and the continental manufacturers who wished to spin or weave cotton, to extract sugar from grapes or beet-root, soda from sea-salt, or dyes from different chemical combinations, found sufficient encouragement for their efforts in a difference of price amounting to 50, 60, or even 80 per cent. The manufactures of the continent, therefore, and particularly those of France, were in great activity. It is true that the consumer was obliged to pay high prices; but to this he was resigned as to a necessity of war, and by this means was attained a double result, that of creating French industry, and of depreciating the value of those articles on which depended the credit of England.

Nevertheless, in this state of matters, besides the annoyance of paying 50 or 60 per cent. to the smugglers of all nations, there was the serious inconvenience of causing the French consumers to pay more for their goods than any other nation. Thus, the price of sugar, coffee, cotton, and indigo diminished in proportion to the distance from Paris. These articles were cheaper at Antwerp than at Paris, at Amsterdam than at Antwerp, at Hamburg than at Amsterdam. The cause of this commercial phenomenon was that the surveillance was either less, or less efficacious in proportion to the distance from the centre of French administration. This inequality would, no doubt, be greatly diminished by the occupation of Holland, and by the presence of Marshal Davout on the coast of the North Sea; but it could hardly be supposed to be thereby wholly removed.

This double inconvenience of paying an enormous bounty to the contrabandists, and of paying more heavily in France than anywhere else, so that the French suffered for their more

perfect administration, was agony to Napoleon. A sudden solution of the difficulty was suggested to his mind by what he saw had taken place at Holland. Not wishing the Dutch to be deprived of the benefit of the union, he had allowed the colonial merchandise accumulated by them to be transmitted to France, on the payment of 50 per cent., in order not too liberally to reward their long insubordination, and not too severely to injure French commerce already supplied, at high prices, with the articles which were to be introduced. This arrangement had satisfied the Dutch and been very profitable to the revenue.

On reviewing the statements of the taxes which led to these results, Napoleon was seized, as it were, with a sudden inspiration. He held two councils on commerce weekly, in which it was constantly urged that, notwithstanding all that could be done, the contraband trade crossed his frontiers, enforcing an immense bounty on articles fraudulently introduced, a bounty which weighed with greater oppression on the French than on any others. "Well," said he, one day, "I have hit upon a contrivance, by means of which I shall baffle the calculations of the English and of the smugglers. I shall allow the introduction of colonial produce at a considerable duty, say 50 per cent.; I shall thus maintain between the London stores and the continental markets the obstacle which keeps these articles at so low a price in the London exchange, and so high in the exchanges of Hamburg, Amsterdam, and Paris, an obstacle amply represented by a difference of 50 per cent. Far from relaxing in my surveillance, I shall render it still more rigorous; and I shall only admit the importations by means of the payment of this duty, so that the English, though they may sell their goods as they now do, will not be able to sell them at a higher price, since the terms will remain the same, and they will be obliged to support the same expense of transport, the same commission, and the same bounty. The only difference will be that this bounty will be paid to my officers instead of to the smugglers; and, to perpetuate the low price of their articles, I shall preserve high prices for the encouragement of my manufacturers, my treasury will thus receive all the advantages of the contraband trade, and I shall thus compel the English to support the expense of the re-establishment of my navy."

Napoleon caused to be laid before him information gathered in the different exchanges of Europe; and, after numerous comparisons, he came to the conclusion that the duty of 50 per cent. would maintain the low prices at London which were ruining the English commerce, and on the continent the high prices which protected French manufactures, and that the dearness occasioned by the war to the consumer would be equalized in Paris, Amsterdam, Hamburg, and Switzerland, so that the spinners of Mulhouse would pay no more for cotton than those of Zurich. Finally, from this new tariff he hoped to derive an important addition to his impoverished finances, a consideration as weighty, at the moment, as all the rest.

Resolved to impose the duty we have mentioned upon all the colonial productions, but not willing thereby to falsify his system of the continental blockade, Napoleon continued in all its

rigour the prohibitions to communicate with the English, to receive their manufactures or their colonial produce; and he decided that, as formerly, all merchandise of these two kinds, the origin of which should be distinctly proved, should be immediately seized and confiscated. But there was colonial produce of another origin, then called *origines permises*, as, for example, the sales of the prizes of our privateers or the privateers of the allies, the cargoes brought by licensed vessels or by bona fide neutrals. Napoleon decreed that all colonial produce derived from these various sources should circulate freely with certificates of its origin, on the payment of 50 per cent. All these supplies would not have been sufficient for the continent, nor would they have furnished much addition to the treasury, but it was understood that the examination of the origin would not be very exact;\* that certificates of origin forged in London or delivered by consuls who had been bribed (and such unfortunately there were) should be held valid; that all colonial produce should be allowed to be introduced and to circulate on payment of 50 per cent., which should be exacted either on their entry into the continent or on crossing the frontier. As it would be very difficult to collect so heavy a duty before the sale of the produce, it was allowed to pay either in money, or in bills of exchange, or in kind, that is to say, by surrendering the half in weight of the article itself.

This principle once laid down, all colonial produce ought to have paid the duty wherever it should be found; and if it could not be proved that it had done so, it was declared contraband and confiscated. Consequently, Napoleon added to his system the order that in all places where he could enforce his authority there should be made unexpected visits to determine the existence of colonial produce, to make it pay the duty if truly declared, or to confiscate it if it had been concealed. In this manner it was hoped to seize such articles almost everywhere at the same time, and to take, for the benefit of Napoleon's treasury or that of the allies, the half if they had been declared, the whole if they had been concealed. It is easy to understand what would be the result of such a measure applied to almost all the continent at once, and what terror it would occasion to the numerous abettors of the British commerce. Not only in Holland were found vast stores of colonial produce derived from the contraband trade, but also at Bremen, at Hamburg, in Holstein, in Pomerania, in Prussia, at Dantzic, in the large commercial towns of Germany, such as Leipsic, Frankfort, in Switzerland, which had become a sort of subsidiary to England, finally, in all Italy, at Venice, at Genoa, at Leghorn, at Naples. Visits to these numerous receptacles of contraband articles could not fail to subject a great amount of property to duty or to confiscation.

However, when Napoleon consented to admit the colonial produce of England, such as sugar, coffee, cocoa, cotton, indigo, cochineal, logwood, tobacco, leather, on conditions as burdensome to the English commerce as they were advan-

\* This toleration, which was the essence of the contrivance, was formally authorized by the correspondence on the customs, which still exists in the archives of that department.

teagous to the French exchequer, he wished to do more than lower the price of the manufactured goods of England. Against the cotton cloths of Manchester and hardware of Birmingham he waged a war of destruction, and decreed that wherever any manufactured goods of England should be found, (and they were easily recognised,) and to whomsoever they might belong, they should be confiscated and publicly burnt.

This system was established by a decree of August 5; and no sooner was it passed than Napoleon sent couriers to all the states of the Confederation of the Rhine, to Italy, Switzerland, Austria, Denmark, Sweden, Prussia, and even Russia. On some he imposed this system by the most urgent arguments, and recommended it to others, saying to all that by placing all the depôts of colonial merchandise under the severest scrutiny, they would be able either to exact a duty of 50 per cent. from the immense quantities of colonial produce fraudulently introduced by the English, or to confiscate the whole, and thus to appropriate the half or the whole, and thus have the triple advantage of enriching themselves at the expense of the enemy, of inflicting a fatal blow on their commerce, and of rendering fraud almost impossible for the future, by scattering those vast accumulations over which it would have been always so difficult to exercise any surveillance.

Napoleon hastened to enforce his advice by his example, and immediately made some seizures. But those in the interior of the empire were not likely to prove the most productive, for the French officers had not allowed much of the prohibited produce to be introduced. The clandestine depôts were established chiefly on the frontiers. Napoleon had the boldness to declare that every depôt established within four days' journey of the French frontiers had manifestly contemplated the injury of France, and he therefore felt himself entitled to punish them by instituting a visitation, and consequently ordered the generals who occupied the north of Spain to examine all the suspected localities. He ordered Prince Eugene to send, without warning, 6000 Italians into the canton of the Tessino, there to seize a depôt which supplied the whole of Italy with the prohibited articles. He was unwilling to employ French troops in that part of Switzerland which was towards France,—that is to say, Berne, and Zurich, especially; he confined himself to sending thither a director of customs to guide the Swiss troops in their search. At Frankfort he caused the seizures to be made by the soldiers of Marshal Davout, who happened to be there on their route. The decree of August 5 had been agreed to at Stuttgart, Baden, Munich, Dresden, and Leipsic, and it was immediately put in force. At Bremen, Hamburg, and Lubeck, Napoleon discovered immense depôts, which he seized without any consideration of the magistrates of those cities. He acted in the same manner at Stettin and Custrin, towns in Prussia, at Dantzic, a Polish town, in all of which French garrisons had been stationed. It was announced to Prussia, which had admitted the decree of August 5, that the proceeds of the merchandise seized on her territory should be reckoned against her debt.

Denmark, which, though observing the law of neutrality, had allowed much contraband goods to be introduced into Holstein, under the pretext of selling the prizes of her privateers, had accepted the decree of August 5. But Napoleon, who never fully relied on the execution of his laws in any place where he had no direct authority, hit upon a contrivance worthy of the most subtle financier. Besides being filled with colonial produce, Holstein, which was on the borders of the territory of the Hanse towns, had a frontier which it was difficult to guard. Napoleon thought it best to make an immediate clearance of this mass of contraband articles by allowing the transmission of the whole for two months into Germany on the advantageous condition of a duty of 50 per cent. The depôt was thus suppressed, and the collection of the duty on a considerable quantity of goods was secured.

To Sweden he repeated the threat, which every one knew was sincere, that he would violate the peace recently concluded and again occupy Swedish Pomerania, if any new depôt of prohibited merchandise should be allowed at Stralsund.

It appears, then, that the decree of August 5 was accepted by every state except Russia; and Russia did not oppose what was taking place generally, but asserted that the new tariff, though perhaps good for other countries, was not suitable to her; that she, therefore, would not accept it, but that, faithful to her alliance, and directly engaged in the war with Great Britain, she would not cease, for her own interests, to present every obstacle to the British commerce. At the same time, she expressed a certain degree of uneasiness at seeing French troops gradually extending themselves along the coasts of the North Sea so far as to establish a *tête de colonne* at Dantzic. These remarks she suggested with extreme moderation, and with the excuses of a power holding a post of observation, not of hostility. Thus, except Russia, who made these timid reservations, and Austria, who had no ports, all governments, including Prussia, adhered to the violent but lucrative system of Napoleon; and though all did not execute the decree of August 5 with the same energy as himself, not having an equal interest nor an equal strength of will, nor yet officers of such probity and exactness, yet they found and seized immense stores of merchandise. Our officers effected many captures in the north of Spain, in Italy, at Leghorn, at Genoa, at Venice, and particularly in the department of Tessino. The Swiss, disturbed in their smuggling, made some remonstrance; but Napoleon replied to them that he would not suffer a country which he had restored to peace, to repose and independence, to become the accomplice of his enemies and a stumbling-block to his power. Considerable quantities were taxed or confiscated at Frankfort, Bremen, Hamburg, Stettin, and Dantzic. The fifth part of the prizes was granted to the officers of custom and to the soldiers; and this was sufficient to stimulate their zeal and to fill them with pleasure.

In addition to money receipts amounting to about one hundred and fifty millions for that year, then very important, the treasury became suddenly possessed of immense quantities of

merchandise, arising either from confiscations or from payment in kind. Those which were derived from Holland were forwarded by the canals to Antwerp; those which were seized in the north of Germany were stored under tents in the boulevards of Magdeburg. Napoleon destined the artillery-carriages returning to France to bring these articles to Strasburg, Mentz, and Cologne. A sale by auction, frequented by all the colonial merchants of the empire, was begun at Antwerp and continued for several weeks, bringing very high prices. Similar sales were to be effected at Mentz, at Strasburg, at Milan, at Venice. While the sugar, coffee, cotton, and indigo, were seized and sold by auction for the benefit of the French exchequer, now the principal holder of these valuable goods, the English manufactures were burnt wherever they could be found. Of these manufactures there was a considerable quantity, particularly in Germany, and their destruction struck alarm into the contrabandists; and the blow was severely felt in England, its force being augmented by an accidental circumstance. Contrary winds had detained a number of English vessels for a long time at the entry of the Baltic. Six or seven hundred had been accumulated in sight of Sweden and Denmark, moored as they best could under the protection of the British fleets. The news of these rigorous proceedings met them all at once, and they endeavoured to retrace their steps; although Napoleon, in order to attract them, had diminished the surveillance at the entry of the ports, and some fell into the hands of our privateers, others increased the amount of unsold goods which distressed England and made her experience misery in the midst of abundance. Anxious to reduce the British commerce to the last extremity, Napoleon, with great secrecy, prepared, at the mouths of the Elbe and Weser, a small naval expedition, which might convey 2000 or 3000 men rapidly to Heligoland, to capture that resort of contrabandists, then filled with wealth.

Insatiable for the success of the industry as well as of the armies of France, and unscrupulous in the means he employed in administration as in war, Napoleon undertook to overcome other rivals besides the English. The Swiss had displeased him because they had greatly encouraged the contraband trade, and because, next to the English, they were the principal rivals of our manufacturers. They spun and wove cotton, not so well as the French, but more economically, because of the low rate of wages in their mountains and the fraudulent contrivances by which they procured the raw material at a low price. They were thus enabled to sell their manufactures as English in Germany and Italy. Napoleon forbade Prince Eugene to admit these fabrics, urging that Italy might easily make some sacrifices for France, which had made so many for her; and that he would show her no greater tenderness than he had shown to Holland if she behaved in the same manner. He also imposed upon Italy another impediment. That country exported a considerable quantity of raw silks, which reached England through the north of Germany, where they were manufactured for exportation to America. Napoleon increased the duty on raw silk one-third when it passed through Switzer-

land and the Tyrol, in order to divert it from England into France by Chambery and Nice. He wished thus to render Lyons the greatest silk-market in the world, and that the Lyonese might combine with unrivalled skill the choice of the best raw material.

In his desire to regulate every thing by his own will, he completed his system of license, by generalizing it and applying it to commerce in every form. At first, only certain kinds of vessels sailed under the protection of a license. Henceforward every vessel which should sail in the ocean or the Mediterranean might be seized by our privateers, unless provided with a license, stating the place of its departure and where it would touch, and also the nature of its cargo, both in departure and return. It was allowed, under an assumed flag, to repair even to Looe land, notwithstanding the decrees of Berlin and Milan, provided it carried national productions and brought back only certain defined articles. The vessels sent from France or from the allied countries might carry out cargoes of grain, linen, silk, cloth, objects of Parisian luxury, as wine, in particular, and bring back naval stores, American cotton, indigo, cochineal, dyewoods, rice, tobacco. Sugar and coffee were strictly prohibited. In the Mediterranean, in particular, the French vessels might carry grain, oil, wine, cloth, glass, soap, and other French products, and bring back merchandise from certain quarters, as the cotton (so called) of the Levant, Mocha coffee, and various drugs. The whole system of commerce was thus regulated by decree,—that is to say, rendered almost impossible. All the art in the world could not persuade the English to take our products while we refused to take theirs. Yet the result which Napoleon had actually obtained was to have inflicted, by singularly violent but very efficacious means, a severe blow upon the British commerce, by lowering the value of all the articles which served as security for the paper money of England. It was impossible to see the end of a resolute perseverance in such formidable measures.\*

While Napoleon was thus waging an active and ruinous war against the British commerce, he was also preparing for that nation another danger,—viz.: a rupture with America. Though he seized the American vessels under pretext that some French vessels had been seized in America, in virtue of the law of embargo, he had not ceased to correspond with the government of the Union, and to declare himself ready to waive the decrees of Berlin and Milan in their special favor if America would cause England to respect their neutrality. He had, besides, singularly flattered the pride of that government by declaring that France would not oppose their seizing Florida, which Spain was manifestly unable to keep, nor would she oppose the emancipation of the Spanish colonies. In accordance with these declarations, Napoleon announced, by a decree, that from the first of the following November, (1810,) the

\* It is not without having read all the correspondence of the officers of customs, of the minister of the interior, of the ministers of finance and the treasury, and, finally, of our consuls abroad, that I have given this description of the complications and the effects of the continental blockade. I think, therefore, that I can affirm the exact accuracy of all the details which I have given, which seemed to me necessary to the knowledge of this period of history.



Americans should not be subject to the decrees of Berlin and Milan, and, therefore, might enter the French ports if they had either obtained from the English the revocation of the orders in council, or had refused to submit to them, and had taken measures to withdraw themselves from their operation.

Nothing could have been better calculated than such a policy; for, when the French restored to the Americans the right of neutrals, they could not avoid demanding the same of England, even at the cost of war; and, in fact, affairs seemed to tend in that direction. We have seen that the Americans, having equal cause of complaint against each nation, had forbidden every citizen of the Union to navigate the European seas, and every French or English citizen to enter America, unless driven thither by stress of weather. For this act, which was too rigorous for themselves, inasmuch as it punished them for the faults of others, they had substituted another measure, which merely debarred their countrymen from intercourse with France and England, and at the same time declared that they would remove this interdict from the first of the belligerent powers which should relinquish the system of violent opposition to neutrals. The English, also courting the Americans, had revoked their orders in council as far as concerned them, and had excused their putting into the Thames to pay dues, but had substituted for this navigation-due their famous system of blockade upon paper, and declared that the neutrals might repair to any place except the ports of the French Empire, which remained blockaded from Embden to Spain, from Marseilles to Orbiello, from Trieste and Venice to Pesaro.

The Americans said, with reason, that England had by no means granted all that she ought to have done, in ceasing to require them to put in to the Thames and there pay tribute; and that in fact she had done nothing, if, by a fictitious and general blockade, she interdicted their touching at extensive countries which could neither be besieged nor blockaded. In vain did England reply that the revocation of the orders in council for them alone was an immense concession; that Napoleon made them fine promises but adhered to none; that, on the contrary, he had recently in a secret manner exhibited to the cabinet of London very unfriendly dispositions towards them, (alluding to the ridiculous propositions transmitted under the authority of the Duke of Otranto:) the Americans listened to none of the arguments.

Guaranteed by the decree of Napoleon, which

fully re-established relations with the Americans from November 1, if these last could secure respect to their own flag, the President of the United States announced by a proclamation, that if by the 2d of the following February (1811) England should not have revoked all her plans, even that of the fictitious blockade, the commercial interdict should be removed as far as concerned France, but maintained with every possible rigour against the English. There was but one step between the interdiction of commercial relations with England and open war, for it was probable that the English would not allow American vessels to enter French ports, that they would seize them on their way, and that, however inclined America might be to peace, she could not allow her vessels to be turned from their course and perhaps captured in the open sea, without avenging her outraged honour and her endangered security.

By such means Napoleon endeavoured during 1810 to ruin the commerce of Great Britain, while his generals in the Peninsula endeavoured to drive her armies into the sea. These means, which displayed the extent of his genius, the depth of his calculations, and the force of his passions, might effect his object, but they might also carry him much further than he intended. It was necessary, in short, to take care lest his efforts to debar England from the continent, which had already obliged him to seize Holland and to oppress the states on the North Sea and the Baltic, should procure as many secret allies to England as they procured apparent co-operators with himself in the blockade; lest this war of customs should involve him in a war of a totally different kind with those who might refuse to subject themselves to all the privations which he wished to impose upon England. It was therefore of importance no longer to continue a state of uneasiness hateful to everybody, but to devote himself exclusively to the war in Spain, to consecrate all his resources to it, in order to inflict on Great Britain a decisive blow, which, combined with her commercial sufferings, would probably oblige her to sign a peace and to subscribe to the alteration he had introduced into Europe. The fate of Europe was therefore to be decided in Spain, (an anticipation which, we shall see, was corroborated by the fact:) for in that country must be struck a blow at once prompt and energetic, if he were not disposed to prolong a state of affairs beyond all patient endurance, which might press less severely upon England than upon the constrained allies of France, or upon her sincerest friends, or even upon herself.

## BOOK XXXIX.

## TORRES-VEDRAS.

*Vicissitudes of the war in Spain at the close of 1809—Retreat of the English, and their long period of inaction in Estremadura—Events in Catalonia and Aragon—The guerrillas—Plan of campaign for 1810—Situation of Joseph at Madrid—Siege of Cadiz—Of Llerda—Of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida—Sir Arthur Wellesley created Lord Wellington—His political and military views—Retreat of the English to Coimbra—Battle of Busaco—The English enter the lines of Torres-Vedras—Massena despairs of forcing their lines—Mission of General Foy to Paris to explain the state of affairs and receive further instructions and succours—Difficulties of Lord Wellington with the Portuguese Government, and also with the British Cabinet—State of opinion in England—Accession of the Prince of Wales to the regency—His political opinions.*

AFTER the battle of Talavera and the loss of the bridge of the Arzobispo, the English and Spaniards fell back with precipitation from the Tagus to the Guadiana. Although indecisive, this engagement, having occasioned the assembling of the French forces around Madrid, was to them in every respect as a lost battle; for it left them no alternative but to retreat with all haste to the south of the Peninsula, leaving their wounded, their sick, and even some of their property. The Spaniards had taken refuge in Andalusia beyond the Sierra Morena. Sir Arthur Wellesley had just taken up his position in the heart of Estremadura, in the vicinity of Badajoz. There, complaining, as was his wont, of the want of hearty co-operation on the part of the Spaniards, and particularly of their negligence in supplying him with provisions (as if they could be expected to provide for the necessities of his troops when they could scarcely support their own,) settled, moreover, in a country fertile in cereal produce and rich in cattle, with a retreat secured in Portugal, resolved not to venture with light cause into the interior of the Peninsula, since he fully comprehended the danger which he had almost miraculously escaped. Sir Arthur Wellesley alleged, as his excuse for inactivity, the increasing heat of the season, and advised the Spaniards to avoid great battles; to select a good position upon the Sierra Morena, and from that point to defend Andalusia; and there to await the effects of the season, always unfavourable to the invader in such a climate as that of Spain; finally, to learn how to govern themselves, to manage and to discipline their armies.

This advice was good, but more easily given than followed, and expressed in terms not altogether calculated to render it acceptable. It could not be of any great use to the Spaniards, thrown by a zeal for royalty into a state of revolution nearly as violent as that into which the love of liberty had precipitated the French twenty years previously; investing all they did with the ardour natural to the southern nations; and having to overcome the double difficulty of self-government and self-defence against a formidable invasion. A people less passionate, less inexperienced, than the Spaniards, might in a similar situation have shown themselves as unskilful, and with a little difficulty as resolute. Moreover, not appropriating to themselves the offensive reproaches of Sir Arthur Wellesley, they transferred them to the central junta, which had taken the place of the regency of Aranjuez, and to which it was then the custom

to ascribe whatever happened, not of good and evil, but of evil only.

If the English were discontented,—if they had more wants than they were able to satisfy,—if they were inactive either from design or in consequence of the heat,—if the undisciplined soldiery, led by the monks, were unable to resist the old troops of Napoleon,—the fault, they said, rested in the bad feeling and incapacity of the central junta. This unfortunate junta had, as its instructors, (independently of all those parties differing from it in opinion,) the provincial juntos, ever jealous of superior authority. The provincial junta of Seville, displeased at having to resign the reins of government to the central junta,—that of Valencia, proud of its pretended invincibility,—and that of Badajoz, breathing the sentiments of the English settled within the province,—heaped upon the central junta insults of every kind, and daily summoned it to convoke the cortes, which was the new remedy from which they hoped in a moment to obtain a cure for all evils.

Nothing would have been easier than to yield to this wish; and the central junta, weary of the sad and dangerous part it played, would have hastened to resign the authority into the hands of the cortes, if there had been unanimity upon the subject of its assembly. But it was not so. Although, unlike France in 1789, Spain had not commenced her revolution by an explosion of liberalism, but, on the contrary, by an explosion of zeal for loyalty, she reached the same point about the same time, and she was agitating all the questions which the French had treated formerly in the constituent assembly. There existed a body of enlightened men, who wished to take advantage of the absence of regal authority to effect those changes which the times demanded, and to present, to returning royalty, Spain, reformed and renewed; who believed they possessed, besides the rights common to all the nation, certain claims acquired by devotion to the dynasty; and who, in respect to national defence, deemed themselves capable of reforming abuse, thus taking from Napoleon the only pretext with which he had given a colour to his actions,—that of having invaded Spain for the purpose of regenerating her.

It was not only among the middle classes that this train of thought was to be met with. Doubtless it did there exist; but also among many members of the Spanish aristocracy, and among educated men scattered through all ranks, but united by circumstances into one

body, which events rendered powerful. The opposite opinion penetrated equally the various classes; it existed among the small portion of the enlightened nobility, among the clergy, among the magistracy, in the army, among a certain number of the Spanish citizens, and even among some educated men whom the French revolution had filled with terror.

While some, desiring a complete reform in the monarchy, demanded an assembly of the cortes, as the only instrument to effect a social revolution, others, not wishing this revolution, urged that, far from longer submitting to the administration of assemblies, a return should speedily be made to that of a royal regency, by which they had begun in Aranjuez, and which should be composed of five or six considerable persons, chosen from among the generals, the chief members of the clergy, and the former ministers of the monarchy. At the head of this last party figured the Palafoxes, defenders of Saragossa, the Duke de l'Infantado, the General Gregorio de la Cuesta, a singular individual, the Count of Montijo, a noble dwelling among a people whose passions he loved to excite, the Marquis de la Romana, commanding the armies in the north of Spain, and, finally, the old minister Florida Blanca. At the head of the contrary party were found the celebrated M. de Jovellanos, and many men such as M.M. de Toreno, Arguëlès, and others, less known at this period than subsequently, and who endeavoured to give to their country a government worthy of a civilised nation.

After a long struggle between the two opposing parties, an unforeseen circumstance brought about a solution. A conspiracy had been discovered among the nobility heading the party opposed to all revolution, for the purpose of dissolving the central cabal, seizing upon the power, and instituting a monarchical government without any reform. They wished to secure the support of the English, and had made an overture to Henry Wellesley, English ambassador, and brother to Arthur Wellesley, general of the British army. The ambassador, although England was not favourable to this central cabal and to the plan of a general reform, had loyally informed the principal members of this cabal. The conspiracy was thus frustrated; but the central cabal felt how impossible it was to maintain their position longer; and, desiring to be succeeded by the true representatives of the nation, decreed that the cortes should be summoned for the beginning of the year 1810, reserving to themselves the right of deciding at a later period the method, the place, and the exact time of their convocation, according to the circumstances of the war. Perceiving at the same time the necessity for a more concentrated authority, it instituted an executive commission, composed of six members, to whom were resigned all measures of government, while the cabal retained only authority in matters of legislation. Among the members of this executive commission was the Marquis de la Romana, a restless individual, always promising great things, and who never accomplished more than one,—that of escaping from Denmark with his division. He had been transferred from Old Castile to Andalusia, for the purpose of re-establishing a

better organization among the troops in this part of the Peninsula.

The Spanish armies were at this time divided into the army of the left, comprising the troops who had contended for Old Castile, the kingdom of Leon, the Asturias and Galicia, against General Kellermann, General Bonnet, and Marshal Ney; the army of the centre, comprising the troops who defended Estremadura, La Mancha, Andalusia, who had lost the battles of Medellin. of Ciudad Real, of Almonacid, and who imagined they had gained that of Talavera, because the English had defended their position; finally, the army of the right, comprising the troops which, under Generals Reding and Blake, had endeavoured, during the active year 1809, to wrest Catalonia from General Saint-Cyr, and Aragon from General Suchet.

The object of the new executive commission was to collect a vast army in the centre, in order to fall back upon La Mancha and reconquer Madrid from King Joseph, who, having at his service the troops of Marshals Victor, Mortier, Soult, and of Generals Sebastian and Dessoles, could bring together for action 80,000 of the finest soldiers in the world. In vain Sir Arthur Wellesley advised that no great battle should be attempted as long as they could oppose the French with no better-disciplined troops; the new chiefs in the Spanish government lightly regarded his counsel, and set diligently to work to organize this new army of the centre. They had assembled for its formation the troops which under Gregorio de la Cuesta had fought at Talavera, those who under Vénégas had lost the battle of Almonacid, and which comprised at that time the armies of Estremadura and La Mancha. To this they added a detachment of Valencians; and to form its *maitriel* they used that which they received daily from the hands of the English. They hoped by these means to assemble an army amounting to from 60,000 to 80,000 men, comprising a body of good cavalry, and the finest artillery in Spain. The proud Gregorio de la Cuesta was at first appointed to command this army; but the junto, which loved him little, upon some offers of resignation which he had made, according to his manner of continually threatening to retire, took him at his word, and named as his successor General Eguia, whose only merit lay in his not having lost the last battles. They proposed, after the hot season, to take the offensive against the troops which Joseph had assembled around Madrid, and, in the mean while, they urged the armies of the right and of the left to attack the rear of the French, in order to compel the latter to carry back their forces towards the north and to reduce their strength in the immediate vicinity of Madrid.

Meanwhile, events were transpiring of equal importance in Catalonia and Aragon on the one hand, and in Old Castile on the other. In Catalonia, General Saint-Cyr had struggled during the year 1809 against the Catalonians, and against the troops of General Reding, whom he vanquished in Tarragona. He was then sent back to Barcelona, there to establish some degree of order and supply it with provisions, and to remove the prisoners taken at the four bat-

tles which he had gained over the armies of Catalonia. He had conducted these prisoners to the frontier, and had commenced the siege of Gironne, which Napoleon had assigned to him, a little inconsiderately, as an easy task, and which was to prove the completion of his glorious services. General Verdier was appointed to direct the plan of attack, and General Saint-Cyr undertook to cover it. They had not yet learned, even after the taking of Saragossa, that sieges in Spain were really great feats in war, much more difficult than battles, and that the most skilful chief, with perfect unity of command, could with difficulty take possession of a Spanish fortress. Immortal and terrible sieges were soon to teach us this.

General Saint-Cyr left with General Verdier all the forces which he could spare, and at the head of only 12,000 men suddenly fell upon the fertile plain of Vich, where he procured for himself and for General Verdier a considerable supply of provisions, and then established himself in a position whence he could in some degree impede the armies which they could not fail to send to the aid of Gironne.

The heavy artillery, long expected, having at length arrived, General Verdier commenced the approaches. The town of Gironne, situated on the banks of the Ter, at the foot of fortified heights, surrounded by regular works, filled with a fanatical population, the very women of which played an active part under the title of the company of Saint Barbara, defended by a garrison of 7000 men, and by a brave commander, Don Alvarez de Castro, promised to immortalize itself by its resistance; and we are about to see that it kept its word. Besides, the length of time employed in preparing the attack, in consequence of the delay of the transports, had given the town sufficient opportunity to make ready for defence.

General Sanson, a skilful officer intrusted with the operations of the engineers, having decided that it was necessary to commence by the taking of the heights, a trench was opened before the foot of Montjouch, and after long windings a breach was made. Unfortunately, the siege not being conducted with sufficient decision, many days were permitted to elapse between the time when the assault was possible and the time when it was actually made, thus affording the enemy an opportunity to prepare for an energetic resistance. Our troops, arrested by the valour of the besieged, and particularly by obstacles built up behind the breach, were repulsed,—an event which excited great triumph among the inhabitants of the city.

After this trial, the point of attack upon Montjouch appearing to have been badly chosen, it was changed, and the approaches were undertaken against another bastion. One may easily imagine what a loss of time and life, and what vain efforts, were involved by these changes in the plan of the siege. Nothing had occurred to inflame the zeal of our soldiers or to cool the fanaticism of the inhabitants. At last, the breach being again made, and the Spaniards feeling this time the impossibility of disputing the fort of Montjouch with our troops, deserted it during the night. This fort thus became our conquest, but after a number of days equalling the length of the greatest sieges.

Wearied with the time employed in preliminary

operations, our soldiers undertook the attack of the place itself, and descended to the banks of the Ter, thus putting themselves directly under the fire pouring down from the heights yet in possession of the enemy. A new siege was undertaken against the walls of the city; and, the breach having become accessible, it was resolved to make the assault. Don Alvarez de Castro, at the head of his garrison, having behind him all the inhabitants, men and women, had sworn to die rather than surrender, and to oppose the French with heaps of corpses in place of the walls overturned by their guns. The assault was, indeed, made with the greatest vigour, repulsed, and renewed again with fury, under the perpetual fire from the fort and the heights, amid the noise of bells and the cries of a fanatical population. Often did our brave soldiers succeed in climbing to the summit of the walls, and there they always found a crowd of furious men, pressing upon them and opposing to them impenetrable masses. Women, priests, and children, were seen with the soldiers upon this blood-stained and battered breach; and it was at last necessary to yield to the noble delirium of Spanish patriotism. This was the second assault in which we had not succeeded during the siege. Never had the like happened to us since St. Jean d'Acre, nor was it destined to recur even in the sieges of Spain. We were now obliged to desist from a forcible attack, and to have recourse to a blockade, which, moreover, seemed sufficient, for typhus fever and famine were devouring the gallant population of Gironne and carrying off its last defenders. The governor himself had been seized with a fatal disease.

To interrupt the supply of provisions and ammunition was henceforward the only hope of success; and this offices was deputed to General Saint-Cyr. This general had first brought himself into disgrace (easy to have been foreseen) by showing too little respect to the ill-considered orders from Paris. His place had been filled by one of Napoleon's old companions-in-arms, Marshal Augereau, who, having been unemployed since Eylau, had eagerly requested to re-enter the service. But the marshal, after having earnestly solicited this appointment, was but little desirous of fulfilling his duties; and it was necessary that General Saint-Cyr should continue, in the most difficult conjunctures, to command an army which had ceased to belong to him, and which he had under his authority but for a few days longer.

At this time, General Blake, knowing that Gironne was in danger of yielding from famine, had collected all the wrecks of the armies of Catalonia and of Aragon, and was advancing with a convoy of a thousand beams laden with supplies for the town. Coming up as quickly as possible, General Saint-Cyr stationed himself upon the road from Barcelona to oppose the Catalonians, in that part of the line of blockade which was the most accessible and the most threatened. General Verdier was charged with the defence of the banks of the Ter and the immediate approaches to the enclosure. They remained for three entire days in front of each other, and involved in a thick fog, through which they heard the voices of men without seeing them. But, whilst General Saint-Cyr kept in check this invisible enemy, the Lecchi division of the besieging corps was surprised, and the

Spanish general effected an entrance into Girona, besides the convoy of provisions for a reinforcement of 4000 men,—an assistance more dangerous than useful, for the besieged wanted not arms, but food.

The unfortunate Alvarez de Castro, whose resources were not increased by this movement, having succeeded in secretly conveying to General Blake a demand for fresh assistance, the latter made one more effort to introduce a convoy into the fort, at whatever risk; for all Catalonia required that Girona should be saved at any price. He approached, indeed, with immense supplies by circuitous and difficult routes. But this time General Saint-Cyr, trusting only to himself, took the best positions, and concealed his forces in such a manner as to permit the convoy and the troops which accompanied it to reach the very gates of Girona. All at once his columns, successfully hidden from view, checked the van, and took the convoy in flank and rear along with its escort, obtaining possession of many thousand richly-laden beasts of burden, and making some thousand prisoners. The poor citizens beheld, from the top of their walls, that provision they so urgently required passing into the hands of the besiegers; and soon, decimated by fever, typhus, and famine, and deprived of their commander, who then lay dying, they were obliged to surrender, on the 11th December, after a siege of more than six months, leaving their name immortal in history.

General Saint-Cyr, having left after the repulse of the troops of Blake, had not the honour of receiving this surrender, although he had all the merit of it. He was even put under arrest for having left too soon, and Marshal Augereau, who had only arrived in time to be present at the opening of the gates, obtained from Napoleon the most flattering congratulations. Thus the Imperial government conducted itself already as those weak and blind governments who prefer the favourites who flatter them to the faithful servants who trouble them by the independence of their counsel.

Such were the events in Catalonia during the close of the year 1809. This great province, desolated though not conquered by the taking of Girona, attempted nothing of importance during the winter of 1809 and 1810. In Aragon, also, important events had occurred. After the surrender of Saragossa, the 5th corps, under Marshal Mortier, proceeded to the Tagus, and the 8d, exhausted by the terrible siege of Saragossa, had remained in Aragon. Happily, this corps had just received a skilful and resolute commander, General Suchet. This general, excelling at the same time in the direction of military operations and in the government of armies, (a double merit very rare among the lieutenants of Napoleon, more accustomed to obey than to command,) knew how to make himself at once loved by the soldiers and esteemed by the people, in spite of all the sufferings of a frightful warfare. His corps was composed of three old regiments of infantry, the 14th, 44th, and 5th; of four new, the 114th, 115th, 116th, and 117th of the line; of three regiments of Polish infantry; of the 18th cuirassiers, the only corps of this army which was in Spain; of some light cavalry; and, finally, of some fine artillery. He quickly got the command over his troops, and endeavoured to instil a sentiment of duty

into their hearts, as also of resignation to a war which the siege of Saragossa had rendered odious to them. After having allowed them some rest, he led them straight to the enemy. General Blake, who, we have just seen, commanded all the armies of the right, (according to the Spanish arrangement,) having formed the plan of profiting by the departure of the 5th corps, by throwing himself upon Aragon and retaking Saragossa, General Suchet, not wishing to wait for his attack, went to meet him near Alcañiz. But the French general soon saw that fatigue, disgust, and an insufficient organization, had produced upon his troops more distressing effects than he had at first imagined; and, after behaviour on their part somewhat weak, he was obliged to take them to the rear. By good fortune, General Blake, not profiting by this first advantage, gave him time to concentrate his forces at Saragossa, and there to recruit his regiments with some new soldiers taken from Navarre, to reorganize them, to clothe them with the resources of the country, to lighten them of their grievances, to reanimate them, and to inspire them with confidence and ardour to fight. When General Suchet had thus filled them with fresh spirit, they awaited at Maria the army of Blake, which arrived confident and reinforced, accepted battle in a well-chosen defensive position, and then, having permitted the first ardour of the Spaniards to expend itself, changed from the defensive to the offensive, and precipitated them into fearful ravines, thus occasioning considerable damage. Henceforward, confident in his troops, he followed the Spanish army to Belchita, there found it again in order of battle and inclined to resist, attacked it vigorously, and took from it all the artillery and many thousand prisoners.

After this day, General Blake ceased to dispute the plains of Aragon with General Suchet, and the latter had now only to contend against the guerillas and fortified places. It was necessary that he and Marshal Augereau should take Lerida, Mequinenza, Tortosa, and Tarragona, before they thought of penetrating into the kingdom of Valencia. But the siege of Girona may give us some idea of the true character of sieges in these countries.

General Suchet, master of Saragossa and of the fertile plains of Aragon, applied himself henceforward to calm the country and therein to restore a little order, to remove the guerillas, to draw from them the necessary resources for the army, with as little injury as possible to the inhabitants; and, finally, to collect the immense *matériel* for the siege which was unavoidable in the conquest of the forts. Knowing by much experience that in a rich country the support of a conquering army, though serious without doubt, yet need not be ruinous, if to procure necessities is employed, in place of the destroying hand of the soldier, the prudent means of a wise and honest administration, he assembled the former members of the government of the province, and among others the Archbishop of Saragossa, acquainted them with the wants of his army, the desire that he had to spare the inhabitants in supporting it, his wish to make them as happy as possible if they seconded his benevolent intentions. They recognised in his persuasive language, in his mild and intelligent countenance, a good and able man, who thought

ordered to subject them, was unwilling to oppress them; and they resolved to aid him as much as lay in their power. Saragossa, by its heroic resistance, thought it had paid its debt towards the independence of Spain; and, in truth, so it had. Besides, all the passionate and implacable characters had either been destroyed or dispersed, and the rest of the population demanded a repose, dearly enough purchased. These circumstances were well calculated to second the intentions of General Suchet; and, in a few months, Saragossa appeared to have sprung up again from ashes. The general re-established the former taxes, the collectors and authorities, and ordained, in agreement with the members of the provincial administration, that all the revenues should be put into the provincial bank, giving a large portion to supply the wants of the country, and took the surplus to support his army, making the promise, to which he scrupulously adhered, to respect persons and property. Although he did not allow his soldiers to want for any thing, he had the art of incurring certain seasonable expenses, so as to flatter the spirit of the country. In place of selling the plate belonging to the church of Notre Dame del Pilar, the object of general veneration, he restored it; he devoted some funds to the restoration of the Canal of Aragon, alongside the Ebro, as well as to the repair of the buildings most injured by the war; while he collected and repaired the heavy artillery, as well that which had been carried into, as that which had been found in, Spain, and thus he prepared all the means of besieging the important places, Lerida and Mequinensa, which it was absolutely necessary should be taken before the army of Catalonia could venture to approach Tortosa and Tarragona.

One obstacle alone stood in the way of complete peace in Aragon: these were, the guerrillas. While the central junta of Spain whose sad history we have just read, endeavoured, in Seville, where it then existed, to organize regular armies, which were always vanquished, there were formed, spontaneously, irregular troops, which no one had created, and which no one thought of supporting or directing, who, as it were, springing out of the earth, conducted by instinct, acting according to the circumstances of the moment, wanted for nothing because they took all their supplies by their own hand, reduced the French, on the contrary, to great necessity, appeared suddenly where they were least expected, dispersing if the enemy were too powerful, reappearing, if they found it divided, to guard posts or to escort convoys; despaired of conquering *en masse*, but destroyed it man by man; and, as humanity is not a characteristic of the Spanish nation, nor the duty of a people treacherously invaded, did not hesitate to murder, to the last man, the wounded, the sick, and their escorts. In course of time, such a system of hostilities, indefatigably maintained, is sufficient to destroy the largest and most valiant army, for it cannot always be united *en masse*; indeed, it is rarely so, for a considerable portion of the effective must ever be employed on the line of operation in obtaining provisions, escorting ammunition, or conveying the sick, the wounded, and the recruits. An army whose detachments have been destroyed is as a tree having its roots cut, which,

after lingering a while, must inevitably dry up and wither away.

The guerrillas, who had already given us much annoyance, were infinitely increased since the destruction of the regular troops of Spain; and the time was approaching when there would exist in the country but one organized army, that of the English, and multitudes of bands, impossible to be counted or even to be designated by name; and one could not tell which contributed most to the defence of the Peninsula,—the English army which fought the battles, or those innumerable rovers who, without fighting, took from us the fruits of victory, and rendered disastrous the consequences of defeat.

Sometimes an officer unemployed since the dispersion of his armies, sometimes a restless monk, a *curé* wishing to defend his village, a farmer disturbed in his lands, a student voluntarily quitting his studies, or a shepherd his flocks, to adopt a new mode of life, a smuggler deprived of his property, some urged by patriotism, others by religion, by the spirit of adventure or desire of gain, collected here and there some peasants, chiefly deserters from the vanquished armies, prisoners escaped from the hands of the French, took courage if they were successful, or, uniting themselves to others who had acquired some renown, established themselves in certain provinces, there governed the inhabitants by sympathy of feeling or by terror, gained from them authentic information, provisions, and a secure retreat, restrained them from submission, made terrible examples of whomsoever was suspected of being friendly towards the French, going about from one province to another if they were pursued, or if they desired a union; thus tormenting their conquerors, leaving them no rest, but rendering them as uncomfortable, as annoyed, and as unsettled as the vanquished themselves. While the centre of Aragon had been subdued by the arms and policy of General Suchet, all the neighbourhood of this beautiful province was overrun in the course of a few months by hardy and sometimes numerous bands of men. An officer of Lerida, the celebrated Renovalet, had settled in the valley of Jaca, to the south of the Pyrenees, in a convent almost inaccessible, and held in great veneration in that part of the country,—that of Saint Jean de la Pena. In the centre of Navarre a young student, whose name was soon to become famous from his own achievements and those of his uncle Mina, then nineteen years of age, placed himself at the head of some hundred men, and completely intercepted the road from Pampeluna to Saragossa, which was the principal route of the army of Aragon. To the south of this province, an old officer, Villacampa, having collected around him the wreck of the regiments of Soria and of the princess, with a certain number of fanatical countrymen, governed the environs of Calatayud. He was on friendly terms with Colonel Ramon Gayan, who, with about 8000 men, was stationed in the mountains of Montalvan, in the celebrated convent of Notre Dame del Aguila. Both were connected with an ally not less famous, l'Empecinado, who infested the road from Saragossa to Madrid, by Calatayud, Sigüenza, and Guadalajara. Finally, Garcia Navarro, at the head of 2500 insurgents, stationed at Tortosa towards the

Lower Ebro, completed, to a certain extent, the line of investing drawn around the province of Aragon, which, very quiet in the interior, was thus disturbed on the confines.

General Suchet, after having dispersed the regular army of General Blake, and re-established order in the government of the province, set himself to make war upon these bands. He had intrusted the pursuit of Mina to General Harispe. This general, after a hot pursuit, had succeeded in taking the young guerilla, and, in place of shooting him, as he was directed to do by the orders received from Paris, he sent him to France, where this prisoner was to be shut up at Vincennes. But scarcely had Mina been captured, when an uncle of this young man, jealous of the glory of his nephew, had re-collected the remainder of his band, and appeared in Navarre. General Suchet had directed an expedition against Jaca, and taken from Renovalde the convent of Saint Jean de la Pena. Without quite clearing the Pyrenees, they thus succeeded in freeing the grand route from Navarre. In the south of this province Colonel Henriod had fought with and dispersed for some time the bands of the intrepid and indefatigable Villacampa, and taken from him Origuella. Another French detachment had surprised the convent of Notre Dame del Aguila, and scattered the band of Ramon Gayan. By these fortunate strokes the roads from Valencia and Madrid were made free, and there was reason to believe that, the forts of Lerida and of Mequinenza once taken, and after them those of Tortosa and of Tarragona, the province of Aragon, perhaps even that of Catalonia, would be pacified.

But this advancement, due as much to the administrative as to the military skill of General Suchet, was far from being anticipated in Biscay, in the two Castles, and in the kingdom of Leon. Generals Thouvenot in Biscay, Bonnet in the Asturias, and Kellermann in Old Castile, were exhausting themselves to no purpose in pursuing the bands, and were quite at a loss how to proceed. It is true that the country was well suited to the roving life of the guerillas, and that other local circumstances favoured them equally. Thus, independently of the nature of the places, which were very perilous in Biscay, in the Asturias, and in the neighbourhood of Burgos and Soria, there was, in the sufferings alone of the country, continual cause for insurrections. From Bayonne to Burgos, from Burgos to Segovia, or from Burgos to Somosierra, according as they took the left or the right route to Madrid, the constant passage of armies ruined the country, and would have compelled a revolt, even against a government which was popular. Besides what was required to satisfy the avarice of the gangs, contributions in provisions or in money were levied by the French troops on their march. Generals who did not possess the wisdom of General Suchet, and who only considered how the marching armies might be speedily supplied, collected whatever they could,—corn, cattle, and provender, frequently gathering the harvests as they went, or giving it to their horses to eat green, troubling themselves neither about the succeeding day nor about an equal division of their burdens, but taking all they required at the first place they came to, to the utter desolation of a population already ruined. If, in addition

to these misfortunes, in place of a humane officer, he who commanded had been hardened by twenty years of war, soured by afflictions, irritated by crimes committed against our men, he shot the wretches who had done no wrong, who at most had only striven to defend their children's bread, and he shot them in revenge of the assassinations committed by the guerillas. Then after our detachments came the gangs, who had hung up to trees our soldiers taken upon the roads, and often hung beside them poor Spaniards, accused of having favoured the French. Frequently writings were found upon the victims, explaining, with atrocious reasons, the motives for their atrocious assassinations. Thus, in those unhappy provinces, wronged by the Spaniards as well as by the French, there reigned a dark despair, and, as it was decided that all this evil was due to our presence, they attributed to us alone both the excesses of our soldiers and the crimes of the Spaniards.

The gangs in these countries were innumerable. El Pastor in Guipuscoa, Campillo in Santander, Porlier in the Asturias, Longa between Aragon and Castile, Merino around Burgos, Capuchino and the curé Tapia in the plains of Castile, El Amor in Rioja, Duran in the mountains of Soria, Don Camillo Gomez in the neighbourhood of Avila, Don Julian Sanchez (a brave soldier, the death of whose father, mother, and sister, had taken him from his farm, and filled him with fury,) Don Julian Sanchez near Salamanca, and a list of others too long to be named, passed through the mountains on foot, and through the plains on horseback, now collecting for great expeditions, now separating to elude our pursuit, or sometimes even, as Porlier in the Asturias, embarking in English vessels when they were too closely pressed, in order to descend upon the opposite shores. Their crimes were fearful and their ravages ruinous. Independently of the wounded and the sick, which they murdered without pity; the despatches which they seized, and which revealed our plans to the English; independently of the obscurity which they maintained around us; of the often fatal delay which they caused in the transmission of orders; independently of the sums they carried away; of the continual anxiety in which they kept the French, as well as the Spanish agents in our service; they cut off all means of victualling the army, by capturing the horses, the mules, and the conductors; they at last rendered the recruiting of our armies impossible by compelling the battalions and the squadrons, then on the march, to remain in the North, and there to exhaust themselves in vain journeys, without being able to join the regiments which they were intended to complete.

Napoleon, according to his custom, sent in marching battalions, or in provisional squadrons, the new soldiers who were to recruit his corps. These conscripts were mere raw youths, led by officers of the lowest order, incapable of usefully employing their men, particularly of commanding them in danger, and, moreover, not taking any great interest in their preservation. These detachments had no sooner arrived at Pampeluna, Tolosa, Vittoria, Burgos, and Valladolid, than they were disposed of for local objects. These conscripts were employed in the pursuit of the indefatigable guerillas, though

still unused to fatigue or prepared for fighting, and numerically inferior to the bandits whom they were to pursue, and thus condemned to find a fatal apprenticeship in this war. The greater proportion, after a fortnight, went to perish in the hospitals, which were no other than convents or large churches, destitute of linen, medicine, and even of beds; infected with scurvy and devouring fevers, presenting, in a word, the most revolting spectacle. Out of so many men destined for the acting armies, only about one-fourth reached them. The destruction of the horses was not less than that of the men, and a troop of 300 cavalry were reduced in a few days to about 80 or 100 horsemen. Scarcely had they reached the first stations of the army in Spain than they breathed a pestilential atmosphere, and were in consequence seized with deep despondency. Soldiers and officers looked upon themselves as already devoted to a useless and inglorious death. The certainty, or almost certainty, of never being there under the eye of Napoleon added not a little to this feeling of disgust and despondency.

In order to destroy the gangs, the causes of so much evil, the generals commanding different stations, reduced to their own ingenuity, proposed methods either ridiculous or odious, such as to cut down the woods to a certain distance from the roads; to maim the mules and the horses of the country, so as to deprive the guerrillas of the use of them; to burn or to decimate the villages where young men had gone out to join the bands. The most sensible among them, General Kellermann, not knowing to what plan he should have recourse, addressed from Valladolid the following considerations to Major-General Berthier:—

“The force which I have at my disposal is evidently insufficient, since, independently of the enemy’s corps which I must oppose, it is necessary to guard against the numerous swarms of brigands, and of strong organized bands which infest the country, and who by their activity, and particularly by the favour of the inhabitants, escape all pursuit, and reappear behind you a quarter of an hour after you have passed. This is the system of dodging which seems to have been adopted by the insurgents.

“Permit me, prince, frankly to declare my opinion. The war with Spain is no longer an ordinary affair; there are doubtless no reverses or disastrous checks to be feared, but this obstinate nation undermines the army by petty oppositions. It is in vain that on one side are crushed the heads of the hydra; they reappear on the other; and without a revolution in the minds of the people, you will not be able for long to reduce this vast peninsula to submission; it will absorb the population and the wealth of France. It would gain time and weary us by perseverance. We shall only obtain submission by endurance, and by the annihilation of half the population. Such is the spirit which animates this nation, that we cannot gain over even a few partisans. In vain is it to exercise moderation or justice; this will barely obtain for you a little consideration or some milder epithets; but in a moment of difficulty, no governor or chief whatever will find ten men who dare to take up arms in his defence

“We must, therefore, have more men. The

Emperor, perhaps, is weary of sending them; but it is necessary in order to put an end to the war, or else to be satisfied with strengthening ourselves in one part of Spain, in order thus to complete the conquest of the other. Meanwhile, the resources diminish, the means of agriculture perish, money is exhausted or disappears; we know not which way to turn, to provide pay or maintenance for the troops, or to supply necessities to the hospitals, or, in short, to attend to the endless minutiae indispensable to an army totally destitute. Misery and privations increase disease, and continually weaken the army; while, on the other hand, the bands plunder in all directions, carrying off, each day, small parties or individual men, who, with the greatest imprudence, risk their lives in combat, in spite of the most positive and reiterated prohibitions.

“When buried in these reflections, I lose myself, but now return to say we need the head and the arm of Hercules. He only, by prowess and address, could terminate this great matter, if indeed it admits of being brought to a conclusion.”—(Letter from General Kellermann to the Prince of Neufchâtel, extracted from the *depôt* of the war.)

This signified that, besides immense forces, the presence of Napoleon himself was requisite to terminate this hateful war. Although the picture drawn by General Kellermann was far from being exaggerated, and the hatred borne towards us by the Spanish nation was as deep as he had represented it to be, yet the difficulties were not so great in all the provinces. By time and perseverance, and by destroying first of all the regular armies, and particularly by setting to work to expel the English, and, after having thus taken from the Spaniards all serious hope of successful resistance, by applying diligently to the good administration of the country, by submitting to involve it in considerable expenses to lighten the burden of the war, which would imply the employment of many men and much money, it would be possible to succeed. A general peace then ensuing, the work of Louis XIV. would a second time be accomplished, amid circumstances quite as unfavourable as those which had met Philip V.; but the first step was to apply to the accomplishment of this work all the wealth of France and all the genius of Napoleon.

The northern provinces, as has just been said, were the most difficult to subdue, from the nature of the country and the exasperation of the population. Besides the bands, there was a regular army to conquer,—that of the Duke del Parque, called the army of the left, and which the Marquis de la Romana had commanded. This army was composed of troops collected from Galicia, Asturias, and Leon, which Marshal Soult had neglected in order to penetrate into Portugal, which Marshal Ney had repulsed but not destroyed, and to which he had been obliged to deliver up Old Castile, in order to proceed to the Tagus, where he had received orders to join the other marshals at the rear of the British army. Marshal Ney, after the journey from Talavera, presented himself in Paris for the purpose of explaining to Napoleon all the subjects of dispute which had arisen between himself and Marshal Soult. His corps, (which was the 16th,) reduced by fatigue and by



autumn: complaints to 9000 fighting men, was, at the end of October, 1808, face to face with the Duke del Parque, whose forces numbered about 30,000. The latter, receiving from the *junto* repeated notice that they were about to resume the offensive, and march even upon Madrid with the reorganized army of the centre, advanced as far as Tamames, by the route from Ciudad Rodrigo to Salamanca, in order to try in some way to concur with the ambitious views of the government of Seville. Profiting by the example of the English, he stationed himself with prudence and some degree of skill upon a line of rocks of very difficult access, and from the heights of which an infantry, aiming well, would be able to stop the most valiant troops, if they were not conducted with much precaution. General Marchand, filled with the audacious spirit of his chief, accustomed but lightly to regard the Spaniards, advanced upon Tamames on the 18th of October, and did not hesitate to attack the position of the enemy. He charged them in three columns. Some guns covered by the cavalry were placed before the heights occupied by the Spaniards. Our cavaliers, in the twinkling of an eye, seized this artillery, after having cut in pieces the gunners, while one of our battalions of infantry, brought up in front, received the Spanish cavalry on the point of their bayonets and dispersed them by their gunshot. But, after this easy success, it was necessary to force the position itself. Two regiments to our left,—the 6th light and the 69th of the line,—having wished to gain the heights under the fire of 15,000 men, secured by their position, experienced instantaneously a considerable loss, and were withdrawn to the rear by General Marchand, who feared to lose too many by this bold attack. All our line followed this retrograde movement, and the intrepid 6th corps for the first time stood still before the Spaniards. The fire was such that we were unable to retain the artillery taken from the enemy, all the horses which drew it having been killed.

This was an insignificant check, but sufficient to raise the spirits of the Spaniards and encourage them to carry out their project of an offensive campaign. Nothing would please us better than to see them coming down upon us in a large body; for, mined by petty combats, our chance of success lay alone in general actions. The central government resident in Seville, already strongly inclined, in spite of the advice of Sir Arthur Wellesley, to bring forward once more the army of the centre, hesitated no longer after the battle of Tamames to command a march upon Madrid, which also was ardently desired by many of the persons confined in Andalusia since their departure from the capital. The central *junto*, finding even the General Egüía too timid, appointed in his room Don Juan de Areizaga, a young officer who had distinguished himself in the battle of Alcanitz against the troops of General Suchet. This new chief, who possessed some activity and energy, attributing to the officers alone the reverses of the Spanish armies, dismissed some, and substituted those younger and more accustomed to the great perils of actual war. His spirit of reform was much praised; and hopes were entertained of a speedy re-entrance into Madrid, in spite of the disdainful remonstrances of Sir Arthur Wel-

lesley. They said they could do very well without the English, since they no longer wished to act; and their confidence rose to such a height that they even discussed in the central government the measures which should be adopted when once arrived at Madrid.

Don Juan de Areizaga, having collected upon Sierra Morena the troops of Estremadura, formerly conducted by Gregorio de la Cuesta, those of La Mancha, commanded by Vénégas, besides a detachment of Valenciens, traversed La Mancha during the course of November, and came to the banks of the Tagus above Aragon, near the environs of Tarancon. He numbered under his command rather more than 50,000 foot-soldiers, somewhat more capable of preserving the line than the other soldiers of Spain, 80 guns well served, and from 7000 to 8000 good horsemen. Moreover, the ordinary confidence of the Spaniards animated this army of the centre. The approach of the Spaniards was learned with joy at Madrid, and preparations were made to receive them well.

Marshal Soult, now major-general of the army of Spain since the departure of Marshal Jourdan, whose duty it was consequently to regulate the movements of the different corps, had at first some difficulty in distinguishing the intentions of the Spanish general, which were by no means easy to perceive. The enemy might come by the route from Estremadura, opening from Truxillo upon Almaraz and the bridge of the Arzobispo; by the road from La Mancha opening from Madrilejos upon Ocana and Aranjuez; or, lastly, by the route from Valencia opening from Tarancon upon Fuenteduena and Villarejo. The marshal, having a great portion of his troops behind the Upper Tagus, towards Aranjuez, was prepared to oppose the enemy in all directions, and needed not to hasten to take any part. The disposition of his forces was as follows:—The 6th corps, under General Marchand, had returned to Old Castile, where, as we have just seen, he had an engagement with the Duke del Parque at the battle of Tamames. The 2d, which Marshal Soult had directly commanded, and which was now under the orders of General Heudelet, was stationed at Oropesa, behind the bridges of Almaraz and of the Arzobispo, guarding the road from Estremadura. The 6th, under Marshal Mortier, was at Talavera, ready to support the 2d. The 4th, previously commanded by Marshal Lefebvre, now by General Sebastiani, was distributed between Toledo and Ocana. The first, always commanded by Marshal Victor, was placed before Aranjuez beyond the Tagus, guarding the plains of La Mancha as far as Madrilejos. The Dessoles division, the royal guard of Joseph, occupied Madrid. With the 2d, 5th, 4th, and 1st corps, Marshal Soult could muster at least 60,000 men of excellent troops, which was twice the number requisite to disperse all the regular armies of Spain. In the impossibility to comprehend the plans of an enemy which was almost without plan, Marshal Soult so disposed his troops as to meet all possible emergencies. He brought back the 2d corps (General Heudelet) from Oropesa to Talavera, giving orders to keep a constant watch upon the road from Estremadura, whence the English would come, if they came at all. He led back the 5th (Marshal Mortier) from Talavera to

Toledo, and concentrated the 4th (General Sebastiani) between Aranjuez and Ocana. The 1st, which was beyond Aranjuez, in the middle of La Mancha, fell back upon the Tagus. So positioned, in two marches three corps could be united so as to act in concert. Thus was all prepared for every emergency.

About the 15th November, the enemy having all at once quitted the route from Seville for that from Valencia, and apparently directing themselves against our left, Marshal Soult conducted the 1st corps towards Santa Cruz de la Sarza, and caused General Sebastiani to take the first step in the same direction. However, Don Juan de Areizaga, after some uncertainty, feared to be cut off from the route from Seville, and thrown back upon Valencia, which would have left Andalusia unprotected; he therefore changed his course, and, marching to his left, came down upon our right, towards Ocana and opposite Aranjuez. Marshal Soult, following attentively the movements of the enemy, led the 4th (General Sebastiani) from left to right, and ordered it to cross the Tagus near Aranjuez, on the bridge called La Reyna. He withdrew the 5th (Marshal Mortier) from Toledo to Aranjuez. Wishing to insure unity in command, he placed the 4th and 5th corps under the superior authority of Marshal Mortier, and enjoined them that day to descend upon Ocana. He ordered Marshal Victor, with the 1st corps, to cross the Tagus between Villareja and Fuenteduenca, to the left of the corps of Sebastiani and Mortier,—rather a disjointed movement, and which might render Marshal Victor entirely useless, but which involved no danger from an enemy which need not have intimidated even one corps of our army had it been unaided. Marshal Soult himself left Madrid with King Joseph, the Spanish guard of this prince, and the remainder of the Dessoles division.

On the afternoon of the 18th, General Sebastiani approached the Tagus with the dragoons of Milhaud, of whom three regiments only—the 5th, 16th, and 20th—were actually at his command, the two others having been sent to reconnoitre. The general crossed the river by the bridge of La Reyna with his cavalry, leaving behind his infantry, who were still on the march. When they left the banks of the Tagus, following the route from La Mancha, they clambered up by pretty steep declivities to the edge of a vast plateau which extends from Ocana almost uninterruptedly as far as Sierra Morena and forms what is called the Plateau de La Mancha. General Sebastiani, coming to the farthest edge of this plateau, perceived the Spanish cavalry which defended the body of the army of Areizaga marching from Santa Cruz upon Ocana. This troop presented a mass of about 4000 horsemen, well mounted, well armed, and presenting a bold appearance. Not possessing more than from 800 to 900 dragoons, General Sebastiani found a perplexing inequality in his forces. Happily, Marshal Mortier, who had just arrived in Aragon, pressed forward to his assistance, and sent to him the 10th chasseurs with the Polish lancers. General Sebastiani had then at his command about 1500 horse.

General Paris, who commanded the 10th chasseurs and the Polish lancers, came immediately upon the plateau, and effected by our

left an offensive movement upon the Spanish cavalry, in order to take it in flank. Up to this time this cavalry had shown firmness, but, perceiving itself threatened upon the right, desired to send part of the line to the rear in order to oppose this attack on the flank. General Milhaud, seizing the opportunity, charged it in front with his dragoons, while General Paris attacked the flank with the 10th chasseurs and the Poles. In a moment all this mass, at first so imposing, was cut to pieces. The Polish lancers destroyed nearly an entire regiment: 400 or 500 horsemen were killed, wounded, or taken prisoners. We possessed about 500 fine horses with which to mount our cavalry. Unhappily, General Paris received a mortal wound while charging in person with the greatest bravery. This brilliant deed of arms augured well for the battle of the ensuing day, preparations for which were already visible. Behind the curtain of the Spanish cavalry actually rent might be distinguished the main body of the army of Areizaga, which had been marched from Santa Cruz to Ocana for the purpose of there giving battle.

The following day, the 19th of November, Marshal Mortier, commander-in-chief of the 4th and 5th corps, actually united, laid the plan of battle. General Sebastiani, as on the day previous, received the command of the cavalry. General Leval was to command the Poles and the Germans of the 4th corps,—General Girard the 1st division of the 5th, the only one in the line, the second being still at Toledo. General Dessoles was to have under him, besides the portion of his division which was present, the French regiments of the 4th corps. The Royal Guard were reserved in the rear. These troops comprised about 23,000 or 24,000 fighting men,—quite sufficient to disperse the 50,000 or 55,000 men of General Areizaga.

The little town of Ocana, round which was collected the Spanish army, is situated on the elevated, extensive, and almost unbroken plain of La Mancha. A ravine which descends from this plateau towards the Tagus surrounds the town, and forms a natural defence, by which the Spaniards were protected. This ravine formed to our left an almost imperceptible bend in the ground, then passed before our centre, and terminated in the Tagus to our right, thus forming a declivity increasing gradually in depth and abruptness. It was beyond this obstacle the Spanish army must be sought out and conquered. Marshal Mortier, with much judgment, thought it would be right to meet the Spaniards to our left, and to their right, where the ravine just commencing was most easily crossed. He intrusted the head of the attack to General Leval, who led with him, as we have just seen, the Poles and the Germans. He caused him to be supported by the excellent regiments of General Girard. He placed General Dessoles towards the centre, with orders to fire from above the ravine and thus engage the Spaniards upon the front. All the cavalry was to follow the movement of the left, to cross the ravine at its commencement, and fall upon the Spanish army when our infantry should have broken in upon it. The battle, to all appearance, was to be a repetition of that of the previous day, owing, we may say, to the nature of the ground, which led to the same manœuvre.

Marshal Soult, arriving with King Joseph at the moment when these movements were on the point of being executed, had only to confirm the orders issued by Marshal Mortier.

At 11 o'clock in the morning, General Leval bravely attacked the right of the enemy's army, crossing the ravine at its commencement and presenting himself in close column by battalions. General Areizaga, perceiving the intention of the French, led all his artillery to the right, with his best troops. This artillery, being well served, commenced a heavy fire upon the Germans and the Poles, who were not, however, staggered by it. But the Spanish infantry, approaching the head of the ground where it was necessary to cross, and keeping up a spirited fire of musketry, produced a little hesitation on the part of our allies. General Leval was seriously wounded; two of his aides-de-camp were killed; many of his pieces were dismounted. Marshal Mortier then ordered General Girard to enter immediately into action, passing through the spaces of our first line. The latter, forming immediately into a column the 84th, 40th, and 64th regiments of infantry, while he opposed the 88th to the Spanish cavalry which threatened the left flank, crossed the ravine, passed through the spaces left between the Poles and the Germans, effected this passage through the lines with remarkable firmness under the fire of the enemy's artillery, and resolutely attacked the Spaniards. Before this attack, carried on with as much precision as vigour, the Spaniards began to give way and retire towards Ocana. The regiments of the 5th corps, supported by those of the 4th which followed them, pursued their attack, and soon some disorder was shown in the body of the enemy's army. At the same time, General Dessoles, who hitherto had contented himself with firing over the ravine, the depth of which at this place presented an embarrassing obstacle, hesitated no longer to cross where the Spaniards appeared to waver. He descended, went up on the other side, and emerged hastily upon Ocana, which he succeeded in taking. In the mean while our cavalry, placed at the opposite wing, galloped in among the Spanish cavalry which defended the baggage towards the road from Santa Cruz to Ocana, dispersed it, and then threw themselves among the broken and flying masses of infantry. There was soon a horrible confusion. The Spaniards, this time endeavouring to keep together, were overtaken, surrounded, and captured. In a few minutes, 4000 or 5000 fell under the sabre or the bayonet of our soldiers; 48 guns, 82 standards, and 15,000 prisoners, remained in our power. There were collected, besides much baggage, at least 2500 or 3000 saddle and draught-horses.

Three hours had sufficed for this action, conducted with as much wisdom as vigour. The Spanish army might be considered as destroyed; for it had lost at least 20,000 out of 50,000 men: and all the results of this battle were not yet accomplished. Indeed, the following day they pursued without mercy the wrecks of the Spanish army. The peasants of La Mancha, who were less opposed to us than others, and who had no desire to see the war established in their vicinity, indicated to our cavalry the roads taken by the fugitives; 5000 or 6000 more prisoners were taken, causing the number of

soldiers lost by Don Juan de Areizaga to amount to 25,000 or 26,000. In a few days all were dispersed, and there remained in Sierra Morena only a few disorganized bands almost destitute of artillery or cavalry. Besides the general effect, which was great, the French army had obtained a considerable quantity of baggage, and many thousand excellent horses, of which it stood much in need. About 20,000 prisoners were sent through Madrid, and thence immediately to France. To make this triumph complete, it only required that it should have been gained over the English.

The agitation at Seville was naturally very great, and led to a new torrent against the central junta. The plan of substituting in its room a royal regency was now proposed more vehemently than ever. Nevertheless, the Marquis of La Romana, who had formerly wished to dethrone the central junta, now that he had received from it the principal share of the executive power, hastened to curb the most active adversaries of this junta, and caused the Count de Montijo and Francisco Palafox to be arrested. Unhappily, there ensued a most alarming succession of evil tidings. They learned in the same moment that Girona had surrendered; that General Kellermann, together with General Marchand, had avenged the check of the Tamames, and repulsed the Duke del Parque in the battle of Alba de Tormes; that peace had been signed between Austria and France; that Napoleon had returned victorious to Paris, and that he was directing by forced marches numerous troops into the Peninsula; and, finally, that the English, blaming more strongly than ever the imprudence of the last campaign, had retired into Portugal to seek safety in distance. Under all these repeated blows, the junta, seeing no longer any safe asylum but in the south of the Peninsula, behind the lagunes which covered Cadiz, decided that it should meet in the island of Leon, in the beginning of 1810, there to prepare the convocation and the assembly of the cortes on the 1st of March.

Thus, in spite of the extreme difficulties inherent in the war of Spain,—in spite of all the cross-accidents of this year 1809, during which such sad employment had been given to all the admirable troops accumulated in the Peninsula,—it may be said that the campaign ended advantageously and even with éclat. Hope might therefore be entertained, if yet they could make some use of the forces prepared by Napoleon;—if, above all, he himself should give sufficient attention to the affairs of Spain, without allowing himself to be diverted from his aim by other enterprises,—hope might be entertained, we say, of a happy termination, perhaps even speedily, to this long and cruel war.

But, as it almost always happens, trouble and grief remain not only among the vanquished: there were also many miseries, much uneasiness and trouble, at Madrid, in the court of the king who was actually victorious. Joseph in Spain had not fewer cares and subjects of dispute with his powerful brother than Louis in Holland; and, if he were less excited by them, it was because with a less energetic disposition he combined more sense and prudence. We have already seen he was not destitute of military pretensions; that, further, he believed himself skilled in the art of gaining the hearts of men, prudent and

wise in the art of government; that he was persuaded if he were allowed to act for himself he would overcome the Spaniards more easily by flattery than his brother by terror; that, from a partiality common to all the kings raised to royal dignity by the favour of Napoleon, he had espoused the cause of his new subjects, especially against the French armies appointed to effect their submission to him; that he continually complained of the evil treatment of the Spaniards by the French; and that Napoleon, after having ridiculed his military genius and his art of pleasing the people, treating more seriously this part of his policy, got into a violent passion when he beheld the Spaniards dearer to Joseph than the French soldiers who shed their blood to make him King of Spain. He gave himself up to singular outbursts of passion, which, circulating unscrupulously at Madrid, produced between the two courts a most distressing and highly-unbecoming irritation. The English had indeed obtained from the hands of the guerillas more than one intercepted letter found on the French couriers,\* and in their journals did not fail to display the sad spectacle of the divisions in the imperial family.

Naturally, King Joseph had wished to create for himself a court at Madrid, as his brothers had done at Amsterdam, Cassel, and Naples. Some French flatterers, some indifferent individuals among the military and the civil officers, some Spanish partisans of the new royalty, but ashamed in the presence of their compatriots at the part which they had adopted, although with sincerity, composed this court, to which Joseph confided implicitly, freely declared his mind, and distributed the only favours at his disposal, and which, in return, admired his superior sense, his great generosity, his practical acquaintance with human nature,—no doubt, found him different from his glorious brother, but, although different, not so inferior to him as they were pleased to say in France. These flatterers of Joseph delighted to tell him that Napoleon was surrounded by flatterers, who exaggerated his merit at the expense of that of his brothers; that, without doubt, he did possess an unmitigable military genius, but no moderation, no prudence; that he could only act with force and disorganized haste; that perhaps a day would come when he would ruin himself and his family; that Joseph, on the contrary, more mild and more politic, quite as much beloved in France, although less odious to Europe, would perhaps be better able to complete the imperial work. Some of these flatterers in Madrid, such good judges of the Parisian flatterers, had had the impru-

dence during the campaign of Wagram to calculate the chances which threatened the life of Napoleon, and, even in praising his personal valour, to assert that, although doubtless the death of so great a man would be a most sorrowful event and a deep grief to all who admired his genius and his glory, yet that the misfortune to the empire would not be so great as might be imagined: that their peace would be as easy to effect as it was now difficult; that those countries rashly united to France would be restored to Europe, England would be satisfied, the pope would return to Rome, the worn-out populations would be relieved, the finances would again be abundant; that the French army would be better, comprising only men devoted by habits and taste to the profession of arms; others would return to their homes; the imperial family itself would be placed under an authority more gentle and more conciliatory than that of Napoleon; finally, there would be given to France and to Europe a repose ardently desired and a stability necessary to the welfare of all the world. These things, which were not without truth, the friends of Joseph had the imprudence to tell him in the presence of generals who repeated them to Napoleon from hatred to the court of Spain, before the French ambassadors, who communicated them from a sense of duty, before a police whose business led them to repeat them; and one may easily believe the irritation which would result from them in Paris.

Joseph, in his distress, would have been willing to pay his flatterers for their admiration, but he was unable to do much for them. His entire revenue consisted in the taxes on Madrid; for the provinces occupied by our troops sent him no supplies. The only well-governed province, Aragon, scarcely could maintain the army; but Catalonia, Navarre, Asturias, and Old Castile, fearfully ravaged, were utterly unable to meet other expenses than that they naturally discharged,—of supporting the marching army. Calculating the taxes on Madrid, and some receipts from the neighbouring province, Joseph scarcely obtained 1,000,000 per month, while more than three times this sum was necessary to provide for the wants of his house, his guard, and his officials. There remained for him but one resource,—that of establishing rescriptions upon the national domains,—a kind of assignats, serving to buy the goods which had been taken from the monks and proscribed families. (Napoleon, nevertheless, appropriated the wealth of the ten principal houses in Spain.) This resource, which nominally amounted to 100,000,000, was reduced to about 30 or 40,000,000, on account of the depreciation of paper money. Joseph had quite exhausted it, after having squandered the price of the fleeces seized at Burgos, a part only of which belonged to him as revenue. He had from this sum distributed largesses to his favourites, adding some titles of nobility, and some orders, and some ranks in his guard; for he also had formed a guard, which cost him much, and which was composed of Spanish prisoners, who accepted service rather than be sent to France, and then deserted, carrying away the fine clothes he had given them.

To justify these acts, Joseph said it was very necessary that a king should have something to

\* They possess in England a part of the private correspondence of Joseph, particularly with the queen, his consort, who had remained in Paris, and who related to him, with the greatest minuteness, all that interested him, seeking to calm rather than to irritate him. There also remains among our records the manuscript correspondence of Joseph with Napoleon; that of the French ambassador, M. de Laforest; that of a leader of the French police in Spain, a clever and moderate man, M. de Lagarde; finally, that of General Belliard, Governor of Madrid; and it is from these authentic documents, often contradictory, but easily harmonised when one knows how to distinguish truth through contemporary passions, that I extract the account given here, and of which I can warrant the exactness. According to my custom, I soften the colours, to be nearer the truth; for the colours at the time are always exaggerated, and I wish only to ground my recital upon the indisputable footing of the documents which I use.

give, that he might reward the French sharing his fate, and who had followed him from Paris to Naples and from Naples to Madrid; that he might also indemnify the Spaniards who had left their countrymen to devote themselves to him; that he had much need to form the nucleus of a Spanish army, for Spain could not always be guarded by the French. This saying was very reasonable.

Joseph had, however, some other weaknesses to reproach himself with. Coldly received by the French troops, who beheld in him neither a friend nor a general, still more coldly by his subjects in Madrid, who saw not in him their legitimate prince, he lived shut up in his palace, or at the Prado,—a royal house upon which he incurred great expense, in order to have, as Philip V., his Saint Ildephonsa. He there passed a great part of his time, surrounded by his flatterers, of whom we have already spoken; and there also he met with a princess of Ursins, beautiful and clever, who was one of the small number of Spanish ladies who dared to appear in his court.

There was therefore little that was reprehensible in the conduct of Joseph, except some weaknesses common to all courts, ancient or modern; but Napoleon, unmerciful towards the follies he would have pardoned in himself but not in his brothers, who did not, like him, possess the brilliant excuse of genius and of glory,—Napoleon, irritated by a number of malicious reports, particularly by the idea that in such a member of his family ill-judging courtiers were seeking perhaps a successor to the Empire, spared no more the court of Madrid than he had that of Amsterdam, and even less; for to all the subjects of ill-humour just related were added incessantly the poignant griefs of the war in Spain. He said to the wife of Joseph, detained in Paris on account of her health, to Marshal Jourdan, recalled to France, to all the generals who went and came, to M. Roederer, who had often acted as mediator between the two brothers,—he said that Joseph had no idea of war; that he had neither genius nor taste for it; that without the French, to the number, not of 300,000, but of 400,000, (soon about to become necessary,) Joseph would not remain eight hours in Spain; that the pretended attractions of his character would lead him in a short time to Bayonne, as in 1808; that in opposing the Emperor in a state council, amid some mediocre persons, who knew little of administration and spoke indifferently of some administrative affairs, he was no more a politician than one would be a general by following the army and neglecting the head of the staff, or rather, which would be worse, interfering with him; that mildness might have its value, but only after force should have prevailed; that now he must show himself formidable, shoot without pity the bandits who murdered our soldiers, first endeavour to support the French before dreaming of sparing the Spaniards; that doubtless this was a distressing method of ruling, very cruel to so gentle a character as that of Joseph; but that, after all, he, Napoleon, had not compelled him to become King of Spain; that he had given him the offer, not forced him to it; and that, after having accepted it, he must bear this crown well, heavy as it was; that as to the financial embarrassments, they were owing en-

tirely to the incapacity of Joseph and his ministers; that Spain had already cost the imperial treasure 200,000,000 or 300,000,000, and that it would not do to let her ruin France; that Spain was rich, and contained immense wealth; that if he, Napoleon, were to go there, he should easily make her support his armies, and yet find a surplus sufficient for civil purposes; that he was about to send 120,000 men as a reinforcement, in order to put an end to this grievous war, but that to the expense of their equipment, arms, and instruction, he could not add that of their support; that at most he would be able to furnish 2,000,000 per month for their pay, (we have already stated and explained in the statement this resolution of Napoleon,) but that beyond this he would do nothing, for none are bound to perform impossibilities; that if they were so hard up as his brother represented them they ought to have no favourites whatever, nor expend in useless attentions those few resources which they possessed; that with respect to the guard, it was a useless and even dangerous institution, which would involve a sure loss of the money necessary for other purposes; that it would desert bodily on the first opportunity that to take the prisoners from Ocaña, as they had done, in order to convert them into guards for the king, was a scandal and a cheat; that it was but cherishing the enemy in their bosom; that for many years he must be content with French soldiers; that in vain would they seek in the establishment of a Spanish army to obtain independence from France, impossible in the present state of things; that this independence with 400,000 Frenchmen in Spain was the height of absurdity; that Joseph must either resign the throne, or occupy it under Napoleon and in subordination to his will and views; that it would be fortunate if he could spend a short time in Spain, (this the court of Joseph feared, and allowed their fears on this point to be seen;) that by his presence he should restore all to order and correct errors, but that in default of his presence they must submit themselves to his will; but, if they would not administrate and govern in a different way from the present, he should have recourse to the simplest means, which would be to convert into military governments the provinces occupied by the French armies, but to yield up these provinces to the king at the peace; but that then even it would perhaps be necessary that France should receive some compensation for her efforts and her expenses,—a compensation plainly indicated by the nature of things,—namely, the provinces lying between the Pyrenees and the Ebro.

These resolutions repeated to Joseph, and without exaggeration, (for it was impossible to exaggerate the words of Napoleon, being always the extreme expression of his thoughts,) threw the unhappy king into despair. He found, said he, sufficient cause to complain. Not only had he to encounter a thousand difficulties from the conduct of the French generals, but he must also have in his dominions military governments, and, moreover, announce to his people the dismemberment of the monarchy; thus rendering not 400,000 but 1,000,000 men necessary to restrain the Spaniards. Even 1,000,000 men would not suffice: and the whole of France, were she to pass the Pyrenees, would not succeed, unless each Frenchman had killed a Span-

iard to take his place in the Peninsula. For Napoleon to assign such a part to Joseph was to make him reign over the dead; and better were it to dethrone him at once than allow him to reign at such a price.

It may be noticed that, under a different form, the quarrel of Louis with Napoleon was being repeated in Spain, and that Napoleon did not gain much by employing his brothers as the instruments of his power; for, in spite of themselves, they became the representatives of the interests he wished to sacrifice to his inflexible designs. In his brother Louis he had seen aroused the mercantile and independent spirit of the Dutch; in Joseph he beheld personified some of the miseries of unhappy Spain; it was to be feared that in each country the unrecognised force of circumstances would soon rouse the vengeful energy of which the brothers of Napoleon, without any suspicion on his part or on theirs, were but the mild precursors.

Be this as it may, Joseph at this time, consoled for the griefs of this year by the victory of Ocana and by the taking of Girona, receiving from his emissaries in Andalusia the assurance that the south of Spain, wearied of the strife of the contending parties, only required to see him to yield to him, flattered himself that he had come to the end of his troubles; and Napoleon, expecting a decided result from the great resources collected for 1810, congratulated himself on his part upon having at last come to the end of his sacrifices. Hope tempered the despair of the one and the imperious anger of the other, and the object of each was to render the ensuing campaign as advantageous as possible.

Joseph wished to commence this campaign by an expedition into Andalusia. His ministers, Spaniards attached to the new dynasty, and people of some merit, such as MM. O'Farill, d'Azaña, d'Urquijo, thinking, with him, that gentleness was better than force,—that Spain required few Frenchmen and many millions of money,—that it was necessary to speak very little of Napoleon and much of Joseph, and never to allude to any division of territory,—believed that the conquest of Andalusia would afford an opportunity of carrying out their views. Listening to the Spaniards settled in Seville, who represented Andalusia as tired of the government of the junto and ready to yield itself to the new dynasty, they anticipated that they might accomplish it without resistance; that force, having but a small share in the conquest, would retain but little influence; that Joseph, by his art of gaining the affections of men, should alone be the conqueror of this beautiful province; that he should receive both the glory and the profit of the conquest; that Grenada and Valencia should soon be made as Seville, and Cadiz as all these; that he should thus have nearly all the south of Spain under his direct authority; that he should thence procure finances; that by these resources and by absence he should obtain a certain degree of independence of his brother; that, in a word, he should begin to be King of Spain in Andalusia, and that there would be seen the triumph of his system, of his person, of his kingly state. Joseph, who was easily persuaded of these things, demanded urgently permission from Paris to make conquest of Andalusia. Marshal Soult, perceiving the

same facility in carrying it out, especially since the English were apparently withdrawing into Portugal, desiring by this success to efface the remembrance of Oporto, pressed upon Napoleon the idea of an expedition into Andalusia; and, in order further to encourage Joseph, behaved towards him as a submissive and devoted lieutenant.

Napoleon, however, hesitated, which was very unusual with him when he had military resolutions in hand. He was perfectly sensible of the advantages which would ensue from an immediate possession of Andalusia, and, perhaps, by the force of example, of the kingdoms of Valencia, Murcia, and Grenada likewise, when he should thus at one blow conquer the entire south of the Peninsula. But his great military knowledge led him to see that the first and chief enemy in Spain was the English, whom, before attempting any thing else, it was necessary to vanquish and to compel to re-embark; that when they were once expelled from the Peninsula it would be easy to retreat from Portugal, whither it would have been necessary to follow them, upon Andalusia, where the Spaniards, left alone, would be without either the power or the courage to resist; that, even should they attempt to defend themselves for some days, this defence could not be of long duration; for the expulsion of the English would inevitably lead to a general peace, and, a general peace once concluded, the passions of the Spaniards would be as a fire without fuel, which soon becomes extinct. To march immediately, and first of all, upon the English, was, therefore, in his opinion, at the same time the most politic and most military plan; and it was with this view that he had prepared an overwhelming power to bring up against Lord Wellington. Unhappily, he permitted himself to be turned from this wise project by the assurance that La Mancha and Andalusia might be invaded without striking a blow; that thence by an unimpeded march he might secure the riches of Grenada and Seville, and the port of Cadiz in addition, which would thus be lost to the English, who, it was to be feared, if driven out of Portugal before the conquest of Andalusia, would only embark at Lisbon to land at Cadiz, which would be a very embarrassing event. He allowed himself to be persuaded, by reasoning that the troops on the way towards the Peninsula, which were to invade Portugal, had not yet arrived, and that they would not be ready for action before the month of April or May; that by that time the expedition into Andalusia, for which only fourteen days were deemed requisite, would be accomplished; that the troops which should have been there employed, being brought back from Badajoz, would be directed towards Portugal, and would be able to assist, on the left of the Tagus, those which should have descended on the right. Napoleon, not considering how great would be the consumption of men in this fatal country, and only regarding the expedition into Andalusia as a temporary employment of the fine troops he had around Madrid,—an employment which would further their immediate removal from Seville towards Lisbon,—consented to the expedition into Andalusia, without suspecting the consequences of this fatal resolution. As we have previously seen, he had prepared about 120,000

men as a reinforcement to Spain, and he proposed raising this reinforcement to 150,000. Those 150,000 men, all on the march, had been supplied in the following manner:—

First, there had been added to the dépôts quartered along the borders of Bretagne and the Pyrenees, and the regiments of which belonged some to the army of Portugal and some to the armies of Spain, the 36,000 conscripts levied some days before the peace of Vienna for the wants of the Peninsula. These dépôts had been able to furnish without delay well-trained conscripts of the preceding levies, to the number of 25,000 infantry, which the 36,000 conscripts had immediately replaced. Napoleon had formed from these 25,000 recruits two fine divisions, one under General Loison, an old officer, full of energy, who had served in the campaign of Oporto; the other under General Reynier, a distinguished officer in the army of the Rhine, little engaged since the events in Egypt,—rather skilled in the principles of war than successful in their application.

These two divisions, despatched with all haste, had in the first instance served to relieve a number of the detachments detained in the provinces of the North, and thus taken from the corps they were intended to recruit. One of them, that of General Reynier, had been dissolved, and the battalions of which it was composed sent to their regiments. The other, entirely composed of battalions of the 6th corps, had been given to this corps, to form its third division under the orders of General Loison. Napoleon proposed to increase the 6th corps to 80,000 men, and to make it form, under Marshal Ney, the principal element of the great army of Portugal, which he wished to oppose to the English. Thus, after having heard Marshal Ney, he had obliged him to leave Paris, telling him that he could not employ his energy better than by proceeding to Spain to serve against the English. The marshal, indeed, had just been placed at the head of the 6th corps, now reinforced, and had settled his head-quarters at Salamanca.

To this first detachment, formed so speedily, Napoleon added another. He had previously united in Suabia under General Junot a certain number of the 8d and 4th battalions of the regiments serving in Spain, in order to form a reserve, in prospect of the war with Austria. Since the peace he had marched them again towards the Pyrenees, after having recruited them *en route*,—some to join their respective regiments in Spain, when the neighbourhood of the encampments would permit of their so doing, others to form under General Junot a second corps of 80,000 men destined to compose a part of the army of Portugal. There remained yet a third resource, in the dépôts of infantry stationed upon the Elbe and upon the Rhine, and comprising a number of youths well trained and having no further employment in the North. The detached companies from these dépôts were to conduct them into Spain, and, after having disposed of them there, to return to the North, their habitual residence. These different combinations might amount to about 80,000 infantry. The dragoons, of which the third and fourth squadrons, to the number of 48, were about to return to Spain, whence they

had for a time been withdrawn, would furnish from 9000 to 10,000 cavalry. The dépôts of twelve regiments of light cavalry, devoted to Spain, should, for their part, supply from 5000 to 6000. The baggage-troops, the engineers, and the artillery, raised the whole reinforcement to 100,000 men; 15,000 to 18,000 men of the guard already set out, 7000 to 8000 withdrawn from Piedmont, whose resided the dépôts of the army of Catalonia, completed the proposed number of 123,000 men. There remained still two fine divisions,—those which in the last Austrian campaign had served under Marshal Oudinot beside the heroic division of Saint-Hilary, and had learned the art of war at Essling and Wagram. These were composed of fourth battalions. Those which belonged to the regiments stationed in the North had been detached in order to return to their corps. Those which belonged to the regiments serving in Spain had been marched towards the west of France, where they remained under General Drouet, (Count d'Erion,) ready to form a new reserve to follow the great army of Portugal. It was thus that Napoleon intended to procure the reinforcement of 150,000 men whom he wished to send into the Peninsula in 1810, and who composed a body of more than 400,000 men devoted to this devouring war.

Napoleon, in permitting the expedition into Andalusia, which Joseph was about to enter upon with 70,000 veterans assembled at Madrid, thought that 80,000 at least of these soldiers might be detached at the close of the expedition and proceed towards Alentejo; that these 80,000 men would march upon Lisbon by the left of the Tagus, while Massena should march upon it by the right, with the 60,000 men under Ney and Junot, with the 15,000 of the guard, and with the 10,000 cavalry under Montbrun. Not to speak of the reserve of Drouet, it would be impossible for the English to resist so overwhelming a force, and, their embarkation having become inevitable, the campaign of 1810 would, perhaps, be the last in the Spanish war. Before being taught by cruel experience the fate of armies exposed to the climate of the Peninsula, such hopes as these might be entertained by those possessed of the great penetration even of Napoleon himself!

Consequently, without deviating from his primary object, which was always the expulsion of the English, Napoleon permitted the expedition into Andalusia, which in his view was only to be a useful employment of the troops concentrated near Madrid; while in Castile were being united the elements of the great army of Portugal, destined to march upon Lisbon under the conduct of the illustrious Massena.

In consenting to the expedition into Andalusia, Napoleon prescribed to Joseph certain precautions to be observed in this undertaking. He commanded him to march with three corps, the 4th under General Sebastiani, the 5th under Marshal Mortier, and the 1st under Marshal Victor, the Dessoles division remaining in reserve. As for the 2d, which had successively passed from the command of Marshal Soult to that of General Hennebet, and recently to that of General Reynier, he ordered it to remain upon the Tagus opposite Alcantara, in order to watch the English, whose plans could scarcely be discerned after their retrograde movement in Por-

tugal. Napoleon recommended him to take heavy guns, in order not to be detained before Seville, as Marsual Moncey had been before Valencia from want of siege-artillery. With the three corps which he led, and with the old divisions of dragoons, Joseph would have about 60,000 men, independently of the reserve of General Perros, which was to protect him in the rear, and of the *corps d'observation* of General Reynier, who was to keep watch upon his right, which formed a total of at least 80,000 men. These were many more than were necessary for the invasion of Estremadura, Andalusia, and the kingdoms of Grenada and of Murcia, considering the condition of the Spanish forces. To protect these provinces was another task which they had not yet considered.

These instructions having been forwarded, Napoleon enjoined General Suchet to employ in the taking of Lerida and Mequinenza the time which Joseph should employ in the conquest of Andalusia. General Suchet, aided in this undertaking by Marshal Augereau, would be able in his turn to aid the latter in the taking of Tortosa and Tarragona, and to march them upon Valencia, where they should complete the conquest of the South commenced by Joseph. Marshal Ney in Old Castile during the same time should organize his corps, pursue the insurgents of Leon, assist General Bonnet in the Asturias, prepare for the sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and of Almeida, by which should be begun the campaign of Portugal, and await thus, in a kind of unflagging activity, the complete assembly of all the elements of the army of Portugal.

When Joseph was thus authorized to make the expedition into Andalusia, he evinced an unfeigned joy, especially because he was about to act out of the presence of Napoleon, and with the counsel only of Marshal Soult, who acted as his major-general and conducted himself towards him in the most deferential manner. The marshal was not less glad at having to march into Andalusia, where, in the absence of the English, they had only the battle of Ocana to fear, or rather to hope for.

Joseph made splendid preparations, and very similar to those of Louis XIV. when marching towards Flanders with his court. He had with him four ministers, twelve counsellors of state, his usual courtiers, and an infinite number of domestics. In order to procure the money necessary for such a pompous display, he had discounted at all risk the bills upon the national domains and the letters of exchange upon Bordenaux, the pledges for which were the wools and the colonial produce seized in Spain. He set out in January, and arrived on the 15th of that month at the defiles of the Sierra Morena. Marshal Soult, who directed the operations, had marched the 4th corps (General Sebastiani) on the road from Valencia upon San Clemente and Villa Maurica, in order to turn by the left the principal defile from Despena-Perros, leading to Baylen. He had sent forward the 5th corps (Marshal Mortier) by the great road from Seville to the defile of Despena-Perros, and the first (Marshal Victor) by Almaden, in order to turn this defile by the right, and descend upon the Guadalquivir between Baylen and Cordova. A kind of superstitious terror was associated with these defiles of the Sierra Morena since the misfortunes of General Dupont. The Span-

iards could not be shaken from their confidence nor the French delivered from their fear. However, the mines which were reported to have been prepared there by the Spaniards, the wreck of the army vanquished at Ocana, which had been but confusedly gathered, were not able to endure an hour before the admirable troops which accompanied Joseph.

Although the authority of Joseph was very uncertain over the corps which were not placed immediately around him. Marshal Soult, acting in his name, wrote to General Suchet, to make him abandon the idea of the siege of Lerida and to urge him to march upon Valencia to cover the left of the army of Andalusia. Addressing an order of the same nature to Marshal Ney, he recommended him to commence immediately the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, to draw the English towards the north of Portugal, and to relieve the right of this army of Andalusia, which they protected in every way, as if it had been exposed to the greatest danger.

After these precautions, they advanced upon Sierra Morena, with the intention of making the attack upon the 19th or 20th of January, 1810. General Areizaga always commanded the Spanish army half destroyed at Ocana and dispersed throughout the numerous recesses of the Sierra Morena. General de la Romana, who had been appointed to reorganize this army, had promised much and done almost nothing. The army consisted of scarcely 2500 men, demoralized, destitute of every thing, and arranged in three divisions, nearly facing the three passages of Almaden, of Despena-Perros, and of Villa Maurica. One division detached from Old Castile, under the Duke of Albuquerque, had passed the Tagus in the neighbourhood of Alcantara, and marched to Seville to defend this capital.

On the 18th January, Marshal Victor marched from Almaden upon Sierra Morena by a route little adapted to artillery, and advanced on the 20th across the mountains, so as to descend upon Cordova and thus to turn the defile of Despena-Perros. He found before him only fugitive troops, running precipitately upon Cordova and resting nowhere. On the 20th, Marshal Mortier attacked in front the principal defile,—that of Despena-Perros, which opens out upon Carolina and Baylen, the witnesses of such fatal events. Scarcely was he perceived than the Spaniards, blowing up some mines which nowhere impeded the road, escaped from height to height, firing from a great distance and without effect. In pursuing them our men arrived at Carolina and Baylen, which they entered, after having taken some guns and 1000 prisoners. At the same time, General Sebastiani, issuing from Villa Maurica upon the ridge of San Estevan, there met with a little more resistance; but in virtue of this very resistance he was enabled to obtain more important results, for he took 8000 men, with some standards and cannon. On the evening of the 20th of January all the French army were united upon the Guadalquivir, from Baeza to Andujar, from Andujar to Cordova, and these redoubtable defiles, haunted so long by evil omens, had now lost all their superstitious terrors.

The troops which, under General Areizaga, had so badly defended the defiles of San Estevan and of Despena-Perros, had retreated in all haste



upon Jaen, to defend Grenada. The others, those which from Almaden had fallen back upon Cordova, had effected their retreat not towards Seville, from which the Spaniards expected but little resistance, but towards Cadiz, where they hoped to find a secure refuge behind the lagunes of the island of Leon and under the cannon of the British vessels. The French army followed, in part, this double course. The 4th corps, forming our left, under General Sebastiani, followed towards Jaen the two divisions which retreated into the kingdom of Grenada, in order to take from them this kingdom and the port of Malaga. The 5th corps, (Marshal Mortier,) forming our centre, arrived at the Guadalquivir, turned to the right, and rejoined the 1st corps, which, under Marshal Victor, had descended upon Cordova. From Cordova they proceeded towards Seville, from which town the French army received many invitations, with a promise of immediate surrender. They marched upon Carmona, and rested in this little city, a short distance from Seville. Joseph, who did not wish to take the towns by assault, desired to remain at Carmona, to await the result of the secret relations which MM. O'Farill, d'Azanza, and Urquijo had endeavoured to form with the interior of Seville.

While awaiting this peaceful result, they might have been better employed than resting inactive at Carmona, by leaving Seville to their right and proceeding directly upon Cadiz, to intercept the troops, the *maitres*, and especially the members of the government, which were about to seek refuge there. The possession of Cadiz, in short, was much more important than that of Seville: they were always sure of being able to overthrow the walls of Seville with their cannon, but they were not always able to get beyond the lagunes which separate Cadiz from the mainland of Spain; and only by a surprise, by a sudden appearance of our troops, could this important town be delivered up to us, if, indeed, there was any chance whatever of conquering it.

Joseph proposed to direct a detachment upon Cadiz to intercept those who were proceeding thither, and to march with the 1st corps only upon Seville. It would surely have been better to march *en masses* upon Cadiz, than to divide themselves and arrive in this divided state before the two principal points of the province; but, such as it was, this proposal was preferable to not sending any force to Cadiz. It was supported by many generals, and opposed by Marshal Soult. The fear of finding the gates shut, as at Valencia, or a formidable siege, as at Saragossa, so possessed him that he employed all his powers to oppose Joseph's plan.\* He objected that they were already weakened by the despatch of General Sebastiani before Grenada; that they must not weaken themselves further by sending a detachment upon Cadiz; that, Seville being taken, Cadiz would fall off itself, (this the result did not justify;) and he said to Joseph, "If you will answer for Seville, I will answer for Cadiz." The authority of the

marshal turned Joseph from his first plan: and, in place of extending one arm towards Cadiz, in order to intercept at least all those who were going thither, and the other to Seville, to capture the capital, Seville alone was thought of and thither were marched immediately the united corps of Marshals Mortier and Victor. We shall see that 40,000 men were not necessary to effect an entrance. The reserve, under General Dessoles, was left at the defiles of Despena-Perros, between the valley of Penas, Carolina, and Baylen.

The approach of the French had occasioned an extraordinary excitement in Seville. The central *junto*, foreseeing what was about to happen, had decided by a decree to remove to Cadiz, and to leave the defence of Seville to the executive commission,—a case which concerned exclusively this commission. When one after another of the members of the central *junto* were seen to depart, it was supposed that in the moment of danger they were abandoning the new capital of the monarchy; many of them were assaulted and maltreated; then the people rose in insurrection, as they had often threatened, and which was quite according to the customs of the country, proclaiming the *junto* of Seville a *junto* of defence, and liberating from prison the Count of Montijo and Don Francisco Palafox, in order to dispute with the French the capital of Andalusia. They added Generals de la Romana and Eguia to the provincial *junto*, and, by letting loose a furious people in the streets, by sounding the tocsin, by tumultuously drawing up some guns upon a kind of earth-mound which had been raised around Seville, they thought they had done much for her defence. We must say, by way of excuse for those who thus acted, that they possessed scarcely any means of doing more. The spirit of the population was not that of Saragossa, when that heroic city swore to perish, and did in truth perish almost entirely, in her resistance to the French. The energy of Seville was spent in internal dissensions. Each party had successively disgusted the population, and so almost induced a wish for the arrival of King Joseph, whose character was represented as gentle and benevolent. A large portion of the people was, indeed, in a high state of excitement, and demanded, at any price, the heads of those whom they called traitors,—a name which the multitude gives indiscriminately to the men whom they do not like,—and upon whom they wished to avenge their fear; but, none coming forward as a leader, the intimidated clergy, fearing that the French would revenge themselves not only on their goods, but even on the persons of some of their members, for the resistance which they should meet, urged no longer a defence such as that of Saragossa or Girona.

During these fruitless agitations, the French had arrived at the very gates of Seville by the road from Carmona. The Duke of Albuquerque, with a considerable division of the army of Old Castile, had surrounded Seville without entering it, seeing no advantage in getting shut in, and had gained the road from Cadiz by Utrera, after the example of the troops who had retired from Cordova before the corps of Marshal Victor. Both hastened to gain the Lower Guadalquivir, to seek an asylum in the island of Leon. On the 29th, the corps of Marshal Victor appeared

\* I here quote the records of Marshal Jourdan in his manuscript memoirs. The marshal is supported by the testimony of many generals who were present, and by a very exact letter of King Joseph, who himself related minutely the circumstances of the council of war held at Jarona.

in sight of Seville. All the bells sounded; the people assembled on the ramparts and on the roofs of the houses, uttering furious cries; a certain number of guns were pointed behind the mound which had been raised round the city. But it was not by such means they could stop the French. Marshal Victor summoned the fort, and announced that if they did not open the gates to him he would attack it immediately, and slay all who resisted him with the edge of the sword. These threats, together with secret communications held with the interior of the city, led to conferences, during which the greater number of the principal persons, the Marquis de la Romana at their head, escaped from Seville. The *junto* (that of the province) then consented to surrender the capital of Andalusia, and on the 1st of February the gates were opened to the army of Joseph, who made his entrance with drums beating and colours flying.

The city was nearly deserted. The higher classes had fled to Cadiz, to the neighbouring provinces, or to Portugal. The monks had likewise sought to escape the conquerors, and the people, in the moment of terror, had spread over the surrounding country. But the French committed no disorders, and, beyond taking necessary provisions, they respected persons and property. Joseph, hastening to the practical application of his system, promised a free pardon to all who should return, flattered the clergy, strongly inclined to come back, and in a few days brought back the people, whose anger had passed off with their fear, and who were weary of enduring hunger and cold in the neighbouring fields. There were found in Seville provisions, ammunition, artillery, and, above all, considerable treasure, partly in tobacco, partly in the produce of the mines of Almaden,—resources of which they stood much in need, and of which they hastened to make use.

It now remained to be seen whether, as Marshal Soult had affirmed, the conquest of Seville would be the infallible pledge of the reduction of Cadiz. The movements of our various corps d'armée were soon to solve the question.

The 5th corps, directed upon Estremadura, had dispersed *en route* some detachments conducted by the Marquis de la Romana, and taken prizes of some importance in goods and in money from the numerous fugitives who were about to seek a refuge behind the strong walls of Badajoz. Arrived at the gates of Badajoz, he had summoned the place, the strong and well-furnished fortifications of which were occupied by a powerful garrison, where the provisions were abundant and easily renewed, and the population of which, increased by the number of Spaniards who within the walls had sought safety for themselves and their most valued possessions, opposed any surrender to the French. The governor had replied, in the name of the Marquis de la Romana, that the place had resolved to defend itself, and would oppose such resistance as might be expected from its natural strength and the energy of its commanders. Marshal Mortier, having nothing necessary for a siege, had taken a strong position upon the Guadiana, and connected himself with the 2d corps, (General Reynier,) posted at first on the Tagus, and now advanced as far as Truxillo.

On his part, General Sebastiani, with the 4th corps driving before him the wretches from Arel-

saga, had successively entered Jaen, Grenada, and had then appeared before Malaga, where the infuriated state of the people augured a violent resistance. But an advanced guard of cavalry and of light infantry had boldly assailed Malaga, had checked the fury of the populace, and led to the prompt surrender of this important seaport; and the 4th corps hoped to establish themselves as peaceably in the kingdom of Grenada.

Unhappily, at the most important point—that of Cadiz—things were far from taking so favourable a turn. The ministers of King Joseph had written to many members of the government, and to different generals, who, even at Seville, seemed disposed to yield, tired as they were of a devastating war and of interminable civil dissensions. But the latter, restrained by all that surrounded them, only answered in a vague and unsatisfactory manner. As for the inhabitants of Cadiz, trusting in the natural strength of their city, and in the support of the English troops which was promised to them, they were able thenceforward to give full play to their passions, to oppose the summons of the French with outrageous bravadoes, to raise excitement and division, and to commit murder among themselves almost with impunity.

An insurrectionary local *junto* was formed, and had undertaken the defence of the fort. Flattered by seeing that Cadiz had become the seat of government, this *junto* had not so abused the central *junto* as had the inhabitants of Seville. It had furnished all the requisites for the siege, and had well received all the great civil and military persons who had sought refuge within the city. To those numerous and important political refugees were added the Duke of Albuquerque with his division, and the troops which from Almaden had retreated to Cordova, and from Cordova to the island of Leon. Without delivering up the great arsenal of Caraca to the English, without even opening to their fleet the internal road, the *junto* of Cadiz had opened to them the external road, and had consented to receive into the interior of the place 4000 of their soldiers. Having already 18,000 armed Spaniards in the city or in the island of Leon, and also the government and the cortes, soon to be assembled, the city feared no undue dominion on the part of the English, nor, in particular, did they anticipate seeing the riches of the Spanish navy passing into their hands.

With such resources, Cadiz had no thoughts of surrendering. The most violent passions prevailed; and all the political movement which had been interrupted at Seville by the arrival of the French was to be continued in Cadiz with still greater violence, under the protection of natural and military obstacles almost insuperable.

The first result of this continued and accelerated movement was naturally the dissolution of the central *junto*, which, persuaded of the impossibility longer to preserve power, hastened to resign it. Amid the universal applause of the inhabitants and the refugees of Cadiz, it immediately assembled the cortes, determined the form of this convocation, and named a *royal* regency invested with executive power. This regency was composed of five members:—the Bishop of Orense, a man of mediocre and fanati-

sal mind; General Castanos, a man of tact and prudence, but more skilled in eluding difficulties than in solving them; the state-counsellor Saavedra, an old functionary much experienced in the Spanish administration; a renowned sailor, Don Antonio Escano; and a Spaniard from the American colonies, Don Miguel de Lardizabal, representative in the government of the transatlantic provinces. After these two acts, the junto separated, and, without any sense of its disinterestedness, the infuriated multitude loaded its members with insult. They even went so far as to stop many, to search their luggage, and see that they did not carry away with them the funds of the state,—a most unmerited outrage, for they generally bore the character of honourable men.

Scarcely had the new regency been instituted than it seized upon power, and, along with the junto of Cadiz, whether for good or evil, made a separation between the local and government offices, and evinced a very evident desire to delay the convocation of the cortes. But the people of Cadiz desired the speedy meeting of this assembly; the refugees also desired it; and, in order to render it more certain, it was decreed that the elections for the provinces, disturbed by the French armies, should take place within Cadiz, by means of the refugees. The cortes so greatly desired were to be assembled in the month of March.

Such was the state of affairs when the 1st corps, under Marshal Victor, arrived before the canal of Santi Petri, three or four days after the entry of the French into Seville. Had they appeared before Cadiz with overwhelming forces, when the government, the army, and the most ardent minds, were yet at Seville, perhaps it would have been possible to surprise the city and to effect a surrender. But, since the members of all the powers—since numerous troops, and the noblest of the Spaniards—had had time to assemble in Cadiz, and since the English had joined them, it would have been folly to expect surrender. Also, in spite of some secret transactions, the public replies were haughty and even outrageous, and there was no choice but to decide on preparations for a long and difficult siege.

Every one knows the site of this great coast-town, the centre of the old naval power of Spain, and situated at the mouth of the Guadalquivir, as is Venice at the mouths of the Po and of the Brenta. A kind of slightly-elevated rock, some hundred feet above the level of the sea, terminated in a plateau in all directions, covered with numerous and rich habitations, forms the city of Cadiz, and then by a flat and sandy tongue of land joins the vast lagunes which bound the southern coast of Spain. The portion of sea lying between Cadiz and these lagunes forms the interior road. In the midst of these lagunes, some cultivated, others covered with salt-works, rises the celebrated arsenal of Caraca, communicating with the road by numerous broad passages. All around these lagunes a great canal, very deep, and as difficult to cross as a river, extending from Puerto-Real to the fort of Santi Petri, separates from the mainland this collection of settlements, excepting only the Caraca itself, and traces the boundary of what is called the island of Leon. Now, in order to take this island and the town of Cadiz itself, it was necessary to pass

by main force the canal of Santi Petri, before an enemy's army and in spite of the numerous vessels of the Spaniards and English, then to cross the lagunes, clearing ditches, all easily defended, to conquer, one by one, the buildings of the Caraca, situated beyond the canal, and finally to proceed along the tongue of land leading to the rock of Cadiz, taking, *en route*, by a regular attack, the fortifications with which it is covered.

It is true that from some projecting points of the coast, as that of Trocadero, situated to the right of and without the canal of Santi Petri, they might send inflammatory projectiles upon Cadiz, and, perhaps, in this manner spare themselves a direct and regular attack. But this was a very hazardous and difficult operation, and one involving the previous performance of many others. Thus, it would be necessary first to have obtained possession of Trocadero, in order to rebuild the fort of Matagorda, whence it was possible to fire upon Cadiz, then to establish along the canal of Santi Petri a line of little intrenched camps to form the investment of the island of Leon. The artillery necessary to arm these different works must have been sent for from Seville, and even partly have been founded in the arsenal of that city; for that already existing there was not of a sufficient calibre. The mortars of longest range did not exist in Seville, and they were obliged to make them. Finally, a fleet would have been indispensable, both to cross the canal of Santi Petri and the interior road at the moment of the decisive attack, also to ward off the enemy's vessels, which would not fail to come to oppose the proceedings of the besiegers and to batter down their works. There were at Puerto Real, at Puerto Santa Maria, at Caraca itself, (on this side of the canal,) the elements of a flotilla; although at our approach the Spaniards had transferred all their vessels from the interior road, which was within our gunshot, to the exterior road, which was entirely beyond the reach of our fire. Besides the *matériel* of this flotilla, we could from the sailors of the guard supply crews for its service. But much time would be necessary to unite these various means of attack, and one consideration presented itself to every mind. It was that, now being in this immense country, extending from Murcia to Grenada, from Grenada to Cadiz, from Cadiz to Seville, from Seville to Badajoz, our fine army, twice as large as was necessary for the invasion of the south of Spain, would be barely sufficient to retain it. Marshal Victor, with 20,000 men, had scarcely wherewith to form the investment of the island of Leon, and to keep in check the garrison of this island, more numerous, but happily less valiant, than the 1st corps; and if he had enough to prepare the siege he had enough to carry it on. The 5th corps, under Marshal Mortier, obliged to furnish a garrison to Seville, and a *corps d'observation* before Badajoz, were about to meet with great difficulties in the fulfilment of this double duty. General Sebastiani, with the 4th corps, obliged to hold Malaga, to occupy Grenada, and to oppose the insurgents of Murcia who trusted to the Valencians, had not one superfluous soldier. The Dessoles division, which had been posted at the defiles of the Sierra Morena in order to protect the line of communication, would be fully employed there: for, besides the defiles of Sierra Morena, it had to

guard Jaen, which commanded the road from Grenada, and the plains of La Mancha, which must be traversed on the way to Madrid. But a French garrison was also requisite at Madrid, where had been left only a few Spaniards and the invalids. The Desolles division, which was to supply this garrison, when divided for the purpose of fulfilling these two duties, would probably prove insufficient for either. Finally, the 2d corps, under General Reynier, settled on the Tagus between Almaraz, Truxillo, and Alcantara, could not, without imprudence, leave this position, for it was by that route the English had passed the preceding year from Abrantes to Talavera. At most, they would be able, by leaving this corps on the Tagus, to carry it farther into Portugal, if a French army advanced upon Lisbon, and unite it with the main army; but then the entire course of the Tagus from Madrid to Alcantara would remain open to the innumerable depredators from Salamanca, Avila, Plasencia, and Estremadura. We see then this numerous and beautiful army, the most valiant among those of the Empire, having no rival but the corps of Marshal Davout in Hanover, which to the number of about 80,000 men was scattered over the provinces of Grenada, of Andalusia, and of Estremadura, at the point of being nowhere in full force, and certainly not able to lend any assistance to the army which was about to oppose the English in Portugal. The hope of being able to carry back a part of it towards Lisbon, which had induced Napoleon to consent to the expedition into Andalusia, was then soon to disappear and give place to the fear of finding it insufficient even to retain Andalusia.

Already, indeed, the garrison of Cadiz was in motion, and displayed the heads of columns to such an extent as to arouse the fear of their sudden appearance upon the mainland. The half-wild population of the mountains of Ronda, augmented by smugglers from Gibraltar, over-spread and ravaged the country. The corps seeking refuge in Badajoz, united to a strong detachment of the English, showed by their movements that nowhere did the Spaniards desire to remain idle.

The new regency, governing the insurrection from the midst of the lagunes of Cadiz, had intrusted the Marquis de la Romana with the command of the troops of Estremadura encamped around Badajoz. This same regency had summoned General Blake from Catalonia, where it had appointed General O'Donnell to succeed him, and had placed him at the head of the army of the centre, the remains of which had sought refuge in the kingdom of Murcia following General Areizaga. Blake was to collect them, and in concert with the garrison of Cadiz to direct expeditions against Grenada, Seville, in short, wherever he could, in order to support the guerillas of Bonda. We must add that the double diversion attempted upon our wings, consisting in driving Marshal Ney upon Ciudad Rodrigo, and General Suchet upon Valencia, had not succeeded.

The inconsiderate order given to Marshal Ney to attack the important fort of Ciudad Rodrigo, without siege-artillery, and in the neighbourhood of the English positioned in the north of Portugal, could lead to nothing but a vain bravado. Marshal Ney had been obliged

to confine himself to directing against the walls of the fort some of his field-artillery, and then summoning the governor, whose reply was such as was merited by such an attempt. He had returned to Salamanca. General Suchet, believing that the order to march upon Valencia had been concerted with Napoleon, and would prevail over that of besieging Lerida, Mequinenza, and Tortosa, had advanced in two columns, one along the coast, the other by the mountains of Teruel, and after their union, effected at Murviedro, had appeared before Valencia. He had even seized upon the suburb of Gnao, and had fired into the city, which, in the opinion of many, was inclined to surrender. But the Valencians in reply had seized and persecuted the inhabitants suspected of wavering or desirous of peace, particularly the Archbishop of Valencia, and had presented an opposition which, without large artillery, could not be overcome. General Suchet had been obliged in all haste to retreat towards Aragon. This was the second French army (including that of Marshal Moncey) which, after appearing before Valencia, was obliged to retire without being able to force the gates of this proud city. The exultation of the Valencians would by this event be greatly increased.

Nevertheless, there was nothing to fear in Andalusia, with the army collected there; and the evil, though great, was reduced to paralyzing 80,000 veterans. For the time they ruled from Murcia to Grenada, from Grenada to Cordova, from Cordova to Seville. These important cities were submissive, and paid tribute. Joseph proceeded as king from one to another; and, curiosity attracting around him a certain resort, and weariness of the war procuring for him some partisans, he made a progress which his courtiers called triumphal, but which sensible men regarded as very unimportant. It must be mentioned, however, that the fickle and inconsistent population of these cities, though detesting the French, yet applauded this French king in such a manner as to deceive him. Thus, his flatterers did not fail to say that they had good reason to hope that he should obtain by his personal favour and kindness more than Napoleon by his terrible soldiers, and that if they let him alone he would soon subjugate Spain, forgetting that, when they said this, they had around them 80,000 of these terrible soldiers to protect them and to enable King Joseph to try his chance upon the people of Andalusia. Joseph was therefore satisfied, and Marshal Soult flattered himself that he had greatly added to the claims which he believed the severe tribunal of Napoleon would demand.

But, while they congratulated each other upon having completed this expedition into Andalusia, a thunderbolt issued from Paris which would change Joseph's joy into deep grief. The expedition into Andalusia had occupied in Spain the first months of 1810; and during this very period had arisen the most serious quarrels with Holland. Napoleon had not only contests with King Louis, but also with King Jerome for Hanover, and for the execution of the financial conditions of the surrender of this country. Wearied with meeting incessant opposition from his brothers, not perceiving that they were but the passive agents of opposing

circumstances he indulged in the most violent passions against them, and ascribed to them not only their faults, but his own; for, after all, who had created the obstacles which he met at every step, if not he himself, by wishing everywhere to attempt the impossible? In these irritable moods, receiving many reports from the court of Joseph respecting the language employed there and the system which was sought to be established, and regarding some bounties given to certain favourites, he adopted strong measures, which were not of a nature to facilitate the task of Joseph in Spain. He first found fault with General Suchet having been withdrawn from the siege of Lerida to be brought without heavy artillery upon Valencia, — a proceeding which had caused the French army to appear twice in vain before the walls of this city. He blamed Joseph; he blamed the general himself, and forbade him henceforward to obey any authority but that of Paris. He equally disapproved of the imprudent march of Marshal Ney upon Ciudad Rodrigo; and again he attributed this error to the staff at Madrid, who had advised this movement. But these were the smallest troubles.

To see money given to favourites, however trifling in amount, when resources were everywhere wanting, displeased him beyond expression. "Since they have been able," said he, "to give money to the idle and the intriguers, they should also be able to support the soldiers who shed their blood for King Joseph; and, since they will not provide for their wants, I shall provide for them myself." Saying this, he converted into military governments Catalonia, Aragon, Navarre, and Biscay, which were the four provinces to the left of the Ebro. He decreed that in these governments the commanding generals should exercise authority, civil as well as military; that they should receive all the revenues for the expenses of the army, and should maintain towards the authority of Madrid only an appearance of deference, but lay aside altogether any idea of obedience or responsibility. It was to himself alone that the chiefs of the corps, Angereau, Suchet, Reille, and Thouvenot, should render any account of their actions, and from him only were they to receive instructions. After having thus taken military possession of the territories situated to the left of the Ebro, Napoleon secretly informed each of his generals of his real intention, — namely, to unite the west bank of the Ebro to France, in order to indemnify himself for the sacrifices he had made to secure the crown of Spain to his brother. However, not yet wishing to announce this plan, he recommended to them the greatest discretion; but, in the event of their receiving orders from Madrid contrary to those from Paris, he authorized them to declare that they had received a prohibition to obey the Spanish government, and injunctions to obey no other than that of France. Such a resolution was most serious, not only respecting Spain, but respecting all Europe. It appeared in fact that Napoleon, insatiable in peace as in war, when he could not conquer by his sword desired to conquer by his decrees. He had just united Tuscany, the Roman States, and Holland, to the Empire. Though he did not speak of it, he hoped at this time to do the same with Valais and the Hanse towns. To add to

these acquisitions the territory beyond the Pyrenees extending to the Ebro was to announce to the world that nothing could escape his avidity, and that every land on which he fixed his terrible eye was lost to its possessor, even though a brother.

To pretend that the left of the Ebro should indemnify France for her expenses in Spain was simply ridiculous. Doubtless, if Napoleon had left Ferdinand upon the throne, — had he, for example, aided him in conquering Portugal from the English, and had he required the left bank of the Ebro in return, — it might have seemed reasonable, though exposed to the just umbrages of Spain and of Europe; but to impose upon Spain a dynasty in spite of herself, — almost to compel this dynasty to reign, (for Joseph was scarcely less constrained than the Spaniards,) — and then to require both to pay for their benefits by a dismemberment of territory, — was the height of ambitious folly: it was to add, to the many causes of the hatred borne against us by the Spaniards, one cause yet more powerful than all the others, — that of seeing this peninsula, so dear to their heart, invaded and parcelled out by an ambitious neighbour, who, after having deprived them of their dynasty, took from them also a portion of their territory. It was, in short, to reduce to despair, and to send back forever to the ranks of the insurrection, all those whom the hope of a better régime and the deeply-felt need of a political regeneration had attached for a moment to the new dynasty.

It was not long possible to keep secret the orders given to the generals with regard to the union of the four provinces. The establishment of military governments in these provinces would have been sufficient, apart from all indiscretion on the part of the generals, to reveal the true purpose of Napoleon; and we shall soon see that no one was deceived. Besides Napoleon did not confine himself to this step. He took others which limited the regal authority of Joseph within the gates of Madrid. Beyond the above-mentioned military governments, he divided the acting armies into three parts, one for the South one for the centre, and one for Portugal. He placed at the head of the army of the South Marshal Soult, the inquiry into whose conduct at Oporto he had on reflection determined to relinquish, and intrusted to him the 4th, 1st, and 5th corps, which occupied Grenada, Andalusia, and Extremadura. He composed the army of the centre of the Des-soles division, added to it the dépôts generally settled at Madrid, and intrusted it to Joseph. Finally, that of Portugal was to be formed, as we have seen, from all the troops united or about to be united in the North, to march upon Lisbon under Marshal Massena. Each of the generals commanding these active armies, possessing the authority which belongs to the head of an armed force upon the scene of action, owed obedience only to the minister of France, — that is to say, to Napoleon himself, who had already assumed the title of supreme commander of the armies in Spain, and had named Prince Berthier as his major-general. Thus Joseph had no power over the governors-general of the provinces of the Ebro nor over the chiefs of the three active armies. Only as chief of the army of the centre, he had the right of

commanding this latter; but it was the smallest in number, had an insignificant duty to perform, and was composed of from 20,000 to 25,000 men, sick or well, of whom 12,000 at most were capable of action. It was hardly possible to render his authority more restrained or more merely nominal; and this was certainly not the way to raise him in the estimation of the Spaniards. Further, the regulations respecting the finances were as severe as those relative to the military government. The revenues collected in the provinces of the Ebro were bestowed upon the armies which occupied them. The active armies were to support themselves from the country in which they fought; and, as it was possible they should not obtain sufficient funds for their pay, Napoleon consented to send into Spain the inadequate sum of 2,000,000 per month. From that time Joseph, already reduced to the command of the troops stationed around Madrid, was about to be reduced in his revenues to that which he received from Madrid alone,—that is to say, to the taxes on this capital: and the hatred which the Spaniards bore him, not as an individual, but as the representative of the foreign invasion, was about to be changed into a yet stronger feeling,—that of scorn.

Joseph received this intelligence at Seville, and was overwhelmed by it. What could he say in the face of such acts as these to his subjects, whether submissive or rebellious, whether returned to allegiance or showing some inclination to return? Independently of his restricted authority, now exposed to the arrogance of his generals, the division of the territory would fill all true Spaniards with despair. Already they had witnessed the colonies passing out of their hands; but to add to this loss that of the Pyrenees and the provinces to the left of the Ebro was to suffer all calamities at once. Besides, the pretended secret had penetrated into the rebel as into the submissive provinces; the enemies exulted over this approaching dismemberment, which justified their hatred; and those amicably inclined regarded it with consternation, as taking from them all excuse for submission. The regeneration of the monarchy, were it realized, was no compensation for the dismemberment of the territory; and, besides, this regeneration, so much promised, at present consisted in the spoliation of the country and the effusion of blood. MM. O'Farill, Urquijo, d'Azanza, and d'Almenara, who had accompanied Joseph to Seville, fell the victims of a deep despair. Thus, as we see, Joseph was not more happy than Charles IV. confined at Marseilles, than Ferdinand VII. a prisoner in Valençay, or than many other kings vanquished and dethroned, some deprived of a portion, others of the whole, of their kingdoms.

Struck with so rude a blow, Joseph had no inclination to remain at Seville; for his presence, whether preceded or followed by such actions, could no longer have over his new subjects the effect he had expected. He found himself, besides, without authority in Andalusia, Marshal Soult having become commander-in-chief of the army of the South; and it was also necessary for him to proceed to France to treat with his brother, and to represent to him the probable consequences of these last measures taken at Paris. He therefore set

out with his ministers, leaving Marshal Soult absolute master of Andalusia, glad to be relieved of a nominal royalty which could only restrain his own real power. Thus 80,000 men the finest in Spain, had just been paralyzed to make, not Joseph, but Marshal Soult, King of Andalusia.

Joseph speedily and quietly departed from that Andalusia where he had so recently made triumphal progresses; and in crossing the defiles of Sierra Morena, where had been posted the Dessoles division, the only active force which remained to him, he despatched them to Madrid; for with the wounded, the sick, the dépôts, with the soldiers of the baggage and the artillery, with the Spaniards, whom he had had the imprudence to recruit among the prisoners of Ocana, he had scarcely wherewith to protect the capital and the immediate vicinity. He left some infantry at the defiles of the Sierra Morena, one or two dragoon regiments to attack La Mancha, and concentrated around Madrid the small force upon which he could rely.

As soon as he re-entered his capital, where, although conqueror of Andalusia, he exhibited the deepest grief, he received the strangest communications from Seville. Marshal Soult, considering his forces not sufficient with the three corps which had been intrusted to him, which comprised the best in Spain, pretended that all which were posted in the southern district belonged to him, and consequently commanded the brigade which was between La Mancha and Andalusia to come to him for orders. General Lahoussaye, to whom these injunctions were given, replied that he was subject to the staff at Madrid, and that without its authority he dared not leave the post he there occupied. Marshal Soult replied, accompanying his orders with severe threats in the event of disobedience. Joseph held to his own orders, and forbade General Lahoussaye to obey Marshal Soult. While engaged in this quarrel with Marshal Soult, he maintained a new dispute, not less dangerous than the others. The generals who were stationed in the kingdoms of Leon and Old Castile, where military governments were not yet established, put into practice the principle laid down by Napoleon that each army should support itself by the province which it occupied, and levied contributions without employing the medium of Joseph's financial agents, without even regarding his authority. These repeated blows humbled Joseph to the last degree. Having already purposed leaving Madrid to return to Naples, he was ready to abdicate, even without compensation, the heavy crown of Spain. However, supported by his ministers, and by some confidential friends, who did not wish to see the king to whom they were attached depart, he charged his wife, who was at Paris, and two of his ministers, MM. d'Azanza and d'Hervás, who were about to proceed thither, to negotiate with his brother and represent to him that the loss of the provinces of the Ebro exposed him to the hatred of the Spaniards, the diminution of his authority to their scorn, and that he would rather retire from the Peninsula than remain in it on such conditions.

Napoleon received the Spanish ministers civilly, but with a slight exhibition of scorn, treated most contemptuously the policy of Jo

seph, who imagined, he said, that by money, without soldiers, might be conquered an implacable nation, to which the hand of friendship might be extended only after subduing it. He showed himself inflexible upon the subject of finances; he declared that it was impossible for him to support all the expenses of the war; that if the troops were not paid he should be obliged to recall them; that, Joseph being either unable or unwilling to obtain the money existing in Spain, it was very necessary that he should do so himself by the hand of his generals; that, moreover, he would watch them closely and oblige them to place in Joseph's treasury all that remained from the wants of their armies; that besides this surplus there remained to Joseph the contributions from the provinces of New Castile, La Mancha, and Toledo, now nearly subdued; that, regarding the supplies sent from France, he could add nothing to the 2,000,000 he had promised, to furnish the portion of the pay given in money; that the most he could consent to was that the army of the centre, intrusted to Joseph, should take its share of these 2,000,000; that, as to the different commands, he could not change the distribution; that two great armies were necessary, that of the South and that of Portugal, to unite in the expulsion of the English; that he alone was capable of directing them, and that in leaving between the two an army of the centre which he had intrusted to Joseph, who should dispose of it as he was directed by him, he had conceded as much as was possible; that, in short, the generals commanding the active armies had only authority in respect to military operations and the support of their armies; that in every other respect they were simply the guests of the King of Spain, and should treat him as king and as brother of the Emperor; that he should seriously reprimand those who had failed to do so, (Marshal Soult in particular,) but that the military command should remain absolute and undivided.

Regarding the provinces of the Ebro where he had instituted governments, Napoleon did not conceal his plan of subsequently uniting them to France in order to indemnify himself for all his expenses; nevertheless, he added that he should not unite them without compensation, which Portugal, one day joined to Spain, would amply supply; but that before giving it away he must conquer it, and to do this it was necessary to drive out the English, and, after having driven them out, to effect peace, which was by no means easily accomplished. For the present he knew the difficulty of determining any thing, the danger of making any disclosure, and the advantage of delay and silence. After having repeated this speech on more than one occasion, Napoleon retained around him the ministers of his brother, and appeared desirous of expressing his decision upon difficult points even after the events of the campaign of 1810, which perhaps, in terminating the war with the year, should put an end to the perplexities of Joseph and happily determine existing questions. The Spanish ministers therefore remained in Paris to negotiate, and to seize every opportunity of operating upon the inflexible will of Napoleon.

At the time, Napoleon promised them that he should add some troops to the army of the centre, reprimanded Marshal Soult for the way

in which he treated the king, opposed the attempt of this marshal to appropriate the brigade of La Mancha, and employed himself in fixing definitely the plan of operations for 1810. It was a great loss not to have fallen immediately upon the English, from the month of February or March, with what forces they had; for in the south of Spain the season for military operations might begin early. Indeed, without waiting for the troops of General Junot, only with the divisions of Reynier and Loison, one of which had served to recruit the old corps, the other of which had been employed to complete the 6th, (Marshal Ney,)—with that which had arrived of the guard, and the 80,000 veterans who had assembled on the Tagus after the battle of Talavera,—it had been possible before the hot season to march against the English and drive them vigorously back upon Lisbon. But, the 80,000 old soldiers encamped around Madrid having been scattered between Baylen, Grenada, Seville, Cadiz, and Badajoz, it was necessary, in order that the army of Portugal should be sufficient, to wait until all the troops marching towards the Pyrenees should have arrived. Thus, it was not a spring but an autumn campaign which could be carried on against the English; for during the summer, particularly in the south of Spain, the heat rendered all operations nearly impossible. It therefore remained to employ advantageously the months of May, June, July, and August. Napoleon finding himself, by the error committed in Andalusia, involved in a more lengthened war, thought to render it methodical by besieging the forts before commencing a new invasion of Portugal. Already it was agreed that General Suchet should attack Lerida and Mequinenza, and that Marshal Augereau should attack Tortosa and Tarragona, before marching again upon Valencia. Napoleon decided that Marshal Soult, while endeavouring to take Cadiz, should also try to capture Badajoz, upon the frontier of Portugal; that Marshal Massena, on his part, while his army was forming, should accomplish the sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and of Almeida, which were the keys to Portugal on the Castilian side; and that, these points of support once secured, they should assume the offensive in the course of the month of September by marching together upon Lisbon, Marshal Massena by the right bank of the Tagus, Marshal Soult by the left. According to this new plan, all the summer was to be devoted to sieges. Orders were given that it should be occupied in this manner and all possible speed be used.

General Suchet had indeed from the month of April undertaken the task which had been assigned to him. Having quickly repaired the error which they had made him commit by bringing him to Valencia, he appeared before Lerida to commence the siege. On the 10th of April he had established his head-quarters at Monzon upon the Cinca, the spot where he had collected in advance *matériel* for the siege, as heavy artillery, fascines, gabions, and tools of all kinds. His corps, completed to somewhat more than 80,000 men by the arrival of the last reinforcement, could only supply from 23,000 to 24,000 fighting men. He had left about 10,000 as the guard of Aragon, and with 13,000 or 14,000 he was marching upon Lerida, of which he had formed the investment upon the two banks

of the Segra. These forces were barely sufficient for the attack of the city; but it was to be feared they would prove too few if it was necessary to cover the siege against the expected attacks from without. In truth, Napoleon had rejoined the two armies of Catalonia and Aragon, commanded by Marshal Augereau and General Suchet, to take advantage of their vicinity to lend mutual aid. Marshal Augereau was to cover the sieges of Lerida and Mequinenza, while General Suchet should accomplish them; and General Suchet in his turn was to cover those of Tortosa and Tarragona, while Marshal Augereau should on them concentrate his forces. Unhappily the army of Catalonia, divided between so many cares,—now employed in defending the French frontier, which the guerrillas attacked every day, now obliged to hasten to Barcelona, to protect or support this city, now summoned to Hostalrich, the investment of which had been undertaken,—frequently failed in accomplishing these various intentions by attempting all. A mind at the same time inventive and active was needful for the performance of so many duties; and the aged Augereau, successor to General Saint-Cyr, did not possess such a mind. At the present moment he found himself before Hostalrich, and not in the neighbourhood of Lerida. General Suchet, therefore, arrived alone before this latter place, whence he did not remove; for, by dividing his corps between the siege-operations and the expulsion of the army which was about to annoy him, he hoped to be able to execute the double task intrusted to him.

The fort of Lerida is celebrated in history, and from the days of Cæsar to those of the great Condé it has played an important part in the wars of all ages. The great Condé, as all know, could not take it; the Duke of Orleans succeeded in the war of succession, and they might fail in this enterprise very readily. The fort is on the right of the Segra,—a river which runs at right angles towards the Ebro and drains at least half of the Pyrenees. The town, situated at the foot of a rock, surmounted by a strong castle built between this rock and the Segra, is partially protected in front by the waters of this river, and on all sides by the downward fire from the castle. The rock on which is built this castle, almost precipitous on every side, is accessible only from the southwest, by a gentle declivity which extends beyond the city; but towards the extremity this declivity terminates abruptly, and presents various points, on which have been constructed the fort of Garden and the strongholds of San Fernando and of Pilar; so that the only accessible side of the castle is itself defended by strong fortifications. It was, therefore, necessary to take the city under the fire from the castle, and, after the city, the castle itself, storming the outworks which defended the approach; or, at least, by a well-contrived attack, to direct the siege so as to occasion the fall of the city and the castle about the same time. Able guidance might, it is true, effect this double result in almost the same day.

The city contained 18,000 members of a fanatical population, besides a garrison of from 7000 to 8000 men commanded by a young and energetic chief, Garcia Conde, who had distinguished himself at the siege of Girona. It had

provisions and ammunition sufficient for a long siege.

Haxo, the skilful officer of engineers, resolved to commence by the attack of the city, approaching it on the northeast,—that is to say, between the river and the castle,—and by the most populous side, so as to put the courage of the inhabitants to a severe trial. It is true that they were thus exposed to all the fire from the castle; but the nature of the earth rendered the working of the trenches easy; and in approaching rapidly this firing would become so perpendicular as to afford less cause for fear. A further advantage arising from making the attack upon this side was that of not having behind them the fort of Garden, which was situated opposite.

While preparing to open a trench, an intercepted letter informed General Suchet that the Spanish General O'Donnell was coming with the troops from Catalonia and Aragon to make him raise the siege. General Suchet did not hasten to meet him, not wishing to withdraw from Lerida either too soon or to too great a distance; but he had bridges over the Segra, and he could in a few hours pass the river, and bring the mass of his forces in front of the enemy, leaving before the fort a rear-guard sufficient to restrain the garrison.

On the 22d of April he learned the approach of General O'Donnell, who was but one march distant. He had come from Catalonia by the left of the Segra, while the city and the besieging troops were on the right. General Suchet so arranged as to oppose the enemy without and the city within. General Harispe remained upon the bridge of the city over the Segra, by which the garrison could communicate with the assisting army. He required to restrain at the same time the garrison and the corps of O'Donnell. General Musnier, placed a little higher up the Segra, at Alcoletge, was in a condition to pass the river immediately and to fall on the flank of the enemy which should present itself before the bridge guarded by General Harispe.

On the 23d April, at the break of day, General O'Donnell appeared at the extremity of the plain of Margalef, which extends to the left of the Segra, and commenced action immediately. He was preceded by an advanced guard of infantry and of light cavalry, which marched in two columns, amounting together to from 9000 to 10,000 men, one to the right, the other to the left, of the road. These were the finest troops of Catalonia and Aragon. Scarcely was General Harispe aroused by the fire of the advanced posts, than he took to horse with the 4th Hussars, ordered the two light companies of the 116th and 117th of the line to follow him, and, without wavering at the sight of the advanced guard of the enemy, charged it at full gallop and drove it in confusion far in the plain. This first advantage gave him time to return towards the city to restrain the garrison, which, completely united, began to issue forth by the bridge of the Segra, amid the cries of joy of the inhabitants. General Harispe, with the 117th and its brave leader, Colonel Robert, met this garrison at the point of their bayonets, drove them back upon the bridge, and compelled them to re-enter the fort.

These two rapid actions had given time to the



Musnier division to pass the Segra at Alcoletge, which is, as we have said, above Lerida, and to come up upon the field of battle. General Musnier, in place of descending along the Segra, in order to join General Harispe, and with him to offer resistance upon the great road which the enemy followed, fell diagonally, and by the shortest line, upon the flank of the two Spanish divisions, across the plain of Margalef. His infantry was preceded by the 18th cuirassiers, the only regiment of heavy artillery, serving in Spain, 1200 horse strong, and commanded by an excellent officer, Colonel d'Aigremont. Scarcely arrived at the enemy, the cuirassiers put themselves in fighting order, having cannon on their wings, and threatening the flank of the Spanish army. After a pretty brisk fire of artillery, the enemy's cavalry coming forward to cover the infantry, the cuirassiers charged it at full gallop and routed it. The Walloon guards formed themselves immediately into a square, in their turn, to protect the cavalry. But the cuirassiers, continuing the charge, broke them, and dispersed all who attempted to follow the example of the Walloon guards. In a few minutes they had compelled nearly 6000 men to lay down their arms. The rest took to flight with the utmost speed towards the roads leading from Catalonia. A great quantity of guns, baggage, and many banners, were taken.

After this brilliant success, there was no longer fear that the siege should be disturbed. General Suchet, desiring to know if this combat, which would deprive the garrison of all assistance, had at all shaken it, displayed the prisoners in the plain, proposing that the governor should send an officer to make a list of them, and summoned him to surrender. The governor proudly replied that the garrison had never depended for their defence upon a foreign support. It was necessary then to undertake the siege.

The trench was opened on the 29th of April. The work was difficult, not because of the hardness of the soil, but from the waters of the Segra which spread through the vicinity, from the heavy spring rains, and from the castle artillery, which was very annoying. Certain canals were stopped up, so as to turn the waters into our trenches, and the men protected themselves as well as they could from the fire of the castle. While they proceeded, Colonel Haxo, deeming that it would be a great advantage to take the fort of Garden, which was the real key to the castle, attacked the two redoubts of San Fernando and Pilar. They succeeded in the attack on the one, and failed in that on the other, which obliged them to desist from both, at least for the present.

During this time they had continued the works of approach, directing them against the two bastions, those of Carmen and Madeleine, and they had repulsed a strong sortie from the garrison. On the 6th and 7th of May, all the batteries being constructed and armed, some to knock down parapets and silence the artillery of the fort, and others to pour fires upon the castle, they commenced the cannonade. Our artillery sustained it at first very briskly, but suffered much from that from the castle; many pieces were dismounted, and we were obliged to suspend the fire to arrange new batteries and modify the direction of the old ones. They established one upon the left of the Segra, in

order to destroy the bridge of that city and to fire *a ricochet* upon the attacked bastions. These new undertakings occupied from the 8th to the 12th of May. On the 12th, they resumed firing, this time with perfect success; they silenced that of the fort; as for that of the castle, they had rendered it less dangerous by approaching nearer. In short, they could make a breach, and effect a large opening into the interior, so as to render the assault practicable.

Here the idea of General Suchet and of Colonel Haxo had been to destroy both the city and the castle at the same time, by so directing the siege as to drive the entire population into the castle, where they could only survive a few days. To secure this result, it was necessary to be in possession of the fort of Garden, or at least of the outworks in which the people might have found an asylum.

On the evening of the 12th of May, General Suchet caused an attack to be made upon the redoubts of Pilar and of San Fernando, as also upon a horn-work which united them with Garden, by three columns of picked men, at the head of whom were General Vergès and Buget, and Plagniol the officer of engineers. The redoubt of Pilar was taken. The horn-work was also taken, partly by scaling, partly by a direct attack upon one of the entrances, which Sergeant Maury broke open with his axe. The redoubt of San Fernando was likewise taken by scaling. We lost in these various actions 100 men, and the enemy lost 300 or 400. Although the fort of Garden itself was not in our power, an object was gained, for the surrounding district could no longer serve as a refuge for the population of the city.

This provident arrangement having thus secured complete success, the general commanding-in-chief and Colonel Haxo wished to make the assault on the main body of the fortress on the same day, the 18th of May. The breaches at the bastions of Carmen and Madeleine were practicable, and there remained nothing to do but to take them. Two columns were ordered to make a simultaneous assault; one to the left, along the river, was to assail the bastion of Carmen, while General Harispe, forcing the bridge of the Segra, should endeavour to take the defenders of that bastion in the rear; the other, to the right, was to assail the Madeleine bastion, while a company of miners should beat down with the axe a gate situated in the neighbourhood, in order through it to introduce the army. The general commanding-in-chief and Colonel Haxo, at the head of the reserves, remained in the trenches ready to act as occasion required. General Habert and Colonel Rouelle, on duty that day in the trenches, commanded the columns of assault.

At the close of day, on a signal given by four bombs, the two columns poured from the trenches on the breaches, and ascended them notwithstanding a formidable fire in front and flank. Attaining the ramparts, they were for a moment staggered; but General Habert rallied them sword in hand, and they entered the town, which they found barricaded behind the bastions which they had just taken. This difficulty was provided for by the secondary attacks. Romphleur, lieutenant of the miners, after a close combat, broke open the gate near the Madeleine bastion, and introduced the columns

which were waiting outside. These columns advanced into the great street, which was barricaded; Vallentin, captain of engineers, with Baptiste, sergeant of sappers, in spite of a brisk fire, leaped on the principal barricade and beat it down. They thus overcame successively all the obstacles raised behind the Madeleine bastion. The success was equal on the side of the Carmen bastion. General Harispe carried the bridge of the Segra, and our columns, everywhere penetrating the city, drove the garrison and population pell-mell to the slopes which lead to the castle. The alarmed population followed the garrison into the castle itself, and took refuge in the ditches. The whole night, General Suchet poured a shower of howitzers, bombs, and grenades into this narrow space, crowded with men, women, and children, who filled the air with their cries, a terrible but inevitable spectacle, for the immediate termination of the siege depended on the despair of the unfortunate inhabitants of the castle.

But, however devoted might be the commandant and the garrison, it was impossible for them to shelter and support this population, or to see them perish under the bombs of the enemy. On the 14th of May, at mid-day, the governor, Garcia Conde, displayed the white flag, and surrendered his garrison prisoners of war, after having resisted the French to the utmost possible extent.

This remarkable siege, which had cost us a month of investment, fifteen days of open trenches, and 700 men killed or wounded, procured us, besides the most important fortress of Aragon, 7000 prisoners, 133 guns, 1,000,000 cartouches, a large quantity of powder and muskets, and some well-furnished magazines. The enemy lost about 1200 men. This conquest produced a lively sensation in that part of Spain, and much diminished the confidence which the inhabitants had placed in their walls since the defence of Girona.

Napoleon, soon dissatisfied with Marshal Augereau, had recently filled his place with Marshal Macdonald, a man of great resolution in the field, but little adapted to a war of strategy, where it was necessary to be young, active, and fertile in expedients. Wishing to leave the conduct of this war of sieges to General Suchet, who appeared to excel in that mode of warfare, Napoleon added to his forces one-half of the army of Catalonia, with one-half of the territory of that long narrow province, and assigned him the difficult task, when he should have taken all the fortresses of Aragon, of conquering also those of Catalonia, particularly Tarragona and Tortosa, situated, one on the sea-coast, the other at the mouths of the Ebro. Marshal Macdonald was to concentrate his action between Barcelona, Hostalrich, Girona, and the frontier, directing himself always to those points where he might second the great sieges, which were to be the duty of General Suchet.

While these events were passing in Aragon, Napoleon had, at last, obliged Marshal Massena to quit Paris for Salamanca. We have already indicated the motives which prevented his taking the head of the army in Spain himself, and induced him to delegate that office to Marshal Massena. Marshal Soult, on two occasions opposed to the English, at Corunna and in Portugal, did not appear to Napoleon to have shown

sufficient vigour to induce him to employ him against them further. Marshal Ney, on the contrary, possessed the energy necessary to contend against such enemies; but he had never held a chief command, and, to meet so prudent a general as Lord Wellington, a consummate general was requisite, who should unite with great energy of character the habit of command which enlarges the mind and adapts it to meet all the anxieties of a superior responsibility. In the whole empire, Marshal Massena alone was fitted for such a part, by his natural and ready intelligence, practised eye, and iron soul. All obstacles might be overcome by Marshal Massena, with the co-operation of Ney and Junot, if Ney would consent to be second and Junot would forget that he had held a chief command in Portugal. Unhappily, Marshal Massena was then suffering from the long fatigues of twenty years of active war. Alike distinguished by political sagacity and military talent, he did not require the sanguinary and glorious lesson of Essling to teach him that the limits of prudence had everywhere been transgressed in the present reign, and that every thing tended rapidly to a catastrophe. After having experienced war in all its forms in Calabria, in Italy, in Germany, and in Poland, he augured little good from that which was obstinately maintained in Spain, and he was by no means desirous of risking his high renown on a theatre which seemed to combine all the difficulties with which Napoleon had tempted his fortune. He accordingly evinced great unwillingness to undertake the campaign in Portugal, and, when constrained by Napoleon to assign his reasons, he alleged, besides the difficulties of the position and the insufficiency of the means, which he suspected without certain knowledge, his health already shaken, his mental qualities weakened, probably by his health, and the inconvenience of commanding subordinates who regarded themselves as his equals, and who had been accustomed to obey none but Napoleon himself. His disinclination was augmented by the reports of the disagreements between Marshals Ney and Soult. Napoleon, with the fascinating familiarity which he could exhibit to his old companions-in-arms, had caressed the old soldier, reminded him of his glory, his proverbial vigour, said, what every one likes to hear, however little he believes it, that he had never evinced more youth or vigour than in the last campaign; that the army resounded with his name; that none of his subordinate officers could be so void of sense as to suppose himself his equal; that, if they had scrupled to obey others, none would refuse obedience to his superiority, his age, and the imperial confidence with which he would be so manifestly intrusted; that, while they were marshals and dukes, he was a prince, he was Massena; that it was quite possible to subject unruly wills by breaking their force; that the climate of Portugal was the best in the world to restore his health; that he had already enjoyed some repose, and should enjoy yet more, for three or four months must be employed in sieges before beginning offensive operations; that means would be furnished in abundance; that he would have no less than 80,000 men under his command and an immense material, which was a much larger force than necessary

against 30,000 English, however well seconded by the climate and the insurrection in Portugal; that it was requisite to give a final blow, and that in confiding this operation to him he had probably reserved for him the best glory that remained to be gained, for peace would probably ensue, and the name of Massena, among the first heard of at the beginning of the wars of this century, would be the last to resound in the ears of the present generation; that he would be at once the most glorious and the most popular of the soldiers of France, by conquering the maritime peace, the only one desired, because the only one hitherto unattainable. All these reflections, accompanied by a thousand familiar and kindly suggestions, had gained over, without having persuaded, the aged Massena, who, some months before, named Prince of Essling, and overwhelmed with honour and wealth, could refuse nothing to the most generous of masters. He had, therefore, submitted with the melancholy of a man subdued by gratitude and obedience, but too penetrating to be deceived.

Massena having received the command of the army of Portugal, whether by constraint or willingly, had repaired to Salamanca, where his arrival was the source of alarm to the insurgents, of confidence to the soldiers, and of some displeasure to his two principal coadjutors, Junot and Ney. Junot had been commander-in-chief in Portugal, almost king, and to return thither in a subordinate command was very painful to his pride. Marshal Ney, who had served against his will under Marshal Soult, to whom he thought himself superior, served less unwillingly under Massena, who was considered the greatest man in the French army; but he had hoped for the honour of being opposed singly to the English, and he painfully felt that he had been under a delusion, when he found himself called to a second command. Yet he did not evince all the vexation he experienced, whether from respect to a great name, or from fear of the severity of Napoleon, to which he had been exposed the previous year. But feelings that are disguised are not long in reappearing, especially in men of ardent character, rudely agitated by the terrible shocks of war. Of this we shall soon see an example presented by Junot and Ney.

To increase the evil, Massena possessed not the dignity, though he possessed the vigour, of a commander. Simple, without external advantages, not careful to exhibit his intelligence, though really remarkable, negligent even when in the full activity of youth, already disgusted with the war, much given to pleasure, he wanted that hauteur of manner, either natural or studied, which exerts an influence upon men, and is one of the elements of command which Napoleon himself sometimes neglected to assume, but which in him was supplied by the prestige of a

prodigious genius, a dazzling glory, and an unequalled fortune. Massena, arriving at his head-quarters with too little pomp, saluting his coadjutors, already somewhat discontented, with a friendly simplicity but no very great enthusiasm, followed by a troublesome attendance, including, in particular, a mistress, and imprudently complaining of fatigue, gained neither affection nor respect from those who were to second his efforts. "Massena has grown old," was continually repeated in the circle of Marshal Ney at Salamanca, and of General Junot at Zamora. Whether Ney and Junot really supposed him to have grown old, or whether their flatterers (who are the attendants of a military staff no less than of a court) conjectured that so to represent him would gratify them, the remark was heard from every mouth. Ney and Junot also, in virtue of their personal importance, professed that they were not ordinary lieutenants, nor bound to yield the customary obedience. According to them, Massena was merely to direct the general operations, and to leave to each of them the part of commander-in-chief in his own corps. These observations and assumptions could not remain concealed from Marshal Massena, for, if there are flatterers who invent scandal, there are others who report it. "They say that I am grown old," said he, with irritation; "I will show them that my strength of will at least has not decayed, and that I can still enforce obedience on those subject to my orders." This was to begin a difficult campaign under bad auspices, and on the part of the future lieutenants of Massena a reprehensible conduct, especially on the part of General Junot, who had neither the merit nor the rank of Marshal Ney, whose pride was, therefore, less excusable, and who, still young, having been placed under the orders of Marshal Massena, ought to have readily yielded him obedience. A third lieutenant, General Reynier, whose corps was to join the army of Portugal, evinced a much better disposition, at least in the beginning. Brought up in the army of the Rhine, accustomed to discipline, and little spoiled by fortune, he welcomed the arrival of his commander with the respect of a modest and serious officer, and expressed it to him in a correspondence marked by deference and circumspection.\*

These personal difficulties were neither the most trivial nor the most serious of those which awaited Massena. Napoleon had indeed prepared many corps, whose union might present an imposing force, but they had not been formed into an organized army. There were neither general staff, nor military superintendence, nor hospitals, nor means of transport, nor general park of artillery, nor, in particular, any siege-artillery. In order to bring together the necessary material, they would require ready money; because, although by a remorseless

\* We are often in danger, in detailing such particulars as the above, of giving merely imaginary statements. We can, happily, here relate with accuracy the scenes which passed between the commander-in-chief and his lieutenants, because, independently of the correspondence of several officers, there is that of the intendant-general of police of Portugal, of whom I have already spoken, who was an intelligent and benevolent man, connected with no party in the army, much interested in the success of the expedition, owing no ill-will to any but to those who might expose it to failure, and desiring it of infinite im-

portance to disclose the truth to Napoleon, to whom his correspondence was directly communicated by the Duke of Rovigo. In this, with much minuteness of detail, he describes all the phases of the campaign with a degree of truth and sincerity strikingly apparent at the first reading. Owing to this correspondence, I have been able to relate certain important particulars, without investing history with the character of fancy,—a risk which we incur when we present with too much detail the actions and words of those who exist no longer, and who have left no record of what has been said or done in their presence.

sacrifice of private property they might obtain from their several localities corn, wine, and cattle, they could not there find cannons, mortars, carriages, implements, wagons; but, as we have seen, Napoleon would send no funds into Spain, in order that his generals might be compelled to extract them from that country. And, weary of this war, which secretly consumed the resources of the Empire, he no longer paid it sufficient attention. He caused the correspondence to be read by Major-General Berthier, and he replied through the same channel; and his will, which, though expressed by himself on the spot, with all the vehemence due to personal observation, would scarcely have sufficed to overcome the difficulties peculiar to Spain, being formed only on the analysis of correspondence, and transmitted through secondary media, reached the army with all the indistinctness and confusion of one among many echoes. It was, therefore, seldom executed, and never in full force.

The sad result of this state of affairs met Massena in every quarter on his arrival at Salamanca. Some material transmitted from France since the peace with Austria had, indeed, been received, a few mules, horses, and wagons; but each corps seized them if possible in the transit, and used them for their immediate purposes, before entering on the campaign. The weather, moreover, had been still more severe in the Castiles than in Aragon; and from Salamanca to Ciudad Rodrigo, twelve horses harnessed to one twenty-four pounder scarcely accomplished two leagues a day. To these difficulties add the presence of banditti, more numerous and audacious than ever, who intercepted the convoys, unless guarded by considerable escorts, and we shall still be far from forming a complete idea of the obstacles presented to Marshal Massena. The urgency of the wants of the army had given rise to abuses which the officers no longer endeavoured to check, being wearied with the fruitlessness of the attempt, or conscious of participation in the error. The soldiers, and sometimes even the officers, seized the cattle or the corn of the peasantry, not for their necessary support, which is excusable in war, but to procure themselves money by their sale. They also engaged in contraband trade in colonial produce, by allowing trains of mules thus loaded to pass on payment of a tribute, and they even went so far as to receive bribes for the escape of Spanish prisoners. Though far from severe, Massena was much distressed at this want of discipline in the army in a country so fatal to its well-being. The only thing he found unaltered in the weather-beaten countenances of his former companions-in-arms was the expression of martial confidence which no misfortune had shaken, and which on a future day refused to quail before the whole of Europe assembled under the walls of Paris.

Independently of the general condition of the army, every corps had its own particular distresses. In Old Castile, there were only the 6th corps (Marshal Ney's) and the 8th (General Junot's) that could act immediately; and the latter had been obliged to extend itself as far as Leon,—that is to say, to a distance of thirty or forty leagues. The 2d (General Reynier's) had remained on the Tagus, on the other side of the mountains of Guadarrama, and was

not to join the army of Portugal until that army had completed all the sieges that had been assigned to it. Nor was the strength of these corps equal to that which Napoleon had hoped and promised. The corps of Marshal Ney, which ought to have amounted to 30,000 men, after this addition of the Loison division, reckoned only 25,000 or 26,000, so greatly had the number of effective troops been reduced by the mere entry into Spain. With the exception of the soldiers recently brought by General Loison, it was, in fact, composed of admirable soldiers, broken down by fatigue, having been present at Elchingen, Jena, Friedland, as well as at all the great battles of the war in Spain, ready to undertake any thing, enthusiastically devoted to their chief, but willing to obey no other. The 8th corps, which was at first to consist of 40,000 men, and then of 30,000, after having sent several detachments to the other corps, scarcely amounted to more than 20,000 or 21,000 men. It had very recently been diminished by one division for the protection of communications, a measure which had greatly added to the vexation of General Junot. This body was entirely formed of conscripts, which was a great source of weakness, not in actual combats, but in the endurance of fatigue. The third and fourth squadrons of dragoons, which had partially arrived, and been united after some difficulty to their first and second squadrons, furnished General Montrun with a reserve of 4000 excellent horsemen, which raised the army to the number of 51,000 or 52,000 men actually at the disposal of Marshal Massena. It was to be augmented, indeed, by the 2d corps, which was to join at a later date, which, after all its sufferings in Portugal, under Marshal Soult, and more recently on the Tagus, reckoned no more than 15,000 men, several months in arrears of pay, half-clad, but as steady and as accustomed to war as those of Marshal Ney, and ready for the most difficult operations of war, though not free from discontent. By summoning to himself General Reynier, the commander-in-chief might combine at the utmost 66,000 men; but it was probable that this number should be reduced to 50,000 by the diseases of summer, the sieges that were to be undertaken, and the garrisons that were to be left in the conquered fortresses. The imperial guard had arrived at Burgos; but Napoleon, wishing to reserve it for himself in case he should go into Spain, forbade its removal, unless urgently necessary. There remained the corps of General Drouet, composed of the two old Oudinot divisions, estimated at first at 18,000 men, but actually comprising only 15,000, and now occupied in recruiting on the coasts of Bretagne. Massena, then, could at the time only reckon on the corps of Ney and Junot, and on that of Reynier, when he should cross the frontier of Portugal; but in no case could he bring together more than 50,000 men, since the troops of Reynier would do no more than compensate for the losses occasioned by sieges, garrisons, and the weather. At the sight of all that presented itself on his arrival, inferiority in numbers, defect of material, ill-spirit of the chief commanders, loss of discipline, Massena anticipated great misfortune, and wrote to Napoleon letters of a melancholy character, but of the most marked intelligence, such as became one of the most clear-seeing

and experienced generals of the age. He spoke the truth without concealment or exaggeration, demanded all that he required, and, not venturing to insure success even on that condition, so difficult did he consider it to make war not only against the united Portuguese and English, but against the soil, the climate, and the barrenness of Portugal. At no previous period of his life did he apply himself to his work with greater energy than now, when he laboured under the disadvantages of age and fatigue, and was unsupported by those false but encouraging views which are wont to animate the young and enthusiastic.

He had received a superintendent of his own selection,—viz.: Lambert, comptroller-in-chief, an accomplished officer of artillery, General Eblé, a good officer of engineers, General Lasowski, and, lastly, a chief of the staff who was devoted to him, a man of intelligence, punctuality, and courage, General Fririon. With the assistance of these coadjutors, and of General Thiebault, Governor of Salamanca, he set about creating what did not exist and repairing what had fallen into decay. With this view, he began by pouring into the central chest of the army the contributions which each corps had laid upon the provinces they severally occupied for their own use,—an arrangement which he ultimately effected, but not without resistance from the heads of the corps. He urged the transmission of funds from Paris for the settlement of the arrears of pay, and, with the resources which he should have procured, he undertook to create at Salamanca general magazines. He drew to himself the mules which had been bought in the south of France, for the use of the army of Portugal; he mounted on siege-carriages all the heavy artillery that he could collect, hastened the transport of it towards Ciudad Rodrigo, and added all the instruments and ammunition which the roads could bear. Ciudad Rodrigo is situated three or four marches from Salamanca, in a vast, dry, and desert plain, twenty or thirty leagues in width, affording no supplies, scarcely even forage for the horses. Thither Massena sent all that he could for the support of the troops which were to assemble there. These were the troops of Marshal Ney. Massena ordered them to approach the fortress, then to construct ovens, barracks for provisions and ammunition, and, in a word, the whole establishment necessary for a siege. As it was possible that the English, who had left Spanish Estremadura for the north of Portugal since our arrival in Andalusia, might endeavour to intercept our operations, he ordered General Junot to quit Leon and Benavente and take up a position between Ledesma and Zamora, in order to be ready to concentrate himself on the right of Marshal Ney should it be necessary. In consequence of these orders, the execution of which he enforced with unusual vigilance, Massena began to collect at Salamanca the *matériel* of a considerable army, and to concentrate around Ciudad Rodrigo part of the requisites of a great siege. Unfortunately, the road between Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo was broken up by the traffic of numerous wagons, as well as infested by guerillas, who were not deterred by the constant presence of our troops, and often occasioned serious inconveniences. Marshal Massena, therefore, did

not fail to write to Paris to urge the speedy arrival of the corps of General Drouet, asserting that after his departure for Portugal all his communications would be intercepted, unless he were enabled to protect them by numerous forces.

While about to commence the new campaign of Portugal by the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, a prior question arose between Marshal Massena and his lieutenants. The English were encamped at Visen, three days' march from the frontier. The accounts of their numbers differed greatly, varying from 20,000 to 40,000 men, because the English were confounded with the Portuguese; but no one estimated the English themselves at more than 24,000 men. The neighbourhood of this force excited the ardent courage of Ney. He felt it tedious and irksome to accomplish two such sieges as those of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, and thus to waste the noble ardour of his soldiers against stone walls, for a result of very moderate importance,—that of taking fortresses which might indeed occasion some inconvenience on the road to Portugal, but would be of no great avail in the guerilla war, with which they were threatened on the rear. He thought, on the contrary, that by going directly against the English, and assailing them with the 6th and 8th corps and the cavalry of Monbrun,—that is to say, with about 50,000 men,—they would have every chance of beating them, and if they were once beaten the fortresses would probably fall without an effort. And thus the principal aim of the war would be attained almost at the first stroke.

Marshal Ney proposed this plan of operations to the commander-in-chief, and supported it with a degree of warmth which was natural to him, while at the same time he wrote to General Junot to suggest the same plan to him, in order that by gaining him over to his views he might force them irresistibly on Massena. These letters were so urgent and contained proposals so inconsistent with his position as to amount to a flagrant violation of discipline; there was not, indeed, any open scandal, for fortunately the letters were private. The impetuous Junot seconded with eagerness the arguments of Ney, but without shaking the resolution of Massena, whose singular situation compelled him to resist his lieutenants while he shared their sentiments, for he preferred battles to sieges, his genius being adapted to the former, while his patience was scarcely equal to the latter. But the orders of Napoleon were imperative, and required, before any offensive operation, the conquest of the fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, originally built in opposition to each other, but at the time united against us, and forbade any advance into Portugal before the close of the hot weather and the arrival of a quantity of provisions equal to 15 or 20 days' supply for the army. Such precise instructions left no room for hesitation, whatever might be his own opinion; the will of a master so absolute in power, and so unequalled in intelligence, could not be disobeyed. Massena replied to his lieutenants by communicating to them the instructions received from Paris, and they, instead of honestly ascribing to Napoleon the plan that was to be adopted, scrupled not to disseminate through their several corps that Massena, now altered and weakened by age, preferred tedious and ca-

lamitous sieges to an active and decisive campaign. Massena at first despised these seditious rumours, though he could not fail to regard them with a lively sense of their injustice.

All, however, were wrong in not yielding a hearty obedience to the orders of Napoleon. No doubt, if the English general had been disposed to wait for them at Viseu, they ought without hesitation to have met him there; for the advantage of beating him at the very outset would have been immense, and, besides, the soldiers might have carried with them provisions sufficient for operations so near at hand. But the English general was not a man to follow the lead of his adversaries. He would not have waited our arrival at Viseu, but would have retired on our approach, (as he afterwards did;) would have led on our brave soldiers, dying with thirst and hunger, and then have either thrown himself behind the works of Lisbon, or taken up his position on a well-chosen ground, where it would have been impossible for us to overcome, and from which we must have returned without provisions and exposed to two hostile fortresses on our rear. To defer any general attack till the arrival of all the necessary *matériel* and provisions, and till the termination of the extreme heat, and, in the interval, to free ourselves from two fortresses which, if left in the rear, would have been the sources of great danger, was certainly a wiser and better-devised plan, and one worthier in every respect of the consummate prudence of Napoleon, who, in this case, had manifestly the advantage of his lieutenants, though it must be confessed that, on some other occasions in the course of this war, he was led into error by his distance from the scene of action.

His views were completely justified by the plans of the English general. By his recent operations Sir Arthur Wellesley had acquired great credit with the British government, and even with the British people. After the precipitate retreat of General Moore, which might have been so disastrous, the English continually dreaded to see their soldiers driven into the sea; nor was it without great apprehension that they saw them occupy the soil of Portugal. But when they beheld their new general, Sir Arthur Wellesley, instead of being driven from the Peninsula, drive Marshal Soult from Portugal, and then venture to cross the Tagus as far as Talavera, in order to give battle at the gates of Madrid, and then quietly retire into Estremadura before the French armies, they began to regain confidence, and loaded him with those unwonted honours creditable alike to the merits of the general and the gratitude of the nation. They decreed him the title of Lord Wellington, with considerable pecuniary rewards, and, to facilitate his operations, appointed his brother, Henry Wellesley, ambassador of Great Britain at the central junto of Seville, his other brother, the Marquis of Wellesley, being, as we have seen, secretary of state for foreign affairs. He was thus in the highest degree respected and supported in England. But neither his past services nor his growing reputation could secure him from the attacks of the opposition, who wished for peace, nor the cavils of the government, who still feared a reverse. The British government maintained at great expense a large fleet of transports at the mouths of the Tagus, always ready to receive the army if defeated.

Their apprehensions were increased by the peace with Austria, for they were convinced that Napoleon would soon direct against the Peninsula his best army under his own command, and as this idea all England trembled for Lord Wellington and his army.

In this increased anxiety occasioned by the peace with Austria, the English public tormented the ministry, and the ministry tormented Lord Wellington, by the expression of continual fears. They urged prudence; and, instead of proportioning his means to the danger which threatened him, they supplied them parsimoniously, lest he should be tempted to prolong his stay in the Peninsula. Lord Wellington felt keenly this opposition; for, though minds which are calculated to overcome great dangers present an appearance of insensibility, they are in reality as painfully alive to the difficulty of their circumstances as those who evince an inferior power of self-restraint. Whatever he felt, he dared not fully express either to the British government or parliament. He, therefore, constrained himself to endure his vexations and to reply with caution and respect to his superiors. With singular penetration, he had estimated the course of events in the Peninsula more accurately than Napoleon himself,—not that he was equal to him in intelligence, but because he was on the spot, and was not misled by any of those illusions to which Napoleon yielded himself too readily in following an erroneous path. He had estimated the strength of resistance against the French, arising from natural animosities, climate, and distance, the exhaustion of their forces when they should have reached the extremity of the Peninsula, the confusion of their operations when conducted by generals at variance, the improbability of Napoleon arriving at so distant a theatre of war, his disagreement with Joseph,—a disagreement which showed that the system of Napoleon began to be intolerable even to his own brothers,—and he felt immovably convinced that this vast machinery of greatness was everywhere undermined; that though Napoleon might undoubtedly take possession of the greater part of the Peninsula, yet there were certain points which he could not conquer, such as Gibraltar, Cadiz, and Lisbon, protected by distance and by the sea; that if, from these extreme points, England continued to stimulate the hatred of the Portuguese and Spaniards, and to aid it by their succours, that incessant strife would be revived which was exhausting the strength of the Empire; that Europe would, sooner or later, revolt against the yoke of Napoleon; and that he would be able to bring against him only armies half destroyed by an interminable and murderous war. This opinion, which does the highest honour to the military and political judgment of Lord Wellington, had become irreversibly fixed in his mind, and he persevered in it with an admirable degree of firmness and resolution.\* But the success of this plan depended entirely on the resistance opposed to the French when gathered at the extremity of the Peninsula; and Lord Wellington had carefully sought, and with singular accuracy fixed upon, a position almost impregnable, from which he thought he could

\* The publication of the correspondence of the Duke of Wellington has fully disclosed his opinion of the war in the Peninsula, which is written in every page, and does the highest honour to his sagacity and judgment.

brave all the efforts of the French army. This position, which he has rendered immortal, was that of Torres Vedras, near Lisbon. He had remarked, between the Tagus and the sea, a peninsula six or seven leagues wide, and twelve or fifteen long, easy to be cut off by a line of works, almost invincible, behind which, Lisbon and its great roadstead, the fleet of transports, the provisions and the ammunition would be secured. The position having been chosen, he himself marked out to his engineers the general outline of the works, leaving to them the details. Without revealing his plan to any one, and with nothing to fear from the journals of Lisbon, which at that time scarcely existed, he had, without its being known in Europe, collected several thousands of Portuguese peasants, who earned their subsistence by constructing the celebrated lines of Torres Vedras under the direction of English engineers. It was scarcely known even in the English army, where these works were confounded with certain defensive operations naturally required in the neighbourhood of Lisbon. More than 600 guns, Portuguese or English, were made ready to arm the numerous redoubts which were raised across the peninsula of the Tagus.

Lord Wellington then endeavoured to proportion his forces to this wisely-conceived plan. In 1810 the English army directly under his orders amounted to about 30,000 men; besides these, there were several thousand English soldiers in garrison, some at Gibraltar, others at Cadiz. The 30,000 directly under his command were nearly all actually under arms in effective force, owing to their transit having been by sea, their movements leisurely, their supplies abundant, and their age mature, the greater part consisting of old soldiers who had been engaged in Flanders, Egypt, Denmark, and Spain. But the English general had remarkably added to the extent of his forces by the organization of the Portuguese army, effected by Marshal Beresford, to whom, in the first instance, had been given many English officers, a considerable *matériel*, and funds for their payment, which England contributed under the name of a subsidy to Portugal. The Portuguese soldiers, full of animosity towards the French, sober, active, and brave, and, moreover, equipped, fed, and drilled in the same manner as the English, were nearly equal to them when they fought in the same ranks, and were always of much greater value than the Spanish soldiers, not from any superiority of nature, but because they had enjoyed the advantage of more perfect discipline. The Portuguese army, which received pay for 30,000 men, actually supplied 20,000. To these were added a militia tolerably well equipped and very serviceable, because including all the Portuguese officers whose places in the line had been supplied by the English. It amounted to no less than 30,000 men. A last resource which might be employed to attack the rear of the French was derived from a sort of *levée en masse* collected by the hidalgos in the invaded provinces and animated by the most furious passions. Lord Wellington, then, had at his disposal, without reckoning the last-named body, about 80,000 men, English and Portuguese, regular soldiers and militia, of whom at least 50,000 might be well trusted in the field, and 30,000 were competent to maintain a defensive position. They were

followed by 7000 or 8000 well-laden Spanish mules. These forces involved England in the expense of at least 150 millions of francs annually, which may readily be supposed equal to 300 millions at the present day.

The Portuguese government, consisting of a regent who was a refugee at Brazil, and a collective regency residing at Lisbon, subsidized by England and living only in virtue of her protection, often thwarted Lord Wellington, but never ventured to resist his imperative requirements. He was, therefore, the master of that part of the Peninsula, and could direct the war at his pleasure. The Spaniards did not always follow his counsels; but these he regarded merely in the light of natural obstacles to the French presented by the soil of the Peninsula, and pursued his course without any dependence on their concurrence.

As soon as the French had invaded Andalusia, Lord Wellington had hastened to quit Estremadura, unwilling to be any longer compromised by combined operations with the Spaniards, and had withdrawn into Portugal, with the desire of devoting himself exclusively to the defence of that country, which placed him in exact accordance with his instructions, and, at the same time, sufficed for the attainment of his designs; for it mattered little whether the English were in Portugal or in Spain, their presence at any point of the Peninsula was sufficient to sustain the hopes of the insurgents and to perpetuate the war. In the view of confining himself to the defence of Portugal, he had made the best possible selection of a locality.

The French might invade Portugal either by the north, by debouching from Galicia upon Oporto, or by the east from Salamanca upon Coimbra, or by the south from Badajoz upon Elvas to penetrate by Alentejo. Their mustering around Salamanca, very near Ciudad Rodrigo, showed that Ciudad Rodrigo was to be the base of their operations, and that they were to act upon the east. Some doubt might have been occasioned by the assembling of Marshal Mortier's troops about Badajoz, had their numbers and activity been greater. But the strength of the troops collected at Salamanca, and the activity displayed before Ciudad Rodrigo, left no doubt on the real direction of the French, and proved that they were to march by the road from Salamanca to Coimbra, following the valley of the Mondego, a road on which the Spaniards had built Ciudad Rodrigo and the Portuguese Almeida in mutual opposition.

Accordingly, Lord Wellington had established himself at Viseu, at the entrance of the valley of the Mondego, with the main body of his army, — viz.: 20,000 English and 15,000 Portuguese. Not fully reckoning on the French remaining inactive to the south, between Badajoz and Elvas, he had there placed his principal lieutenant, General Hill, with 6000 English and 10,000 Portuguese. In the space between, on the double declivity of the Estrella, which is the continuation of the chain of the Guadarrama, and which, stretching from east to west, separates the large valleys of the Douro and Tagus, he had sprinkled some militia to connect his two principal corps. He was able to concentrate his forces rapidly whenever he should fall back upon Lisbon by means of a road farther to the interior, the construction of which he had exacted from the

Portuguese, which went from north to south in the direction from Coimbra to Abrantès. He had left his cavalry on the Tagus, in the supposition that there would be no very immediate active operations. His design was to watch from his position at Viseu the movements of the French, not to wait for them if they offered battle, but to fall back before them till he should find a strong position, and, when they were exhausted by the fatigue of following him, to engage them with every advantage on his side, but not before to hazard anything in defence of the Spanish or Portuguese fortresses, or to preserve the provinces of his allies from the ravages of their enemies. He was inflexibly resolved to subordinate every thing to the success of the war. He had even issued some cruel orders, requiring the Portuguese, on pain of death, to follow him when he should retire, to destroy every thing in their course, and declaring that he would himself burn whatever they might spare. The Portuguese regency having raised some objections to a system of war so ruinous to Portugal, he replied that they must choose between obedience to his orders and the departure of his army, for unless they complied with him he would embark and abandon the country to the French, who would not treat them better than he did. The regency could say no more; but they felt the presence of their ally a curse scarcely inferior to that of the enemy.

The only practicable plan left to the French was to take Ciudad Rodrigo and then Almeida, there to form large magazines, and only to leave them with mules loaded with provisions, since Lord Wellington was resolved not to engage, but to retreat and leave them to die of famine in the pursuit. It would have been still more prudent to defer the undertaking of the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo till after the collection of all necessary means, not of provisions only, but also of instruments, heavy artillery, and ammunition. But it was difficult to delay it longer without losing the opportunity of beginning the offensive campaign at the close of summer. For this reason, early in June, Marshal Massena authorized Marshal Ney to invest the place, and advanced the corps of Junot in case the English should be tempted to trouble his operations. But, with his practised tact, Marshal Massena had perfectly penetrated the defensive system of his adversary, and, precisely because it would have been our interest to do so, he thought that Lord Wellington would not give battle on the ground which we occupied and where we had the means of living; so that, although he took all necessary precaution against the appearance of the English, he by no means expected them; and, while Marshal Ney went to undertake the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, he himself remained at Salamanca, to prepare the magazines of the army and to send to the besiegers the artillery, ammunition, and instruments of which they stood in need.

Towards the beginning of June, Marshal Ney invested Ciudad Rodrigo. That fortress is situated on the Agueda, a little river descending from the Sierra de Gata (which forms part of the Sierra de l'Estrella) to throw itself into the Douro. The little river was at that time much swelled by the rain. The town is built upon a nearly-perpendicular hill on the side of the Agueda, which washes it to the south, and sufficiently defended on that side by the steep bank

of the river. On the east and north it commands the surrounding country, but is connected with it by a tolerably-gentle declivity, which makes it accessible in these directions. It was, accordingly, to the east and north that it had been artificially defended. To an old enclosure of the Middle Ages, consisting of a thick wall flanked by square towers, was added more recently a bastioned enclosure with unequal fronts, with terrace and ditch lined on each side. To the southeast is the faubourg of San Francisco, flanked by large convents, which had been fortified and united by works. On the southeast is another large convent,—that of Santa Cruz, well defended and cannon-proof. The fortress had an excellent governor, retaining in old age his skill and energy,—General Herrasti. Warned by the preparations of the French, he had early taken his precautions. He had placed under the protection of blindings all the provisions and ammunition with which the fort was abundantly supplied, and covered with earth several buildings to protect them from bombs. His garrison consisted of 4000 men, in addition to a fanatic population of 6000 souls, augmented by the rich landed proprietors who, having sought in the fortress an asylum for themselves and their movable property, had furnished a fine battalion of militia, amounting to 800 men. His artillery was numerous and well served, and the brave Don Julian had joined him with several hundred horsemen to afford him all the aid in his power. Thus, every arrangement was made at Ciudad Rodrigo for a long and vigorous resistance.

General Lazowski, commander of the engineers, had not yet arrived; and General Eblé, of the artillery, being detained at Salamanca in preparing the heavy *matériel*, Marshal Ney employed the engineer and artillery officers of his corps to begin the siege. After consultation with them, he plainly discerned the true point of attack, and selected the north side for the first operations,—that is to say, the side where there were only artificial defences, which might yield to the force of the artillery. On the south the fort was inaccessible, on account of the steep bank of the Agueda; but on that side there was a stone bridge over the river, and the undefended faubourg of Puente. Over the Agueda, a little above the town, Ney threw two bridges of piles for the use of the army, conveyed to the other bank, besides his cavalry, a brigade of infantry, and took the faubourg of Puente and the stone bridge, so as to complete the investment and cut off all communication with the English.

After these preliminary operations the marshal began his approaches. To the north of the fort there was a large plateau called the Teso, within easy gunshot. From this elevation might be seen the two enclosures, the more recent one with its bastions, the older one with the square towers; and it was possible to effect a breach in either even at a considerable distance. They hoped thus greatly to abridge the labours of the siege, and, when the breach was once made practicable, to carry the fort by one of those bold strokes with which the soldiers of Ney were more familiar than any others.

The besiegers, making their attack from the north on the elevated plateau of the Teso, had their right on the convent of Santa Cruz, their left on that of San Francisco and the faubourg of the same name. During the night of the 15th



and 16th of June, notwithstanding the moonlight, he opened the trenches at a distance of 500 metres from the fort, and 1300 metres in extent. Marshal Ney, to divert the attention of the enemy, had ordered a feigned attack in the direction of the stone bridge of the Agueda and of the convent of San Francisco. Owing to this double diversion, the moonlight occasioned us no impediment, and the enemy did not perceive the works before our soldiers had so far dug the earth as to protect themselves. Nevertheless, our casualties amounted to 10 killed and 70 wounded. On the following days the approaches were continued with energy, extending the trench towards the convent of Santa Cruz on the right and the convent and faubourg of San Francisco on the left. The enemy endeavoured to interrupt our works by frequent sorties; but these produced little effect on the soldiers of the 6th corps, who repulsed them with great loss at the point of the bayonet whenever they appeared.

A more serious inconvenience was the rain, which had fallen continuously throughout the month of May and had been renewed during the first fortnight of June. Even on the elevated soil of the Teso our trenches were often rendered uninhabitable, and it was necessary to dig channels to drain them, under the fire of the Spaniards. The state of the roads having delayed the arrival of the heavy guns, our soldiers were obliged to work without the protection of artillery,—a want which was supplied by Marshal Ney, who formed for the period of the siege six companies of the best marksmen of his army, and distributed them in advance of the trenches in large holes dug for their protection, and so contrived as to contain three men with provisions and cartouches for twenty-four hours, from which they kept up such a fire upon the enemy's guns as greatly to diminish the inconvenience of working in the presence of artillery without any to oppose it.

The trench-works having been carried sufficiently forward, and the positions for the batteries being ready, they began to place such of the artillery as had arrived,—viz.: that of the 12th and the 16th; that of the 24th was still behind. Nevertheless, at this stage Marshal Ney and the engineer officers attached to his corps thought it right to carry the convent of Santa Cruz, which by its position greatly annoyed our right attack. Consequently, in the night of the 21st and 22d June, 800 grenadiers, in two columns, were sent against the convent. One, under Captain Maltzen of the engineers, with 20 sappers with bags of powder, was to endeavour to penetrate by a gate in the rear, while the other, under Captain François of the infantry, should attack the front. At night these columns advanced boldly. Captain Maltzen blew up two gates successively by means of the bags of powder, and met Captain François, who had taken the convent in front. Both had scaled the outer walls and pursued the Spaniards, who, seeing the gates forced, had fled into the most retired and elevated parts of the building; and both were mortally wounded at the head of their soldiers, under a murderous fire. But their soldiers continued the struggle without recoil, and disputed each successive building of the convent with the infuriated Spaniards. Captain Treussart of the engineers, under a shower of balls, placed a barrel of powder at the foot of

one of the walls, which occasioned a fearful explosion without effecting a breach. Having no other resource, he endeavoured to set fire to the place. A horrible spectacle ensued; part of the Spaniards perished in the flames; others extinguished the flames and kept their ground in some of the smoking ruins. Thus we held one half of the convent and the Spaniards held the other. But it was evident that the courage of our men could not take the place of cannons against strong walls. The completion of the conquest was, therefore, deferred till it should be possible to effect a breach.

In the mean while, the commander-in-chief had arrived at the camp of the besiegers on the evening of the 24th of June. After having seen and approved the works, he strongly urged the establishment of batteries, in order immediately to effect a breach. On the next day, the 25th of June, began the cannonade. Forty-six guns, some firing right and left to *ricochet* the defences, others point-blank to beat down the wall of the enclosure, caused considerable damage to the enemy's works. Several depôts of ammunition were seen to be blown up, several houses to take fire, and the ridges of the two enclosures to fall into the ditches. Nevertheless, the artillery of the fort replied with some effect; several of our guns were dismounted, and a good number of our artillerymen disabled. The fire was continued on the 26th, when they wished to free themselves from the convent of Santa Cruz, which, though partly conquered, occasioned considerable inconvenience to our trenches on the right. It was therefore determined to take it entirely. Three hundred grenadiers threw themselves into it by an opening effected by our sappers, and drove out the Spaniards, who were at length obliged to take refuge in the city. On the left a similar attempt was made upon the convent of San Francisco; but that convent, connected with the faubourg of the same name, formed an assemblage of works which forbade an attack of this nature: it was therefore relinquished.

During this time our fire had been incessant; but Marshal Massena, not being satisfied with the officers of the 6th corps, summarily ordered General Eblé to take the direct command of the artillery. This was a new vexation to Marshal Ney, who kept a very accurate account of all to which he was exposed, whether inevitable or not. General Eblé introduced some changes into the arrangements of the batteries, succeeded in giving greater effect to our fire, and, on the 28th, in virtue of his efforts, the two enclosures which our commanding position on the Teso had enabled us to destroy from a distance presented nothing but a heap of ruins, which filled the ditch. The two breaches now appeared to be practicable. Marshal Massena wished to make the assault without delay, for the crowding of troops on that unfavourable soil exposed them to disease, and the English, notwithstanding the improbability of an offensive operation on their part, had crossed the Coa, a little river parallel to the Agueda, and threatened an approach. A summons was sent to General Herrasti, with the assurance that he had done all that his honour could demand, that he could not expect to check the bravery of the army of Portugal in an actual breach, and that if he persisted he would expose his garrison to be put to the sword.

The troops of the garrison began to lose courage; but the monks continued to excite the people, and the refugees from the country, who had brought all their valuable possessions into the city, were unwilling that it should be surrendered. Their determination to resist was favoured by one circumstance. The breach having been effected from a distance, before the French had brought their approaches to the border of the ditch, the counterscarp or wall of the ditch opposite the fortress was untouched. Hence the breach, though practicable on the side next the town, was not so on the side towards the country, for, before entering the ditch to make the assault, it was necessary to leap the first wall. This defence could, therefore, be still prolonged agreeably to the rules of art. General Herrasti, determined, not by fanaticism, but by a nice sense of honour, to fulfil his duty to the utmost, made use of this reason to refuse the summons of Marshal Massena, and despatched a message to Lord Wellington to solicit his assistance.

This unexpected resistance was the cause of the greatest vexation to Marshal Massena. The staff of Marshal Ney was assembled, and also that of Marshal Massena; they discussed the cause of the evil, and, as usual, mutually laid the blame on each other. The officers of the 6th corps excused themselves by asserting that there had been too much haste, and that, by endeavouring to make a breach before they had destroyed the counterscarp, little time had been gained. And they were right; but it remained equally true that it was necessary to remove the approaches and direct them from the Tseo to the crest of the glacis and the border of the ditch.

The commander-in-chief, having lost all patience, selected from the 8th corps an officer of great merit, Colonel Valazé, already distinguished at the siege of Astorga, and confided to him the direction of the works, with the view of reaching the margin of the ditch as quickly as possible. They spoke of twelve days: Marshal Massena urged the completion of the works in seven or eight, for provisions were becoming scarce, and the 6th corps was already on half rations.

About this period of the siege, a false alarm retarded the concentration of the 8th corps on the right of the 6th,—a concentration rendered daily more desirable by the neighbourhood of the English. It had been said that a detachment of English troops landed at Corunna was attacking Astorga, and General Junot felt himself obliged to draw out his right, in order to succour that fortress, which closed the avenues of the kingdom of Leon against the insurgents of Galicia. Fortunately the report was much exaggerated. They were the Galicians, some of whom wore the red dress furnished by the English, who threatened Astorga. They were quickly recognised and repulsed, and the 8th corps was at length able to take its position on the right of the 6th at San Felices el Chico.

But this concentration, though dictated by prudence, was really less urgent than had been supposed. Lord Wellington had, indeed, advanced as far as the banks of the Coa, but he refused to fight. In vain had the emissaries of General Herrasti urged him to succour Ciudad Rodrigo; in vain had the Marquis de la Romana come from Badajoz to entreat him to interrupt

the operations of the French: he replied that he could not save the Spanish fortress without a battle, and he was resolved not to risk the fate of the English army for the sake of a city already almost lost. This harsh reply, though founded on very valid reasons, threw the Spaniards into despair, and enraged them again, what they called the frigid egoism of the English.

The new works ordered by Marshal Massena were almost finished, but they had occupied the ten or twelve days originally demanded; and, notwithstanding all the efforts of Colonel Valazé, it was not till the 6th or 8th of July that they had reached the margin of the ditch. Though General Simon had with singular bravery carried the faubourg and convent of San Francisco at the point of the bayonet, to relieve our trenches on the left, the fortress did not appear to be at all shaken by this success, and it was necessary to reach the counterscarp by continuous zigzags and under an unintermitting fire. At length, on the night of the 6th and 7th July, they entered a covered gallery to reach the counterscarp. On the 8th they sprung a mine of 400 kilogrammes of powder and threw the masonry into the ditch. Unfortunately, Colonel Valazé was struck on the head by a grenade, while directing the works, and was considered dead for some hours. But the work was not thereby delayed, and the breach was soon found to be practicable on both sides of the ditch.

On the morning of the 9th July, the commander-in-chief arranged every thing for the assault. He had given orders that the artillery should be prepared for one more day's firing to complete the breach and to overthrow the artillery of the fort. From four o'clock in the morning, our batteries, now twelve in number, poured a shower of balls, bombs, and howitzers upon the unhappy city of Ciudad Rodrigo. The enemy replied at first with some vigour; but their artillery, struck both point-blank and by ricochet, was soon silenced. The two breaches, wrought upon by our projectiles in all directions, presented but a mound of ruins, easily accessible to the agility of our troops. Between three and four o'clock in the afternoon, the engineers having declared the breach perfectly practicable, Massena ordered the assault. Marshal Ney formed two columns of chosen men, under Generals Simon and Loison, and placed them in the trenches, with their music at their head, ready to pour forth at the first signal. According to custom, he called for some volunteers to go under the fire of the enemy and make trial of the breaches in face of the two armies. In these solemn moments, especially among troops who cherish a lively sentiment of honour, courage is raised to its highest point. He required three men; about a hundred offered themselves. He sent to the breach Thirion, corporal of grenadiers, Bombois, carabineer, Billeret, chasseur. These three brave men climbed the breach of the first enclosure, then that of the second, and, reaching the summit, shouted "Vive l'Empereur!" They returned uninjured, amid the acclamations of the army. Ney then gave the signal. The two columns rushed to the foot of the first breach, and, while preparing to climb it, the white flag appeared on the second, in token of surrender. A white-haired old man, General Herrasti, presented himself to treat. He spoke with Marshal Ney

on the very ruins of the walls, and there discussed the terms of capitulation. Ney embraced him as a brave man, and granted him the honours due to a gallant defence, and agreed that the officers should retain their swords and the men their baggage. These conditions settled, our troops entered the fortress. General Loison with his storming columns entered by the breach, the rest of the 6th corps by the gates of the city.

It was high time that this long resistance should be overcome, for our soldiers began to fail in necessary supplies. In Ciudad Rodrigo much less was found than had been hoped. However, they discovered sufficient flour, biscuit, salt meat, and liquors, to supply the army for several days. They also took upwards of 100 guns, many cartouches, some powder, and some English muskets, and 8500 prisoners. The garrison had lost nearly 600 men. The loss on our side was not less than 200 killed, and 1000 wounded, some very severely, as is commonly the case in those who are wounded during a siege. Unfortunately, great heat immediately following the rain had occasioned so much disease that our sick already amounted to 3000 or 4000.

This first act of the campaign in Portugal had thus far passed off well. The troops had exhibited their wanted vigour, notwithstanding the misunderstanding among their commanders and the neglect of discipline occasioned by distress; and they might be fully depended upon in the presence of the enemy. Colonel Valasé had repaired the first faults committed in regard to the works, and their delay in overcoming the resistance of the Spaniards simply arose from their undue haste; for the history of war by sieges proves that every necessary labour omitted remains to be executed afterwards with still greater loss of men and time.

Ciudad Rodrigo having been taken, it was necessary to attack Almeida. But Marshal Massena had determined to hurry nothing on this occasion, and not again to lose time from his desire to save it. Ciudad Rodrigo had fallen on the 9th July; it was impossible to begin offensive operations before the close of the hot weather, which would be in the month of September. July and August might therefore be devoted to the siege of Almeida; and he resolved to return to Salamanca to complete the formation of his magazines, the collection of his means of transport, and the creation of a park of heavy artillery, more perfect than that employed against Ciudad Rodrigo. It was said that Almeida was better fortified and better armed than Ciudad Rodrigo, and he was unwilling to undertake the siege before he had brought together every thing requisite to its speedy termination.

Before leaving Ciudad Rodrigo, he ordered the breaches to be repaired and the fortress to be put in a state of defence. The city contained the wealthiest inhabitants of the country, who had sought refuge within the walls. On these Massena laid a contribution of 500,000 francs, of which he stood in immediate need for the payment of the expenses of the artillery and engineers, and returned forthwith to Salamanca, where the most urgent affairs had made little progress during his absence, not from any want of activity in his agents, but from the want of authority to remove obstacles. His troops, in consequence of the concentration about Ciudad

Rodrigo, having been replaced at Leon by those of General Kellermann, and at Valladolid by those of the guard, they refused to surrender to him the contributions raised in the name of the army of Portugal. It was necessary to exert an act of authority if he would secure the return of the funds belonging to the army; and Marshal Massena found himself obliged to force open the chests of the paymasters to withdraw the funds therein illegally stored. He was unwilling to compromise himself in things of that nature, after the severe lessons taught him by Napoleon in Italy, and this forced violation of the paymasters' chests was a fresh source of annoyance to him. Yet he resolved upon it, and by that measure, aided by funds sent from Paris, he was able to clear some months of the pay that was due, but not the whole. The 2d corps was still three months in arrear, the 6th and 8th two months. He then collected grain, cattle, mules, and asses, and hoped to enter Portugal with twenty days' provisions, one-half carried by soldiers, the other half by the beasts of burden, leaving the fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida provisioned for several months. He further brought together about 60 pieces of heavy artillery, and directed them from Ciudad Rodrigo to Almeida. The corn being ripe, he procured sickles in the country, and reaped the crops by the 6th and 8th corps,—a species of occupation far from disagreeable to the soldiers, and one which ought to yield him great advantage, for the harvest was remarkably fine in Spain that year. Unfortunately, half of the estates had remained unsown, the crops had been prematurely consumed by being used green for fodder. Yet what was left would furnish, besides immediate sustenance, a useful supply to the magazines.

In the mean while, the commander-in-chief had ordered the investment of Almeida. Marshal Ney had advanced with the 6th corps, followed by the 8th, to drive the English back upon the Coa,—a little river which, like the Agueda, flows from the Sierra de Gata (or Estrella) into the Douro, passing Almeida within gunshot. Almeida is on the right of the Coa, and consequently on the same side as ourselves. Lord Wellington continuing immovable, notwithstanding the maledictions of the Spaniards, who were so incensed as to refuse all intercourse with him, was encamped at Alverca, on the slope of the hills which surround the valley of Mondego, whence he coolly observed what transpired. He had only an advanced guard of light troops on the right of the Coa, consisting of 6000 infantry and 1000 cavalry under General Crawford. The commander-in-chief ordered Marshal Ney to remove this advanced guard, and to warn him immediately if they seemed disposed to hold their ground, which did not seem consistent with their actual position. Seeing at hand the moment for offensive operations, he had ordered Reynier to pass the Tagus with the 2d corps, and to take his position at the back of the great chain, which, as we have said, is called Guadarrama, between Segovia and Madrid, Sierra de Gata, between Ciudad Rodrigo and Alcantara, and Sierra de l'Estrella, when it has entered Portugal. He ordered him to have his advanced posts towards Alfayates and Sabugal at the extremity of the mountains, remaining still at Coria to watch the valley of the Tagus.

The hot weather and the labours of the siege

had been very severe upon the 6th corps, and many of the men were in hospital. For this reason Marshal Ney had wished to seek the cool air of the mountainous districts, and there to wait the termination of the great heat, proposing towards autumn to act against Almeida, and, when that city was taken, against the English army. The commander-in-chief, though allowing rest for fifteen or twenty days in July, was desirous that Almeida should fall in August, that he might assume the offensive in September. He therefore ordered the investment of Almeida.

Marshal Ney executed the orders transmitted to him with unusual energy, as we shall see. He forced the English rear-guards to fall back precipitately, and drove them before him to a fortress called the Fortress of the Conception,—a regular work constructed on the road from Ciudad Rodrigo to Almeida, on the summit of a plateau which commanded that road. The English had condemned this fortress, not wishing either to deprive themselves of a garrison for its defence or to give it up to our troops. But our cavalry advanced with so much speed that they could only explode two bastions. Though the work could easily be repaired, we avoided doing so, being no more anxious than the English to leave a garrison there. Marshal Ney, with Montbrun's cavalry and the infantry of the Loison division, arrived before Almeida on the 24th July, pressing close upon General Crawford, who, as we have said, was before the Coa with about 6000 infantry and 1000 horse. That general withdrew in an irregular line, the right of which rested on the Coa, the left on Almeida, under protection of the guns of the fort. Marshal Ney, burning with ardour at sight of the English, proposed first to cut them off from Almeida and then to hurl them into the deep ravine of the Coa. He charged their left in the direction of Almeida, with his light cavalry under Montbrun, a regiment of dragoons, and the rifle companies formed during the last siege, and at the same time vigorously attacked their centre and right with the infantry of General Loison. Though the marching-powers of the English are not great, they could maintain a forced pace for some hours, and they lost no time in reaching the Coa, endeavouring to keep within range of the guns which covered them, and accessible to the bridge of the Coa, which they wished to cross. Marshal Ney pursued them with equal speed. Montbrun with his cavalry and rifles charged them under the guns of Almeida, and obliged them to remove, while Loison, charging their infantry, drove them upon the bridge. Had they been less in advance, not a man would have escaped; and, in fact, 700 or 800 soldiers were killed or taken, a considerable loss to the English, whose numbers were so small, and who boasted that they could never be surprised. After this brilliant coup-de-main, they invested Almeida and began the necessary arrangements for the 6th corps, to which was intrusted this siege as well as the former. General Junot was anxious that this honour should have been assigned to the 8th corps; but this would have changed the order of battle, and the commander-in-chief refused his consent.

Marshal Ney, knowing that they must spend two months in these cantonments, caused barracks to be constructed for his troops, and then sent the soldiers to the harvest. The corn was excellent, the cattle abundant, and the army

might sojourn there without any privation. At the same time they extended their lines, in order to be able to cut wood, which would be much wanted in the siege-works, owing particularly to the nature of the soil.

Almeida was a regular pentagon, perfectly fortified, completely armed, garrisoned with 5000 Portuguese, and built upon a rocky soil, in which it was very difficult to open a trench. In order to protect themselves, therefore, a great multitude of sacks of earth, fascines, and gabions was necessary. The first fortnight of August was employed in reaping, in procuring the necessary *matériel*, and in waiting for the heavy artillery. The trench was opened on the 15th, the fête-day of Napoleon. Massena had repaired to the spot; the south front was chosen as the point of attack, and the bastion of San Pedro, which seemed less defended than the rest. The rocky character of the soil did not readily allow them to dig very deeply, and it was necessary to protect themselves with earth-bags. During the following days they deepened the trench, extended it right and left, in order to obtain positions from which it would be possible to fire in ricochet upon the bastion which they were to attack. These works cost both time and men, for they were badly sheltered, and they were resolved not to employ artillery before they could use all their guns at once. To supply its place, they stationed riflemen, as at Ciudad Rodrigo, whose business it was to fire upon the enemy's cannoners. Yet they made but slow progress, for they constantly met the bare rock, and it was necessary to complete the trenches by tunnelling. Scarcely had the first parallel been opened in its full extent when they debouched in zigzag to open the second, which they brought almost to the bastion of San Pedro without having fired a gun.

During the execution of the approach-works, eleven batteries had been constructed and armed with sixty-four heavy guns brought from Ciudad Rodrigo and Salamanca. On the morning of August 26, the artillery being ready, Marshal Massena gave orders to commence firing. The projectiles, falling from all directions in a very limited space, which, though well fortified, could be almost surrounded by the besieging batteries, caused great damage. The enemy replied with vigour, but were unable to stand against an artillery which was served with equal precision and energy. Several buildings caught fire. A terrible explosion was occasioned towards night by a well-aimed bomb falling upon the powder-magazine in the centre of the town, in the castle. Part of the houses were thrown down, and nearly 500 men perished, including soldiers and inhabitants. Some guns, even, were precipitated into the ditches, and portions of the ramparts were broken down. Our trenches were so filled with earth, stones, and all kinds of fragments, as to require considerable labour to clear them.

On the next day, the 27th, the fate of the city appeared in all its horror. The inhabitants, in consternation, demanded that an end should be put to these ravages. The troops of the garrison, like the defenders of Ciudad Rodrigo, indignant at the obstinate immobility of the English, declared that they ought no longer to be sacrificed to the selfishness of an unfeeling ally, and spoke of surrendering. Massena, well

assured of the disorder that must prevail in the fortress, summoned it on the 27th, urging, in his letter to the governor, that, after the accident to which it had been exposed, all further resistance was impossible. The governor proceeded to parley and to discuss the conditions. In the mean while, a Portuguese general, the Marquis d'Alorna, whom he brought with him, as well as several other officers of the same nation, in order to exert their influence on the Portuguese army, presented himself upon the rampart, conversed with several officers of the garrison, and was received in a very friendly manner. Every thing showed that the garrison could not hold out longer; yet the governor having spent the whole day in discussion, Massena renewed the fire; but a very few shots were necessary, for the capitulation was settled on our own terms at 11 o'clock at night.

On the next day, August 28, the 26th corps, to which had been assigned the glory of the second siege as well as of the first, entered Almeida; and thus began the invasion of Portugal by two glorious feats of arms. More than 5000 men were found in the fort, a large quantity of provisions, and a good artillery. The 5000 prisoners of the garrison were composed of the 24th regiment of the Portuguese line and the militia. Massena was perplexed how to dispose of these prisoners, especially the latter. The English had endeavoured to persuade the Portuguese that the French were accustomed to kill all their prisoners. He thought that it would be an excellent way of refuting these reports to send back the militia, chiefly peasants, charging them to assure their countrymen that the same indulgence would be shown to all who made no resistance. To the 24th Portuguese regiment he proposed, on the advice of the Marquis d'Alorna, to enter the service of France after the example of other Portuguese already enrolled in the French army, and he found them disposed to embrace the proposal. It was accepted by all, officers and men; some to desert shortly afterwards, others from resentment against the English, who had refused assistance in their struggle. Massena then caused Almeida to be put in a state of defence.

Thus, happily, was accomplished the first part of the plan of the campaign, which consisted in the conquest of the frontier-fortresses. The base of operations was good, if they should be able to provision the conquered forts, to create hospitals, magazines, and to maintain sufficient forces to cover their communications. But in Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida they had more than they wished, for these involved their leaving two garrisons instead of one in their rear, a double amount of provisions, and double amount of care in their defence of one object; for the two forts were so close to each other as each to effect the same object. Massena, therefore, wished to destroy Almeida, which would have been a wise proceeding; but, not aware, till too late, that Napoleon had been of the same sentiment, he determined to repair it and put it in a state of defence; and he then began his final preparations for entering Portugal.

It was now September, and it was proposed to cross the frontier between the 10th and 15th. Napoleon, after having warmly congratulated Massena on the taking of Ciudad Rodrigo and

Almeida, urged him strongly to enter into active operations and to throw himself with all his forces upon the English. "They do not exceed 25,000 men," he wrote; "your soldiers ought to amount to about 60,000, even after the sieges and the diseases of summer; and how is it possible that 25,000 English can stand against 60,000 French under *your* command? To hesitate would imply a degree of weakness not to be feared in such a general as the Duke of Rivoli and Prince of Essling." Massena did not require to be urged to attack the English whenever he should meet them in his course; but he was grieved to perceive the extent to which Napoleon deceived himself on the comparative strength of the two armies, and he vaguely suspected that he would himself be the first victim of these illusions, to which Napoleon himself would ultimately fall a sacrifice, which no one then foresaw, unless perhaps the British general, the only person in a situation to form a correct judgment.

Unfortunately, the forces of Massena were not equal to what Napoleon supposed, nor was he fully informed of the strength of the English. The three corps of Reynier, Ney, and Junot, combined, though at Paris supposed to amount to 80,000 men, in reality only numbered 66,000, and could only, at the utmost, send 50,000 into Portugal. In fact, the corps of Marshal Ney had lost at least 2000 by the sieges. The season, having suddenly changed from constant rain to oppressive heat, had deprived the corps of Ney and Junot of at least 7000 or 8000 men,—the latter having suffered the most severely, as it consisted principally of young men. The garrisons to be left at Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida could not be estimated at less than 3000 men,—viz.: 1200 for the one and 1800 for the other. Some troops were also necessary in the rear; and the commander-in-chief, notwithstanding his unwillingness to scatter his forces, had resolved, in addition to the garrisons of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, to leave General Gardanne with a column of 8000 men, composed of 1000 dragoons and 2000 infantry, to keep open the roads between the different fortresses which formed our base of operations, to complete the vast magazines which it was necessary to maintain in the rear, and to receive the men on their leaving the hospitals. For these various reasons, the utmost that could accompany Massena was 60,000 men, which was a small number to meet Lord Wellington, who had just recalled General Hill to Abrantes, as soon as he had perceived the movement of General Reynier towards La Sierra de Gata, and who, with 20,000 English and 15,000 Portuguese which he already had, possessed a total of 50,000 excellent soldiers. In order to contend on equal terms against defensive positions, which are met in Portugal at every step, and which Lord Wellington so well knew how to select and to defend, at least one-third more would have been necessary. In withdrawing, Lord Wellington would find his army augmented by the rallying of the Portuguese, the junction of the Spaniards of Badajoz, and the arrival of reinforcements from Cadiz at Lisbon. Independently, therefore, of the lines of Torres Vedras, the existence of which was unknown to the French, he ought to have about 80,000 men under the walls of Lisbon. To what number might :

be supposed that the 50,000 men under Massena would be reduced by the time they reached the walls of Lisbon, after sustaining many combats and perhaps a grand battle? It would not be extravagant to believe that they should be reduced to 40,000 ill-fed men, who should present themselves before 80,000 English, Spanish, and Portuguese, under Lord Wellington, well supplied with every thing, and entrenched behind some strong defensive position, supported by the sea and the British squadron. Nor was this all. Massena was to arrive by the left bank of the Tagus, which, between Abrantes and Lisbon, is a large river, and thus find himself, without any means of crossing, in the presence of the English, who commanded both banks in virtue of their maritime *matériel*. It would, therefore, have been necessary that 25,000 or 30,000 French, leaving Andalusia with a pontoon-equipage, which might have been brought down from Alcantara, should unite with Massena below Abrantes; that Massena himself should have 70,000 fighting men instead of 50,000; and then, deducting the losses, he might have some chance of success against Lord Wellington, always allowing for the difficulty of finding provisions, which, however, would have been much diminished by the occupation of the two banks of the Tagus; for the Alentejo offered resources which the French who had come from Badajoz might secure before the English should have time to destroy them.

Marshal Massena, though ready to obey, wrote again to Napoleon to let him know that his forces were quite insufficient in comparison with those of the English, that the roads were in a frightful condition, that he could find no means of sustenance, that all his communications would be intercepted as soon as he should set off, that with difficulty he would be able to maintain communications with Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo, that he would be able to receive nothing, and that it would be therefore a great problem to know how he should subsist in presence of the English fully provided, much increased in number, while he would be much diminished, and that he would have no chance of success unless he were speedily reinforced by a considerable amount not only of men, but of provisions, munitions of war, and draught-horses. The difficulties anticipated by the forethought of Massena did not fail to escape his lieutenants. Ney, Junot, and Reynier, on whom indeed did not devolve the difficult task of opposing the Emperor, daily declared that the undertaking was not prudent with their present means; that it was easy to make plans at Paris, and at a distance from the scene of action to give impracticable orders; that severe representations ought to be made to the Emperor, and that they ought not to march until they had received all that was necessary to success. Massena, who, as we have seen, was recently loaded with favours, and feared to incur the charge of timidity from a master who was never satisfied with the energy of his agents, had unfortunately committed an error, the only serious one of the campaign, an error to which the most independent characters are liable under a master who cannot be contradicted,—that of accepting an unreasonable commission,—and he determined to move forwards. Besides, he

reckoned on the speedy arrival of General Drouet with 20,000 men, that of General Gardanne with 8000 or 9000, and even on the probable union of the troops of Andalusia; he reckoned on the fortune which for twenty years had never deserted him; and, finally, wearied as he was, he felt an inward confidence that if he could anywhere meet the enemy he would give them such a check that the war might be terminated in a single battle, and that he would have merely to pursue the wrecks of their army to the ocean.

Napoleon persisted in his orders, notwithstanding all the letters which he received, accustomed as he had long been to hear his generals exaggerate the resources of the enemy and underrate their own; in the English army taking account only of the English, whom he reckoned at 25,000 men at the most, and laying out of consideration all the Spaniards and Portuguese; imagining that 50,000 French should easily master 25,000 English; entirely ignorant of the existence of the lines of Torres Vedras; not calculating on the assistance the enemy would derive from distance, climate, and the barrenness of the soil; and having formed the habit of believing in the accomplishment of all his desires,—a habit which might seem to belong only to mediocrity, but which sometimes is formed by men of genius under the fatal influence of flattery. To all objections he replied that they must march, and not spare the English when they met them. Massena, therefore, determined to set out, hoping that what had been promised would be sent, and that his good fortune and courage would not desert him. He had fixed the 10th for crossing the frontier. He deferred till the 16th, that he might be better prepared, and that the great heat customary at that season might pass over. He trusted that he should be able to accumulate provisions for six months at Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, with the necessary supplies for the retreat of the army in case of need; and he proposed to transport with himself subsistence for twenty days, which for 50,000 men amounted to a million of rations. Here, as everywhere, the reality fell far short of the expectation. At the moment of departure he had been able to introduce into those two forts provision for only four months; he had been obliged to relinquish the formation of magazines in his rear, and had succeeded in bringing together only sixteen days' provisions, after having consumed every method of transport in the country from Burgos to Salamanca. It is true that 1,200,000 rations of grain ought to be derived from the past markets and the requisitions that had been ordered, and that he enjoined upon his agents at Salamanca to communicate with General Gardanne to continue in his absence the execution of his orders. Of the sixteen days' provisions already collected, the soldiers carried six in their knapsacks, and six were to follow on mules, asses, and oxen. In place of one hundred guns, which would only have been in the proportion of two to every thousand men, he could only collect seventy-two, owing to his being obliged to carry with him the munitions of war for the whole campaign. His artillery-horses were already much fatigued by the sieges in which they had been employed; but they were assisted in drawing the heavy material by 2000

oxen. Flocks of sheep taken from the country followed each corps d'armée: in a word, every thing was arranged as if to cross the desert. The army, notwithstanding the gloomy disposition of some of the commanders, saw with pleasure their speedy deliverance from a long period of inaction, and the prospect of an immediate engagement with the English. The two corps of Ney and Reynier consisted of tried troops. The corps of Junot alone was young, but well taught and already excited by the military ardour of the other two. It was also freed from the weak and sickly, having left in the hospitals 5000 men out of 20,000. The infantry were full of confidence; though badly clothed, they were well shod and armed, mature in age and experience. The dragoons, who formed the principal force of the cavalry, were hardened to the climate, perfect in horsemanship, armed with long Toledo sabres, whose every stroke was a mortal wound. If ever valour could overcome natural obstacles, this army seemed fitted to do so. Massena, Ney, Junot, Reynier, would have been equal to the task if they had been in accord among themselves; and at the head of such soldiers they might have accomplished it.

Every preparation having been now made, Massena set his army in motion on the morning of September 16. When on the point of setting out, he again sent an aide-de-camp to the Emperor, to repeat the difficulties of the enterprise and urgently to demand prompt assistance in men and material. The army crossed the frontiers of Portugal in three columns. The corps of Reynier, (the 2d,) brought from the south aspect of the Estrella to the north, was to join the army at Celorico and form the left corps. Ney, with the 6th, taking the direct road to Celorico, formed the centre. Junot, with the 8th corps, forming the right, was to pass by Pinhel, keeping a little in the rear, to protect the numerous convoy of oxen, mules, and asses, which followed with the necessary supplies of bread and cartouches.

All their fears were justified by the first steps they took in that fatal country. They had expected to find it barren, for it had already been crossed by many soldiers; but it was further found to have been devastated by fire and sword. Everywhere villages were deserted, mills rendered useless, stacks of corn and straw in flames. The English had completed the destruction begun by the people. They found none whom they could employ as guides, beyond a few old men who had been unable to follow the fugitive population and whose information was very defective. The deficiency was supplied by three or four Portuguese officers attached to the army, and a few men of the 24th Portuguese regiment who had not deserted. They obtained what in-

formation they could from these guides concerning the roads, which were scarcely adapted to the commonest agricultural vehicles. Yet in the midst of this stony desert, a prey alike to the parching heat of the season and to the flames kindled by men, if neither corn nor cattle remained, there could be found potatoes, beans, and excellent cabbages, to give a relish to the soldiers' soup.

On the 17th Massena slackened the pace of the 6th corps, which was the most alert, to enable the 2d to overtake them. He halted the main body of the army at Juncalis, on the road to Viseu. Junot had followed with difficulty, and was still in the rear with the main part of the baggage.

It was requisite now to determine the road which they should follow in the valley of the Mondego, through which flow to the ocean the waters of the north side of the Estrella. The Mondego, which flows from the north of the Estrella, would mingle with the Douro, were it not diverted to the west by a secondary chain called the Sierra de Caramula, which directs it to the ocean after crossing Coimbra. That river then flows between the spurs of the Estrella and the less abrupt declivities of the Sierra de Caramula, enclosed as it were in a circular basin, until it escapes by a narrow opening forced for itself a little before Coimbra.

The difficulties were numerous to Massena whether he should pass the Mondego to the right or left, in his way to Coimbra, where he expected to find abundant resources and to join the highroad from Oporto to Lisbon. On the left he would meet the steep spurs of the Estrella, on the right the bold undulations of the Sierra de Caramula,—all easily defended,—and, in any case, at the very bottom of the valley where it debouches upon Coimbra, a kind of gorge which the English would not fail to occupy. Being, therefore, exposed to the same difficulties whichever road he should adopt, he selected the right bank, because upon the more gradual declivities of the Sierra de Caramula he was more likely to find cultivation and consequently resources for his army. On the road their only dependence was on a rigid economy of the provisions which they carried with themselves. For this reason, when arrived at Celorico, Massena quitted the left bank of the Mondego for the right, and directed his course to Viseu, a small town of 7000 or 8000 souls, distinguished as a market for cattle.\*

The 2d and 6th corps arrived at Viseu on the 19th. The whole population had taken flight, except a few men and women whose infirmities had rendered it impossible. Though the English had destroyed the ovens, mills, and granaries, and set fire to the stacks of corn, the soldiers, who had expected to find nothing,

\* Massena is severely censured for having taken the road to Viseu, by the Duke of Wellington, in his highly intelligent and generally very impartial correspondence. He considers it the worst he could have selected; but he assigns no valid reason for his opinion. As they were not leaving from Galicia, as had been attempted without success in the preceding campaign, nor descending as far as Extremadura, which would have involved a long détour to gain the Alentejo, their only course was through the valley of the Mondego, situated to the north of the Estrella; and in that valley the right bank of the river was plainly preferable from its superior fertility, nor did it offer to the English engineers any more favourable defensive positions. It was possible, indeed, to have passed by the south aspect of the Estrella instead of the north: but they would then

have come upon the road of Castel Branco, on which Junot had nearly perished three years before. Massena had therefore no other road to choose but that to Viseu; and we may justly be surprised at a criticism so often repeated by the Duke of Wellington, but so unfounded, which seems unworthy of the usual fairness and accuracy of his judgment; and we cannot but regret that the illustrious British general should not have been more equitable towards a rival no less illustrious than himself. It is true that the despatches were addressed to his government and were dictated by the events of the day, and that, at a later period, when he could contemplate his rival from the higher vantage-ground of his own glory, he rendered the most ample justice to Massena, particularly for his conduct in this campaign.

were well pleased to discover large quantities of vegetables. Some indeed were so foolish as to throw away the biscuit with which they were provided, flattering themselves that they would everywhere find support.

The part of the army most worthy of commiseration was the artillery, particularly the corps in charge of the baggage. The roads were almost impassable, and a march of three days had sufficed to exhaust the horses and greatly to damage the artillery-carriages. The conveying column had met with a sudden alarm from Colonel Trent, a bold leader, who, followed by several English and Portuguese, had availed himself of a moment when the escort was at some distance to attack the baggage; but, the escort having fallen back upon him, he was forced to let go his prey. Only a few stragglers were lost.

Massena, who allowed nothing to hurry him, and who, though anxious to meet the English, would have preferred to do so in a more open country, granted two days to the army in order to bring up the 8th corps and to repair the artillery-carriages.

Marshal Ney, as intractable to his inferiors as to his superiors, having become embroiled with old General Loison, Massena had assigned to the latter an advanced division composed of light troops, which were to march at the head of the army beside the cavalry of Montbrun. He ordered them both to advance while the main body of the troops should rest at Viseu, and to repair the bridge destroyed by the English over the two little rivers Dao and Criz, which descend from the Sierra de Caramula into the Mondego. In repairing the bridges and crossing them when repaired, Montbrun and Loison employed the 22d and 28d, skirmishing with the rear-guard at every step, always with a favourable result.

On the 25th, the corps of Reynier on the left, and that of Ney in the centre, crossed the little river Criz. Junot, on the right, left Viseu. Montbrun and Loison directed themselves to the river Mortao, the last to be crossed before reaching the bottom of the valley of the Mondego; here they met with more resistance from the English, but they forced them to fall back and to yield the steep bed of that small river.

At this point they were at the bottom of the basin of the Mondego, from which that river issues by a narrow channel to cross the town of Coimbra. It was evident that the English designed to engage us at that place, for on each bank they had established equally strong positions to oppose us. If we should pass the Mondego to assume the left bank, we should meet a detached spur of the Estrella, which, under the name of the Sierra de Murcelha, presented an obstacle almost insurmountable. If we remained on the right bank, we had opposite to us the Sierra de Caramula, which, in taking a bend to form the basin of the Mondego, where it assumes the name of the Sierra d'Alcoba, presented an obstacle less elevated, but not less difficult to surmount. Two nearly-parallel roads crossed this Sierra d'Alcoba, leading to Coimbra and then rejoining the great road from Oporto to Lisbon. On each were seen numerous forces posted to bar our progress, and above, on the summits of the hills covered with heath, with olive-trees, and with firs, were discerned troops apparently passing from our right to our left.

The peasants said that there was a plain beyond; but it was doubtful whether this was a plateau crowning the chain from which they must descend to the plain of Coimbra, or whether it was the plain of Coimbra itself. Nor were they sure whether they saw before them the English army, determined to dispute Portugal with them from these heights, so well adapted to that mode of warfare, or merely two strong rear-guards, having no intention beyond securing time to evacuate Coimbra by delaying our march.

According to all appearances, these two suppositions were equally probable. Reynier and Ney, on consulting together, agreed in opinion. Whatever the English might wish to do, they did not seem to be very firmly established in their present position; and it was necessary to attack them immediately, in order to drive them back in disorder if they were already in retreat, or to force their position before they were firmly fixed if it were their intention to fight. In this opinion they were right. Unfortunately, Massena had not yet come on the ground, nor did he arrive till evening, whether impeded by fatigue, to which he had become very sensible, or occupied with bringing forward the rear of his army, wholly composed of very inconvenient wagons. His lieutenants had not ventured to risk a general action in his absence; and when he came up with them there was no time for any thing more than a reconnoissance, to guide their conduct on the following day.

The commander-in-chief, after reconnoitring the position of the enemy, came to the same conclusion as his lieutenants, and thought that the English were preparing to give battle on the spot. To avoid a battle, had such been their intention, was difficult. If they had gone to the left of the Mondego, which, for want of bridges, they must have forded, and afterwards have climbed the Sierra de Murcelha, they would probably there have found the English, who, discovering all our movements from the heights which they occupied, would not have failed to follow them, and perhaps even to have fallen upon them during this flank march. To plunge into the very gorge of the Mondego, and to pass it by following the course of the stream, and to debouche beyond it upon Coimbra, was impossible, the heights in that part so closely compressing the Mondego as to leave no practicable road either to the right or left. There remained, then, only the two roads before them, each directly crossing the Sierra d'Alcoba, unless they should endeavour to pass to the right, towards the point where that sierra is connected with that of Caramula, of which it is the prolongation. At this place, in fact, might be seen a declivity which might allow the passage of an army. But the country-people, perhaps incorrectly interrogated, affirmed that there was no road practicable to carriages on that side. No choice, therefore, was left, and it was necessary either to carry the place which was opposed to us or to retire. But opinions were divided. Marshal Ney was no longer in favour of a battle. He maintained that they ought to have attacked the English immediately, before they were well established in their position, but that it was now too late, and that it would be better to make a retrograde movement than to lose a battle in these fright-



ful passages, ignorant of any way of escape and pursued by a victorious army. To these reasons he added various considerations, at the time unreasonable, on a campaign undertaken with means inadequate to the difficulties incurred.

Massena vehemently repelled the proposal to retire, which it was easy to Marshal Ney to make, because the responsibility of its execution did not lie upon him. He maintained that such a proposal was not worthy of the marshal, and that it would be right to risk a battle. Reynier, though commonly cautious, on this occasion adopted a line in opposition to his character, as did Ney in opposition to his, and supported the opinion of Massena. He affirmed that after well studying the position he thought it could be taken. Massena agreed, and the battle was determined for the next day. The first attack was assigned to Reynier, who had confidently asserted that he could take the position; and it was agreed that he should endeavour, early in the morning, to break through by the road on the left, called the road of San Antonio, while Ney should endeavour to force the road on the right, abutting on the Chartreuse monastery of Busaco, and called the road of Moira; that Junot, who had arrived very late, should remain in the rear to protect the retreat if they should not succeed; that Montbrun with all his cavalry should remain in battle-array at the foot of the heights to sabre the English should they attempt to descend; and that the artillery, which could not be taken with them to the assault of these ravines, should be placed on several mounds, whence it might play upon the enemy. Massena was to remain personally between the two attacking columns, to make such arrangements as should be rendered necessary by circumstances.

The French generals were not deceived in supposing that Lord Wellington had determined to engage upon these heights. In fact, the English general, though very prudent, was not willing to re-enter his lines as a fugitive, and he was resolved, should he ever gain a position against which the impetuous valour of the French might expend itself, to risk a defensive battle, which should allow him to withdraw more leisurely, should prepare his troops for the defence of the lines of Torres Vedras if necessary, and which might even, if he gained the day, enable him to avoid falling back upon Lisbon. In this view, he had thought that both the Sierra de Muroelha and that of Alcoba, which meet on the banks of the Mondego above Coimbra, presented to him the wished-for field of battle. Uncertain which of the two would be the object of attack to the French, he had placed upon the Sierra de Muroelha the corps of General Hill, whom he had recently summoned to himself, and took up his own position with his principal corps d'armée on the Sierra d'Alcoba. Having from his commanding position perceived the march of the French, and their union on the right bank of the Mondego at the foot of the Sierra d'Alcoba, he had sent for the corps of General Hill on the 26th, had made him pass the Mondego and ascend the Sierra d'Alcoba, which had occasioned the movements remarked by the French through the firs and the heath which crown the heights.

On the evening of the 26th, the Anglo-Portuguese army had almost entirely assembled, to the number of about 50,000 men, on the plateau of the Sierra d'Alcoba, from the summits looking down almost perpendicularly upon the Mondego to the Chartreuse monastery of Busaco. At the very extremity of the sierra opposite the Mondego, Lord Wellington had placed the Portuguese detachment, which served with General Hill. Next to this, on the left and on our right, came Hill's division, (2d,) then Leith's division, (5th,) which partly closed the principal road of San Antonio, which General Reynier was to attack, and which was completely closed by the addition of Picton's division. Then came Spencer's division, (1st,) which, occupying an intermediate position between the road of San Antonio and that of Moira, might be sent in either direction. The Sierra d'Alcoba, making a slight turn here to join that of Caramula, formed a curved line towards the Chartreuse monastery of Busaco, on the centre of which abutted the road of Moira, which was to be taken by Marshal Ney. This last position was occupied by General Crawford with the English light troops and Portuguese heavy, so that the road of Moira leading to the Chartreuse monastery at Busaco was open at once to the fire of General Spencer and to that of General Crawford. Finally, the extreme left of the British army was formed by Cole's division, (4th,) towards the point where the Sierra d'Alcoba joined that of Caramula. Lord Wellington, believing, as Marshal Massena had done, that there was no practicable road beyond, had been satisfied with watching that side with some light cavalry under Trent. Above the sierra was a plateau, 100 or 200 toises in width, very stony, but sufficiently extensive to deploy upon. On this plateau Lord Wellington had disposed strong reserves of infantry and artillery to pour unexpectedly upon any troops that should have the boldness to reach the summit. He was thus more strongly established at Busaco than he had been at Talavera; and he awaited the 27th with calmness, though not without anxiety.

The French, on all sides exposed to view, while scarcely able to see their adversaries, were little alarmed at the formidable obstacles that beset their paths. In numbers they were about equal to the English, being 50,000; and, believing themselves superior to them in the level country, they hoped by their audacity to compensate for the present disadvantage of ground. At break of day on the 27th, the corps of Reynier and Ney were formed, one before San Antonio, the other before Moira, ready to climb the sierra; the artillery took up their position on some mounds opposite the enemy; the cavalry and the 8th corps were drawn up in the plain to receive the army, if repulsed. Massena had taken his place in the centre of the line, on an elevated space, from which, though exposed to the whole artillery of the enemy, he could with difficulty discern the two points of attack, so obscure and difficult to us was the country which to the English was perfectly clear.

At the break of day, Reynier, according to his promise, was the first to enter into action. The Merle division took the lead, under the guidance of Captain Charlet, who, on the previous evening, had carefully reconnoitred the place. It was followed by the Foy brigade :

the Heudelet division. Our two columns were protected by a thick fog.

After having for some time followed the road of San Antonio de Cantaro, which ascends the side of the mountain in a zigzag course like a staircase, the Merle division took the right of the road, and attempted to force the mountain through the trees and thickets by which it is covered. The 2d light and 86th of the line, under General Sarrut, the 4th light under General Graindorge, ascended with difficulty by the aid of the brushwood which covers these high grounds, while the 31st light of the Heudelet division, followed by the 17th light and 70th of the line of the same division, forming the Foy brigade, continued to march in column on the road. After an hour's struggle, the Merle division, partly protected by the fog, reached the top, breathless and exhausted; but without delay they fell upon and routed the 8th Portuguese and seized their artillery. But the whole of Picton's division was there, supported on one side by Leith's division, on the other by a strong battery and by Spencer's division, which rushed from their intermediate position to the scene of danger. Scarcely had the Merle division endeavoured to deploy, when it was met in flank by the artillery on the right and in front by the musketry of Picton's division, at a distance of fifteen paces. Under this murderous fire, General Merle, Colonel Merle of the 2d light, General Graindorge at the head of the 4th light, and Desgravières, colonel of the same regiment, fell mortally wounded, in addition to many inferior officers and soldiers. Seeing the success of his fire, General Picton, finding himself supported right and left, brought forward the 88th and 45th regiments; and the 8th Portuguese, which had rallied, charged our troops with the bayonet, while yet panting from their difficult ascent and deprived of nearly all their commanders, and drove them back to the extremity of the plateau. At the same moment the 31st of the Heudelet division, preceding the Foy brigade, appeared from the road on the left of the Merle division, and hastened to its support. But it was repulsed as far as the opening of the road, having been assailed by grape and musketry before it could form, and deprived of its colonel, Desmeuniers. Our soldiers, no less intelligent than brave, far from allowing themselves to be hurled from their position, halted at the top of the precipice, and poured a deadly fire upon the enemy from every point where they could gain a footing, and thus gave time for the arrival of the Foy brigade, which, having followed the highroad, appeared at length on the plateau, accompanied by the 31st, which they had rallied, and on the right and left the remains of the Merle division re-formed by General Sarrut. At this moment Lord Wellington directed Leith's division against our left and Spencer's division against our right, with all his reserves of artillery, and thus brought 15,000 men, perfectly fresh and firmly stationed on solid ground, against 7000 or 8000 of our soldiers, panting for breath, staggering on the brink of a precipice, and wholly destitute of artillery. After having riddled them with grape, Lord Wellington charged them at the point of the bayonet with the whole force of his infantry. Assailed by a formidable fire, and pressed by double their force on a sloping

ground, our soldiers were inevitably routed, and retired, bearing along with them, besides the generals already mentioned, General Foy, severely wounded. Reynier, who followed up the attack, had still at his disposal the remains of the Heudelet division; but, already computing 2500 men disabled, he was afraid of weakening himself too much by an imprudent perseverance, which presented no prospect of success until Marshal Ney should have directed against himself part of the British army.

In the mean while Marshal Ney had come upon the scene of action, rather late, unfortunately, owing to the distance he required to traverse,—the village of Moria, from which he set out, being farther off than that of San Antonia, the starting-point of General Reynier. Nor were his difficulties less serious; for the sierra on our right forming a curve to rejoin that of Caramula, in ascending it they were exposed to a formidable concentration of fire. The road, occupying the crest of a spur, debouched upon the park of the Chartreuse monastery of Busaco, which was covered with heaps of wood and occupied by the whole body of the Portuguese troops. The Loison division led the way, followed by the Marchand division in close column. A third division, that of General Mermet, was kept in reserve.

After a pretty smart exchange of musketry, during which was displayed the superior intelligence of our men but the great disadvantage of their position, Marshal Ney brought forward his men. Loison left the road with his two brigades, and endeavoured to scale the side of the sierra, while Marchand continued on the highroad. On this side of the sierra is found the village of Sul, on a rising ground. General Simon threw himself boldly upon it at the head of the 26th of the line and of the legion of the South. He expelled the Portuguese, took some guns, and used that village as a *point d'appui* in his attempt to scale the mountain. A little to the right of Simon's brigade, and opposite to the same steep, the Ferrey brigade, composed of the 82d light, 66th and 82d of the line, ascended the height with difficulty, though unopposed, but without the *appui* of the village of Sul. By dint of obstinate perseverance, clinging to every rock and every tree, the two brigades reached the summit under the fire of the Portuguese, when suddenly they were covered with grape from Crawford's artillery, almost at their breasts. At the same moment General Crawford ordered the light division and Colman's Portuguese brigade to charge with the bayonet, and routed our regiments before they could form and offer any regular resistance. The Simon brigade halted at the village of Sul, after having lost their general, who was left wounded in the hands of the enemy. The Ferrey brigade, finding no rallying-place, was brought back to the foot of the mountain. At this moment the Marchand division, which had remained on the road, and had reached the point at which the Loison division had turned off to go to the village of Sul, found itself the centre of a semicircle of guns which poured their fire from all parts of the heights. Exposed on the right to a shower of balls from the Portuguese and English troops under Crawford, the division hesitated, and, instead of a rapid

descent on the Chartreuse monastery of Busaco, it threw itself on the left of the road, and took shelter under a nearly-perpendicular steep, when, receiving from above the fire of Spencer's division, which had just engaged Reynier's, and in flank those of General Crawford, from which it was endeavouring to escape, it was reduced to the last extremity, being neither able to ascend the steep against which it was pressed, nor to regain the road which it had left and where thousands of projectiles awaited it. This division had lost the opportunity of taking the park of the Chartreuse monastery by a vigorous stroke. Marshal Ney, having already lost 2000 men, including several colonels and generals, and reasoning in the same manner as Reynier, left it to his coadjutor to make some new attempt, which by a desperate effort should prove decisive.

It was now, unfortunately, too late to bring again into action troops exhausted by fatigue, and to attempt to unsettle a victorious enemy, increasingly confident in their strength and their position. Had Massena merely commanded a division, he would probably have renewed the attack, and perhaps have overcome all obstacles by his unequalled determination; but, as commander-in-chief, he deemed it sufficient to have already lost 4500 men in killed and wounded in a fruitless attempt, and, though he did not despair of dislodging the English, resolved on another line of conduct. He gathered about him his lieutenants, to whom he wished to make some observations on the events of the day. General Reynier had kept his word, and had done what he could; but Marshal Ney had been late in his attack, and certainly had not evinced the same boldness as at Elchingen. In fact, if while General Loison was scaling the height he had himself launched the Marchand division on the park of the Chartreuse, supporting it by his third division, which it was useless to hold in reserve, since Junot formed the reserve of the whole army, he would perhaps have succeeded, and by forcing one exit he might have assisted Reynier to force the other. Without a word of reproach, Massena heard their statements with the imperturbable *sang froid* which he was wont to maintain when in difficulties. Reynier explained his conduct, which was irreproachable. Ney declared that he had done his best, and again protested against an expedition undertaken with insufficient means, and against the error of not speaking truth to the Emperor. He clearly pointed out that the wisest way would be to retrace their steps, and to await reinforcements between Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo. Massena did not seek to exonerate himself from the result of the day at the expense of his lieutenants, nor to let his vexation exhale in vain dissertations on what might have been done, in which weak minds are wont to find consolation; he contented himself with haughtily repelling the idea of a retrograde movement, and then, after having ordered his lieutenants to rally their troops at the foot of the sierra, to collect their wounded, and to hold themselves in readiness to march, he withdrew to form his resolutions. In such moments his brave soul found its triumph. He considered that, after all, the English must have suffered considerable loss, and that they would certainly not venture to descend to the plain, where, besides our ever-

steady infantry, they would meet our cavalry and artillery, with which they had not been engaged on the summit of the sierra. And he thought rightly; for the English, though victorious, did not venture to leave their position, from the fear of a fresh attack. He also considered that there must certainly be some egress, especially towards the right, upon the less elevated ridges which unite the Sierra d'Alcoba to the Sierra de Caramula; that they had too readily believed the first reports, and that it was incredible that the inhabitants should have formed no communications on the right, where the ground was less difficult. He, therefore, sent General Montbrun, and Colonel Sainte-Croix, an officer of distinguished merit, to employ the dragoons during the night in seeking a communication on the right of the army. He had no thought of passing by the left; for it would have been necessary to cross the Mondego in presence of the English, ignorant of any fords, and to take positions as difficult as those of Busaco. Having adopted these resolutions, he patiently awaited the result of the investigations he had ordered.

General Montbrun and Colonel Sainte-Croix hastened towards the less elevated hills which connected the two sierras, plunged into their intricacies with the sagacity which is due to the habit of war, and discovered a road which was neither better nor worse than those ordinarily found in Portugal, and which moreover was practicable for artillery. The question was, Where would it lead? When nearly at the summit, at a point from which might be perceived the plain of Coimbra and the highroad of Lisbon, they met a peasant who informed them that the road extended as far as the plain and went to join the highroad of Coimbra near a place called Sardao. They had now reached a village called Boialva, a little on the other side of the sierra, which Brigadier Trent had omitted to occupy. Montbrun and Sainte-Croix left there a regiment of dragoons with the artillery, drew up three others *en echelon* in the rear, with orders to defend the village of Boialva at any price, then descended at a gallop as far as Sardao to convince themselves of the truth of their information, which they discovered to be exact, and returned in all haste to report their fortunate discovery to Massena.

He received the information at noon on the 23d, the day after the battle. The English, checked by the presence of the French army, and anxious lest they should make any attempt, had not moved, and seemed to be almost as paralysed as if they had not been victorious. Without loss of time, Massena ordered Junot, whose corps was intact and was the nearest to the road of Boialva, to decamp in silence at the close of day, and, guided by Montbrun's dragoons, to reach the road they had just discovered, and to occupy the plain beyond. He ordered Ney to follow Junot, the baggage-column, which had in charge 8000 wounded but had been lightened of the prepared provisions, to follow Ney, and Reynier to close the march with his corps. The half of the dragoons who had not accompanied Montbrun to Boialva were to form the extreme rear-guard.

Accordingly, on the evening of the 23th, when the darkness was fully set in, they decamped in silence. Junot, by the position of

his corps, came direct upon the road of Boialva. He marched during the whole night, reached Boialva without an obstacle, and there met the dragoons, whom the enemy had not thought of molesting; and at break of day on the 29th he descended into the plain of Coimbra, which, at that moment, was a sort of land of promise, had it been as barren as it was in reality fertile and rich. Ney had some difficulty in following Junot; for the baggage and the wounded, not perfectly observing the prescribed order of march, from the fear of falling back, continually interrupted the march of the columns. Nevertheless, in the course of the 29th, Ney's corps found itself wholly beyond Boialva; and at the end of that day Reynier entered on the same route without being pursued by a single English picket. Our dragoons collected the stragglers and the wounded, not one of whom was lost.

On the evening of the 29th, the English general at length perceived the movement of the French army. He had remained two days in his position, questioning the course of his adversary without seeking to discover it by means of well-directed reconnoissances. The helmets of the French dragoons glittering on the plain of Coimbra were the first to give him a hint of their designs. Though a conqueror on the evening of the 27th, he might be said to have been conquered on the 29th; and, while Coimbra was illuminated for the pretended victory of Busaco, it had become necessary for the inhabitants of that ill-fated city to prepare for flight and to destroy all that they could not carry with them. In short, Lord Wellington hastened to decamp and to traverse Coimbra in all speed, commanding the inhabitants instantly to leave the town and to destroy whatever they could not save. Montbrun and Sainte-Croix pursued and sabred the English and Portuguese stragglers.

Such was the first rencontre of the French army under Marshal Massena with the English. That marshal has often been blamed for having risked a battle with too little probability of success, and of having thus needlessly compromised the life of many of his soldiers; and the censure is to a certain extent just. But it has been too much forgotten that without this sanguinary battle of Busaco, which intimidated the English and retained them in their position, Massena could never have quietly executed the flank movement upon Boialva by means of which he undermined the position of his adversary. It would, no doubt, have been better to have reconnoitred the road on the right, the existence of which was indicated by the general aspect of the locality, before experiencing a check which obliged them to discover it at all hazards, and then to have made a demonstration on Busaco with the view of deceiving the English, while the main body of the army should have defiled upon Boialva. It would thus have been possible to engage Lord Wellington without great effusion of blood, to bring him forward into the plain of Coimbra, and there encounter him on ground where all the chances would have been in favour of the French. But, if we would be just, we must guard against such judgments, founded upon circumstances known only after the events, and which the general whose conduct we criticize

did not know and scarcely could have learnt. However this may be, if Massena did not obtain the result he aimed at on the very day of the battle, he did so on the following day; and the English general was certainly in serious error, who, though for a long time established in these parts, surrounded with every local indication, and placed on a height which commanded a view of the whole country, had never conjectured even from the aspect of the soil and position of the villages that communications must exist between the valley of the Mondego and the plain of Coimbra, by the lower ridges of the sierras of Alcobá and Caramula. And as errors in war are often followed by immediate punishment, he lost in a few hours the fruit of his wise arrangements, and was obliged to abandon Portugal as far as Lisbon, but no farther, as we shall see in the sequel.

When the French entered Coimbra, they found the greater part of the population in flight, and all the wealthy inhabitants embarked with their most valuable possessions in vessels, the cables of which they cut, that they might descend to the sea by the Mondego. The greater part of the houses had been destroyed by the English, and not by the inhabitants, who were not inclined to ruin their property simply to famish the French. Massena, wishing to make them understand that it was folly in them to follow the counsels of Lord Wellington, desired to destroy nothing, in order to convince them that in preserving their towns they preserved them for themselves much more than for the French. He had, therefore, ordered all his generals to respect private property; but it is difficult to impose discipline on half-famished soldiers, accustomed to see the Portuguese destroy their own habitations. They scrupled little to complete the work of destruction begun by the proprietors or their allies when they found the houses empty or pillaged, the corn everywhere scattered about, and the wine-casks broken in. Nor must it be forgotten that they were really suffering hunger, and that many of them had thrown away their supply of biscuits in the hope of living at the expense of the country they traversed. They might have lived very well at Coimbra; for the city was too considerable to have been wholly stripped by the English in the course of a few hours, and the houses and magazines actually contained provisions. But, unfortunately, General Junot had not sufficiently restrained disorder, and the magazines were uselessly pillaged, as were others formed by the English on the Lower Mondego at Montemor. The dragoons of Montbrun were sent thither; but the supplies could not be turned to use, for want of the means of transport, and, therefore, what could not be consumed was destroyed.

Massena, perceiving that with due precaution it would be possible to find provisions in Portugal, and even to make it the interest of the Portuguese not to destroy them, sharply reprimanded his lieutenants, particularly Junot, which tended little to the improvement of his own starling in their estimation. He endeavoured to check the ravages, to reassure the inhabitants, and to bring them back to Coimbra, and succeeded in conciliating a considerable number and bringing them back to their deserted houses.

Having restored some degree of order to the city, he thought of intrusting it with the precious charge of his wounded recovered from the field of Busaco, of whom there were about 8000, carried on mules and asses. He caused to be prepared a spacious and well-provided hospital, where he placed a number of medical officers and a guard of about a hundred sailors, attached to the Portuguese expedition. This guard was sufficient to secure the hospital against any disorder within, but not to defend the city against an attack from without. To meet such a danger, at least 8000 men would have been necessary. But Massena had lost already more than 4000 men at Busaco in killed and wounded; and nearly 1000 since the affair of Almeida had fallen sick on the road, so that on his arrival at Coimbra he had scarcely 45,000 men. To have deprived himself of 8000 more, and thus reduced his numbers to 42,000, and with these to meet the English, whom they expected soon to engage, and who, as they approached Lisbon, would be augmented by at least one-third of their number, would have been to leave too much to chance; and he preferred intrusting his wounded to the good feeling of the inhabitants, to risking the loss of a battle by the inadequacy of his forces.

He, therefore, assembled the principal inhabitants of Coimbra, and consigned his wounded to their care, promising to reward their attention to them by sparing the country, and threatening signal vengeance on the city should they be maltreated. Having made these arrangements, which, with all possible diligence, occupied three days, Massena continued his march towards Lisbon. He had formed a new vanguard under Montbrun, composed of all the light cavalry and part of the dragoons, leaving to the rear-guard the rest of the dragoons under General Treilhard. He pressed forward this vanguard, reinforced by some light infantry, close upon the English, that he might not allow them time to destroy every thing in their retreat; and accordingly, on leaving Coimbra for Condeixa, they might have saved some magazines which the English had left, had not Junot again allowed them to be pillaged by the soldiers, for which he was again reproved by his chief. The pursuit of the enemy was continued by Pombal and Leyria.

In marching from north to south towards Lisbon, along the low chain which, as we have said, is the prolongation of the Estrella, as the Estrella itself is merely the prolongation of the Guadarrama, and which, gradually diminishing in height, terminates at length between the sea and the mouth of the Tagus, three roads might be followed:—that of the Tagus, which is gained by crossing the chain of heights between Pombal and Thomar, and then following the course of the river from Abrantes to Santarem, from Santarem to Lisbon; the middle road, passing near the ridge of the heights by Pombal, Leyria, Moliano, Candeiros, and descending like the former to the banks of the Tagus by Alcoeire and Alenquer; lastly, the road by the sea, which passed by Alcobaca, Obidos, and Torres Vedras. When arrived at Pombal, the English general dismissed Hill's corps in charge of the most cumbersome part of the forces, in the direction of Thomar, ordering him not to lose a moment

in reaching the Tagus, there to embark his heaviest equipage, and to protect himself by that river if he should be pursued by the French. He repeated the order to destroy every thing, particularly the vessels which might have assisted in throwing bridges over the Tagus. With the most solid part of his troops he took the other two roads, the divisions of Spencer and Leith occupying the middle one, those of Cole and Picton that by the sea, all escaping with the utmost speed from the brisk pursuit of our vanguard.

Montbrun, accompanied by Sainte-Croix, whose intelligence was equal to his courage, were on the steps of the English, of whom they daily put some to the sword. On the 6th of October they had reached Leyria, close upon the enemy, but not sufficiently so to save the provisions it contained. The army arrived there the next day: Massena, uncertain of the direction pursued by the English, who were seen on all the three roads at once, had selected the middle road, being the shortest, not worse than the others, and which removed him the least from the enemy.

On the 8th, the vanguard under Sainte-Croix crossed the heights to descend upon the Tagus, again stumbled on the English, and gathered some barrels of biscuits and powder which they had left behind. On the 9th they reached Alenquer, where they took about 100 prisoners, and disabled an equal number. They reconnoitred the important town of Santarem, which is in the rear on the Tagus, where they learnt that General Hill had set out two evenings before: they were told that every thing there had been destroyed. On the next day, the 10th, the vanguard entered Villa Nova, which they found well supplied with every thing; and they pursued to the foot of the Alhandra heights the rear-guards of Generals Crawford and Hill, which disappeared behind formidable intrenchments.

On the next day, the 11th, the army came up with them, and took position before Alhandra and Sobral, in face of the works occupied by the English the previous evening. On every side were discovered heights crowned by redoubts,—as well as on the hill-side sloping down to the Tagus, and on the opposite side leading down to the sea. On the road they had heard that the English had constructed some works in front of Lisbon; but they were ignorant of their nature, and were far from supposing that they were such as to occasion any protracted delay. The few inhabitants who had been taken on arriving before Alhandra, Sobral, Torres Vedras, spoke of a first line of redoubts armed with several hundred guns, then a second still stronger, which would remain to be taken even if the first were secured, and finally a third, very much compressed, which commanded a port in which the whole English fleet was kept in readiness to receive Lord Wellington and his soldiers. Our army was full of ardour and confidence, in no degree dispirited by Busaco, but, on the contrary, convinced of their superiority to the English, whom they pursued with insulting challenges to stop and try their strength: it afforded them, therefore, a painful surprise to see the enemy suddenly escape from their grasp and enclose themselves in an asylum of so formidable an aspect. But, confident in them-

selves, in Massena, in the united forces which they were assured would be brought into operation before Lisbon, they saw in this obstacle merely a passing difficulty, which they would soon surmount at the cost of some blood which they were willing freely to shed. "We shall manage it," said the soldiers, "as we should have managed Busaco if we had been allowed to continue the attack." So admirable was the spirit of an army sacrificed to a wholly unreasonable policy! But the obstacle was not so easily overcome as they had supposed.

It is right here to give some description of the famous lines of Torres Vedras, of which as yet we have indicated nothing but the design, the situation, and the name. We have already said that, about the month of October in the preceding year, Lord Wellington thought of securing to himself, in the extremity of the Peninsula, an intrenched position, as impregnable as possible, in which he might resist the accumulated forces of the French and await the fall of the imperial power, which he believed to be at hand. The position which appeared the best-adapted to his purpose was the promontory formed by the depressed extremity of the Estrella, stretching out between the ocean and the diffused waters of the Tagus, (called the Sea of La Paille.) The different lines of works by which he wished to defend this promontory were several leagues in advance of Lisbon, and, the roads which united them not passing by Lisbon itself, he would there find himself independent of the population of that capital, the most numerous in the Peninsula, and the most restless, unsettled in their wishes, and seldom in accordance with the English general. Lord Wellington, accustomed to the institutions of his country, and, with a wisdom rarely to be met, loving them although frequently suffering from them, regarded with aversion the popular agitations which attended the birth of liberty on the continent. Intelligent and inflexible, and without hesitation sacrificing to his plans the people whose independence he came to defend, he did not intend that he should one day be constrained to give battle in order to put an end to the sufferings of a blockade, or that a tumultuous populace should ever prevent his weighing anchor if the safety of his army should require him to embark. For these reasons he wished to remain independent of the people of Lisbon, and not to be at pains even to find them subsistence, being determined first to support his own army, then the Portuguese army, whose interests he carefully studied, and next the peasant population who followed him and who afforded him useful labourers. These last, who surpassed in number the English and Portuguese armies together, whom he had entirely ruined, and whose strong and patient arms aided him in turns to raise or to level mountains, were the object of his most careful solicitude. Instead of allowing them to crowd the streets of Lisbon, exposed to contagion, famine, and revolt, he kept them in the open air in his lines, where they were diverted by occupation, fed by the English navy, and engaged daily in constructing new works against the French. The plan of these works was as follows.

At the distance of nine or ten leagues before Lisbon, between Alhandra on the Tagus and

Torres Vedras towards the ocean, he had designed to form a first line of intrenchments, which should intersect the promontory at least twelve leagues from its extremity towards the sea. This first line was composed of the following works. On the bank of the Tagus, the heights of Alhandra, on one side rising almost perpendicularly from the river, on the other side extending towards Sobral, formed, in a space of four or five leagues, almost inaccessible steepes, bathed in their whole extent by the little river of Arruda. He had intersected, by barricades armed with guns, the road which passed between the foot of these heights and the Tagus, leading to Lisbon by the banks of that river. From this point, ascending to Sobral, all the hills not naturally difficult of access had been rendered steep by artificial means. In the hollows formed by the bed of the ravines, which presented small accessible defiles, had been placed sometimes redoubts, and at others barricades of timber. Finally, on the principal summits had been built forts, armed with heavy artillery, mutually defending each other, and commanding to a considerable distance the avenues by which the enemy might approach.

Just at Sobral, which formed the point of separation between the two sides of the hill, was found a plateau, where the deficiency of natural protection had been supplied by a number of very strong works, and on an eminence called Monte Agraca had been built an actual citadel, which could only be taken by a regular siege. Beyond this began the seaward aspect of the hill, along which extended a new chain of heights reaching to the sea, and bathed by the Zizambro. This little river in its windings passes Torres Vedras, whence the lines we now speak of received their name,—a name destined to be immortal. There, as on the side of Alhandra, the heights had in some parts been rendered steep by the mattock, sometimes the gorges had been blocked up by timber or by redoubts, the summits had been crowned and connected among themselves by forts, and the course of the Zizambro had been rendered nearly impracticable by barricades which checked the flow of the water and maintained the marshes at all seasons.

The fortifications were in some instances open at the gorge; the greater number were closed. All had earthen glacis, ditches, stone escarpments, wooden magazines for provisions and ammunition. Some were armed with six guns, some contained fifty, varying in calibre from six or eight pounders to sixteen or twenty-four, all mounted on carriages so fixed as to be impossible to be used by the enemy in case of a retrograde movement from one line to another. The rich arsenal of Lisbon had been stripped in order to supply this artillery, and all the oxen of the country had been employed to bring it into position. The garrisons were permanent, and some amounted to 1000 men. Wide and easy roads had been constructed between these works, for the ready introduction of reinforcements. A system of signals borrowed from the navy (the telegraph being then in its infancy) conveyed in a few minutes to the centre exact intelligence of the proceedings at the extremities. At the very entrance—that is to say, opposite Sobral—was a kind of battle-field prepared beforehand to enable the whole English army to accumulate near the most accessible

points, and join their forces to the numerous guns from the surrounding works. The Portuguese were naturally placed in the fortifications, and to them were added 3000 gunners, also Portuguese, long practised in gunnery and excellent marksmen. The English army, with all that was readily disposed of and easily managed in the Portuguese line, was to occupy the principal encampments, which had been skilfully arranged near the points deemed most open to attack. Every care had been taken to insure to the army adequate shelter and provision, and the power of devoting their time to the practice of manœuvres and the enjoyment of necessary repose.

General Hill, who, in the retreat, followed the course of the Tagus, had taken his position behind the heights of Alhandra; General Crawford, with the light division, was between Alhandra and the plateau opposite Sobral. General Picton, who had kept the road by the sea, occupied the banks of the Zizambro and the heights in the rear as far as Torres Vedras. General Leith defended the entrance of this immense intrenched camp, and was supported by the divisions of Spencer, Cole, and Campbell, which had effected their retreat by the middle road, and would present themselves *en masse*, if the enemy should make an attempt on the more accessible part of the lines.

Lord Wellington having requested the Marquis de la Romana to leave Badajoz, the defence of which was of less importance than that of the lines of Torres Vedras, and to join him at Lisbon, he had brought with him about 8000 Spaniards, admirably adapted to the defensive part they were called upon to sustain. The English general, therefore, had 30,000 English, upwards of 30,000 Portuguese, and 8000 Spaniards, making 70,000 regular troops for the defence of his positions; besides a considerable militia, and a numerous body of peasantry, who, though no doubt involving expense for their support, were able to repay it by continual labour at new works.

It must be added, that three or four leagues in the rear was constructed a second line of works, also securing the promontory from the Tagus to the ocean, for about seven or eight leagues in extent, commanded by the heights of Mafra and Montachique, and accessible only at one point,—the defile of Bucellas, which had been converted into a perfect slaughter-house for any one who should enter it. And, finally, behind this second formidable line, at the very extremity of the promontory, was another defence, consisting in a species of redoubt formed of a semicircle of steep mountains bristling with guns, inaccessible from the land side, and affording in its concavity fronting the sea a secure mooring for the whole English fleet. In the case of the two first lines having been taken, this last redoubt might still hold out several days, which would allow sufficient time for the troops to embark, and thus escape from the pursuit of a victorious army.

Such was the colossal system of defensive lines, worthy of the nation that planned them and of the enemy whose power they were designed to check. For more than a year they had exhausted the labour of thousands of workmen, under the guidance of English engineers and the police of two Portuguese regiments of

the line. Though almost finished when the English entered, they were not perfectly so for some months afterwards, and they reckoned not less than 152 redoubts and about 700 guns in battery. It had been necessary to cut down 50,000 olive trees, which, with the vine, are the principal vegetable production of the country. The peasantry had been well remunerated for their labour, but the proprietors had received little recompense for the loss of their trees. The English thought little of destroying Portugal, so long as they could defend it from the French, and that country certainly suffered more from their protection than from our invasion. Nor did it enjoy a greater amount of independence under Lord Wellington than it would have done if subjected to us.

The works we have just described were on the right bank of the Tagus. On the left some works had been constructed, but of small importance, notwithstanding the urgent representation of the Portuguese regency. In this was again evinced the military policy of the British general in all its cruel simplicity. Near the point where the Tagus empties itself into the ocean, the left bank approximates the right, and in doing so forms the entrance to the river so celebrated by travellers for its picturesque appearance and for the multitude and the beauty of the buildings which adorn it. From the left bank it would be possible to bombard Lisbon, to burn the church and palace of Belem, the palace of Queluz, and all the public buildings of the capital, and thus renew by human instrumentality the horrors of the earthquake experienced the previous century. But this point, though so vulnerable, occasioned little solicitude to Lord Wellington. To have bombarded the beautiful city of Lisbon would, no doubt, have been vexatious, but of little consequence, in his estimation, in comparison to the defence of the promontory of the right bank, whence he could hold in check the power of Napoleon and excite the European nations to a general revolt. But to have defended the left bank, it would have been necessary greatly to weaken his position on the right, to which he would on no account consent. It was proposed to him to form upon the left bank, between Aldea-Gallego and Setubal, an intrenched camp, to which they should attract all the people of Alentejo; but Lord Wellington considered them unable to defend them, and he was afraid that if the camp should be taken, as he expected, there should ensue some degree of demoralization among the defenders of the lines of Torres Vedras. He also said with much reason that the French had not sufficient forces in Andalusia to invade Alentejo; that if they appeared in that quarter it would be with the view of joining the army of Marshal Massena near Abrantes, and, in union with it, attacking the lines of Torres Vedras; that Lisbon ran no serious risk in that direction; that should Lisbon receive a few balls he could not help it, and that it was necessary to leave him undisturbed and free to devote himself to the difficult task of defending the right bank, on which depended the safety of Portugal and Europe. Yet, in order to meet the clamours of the inhabitants of the city, he had consented to erect some works on the heights of Almada, opposite Lisbon, though well convinced that they would be

taken at the first serious attack. But all the palaces of Lisbon were, in his estimation, of less value than one redoubt of Torres Vedras; and in a military point of view he was right.

Lord Wellington, thus supported by three lines of formidable intrenchments defended by 70,000 men and a numerous body of the peasantry, was able to contemplate without apprehension the brave French army which was before him, and which would in all probability be considerably increased. And, accordingly, when consulted by his government as to his situation, at the moment of taking up his position behind these lines, and on the possibility of recalling the transport fleet, which in itself involved England in an expense of more than 75,000,000 per annum, he replied that he felt himself perfectly safe at Torres Vedras; that if they were very desirous of withdrawing the transport fleet they might do so; that he should not suppose himself ruined by such a step, but that he could not regard it as consistent with the dictates of prudence, for the French army might every moment be reinforced by troops from Old Castile and others from Andalusia; that, if orders were sent from Paris, Marshal Massena would make the attack, and that, in the presence of such a general and such soldiers, it was impossible to answer for the result; and, therefore, it would be well to leave him the fleet, at whatever cost, though he hoped to have no occasion to use it. He remarkably evinced his political sagacity by adding that Massena would probably receive only feeble assistance from Castile and none at all from Andalusia.

Such was the unforeseen obstacle which arrested Massena and his army,—an obstacle whose existence was not suspected before it was seen, and whose force was not fully discovered till after a reconnoissance of several days. On the 12th of October Junot's corps had arrived on the plateau of Sobral; on the 13th, Massena, wishing to judge of the situation and intentions of the enemy, attacked with that corps the village of Sobral, which was without the lines, and near the sources of the two small rivers the Arruda and the Zizambro. The English disputed the village with energy, but only for the honour of their arms, for it was not contained within the enclosure which it was their interest to defend. The troops of Junot carried the village with the bayonet and killed about 200 men, our own loss being nearly equal. But scarcely were we masters of Sobral when, wishing to debouche on the other side, a furious fire from all quarters indicated the line of the enemy's works, their strength and their connection. No longer doubt could be entertained of the existence of a vast intrenched camp, embracing the whole promontory of Lisbon in every direction, from the points where the Arruda empties itself into the Tagus to that where the Zizambro empties itself into the ocean.

Before coming to any decision, Massena placed his troops in a position of observation. Junot remained at Sobral and on the neighbouring hills opposite the advance posts of the English; Reynier established himself near the Tagus at Villa Nova, Ney in the rear towards Alenquer. The English could not enforce the same obedience at the gates of Lisbon as they had in the northern provinces, which they occupied with a

military force; and, having traversed the country hastily, they had not been able either themselves to destroy the resources of that province of Portugal, one of the richest in the kingdom, or to induce others to do so. It was, therefore, possible to subsist there for several weeks, and to take time to reflect before deciding on their course. Massena occupied several days in a personal reconnoissance of the English position on each side. On the 10th, being under one of the enemy's batteries, which he was examining with a glass resting on a small garden wall, the English officers, who distinctly recognised the illustrious marshal, became actuated by a sentiment worthy of civilised nations when reduced to the unhappy necessity of war. By a general volley they might have riddled the whole staff, and perhaps have struck the general himself. They merely fired one gun to warn him of his danger, and with so much accuracy as to overturn the wall on which he was resting his glass. Massena recognised the courtesy, and, saluting the battery, retired beyond gunshot. He had seen enough to be convinced of the strength of the vast works before him. Some peasants met with in the neighbourhood, and some persons attracted from Lisbon by the Portuguese officers who followed the army, unanimously affirmed that after this first line of intrenchments there were a second and even a third, the whole armed with 700 guns and defended by 70,000 regular troops at least, besides the militia and peasantry. It was no mere intrenched camp, which might be boldly attacked at once, but a series of natural obstacles singularly aided by art, united by fortifications generally closed at the gorge, impossible to be taken at a dash, and quite as difficult to be surprised; for, while the English, in virtue of the roads they had constructed and the signals they had established, could in a few hours pass from one side to the other and unite all their forces against the part attacked, the French were debarred from any such manœuvre by the nature of the ground. On the part of the promontory occupied by them, a high mountain named Monte Junto, destitute of a road, separated the two sides, and did not allow them to feign an attack on one side and then to transport themselves suddenly to the other. The side upon which they should deploy would be unavoidably that by which they proposed to attack, on which they would certainly find 70,000 English.

Every thing considered, the position appeared impregnable, at least at the time; and the conclusion of Massena proved that with him energy did not exclude prudence. Certainly nothing would have suited his character and situation better than a bold attempt, the success of which might have terminated the war; but he had the good sense to perceive that the attempt was not warranted by the prospect of success, while failure, which was far from improbable, exposed him to infallible loss. His numbers fell far short of 50,000 men, with whom he entered Portugal. The attack of Busaco had cost 4600 killed and wounded; 2000 sick or lame had fallen off on the march. Some of the slightly-wounded at Busaco had, indeed, rejoined the army; some, at least, of the invalids ought soon to be convalescent; and, when all these had resumed their ranks, he might reckon upon 15,000



fighting men,—excellent troops, indeed, and equal to any attempt; but what could they do against 70,000 enemies who on plain ground could not have withstood them, but who, in positions of defence, were the best troops in the world? To carry these lines he would have required 90,000 or 100,000 men: of these 20,000 should have been sent to the left bank of the Tagus, and 70,000 or 80,000 to the right; the attack must have been made not only on each bank, but also on each side of the hill on the right bank, in order to perplex the enemy by the simultaneousness of these attacks, and oblige them to divide their forces, to take some of the principal works by regular sieges if necessary, and others by escalade, thus to make a breach by forcing the line, and in case of reverse to retain sufficient strength not to fear the result of the following day. But if, with 45,000 men and the possession of only one bank of the river, Massena had attacked the lines and had needlessly sacrificed 10,000 men in killed and wounded, which was inevitable, how should he be able on the following day, when reduced to 35,000 men, to retire before an enemy emboldened by success, pursuing him without intermission through an infuriated population, across countries already ravaged, where he could find neither rest nor food? He would probably not regain Almeida till he had lost nearly all his army; and his campaign, which ought to have been triumphant, would issue in disaster. We may add that Massena, being obliged to carry every thing with him, whether provisions or ammunition, had still sufficient ammunition for one battle, but not for two, and after having consumed what was necessary before the lines he would probably not have enough to defend himself on his retreat.

There was, therefore, no room for hesitation: all design of immediately attacking the lines of Torres Vedras must be relinquished. But from this it did not follow that they should not attack them subsequently, or that in the mean time they should have nothing to do on the banks of the Tagus, between Abrantes, Santarem, and Alhandra. For, in the first place, by remaining on their ground they obtained one result,—that of keeping the English blockaded, in continual difficulties, which their government must speedily share with them; and again, by continuing the blockade for some time they would cut off supplies not merely from the army, but from the immense population of Lisbon, who, receiving nothing from the interior, could only be supported from the sea, and at a price, shortly, which would render the support of the Portuguese people absolutely impossible. Now, however disdainful Lord Wellington might be of popular movements, he could not resist a famished people demanding either food or the admission of the French; and should this people, subdued by hunger, open the gates of Lisbon on the left bank of the river, the lines of Torres Vedras would soon fall of themselves. We had, therefore, many chances in our favour if we remained before the English lines. But our stay must be very protracted, and it was necessary to guard against perishing by famine ourselves while seeking to starve out the English. In order to this, it was indispensable to occupy both banks of the Tagus, in order to preclude the enemy from all supplies and to

procure to ourselves all the provisions of the fertile province of the Alentejo, which was only possible on the supposition of a strong detachment of the army of Andalusia, after having taken Badajoz, directing itself upon Lisbon by the left bank of the Tagus. It was, therefore, necessary firmly to establish themselves on the Tagus, between Alhandra, Santarem, and Abrantes, to procure the means of subsisting there, to throw a bridge over the river to admit of manœuvring on each side, at the same time to communicate their position to Napoleon in order that he might send every possible reinforcement from Old Castile, and order the army of Andalusia to Lisbon to wait the result of all these measures, and, when the reinforcements had arrived, make a furious attack with a large force on the English lines, if they had not been reduced by the blockade.

At the distance of 500 leagues from Paris and 100 from Salamanca, in a frightful country, amid a ferocious people, so cut off from communication that he had not received a single despatch since his departure from Almeida, uncertain of provision, arrested by an almost insurmountable obstacle, beyond which he could not reach the enemy but from which the enemy could at any time pour down upon him with superior forces, Massena remained calm, inspired every one with his own resolution, laboured, while his lieutenants still spoke of retreating, to persuade the army to have patience, to rest where they were, to await the reinforcements which could not fail to be sent, to lay aside all idea of the lines being impregnable, and, on the contrary, to prepare their courage to attack them as soon as they should have a sufficient force of men and ammunition to afford a tolerable prospect of success.

His first care was to select a field of battle in case the English should attack him. Junot, at Sobral, was always exposed to an irruption of the enemy. Massena traced out for him a line of retreat towards the hills in the rear,—those of Aveiras, where Ney was already established, whither Reynier could rapidly transport himself, and where the whole army, concentrated in a few hours, should be ready to meet the English, and to overwhelm them if they dared to assume the offensive. His next care was to provide supplies.

The most important town on the part of the Tagus which he occupied was Santarem, which our army had found abandoned and almost devastated; the ravages of the enemy were augmented by those of our famished soldiers. To check the waste, Massena sent thither the chief administrator of the army, and Eblé, general of artillery. After some examination, it was discovered that considerable resources remained in the interior of Santarem and the surrounding villages; that by collecting them carefully, and distributing them with due regulation, the army might be subsisted for some time. An hospital was there established capable of receiving 2000 or 3000 patients, and they collected all that was necessary to supply it, in furniture, linen, and beds. Various provisions were also discovered, such as were most in use among the Portuguese, as lard, salt fish, oil, dried vegetables, sugar, coffee, rum, and excellent wines. Without the town they collected a little wheat, a good deal of maize, and, in the isles of the

Tagus, a considerable amount of cattle. The small neighbouring isles also contained provisions, which the English had not had time or power to destroy. Only the mills had been entirely destroyed, and even their very simple mechanism was rather displaced than destroyed. Among the engineers and artillery-soldiers were workmen who were ready to resume their long-neglected trade for the benefit of the army. With their assistance General Eblé repaired the mills, and soon succeeded in grinding the corn which they had found; after which, regular distributions were made, and Massena ordered a reserve-supply to be made in each corps with the excess of the daily allowance. From Santarem, in the direction of Zezere and Abrantes, extended the rich plain of Gulgao, in which Ney's corps was located, and where they were sure to find abundant resources. They began, therefore, to be easy on the subject of provisions, and, though our soldiers were not accustomed to maize-bread, their life was rendered very tolerable by the abundance of meal, salt fish, wine, sugar, coffee, and liquors. They only wanted shoes; and fortunately they found leather in Santarem, with which they contrived to repair their *chaussures*. A few hundreds of inhabitants were all that remained on this side, though covered with little towns and villages; and these lived upon what the rest had left.

It had been the wish of Massena that these resources should be collected by the central administration of the army and distributed for the general benefit. But against this administration there had been a general outcry, as if it had been chargeable with all the privations to which they had been exposed. It was, therefore, necessary to allow each corps to provide for itself, either by its general or the chief of its staff; and hence each corps made the best arrangement that place and circumstances admitted. But subsistence was not the great difficulty at this moment. In order either to blockade Lisbon on each side of the river, or to open the Alentejo, or to unite with the army of Andalusia if it should arrive, or, finally, to take the important town of Abrantes, it was necessary shortly to pass the Tagus, either above or below that town. This was their principal and most urgent task; but without pontoon-equipage it was impracticable, and all that they possessed was two boats found at Santarem, the rest having been destroyed or removed by the enemy. A great many were necessary; for the Tagus, like the Loire in France, and like all rivers which do not arise from snowy mountains, but depend upon the rains, and are therefore in turns nearly dry or in torrents, rose and fell alternately to the extent of several feet, and not less than a hundred large boats would be required to embrace the whole width. The Zezere, which joins it, and which separated us from the large village of Punhete and from the town of Abrantes, also demanded a bridge, particularly in order to open up the road of Castel-Branco,—one of those by which they could communicate with the Spanish frontier. For these two bridges 120 boats would be necessary.

General Montbrun, notwithstanding his ingenuity, had missed twenty-five large boats in an island near Chamusca, and there remained no method of procuring them in the country. General Eblé, an old artillery-general, distin-

guished by great intelligence as well as unbounded zeal and activity, undertook to construct boats if he were provided with workmen. There were forges in Santarem, iron which might be procured from the ruins, and wood; but they had no tools. General Eblé, after collecting the workmen of the artillery, caused them to make hatchets, saws, and hammers. He then pulled down the houses to obtain wood; but the wood thus procured did not furnish large beams. Having discovered a tolerably good forest some distance from Santarem, they cut down some trees, which they transported to the town by fixing one of the extremities to the fore-wheels of a gun-carriage. Unhappily, by this fatiguing work they exhausted both men and horses. There was a difficulty in finding workmen, because a tolerable subsistence was obtained only in the interior of the corps, where a system of plunder was regularly organized. The soldiers who worked for the benefit of all in the docks, having no time for plunder, were in danger of wanting necessary supplies. They therefore came very unwillingly to the dockyards of Santarem, and quitted them at the first opportunity. A slight punishment would have availed nothing; a severe punishment in their present state no one had the heart to inflict. It only remained to induce them to work by pay; but there was no money. Massena made a collection among the officers and *employés*, who combined to lend 20,000 or 25,000 francs to the army chest. Owing to these efforts, the constructions were begun, and they did not despair of soon possessing the means of crossing the Tagus.

While engaged in these works under the direction of General Eblé, Massena wished to extend his lines as far as Punhete and Abrantes, where he hoped to find great resources. Loison and Montbrun, in fact, passed the Zezere by dint of skill and boldness, threw over it a bridge of piles, and at length established themselves on the opposite bank of that river, notwithstanding serious dangers; for the bridge was so weak and the river so rapid that communication might at any moment be interrupted. However, they at length succeeded in consolidating the piles, and on entering Punhete they found provisions. Nor was it long before they determined to transfer the dockyards from Santarem thither, because the bridge over the Tagus, the materials for which it had been so difficult to collect, would be more easily constructed opposite Punhete, where the Tagus had not as yet received the waters of the Zezere. The boats already made could be sent up by water, and thus none of their labour need be lost.

Punhete being conquered, General Montbrun pursued his reconnoissance to the gates of Abrantes. But the people of that town, numerous and infuriated, and supported by the Anglo-Portuguese army, had raised defences round their walls, and in order to take it a regular siege would have been necessary with guns of a large calibre. Nor would there have been any chance of success as long as the besieged could receive succour from Lord Wellington by the left of the Tagus. This important conquest was, therefore, deferred till they should be able to act upon both banks of the Tagus.

When Marshal Massena had found it possible

to establish himself firmly upon that river, to cross it, to support his army, and thus to await in safety the ultimate resolution of Napoleon, he devoted his care to the discovery of an encampment more secure, less liable to disturbance, and better adapted to his two principal operations,—viz.: the creation of a pontoon-equipage, and the conquest of Abrantes.

The head of our army resting on Sobral and the rear on Abrantes, it was found to be too scattered, and every day exposed to useless and sanguinary combats. Further, the ground which it occupied before the English lines had been wholly exhausted, and no longer yielded means of subsistence. Massena, therefore, proposed to fall back some leagues and take up his position along the Tagus, from Santarem to Thomar, with a division at Leyria to observe the other side of the Estrella, and to guard the highroad of Coimbra, both against an offensive return of the English and the invasion of the Spanish and Portuguese insurgents, who had become very troublesome, having invaded Coimbra since the departure of the army and made prisoners of the wounded left in that city, but without putting them to death. The new position which it was proposed to take between Santarem and Thomar, though removing us some leagues from the English lines, by no means precluded our vigorously blockading them at least on the right bank of the Tagus, the only one in our possession, and at the same time procured us a more peaceable and secure establishment. We were spared the daily skirmishes which may indeed be useful to an army unaccustomed to war, but which fruitlessly fatigue one that is already experienced; and the distance rendered any surprise impossible; for no serious attack (the only kind of engagement we at all desired) could be undertaken without the intentions of the enemy having been disclosed. And this position would bring us nearer Punhete, where our dockyards were, and Abrantes, which it was our aim to capture.

Consequently, on the 14th November, after having remained one month before the English lines, Massena with great skill withdrew his army. It was necessary to conceal Junot's movement from the English, with whom he had daily skirmishes, or they might fall upon him *en masse*, and occasion him serious loss. In order to deceive them, Massena circulated the report that he was about to attack the lines, which delighted our soldiers, and caused the English so much uneasiness as to keep them motionless within the works. He then ordered Junot, who was at Sobral on the central plateau, and Reynier, who was at Villa Nova on the Tagus, to send forward their sick and wounded and all the most troublesome part of the artillery. During the night he caused Junot to decamp with all haste, retaining under arms Reynier, whose troops were more accustomed to war, and who occupied the wide road of the Tagus, on which retreat was easy. By the return of day Junot found himself beyond reach of attack, and Reynier began to decamp, while the English, engaged in guarding their intrenchments, never thought of pursuing us.

Ney had already reached Thomar. Junot followed him, passing by Santarem, and on the next day Reynier followed Junot on the same road. At the moment of entering Santarem,

Reynier had a false alarm. The English, aware at length of their mistake, had followed our steps, full of the idea that we intended to take Abrantes by assault, and naturally anxious to prevent us. Arrived at Santarem, a commanding position on the Tagus, which is reached by a road made through the marshy banks of the river, which might be turned, because it does not pass very close to the Estrella, Reynier found that he was pursued by a considerable force, and was in fear of being surrounded. He became uneasy, and asked succour of Massena, who, too much disregarding his alarm, was late in forwarding aid. The alarm was ungrounded, and, in fact, two English regiments, which had wished to gain the ground on Reynier's flank, were nearly taken. The only disastrous consequence of this adventure was that many of the sick and wounded in the hospital of Santarem, agitated by the indications of alarm, leaped hastily from their beds, and some of them perished in the streets.

They were soon firmly seated in their new position. Reynier stationed himself on the heights of Santarem, where he was protected by the marshes, the steepness of the rocks, barricades of wood, and the course of the Rio Mayor, and connected with the principal chain of the Estrella by Junot's brigade, cantoned from Trêmes to Alcanbêda. He was badly off for nothing but provisions; and, to compensate for this, a part of the rich plain of Gôlgao was abandoned to him. Junot encamped in the middle of that plain, at Torres Novas; Ney fixed his head-quarters at Thomar: he had one division—that of Loison—at Punhete, two at Thomar, and one brigade of infantry, with all his cavalry, at Leyria, on the other side of the Estrella, so as to occupy the road from Torres Vedras to Coimbra. He could thus protect the dockyards of Punhete, threaten Abrantes, and, by a movement from left to right, direct himself to Leyria, if Lord Wellington should attempt to turn our position.

This position was impregnable, and at the same time well suited to the different objects contemplated, which were—to prepare to cross the Tagus, to take Abrantes, and to blockade the English lines, while waiting for the reinforcements demanded of Napoleon. Marshal Ney, habitually dissatisfied with every order that came from head-quarters, would have preferred that the army should have been collected in full force between Leyria and Coimbra. But to remove so far from Lisbon was in a manner to begin a retreat, to abandon the banks of the Tagus, to renounce the passage of that river, as well as every attempt upon Abrantes, without any additional safety or any greater facility of communication with Almeida. On the contrary, by retaining at Leyria only the cavalry and one brigade of infantry, they secured the road from Coimbra and Almeida, without relinquishing any of their essential aims. Besides, by maintaining posts on the Zesere, they were, in fact, nearer Almeida than even at Leyria, for they had it in their power to communicate with the Spanish frontier by a road less infested with Trent's banditti, since it passed to the south of the Estrella.

The army, thus situated, appeared to be confident, satisfied with their manner of life, and full of hope of soon resuming their task when

joined by reinforcements from Old Castile by the road of Almeida, and from Andalusia by that of Badajoz. In the mean time they were occupied, mind and body, with preparations for passing the Tagus and attacking Abrantes. Massena had lost no time in using the necessary means of conveying to Paris a knowledge of his situation and his wants. Had he been in presence of a Spanish army merely, he would have had no serious cause for uneasiness; but, having to do with an English army under a wise and skilful commander, removed to a great distance from his base of operations, condemned to live by plunder during the ensuing winter, encamped by a river, of which he held only one of the banks while his adversary held both, being in numbers one-third less than the enemy, and having ammunition for only one battle, on all sides surrounded by guerilla chiefs, who intercepted every courier, the least misfortune that could happen was the loss of the object of the campaign, and to retire without having forced the English lines; while he might at any time experience a serious disaster if he failed, by means of vigilance, firmness, and wise selection, to render his position impregnable. He determined, therefore, on sending to Paris a brave and intelligent officer, accompanied by a small body of troops, without which he would have little prospect of reaching the Spanish frontier. For this mission he fixed on General Foy, who had served under him since Zurich, who was lively, attractive, endowed with the power of well expressing his ideas, and distinguished by a wound received at Busaco. To him he intrusted the task of explaining the operations of the army from the departure from Almeida to their establishment at Santarem. Independently of the despatches which he bore, he required him to explain every thing verbally to the Emperor, and to demand, with as little delay as possible, ammunition, provisions, and reinforcements, either by Almeida or Badajoz, promising a speedy termination to the war against the English if these succours arrived in time, but prognosticating serious misfortunes if they were delayed.

The two great warriors who were now opposed in the extremity of Portugal could scarcely have adopted any other line of conduct than that which they actually pursued. The one could not better defend the only part of the soil of the Peninsula which remained to him, the other could not better prepare to attack it. On this extreme promontory was to depend the fate of the European nations; for, if the English were once expelled from Portugal, a general peace might be restored to Europe, and, on the contrary, if their position in that country were confirmed and Massena obliged to retreat, the fortune of the Empire would begin to give way to that of Britain, and sink, perhaps, overwhelmed by no distant catastrophe. The question, then, was one of immense weight, involving no less than the empire of the world; but it depended less on the generals to whose arms the solution of it was confided than on their respective governments, whose duty was to supply the means. We shall see how these two generals were supported,—one by a country agitated by parties, the other by a master blinded by prosperity.

Whatever may be the difficulties of a com-

mander-in-chief, we must not imagine that his adversary is without them. Napoleon, who had attained in the highest degree the philosophy of war, as a long life leads men to a knowledge of the philosophy of life, was wont to say that after a battle every one had his desert, and that if generals were well convinced of this they would not allow themselves to be so easily discouraged by appearances, or even by an actual reverse, and that by perseverance they would often be able to retrieve their fortune. If the situation of Marshal Massena was difficult, that of Lord Wellington was scarcely less so. While the French general considered it difficult to carry the lines of Torres Vedras, the English general considered it very difficult to defend them if the French pursued the line of conduct most naturally indicated. Thus, Lord Wellington was exposed to two dangers:—first, that the French should unite their forces at Lisbon, to overwhelm him there; and, next, that the British government, divided, as every free government must be, on so important a question, should recall him from Portugal or should adopt measures which should render perseverance impossible. These two dangers, equally serious but not equally probable, presented themselves in an aspect sufficiently threatening to agitate deeply his mind, brave as it was.

The concentration of the French forces before Lisbon, which might result both from the approach of the troops collected in Castile under General Drouet, and from the reflux of the armies of Andalusia towards Portugal, was carefully to be guarded against, and was so clearly indicated that blindness only could fail to apprehend it. Much, in fact, was said of the arrival of the famous divisions of Essling, (which had passed from the command of Marshal Oudinot to that of General Drouet,) and of their probable influence on the war; also of the appearance of the 6th corps under Marshal Mortier, which, as we have seen, had directed itself from Seville to Badajoz. With respect to the divisions of Essling, lately entered into Old Castile, Lord Wellington, though commonly well informed, thought them not so numerous as they had been represented,—that they would be much engaged in the north of the Peninsula, and that they could only reinforce Massena by the right bank of the Tagus and would in no degree facilitate his passage to the left. Though the arrival of these two divisions might be a cause of uneasiness, the reflux of the troops from Andalusia towards Lisbon was much more to be feared, which, in whole or in part, might unite with Marshal Massena by the right bank of the Tagus, thus secure to him each bank, and procure the means of attacking the lines of Torres Vedras with a formidable force. This was the principal anxiety of the English general, who feared above every thing that the French, neglecting the sieges of Cadiz and Badajoz, should direct their whole strength against Lisbon, to aid Marshal Massena to carry the lines of Torres Vedras. Accordingly, he urged the Spanish regency to engage the French as much as possible before Cadiz, to break down all the bridges of the Guadiana, that they might find the greatest possible difficulties in crossing that river, and to construct at Elvas, Campo Major, and Badajoz, fortresses of such strength that they dare not neglect them to march upon Lis-

don. And, as he much doubted the perfect adoption of his advice, he desired to transform the beautiful province of Alentejo into a desert, as he had that of Coimbra, in order to cut off the means of support from the French, should they invade it. But this he could not obtain from the regency of Portugal, who had no inclination to starve themselves in order to starve the French, and who often repeated, with bitterness, that instead of opposing the French by famine, a weapon equally destructive to both parties, it would be much better to oppose them by arms, and thus to deliver Portugal instead of ruining it.

These replies irritated the English general, without shaking his resolution never to risk a battle against the French, who could more certainly be destroyed by want than by offensive measures, doubtful at least. But, however well-conceived his plan, the execution was very difficult. Provisions were enormously dear in Lisbon, though the sea was open and protected by the British flag. There was no want of corn nor of salt fish; but meat had become very rare, fresh vegetables were no longer seen, and provisions of all kinds were accessible only to the rich to such a degree, that, instead of paying the wages of the people in money, it was requisite to pay them in food. They had even been obliged to introduce a scale of prices for the lodgings of the unfortunate persons who had fled from the provinces to the capital. To these severe sufferings were added incessant alarms, for on every movement of the French an attack was announced with predictions of success. Even in the English army and among the officers, notwithstanding their excellent discipline and their respect for their chief, murmurs were heard. Instead of marching and fighting, which afford the warrior the best relief to his sufferings, to remain under canvas, exposed on the high promontory of Lisbon to all the winds of the ocean and to continual rain, ill suited the soldiers of Lord Wellington and the numerous refugees who had no other bed than the earth in the lines of Torres Vedras. Many officers loudly complained, wrote melancholy letters to their countrymen, and contributed to augment the uneasiness entertained in England for the fate of the British army.

Few persons in London, even among the members of government, believed it possible for the English army to maintain their position in Portugal. Every moment they expected to hear that they had embarked, and hoped they had done so spontaneously, without waiting to be compelled by the French. The ministry, more forcibly attacked than ever, incessantly enjoined prudence on Lord Wellington even to impotency, and to an extent that made him fear either that he would soon be totally abandoned, or, at least, very feebly supported. The situation of the cabinet, and, consequently, that of Lord Wellington, had been rendered still more difficult by the recent occurrence of a melancholy event,—the relapse of George III. into a state of mental alienation. At first they endeavoured to deceive themselves with the hope that the attack would prove transient, and thus to gain a month before proposing to Parliament the measures demanded by such a failure of the royal authority. To such a hope both the Parliament and the public readily lent themselves,

from their respect for George III. and their dislike to the Prince of Wales, who was called to exercise royal authority under the title of Regent. However, after allowing the longest possible delay, it had become at length necessary to address the Parliament, and to demand that the regency should be conferred on the Prince of Wales. That prince was the friend of all the principal members of opposition, and it was fully expected that he would intrust them with power. The old party of Mr. Pitt, which had continued the ministerial party through all the transformations of the British Cabinet, and had always supported the war, had done every thing to limit the powers of the regent, while the opposition, on the contrary, had used every means to augment them. By a species of contradiction not very uncommon in political parties, the opposition professed the most monarchical doctrine and the government the least so. The opposition maintained that there was no need to pass any law; for a law, according to the English constitution, supposed the action of three powers, and, in particular, the royal sanction, which was in this case impossible, for the king was incapable of any act. In virtue of these principles, they wished to confine themselves to the presentation of an address to the regent, urging him to take possession of the royal authority, which fell to him by right during the incapacity of his august father, and to exercise it in full force, for the royal authority, being one and indivisible, ought in no case to suffer any diminution, if the equal balance of powers was to be kept intact. The ministry, on the contrary, maintained that a bill was necessary; that the royal sanction should be supplied by an order of Parliament enjoining the depositaries of the royal seal to sanction the bill; that the authority of the regent, being temporary, (at least so they hoped,) could not be as complete as if it had been final; that it would be inconvenient to give him the power of so altering the state of affairs that the king, if restored to health, should find the course of government so changed that he should be unable to resume the policy of his reign. This line of argument was singularly sophistical, and proved that the logic of the ministry had been as much perverted by interest as that of the opposition had been enlightened by the same cause. But, as the law was determined by the majority, the regency was by a bill transferred to the Prince of Wales, without full powers, interdicting the nomination of peers, the proposing of certain bills, the care of the king's person, the choice of the officers of his house. But it had not been in their power to deprive him of the right to nominate his ministers; and every one expected to see him call to the ministry Lord Holland, Lord Grey, Lord Grenville, relations or former colleagues of Mr. Fox. But the regent, though he did not like the present ministry, in particular Mr. Perceval, was afraid of causing at that moment too great a change by selecting his friends of the opposition, and of assuming too great a responsibility by passing from the system of war to that of peace. Before deciding, he wished to know if the infirmity of the king would be of so long continuance as to warrant any remarkable modification of the state policy. For this purpose he had consulted the physi-

cians, and communicated his doubts to Lords Holland, Grey, and Grenville.

This crisis in the internal affairs of England took place in December, 1810, at the very time when Marshal Massena and Lord Wellington were opposed to each other at the lines of Torres Vedras. Hope commonly augments the ardour and activity of parties. The English opposition, perceiving that the conduct of the Prince-Regent would depend upon their success, or even partial success, in Parliament, redoubled their attacks upon the cabinet; and it must be acknowledged that their criticisms were to a certain degree verified by events, and would have been wholly so if the proper course of conduct had been pursued in France.

Independently of the incessant disquietudes excited by the war and the overwhelming expenses resulting from it, the English opposition could urge the sufferings of a most severe and unusual commercial crisis occasioned by the measures of Napoleon, and combined with certain other circumstances. The Spanish colonies, having refused to recognise the authority of Joseph, and availed themselves of this opportunity to declare themselves independent, had opened their ports to British merchandise. At this news, the English manufacturers, acting with the blindness of avidity, which is not less infatuated than ambition, had manufactured far beyond what America could consume, still less could pay for. They had sent immense quantities of merchandise into the Spanish colonies, and part of these had returned unsold. That which had been sold had been paid for in colonial produce, which, being transported to London, had added to the glut of the market. While these things were taking place in America, 600 or 700 vessels which had left the Thames to take a portion of their superfluity into the Baltic, having been, for the most part, brought back to England, the price of colonial produce was reduced to the lowest point. Moreover, liberty having been granted to the Spanish and Portuguese planters, and even to the French planters whose possessions had been invaded, to dispose of their produce at London, the quantity of foreign merchandise unsold had increased to such a point that many cargoes of sugars, coffees, cottons, tobacco, dyewoods, indigos, were not worth the expense of stowage. Bills issued on these goods were without credit, in general protested, and the bank which had received them was exposed to the most serious embarrassment. The bank-note had been further depreciated, and the exchange upon England, already so low, had fallen from a loss of 16 or 17 per cent. to more than 20, so that England, obliged this year to pay to the foreigner several hundreds of millions to maintain her army and navy, was at a loss how further to continue these payments. Assistance to the extent of 5,000,000 or 6,000,000 sterling had been voted to commerce and industry,—a feeble relief in so distressing a situation. Some accused the imprudence of manufacturers, others accused the bank, and almost all accused the government, who, by their obstinacy in continuing the war, and especially by their orders in council, had been the authors of all the evils which were deplored.

One may easily understand all that an opposition almost within reach of power, and sin-

cere in their criticisms, could find to say in the midst of such circumstances. "See," exclaimed Lords Grenville, Holland, and Grey, and Messrs. Tierney, Burdet, Brougham, Huskisson, members of Parliament,—“see to what point we have been reduced by a war unreasonably prolonged. By our desire of humiliating France we have urged her on from one degree of grandeur to another to the dominion of all Europe; we have rendered her sovereign of part of Germany, of Italy, of Spain, and quite recently of Holland; and, if our opposition be continued, who can tell at what point her power shall be arrested? We receive,” added these orators, “87,000,000 of taxes, (925,000,000 francs,) and we expend 56,000,000, (1400,000,000 francs,) which requires the loan of 19,000,000 per annum, (475,000,000 francs.) It is impossible to borrow every year so great a sum without ruin; and at the same time no addition can be made either to the indirect taxes, the duties on articles of consumption having been carried to their utmost limit, or to the direct taxes, the income-tax having become already oppressively severe. The continually-increasing amount of paper money would soon render commercial transactions impossible at home, and the support of the army and navy impracticable abroad; an end, therefore, must be put to this ruinous war by an honourable peace, which it would be easy to conclude if desired. The victories of which we boast have been our most dangerous allurements, for, although the conduct of the British army has been meritorious, its situation cannot but be alarming to all good citizens. While we are giving to its commanders titles and pensions, generally well deserved, it has allowed to be taken before its eyes two important fortresses,—Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida; it has repulsed the enemy at Busaco, but merely the next day to lose Coimbra and the rest of Portugal; confined now to a tongue of land where it is supported only by imported bread, exposed to an attack of the French, who, unless much misguided, will combine all its forces for its destruction, it exists only as it were by miracle, and may at any moment be destroyed. What would become of England if this army, our only hope against invasion, should at length yield, or should sign any capitulation which would render the whole force prisoners of war? What political advantages, what territorial conquest, can be weighed against such dangers as these?” Such was the daily language of the opposition; and it must be acknowledged that if the English, accustomed at that time to a crushing taxation, to a depreciated paper money, and to annual loans, resigned themselves to these evils, in consideration of the unheard-of development of their commerce, they trembled when they thought of the situation of their army; the idea of leaving it exposed to the blows of Napoleon filled them with alarm, and in this point of view they completely sympathized with the opposition. Every day an unexpected vote might therefore induce the Prince-Regent to change the ministry and substitute the policy of peace for the policy of war.

The ministry, subjected to all these fears and all these agitations, continually sent to Lisbon despatches most painful to Lord Wellington. Even his brother, the Marquis of Wellesley, af-

fectured by the general uneasiness, allowed himself to fear that his brother, by the obstinacy of his character, perhaps by ambition, might commit some imprudence, and endanger the English army by remaining too long upon the continent. The ministerial correspondence with the English general was full of these apprehensions, and full also of complaints of the great expense of the war, which, independently of the subsidy granted to the Portuguese government, was not less than 250,000,000 per annum, of which 75,000,000 or 80,000,000 were consumed by the transport fleet. He was asked if he could not imitate the French generals, who lived at the expense of the countries in which they carried on the war, and if he could not soon dispense with that immense fleet of transports, always kept under sail at so great expense; he was entreated not to carry his resolution to an imprudent point, but rather to withdraw from the Peninsula than to expose to any serious risk that British army which was then regarded as the defence of England from invasion, the fear of which, though much diminished, was kept alive by the threatening phantom of the old *matériel* decaying at Boulogne.

These despatches occasioned Lord Wellington a degree of vexation which he dared not fully express, for he had not yet acquired sufficient influence to admit of that freedom of language which he afterwards indulged; but he exhibited it partially, saying that it was very distressing to him, notwithstanding his long experience of the war, notwithstanding two years spent in the Peninsula in presence of the French, that he could not inspire more confidence; that no one came from England, whether courier or officer or private individual, who did not bring the expression of these humiliating doubts; that if he remained in Portugal it was because he thought he could do so without peril, as far as human prudence could judge; that should the dangers become real he would not hesitate to withdraw rather than compromise the British army or his own glory; that if, notwithstanding his confidence, he wished to retain the fleet of transports, at so great expense, his reason was that there would be real temerity in regarding as certain that which was only probable, and in depriving himself of every means of transport, as if his expulsion from the Peninsula were impossible; that he felt assured that Napoleon would not send many more troops into Spain than were already there, but that the division of Essling, so often mentioned, might arrive; that a considerable force might be detached from Andalusia against Lisbon; that if, for instance, 15,000 French should come from Salamanca under General Drouet, 25,000 from Cadiz and Badajoz under Marshal Mortier, he should soon have 90,000 men to engage on the two banks of the Tagus; that at the first word of Marshal Massena these 90,000 men would rush with the fury of madmen upon the lines of Torres Vedras; that none but those who had been witnesses could form an idea of what they were capable; that it would be very rash to affirm that they could not master the first enclosure; but that in this case he had still a second and a third, and that in consequence of this triple line of intrenchments he

could still have time to embark; that the combination of these intrenchments and the fleet rendered his security so great, and freed his conduct from the charge of imprudence of which he was so often accused; that it was impossible to reduce his expense; that to support the war by the war, which was so easy to the French, was a mere chimera with the English; that the French army was not a collection of men gathered from the dregs of the country and broken by an iron discipline, but that it was taken by law from the whole body of the nation, good and bad together, the good much predominating; that parties of the French could be sent to a distance of twenty or thirty leagues to seek provisions, and would then return to their flag almost to a man; that if it were thought possible to do with the English soldiers what Marshal Massena did with the French, it was a great mistake; that if several days were granted to the English for foraging, not a man would return to his colours; that it was questionable whether the free country of England would allow the life of hired soldiers to be treated as Napoleon treated that of citizen soldiers summoned by law, one-half of whom perished of misery every year without a word being said by the Paris journals to the public; that if they were to have soldiers they must be fed, paid, and kept to their flag; that his departure from the Peninsula would give the signal for general submission to Spain, perhaps to Europe; that the expense they grudged for maintaining the war at Lisbon they must incur in maintaining it between Dover and London; that he defended England from invasion much more certainly at Lisbon than he could between London and Dover; that, in short, England might well put up with expense and uneasiness while himself and his army were subjected to the much greater evils of formidable combats and horrible sufferings.

Such were the difficulties presented to this able and resolute commander by a free country where the question of peace and war, continually opposed with nearly equal force of reason, occasioned inevitable struggles in a ministry deprived of its head. It might seem that the illustrious adversary of Lord Wellington, Marshal Massena, having only to do with a man of genius such as Napoleon, who had to contend only against himself, with whom unfortunately he maintained but too feeble a struggle, should have met with every kind of assistance in the solution of a military question on which depended the fate of the world. It was, in fact, plainly the duty of Napoleon, well aware of all that was passing at Lisbon and London, to employ the vast resources of his administrative genius so as to realize all the fears of Lord Wellington and all the desires of Massena. The following book will afford the means of judging how far he discharged this duty.

General Foy, despatched from Santarem to Paris to convey the demands of his chief and to give verbal answers to all the questions of the Emperor, effected the most perilous passage through Spain, though at the same time the most favourable that could be devised. Four hundred men, excellent for marching, and good marksmen, had been selected from different regiments for his service. The road indicated as

the most secure was that through the valley of the Zézere, which passes to the south of the Estrella to join Ciudad Rodrigo by Sobreira Formosa, Sarzedas, and Belmonte. General Loison, from whose position he was to set out, directed a strong reconnoitring party to Abrantes, in order to alarm the garrison and to prevent them interrupting General Foy's detachment in the outset. The garrison of Abrantes, being alarmed, mistook this little band for the advanced guard of the French army, and, shutting themselves up in their walls, gave him free passage. General Foy eagerly pursued his march, between a Spanish corps which at Villa-Velha guarded the banks of the Tagus, and the guerillas of Trent and Silveyra, who infested the environs. He only met a band of 200 men of the Portuguese *levés en masse*, called the Ordenanza, which he routed, with a slight loss on his side, and, after six or seven days of risks and dangers of all kind, arrived in safety at Ciudad Rodrigo.

He there found General Gardanne, whom Marshal Massena had left in the rear to keep the roads clear, to collect the men who had left the hospitals, to protect the arrival of convoys, and who, assailed on all sides by guerilla companies, had been able to fulfil only the half of his task. General Gardanne had consumed almost as much provision as he had collected in the two frontier-fortresses of Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo; and of 6000 men whom he

had hoped to take from the hospitals he had scarcely brought together 2000.

General Foy transmitted to General Gardanne the order to set out immediately by the road which he had himself pursued, left him for a guide one of his officers who had accompanied him, and ordered him further to bring, under escort of the men who were ready to rejoin their ranks, all the ammunition which he could transport. General Foy then crossed Old Castile, devastated by the guerillas, whose boldness increased daily, and found the Spaniards full of confidence and the French much discouraged by seeing the war prolonged notwithstanding the numerous reinforcements sent during the year, the expedition of Andalusia reduced to the taking of Seville and that of Portugal to a march to the Tagus; he found that General Drouet had collected only one of his divisions at Burgos, and was waiting for the second, and that General Dorsenne was with great difficulty protecting the road from Burgos to Valladolid with 15,000 or 18,000 men of the guard. He everywhere brought news of the army of Portugal, of which nothing was known except through the inflated medium of Spanish reports. He urged General Drouet to take the way for Coimbra and Thomar, and then set out for Paris, occupying twenty days in his journey from the Tagus to the Seine. He arrived towards the close of November, and was immediately presented to the Emperor.



## BOOK XL.

## FUENTES D'ONORO.

Reception given by Napoleon to General Foy—Call for reinforcements to the army in Spain—Union of the Hanse Towns, of part of Hanover, and of the Grand Duchy of Oldenburg, to the French Empire—Misunderstanding with Russia—Preparations of Napoleon for war in the North—Protracted sojourn of the army of Portugal at the Tagus—Discussions on the crossing of the Tagus—Investment and capture of Tortosa—Events in Andalusia—Preparations for the siege of Tarragona—Siege of Badajoz—Retrograde movement of Massena—Battle of Redina—Return of the army to Old Castle—Differences among the general—Advantageous position of Lord Wellington—Badajoz taken by Marshal Soult—Battle of Barossa—Badajoz invested by the English—Battle of Fuentes D'Onoro—Resumé of the operations of 1810 and 1811.

GENERAL FOY, afterwards so celebrated as an orator, combined, with much bravery and intelligence, a lively imagination, not always well regulated, but brilliant, and exhibiting itself with animation in an open, attractive, and expressive countenance. Napoleon loved intelligence in another, though not always willing to be guided by it. The general charmed him by his conversation, and he in turn dazzled the general, who was now for the first time admitted to some degree of familiarity. The news which he had brought was all that had been received of the army in Portugal, which hitherto had been only gathered from the English journals. General Foy found Napoleon well convinced of the importance of the question which was to be solved at the Tagus; for he was better acquainted with the state of things in general than any one else, and he was persuaded that the best chance of restoring peace to Europe was to vanquish the English, or, at least, to keep them for a long time in check before Lisbon. But he also found him full of illusions on the condition of the war in Spain, which had much changed since 1808,—on the immense number of men it demanded,—on the difficulty of supporting the armies in the Peninsula and of overcoming the English; he deemed him very unjust to Massena, preferring to blame that illustrious officer for not accomplishing the impossible rather than himself for having required him to do so. Napoleon was always quoting the false estimate of 70,000 French and 24,000 English, as if he had been one of those indolent and ignorant princes who judge of things from the sayings of flattering ministers, and are too indolent to investigate the truth or too devoid of intelligence to understand it. Napoleon, who had repeatedly ordered his general to give battle, now complained of the attack of Busaco; he who had wished them to pursue the English at the point of the sword now complained that they had not stayed at Coimbra; and, notwithstanding his singular sagacity, he could hardly persuade himself that, instead of 70,000 French who could thoroughly beat 24,000 English, our army consisted of 45,000 brave soldiers, living almost by miracle in the presence of 70,000 Anglo-Portuguese, well fed and almost impreguably established behind formidable intrenchments. But, in reality, the difficulty of convincing him did not arise from the difficulty of enlightening so intelligent a mind, but from the impossibility of making him admit truths which opposed his designs.

General Foy well defended his superior, and proved that in every case the operations of

Massena which had been censured were compelled by circumstances. He maintained that, once arrived before Busaco, it was necessary either to retire with disgrace or to engage; that, although he had not carried the position, he had at least inspired the English with a degree of fear that kept them so stationary as to allow us to pass them; that to stop at Coimbra after having appeared there would have been an acknowledgment of weakness as great as to have refused battle at Busaco; that, moreover, the existence of the lines of Torres Vedras was unknown at Coimbra, which was much more excusable than that it should have been unknown at Paris, the centre of information; that to have arrived before those lines, even though no action had ensued, was not to be regretted, since they had shut up the English and kept them in continual alarm; that a decisive result might still be soon obtained, if sufficient succour arrived in time by the two banks of the Tagus; that, in a word, although the difficulties were great, they were not insuperable, provided we were taught by experience to proportion the means to the greatness of the end in view.

Zealous for the interests of his chief, General Foy, in describing the distressing realities of the war in Spain, revealed the truth as far as was consistent with his desire to please not power but genius. Nor were many words necessary to enlighten Napoleon, who, on leaving the general, was really acquainted with the greater part of the truth. What was to be *done* he well knew, and, had he not, who could have been supposed to know?

In fact, although the war in Spain began to be as irksome to his mind as it was fatiguing to the bodies of his soldiers, and though on this account he trusted the carrying out of the details too much to Major-General Berthier, he had never ceased, even before the arrival of General Foy, to give orders which fell in with the wants and desires of Marshal Massena. He had often urged General Drouet to hasten his movements, to bring at least his first division to Almeida, then to combine all that Massena had left in the rear, all that had quitted the hospitals, and with these forces to clear the roads so as to open communication with the army of Portugal. He had ordered the generals commanding the northern provinces—General Thouvenot, governor of Biscay, General Dorsenne, governor of Burgos—not to retain the 2d division of General Drouet, but to expedite it forthwith upon Salamanca. Anticipating a great loss of men, he had even prepared a division of reserve formed of conscripts taken from

the depôts of the army of Andalusia and Portugal; to this he had added some cavalry taken from the depôts of the cavalry of Spain; and, finally, two battalions of national guards, the only ones remaining from the grand levée of Walcheren, and subsequently attached to the imperial guard. These detachments, amounting to 10,000 or 12,000 men, had been sent into Castile under General Caffarelli, to serve in the rear, until they could be drafted into their several corps, and to render available, in the mean while, the two divisions of General Drouet. Napoleon had, further, addressed a sharp rebuke to Marshal Soult for having drawn out only a small part of the three corps which composed the army of Andalusia, which he estimated at 80,000 men, as he had estimated the army of Massena at 70,000. He reproached him with having conducted the siege of Cadix without sufficient energy,—a town, he said, defended only by a mob; with having allowed the Marquis de la Romana to enter Portugal on the flanks of Massena, instead of detaining him in Extremadura by incessant attacks; with having permitted the 5th corps to be shut up in Seville the whole summer; with having, in short, remained ten months in Andalusia without having done any thing but take Seville, the gates of which he had found open. He had enjoined him to despatch immediately 10,000 men towards the Tagus, in order to assist Marshal Massena. Finally, he had censured with equal severity the commander of the army of the centre—that is to say, his brother Joseph—for having confined himself within Madrid with some 20,000 men, and engaged merely in a few unimportant engagements with the guerillas, in a direction not very well chosen,—viz.: towards Cuenca and Guadalaxara, against the famous leader l'Empecinado, and not towards Toledo and Alcantara, where they might have been very useful to the army of Portugal. To support these censures, he had said to him, as he had said to Marshal Soult and General Drouet, that the fate of the Peninsula, and probably of Europe, was to be decided at Santarem, between Abrantes and Lisbon.

Thus Napoleon had from a distance contemplated this situation, and had in some degree anticipated the necessary arrangements. But, learning at length the true position of Massena, he resolved to make every thing converge towards him, as well the disposable troops which he had in Old Castile as those which had been unwisely detained in Andalusia; and he prepared the most exact orders for the generals who were to effect this union of forces towards Portugal. However, if by sacrificing a few secondary objects to the principal one it would be possible to augment in a remarkable manner the resources of Massena and enable him to fulfil his task, would it not be right to make a last effort, and, since they had committed the mistake of entangling themselves in Spain, would it not be wise to engage themselves yet more extensively in that country, in order the more quickly to escape from it, to divert from the banks of the Elbe or the Rhine one of the armies which were there stationed, not indeed without use, but which might be still more useful elsewhere, to march with 80,000 men to the help of Massena in person, and, by this irresistible movement, to bring together Soult, Drouet, and Dorsenne

before Torres Vedras, and to terminate the European struggle by an overwhelming blow inflicted upon Lisbon? Would not any danger that might arise from leaving the North unprotected be dispelled by the general peace gained by conquest at the extremity of Portugal? The Empire was tranquil; Holland, deprived of her independence, was dismayed but submissive; the young Empress bore in her bosom the heir of the grand Empire, and, though it might be painful to her husband to leave her, it was well known that he was always ready to prefer his projects to his affections. What reason, then, could be opposed to so plainly-indicated a course? Unfortunately, while the events just related were passing in the Peninsula, Napoleon had provoked serious obstacles in the North, and the situation which he had created for himself by his exorbitant ambition exerted over him a tyranny more absolute than that which he exerted over Europe. That glorious despot was, as usual, a slave, and the slave of his own errors.

We have seen that, after having terminated the campaign of Wagram, he had a wish to attach Austria to himself, to restore peace to Germany, so to distribute the territories which remained to him as to enable him to evacuate the countries beyond the Rhine, to devote his attention exclusively to the war in Spain, and to compel England to peace by the double means of a continental blockade and of a great check given to the army of Lord Wellington; but that, notwithstanding these pacific intentions, he had, in order to render more efficacious the continental blockade, annexed Holland to the Empire, extended his military positions on the coasts of the North Sea to the frontier of Holstein, devised an elaborate system of colonial tariff, very profitable to himself and his allies but very oppressive to the people; and that, finally, he had enjoined upon some, and recommended to others, not excepting Russia, the adoption of this almost intolerable system. By an inevitable consequence, this policy, which aimed at peace through the means of military occupation, territorial usurpation, forced confiscations, and ruinous exactions, had revived all the suspicions which he wished to allay. Indeed, to convert into French departments not only Rome, Florence, and Le Valais, but also Rotterdam, Amsterdam, and Groningen, was not very well calculated to tranquillize those who ascribed to Napoleon the project of subjecting the whole continent to his dominion. But Napoleon had not confined himself to this; he was much annoyed at having only a military authority in the Hanse towns, and he thought it would be very useful to extend the territory of the Empire, which already reached to Ems by the annexation of Holland, as far as the Weser and the Elbe by the annexation of Bremen, Hamburg, and Lubeck; that he would thus enclose in his wide seaboard the seas which wash the shores of England, and that the threatening aspect of Boulogne would be, as it were, extended to Lubeck. What difficulties could present themselves to the accomplishment of such a design? The Hanse towns were in his power; Hanover, part of which he must appropriate, belonged to his brother Jerome, who had violated the conditions on which he had given him that country, either by failing to pay with exactness the French

troops, or by not fulfilling his promises to the French, who had become entitled to rewards; the territories of certain German princes, particularly those of Arenberg and Salm, were as much at his disposal as were those of a French subject. All difficulty in regard to them would be removed by leaving them their private property, and indemnifying them for the rest by settlements in France. There was, indeed, the Prince of Oldenburg, whose territory, situated between Friesland and Hanover, between the mouths of the Ems and those of the Weser, could not be omitted, and who was the uncle of the Emperor of Russia. To convert this prince, who was very dear to his nephew, into merely a French subject, could not appear other than a very violent proceeding. But we happened still to retain a fragment of those numerous German states which had recently been distributed by Napoleon,—viz.: Erfurt, a crumb which had fallen from the conqueror's table. By granting that furt to the Duke of Oldenburg, he thought he should complete the measure of his favours to Russia. There remained, finally, the Grand Duke of Berg, the son of Louis, still very young, who had been indemnified for the loss of the crown of Holland, placed for a moment on his cradle, by the fine duchy of Berg. A part of this duchy was required to complete the new distributions of territory; but this was merely a family arrangement, which need occasion no anxiety. The plan once resolved on by Napoleon was immediately put in execution.

We have seen that he had already converted into French departments Tuscany, the Roman States, and Holland. By a decree followed by a *senatus consultum* of December 18, 1810, he converted into three French departments, called those of the Upper Ems, of the mouths of the Weser, and of the mouths of the Elbe, the duchy of Oldenburg, the territory of the Princes of Salm and of Arenberg, part of Hanover, the territories of Bremen, of Hamburg, of Lubeck; and on the same occasion he appropriated Le Valais, which he converted into a French department, under the name of the Department of the Simplon. A simple intimation was addressed the dispossessed princes; and to the Prince of Oldenburg, the uncle of Alexander, it was announced that, in consideration for the Emperor of Russia, the city of Erfurt was granted to him in compensation. Napoleon was much tempted to annex also the two principalities of Mecklenburg, which would have given him a great extent of coast upon the Baltic, and would have placed in his power Swedish Pomerania; but he dared not venture so far. He contented himself with declaring to the two princes of Mecklenburg that he was willing to leave them their states provided they would render themselves as useful to him in the struggle with England as if they had been annexed to the Empire; that is to say, that they should furnish sailors, should arm Rostock and Vismar in such a manner as to prevent the English stationing themselves there, and that, finally, they should close their coasts against British commerce as effectually as could be done by French officers; that, if any one of these conditions should be neglected, their states should instantly be annexed to the Empire, for he would show indulgence to no one, since the English showed none in their maritime decisions.

It was not Prussia, who concealed her hatred under a profound submission, and had besides many other vexations to endure,—nor the German princes, some dethroned and supplanted by the new king of Westphalia, others bound to the Empire by fear or by being accessory to the territorial aggrandisements,—nor was it Austria, reduced to the necessity of concentrating her ambition on the preservation of her remaining territory,—that these measures could principally disgust, though every prince must tremble for his crown at the sight of such proceedings; but Russia, treated with so much levity on the occasion of the marriage with Austria, wounded and alarmed at the refusal to sign the convention respecting Poland, accurately warned of the progressive augmentation of the garrison of Dantzic, alarmed at the sight of France pushing her frontiers successively beyond Holland, Hanover, and Denmark, reaching Sweden, and then approaching Memel and Riga,—Russia, overcome at Austerlitz and Friedland, but not so thoroughly broken as to put up with every thing,—must be much interested in these territorial extensions, and offended at the off-hand way in which France had treated a much-valued relative, for whom she had repeatedly evinced a lively interest, particularly during the arrangements of Germany in 1803 and 1806. Every care ought to have been taken to remove as far as possible the harshness of these acts by a due regard to forms; but unfortunately the forms adopted were nearly as harsh as the acts themselves.

Already had Napoleon demanded of Alexander that he would not admit the Americans, who, according to him, were false neutrals, and that he would apply to colonial produce the French tariff of August 5, which admitted those articles at a duty of 50 per cent. Not satisfied with his replies received from St. Petersburg, he had renewed his demands with an urgency almost amounting to menace; he had said, with great bitterness, that at the fairs of Leipsic and Frankfurt had been seen large quantities of colonial produce which had been discovered to have been brought into Germany on Russian wagons, and were evidently the result of a contraband trade tolerated by Russia in violation of the treaty of Tilsit; that for his part he was ready to fulfil all the conditions of the treaty, provided they were observed in regard to him; that of all these conditions he attached the most importance to those which tended to destroy the British commerce, the observance of which was necessary to bring England to the adoption of a peace, which all the world longed for, Russia no less than other states; that not the alliance with Russia, nor even peace itself with her, was of such value to him that he would allow any participation with England; that he would rather renew the war with the whole continent than permit it, for thus alone could he secure the peace of the sea—that is to say, a general peace.

To these reproaches, which Napoleon addressed to St. Petersburg instead of any explanations of his recent territorial usurpations, he was contented to add, in terms sufficiently courteous, a brief announcement of the annexation to the Empire of the country of Oldenburg, and the compensation of Erfurt, granted, he said, in consideration of the Emperor Alexander.

So many alarming or offensive acts, accompa-

nied by a language far from conciliatory, must have deeply affected the Emperor Alexander, especially as they followed the somewhat disrespectful evasion of a marriage at first eagerly solicited, and the just but peremptory refusal of any engagement with regard to the re-establishment of Poland calculated to remove anxiety on that subject; and they proved that with Napoleon the step from coolness to open war was but short. The Emperor Alexander did not wish to take that step quickly, or even at all. In the first place, he had many reasons for avoiding war, or for delaying it if inevitable. Though he had confidence in his forces, in the effect of distance, and in the alliances which might be secured to him by the general animosity of Europe towards Napoleon, he had not the least desire again to brave the dangers which he had encountered at Eylau and at Friedland. And, besides, he was himself the author of the alliance with France,—a policy which had exposed him to many severe criticisms at home and abroad, and it would have been painful to him to corroborate these censures by so speedy a return from the alliance to war. But, if he must be reduced to that extremity, he was desirous not to break the alliance before he had reaped from it the fruits he had promised himself, and which alone could justify his conduct in the eyes of the severe judges by whom it was tried. Finland had been acquired, but not so the Danubian provinces; and these he wished to hold securely before exposing himself again to the formidable chances of a rupture with France. The campaign of 1810, against the Turks, had been tolerably favourable, though the progress of the Russian generals had been slow. After having invaded Moldavia and Wallachia in the preceding year, they had this year crossed the Danube to Hirschova and Siliustria, taken those two fortresses, marched upon Routschouk on the right and Varna on the left, carried Bajardjik by assault, bombarded Varna without result, failed before Tschumla, where the Turks had a considerable camp, but taken Routschouk and gained an important victory in its neighbourhood. However, though fighting with a want of military skill as conspicuous as their valour, the Turks had not finally lost the line of the Danube, and much more decided success was wanting to compel them to make the sacrifices demanded by Russia, who aimed at depriving them not only of Moldavia, but of Wallachia, by adopting as a limit, the bed of the old Danube, which goes from Rassoova to Kustendjé, besides the sovereignty of Servia, which she wished to render independent, part of the territory along the Caucasus, and a sum of money to defray the expenses of the war. To obtain such concessions from the Porte, resolved to maintain the integrity of the Empire, at least one more campaign, and that a very fortunate one, was necessary.

For all these reasons Alexander did not desire war with France, and, if unavoidable, he wished it not to be immediate. But he was firmly resolved not to submit to the commercial sacrifices required of him, though he declined them in terms intended to be conciliatory and calculated to retard the consequences of his refusal.

He had made considerable sacrifice in declaring war against England, which was the princi-

pal consumer of the natural products of Russia, and the loss of whose markets greatly impoverished the large proprietors of the Empire. But to this war he was resigned, because it was the condition of the French alliance, on which depended the two great conquests at which he aimed,—Finland to the north, the Danubian provinces to the south. But to go further, and, after having relinquished the commerce of England, to throw up that of America, was what he could not consent to without incurring the risk of greatly irritating his subjects. His reasons, indeed, were not very valid, for the Americans were almost all smugglers. They had either left America during the embargo, as we have said, and then they were acting contraband to the authority of their own country, or else they had left since the removal of the embargo, and the greater part, it was well known, went to Havana, to Teneriffe, and even to London, to purchase colonial produce which was English produce, and then, under convoy of the English flag, entered the Russian ports, and there sold sugar, coffee, cotton, indigo, dyewood, which were so eagerly sought on the continent and only a very small quantity of which was admitted since the continental system established by Napoleon, and brought back to London the corn, iron, and hemp which were taken in exchange. Nor were the Americans the only pretended neutrals which Russia was willing to admit; the Swedes carried on this intermediate trade with equal convenience to her, and with even greater effrontery. Though Napoleon had granted peace to the Swedes on condition of their breaking off all commercial relations with England, they had established at Gottenburg, at the end of the Cattegat, an immense dépôt, where, under pretence of receiving neutrals, and especially Americans, they received the English themselves, without regard to the national flag, transferred the cargoes to their own vessels, and then carried them to the Russian ports in their own name. It is true that Alexander, wishing to confine himself within the strict observation of treaties, had instituted a tribunal of prizes, in order to condemn the Americans who should be clearly convicted of not having come from America, or the Swedes who should too notoriously carry English merchandise. He thus caused a certain number to be seized and confiscated; but, though he might consent to impede and diminish his commerce, he was by no means willing to destroy it. The bearded merchants might still exchange grain, wood, hemp, for sugar, coffee, cotton, to be sold in Russia, or, by a long land-carriage very profitable to the Russian peasantry, transported to Königsberg on the frontiers of old Prussia, or to Brody on the frontiers of Austria. From these points German wagons brought them to Leipsic and Frankfort. The high price to which these articles had been raised by the continental blockade allowed a high charge for carriage; and it happened that a quantity of sugar grown at Havana, transported thence into England, and from England to Sweden by English vessels, and from Sweden to Russia by American or Swedish vessels, passed at length from Russia to Germany on Russian wagons.

Inconvenient as the traffic was, Alexander might have consented to impede it still further, but never to destroy it altogether. His com-

merce was interested in another point, which he was resolved never to sacrifice. The rate of exchange fell to an alarming extent, and there was reason to fear that foreign transactions would be rendered altogether impossible if it should continue necessary much longer to give so high an amount of Russian bills in order to procure German, French, or English bills in order to pay for what had been bought at Frankfort, Paris, or London. The first cause of the fall in the rate of exchange was to be found in the paper money. In fact, the same thing happened to the rouble which had happened to the pound sterling; and it was natural that foreigners should only accept the rouble as they did the pound sterling at the reduced rate of the paper. Another cause of this fall was the diminution in the export of Russian produce in consequence of the war. A third cause was the inferiority of Russia in respect to manufactures, which condemned them to import from abroad every article of luxury. The two first of these causes could not be removed except by the substitution of gold or silver for paper money, or by facilitating exportations from Russia to an extent which the war did not allow. But the Russian merchants imagined that if the cloths, silks, cotton cloths, and other articles of foreign manufacture, were prohibited, Russian industry would produce them, and thus one cause of the low rate of exchange would be removed. This was possible in the course of time; but to reckon upon it in the actual state of affairs was one of those chimerical expectations to which men are apt to cling when their interests suffer. A committee of Russian merchants, formed near the seat of government, had used such remonstrance on this subject that Alexander found himself obliged to pass a ukase prohibiting all English manufactures, and several German and French manufactures, which were considered to compete with Russian industry, such as cloths and silks. This ukase announced severe penalties, such as those enforced by Napoleon in his code of customs,—viz.: the confiscation or burning of the goods.

In this manner Alexander professed to fulfil his engagements contracted at Tilsit. Seeing that Napoleon put himself to no inconvenience in his commercial arrangements, sometimes interdicting English produce under severe penalties, sometimes admitting large quantities on payment of a profitable duty, and prohibiting from France the produce of friendly states, such as those of the Swiss and Italians, when they came into competition with the French, he thought that he also might suit his own convenience, while, at the same time, he observed the literal terms of the treaty in their most restricted meaning. Within these limits he resolved to defend himself, *suaviter in modo, fortiter in re*, endeavouring to avoid a rupture with France, and at any rate to avoid war until he had disposed of his Turkish difficulties, but rather to engage in it than sacrifice the remains of his commerce.

Yet, fearing lest the mildest forms might not suffice to prevent a rupture with one of so absolute a character as Napoleon, he resolved to adopt some military precautions which might be efficacious without being menacing. He determined to do nothing very near the Polish

frontiers, which were in a manner French frontiers; and, therefore, relinquishing the line of Niemen, he chose a line of defence more in the rear, that is to say, on the Dwina and Dnieper,—rivers which, rising at no great distance from each other, run, the one towards the Baltic, the other towards the Black Sea, and thus trace a long transverse line from northwest to south-east, which is the true interior line of defence of Russia. To an adversary so impetuous as Napoleon it was necessary to give some ground and to select within the Empire the field of resistance. Alexander, engaging in military details with the assistance of experienced men, ordered the construction of fortifications at Riga, Dunaburg, Vitepsk, Smolensko, and particularly at Bobruisk, situated on the Beresina, in the midst of the marshes which border that river. To these defensive works, which he asserted ought not to be more irritating than those which Napoleon was constructing at Dantzic, Modlin, and Torgau, he added some measures of military organization. A certain number of regiments belonging to the divisions commonly stationed in Lithuania had remained in Finland since the war with the Swedes. These he brought back to Lithuania, and placed on a war-footing all the divisions posted on the frontiers of Poland, and which had for the greater part remained in the same cantonments since the peace of Tilsit.

After having adopted these measures, Alexander took care to suit his language to his policy. It was requisite that he should come to an understanding with M. de Caulaincourt on the admission of neutrals into the Russian ports, the extension of the French frontiers to Hamburg, the occupation of the country of Oldenburg, the manifest though secret formation of a powerful garrison at Dantzic; and he resolved to express himself on all these subjects with such a union of mildness and firmness as should indicate that he was well informed of what was passing, and that, while he did not seek war, he should not refuse it, rather than incur certain sacrifices which had been demanded:—in short, in such a manner as to give no hasty offence nor to lead to any immediate crisis.

He had exhibited some coolness to M. de Caulaincourt since the failure of the marriage and the refusal of the convention relating to Poland,—a coolness which was directed against the French government, and which, with great tact, he prevented from becoming personal to M. de Caulaincourt. He knew that that gentleman, feeling the difficulty of his position, and anxious to return to France in order to be married, had requested and obtained his recall; he did not, therefore, wish that a man whom he esteemed and loved should return home dissatisfied; and he also wished to give to his words a friendly character which no longer distinguished his acts. For these various reasons, he professed to show the French ambassador his wonted favour; he saw him as frequently and familiarly as before, and held with him many private conferences to the following effect:—

Napoleon, said Alexander, had manifestly changed with regard to him; and, from being a close ally at Tilsit, and equally so at Erfurt, had become an indifferent friend, soon, it ap-

peared, to be an enemy. This he perceived and deeply regretted, for he did not desire a rupture, and would do every thing in his power to avoid it. Independently of the risk incurred by war against so great a captain as Napoleon and so valiant an army as the French, it would imply the condemnation of the system of alliance which, for three years, had been maintained by himself and M. de Romanzoff alone in the Empire. In this system he persisted, and did not deny that he found it for his advantage, by obtaining Finland and the provinces of the Danube, though these last, indeed, were still to be taken, perhaps a little owing to France, who had not sufficiently seconded Russia at Constantinople. But if Russia gained by this system, how much more did France, who, since 1807, had invaded Spain, taken from Austria Illyria and part of Galicia, and who had recently changed into French provinces the Roman States, Tuscany, Le Valais, Holland, and the Hanse towns? Could Finland and the Danubian provinces be compared to these vast kingdoms, these beautiful continental and maritime possessions? He had reason to complain of such a method of maintaining the equilibrium between the two empires, and especially of the extension of territory which, by carrying France as far as Lubeck, made it coincide in frontier with Denmark and Sweden, and almost with Russia; but he preferred not to urge that question, as he wished to convince Napoleon that he entertained no jealousy of him. But, while he made no complaint of this want of equality in the advantages mutually derived from the alliance, could he refrain from speaking of the occupation of the duchy of Oldenburg,—a possession of so small importance to Napoleon, but so interesting to the reigning family of Russia, and which he might so easily have foregone, since, for so little advantage, he caused so much uneasiness to an ally who deserved his consideration? To offer Erfurt in compensation was ridiculous, and seemed even to add insult to injury. He might have put up with the injury, reserving to himself the office of making compensation to an uncle whom he loved; but the want of respect to Russia affected him deeply, less on his own account than on that of his people, who were sensitive and proud, as it became so great a nation to be. The enemies of the alliance, who were very numerous in Europe, had often enough said that Napoleon treated Alexander like a young man without experience or character, whom he had reduced to the condition of a submissive dependent, whom without scruple he would expose to all the vexations which might gratify his own caprice. Was it right or necessary to give them such ground for their satire?

The occupation of Oldenburg, he insisted, affected him principally by the effect it had produced upon his court and the public,—an effect to be greatly regretted apart from all consideration of self-respect. He could not accept Erfurt as an indemnification without exposing himself to ridicule, and in refusing that he demanded nothing; since Napoleon had nothing to offer which had not been taken from some poor German prince, chargeable with no fault, and he could not allow himself to be accused of contributing to one of those acts of violent

dispossession by which the moral sense of Europe had for some years been shocked. It was not necessary, indeed, for him to assert that he had no intention of declaring war on account of the duchy of Oldenburg; but he wished it to be well known that he felt himself very deeply wounded, and that he expected a reparation sufficient to satisfy the Russian nation, without professing to enforce it, or even to define its source.

And, while he had so many grounds of complaint, he continued, there had just been made a cause of quarrel with him in reference to the admission of neutrals to his ports, and particularly in regard to the ukase of December 31. Well, he admitted freely that to insist upon such a point was to ask of him the total ruin of the Russian commerce, already greatly damaged; and to this he would not consent. It was not generally understood in Europe what interest maritime nations could have in resisting the pretensions of England, and in imposing upon themselves such cruel privations for this purpose; and it was, therefore, not astonishing that it was not understood in Russia. This interest was understood by Alexander and a few of his more enlightened subjects; but the mass could perceive in the continental blockade only an act of despotism on the part of France, to which it was very painful to submit when at so great a distance and possessed of powers adequate to secure respect. On what principle could Napoleon demand the sacrifices which he had most recently called for? On the ground of treaties? Russia had faithfully executed that of Tilsit. She had there promised to declare war with England, to proscribe her flags, and to subscribe to the four articles on the rights of neutrals; and all this she had done. She had declared war with England without any private interest; she had closed all her ports against the British flag; she had even so carefully sought out that flag under the American disguise, that in the course of that year more than 100 vessels styling themselves Americans had been seized, condemned, and confiscated. Those which had been admitted had first undergone a close examination of their papers, in union with Mr. Adams, the minister of the United States. Napoleon, indeed, pretended that all the Americans who had been admitted had touched at England, or had been convoyed by her vessels; which proved an interested connivance with her, and which was contrary to the decrees of Berlin and Milan. But were these decrees which Napoleon had chosen to add to the maritime right under the title of reprisals, and which deprived of their national right any vessel that had touched at England or had submitted to her visitation or convoy,—were these decrees obligatory on Russia? Had Napoleon passed them in concert with her? Or was it sufficient that he should decree any thing at Paris in order to its being implicitly obeyed at St. Petersburg? Because the two empires were allied, were they, therefore, united under one master? Many enlightened men, even in France, disputed the efficacy of the new measures, and considered that they injured their own country as much as the enemy. Might not the same opinion be entertained in Russia, and might they not act on that opinion? Did Napoleon himself set much by his own

decrees: After having passed them, and endeavoured to impose them not only on France but on the whole continent, had he not just abandoned them in the strangest manner by adopting the system of licenses, in accordance with which every vessel might enter the ports of England, and on certain conditions return loaded with British produce? Had he not done still more by the decree of August 5, and authorized the large importation of British produce on payment of a duty of 50 per cent.? But, supposing that the professed Americans admitted to the Russian ports were all English, which was not the case: would Russia have done a stranger thing than France had done by her latest decrees? And if the latter might violate the blockade, on condition of exporting her silks and wines and receiving an enormous duty, might not the former admit produce, possibly English but more probably American, in order to sell her woods, her hemp, her iron, her corn? When France could not for her own cause support all the privations of the blockade, should the other nations be compelled to submit to sacrifices and to self-denial of which she gave them no example in a cause in which they were only interested in a secondary degree? Such submission could only be demanded of slaves who threw away their lives for a master who would not condescend to incur any risk. But Russia was not reduced to that point, nor would she consent to be so in relation to any one. She had engaged to make war with England, and that engagement she had fulfilled; she had excluded the British flag, and would continue to do so, and would endeavour to discover her under every disguise; but further she would not go, and she would still recognise and admit neutral vessels. Not a word could be said against the ukase of December 81 by any one who was willing to consider the true public right of nations. Every nation was entitled to prohibit certain articles with a view of encouraging the native production of the same articles, without involving herself in hostility with any other nation. This was no act of hostility, nor even of ill-will; for the highest degree of friendship for a foreign nation did not prevent a preference for our own. Now, Russia thought that the great sale of foreign manufactures contributed to the decline in her rate of exchange,—a decline which had become serious: she had, therefore, thought right to manufacture cottons, cloths, silks, glass, and had resolved to make the attempt, which she had certainly a right to do. It was neither from indifference nor ill-will towards France that she had prohibited certain articles of French manufacture, but from a desire to produce them herself, which was proved by her prohibiting in the same act all the English manufactures and many of the German. Had not France, in the same view, forbidden certain Russian productions, as, for example, potash? Alexander maintained, therefore, that he was not justly liable to the slightest reproach, having rigorously adhered to the alliance. "It is true," he said, "that I admit Americans, some of whom may, perhaps, be English in disguise, notwithstanding all my efforts to detect them; but it is an act of necessity, for without them some of my subjects would die of hunger. In this I transgress only the decrees of Berlin and

Milan, which do not bind me, and which Napoleon himself was the first to violate by his licenses and his tariff of 50 per cent. duty; and he ought not to molest me for a line of conduct which he pursues himself as much as I, and with less excuse, for he ought to hold himself bound to respect his own decrees. On this point I declare with the utmost frankness and determination that I will never yield: I therefore entreat you not to urge me too closely, lest you force me to engage in war against my will, and while it is my sincere desire to maintain the alliance,—an alliance which is attended with advantages and disadvantages to me, but having entered it I wish to abide by it, from a regard both to my own dignity and also to my own interest; for the true results of a system can only be derived from it by persevering adherence to it. I acknowledge that I have acquired Finland; I shall acquire Moldavia and Wallachia if my generals do their duty and my ally does not forsake me at Constantinople; these I confess to be valuable results of the alliance.—less valuable, however, than Spain, the Roman States, Tuscany, Westphalia, Holland, the Hanse towns. Nevertheless, without comparing advantages, I am willing to continue the alliance, and from it to effect peace with England, which would consolidate all my acquisitions, and which can be effected only by perseverance. A few barrels of sugar or coffee that I may procure from London without knowing its source, or even with that knowledge, as does Napoleon himself, are not of sufficient importance to create a coolness between us; nor is the inconvenience arising from them to be compared with the designs contemplated in consequence of our misunderstanding. The hope of setting us at variance will gratify England a hundred times more than would the introduction of all the sugar and cotton which now encumber the warehouses of London. Let us, therefore, remain firmly united, mutually excusing many inevitable circumstances, and carefully avoiding useless quarrels, which soon become known, to the great peril of the alliance and of the general peace. For my part, I know well all the preparations made at Dantzic, all that is said by the Poles, but I am not affected by it: if war must ensue, I leave you to fire the first gun. I will then appeal to God, to my people, and to Europe, and the whole nation will rather die, sword in hand, than submit to an unjust yoke. However great the genius of the Emperor Napoleon may be, and however valiant his soldiers, the justice of our cause, the energy of the Russian people, the greatness of the distance, leave us room to hope for success in a war purely defensive on our side. But let us lay aside these melancholy anticipations," said Alexander, pressing warmly the hand of M. de Caulaincourt; "I give you my word of honour that I do not desire war,—that I dread it, and that it opposes all my views. But, if I am driven to it, I will carry it on with desperate energy: but I do not wish it: this I declare to you as a sovereign, as an honourable man, as a friend, who in all these characters would be ashamed to deceive you."

Frequently did Alexander speak in this manner, and always with a remarkable appearance of truth, and with a union of condescension, of kindness, and force, showing the utmost ten-

derness and familiarity to M. de Caulaincourt, who found it difficult to answer so many arguments, some true, others at least plausible.\*

For my own part, I am bound to declare as a sincere historian, loving my country with ardour but truth still more, that, after having read all the documents, I am persuaded that Alexander did not wish for war. On the contrary, he feared it greatly, and though, distrusting Napoleon, he began to make preparation for it, he would by all means have avoided it; for, apart from its great danger, it implied the condemnation of his policy, an acknowledgment that he had been deceived at Tilsit in adopting the French alliance, the renunciation of Wallachia and Moldavia, (as the event proved,) and a useless and unmeaning temerity. The interest of his commerce was the only consideration that would incline Alexander to war. To impede it beyond the limits which he had prescribed to himself was impossible in the present state of public opinion in Russia. On the ground of strict right he was perfectly correct in saying that he was not bound by the decrees of Berlin and Milan, in virtue of which was forbidden the admission of Americans who had communicated with the English. On the ground of the alliance, and as a matter of friendship, he ought, undoubtedly, to have excluded the Americans, who were generally conveyed by the English; but, Napoleon having by his licenses and by the tariff of August 5 allowed the introduction of English colonial produce, he had surely no right to demand a greater degree of zeal in his favour than he himself manifested; and it must be confessed that after the proceedings in regard to the marriage, after the refusal, otherwise very honourable, of the convention relative to Poland, he had no reason to demand or to expect an entire devotion. In one word, Alexander had become cool in his attachment, but he had no desire to break his alliance. It belonged to Napoleon to determine whether it would be best to take the step, which is but too easy, from indifference to war.

Such were the dispositions of the Russian court, in consequence of the territorial acquisitions which had carried the French frontiers as far as Lubec, and of the new requirements of Napoleon relating to the continental blockade. M. de Caulaincourt had communicated every thing to Paris with perfect sincerity, and had expressed his own conviction that the Czar was not desirous of war. One thing, indeed, he had not stated, but of that he was unaware,—viz.: the commencement of military preparations, which we have mentioned, which were the result of the suspicions entertained by Alexander. But that which Napoleon had not learned from St. Petersburg, nor gathered from the silence around him, the Poles of the grand duchy, and especially those of the army, had quickly perceived, and had published with their accustomed vivacity. Devoutly praying for war,

which they trusted would restore to them their country, and placed on the frontiers of Russia, they had not been slow to learn, notwithstanding the efforts of the police to prevent intercourse, that operations were beginning on the Dwina and Dnieper, at Bobruisk, Vitepsk, Smolensko, Dunaburg, and even at Riga. They had, further, learned that some troops were coming from Finland to Lithuania. With the fullest confidence they had interpreted these facts as infallible signs of an approaching war, and had communicated them, not without exaggeration, to General Rapp, the Governor of Dantzic, who had made them known to Napoleon, as his duty required. In a few weeks all Poland had resounded with the reports of a rupture between France and Russia, and these reports had been re-echoed from Poland to Germany. In France alone they had not been repeated, for there all was silent; but commercial correspondence had indirectly conveyed the rumour.

Napoleon was much excited when he learned from M. de Caulaincourt the replies of Alexander to his remonstrances, and from General Rapp the facts communicated by the Poles. He expressed great displeasure with M. de Caulaincourt, and said that he did not understand the matters treated by the Czar, and that he had evinced great weakness in his intercourse with that prince. He ordered him immediately to reply that the professed Americans were all English, for otherwise the English would not have allowed them to pass; that none should be recognised as neutral, for neutrals no longer existed; that the licenses which they used as an argument against him had no weight; that, the English being in need of corn, he supplied them with a little at a high price, and on the condition of their taking his wines and silks; that the introduction of colonial produce at a rate of 50 per cent. was ruinous to the English commerce; that in permitting it he had merely substituted it in the place of the contraband trade, which, by a bribe of 50 per cent., was always able to introduce sugar and coffee, notwithstanding every effort to prevent it; and that he had consented to this method of importation, and had even urged Alexander to adopt it in Russia, for it would be found very profitable to the Russian exchequer; that the prohibition of English produce was the surest method of obtaining a maritime peace; that the plans which he proposed were the best adapted to the natural difficulties of the enterprise; that his allies ought to rely on his experience and follow his example if they were sincere, and that he would recognise them as allies only on that condition.

But the sentiments of Napoleon when he learned the works on the Dwina and the Dnieper and the movements of the troops from Finland to Lithuania were by no means those of irritation or of a desire to convince by argument. With his wonted quickness he instantly saw in these simple precautions war projected, declared, begun, and impetuously desired to meet it. He had already often experienced, with England in 1803, with Austria in 1805 and 1809, with Prussia in 1806, with Russia in 1805, that coolness led to suspicion, suspicion to preparation, preparation to war; and, impressed with the remembrance of this rapid train of consequences, he did not doubt that

\* I have here scrupulously recalled the conversations of Alexander contained in a hundred despatches: and I must say that one cannot but be struck, in reading them, with the singular knowledge of affairs which he indicates. The most skillful of the French or Russian statesmen could not have more accurately explained the reasons derived from treaties and from the principles of legislation in support of his position, which was maintained with subtlety and sound argument, from his point of view.



within a year, or even within a few months, he should be engaged with Russia. If he could have judged himself with impartiality, and acknowledged how greatly his own impetuosity had contributed to this rapid succession, he might have perceived that even though Russia should arm herself under a very natural apprehension, yet the war remained in his own power, provided he could resist his passions, for Russia evidently did not desire it, unless he required of her more than he was willing to concede himself in reference to commerce. But what Napoleon demanded of Russia was not indispensable to the success of his designs; for, by continuing to require of her the execution of the continental blockade as at present enforced, or even with a little more rigour, which was possible, by remaining at peace with her, and thus at liberty to send more forces into the Peninsula against the English, and persevering in his plan of exposing them to great mercantile inconvenience and to a serious military check, he might bring about the maritime peace, which was equivalent to a general peace, and thus obtain the recognition of his greatness throughout the world. But, accustomed to exercise an absolute command, and irritated at opposition from a power which he had already conquered but not subdued, thinking it incumbent on him to give another and a final lesson, and deceiving himself with sophisms adapted to his passions,—a weakness to which the greatest minds are liable,—flattering himself that he was still young enough to crush all European resistance and to leave to the future heir of the Empire a dominion universal in itself and universally acknowledged, with the fickleness of an ardent character beginning to weary of the plan of seeking in Spain the end of his long struggles, fatigued by the obstacles which he encountered and the delays which impeded the accomplishment of his designs, ascribing these delays not to the nature of things but to his officers, suddenly enchanted with the idea of taking upon himself the solution of his difficulties by neglecting the South in order to inflict on the North one of those terrible blows which he so well knew how to deal, and thus to bring matters to a close in a few months, instead of remaining for years entangled in the inextricable difficulties of the war in the Peninsula,—thus enchanted, enslaved, and blinded by a crowd of thoughts which assailed him all at once, he suddenly saw a new war with Russia written in the book of fate as the end of his great labours, and was firmly resolved to execute it, though unable definitely to name the day or hour when that resolution was adopted.

Having formed the idea, he proceeded to realize it with incredible promptitude. Without examining on whose side lay the cause of the conflict, and whether it was not in his own power to prevent it, he considered it certain that Russia would make war at no distant date; that she would choose the time when she should have all her forces at command by having overcome the Turks and forced them to abandon the Danubian provinces: that she would then conclude peace with England, and, having obtained by his instrumentality Finland, Moldavia, and Wallachia, she would endeavour to obtain Poland by means of England, to the great injury and eternal disgrace of France; and from all this

he inferred that he must immediately adopt his measures of precaution and put himself in readiness before Russia could do so. From that moment (January and February, 1811) he began the preparations for a decisive war in the vast plains of the North. Once determined to keep no longer any terms with Russia, but to subdue her as absolutely as Prussia and Austria, he was certainly right to set about it as quickly as possible, before she should be freed from the war with Turkey.

The principal difficulty to be overcome in a great war in the North was that of distance. To convey 500,000 or 600,000 men from the Rhine to the Dnieper, with an enormous pontoon-equipage to enable them to cross the principal rivers of the continent, and an adequate supply of provisions for man and horse in a country sparsely inhabited and very partially cultivated, and very probably laid waste before their arrival, as Massena had found in Portugal,—and with all this material to pursue a desperate people across the illimitable plains which extend to the Polar seas,—was a greater difficulty than the military art had ever yet overcome; for, when the barbarians formerly invaded the Roman empire, and the Tartars invaded China and India, barbarism invaded civilization, and was supported by the fertility which it afforded: but civilization, however distinguished by skill and courage, has a serious difficulty to surmount whenever it undertakes to invade barbarism in order to subdue it,—viz.: that of bringing with it those supplies which cannot be found in its path.

Though Napoleon had in some degree forgotten the various difficulties which he had experienced in 1807, yet, as he might conjecture from the devastations of Lord Wellington in Portugal that his enemies would not fail to employ the most desperate measures, he was sensible that his principal obstacle would be the remoteness of the scene of action. To overcome this difficulty it was necessary to change the base of his operations and remove it from the Rhine to the Oder or the Vistula, and if possible to the Niemen,—that is to say, 800 or 400 leagues from the French frontier; and already his vast intelligence had sketched his plan of operation, for it was in combinations such as these that he evinced himself unequalled.

On the Elbe he had the important fortress of Magdeburg,—a precious remnant of the crown of Frederick the Great, which had remained in his hands, and which had not fully surrendered to his brother Jerome; on the Oder he had Stettin, Custrin, Glogau,—other remnants of the Prussian monarchy, retained in pledge for the payment of the war-contributions due by Prussia; on the Vistula he had the strong fort of Dantzic,—a city both German and Slavonian, Prussian and Polish, constituted a free city under the protectorate of Napoleon, (if freedom could be enjoyed under such a protector,) and already occupied by a French garrison. Finally, scattered through these different forts might be found the corps of Marshal Davout, which might serve as the nucleus to the most splendid army. By all these steps he hoped speedily and stealthily to bring an immense military force in men and *matériel* from the Rhine to the Elbe, from the Elbe to the Oder, from the

Oder to the Vistula, from the Vistula to the Niemen. He hoped to succeed by concealing his first movements from the eye of the enemy, and, when he could no longer conceal them, by assigning false pretexts, and, when these were exhausted, by acknowledging the design of an armed negotiation, and finally, at the last moment, by a rapid march from Dantzig to Königsberg, in such a manner as to place in his rear and to snatch from Russia the rich territories of Poland and Old Prussia, to appropriate their resources, and thus economize for as long a period as possible his own resources. By thus employing these different steps he hoped to advance his base of operations 800 or 400 leagues, and transfer, as it were, the Rhine to the Vistula or the Niemen, Strasburg and Mentz to Thorn and Dantzig, perhaps even to Elbing and Königsberg.

But, with every possible care to conceal these movements or to dissimulate their design, they could not so escape the notice of the most careless observer as to prevent Russia taking the alarm and using every precaution, perhaps even being the first to seize and ravage the intervening countries and thus augment the distance and the difficulty. In this case, besides the risk of leaving to her grasp the most fertile provinces of the North, the war would be rendered inevitable; for, if the grand duchy of Warsaw were invaded by Russia, Napoleon could not honourably remain at peace. But Napoleon, who regarded this rupture as inevitable, would nevertheless gladly have prevented it; for it may be repeated that it was no longer owing to his love of war that he thus attacked first one and then another, but to his love of dominion; and he had calculated that by beginning his preparations at that moment, while Russia, being occupied in the East, must delay her reprisals, he should find himself ready and armed on the Vistula when Russia should return from the banks of the Danube; that he should then be able to shield Poland and Old Prussia from her ravages, and perhaps succeed in intimidating her to such a degree that he might obtain from her by an armed negotiation that submission to his views which he was resolved to obtain by war, if unattainable otherwise. He even allowed so wide a range to his imagination as to indulge a hope that, owing to his immense resources, to the numerous nations which he thought he could make French by including them in French battalions, to his riches, the result of his economy and of his commercial exactions, he should be able at the same time to continue the war in the South and to prepare for it in the North,—on one side to pursue the English to the extremities of the Peninsula, and on the other accumulate so many soldiers in Poland that Russia would, in alarm, submit to his will or sink beneath his thunderbolts. Fatal desire to embrace every thing! A desire destined to be his ruin; for, great as he might be, it was not possible that his arms should extend from Cadiz to Moscow, still less that they should strike any decisive blow at so great a distance, especially when, in order to reach the Volga, it was necessary to cross plains covered with ruins, bristling with ice, and thick-set with hatred.

Such, then, was the thought of Napoleon in making these prompt preparations:—first, if war

were inevitable, to commence it before Russia should be exonerated from Turkey; then, to select the moment for taking arms when that power, being otherwise occupied, could not reply to a menace by any act of aggression; thus to reach the Vistula before her, and in such force as to obtain the result of war without actually engaging in it.

The first object of his care was naturally Dantzig, owing to its position on the Vistula, its extent, and its fortifications, which destined it to be the dépot of his material resources, as vast as it was secure. After Dantzig, the greatest share of attention was claimed by the fortresses of Thorn and Modlin on the Vistula, of Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau on the Oder, of Magdeburg on the Elbe. Napoleon had already reinforced the garrison of Dantzig; he gave immediate orders to raise it to 15,000 men: he increased the French companies of artillery and engineers at that place, added a French regiment of light cavalry, and sent thither a new reinforcement of Polish infantry, which was as secure as his own. This infantry, drafted from the fortresses of Thorn, Stettin, Custrin, Glogau, was replaced by the regiments of Marshal Davout, in order that their movements, being at short distances, might be less noticed. He requested his brother Jerome, the King of Wurtemberg, and the King of Bavaria, each to furnish him with one regiment, that he might have at Dantzig German troops from every part of the Confederation. At his own expense he completed the supplies of the fortresses of Stettin, Custrin, Glogau, and Magdeburg. The King of Saxony he required to resume the works of Thorn on the Vistula, of Modlin at the confluence of the Vistula and the Bug,—an important position, which, it should be remembered, took the place of Warsaw,—a capital too difficult to defend. The King of Saxony was deficient in financial resources: Napoleon devised several means to procure them. He first took into the pay of France the two new Polish regiments which he had just demanded of him; he then opened a loan at Paris through the house of Lafitte, which was to assign the funds arising from this loan to the Saxon treasury, as if received from the public, while in reality they were received from the Imperial treasury. He sent cannons and 15,000 muskets to Dresden, on pretence of liquidating in this manner a debt existing between France and Saxony. He removed General Haxo from Catalonia, and sent him to trace the plan of new fortifications at Dantzig and Thorn, both at the expense of France. Wood and iron being abundant at Dantzig, he ordered there to be prepared several pontoon-equipages, carried on drays or wagons, to be drawn by several thousand horses, for the purpose of crossing rivers, or, as he expressed it, overcoming every obstacle. By the canals which unite Westphalia to Hanover, Hanover to Brandenburg, Brandenburg to Pomerania, he conveyed an immense number of boats laden with ball, bombs, powder, and ammunition. A French detachment appointed to these boats was to escort them, and sometimes to drag them in difficult passages. Under pretence of provisioning the garrison of Dantzig, General Rapp was ordered to purchase large quantities of wheat and oats, and to make a secret examination of all the cereals commonly to be found

In that place, in order to seize them at the first moment. Dantzic being the granary of the North, they might there find provisions for an army of 500,000 or 600,000 men. With respect to all the affairs that should come under his hand, General Rapp was required by Napoleon to "act and say nothing."

In addition to the *points d'appui* which he possessed in the North, such as Dantzic, Thorn, Stettin, and Custrin, Napoleon proposed to create for himself in the middle of Germany a dépôt as vast and secure as that of Dantzic, but situated between the Oder and the Rhine, and capable of checking an enemy who should come by sea. In this situation he already held Magdeburg,—a strong fortification and requiring little repair. But Magdeburg was situated too high up the Elbe, too far from the sea, and, in a manner, not calculated to protect Hanover, Denmark, or Pomerania. Hamburg, on the contrary, possessed all the advantages of situation which were wanting to Magdeburg. The numerous population of that city, though presenting some danger of rebellion, afforded also immense resources of all kinds of *matériel*; and Napoleon rightly thought that an army can find all it requires only in the midst of crowded populations, abundantly provided with the means of sustenance, lodging, clothing, and transport. He had also reflected that Hamburg, being the chief capital of the three new Hanseatic departments, always contained, in the character of officers of custom, collectors of tribute, gend'armes, sailors, soldiers leaving the hospitals, and battalions in dépôt, from 6000 to 10,000 French, who together formed a strong garrison, provided there should be left a permanent staff of companies of engineers and artillery. Hamburg had the further advantage of being able to give an asylum to the flotilla of the coasts; for it received into its waters corvettes of considerable size, and even frigates. Napoleon, therefore, ordered extensive works to embrace, if not in a continuous circle, at least in a series of well-connected works, this large Hanse town, which was destined to become the head of his military establishment in the middle of Germany and on the road to Russia.

In order to overcome the formidable difficulty arising from distance,—the principal one in the opening war,—it was necessary to provide extraordinary means of transport in addition to the numerous relays of support on the road. Napoleon had already done much to secure this important object. In fact, in the wars of the early part of the century, provisions, ammunition, and even artillery, had been intrusted to ordinary wagoners, either hired on the spot or furnished by mercantile companies, who discharged their duty very imperfectly, especially in hours of danger. Napoleon was the first to intrust the artillery and the ammunition, which it was the duty of the artillery to defend and to transport, to military conductors, governed as other soldiers by military discipline and honour. He had done the same for the baggage of the army, such as provisions, utensils, ambulances, by instituting battalions, called "train-battalions," which conveyed, under the order of officers and subalterns, wagons distinguished by numbers. There were battalions of this nature in France, Italy, and Spain. Those in

the last-mentioned country, having lost their carriages and their horses, and retaining little more than the framework, could be of no service in the Peninsula. Having fitted up a small number with the remaining men and horses, Napoleon sent to the Rhine such as were disposable, with orders that they should be recruited, and, without assigning any motive, ordered the construction of numerous wagons at Plaszenza, Dole, Besançon, Hamburg, and Dantzic. It only remained to procure horses, which might be bought at the last moment in France, Switzerland, or Italy, where draught-horses abound. Independently of the magazines on the Vistula and Niemen, Napoleon proposed to take with him twenty or thirty days' provision for an army of 400,000 men. At no time had war been prepared on so gigantic a scale; and, unless these prodigious efforts should fail from some moral causes, civilization would, in 1812, present the spectacle of the greatest difficulty ever overcome by men.

To meet those expenses Napoleon had the returns for the colonial produce which had been seized, and which had yielded considerable sums, especially in the North. He had, therefore, money in hand. To the care for the *matériel* was to be added that for the *personnel* of the future army of Russia. For the first time for many years there had been no conscription in 1810. It is true that the class of 1810 had been levied in 1809, according to the custom previously adopted of levying each class a year in advance. But at length the eyes of the people had been relieved during a whole year from the painful spectacle of the muster-roll; and the conscription of 1811 remained intact in the beginning of 1811, without having been levied before the regular return of the period. Napoleon resolved to levy it immediately, reserving till 1812 the conscription of 1812, if it should be necessary to pass from the preparations for war to war itself. He therefore ordered the minister Clarke (Duke of Feltre) to withdraw from the 5th battalions (which were those of the dépôt) the conscripts already raised and fuse them in the 4th battalions, in order to make room in the 5th for the next conscription. He determined that the superb regiments of Marshal Davout's corps, destined to be the nucleus for the grand army, should be augmented by one light regiment, which should raise their number to sixteen; that they should immediately receive their 4th battalion, (there were formerly only three to the corps,) and that to them should be added the Dutch regiments recently incorporated with the French army, as well as the rifles of Corsica and the Po. This fine infantry, with four regiments of cuirassiers, six of light cavalry, and 120 guns, would form a body of 80,000 men, unequalled in Europe, unless by some troops in the army of Spain. Napoleon ordered the immediate recruiting of the cuirassiers, chasseurs, and hussars, scattered through the cantonnements of Picardy, Flanders, and Lorraine, comprising more than twenty regiments, and capable of furnishing 20,000 horsemen of high character, worthy companions of the infantry of Marshal Davout. The banks of the Rhine, the coasts of the British channel and of Holland, contained the infantry-regiments of the famous divisions of Boudet, Molitor, Carra-Saint-Cyr, Legrand, and

Saint-Hilaire, which had sustained the conflicts of Essling and Aspern. By transferring the conscripts already raised from the dépôt-battalions to the war-battalions, these regiments might be augmented by three fine battalions, and subsequently by four, if the war should be deferred till 1812. They would present the elements of a second corps as powerful as the first, stationed a little beyond the Rhine, and summoned to replace upon the Elbe that of Marshal Davout, when the latter should advance upon the Oder. There remained the army of Italy, supported on the right by that of Illyria, on the rear by that of Naples. Napoleon had already drawn into Lombardy several regiments from Friuli, substituting for them in that province an equal number of regiments from Illyria. He had also withdrawn several regiments from Naples, of which Murat had no immediate need. The state of his relations with Austria removing all fear in the direction of Italy, he proposed to form between Milan and Verona a fine corps of fifteen or eighteen regiments of infantry, ten regiments of cavalry, to which should be added the 80,000 Lombards composing the proper army of the kingdom of Italy. It was easy to recruit it with the trained men in the dépôts, who were to be replaced by the conscription of 1811. In a short time, therefore, a third corps might be stationed at the passage of the Alps, which, at the first signal, might pass from the Tyrol into Bavaria, from Bavaria into Saxony, where it would meet the Saxon and Polish armies all waiting in readiness.

It was the design of Napoleon, should the war with Russia break out in the year 1811, contrary to his expectation, immediately to send to the Vistula the corps of Marshal Davout, which amounted to 80,000 men, the advanced posts of which were already on the Oder,—a movement which should be the work of a moment, should the Russians excite any great uneasiness. These 80,000 French would find 50,000 Saxons and Poles between the Wartha and the Vistula, and a garrison of 16,000 men at Dantzic; and they would thus present to the enemy an entire body of 140,000 men,—a force fully adequate to check the Russians should they have exhibited an unexpected degree of activity. These were to be followed, without delay, by 20,000 cuirassiers and chasseurs, the oldest cavalry in Europe. The corps formed upon the Rhine, which mustered at least 60,000 men, would be ready a few days after; and in another month the army of Italy, the German contingents, the Imperial guard, would raise the forces of the Empire engaged against Russia to more than 800,000 men. It is doubtful whether the Russians, even by relinquishing the war in Turkey, could, in the same space of time, have brought together equally vast resources.

On the very improbable supposition, then, of hostilities commencing in 1811, Napoleon might hope to be more prepared than the Russians. But should the war, though inevitable, be deferred, as every thing indicated, Napoleon, having time to levy the conscription of 1812 immediately after that of 1811, could procure forces much more imposing; for he could raise Marshal Davout's regiments to five war-battalions, those of the Rhine to four, those of Italy to five, all his cavalry regiments to 1100 men,

and, finally, fuse the surplus of the conscriptions of 1811 and 1812 into about 100 skeletons of battalions taken from Spain, carefully withdrawing the skeletons only, and leaving the effective force entire. By these various means he might have 800,000 French and 100,000 allies on the Vistula, a reserve of 100,000 French on the Elbe, 185 battalions of dépôt occupied in the interior of the Empire in instructing the recruits and guarding the frontiers, without having sensibly weakened by all these measures the forces devoted to the Peninsula,—a formidable armament, which might make Europe tremble, intoxicate with foolish pride the victorious lord of so many armies, and perhaps even insure the triumph of his gigantic pretensions, if the bond which united this immense machine of war were not dissolved by some physical accidents from which it could never be secure, or by moral causes too easily anticipated.

Napoleon did not confine himself to these military precautions; he adopted a line of diplomacy consistent with them, particularly in reference to Turkey and Austria.

In Turkey he had faithfully adhered to his engagements respecting the Emperor Alexander assumed either at Tilsit or at Erfurt, and had never done any thing which could induce the Porte to abandon to Russia the Danubian provinces. Nevertheless, through M. de Latour Maubourg, his *chargé d'affaires*, he had secretly conveyed to the Turks his conviction that they could not long dispute Moldavia and Wallachia with Russia, and his advice to relinquish these provinces, but nothing more, and that, if Russia urged her pretensions further, that he was ready to aid their resistance. In fact, when there had been a question relating to the limits of Bessarabia and Moldavia, to carry the Russian frontier as far as the Old Danube, the bed of which exists from Rassoova to Kustendjé, he had advised the Turks to resist this concession, and had even offered to guarantee by treaty that, if the frontier of the Danube were once stipulated with the Russians, he would engage to defend the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire within that boundary.

But, while France thus indicated her interest in Turkey, the sentiments prevalent in that country were in the highest degree unfavourable to France. Since the conferences of Tilsit and Erfurt, the details of which had been communicated by England to the Porte with great exaggerations, the Turks considered themselves completely given up by France to Russia, and betrayed after a friendship of many centuries. They had so utterly lost confidence as to believe nothing that was said by the French legation, now reduced to a mere *chargé d'affaires*. Not only were their most urgent interests—those of the Danubian provinces—seriously affected, but their pride was hurt; for Napoleon, either from negligence or from his ardour for the Russian alliance, had left unanswered the letter in which the sultan Mahmoud announced his succession to the throne of the unhappy Selim. The Turks, therefore, with difficulty endured the presence of the representative of France at Constantinople, never spoke to him but to complain of our treachery, and to all his statements evinced the utmost distrust. To the advice to yield the Danubian provinces they

and is dignantly replied that they would never abandon an inch of their territory, and to the offer of support if required beyond the line of the New Danube, they had replied with a degree of indifference which showed that in no case they depended on our support.

Napoleon had flattered himself that on the first suspicion of our misunderstanding with Russia this state of things would change; that England, anxious to terminate the war between the Turks and Russians, in order to secure to the latter the full use of all their forces, would be induced to advise the cession of the Danubian provinces; that henceforward the Turks would be as little inclined to England as they were then to France; that very soon, recognising us as the enemies of Russia, they would begin again to regard us as friends, and would lend a willing ear to proposals of alliance. He, therefore, ordered M. de Latour Maubourg to exhibit the greatest reserve towards the Russian legation, but to neglect no means of gaining over the Turks; to give them a hint of the coolness existing between France and Russia; to make them understand that Russia would soon be obliged to transfer her forces from the Danube, and that they ought, therefore, to be careful not to conclude peace with her, which must be disadvantageous, but, on the contrary, to continue the war after contracting a firm alliance with France. He charged M. de Latour Maubourg to explain the past by their own errors, by the cruel murder of Selim, the best friend of France, by the weakness and fickleness with which they had resigned themselves to England, which had compelled France to ally herself to Russia; but that the past was to be forgotten as if it had never occurred, and as exerting no unfavourable influence on the state of the Turks, if they would return to a sincere union with France, by means of which they would save the Danubian provinces, of which an unreasonable peace with Russia threatened to deprive them.

All this was to be said with great caution and reserve, in order that, when the misunderstanding between France and Russia should become gradually known to the public, the tendency of France to a union with Turkey might be represented to Russia as the result of her conduct to France. The utmost prudence was enjoined on M. de Latour Maubourg, who was required so to conduct himself as to be able to draw back if any unforeseen reconciliation should be effected with St. Petersburg. He was to receive notice when all hope of accommodation should have vanished, and when he could act without further disguise.

Similar overtures, and with equal prudence, were to be made to Austria. The difficulties at Vienna were less than at Constantinople. The two courts and the two nations had been drawn closely together by the recent marriage, and the ties would be rendered still more binding by the accouchement of Maria Louisa, which was hourly expected, especially if this should yield a male heir. Napoleon had sent back M. de Metternich to Vienna with the most friendly letter to his father-in-law, and the renunciation of the most important article of the last treaty, —that which restricted the Austrian army to 150,000 men. This was a remarkable indication of confidence and reconciliation. M. de

Schwarzenburg had subsequently made certain insinuations of the possibility of an alliance. Napoleon, relinquishing the Russian alliance as readily as he had embraced it at Tilsit, ordered M. Otto, in his conferences with M. de Metternich, to appear not to understand the designs of Russia; to express himself as wearied with the restless, undecided, ambitious spirit of that court; to express a lively regret at the engagement to surrender the Danubian provinces to Russia; to add that, the courts of Schönbrunn and of the Tuileries being united by a marriage which speedily promised an heir, it was high time no longer to sacrifice the east of Europe to the enmity of France and Austria, now happily extinct. These overtures were to be made with caution, and, as it were, by casual expressions, which should be rendered more intelligible when the representations of Austria at Paris and Vienna should have shown a desire of further explanations. The greatest secrecy and discretion towards the Russian legation at Vienna were enjoined on M. Otto.

It was impossible long to conceal from the court of Russia so many military movements and diplomatic machinations. Nor could the levy of the conscription of 1811 fail to be immediately and universally known, being executed in virtue of a decree of the senate. But Napoleon was resolved to conceal these operations as long and as completely as possible, wishing always to be firmly established on the Vistula before the Russians could approach it. He consequently regulated as follows the language of his agents in respect to the cabinet of St. Petersburg:—Regarding the approaching augmentation of the garrison of Dantzic, they were to say that an immense English armament directed to the Sound with troops rendered it necessary to defend such a city as Dantzic against the designs of Great Britain, and to add that, the troops on the march for that city being Germans, they ought not to occasion any offence. In the same manner they were to explain the envoy of *matériel* by the canals from the Rhine to the Vistula. To account for the sending of muskets and cannons into Saxony, they were to allege that, certain sums being due from France to the King of Saxony, whose *matériel* was not proportioned to his new states, he had been paid in French manufactures, which were considered the best in Europe as respected arms. The conscription was to be ascribed to the omission of that of 1810, and the great drain occasioned by the war in Spain, to which the present conscription was exclusively destined. And, finally, when these explanations should have been exhausted and have lost their force, M. de Caulaincourt was authorized to declare that it was indeed possible that France should contemplate a double object in arming herself,—viz.: the English and Spaniards on one side, and the Russians on the other; that, undoubtedly, she had no desire to make war with the latter, but that she had lost confidence in them; that she had recently learned the arrival of troops from Finland in Lithuania, and the construction of intrenchments on the Dwina and Dnieper; that the armaments of Russia would explain to St. Petersburg the true cause of the armaments of France; that any explanation must be mutual. that, to speak frankly, judging from the pre-

parations of Russia and her conduct in the question of neutrals, she might be supposed to contemplate a speedy termination of the war in Turkey, and then, having reaped the fruit of her alliance with France, by the addition of Finland, Moldavia, and Wallachia to the Empire of the Czars, the conclusion of a peace with England, in order to enjoy her acquisitions by abandoning the ally to whom she owed them; that even on this supposition, which was not the worst imaginable, amounting not to treason but to desertion, (for an open charge of war with France was not laid to her charge,) Napoleon had formed his resolution, and that peace concluded with England, even without the addition of hostilities with France, would be regarded as a declaration of war, and followed by an instant recourse to arms.

Thus was M. de Caulaincourt required to meet every question and complaint with a corresponding question and complaint, without bringing on any crisis; for the object of Napoleon was to gain time, and to advance gradually upon the Vistula, while Russia should be detained on the Danube by the desire and hope of obtaining the surrender of the provinces.

Such had been the measures of Napoleon on the first indication of unfriendly feelings on the part of Russia, which he had drawn upon himself by his own acts, by treating her with too much levity in the proposed marriage with the archduchess Anne, by refusing to sign the convention of Poland, (the only point in which he was in the right,) by pushing his territorial acquisitions towards the Baltic in a manner well calculated to alarm the Northern states, and, finally, by his conduct towards the Duke of Oldenburg, which implied a strange forgetfulness of what was due to a near relative of the Emperor Alexander. Whatever may have been the causes of his present situation, the facts were irremediable, and Napoleon, anxious to prepare for Russia, could give to Spain only a portion of his attention and resources. His presence in that country, which would itself be worth battalions, could no longer be thought of, and his armies of Spain, deprived of him in 1809 by the war in Austria, in 1810 by his marriage with Maria Louisa and by the affairs of Holland, were again to lose the advantage of his presence by preparations for the war with Russia. Nor did the present state of things allow a supplementary force of 60,000 or 80,000 men to be sent to overwhelm at a blow the English at Torres Vedras; for it was necessary to prepare in all haste three corps d'armée between the Rhine and the Vistula, and therefore only remained to employ as judiciously as possible the resources actually existing in the Peninsula. With the view of hastening the sieges of Tortosa and Tarragona, Napoleon had already organized a division of reserve for Catalonia, with certain drafts from Piedmont and Naples. He had organized another division of reserve for the provinces of Castile with conscripts taken from the dépôts, to recruit the armies of Andalusia and Portugal. He was unwilling to fall back upon any of these measures, and he hoped with these resources, added to the corps of General Drouet and the army of Andalusia, to furnish Marshal Massena with sufficient reinforcements

to secure his triumph over the English. And consequently, after having heard the statements of General Foy, he rendered more full and precise the orders already given, and enjoined upon General Caffarelli to accelerate the march of the reserve division prepared for Castile; upon General Thouvenot, who commanded in Biscay, on General Dorsenne, who was stationed with the guard at Burgos, and on General Kellermann, who, with the Seras division and several detachments, extended from Valladolid to Leon, to detain none of General Drouet's troops, but to allow him to pass with his two divisions without losing a moment. The latter he had ordered to use all possible haste in uniting, between Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, the dragons which Massena had left in his rear, the soldiers who had quitted the hospitals, the necessary provisions and ammunition, and at least one of his divisions if he could not move both, to march with these forces and a great convoy to the help of Marshal Massena, to re-establish communications with him at any cost, but in doing so not to lose his own communication with Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo; in a word, to render every service in his power to the army of Portugal, without allowing himself to be cut off from Old Castile; even to seek aid from General Dorsenne, if necessary. At the same time he ordered General Dorsenne to assist General Drouet, especially in the case of any great engagement with the English, but without scattering his forces or fatiguing the guard, which, under certain circumstances, might be required to retrace their steps towards the North.

To these orders forwarded to Old Castile Napoleon added others equally positive for Andalusia. He ordered Marshal Soult to send to the Tagus the 5th corps under Marshal Mortier, estimated at 15,000 or 20,000 men, even though it should be necessary to weaken the 4th corps which guarded the kingdom of Grenada. The 5th corps was to provide itself with a small siege-equipage in order to combine in the attack upon Abrantes; to break through the miserable troops which, under Mendizabal, O'Donnell, and others, formed a kind of army of observation about Badajoz, Olivença, and Elvas, and then with all haste to go to assist Marshal Massena in holding the two banks of the Tagus. Napoleon further urged King Joseph to send to Alcantara all troops not absolutely indispensable to him. He hastened the formation of the division of reserve intended for Catalonia, in order to reinforce Marshal Macdonald, who was to second General Suchet in the sieges of Tortosa and Tarragona. He recommended General Suchet to hurry forward these sieges, in order to come the sooner upon Valencia and support Marshal Soult in his operations in Portugal. Finally, Napoleon ordered Admiral Ganteaume to hold himself in readiness to embark in eighteen vessels several thousand men collected at Toulon. By this confluence of all the forces in the Peninsula towards the Tagus he hoped to furnish Massena with a material and moral aid at the same time; for he impressed upon all those who were to second the army of Portugal that nothing in the Peninsula equalled in importance the events which were transpiring between Santarém and Lisbon, on which perhaps even the fate of Europe depended.

Napoleon, having made these arrangements, and bestowed on General Foy, whom he had made general of division, the well-earned recompense of his services, after allowing him the rest required by his wound, despatched him to Portugal to convey to Marshal Massena the instructions which had already been forwarded to him by several officers. In these instructions Napoleon enumerated all the aid destined to him, the orders given to General Drouet and to Marshal Soult to combine their efforts on the Tagus; he traced to him the conduct he wished him to pursue on the Tagus, recommending him to secure both sides of the river that he might be able to manœuvre on either, to throw over it not one bridge but two, as had been done under Vienna, that he might not risk the loss of his communications;—in a word, to prepare every thing for his union with the 6th corps, and, when united with Mortier and Drouet, to attack the English lines with 80,000 men, and, if unable to take them, to remain before them as long as possible, to exhaust the English, to famish the people of Lisbon, to increase the enemy's loss both of men and money; for, while this situation lasted, the government and people of Britain would be kept in a state of anxiety which, united with commercial suffering, must sooner or later effect a revolution in the policy of England, and thus secure a general peace,—the aim of all the efforts of French policy.

While the events just related were being accomplished in the North, Marshal Massena, spending the winter of 1810 and 1811 on the banks of the Tagus between Santarem and Punhete, making unheard-of efforts to support his army and to prepare for the passage of the river, had received no news from France since the departure of General Foy. He had therefore been nearly five months without communication from his government, without succour, without instructions, wasting all his force of character to maintain the moral condition of his army,—not indeed of the soldiers, who cheerfully fell into their strange position, but of the principal officers, who were dissatisfied, disunited, some affronted because without command, others disgusted with a campaign which exacted much patience and resignation without affording the opportunity of any brilliant action.

The energetic and pliable character of the French was indicated by the singular habits adopted by the soldiers. Unable to procure wheat, they accustomed themselves to maize, vegetables, and salt fish, as readily as if born in the most northern latitudes of Europe. This unusual diet was compensated for by mutton, beef, and wine, of which they had sufficient. But these provisions were procured at the cost of great fatigue, often at the distance of three or four days' journey from the camp, since the neighbourhood was exhausted. They set out in companies under their officers, explored farms, penetrated woods, where they sometimes found the peasants and their cattle in a kind of intrenched camp, fought with them when necessary, and, after living on their best during the passage, faithfully conveyed the booty to the army. This manner of life, made up of good and evil fortune, of skirmishes, of strange adventures, gratified their imagination. It cannot be matter of doubt or suspicion to any that they should commit many excesses in this continual

spoliation of the country, now their only means of subsistence. But it may be affirmed on the authority of the English general himself, that the French, with their usual humanity, treated the Portuguese, though their enemies, much better than did the English, though their allies. Marshal Massena had endeavoured to restrain this terrible manner of making the war support itself within the narrowest possible limits by the most stringent proclamations. But what could he do when placed by his government in a situation which rendered it absolutely necessary to the support of his army? It should be added that almost all the soldiers engaged in these distant foraging excursions returned faithfully to the camp, and that only a few hundred desertions were found to have occurred during several months of a manner of life which would have reduced to ruin almost any other European army. Nevertheless, some companies of marauders had been formed, Germans, English, and a few French, who took up their position in the deserted villages, and, forgetful of the claims of duty or nationality, lived in the midst of abundance purchased by their guilty efforts. It is remarkable that, though the French were the least numerous in these companies, they submitted to the command of a Frenchman, an intelligent officer of inferior rank. The French and English commanders-in-chief had agreed unconsciously to make war on these marauders, and they shot them without mercy wherever they were caught.

It had been the wish of Massena that from the produce of the systematized plunder each corps should keep a reserve of biscuit for ten or twelve days' subsistence, in case of being required suddenly to concentrate themselves either for attack or resistance. The various corps, dissatisfied with the general administration, to which they very unjustly ascribed all their sufferings, had excluded it from all participation in their support, and had in fact created for themselves private magazines with a wonderful amount of selfish exclusiveness. The eye of the commander-in-chief not being able to penetrate their affairs, it was impossible to know what they possessed, to compel mutual aid, or to provide for the hospitals, which were often in great want. Certain corps, as that of Reynier, for instance, posted on the barren heights of Santarem, compelled, by the neighbourhood of the enemy, to keep many men under arms and to spare very few for foraging, were exposed frequently to the greatest want, and loudly complained of its situation. It was at first agreed that Ney with the 6th corps should replace them, in order to equalize the sufferings of the army. But this latter, at the last moment, had devised a thousand excuses, and had merely sent some quintals of grain to their comrades of the 2d corps. However, the 2d corps had obtained the bread and meat, with the want of which they were threatened, by the fortunate discovery of these articles in the environs of Santarem, and even in Santarem itself in deserted houses, and by some bold descents upon the islands of the Tagus, so that, in short, they were not as yet exposed to scarcity of food. They were much worse off for clothing: their shoes and coats were in tatters. In this view the industry of the soldiers came to their aid: they mended their shoes with leather casually

picked up, and those who had no shoes contrived a species of sandal, such as those made by the inhabitants of all mountainous countries from the skins of their animals. They had patched their vestments with cloth of every colour; and their garments, either torn or grotesquely mended, bore witness to their suffering, without detracting from their dignity or from their martial bearing.

The officers were the only objects of pity: their destitution was extreme. Depending for their nourishment on the affection of the soldiers, and unable as they were to mend their garments with their own hands or to invest their feet in the skins of beasts, they were obliged to purchase, at an exorbitant price, the services of the few workmen remaining at Santarem and some neighbouring villages. The mending of a pair of boots cost fifty francs; and to meet these expenses they had not even the resource of their pay, which was several months in arrears. They suffered, therefore, from want and from humiliation, though supported by a sense of duty, as the private soldiers had been supported by gayety and the spirit of adventure. Massena having persuaded them all that they were on the Tagus for the accomplishment of a great object, that they would soon be succoured by considerable forces, which would enable them to drive the English into the sea, and that, in the mean while, they must endeavour to cross the river, either to gather the riches of Alentejo or to prepare for future operations, they were all occupied with the passage of the Tagus, which afforded them subject for constant discussion. "Could they construct the bridge? Could they find materials, or use them if found? Would the importance of the work repay the danger? If the work were effected, would it be prudent to remain divided on the two sides of the river, or would it not be better to wait till joined by a French corps from Andalusia?" Such questions were continually agitated with a degree of freedom peculiar to the French armies, accustomed to pass a judgment on subjects which in other armies engage the attention only of the staff.

To create a bridge-equipage without tools, without wood, and almost without workmen, was the first problem, which General Eblé undertook to solve with admirable perseverance and fertility of resource. He had been obliged, as we have seen, to manufacture the most necessary tools, as pickaxes, hatchets, saws, then to cut down wood in a neighbouring forest, to convey to the docks large trees fixed by one extremity on the fore-wheels of a gun-carriage while the other extremity trailed along the ground, to bring them to the Tagus by means of horses already worn out, ill-shod, and badly fed, to saw them into planks, to bend them in curves, and to form them into boats capable of supporting the groundwork of a bridge. They had fortunately found among the Portuguese some sawyers, by whose assistance they had been able to expedite the sawing of the wood, and who were paid by a loan of some thousand francs, collected from the superior officers and employés of the army; for they had not received the smallest sum since their entry into Portugal, nor had they found any money, for the inhabitants had carried with them their ready money in preference to every thing else. It was with

the greatest difficulty that the workmen in the army had been induced to labour, owing to the want of means of paying them, and to the absence of any source of enjoyment on which to expend their extra pay if obtained. The only way to retain them was to feed them well; and, notwithstanding the authority of Massena, it was not without great difficulty that some of the divisions stationed near the docks supported a few hundred soldiers who were working for the benefit of the whole army. Fortunately, the excellent General Loison, who refused nothing that tended to the good of the army, whatever it might cost him, had applied himself with the utmost diligence to procure necessary provisions for the docks. In virtue of these unparalleled exertions of intelligence and zeal, General Eblé made progress in his task, but it led to the serious loss of the horses of artillery and baggage, which could no longer be supplied with corn, and only with a little green food such as Portugal yields even in winter, from which they could not derive much strength even when it kept them in life, which was far from being always the case. Already had the artillery-equipages been reduced by more than 100 carriages, and it was becoming necessary to reduce each division to less than two guns for every thousand men,—the utmost limit that could be allowed. From this was derived one advantage, though a very sad one,—that of rendering superfluous a number of cannon-charges, which could be converted into cartouches to supply the loss occasioned by the daily marauding expeditions.

The only remaining difficulty in bringing together the materials of the pontoon was to procure cordage and means of fastening the various parts, such as anchors, grappling-irons, &c. These had been supplied by further prodigies of industry on the part of General Eblé, who had formed cordage from hemp and from old ropes found at Santarem. For want of anchors he had forged grappling-irons which might hold the bottom of the river; and, if they succeeded in launching the boats and manœuvring them in the presence of the enemy, they were in condition to fix them at each end to the banks of the river. But whether they could do this was the question that now divided their minds.

We have already said that the place of building had been transferred from Santarem on the Tagus to Punhete on the Zezere, and that the two banks of the latter river had been occupied with solid wooden bridges. They were thus at some distance from the junction of the Zezere and Tagus, having Abrantes on the left, not far removed, whither Lord Wellington had sent all Hill's corps, and on the right, but much lower down, Santarem, where Lord Wellington had stationed his advanced posts. To throw over the bridge it was necessary first to bring the boats from the Zezere to the Tagus, which was not difficult, for it might be done by the mere force of the current; but, after having brought them to the Tagus, would it be better to bring them up the stream and endeavour to pass over near Abrantes, or down the stream to pass over near Santarem? If they should bring the vessels to the neighbourhood of Abrantes, they would have the advantage of finding the Tagus better embanked, and less in volume by all the



waters of the Zezere, which had not yet joined it; but they would be in presence of a numerous and well-positioned enemy, and without the power of employing all their forces; for Reynier's corps must be left in the camp at Santarem, to make head against the main body of the English army if it should leave its lines for the purpose of attacking ours. On the other hand, if they should descend as far as Santarem, (which might be done, for it was not absolutely impossible to convey the boats thus far in safety,) they would have the advantage of operating with the full force of the army; but they would find the Tagus of great width, and subject to such alternations in this respect that they would be unable to determine when to attack the bridge and how to secure access to it. Either operation, therefore, might be supported or opposed by powerful reasons. Near Abrantes the bridge would be more easily thrown across, but the army would be divided; near Santarem the army would be sufficiently concentrated to defend our lines and protect the passage, but the breadth and variableness of the river greatly increased the difficulty of constructing the bridge. And, whatever plan should be adopted, and should it be attended with success, would it be right to remain divided on the two banks of the river? and was there not cause to fear that if only a small detachment remained on the left bank, the bridge, being feebly defended, might be destroyed? and if, on the contrary, an adequate force were left, the whole corps might be endangered by some such accident as that which occurred at Easing? Such were the different probabilities discussed by the soldiers with remarkable intelligence and sang-froid, and without the least tendency to demoralisation; and each man solved the difficulty in his own way. The same controversy existed among the members of the staff. Reynier, who disliked his present position and wished to change it, maintained that the passage was both urgent and practicable, and undertook, during the operation, to overwhelm the English should they attack the position at Santarem. But Marshal Ney, on whom devolved the responsibility of the passage, being placed in the rear towards the Zezere, and who was pointed out for this bold operation by his position, his energy, and the memory of Elchingen, without refusing to throw the bridge across, was doubtful of the success of the attempt with the materials then at his disposal, in the presence of an enemy so much on the alert as Lord Wellington. And, even were the passage accomplished, he could not answer for the consequence of any rupture of the bridge. Junot, as changeable as the wind, maintained no settled opinion: when with Reynier he advised the passage, when with Ney he deemed it impossible, and he was of no kind of use until the actual commencement of hostilities.

But these differences of opinion might have been unimportant, had they not led to bitter accusation of the commander-in-chief, as if he could be held responsible for the strange situation in which they found themselves on the Tagus, and as if he were not the chief victim of an inflexible will which formed resolutions far from the scene of action and in total oblivion of the real state of things. In all the headquarters language was used against Marshal

Massena totally inappropriate and of dangerous example, being calculated to unsettle the minds of men,—the most fatal deviation from military discipline; for by destroying the unity of thought and will it renders unity of action impossible. Even Reynier, soured by the sufferings of his men, indulged in complaints, and no longer maintained his accustomed reserve. Junot, as usual with him, adopting the language of Ney when at Thomar and of Reynier when at Santarem, and when at head-quarters no longer daring to contradict Massena, whom he loved, never deviated from the external respect which he owed to him. Reynier also observed this respect to a certain extent. Ney, on the contrary, had converted his head-quarters at Thomar into a central point for the union of all the malecontents of the army, where conversations of the most objectionable kind were publicly held. The members of the commissariat department, whom the distrust of the soldiers had deprived of all participation in the support of the corps, had brought to Thomar the discontent consequent on their idleness, and among them the commissary-general; the relation of Marshal Ney was by no means the least offensive in his language, though he had been recalled to office by the protection of Massena. All the decisions of head-quarters were now bitterly censured, and the sufferings of a protracted delay were imputed not to the imperial policy, but to the commander-in-chief, who was certainly very innocent of the evils they endured. To such a point had things been carried that, since having taken up the new position on the Tagus, Ney had never visited Massena, but remained at Thomar, as if he had been the commander-in-chief and Thomar the head-quarters of the army. These details were naturally reported to Massena, who was sometimes irritated by them, but who speedily resumed his accustomed negligence and disdain, and whose morals were unfortunately such as not to secure respect, but whose firmness and sang-froid afforded examples well worthy the imitation of his officers to a greater extent than they obtained. This sad want of discipline had not descended from the generals to the men, who, strangers to the envious declamations of their immediate chiefs, confident in the character, the glory, and the fortune of Massena, reckoning on speedy succour from Napoleon, who would never have sent them so far in pursuit of the English without furnishing them with the means of bringing that pursuit to a close, still hoped to accomplish the great achievements which they had promised themselves from the campaign. But, though ready to devote themselves on important occasions, they were unwilling to sacrifice themselves on such as were not so. The sad state of the hospitals, where there was a deficiency of medicines, of beds, and almost of food, where provisions were brought only by an energetic and unremitting effort on the part of the commander-in-chief, had given rise to the opinion that a sick or wounded man was virtually dead. Accordingly, though resolved to die to the last man in a decisive battle, the soldiers demanded to be spared the skirmishes which did not appear necessary; and, further, well knowing that ammunition was deficient, they wished their blood and their cartouches to be reserved for the moment when one grand battle should de-

cide the fate of the Peninsula and of Europe. Thus this army, unchangeable in its devotion and heroism, enduring privations and sufferings with admirable patience and industry, had lost a little of its value only in regard to its constant applicability to every kind of service. It might always be called upon to perform great things, but not always to perform little.

In such circumstances it is easy to judge of the utility, consistency, and appropriateness of the Imperial instructions which recommended Massena to secure well to himself the means of manœuvring on the two banks of the Tagus; to throw across that river not one bridge, but two, as had been done over the Danube; to create large magazines of provisions and ammunition to enable him to prolong his stay under the walls of Lisbon; above all things to take Abrantes, which must afford great resources; to harass the English incessantly; to seek to draw them from their lines, &c. :—wise lessons, no doubt, which Massena could not have forgotten, for he had contributed to insure the successful application of them on the Danube, but which he who gave them would have found it very difficult to put in practice on the Tagus, without wood, iron, or bread, without all the resources of Vienna and the fertility of Austria, without communication with France, without obedience to his views,—in short, without any of the means which he possessed of effecting the wonderful passage of the Danube on the day of the battle of Wagram. Had he been born to a throne, the heir of twenty kings, and regarded war in no other light than as a royal amusement, Napoleon could not more effectually have given orders at variance with facts. So readily are even men of genius blinded by fortune when they undertake to subject not their desires to the nature of things, but the nature of things to their desires.

The army, always reckoning upon prompt and important assistance, was alive to the slightest rumours of the approach of a friendly force. An emotion of hope and joy, unhappily transient, had been excited by a vague report which had reached the advanced posts. In fact, a column of our troops had almost arrived at the advanced posts upon the Zézere, and had then retired almost immediately. They had great difficulty in understanding this strange event, which, however, admitted of a very simple explanation.

General Gardanne, to whom General Foy had sent the order to join the army with the brigade of dragoons which had been left in the rear, with the men who had left the hospitals, and the convoys of provisions and ammunition, had not been able to collect more than 800 or 400 horsemen and 1600 or 1800 infantry. To these he had been unable to add a single sack of flour, barrel of cartouches, or transport-wagon. In fact, since the departure of Massena he had been totally unable, from the want of means, to protect the roads, to continue the magazines of Salamanca, and to provision the fortresses of Ciudad-Rodrigo and Almeida. Like all the commanders in the northern provinces, he had lived from day to day, with difficulty extending his operations beyond a few leagues, and consuming all the provisions that came within his reach. On receiving the orders of General Foy he had begun his march with a column of 2000

men, had passed to the south of the Estrella, followed the vale of the Zézere, according to his instructions, and pushed his march to within one day of the advanced posts of Loison before Abrantes. There, wholly occupied with the unknown dangers which surrounded him, having heard, and having good reason to believe, that the army of Portugal had as many enemies in the rear as in front, he had feared to fall into the hands of a numerous body, and, not meeting any of the French advanced posts, he supposed that a considerable body had forced them to fall back. He had therefore returned in all haste to Almeida, in the face of greater dangers than he shunned. Yet General Gardanne was a brave and intelligent officer; but in this war of adventures and surprises expectation was kept so much alive that every imaginable danger was apprehended. Returning to Almeida, he had there found General Drouet, so often announced, who had at length arrived, not with the two divisions of Essling, but with only one,—that of General Conroux. The Claparede division was still a long way in the rear. In respect of men these divisions were all that could be desired, for, though young, they had served a rapid but sharp apprenticeship to war in the campaign of 1809. Unfortunately they were much diminished in strength and number by having crossed one-half of France and Spain, from the coasts of Bretagne to Old Castile. The highest number of men on whose efficiency Conroux could depend was 7000. The Claparede division still on the march was about 1000 more numerous, so that the whole corps could not muster more than 15,000 men actually under arms.

Urged by the reiterated instructions of Napoleon, especially by the most recent, to penetrate into Portugal, to reopen at all costs the communication with Massena, and to render him every service in his power, General Drouet had no resource but immediately to take the field, though he had at command only the Conroux division. It was not absolutely necessary to wait for the Claparede division; for, Napoleon's instructions assigning a double object to the 9th corps,—that of assisting the army of Portugal and that of restoring communication with it in such a manner as to prevent any future interruptions,—General Drouet could fulfil the first part of his mission with the Conroux division, and confide the second part to the Claparede division. Though authorized to demand the co-operation of General Dorsenne, he declined doing so; for he found that he was exhausting himself by the pursuit of the guerillas, distressed with the dispersion and the labours of the young guard, and, consequently, little disposed to send a detachment to the frontiers of Portugal. The only service he demanded of him was not to detain the Claparede division; but, having ordered the latter to take its position as soon as possible at the entrance of the valley of the Mondego, between Almeida and Viseu, to fall upon the detachments of Trent and Silveira, and keep the road always open as far as Coimbra, while he should himself leave with the Conroux division for the Tagus, he added to himself the detachment of General Gardanne, which raised to the number of 9000 men at most the much talked-of aid of the famous Essling divisions. General Drouet had indeed received the command of the Seras division, for

merly detached from Junot's corps, and assigned as the guard of the kingdom of Leon; but it was there so much occupied that it would not have been wise to remove it. He therefore took the road with his 9000 men along the valley of the Mondego. Though not sufficient to afford adequate aid to Massena, this was certainly enough to rout all the enemies he could meet, though public rumour raised them to a formidable amount. General Drouet, like General Gardanne, brought with him neither money, nor provisions nor ammunition. The money would have been unnecessarily risked, without being very serviceable in the deserted cities occupied by the army. Of provisions and ammunition he was destitute; and, had it been otherwise, he had no means of transporting them. He had even found himself constrained, during his stay in Old Castile, to live on the provisions of the two fortresses of Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo; which was a serious misfortune, for each of them might sooner or later be invested by the enemy.

General Drouet, having taken his road through the valley of the Mondego, confined himself to the left bank of that river as the shorter route. He crossed the Sierra de Murcelha almost without obstacle, debouched upon Leyria, living upon what he found and dispersing without difficulty the depredators who hung about his path. The army of Portugal, which had heard the report of General Gardanne's attempt, anticipated with the greatest impatience the arrival of a French force, were it but a column of a few hundred men. They longed for communication with Old Castile and with France as much as for assistance. They wished to know whether they were forgotten or not; whether or not they were destined to any great, or practicable, or even intelligible, undertaking; for they had received no message from France since September 16, 1810,—the day on which they crossed the frontier of Portugal,—and it was now the middle of January, 1811. Accordingly, notwithstanding the dislike to skirmishes, every one was ready to take part in the boldest reconnoissances executed with columns of 1200 or 1500 men, and in every direction, along the Tagus to Villa-Velha, along the Zezere to Pedragosa, and on the Mondego to Coimbra. Everywhere they had put to flight the peasants as well as the militia of Trent and Silveyra, but with no further result than the slaughter of a few persons, the burning of some villages, and the carrying off of some cattle and corn,—a great consolation, indeed, in their present state of want, but which by no means compensated for the news so impatiently and so vainly expected. For some days past they had seen, on the left bank of the Tagus, companies of peasants driving before them their flocks across the plains of Alentejo, carrying their property on beasts of burden, and gaining the environs of Lisbon, as if the army of Andalusia were on their track; and they had concluded that Napoleon might have given Marshal Soult the order to join the army of Portugal, and that he had executed it. The joy diffused through the camp was general, but of short duration.

At length, after many days of anxious expectation, a troop of dragoons under General Gardanne joined the advanced posts of Ney between Espinhal and Thomar. They recog-

nised and embraced each other with eagerness relating on one side the perplexities of a long and painful expectation extending through several months, and on the other the perils vainly endured in the attempt to join the army. General Gardanne, who more than any other deplored his recent expedition, thought to correct his errors and to silence reproach by relating wonderful stories to his companions, eager to learn what was to be done for their benefit. He said that, besides his own brigade, General Drouet was bringing a strong division; but that was not all: that another division was following; that the 9th corps would muster not less than 25,000 or 30,000 men; that abundance would attend them, for there was treasure at Salamanca; and that, when once the communications were re-established, provisions, ammunitions, and all necessities, would easily follow. Every one knows the very excusable exaggerations that attend the intercourse of military men who meet after the experience of great danger. Immediately after this encounter the news of the appearance of General Drouet was spread through the army from Thomar to Santarem, and diffused general enthusiasm. Reckoning on the speedy arrival of 80,000 companions, the soldiers of Massena felt that they would soon be capable of any thing, and resigned themselves to the most flattering hopes. The winter, always short in those regions, was about to give place to spring. Before them were the lines of Torres Vedras, which no longer appeared insurmountable to an army of 75,000 Frenchmen; on the left was seen the Tagus, which ought no longer to be an obstacle; and beyond the fertile plain of the Alentejo, where they might gather in abundance the provisions which the devastated plain of Gulgao refused any longer to yield.

Massena had an interview with General Drouet, and received from him the despatches which had been long due. Some of them had no longer any relation to the actual state of things, and merely showed the illusions which were indulged in Paris; others of a more recent date, subsequent to the mission of General Foy, contained some criticisms which the explanations of that general had not been able to satisfy, and which could only create a melancholy smile at the obstinacy with which Napoleon clung to his errors. These criticisms, however, were compensated by the most liberal promises of assistance, by the intimation of the speedy approach of General Drouet, by the communication of orders addressed to Marshal Soult, and by the fullest approbation of the position on the Tagus, accompanied by urgent recommendation to remain there as long as possible. However inappropriate were many of the suggestions from Paris, it was much to have obtained so decided an approbation of the position on the Tagus and so strong a recommendation not to quit it. This might remove all anxiety from the commander-in-chief as to the conduct he should pursue, and inspire the army with entire confidence in the course already adopted, being the same as that pointed out by Napoleon at a distance, as the most conformable to his views. But it still remained to see what means Napoleon should send for the execution of his firm determination either to force the position of the English or to blockade them till they should be compelled to withdraw. In this respect there

was nothing but deception and vexation. The 9th corps, estimated at 80,000 men, scarcely mustered 15,000. Of these 15,000 General Drouet brought 7000, under General Conroux, without reckoning 2000 of Gardanne, reduced by the double journey to 1500. The 8000 of Claparede had been left at Viseu,—that is to say, sixty leagues in the rear,—to keep open the communications; and even the 7000 men of Conroux's division General Drouet could with difficulty leave permanently at Thomar, for, his instructions requiring him urgently to preserve his communication with the frontier of Spain, he was obliged to retrace his steps in order again to quell the insurrection, which, however frequently subdued, still followed his path, as the wave follows the keel and obliterates every impression of its course.

While the army was elated with joy, Massena was a prey to vexation, his eyes being opened to the amount of succour so often promised. Not a bushel of corn, not a barrel of powder, not a purse of money, though there were millions at Salamanca; and instead of 80,000 men, the utmost were 9000, of whom 7000 were to return, and had only come as an escort of some unimportant despatches! Such an appearance of aid might for a moment fill the army with ill-grounded joy, but in reality was a fatal blow to their hopes, more effectually destroyed by so delusive a succour than they would have been by the total want of despatches and reinforcements.

Nevertheless, Massena was resolved not to allow General Drouet to leave. His departure after a brief sojourn might throw the army into despair, and would certainly deprive him of the means of crossing the Tagus, by taking from him the courage to attempt it. But not to cross the Tagus was virtually to sound a retreat, since in a few days it would become impossible to live on the right bank, which was wholly stripped. Massena explained all these inconveniences to General Drouet. He might have given his express orders on his own responsibility, for General Drouet having come within the range of the

army of Portugal, he evidently was under the authority of the commander-in-chief. But Massena, less imperious than energetic, preferred by persuasion to obtain from the free will of General Drouet what he might have required from his obedience. General Drouet showed no ill-will, though little disposed to form part of an army so situated: but he urged the exact and formal nature of his instructions, which he feared to disobey. These instructions required that, while bringing aid to the army of Portugal, he should not allow himself to be cut off from Almeida, nor suffer his own communications to be interrupted in order to secure those of Massena. But at Thomar, where he actually was, or at Leyria, where it was proposed to establish him, he was as much cut off from the frontier of Old Castile as Massena himself. However, it still might be said that if he persisted in fulfilling that part of his instructions which specially enjoined on him the care of his communications, he would violate another much more important,—that of succouring the army of Portugal; that, in the forced alternative of violating one or other, it was better to observe the most important, and the most in unison with the spirit of his mission, which was to aid the army of Portugal; and that, far from aiding it by his appearance, he would expose it to greater danger, if not to certain destruction, should he so suddenly remove. It was surely enough to have brought only 7000 men instead of 80,000 who had been promised! Besides, there remained the Claparede division, the stronger of the two, to secure his communications and accomplish the second part of his task. To all these arguments Massena added the most decisive, by saying that he would assume the personal responsibility of whatever might happen, if he should immediately retrace his steps and leave the army of Portugal to itself.

These arguments of the commander-in-chief determined General Drouet, who was an honourable man, but the victim of inappropriate instructions; and he consented to remain near the army of Portugal.\* The marshal caused him

\* This celebrated campaign of Portugal has naturally occasioned sharp controversies. Military writers have been divided in opinion. An able defender of Marshal Massena—viz.: General Koch—has recently, in a remarkable work, reproached General Drouet, in a certain sense with truth, with having greatly enhanced the difficulties of Marshal Massena during this deplorable campaign. Had General Koch been acquainted with the correspondence of Napoleon, he would have seen that the error lay not with General Drouet, but with Napoleon himself, who, full of vain expectations, and supposing that the communications in Portugal could, and ought to be, cared for in the same way as in Germany, gave him the strange order to succour Massena on the Tagus and at the same time to keep up his communications with Almeida. We can quote the letters of Napoleon himself, which, without neutralizing the allegations of General Koch with respect to the difficulties occasioned by General Drouet to Massena, show plainly on whom the blame should be laid. Nor indeed must the genius of Napoleon be considered at fault, for none was so capable of giving instructions as he, but his system of policy, which obliged him, in order to meet all his undertakings, to give orders unworthy of himself, unworthy of his remarkable forethought. The following is the literal text of the letters:—

"TO THE MAJOR-GENERAL.

"FONTAINELEAU, November 3, 1810.

"I have received General Drouet's letter of October 22. from Valladolid.

"The arrangements made by him to reopen communications with Portugal do not appear to me sufficient. Repeat to him the order to go to Almeida, and to collect con-

siderable forces, in order to be useful to the Prince of Essling, and to assist him in opening his communications.

"He must give General Gardanne or some other general a force of 6000 men with six guns to reopen communication, and another corps of equal force must repair to Almeida to correspond with him. It is of importance that the communications of the army of Portugal should be re-established, in order to secure the rear of the Prince of Essling until such time as the English shall have embarked.

"Send him the *Moniteur* of to-day, in which are news of Portugal through London.

"As soon as the English shall have re-embarked, he will take his head-quarters to Ciudad Rodrigo, my intention being that the 9th corps should not engage in Portugal unless the English maintain their ground; and even the 9th corps should never allow itself to be cut off from Almeida, but must manœuvre between Almeida and Coimbra.

"Write to General Drouet that I am anxious to receive news from Portugal; that this is in every point of view important, and that communications must be established so as to admit of the transmission of news, if not every day, at least every week.

"Inquire of him the state of the troops left in the rear, of the Serras division, of that left by the Prince of Essling, of the cavalry, infantry, and artillery,—in short, of every thing in the 6th government."

"TO THE MAJOR-GENERAL.

"PARIS, November 20, 1810.

"You will find annexed the extract from the last English journals. You will perceive the importance of forwarding a staff-officer to General Drouet to inform him

to take up his position at Leyria, on the back of the Estrella, where he might prevent the army being turned by the road near the sea, so long as it was encamped upon the Tagus. Another advantage arising from this position of General Drouet was that Ney's troops were thereby relieved, and enabled to concentrate themselves between Thomar and Punhete, at the point where preparations were being made for the passage. Though the reinforcements, including the detachment of General Gardanne, was only about 9000 men, the army now amounted to about 53,000 men, in which Massena saw the means, not of attacking the English lines, but of greatly diminishing the danger of crossing the Tagus. By leaving 23,000 men on the right bank, and crossing with 30,000 to the left, there was less cause of uneasiness for the two portions of the army divided by a large river, though there would still be serious danger of both posts, if the bridge uniting them should chance to be broken, as that over the Danube at Essling. Nevertheless, the risk of dividing his forces being much less with the reinforcement he had just received, Massena confirmed himself in the thought of crossing the Tagus, for, when once in Alentejo, he might live three or four months longer in the neighbourhood of Santarem, comply with the instructions of Napoleon to persist in blockading the lines of Torres Vedras, and thus await the succour of the army of Andalusia so often announced. Should this arrive, the destiny of the army of Portugal would be changed; it might assume the offensive instead of the defensive, and under the walls of Lisbon terminate the long war which for twenty years had wasted Europe.

Though Massena may have formed his plans in consistency with the disappointment he had just experienced in receiving, instead of a corps of 30,000 men expressly devoted to his aid, only a division of 7000 men with equivocal instructions, the army did not endure this sad deception with equal patience. From enthusiasm they passed to despondency; they murmured quite openly, even against the Emperor himself, who left them in such a situation without provisions, ammunition, or succour. "Why leave us to waste our time on the Tagus, if we were not soon to have the means of acting offensively and efficaciously? The evil occasioned to the English, if we had been permitted to shut them up closely in Lisbon, would, no doubt, have been worth the most painful sacrifices; but to allow them to circulate through the whole of Alentejo, there to supply themselves at their ease, was in reality to occasion them little inconvenience, and was rather to embarrass ourselves. They lived well, we lived

that up to the 1st of November there had been no battle; that the French army had its left at Villa-Franca and its right at Torres Vedras, and that the English army was four leagues from Lisbon; that 10,000 militia occupy Coimbra and intercept the road; that the cavalry is of very little use; that it is therefore important to renew communications with the Prince of Essling by means of a strong force; that I rely on his prudence not to allow himself to be cut off from Almeida.

"It would appear from the English journals that the garrison of Coimbra had allowed itself to be surprised between the 10th and 15th of October, and that 1500 sick who were in that city had been taken.

"Repeat the orders already given to Generals Caffarelli, Dorsenne, and Reille, to execute such movements as shall concentrate the guard at Burgos, and that all belonging to General Drouet should be sent to him. Recommend

ill; and if this situation was prolonged we should at length be subdued by absolute want!" The army began to suspect, as had all the troops sent into Spain, that they were sacrificed without pity, without chance of glory, to the ungrateful task of enduring the members of one family with royal dignity. A very slight addition to the causes of irritation would have sufficed to produce insubordination. Before the enemy, indeed, this disposition would have instantly given place to military honour and the most exalted courage, as was shortly proved by facts.

In the corps of Reynier patience had attained its limit, and the cry was everywhere heard,—"Let us pass the Tagus, or let us depart." In fact, General Eblé had completed his wonderful work. He had about one hundred large boats, with cordage and grappings of considerable strength, to construct the bridge so anxiously expected. He had also secured our position on the two banks of the Zesere, by consolidating the wooden bridge and joining it to a bridge of boats, without diverting from its destined purpose any thing necessary for the large bridge over the Tagus. The material means, therefore, though difficult to accumulate, were no longer the principal difficulty. The true question for examination and solution was twofold,—viz.: the forcible passage of the river, in presence of an army fully warned, and the separation of the army on two banks of a river.

Every one was occupied with the discussion, when at length arrived General Foy, with a new detachment of about 2000 men, with the verbal instructions of Napoleon and the convictions inspired by many personal interviews with him. General Foy, having reached Ciudad Rodrigo in the end of January, had waited several days before being able to form from recruits, invalids, and wounded dismissed from the hospitals, an escort sufficient to protect his march and bring a small reinforcement to the army; and during its formation he had availed himself of an aide-de-camp who was going to Seville to write to Marshal Soult most urgent letters on the necessity of annexing the whole or a part of the army of Andalusia to the army of Portugal. General Foy had served under Marshal Soult, and had some reason to believe in his kind disposition towards himself. Referring to his interviews with Napoleon, he explained to him the situation of Europe, and particularly of England, and the sanguine hope of bringing the British policy from war to peace if Lord Wellington could be made to suffer a serious check. These views he did not represent as peculiar to himself, but as belonging to Napoleon; and he felt warranted in

General Kellermann not to retain the Conroux division, but to allow it to file off for Salamanca.

"When will the fusiliers of the guard arrive at Bayonne? Order them to rest there two days. Their companies will be joined by the detachments found at the camp of Marac.

"Let the Duke of Dalmatia know what the English say of the army of Portugal, and impress on him the importance of a diversion in its favour."

The dates of these letters, we see, are a month or two earlier than the period we describe; but they expressly contain the principle of all the instructions afterwards given to General Drouet by the minister of war, and explain the doubtful position of that general, who, distracted between the desire of assisting Massena and not losing his communications, was to the army of Portugal a source of embarrassment rather than advantage.

affirming that the settled wish of the Emperor was that the army of Andalusia should march to the Tagus, to the exclusion of every other operation. He ended with the following consideration:—

"I conjure you, *Monsieur le Marshal*, by a sentiment sacred to the heart of every Frenchman,—that sentiment which inflames us all with zeal for the interest and glory of our august master,—to present as soon as possible a body of troops upon the left bank of the Tagus opposite the mouth of the Zézere. One march and one detachment on that side cannot compromise the army under your command. It is scarcely four days' march from Badajoz to Brito,—a village situated opposite Punhete. The English are in small numbers on the bank of the Tagus; they can venture nothing on that side without risking the safety of their formidable intrenchments before Lisbon, which are only eight leagues from the bridge of Rio Mayor. The fate of Portugal and the fulfilment of the will of the Emperor depend upon your Excellency. According to the determinations you may form, either the army of the Prince of Essling will pass the Tagus, give the law to the English on each side of the river, expose them to all kinds of annoyance, force them to continue their present painful and ruinous inaction, form between them and your sieges a barrier calculated to accelerate the surrender of the fortresses; or else this army, failing in accomplishing a passage now absolutely necessary, will be forced to remove from the Tagus and the English in search of food, and thus will give the victory to our eternal enemies in a struggle in which up to the present day the chances have been in our favour. The utterly-exhausted state of the country between the Mondego and the Tagus precludes the possibility of the army of Portugal making a retrograde movement of nearly five or six leagues. It will be driven by hunger to the northern provinces. The consequences of such a retreat are incalculable. To you, *Monsieur le Marshal*, it belongs to be at once the saviour of a great army and the principal instrument in realizing the conception of our glorious sovereign. The day that sees the troops under your orders on the banks of the Tagus, facilitating the passage of that river, will also behold in you the true conqueror of Portugal."

After having written these letters and formed his column, General Foy set off on January 27, and reached head-quarters February 5. His arrival produced a lively sensation in the army, because, full of the impressions received at Paris in his interview with the Emperor, he brought with him the conviction that the army of Portugal was the instrument of great designs; that their long sacrifices would not be without result; that succour proportioned to the greatness of their mission would be sent; and that a little patience only was wanting to enable them to complete their glorious task. His conversations held with all the generals, and by them conveyed to the other officers, established the opinion that they were not sacrificed to an insignificant object, and that, to attain the object to which they were really destined, it was necessary to remain for a while where they were, and then to effect the passage of the Tagus. By these means the moral condition of the army was remarkably raised, and the ill effect

of the inadequacy of the recent succour in a great degree removed. Unhappily, the arrival of General Foy added to the embarrassment of General Drouet; for a bundle of despatches received by him on this occasion contained instructions, more formal than ever, to assist Massena but carefully to avoid being cut off from Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo. But, while he remained with the army of Portugal, he was as much cut off from these points as Massena himself. Hence a call for renewed efforts at persuasion. However, the moment of crossing the Tagus having actually come, the necessity of the case silenced all the objections of General Drouet. He consented to remain at Leyria, on the rear and flank of the army of Portugal.

By the additional reinforcement of General Foy the army now amounted to 55,000 men, Massena was disposed to attempt the passage; but, many objections having been raised, he wished to confer with his lieutenants and secure unanimity in an operation which could only succeed in virtue of devoted and unreserved co-operation. Besides, the presence of General Foy, the depositary of the express will of the Emperor, could not fail to exert a beneficial effect on the assembled generals. He determined, therefore, to bring them together; but, not wishing to present the appearance of a council of war, he collected, at a breakfast given by General Loison at Golegao, the greater number of the principal officers whose opinion it was desirable to obtain.

The meeting, which under the aspect of a friendly gathering had all the importance of a council of war, took place at Golegao on February 17. It was attended by Marshal Massena, commander-in-chief, Marshal Ney, Generals Reynier and Junot, as heads of the three corps d'armée, General Fririon as head of the staff, Generals Eblé and Lazowski as commandants of artillery and engineers, and Generals Foy, Loison, and Solignac, in their respective characters. On the conclusion of the report Massena said to his lieutenants that he gladly availed himself of the opportunity afforded by their present meeting of learning their opinion on the course to be pursued, for it was necessary to decide, since it was impossible that the army could any longer live in its present position, the horses of the cavalry and artillery dying every day from fatigue and want. Removal was therefore absolutely necessary, and the choice lay between a retreat upon the Mondego, where some supplies might still be found, and the passage of the Tagus, which would allow them to live in Alentejo without removing far from Lisbon, and which, though difficult and dangerous, was now rendered practicable by the zeal and skill of General Eblé. He added that before giving their opinion it would be right that they should know the intentions of the Emperor, gathered from his own lips by General Foy, who was himself present. He then invited General Foy to relate the particulars of his various interviews with the Emperor.

General Foy then spoke, and repeated what he had so often said of the advantage of keeping the English in check before Lisbon until they should be compelled to withdraw either by famine or by force; of the necessity, in order to this, to cross the Tagus in order to obtain support in Alentejo, to unite with the 5th corps,

which could not fail to arrive in a few days, in accordance with express orders from Paris; of the firm persuasion entertained by the Emperor of obtaining an immense political result from driving the English from Portugal, which would speedily lead to a peace. The language of General Foy, expressed with his usual energy, and conveying the sentiments of the Emperor derived from personal intercourse with him, filled the hearers with a clear knowledge of the Imperial will and a desire to conform to it. It remained to discuss the means by which the passage of the Tagus could be effected.

Massena then proposed the following questions:—Is it necessary to cross the Tagus? At what point must it be crossed, and by what means? If the difficulties of crossing this river in presence of the English, or, when crossed, of remaining divided on the two banks with a bridge of doubtful validity, appeared to be too great, would it not be better, since it was impossible to stay longer in their present position, to execute a retrograde movement of small importance,—to withdraw, for example, to the Mondego, the vale of which had not been plundered, and which presented, as a principal point of settlement, the city of Coimbra, from which they might keep the English in check and receive the necessary supplies from France?

Scarcely were these questions proposed, when, with an eagerness of language with which their subsequent acts too little corresponded, they addressed themselves to the last question as if it had been the only one,—as if it were a crime even to discuss it, because it was wholly contrary to the will of the Emperor. Marshal Ney, who saw difficulties in every case,—either in remaining where they were, in departing, in passing the Tagus, or not passing it,—declared that on no consideration would he consent to the retreat on the Mondego, as being both opposed to the intentions of the Emperor and also replete with serious inconvenience; for in his opinion they would find all the roads destroyed and the country of Coimbra as devastated as that of Santarem; the artillery and cavalry would lose the remainder of their horses in the journey; the pontoon-equipage, constructed at great expense, would be sacrificed; and, even should they withdraw to only one-half the distance, they would present to the enemy the appearance of a retreat, and thus would compromise the honour of their arms. After the speech of Marshal Ney each strengthened himself in his opinion, and supported with great warmth the views of the Emperor as imparted by General Foy as though he had been himself present, and burned before the image of the absent deity all the incense which they would have devoted to his honour if present.

The idea of retreat upon the Mondego having been laid aside, there remained that of passing the Tagus, however perilous the enterprise might be; and it seems, from what has been said, that they ought to have given their attention rather to discover the facilities than the difficulties. But this did not seem to be done; for, after having evinced their zeal for the accomplishment of the Emperor's designs, it remained to discuss the dangers of the proposed operation, of which every one was keenly sensible. They set off with the idea of making Punhete the point of departure, the docks being there, two bridges

having been already thrown over the Zezere, and the army being so near Abrantes as to be in a condition to invest and take it. With strong *lignes de pont* on the Zezere and the Tagus, with an entire division left to protect them and to preserve the possession of the right bank, it was possible to occupy the plain of the Alentejo with the main body, there to find subsistence and to unite with the 6th corps. Junot was supporting this project eagerly, when General Loison, who knew the confluence of the Zezere and Tagus better than he did, having been encamped at that spot, pointed out the danger of the proposed plan. He said that they would have to guard these *lignes de pont* on one side against the main body of the English army, which would leave its lines, and on the other against the garrison of Abrantes, which, by the addition of Hill's corps, had become actually an army. The plain of the Alentejo, though fertile, must be exhausted in the neighbourhood of the Tagus by the foraging of the English troops; it would therefore be necessary to remove to a distance in order to find provision, and what then would become of the division left on the right of the Tagus? Would it not be exposed to the greatest danger? Ought they not immediately to examine whether they should not pass over entirely into the plain of the Alentejo, after placing the pontoon-equipage under some protection on the left of the Tagus, to be used when required?

The idea of making the plain of the Alentejo the principal seat of the army was instantly repelled by Junot. And it was in fact attended with serious inconveniences; for it was still more difficult for a single part than for an entire division to maintain itself on the right bank of the river, and then to insure the preservation of the pontoon-equipage. By this arrangement, therefore, the *matériel* for passage might be considered sacrificed, the right bank lost, and the army to have changed its part of the army of Portugal for that of the army of Andalusia, charged with the taking of Lisbon by the left bank of the Tagus. No doubt the formidable lines of Torres Vedras did not exist on the left bank, but on that side Lisbon was protected by the river, being situated on the right bank. Before the city the river is more than a league in width, (when it takes the name of the Sea of La Paille;) and when it is again contracted opposite Lisbon itself it still presents an arm of at least 1000 metres, beyond which some bombs might easily be thrown, but without much result or much chance of disturbing Lord Wellington in his lines. Every project of attack founded on the consideration of only one bank was manifestly false in principle, for on one was the obstacle of the lines of Torres Vedras, on the other the obstacle of the Tagus, and the only idea admissible was to occupy the two banks at once, to make them the base of a double attack and a double blockade.

But the difficulties attendant on a division of the army between the two banks, with an uncertain bridge and forces which did not allow a sufficient force on each side, incessantly presented themselves. They were thus led to examine the proposal to pass lower down, near Santarem, where they were, so to speak, invincible, if they could credit General Reynier, who was well acquainted with that position,

having occupied it for five months. He affirmed that whoever should attack the front of the position of Santarem would be routed at the foot of the heights, and that whoever should endeavour to turn it by passing the Rio Mayor, which joins it to the chain of the Estrella, would be surrounded and taken. Granting the force of this double assertion, and crossing the Tagus near Santarem, they might leave Reynier flanked by Drouet on the right of the river, then with all the rest of the army make for the left; and then, being all concentrated, and in a state to afford mutual assistance during the passage, and, after that was effected, having on the right bank the strength of the position of Santarem and on the left two-thirds of the whole army, they might consider themselves almost in safety.

Every thing, therefore, favoured this selection, except one difficulty, which we have already pointed out, and which was, unfortunately, capital, considering the width of the river before Santarem, and the incessant variation of its width by the rise and fall of the waters.

Yet, by sacrificing some of the advantage arising from the proximity of Santarem, they might find considerable facility afforded by the existence of an island situated at the mouth of the Alviela, — a small river which joins the Tagus under the heights of Bonvista. This island being placed beyond the principal width of the river, as Lobau in relation to the Danube, when once reached left only a small branch to cross. By getting possession of it during the night with an adequate force, the bridge might easily be attached to it, and would terminate in a fixed point, invariable and easily defended; and the remaining branch might then be considered merely as a ditch over which it would be sufficient to throw a drawbridge.

To this method there was only one objection, which unluckily appeared to General Eblé much greater than it really was. The bridge-equipage was at Punhete: to transport it by land to the mouth of the Alviela would have required more draught-power than could be supplied, (for all the horses were exhausted,) and, moreover, would have occupied sufficient time to betray our plan to the enemy; to bring it down by water on the Tagus required more than one night, and, by following the windings of the river, would have brought it so near the fire of the English as imminently to expose it to destruction.

The great authority of General Eblé, who had performed wonders in making the equipage, and whose opinion was supported by Massena, prevailed; and unconsciously they turned their back on fortune by neglecting the isle which might have been a second Lobau. Why was not Napoleon, whose superior glance had so well detected the method of crossing the Danube before 200,000 Austrians, — why was he not there, instead of at Paris preparing the fatal expedition into Russia?

However this might be, the possibility of passing at Santarem being negated, they knew not what plan to adopt, the passage near Abrantes having been already relinquished for the reasons stated. They were, therefore, divided, when General Foy, full of the idea of faithfully executing the Imperial orders and

convinced that Marshal Soult would be unable to resist the urgent persuasion of his letters, said that in all probability the 5th corps would appear on the left bank of the Tagus in eight or ten days, when all difficulties would vanish spontaneously; for the English, on seeing the 5th corps, would no longer remain opposite Punhete, and thus the left bank would be cleared, and they would pass the Tagus at that point as if in perfect peace. Besides, he added, after the union of the 5th corps they need not be anxious about the separation of the army on the two banks of the river; they might, even after having crossed, send the bridge down as far as the mouth of the Alviela, and thus secure the advantage of concentrating their forces near Santarem. It was moreover probable that they should take Abrantes, and there find means of rendering the bridge firm, independently of which no means of its destruction would any more emanate from Abrantes itself.

The arrival of the 5th corps seemed so probable that every one yielded to the arguments of General Foy; and if in fact the 5th corps were to come from Badajoz there was no reason for hesitation; it should be waited for even for ten or twenty days. Marshal Ney, who had remained long silent, powerfully supported this opinion. Every one present fell in with it, because it solved their embarrassment, except Reynier, who affirmed that he could not subsist where he was for more than five or six days without consuming all his remaining provision. When much interested in any uncertain event, we are apt by turns to expect it with too much confidence or with too little. Reynier said that he would gladly reckon on the arrival of the 5th corps as fully as they did, but he felt by no means equally certain; that the orders might have been detained on the way; that, even if they had arrived, arrangements must be made for their execution; that Marshal Soult before coming might wish to take Badajoz, and, therefore, that this much-vaunted arrival might not occur so soon as was expected; that in the mean time his soldiers would die of hunger; that, considering their distressed condition, he could not answer long for their obedience; that it would be absolutely necessary to adopt some measure a few days sooner or later; and, if deferred, this would involve much more difficulty, since they would have consumed part of their reserved provision and lost one-half more of the artillery and cavalry horses; that it would be better to risk an immediate attempt, of whatsoever nature; that if necessary they might employ the whole army in the passage, for on himself alone lay the duty of defending the camp of Santarem as far as the sources of the Rio Mayor.

The warmth of Reynier induced equally warm replies, and disputation was about to take the place of decision, when Massena interrupted the conference. He clearly saw that the general opinion inclined to await the arrival of the 5th corps, which was sincerely expected, and accordingly he announced his determination to defer operations for a few days. It was agreed, in order to appease Reynier, that each should contribute to his subsistence, and that he should be allowed to pillage the isles



of the Tagus, which contained many supplies, and where they had not ventured to show themselves, from the fear of bringing the enemy thither and endangering some of the boats which had been constructed with so much difficulty. After these determinations, they separated, in the hope of seeing all difficulties soon resolved by the appearance of the 5th corps, and all agreeing that it was right to wait, except Reynier, whose motives we have just explained, and Massena, whose simple, clear, and singularly accurate intelligence forbade the indulgence of unfounded expectation. To a true soldier's eye Massena united a penetrating and correct judgment, developed by the experience of military life, in which the general principles of human conduct are the same as elsewhere; and he never flattered himself that Marshal Soult would come to his aid. He was too well acquainted with Spain and with human nature to believe any thing of the kind. He therefore inclined to retire immediately to the Mondego, for he anticipated no succour from the South, and the arrival of General Drouet had forbidden him to expect any from the North. The position of Coimbra—less annoying to the English, it is true, and less offensive to them, and, therefore, less imposing, but situated in a new country, near the frontier of Spain, within reach of the resources afforded by that country, and of Claparede's division—appeared to him the position which it would have been prudent to take immediately, before constrained by want, before the loss of a greater number of artillery and draught-horses. But a desire to flatter the Emperor, even at a distance, having prevented their showing this opinion the respect even of examination, 'would have been too much for the marshal to act in opposition to that of all the general of the army; besides, since it rested on the improbability of the promised succour, would any have believed the marshal (except Reynier, who was enlightened by want) if he had said that the army of Andalusia would not appear before Abrantes within ten or twenty days? And would he not have been universally blamed for having left the Tagus prematurely?

After the conference of Glogau each returned to his quarters, expecting, in default of the succour which had not come from Old Castile, that which was to come from Andalusia. A strong cannonade, heard from time to time in the direction of Badajoz, at the distance of about twenty leagues, led to the supposition that Marshal Soult was besieging that town, and that, on the conclusion of the siege, he would march on the Tagus. Every day men applied their ear to the ground to catch more distinctly these indications of proximity, and, according to the direction of the wind, joy or sadness was diffused through the army of Portugal, so cruelly neglected, though on it depended the destiny of the war and of the Empire.

Correctly to estimate the probability of the long-promised and eagerly-expected succours, it is necessary to shift our ground and leave what is passing in Andalusia, and even in Aragon, the operations in which provinces were closely intertwined. In the preceding book we saw that the skill evinced by General Suchet in his siege of Lerida had procured for him the

office of besieging in succession Mequinenza, Tortosa, Tarragona, and the addition to his command of part of Catalonia, with this view; and that on the termination of these sieges the general was to descend upon Valencia. Marshal Macdonald, commanding in Catalonia, was so to arrange his movements as to second those of the general commanding in Aragon. General Suchet, regulating with equal care his province and his army, had succeeded in maintaining the latter in the number of 28,000 fighting men, out of a total effective of 40,000. Of this number, 12,000 kept the principal posts, and 16,000 executed the active operations. Paying equal attention to the *materiel* and *personnel* of his army, General Suchet had succeeded in combining the most powerful means of attack, and in the course of a few days had taken Mequinenza,—a fortress which, though very small, was of difficult access, and very important, because it commanded a part of the course of the Ebro. It remained to him to take Tortosa and Tarragona, the two strongest fortresses in Catalonia and Aragon,—perhaps even in Spain, except Cadiz. Tortosa is situated on the Lower Ebro, almost at the mouth, and commands, besides the opening of that river towards the sea, the direct communication between Catalonia and Valencia. Tarragona, situated more to the north, between Tortosa and Barcelona, on the sea-coast, in the centre of a fertile country, surrounded by formidable works, defended at once by the Spaniards on the land-side and the English towards the sea, was doubly important by its strength and its position, and was to the northeast of the Peninsula what Cadiz is to the south and Lisbon to the southwest. From Tarragona, as from a centre, had radiated in all directions the Spanish insurrection of Catalonia, Aragon, Valencia, under the orders of General Blake, and, more recently, under those of General O'Donnell, to penetrate Aragon by Lerida, before it had been taken; to threaten Barcelona by the road of Ordal; to debouche upon Valencia by Tortosa and the Lower Ebro. But it was necessary to isolate Tarragona before attempting to take it; and it was with this view that General Suchet, after having taken Lerida, which united it with Aragon, wished to make himself master of Tortosa, which united it with Valencia.

It was to this that General Suchet had devoted the close of 1810 and the early part of 1811. The great difficulty experienced by Suchet in the siege of Tortosa consisted in the transport of a considerable artillery; but, happily, the capture of the small fort of Mequinenza had secured, besides many objects of advantage to a siege, the possession of the ravines through which the Ebro flows to the sea. The skilful General Valée had formed a large park of artillery with the means he had at Lerida and Mequinenza. To these he had joined the necessary instruments and ammunition; and the whole, embarked on about twenty large boats, had waited at the foot of Mequinenza the rise of the waters to descend as far as Tortosa. But, as this would not occur before the winter, General Suchet had undertaken to construct a road by land, which, crossing the mountains of Lower Catalonia, should debouche by the shortest road upon the Lower Ebro. The soldiers, exposed in their work to the great heat

as well as to the annoyance of mosquitos, had suffered greatly here, as in all parts of Spain; but, well fed and well paid, they had borne their sufferings with patience and discharged their duty with energy. During the construction of this road, General Suchet had invested Tortosa on both banks of the Ebro, bringing the Habert division to the left, the Leval division to the right, and had successively thrown back O'Donnell upon Tarragona and brought back Caro with the Valencians to Valencia. Finally, in order that Marshal Macdonald, who had been ordered to take up his position near him and to second him, might be in no want of provisions, he resigned to him a part of the magazines formed by his own foresight.

These preliminary operations had required no less than several months; and at length, the rise of the waters on the approach of autumn having allowed him to bring to Tortosa the part of the *matériel* which could not be brought by land, General Suchet opened the trenches before that fortress on the 19th or 20th of December.

The stronghold of Tortosa, situated on the left of the Ebro, not very far from the mouth, but sufficiently far to be beyond the aid of the British navy, was built at the foot of the detached counterforts of the Alba, partly on the borders of the river, partly on the extremity of the heights, so that the enceinte, ultimately stretching along the plain and ascending the hills, followed all the sinuosities of the ground. It was regularly fortified, provided with a bastioned enceinte, a castle, and several advanced works. That portion which was upon the Ebro had for its defence the river itself, and beyond this a *tête de pont* very firmly constructed. The garrison comprised 11,000 men; there was a good governor and a considerable supply of provisions.

General Haxo, summoned to Dantzic, had been replaced by General Roguait,—a man of eccentric but energetic character, and an officer of high merit. The point of attack had been chosen to the south, between the mountains and the river, in a flat country, before the bastions of St. Peter and St. John, on account of the facility of the works in this part of the ground. Our principal attack, supported by the Ebro on the left, was to be preceded by a secondary attack on the *tête de pont*. On the right it was exposed to the fire of an exterior fort built upon the heights, and called the Orleans Fort, in memory of the Duke of Orleans, who took the place in 1708 by that side. They had also opened the trench before this fort to divert the fire and to be ready to take it when the due time for the assaults should have come.

The trench boldly opened near the enceinte had been pushed on with vigour, so as to lose little time in the approach-works. In fact, in a few days they had reached the foot of the works, very near the covered way. The garrison made numerous sorties to interrupt our works; and particularly on December 28 they had made a considerable sortie, not in the direction of the posts attacked, which were in the south, but towards the east, in order to surprise our trenches by turning them. Our labourers had been briskly assailed by 3000 men well commanded, who had killed several engineer-officers and had begun to throw disorder into

our trenches, when Generals Habert and Abbé, hastening with the reserves of the 44th and 116th of the line and the 5th light, had cut short their proceedings and driven them back at the point of the bayonet, after having taken or killed 600 men. In this vigorous action an officer destined to a high career, Captain Bugaud, was seen, at the head of the grenadiers of the 116th, driving the Spaniards to the very foot of the walls with an intrepidity that gained universal admiration. Notwithstanding this energetic sortie, the opening of the fire had not been delayed a single day; and the following day, the 29th December, after completing some necessary repairs of the works, a shower of howitzers, bombs, and balls, from forty-five guns of various calibre divided among ten batteries, had been poured upon the fortress, and had everywhere dismantled the walls. On the 30th had been begun two large breaches,—one on the right at the high Orleans fort, the other on the left at the bastion of St. Peter, which promised free access to our soldiers in the course of two days. After having employed the 31st in perfecting the approaches, the fire was resumed on the 1st January and the breach was rendered practicable. The brave soldiers of the army of Aragon, well experienced in this kind of siege, were loudly calling for the assault, when the display of the white flag upon the fortress announced the inclination to capitulate. But, the governor having demanded that the garrison should be allowed to withdraw freely to Tarragona, General Suchet had refused, and resumed the fire, when suddenly the white flag was a second time displayed. Information had been brought from Tortosa that the hesitation arose from the garrison refusing to surrender themselves prisoners of war and to obey the governor. General Suchet then boldly presented himself at the gates of the castle, entered with some officers, threatened the governor to put the garrison to the sword if the castle were not surrendered to him, caused the gates to be given up to him, and obtained on the 2d January the surrender of the city, when 9400 prisoners defiled before him and laid down their arms.

This fine siege, conducted with even greater vigour than that of Lerida, had cost the army of Aragon seventeen days, (during thirteen of which the trenches were open,) and the loss of 500 or 600 men. Equal skill and energy had been exhibited by Rogniat, general of engineers, and Valée, general of artillery.

The siege of Tarragona was likely to be both longer and more difficult, and every thing rendered probable the delay of the army in Catalonia during part of the year 1811. It was, therefore, impossible that the army of Andalusia should receive any speedy succour.

During the same time, from June, 1810, to January, 1811, the army of Andalusia had not been less occupied than that of Aragon.

The central junto, which had taken refuge in Cadiz after the taking of Seville, had resigned, as we have seen, in favour of a royal regency and a cortes. The cortes had met at Cadiz with much solemnity on the 24th of September, 1810, and, after having been present at a grand religious ceremony, this celebrated assembly had begun by proclaiming that the national sovereignty resided in the cortes; that the royal dignity was maintained in the house of Bourbon; that

until the deliverance of Ferdinand VII. that royal dignity should be supplied by the regency recently instituted, and that the cortes should exercise the legislative power in the fullest extent. After having passed these decrees, the assembly of Cadiz required the regency to accept them and take their oath to observe them. The Bishop of Orense had been desirous of avoiding this oath, but had been constrained to submit, after a scene which exposed him to some ridicule. The preliminaries having been settled, the assembly proceeded to discuss some laws with the view of effecting a reform in the Spanish monarchy. The military operations were concerted by the regency, and particularly by General Castanos, with General Blake, the other commanders of the army, and with Henry Wellesley, brother of Lord Wellington.

Cadiz and the isle of Leon were abundantly provided with troops and all sorts of resources, especially such as could be brought by sea. Lord Wellington had at first sent thither 5000 men, 8000 of whom he had been authorized to withdraw since the entrance on the field of Marshal Massena. To the remaining 2000 had been added 5000 from Sicily, owing to the error of Murat, who, after having made all the preparations for an expedition against that isle, had subsequently publicly announced his relinquishment of it. Besides 7000 English troops, Cadiz included 17,000 or 18,000 soldiers, the remains of all the regular armies of Spain. The corn and salt meat brought from America, and wines from every quarter, were in abundance, though at a high price. They were merely in want of fresh meat and forage; but this privation was little in the elated state of the inhabitants, the army, and the cortes. Union only was wanting, and even union sprung up in the extremity of danger.

To this force collected in Cadiz was united, on the right (of the Spaniards) in the province of Murcia, a mass of about 20,000 men, composed of the troops drawn from the defiles of the Sierra Morena towards Grenada, and of the insurgents of Murcia, often assisted by the Valencians. In the centre, between Grenada and Seville, were found, besides the very ferocious mountaineers of Ronda, the contrabandists of the neighbourhood of Gibraltar, unemployed at the time, and very capable of acting the part of guerrillas. Finally, on the left, at the mouth of the Guadiana in the county of Niebla, were stirring certain other very active contrabandists; and higher up upon the Guadiana, between Badajoz, Olivença, Elvas, Campo Mayor, and Albuquerque, was the army of La Romana, about 27,000 or 28,000 strong, of whom 7000 or 8000 had joined Lord Wellington, under the Marquis de la Romana himself.

With these different combinations, favoured by place and season, Generals Castanos and Blake had succeeded in paralyzing completely the three corps forming the army of Andalusia. Their plan consisted in profiting by the presence of the English and Spanish troops assembled at Cadiz and Gibraltar, to make frequent sorties on the front and wings of the first corps, and to oppose as much as possible Marshal Victor in his preparations for the siege of Cadiz; to support by other sorties, both from Cadiz and Gibraltar, the mountaineers of La Ronda; and to annoy in every possible manner General

Sebastiani in the direction of Grenada and Malaga; finally, to effect frequent descents on the mouth of the Guadiana, then to unite with the insurgents of the county of Niebla, and to keep up incessant incursions between the five fortresses of Olivença, Elvas, Badajoz, Campo Mayor, and Albuquerque, so as not to leave a moment's rest to the 5th corps, or to Marshal Mortier, who commanded it. To be beaten was nothing, provided they were never subdued, that they were never a day inactive, and never allowed a day's rest to the French. If the vanity of gaining regular battles were once laid aside by the Spaniards, this guerilla warfare, supported by Valencia, Murcia, Gibraltar, Cadiz, the sea, the Guadiana, and the five fortresses of Extremadura, ought to be as advantageous to them as that carried on in the North; and, in fact, the whole of this year, 1810, by realizing their hopes, had shown the error of the French in having entered Andalusia before they had pacified the north of Spain and driven the English from Portugal.

General Sebastiani, alternately occupied in La Ronda and the Apulzarnas, had been once obliged to bear down *en masse* upon Blake, whom he had beaten at Baza, once to give battle to the English at Fuencirola, whom he had obliged to re-embark. At length, joined by a detachment of the 5th corps from Seville, he found himself obliged to burn the principal villages of La Ronda, without extinguishing the insurrection, though he succeeded in driving back to Gibraltar the troops which incessantly kept alive these mountain disturbances.

The campaign of the 1st corps had not been so fatiguing or so fatal, because it had not so many obstacles to remove; but it had not been less laborious, owing to the task assigned to it of the investing-works. Marshal Victor, aided by Senarmont, the able artillery-general who had exhibited so much boldness and presence of mind at Friedland and Ucles, had embraced, in a series of redoubts perfectly well placed and admirably adapted to their object, the whole space from Puerto Santa Maria to Puerto Real, and from Puerto Real to Santi Petri. He had armed them with 250 guns of the largest calibre, all founded at Seville. By main force he had taken from the enemy the Trocadero and the fortress of Matagorda, which, forming an advanced point in the roadstead, might cover Cadiz with projectiles. He had founded at Seville a mortar of a new plan, which threw bombs to the distance of 2400 toises,—a force sufficient to put in flames the unhappy city of Cadiz. A great number of this kind were prepared at Seville to be placed on the fort of Matagorda. Marshal Victor had collected, repaired, or constructed, 160 gun-sloops armed with heavy guns, and transports for 10,000 men, and had brought them by coasting along the shore from the mouths of the Guadalquivir to the mouth of the Guadalete. But to bring them from this point to the interior road of Cadiz, where they were wanted, it would have been necessary to double the points of Matagorda so near the enemy's fire as to expose them to danger. To escape this difficulty, the marshal had caused them to be placed upon rollers and brought by land from Puerto Santa Maria to Puerto Real. The preliminary works were therefore far advanced. However, sailors

were still wanting to manœuvre the flotilla, the battalion of sailors of the guard not being sufficiently numerous; gunners were wanting to serve this immense artillery, and a mass of projectiles and ammunition proportioned to the extraordinary use of it contemplated. A reinforcement of infantry would also have been necessary; for Marshal Victor, who, out of an effective of more than 80,000 men had succeeded in bringing into line 21,000 or 22,000, had scarcely 15,000 actually disposable.

He continually repeated that if he were allowed 500 or 600 additional sailors, 1000 gunners, a sufficient quantity of powder and projectiles, and a reinforcement of some thousand infantry, he would pass the canal of Santi Petri in his flotilla, would take the isle of Leon with the bayonet, then go by the isthmus to the fortress of Cadiz, while the fort of Matagorda would open a formidable fire upon it. He added that if a French fleet were to appear for a few days before Cadiz, where there were only eight English vessels, the city would immediately surrender, and in that case the fleet would be as secure as at Toulon. And, indeed, what might not have been effected by the eighteen vessels of Admiral Ganteaume, disembarking 12,000 or 15,000 men and a vast amount of ammunition? They would probably have changed the state of things in the Peninsula; for, if Cadiz were taken, they could have immediately sent 80,000 men to Lisbon, which would almost certainly have caused the fall of the lines of Torres Vedras. After having so frequently trusted the French fleets to chance, what more favourable opportunity could have presented itself of risking one, even though it should be lost? Never could the greatness of the aim have more fully justified the greatness of the sacrifice.

Not only was the naval succour refused to Marshal Victor, though so frequently solicited, but in no way whatever did Marshal Soult afford him aid: these commanders, unhappily, were far from being cordial. Marshal Victor was persuaded that the siege of Cadiz was not promoted by Marshal Soult, because, the work being assigned to him, success would redound to his honour; and it is true that, so far from sending him reinforcements, Marshal Soult often withdrew detachments from him to employ them either in the mountains of Ronda or in the county of Niebla, and that the taking of Cadiz appeared to be the object in which he was least interested.

The modest Marshal Mortier, who, content with the second rank, presented an obstacle to none and made himself useful to all, had undergone labours no less continual than those of Sebastiani at Grenada and of Marshal Victor before Cadiz. Obligated to hasten with the 5th corps sometimes to Badajoz against the troops of La Romana, sometimes in the county of Niebla against the insurgents of that country and the detachments from Cadiz, sometimes as far as Jaen to assist General Sebastiani, he had to carry on operations at the distance of sixty leagues, and his troops were exhausted by fatigue. He had, no doubt, met with success: for he had taken or killed 2000 men at Mendi-sabal, in the direction of Llerena, and had destroyed the Portuguese cavalry at Fuente de Cantos. But, having returned to Seville about the end of the year 1810, he did not reckon

upon more than 8000 men capable of marching out of an effective of 24,000.

The three corps composing the army of Andalusia could not muster 40,000 men, though in reality they reckoned 80,000. It is true that, on the arrival of winter, the disposable portion had greatly augmented, owing to the termination of the hot weather, to rest, and to the dismissals from the hospitals. Napoleon had severely blamed the operations of Marshal Soult, who had command of the three corps, and had reproached him with want of vigour and want of combination in the employment of his troops. And, no doubt, after having committed the error of scattering his forces in Spain by the premature invasion of Andalusia, he had committed the same error in Andalusia by pursuing all objects simultaneously. To wish at the same time to threaten Valencia and Murcia, to occupy Jaen, Grenada, Malaga, to subject Ronda, to shut up Gibraltar, to guard Seville, to besiege Cadiz, Badajoz, Elvas, and Campo Mayor, was to expose the army to total ruin without attaining one of these ends. Although it would have been better from the beginning, as we have said, to have made a decisive campaign against the English in preference to every thing else, yet, having resolved on executing the campaign of Andalusia concurrently with that of Portugal, it became necessary to direct all their forces against Cadiz and confine themselves to maintaining simple posts at Cordova and Seville, as it were to mark out the road to Madrid. If Cadiz were secured, the whole of Andalusia would soon have been subjected, and they would have had a disposable force for employment in any direction,—at Grenada or at Abrantes. By deferring the occupation of Grenada by the 4th corps, General Blake would not have been rendered much more formidable; for the thing most to be desired was to see the Spaniards present themselves in an entire corps d'armée, which, with a few thousand men, we should be able to engage and put to flight for a considerable time. Even without sending the 5th to Badajoz, it would have been possible to allow La Romana to approach Seville, in order to have the advantage of engaging with him in a general battle without shifting our own position. Thus all our forces might have been brought together before Cadiz, ready to march wherever urgent circumstances required them, besides having collected under our colours one-fourth more effective men, by avoiding the very fatal incursions against guerillas, whom they dispersed but could not destroy. In Spain it was necessary first to aim at grand results, and from these to pass on to smaller. For want of thus acting, the army of Andalusia, exhausted by fatigue, ruined by disease, extending indeed from Carthagens to Badajoz, and pronouncing Andalusia subjected, but unable to preserve it from the devastation of the guerillas, had neither taken Cadiz nor Badajoz, could render assistance to no one, and, on the contrary, was reduced to the necessity of soliciting reinforcements. In fact, Marshal Soult closed the year with a demand of 25,000 infantry, 1000 sailors, 1000 artillerymen, and a fleet. With these means he promised soon to take Cadiz and conquer all the south of the Peninsula, from Carthagens to Ayamonte.

It is easy to conceive how, after such demands, Marshal Soult would welcome the order from Paris to send part of his forces to the Tagus. The order had been frequently addressed to him in different forms, and always more and more embarrassing. He had first been ordered to press close upon La Romana and prevent his injuring Marshal Massena; then to effect a diversion on the Guadiana with a detachment of 10,000 men; and, lastly, he had just been formally required to send the whole of the 5th corps, with a siege-equipage, to Abrantes, every object except the siege of Cadiz being called upon to yield to this supreme object. When the last order reached Marshal Soult, he was surprised, or, rather, thrown into consternation. He was required to do that which, though not absolutely impossible, was extremely difficult, and even dangerous, and all to serve a neighbour whom he erroneously regarded as a rival,—for the renown of these two marshals was not equal,—and to insure success to the work of another at the expense of his own. This was much to ask of human nature.

The difficulty is manifest on the mere statement of the facts. General Sebastiani with difficulty retained Grenada; Marshal Victor had enough to do in guarding his redoubts; Marshal Mortier, reduced to 8000 men at the end of summer, having at his disposal perhaps 10,000 or 12,000 at the end of autumn, was, if not indispensable, at least very serviceable, in covering the rear of Marshal Victor, occupying Seville, and manœuvring between Seville and Badajoz. And how, without incurring imminent danger, could he launch into the plain of the Alentejo, leaving on his rear five strongholds,—Badajoz, Olivença, Elvas, Campo Mayor, Albuquerque,—and having at his heels 15,000 or 18,000 men of La Romana's troops, exposed to a rencounter with the English, and ignorant whether Massena had made every arrangement to join him near Abrantes? These were powerful objections, and would have caused just ground for anxiety to a general, however determined he might be to comply with the orders he should receive. How influential must they have been with one who was required to renounce his own conquest in order to secure that of another!

Marshal Soult, considering the requirements to be impossible, felt himself exonerated from immediate obedience, and deferred the execution of the imperial orders, saying that they would involve the loss of Andalusia, and probably of the 5th corps, which would fall, before reaching the Tagus, between the English, who would meet them, the Spaniards, who would pursue them, and the French, who could not assist them; that for these reasons he felt it his duty to defer the execution of such fatal orders, and he implored that some officer should be sent to examine and verify the exactness of his statements. Nevertheless, he added that, anxious to render assistance to Marshal Massena, he was about to march on the Guadiana with all the 5th corps, and some detachments of the other two, in order to undertake the siege of Badajoz, Olivença, and Elvas; and that this would probably be a very useful diversion to the army of Portugal.

The last assertion could hardly be regarded as serious. To effect the conquest of Badajoz

in the space of two or three months, at the distance of twenty-five leagues from Marshal Massena, when the latter required his immediate aid to cross the Tagus, was simply ridiculous. The only plausible reason that Marshal Soult could assign was the difficulty of the requirement. He could not but ask himself whether it were possible to go to the aid of the army of Portugal. It was certainly impracticable in the system of occupation adopted in Andalusia; for, being already too weak in all points, they would certainly lose every post that should be disarmed, without supplying the 5th corps with a sufficient force to pass the Tagus in safety. But Napoleon, without approving, and in a certain sense confirmed, this system, by allowing it to be put in force during a year: how could it be suddenly changed without his express order, by making territorial sacrifices, which to the eyes of the enemy would present the appearance of retrogression? Yet there was no middle course: if they were to attempt any thing with the least chance of success, it was necessary immediately to withdraw the 4th corps from Grenada, direct it upon Seville, leave one-half in that capital to parry any unforeseen accidents on the rear of Marshal Victor, and with the rest to join Marshal Mortier, to fall upon all the Spaniards that could be found in the five fortresses of Estremadura, to march in all haste upon Abrantes with about 20,000 men, to run the chance of their finding the English in great force on the left bank of the Tagus, but to remedy this risk by warning Massena of his arrival, so that he should be ready to throw his bridge and set foot upon the left bank whenever he should appear. With these precautions, with great sacrifices, with much boldness and devotion, the operation was practicable. But on any other conditions, without relinquishing Grenada, without locating an intermediary corps, which in case of need might support Marshal Victor, without greatly reinforcing the 5th corps destined to the Tagus, the thing was impossible, and Marshal Soult would have been entitled to decline the undertaking. If he must obey, they ought first to have explained to him beforehand the sacrifices he must make, and have imposed them upon him, which would leave him without excuse for disobedience, false or true; and, finally, to have issued orders not vaguely, but with absoluteness and precision, as if there were a real determination to secure obedience. But, unhappily, charmed with his own illusions, and distracted by other objects, believing seriously, if not in the existence of 80,000 men, at least in that of 60,000 in Andalusia, Napoleon thought that there ought to be no difficulty in the execution of his will, and satisfied himself with ordering Marshal Soult to march upon Abrantes, even at the risk of weakening himself in the direction of Grenada. This was the only sacrifice which he foresaw and authorized. In such circumstances he could not fail to be disobeyed; and he was so in a manner most detrimental to the general result.

Marshal Soult had long been thinking of besieging Badajoz in person,—an operation much less important than the siege of Cadiz, but a work properly belonging to himself, whereas the latter was more specially the duty of Marshal Victor; and he had made this proposal to

Napoleon long before he had been ordered to the Tagus. On receiving this last order, he thought that he should sufficiently comply with it by transporting himself immediately to the Guadiana, to undertake, besides the conquest of Badajoz, that of the double row of fortresses constructed by Portugal and Spain in Estremadura, which, formerly directed against each other, were now united against us. He therefore immediately set off for Estremadura with the 5th corps, leaving Marshal Victor to himself, but recommending General Sebastiani, in case of any hostile incursion from Gibraltar or elsewhere on the rear of Cadiz, immediately to repair to the spot. He took the road in the beginning of January, 1811, with the Girard division, followed by the Gazan division, which was to march more slowly, in order to escort the siege-equipage. There were not less than forty leagues of very bad road from Seville to Badajoz; and, with the guerillas continually infesting even the subdued countries, the precaution of keeping the Gazan division in the rear was very necessary.

On the 11th of January they arrived before Olivença, which they invested without delay. This fortress, built on the left of the Guadiana, intended for the service of the Spaniards against the Portuguese, had during two centuries alternately belonged to each of those nations; but since 1801 it had been in the hands of the Spaniards. It comprised a population of 5000 souls, a garrison of 4000 men, and a feeble governor. Fortified with considerable regularity, and enclosed in an *enceinte* of new fronts, it might have shown some resistance if the governor had used sufficient precaution and had armed his outer works. But not a single semicircle was armed, and the covered ways were neither palisaded nor occupied. It would then have been literally possible to have attempted an immediate escalade; but, the stone escarpments being high, the attempt might have been unnecessarily sanguinary. They contented themselves with carrying one lunette, which was not armed, and beginning the approach-works near the *enceinte*. The engineers, well seconded by the infantry, executed these works with great boldness and rapidity, though impeded by the want of tools. On some occasions, the infantry of Marshal Mortier, roused by his presence, loosened the earth with their bayonets. Fortunately, a company of engineers arrived with a convoy of instruments, and in ten days the breaching-battery might open fire and destroy a large breadth of wall. At sight of our columns ready to mount the wall, the population, hitherto full of ardour, showed alarm. The garrison and its commander did not endeavour to reassure them, and on the 23d of January the fortress opened its gates and delivered up to us some magazines, a little artillery, and 4000 prisoners. If the siege of Badajoz had been conducted with equal rapidity and success, it might have been possible to realize the singular promise of succouring Marshal Massena after having taken the fortresses.

Marshal Soult remained before Olivença the 23d, 24th, and 25th of January, and left for Badajoz on the 26th. This was the second fort situated on the left of the Guadiana, on the Spanish side, and, in fact, the only important one. If this were taken, there would be no

doubt about taking the three others,—Elvas, Campo Mayor, and Albuquerque. Marshal Soult arrived there with merely the Girard division and those engineer-troops which had already joined the 5th corps. The Gazan division, as we have said, was still in the rear, escorting the grand park. On the 27th Badajoz was invested, and the cavalry cleared the environs of the enemy's troops, and they proceeded at once to reconnoitre the fort.

Badajoz, the capital of Spanish Estremadura, having a population of 16,000 or 17,000, is situated on the left of the Guadiana, near the confluence of a small river called the Rivillas. Protected on the side of the Guadiana by that river and a wall with salient angles, it is defended towards the country by nine regularly-built fronts, forming a semicircle terminated at each extremity by the Tagus. At one of these extremities—that towards the northeast—is a strong castle, built upon an escarpment, commanding at once the Rivillas and the Guadiana at their point of meeting. The nine fronts composing the *enceinte* are protected by a series of half-moons with covered way and glacis, by several lunettes, and by an advanced work, called the Fort of Pardaleras. The fortress is connected with the right bank of the Guadiana by a stone bridge, very old and strong, and by a strong *île de pont*. On the same bank, nearly opposite the castle of Badajoz, is found the fortress of St. Christoval, supporting an intrenched camp formed on the heights of Santa Engracia, protected and watered by the Gevora, which falls into the Guadiana. At this time the Spanish army of La Romana, occupied with incursions between the different fortresses of Estremadura, was accustomed to lodge in this camp. Scattered by their various encounters with the 6th corps, but, as usual with Spanish armies, scattered only to be reassembled the next day, it was found in the neighbourhood of Badajoz, waiting only the detachment from Lisbon to march upon it. This detachment had been demanded of Lord Wellington, who had been unable to refuse it, and who had allowed it to leave for Estremadura, comprising 7000 or 8000 men. It arrived at Badajoz, a little reduced by the season and by disease, without General La Romana, who had recently died at Lisbon of an acute malady. The whole army, commanded by General Mendizabal, after leaving a garrison of 9000 or 10,000 men at Badajoz,—i. e. on the left of the Guadiana,—might present on the other bank, at the intrenched camp of Santa Engracia, a body of about 12,000 men, communicating by means of a stone bridge, so that at certain times it was possible for the besiegers to have to do with about 20,000 men.

In addition to the garrison, the fortress had an excellent governor,—General Menacho,—provisions for six months, and works in a perfect state of defence. To the 20,000 Spaniards scattered on the two banks of the Guadiana with free intercommunication, the French army could oppose 9000 or 10,000 men, which, by the arrival of the Gazan division, might be raised to 15,000 or 16,000. They had no means of crossing the river, except a ferry-boat capable of carrying a few men.

Happily the quality of the soldiers in a great

measure compensated for this numerical inferiority, and with a smaller number of troops General Suchet had taken much stronger places in fifteen or twenty days. If Marshal Soult should take Badajoz in a similar space of time, he might be on the road to Abrantes by the 16th or 18th of February, at the moment of the conferences of Glogao, when it would be very opportune to debouche upon the left of the Tagus.

The bloody experience we had had of the peculiar character of Badajoz, which in two years had been taken and retaken by the French and English, taught us that towards the southwest, before a salient front ill flanked, on the side opposite the castle, and not far from the Guadiana, was a point of attack advantageous to the besiegers, which, reaching the fort by a prominent part of its circumference, would not be much exposed to the flank-fires of the besieged. It is probable that by resolutely attacking Badajoz on that side, which is the first to present itself on coming from Olivença, they might have succeeded in quickly getting possession of it, which would have allowed a seasonable arrival on the Tagus. But immediately on arriving at Badajoz, from the fear apparently of failure, they made the attack from all sides at once,—at least from all those which were towards the country and were not bordered by the Tagus. They directed an attack on our left, supported by the Guadiana, against the front, which they ought to have assailed exclusively, another in the centre, opposite the fort of Pardaleras, and one on the right, beyond the Rivillas, whence might be thrown some unimportant projectiles on the castle and into the interior of the fort. This would have been very well if they had abundance of troops and a good supply of artillery and ammunition, for by dividing the attack they would have divided the defence; but, having little artillery and ammunition, and at most 9000 infantry, until the arrival of the Gazan division, this plan exposed them, whether they would or not, to remain forty days before Badajoz instead of twenty.

They undertook then three unconnected attacks, so distant from each other, especially considering the Rivillas, which was to be crossed, that it was necessary to traverse a league and a half to communicate between the right and left. The trench was opened on the 28th of January at 1000 metres from the enceinte towards the right, and 500 towards the centre, and continued very slowly, either from the want of labourers or because they were unwilling to hasten the result. No sooner was the trench opened than they began to construct some batteries, as if they designed to begin the fire almost as soon as the approaches. They broke the ground accompanied by a slow and feeble cannonade, which had no other effect than an unprofitable waste of ammunition. It should be added that the roads had been so softened by continual rain that the condition of the troops was truly pitiable; for, all the horses having been employed for the heavy artillery, they had been unable to forage at any distance, and they were in want of bread. For several days the soldiers were fed exclusively on meat, which caused sickness in several instances. Instead of several hundreds of labourers, who were really wanted, they had scarcely 150 at each point of attack,

—another proof of the necessity of concentrating their resources on one point.

Little advance was made during the first days, on account of the bad weather, the absence of the Gazan division, and the want of zeal in accelerating the siege. The governor, Menacho, wishing to impede our works by numerous sallies, resolved to make them very frequently and in large columns. On January 31 he directed one against our attack on the centre before the fort of Pardaleras with four battalions, two guns, and two squadrons of cavalry. The Spaniards advanced with so much promptness and resolution that our labourers, having barely time to rally and seize their arms, were driven back. But General Girard, having come up with three companies of sappers and a battalion of the 88th, checked them suddenly, and drove them back at the point of the bayonet to the covered way. In the mean time the Spanish cavalry, having defiled along the Guadiana at a gallop and then fallen upon our left attack, had surprised our labourers and sabred several of our officers of engineers, who held it a point of honour not to leave their trenches. Cazin, chief of battalion of engineers, had been cut down. Captain Vainot, of the same branch, had received eleven wounds. This cavalry was in turn repulsed with considerable loss. In this sortie we lost about sixty men, and the enemy one hundred. But our works were too remote and too little advanced to suffer greatly from it.

On the following days all work was suspended by the heavy rains and tempests. Several of our men and horses were carried away by the overflowing of the Rivillas. Happily the Gazan division at length arrived, with about 6000 foot, some heavy guns, and tools. From this time they could reckon upon rather more than 12,000 infantry, 1200 engineers and artillery, and 2500 cavalry, making a total of about 16,000 combatants. By employing a more numerous infantry, a little more activity was introduced into our works. Towards the right they assumed the form of a long line of contravallation, rather for protection against the Spaniards from without and from within than for undertaking any serious attack on that side. In the centre they aimed at an approach to the fort of Pardaleras, which they intended to take, to make it the base of their principal attack; and on the left they surrounded with a circular line a mamelon called the Cerro del Viento, on which rested the extremity of our line. Some days were spent in freeing our trenches of the mud occasioned by the rain, and in repelling the sorties of the enemy: during this week they advanced little, and confined themselves to throwing a few bombs to alarm the inhabitants.

On the 6th of February they learned the appearance of the relieving army, returned in part from Lisbon, as we have said. By uniting what came from the English lines to that force which was generally in the open country outside of Badajoz, the enemy might present a total of about 10,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry. Each came to take their position on the right of the Guadiana, in the camp of Santa Eufracia, behind the Gevora, opposite the fort of Saint Christoval. Being in communication with the fortress by the stone bridge of Badajoz, they might, if combined with the garrison, form a force of 21,000 men, ready to fall *en masse* upon

the French army. By skilful manœuvring and debouching with energy on a single point, they might possibly arrest the siege, and perhaps even cause it to be raised. It is true that it was difficult to complete any operation thoroughly; for, though brave, they were not well adapted to the open field.

The first use they made of their forces was to attempt a grand sortie on the 7th of February. After a feint upon our left, they debouched upon the right, crossing the Rivillas under protection of the castle guns. They reached our lines in a compact mass of 7000 or 8000 men, in quick march. Our detachment, who rushed to the point, were not sufficiently powerful to resist them, either in number or in impetus. As generally occurs in sorties, they held the field for an instant, threw down some works of little value, especially on our right attack, which, not having been undertaken with any very serious intention, presented little of consequence to destroy. But Marshal Mortier soon arrested them, by deploying two battalions in front, and then, taking advantage of their advanced position, threw two battalions on their flank, one of the 88th and one of the 64th, taken from the central attack and brought rapidly across the Rivillas. Charged in front and threatened in the flank, the Spaniards, after a momentary impetuosity, fell back, at first in good order but afterwards in confusion, and left in our hands 700 men killed or wounded. The temptation of pursuing them under the fire of the fort unfortunately cost us about 100 men killed and 300 wounded.

Marshal Soult then conceived the design of seeking them in the camp of Santa Engracia, and depriving them of the power of renewing similar operations by destroying the relieving army.—a very wise design, for the garrison derived from its presence considerable moral and material strength. But it was necessary to bring together the means of passing the Guadiana, which was not easy, owing to the amount of water; and in the mean while he wished to take one step towards the enceinte, by taking the fort of Pardaleras. This work consisted in a bastion flanked by two demi-bastions and closed in the gorge by a simple palisade. It was possible to take it by a surprise, and then to make it the *point d'appui* of a movement almost direct upon that point of the enceinte which they proposed to attack. The chief of battalion—Lemare, a distinguished officer of engineers\*—drew up two columns of 200 men each, formed of detachments of the 21st and 28th light, of the 100th and 108d of the line, preceded by the sappers of the engineers, and commanded by two brave officers,—Guerin, chief of battalion, and Coste, captain of engineers. Agreeably to a preconceived plan, these two columns left our trenches on the 11th of February, at 7 p. m., in profound darkness, advanced directly upon the salient of the fort of Pardaleras, then separated to pass it, one on the right and the other on the left, following the crest of the glacis to attack the work by the gorge. The columns of the right, having lost their way in the dark, contrived to descend into the ditch of the curtain, found a back-door partly opened, and rushed

vehemently upon it. Captain Coste, who commanded the column, cut down a Spanish officer who had hastened to close the door, boldly entered, followed by his men, and reached the work at the moment when the left column, having succeeded in turning it, were cutting down with their hatchets the palisades which closed the gorge. The two columns united, loudly shouting "Vive l'Empereur!" charged the Spaniards with the bayonet, killing some, taking prisoner a still larger number, and putting the rest to flight towards the fort. They lost no time in beginning an epaulement in the direction of the enceinte to protect themselves from the fire which would unquestionably be directed against the work of which we had made ourselves masters.

This bold action secured for our attack of the centre—the only one of a serious character—a firm *appui*, well calculated to insure its success.

But Marshal Soult was more anxious to disengage himself from the Spanish army, encamped beyond the Guadiana, than to press on the operations of the siege. There was never any great difficulty in beating a Spanish army in the open field. But on this occasion it was necessary to cross the Guadiana, greatly swollen, then to attack the camp of Santa Engracia, fording the Gevara under the enemy's fire, without, however, endangering the siege, the works of which would be very scantily guarded. Fortunately, the Spaniards, notwithstanding the prudent advice of the Duke of Wellington, had neither raised a palisade about their camp nor the slightest earthwork; they also kept a bad watch, and with secrecy and promptitude it would be possible to surprise and rout them with 7000 or 8000 men. The same number must be left to guard our trenches; and this would be sufficient, as the enemy were unaware of our designs.

This plan of Marshal Soult was as well executed as it had been conceived. On the 16th of February he had succeeded in procuring for himself, by the labour of his engineers, a method of passing the Guadiana, sufficient for 6000 infantry and 2000 cavalry. They effected the passage in the night of the 18th and 19th, with picked men from the Girard and Gnan divisions. Marshals Soult and Mortier marched at the head of their soldiers. At break of day on the 19th they found themselves on the other bank of the Guadiana, having on the right in the plain the cavalry composed of the dragoons of Latour-Maubourg and two regiments of chasseurs, in the centre and on the left the infantry ranged in columns by battalions. Having passed the Guadiana above Badajoz, it was necessary to descend the right bank of that river to get near Saint Christoval and the heights of Santa Engracia, on which was established the Spanish camp. The march of our little army was favoured by a thick fog.

They soon reached the banks of the Gevara before the Spaniards thought of disputing the passage. The cavalry crossed it a little farther to our right, and routed in an instant the Spanish cavalry who protected the camp on the side of the plain. Our infantry, led by Marshal Mortier, entered the Gevara, crossed it with the water up to their waist, and arrived in complete order at the foot of the escarpment of Santa

\* The author of an excellent work on the sieges of the Spaniards and French in Badajoz.



Engracia, at the very moment when the fog dispersed.

Before ordering the attack, the commander-in-chief pushed forward two battalions on our left, to interpose them between the fort of Saint Christoval and the Spaniards, and to prevent their taking refuge in the fort. At the same time he ordered the cavalry to wheel about to our right, so as on that side, which sloped gently, to attack the enemy's camp. He then gave the signal for attack.

Our soldiers, who little feared the Spanish troops, boldly faced the height of Santa Engracia under a heavy fire which occasioned some loss. But in a few moments they reached the top of the escarpment, while the two battalions sent to the left were intercepting the road of the fort of Saint Christoval, and the cavalry, dashing into the plain on the right, gained the rear of the enemy. The Spaniards, seeing themselves threatened in front by our infantry, in flank and rear by our cavalry, formed themselves into two squares tolerably deep and firm. But, assailed by our infantry and dragoons, they were broken, and shared the ordinary fate of squares when broken: nearly 2000 of them were killed or wounded; 5000 were taken, with all the artillery and a great number of flags. Of 12,000 men who had entered the field the Spaniards saved scarcely 5000, who fled in all directions.

Though our troops had no difficulty in beating 12,000 men with 8000 when they had to do with Spaniards without English, the operation just related was one of great merit, considering the position of the enemy, protected by the heights of Santa Engracia and the bed of the Gevora, and the necessity of crossing the Guadiana before giving battle, as well as the necessity of continuing to guard the siege-works while fighting in a different direction. All these difficulties had been successfully overcome by acting with secrecy, promptitude, and vigour.

Marshal Soult profited by his victory to invest the fort on the right of the Guadiana and to deprive it of all communication from without. If he had wished to use it as a means of accelerating the surrender of Badajoz, he would certainly have terminated that siege before the 1st of March; and in that case, the two strongholds of Olivença and Badajoz having been taken with their garrisons, and all the Spanish armies of Estremadura having been scattered, he might have advanced upon the Tagus without great risk, and with a great chance of giving immense impulse to events. It is true that the danger remained of doubling the distance between himself and Marshal Victor. But by taking upon himself to evacuate Grenada, or at least to leave there a small body and carry the main body of the 4th corps towards Ronda, between Grenada and Cadiz, so that in an emergency the 4th corps and the 1st might rapidly unite, the danger of his movement upon Abrantes would have been much diminished. In any case the moral effect of a great success on the Tagus would have compensated the inconvenience of his absence; while, by leaving Marshal Massena alone and obliged to retire, he exposed himself to the cruel retribution of being forced to engage the English after they were freed from Marshal Massena. Taking every thing together, after the success he had just obtained,

and having an eye to the future, there would have been less risk in an imprudent generosity than in a prudent reserve. Of this we may judge by the results.

Marshal Soult, when relieved of the Spaniards, resumed quietly and leisurely the siege of Badajoz. In the mean while Lord Wellington and Massena waited the issue of these operations with very different sentiments. The French having troops in Estremadura and also in Castile, (for the Claparede division had arrived at Viseu,) Lord Wellington could not understand why they did not muster in full force on the two banks of the Tagus at the height of Abrantes. This he expected, and dreaded above every thing. In this case he would have regarded his position a difficult one; for he might have to do with 75,000 men, if the Claparede division and the 5th corps joined Marshal Massena, whose energy might well excite alarm even behind the lines of Torres Vedras. Every motive, then, seemed to induce the French to combine their forces; and Lord Wellington, supposing that they would adopt a line of conduct which was so reasonable, continually urged the Portuguese to lay waste Alentejo and to gather all they could into Lisbon, but with little success; for the Portuguese, however inimical to the French, were not willing themselves to destroy their own corn and cattle in order to prevent its falling into their hands. Far from intending to give battle to Marshal Soult if he should quit Andalusia to succour the army of Portugal, he had ordered Marshal Beresford, who commanded at Abrantes, to defend the tributaries of the Tagus which cross the Alentejo sufficiently to retard the arrival of the French, but not so as to risk the loss of a battle, and had further recommended him to re-enter the lines of Torres Vedras, which were now his only object, and were in fact the most important one. The road would thus be found open to Marshal Soult, and he would have incurred no other risk than that of being at a distance from Seville and of depriving his lieutenants of his support for a few days longer. Every thing therefore was ready in his path to facilitate his accomplishing some great action. It is true that he was not aware of this, and that he was ever haunted with the idea of the English army marching upon Abrantes.

Of such a movement he had no unreasonable fear, nor would he have hesitated to attack the army in the open field had he been sufficiently provided with ammunition, though far from undervaluing its real merits. But he was struggling against a want of food and ammunition, against the growing disaffection of the army and the resistance of his lieutenants, which amounted sometimes to a degree of factions discontent. If, on the arrival of General Foy, they had submitted to the Imperial order to remain upon the Tagus, they would speedily have returned, under the influence of famine and dejection, to the ardent desire of quitting a land where they were condemned to die of want without the prospect of achieving any considerable result. When they reckoned upon General Drouet on one side and Marshal Soult upon the other, they had in view a great end and the means of attaining it. General Drouet, having only brought 7000 men, had occasioned some sense of discouragement; but still Marshal Soult

remained, and on him they reckoned. Brisk cannonades in the direction of Badajoz, whose echoes were heard as far as Punhete, kept up the excitement. But these had not been heard for some time, owing perhaps to some atmospheric cause, and it was concluded that Marshal Soult had withdrawn into Andalusia. They therefore felt themselves deserted, and wholly impotent against the lines of Torres Vedras, destined to die of starvation in a desert, without any serious or important object. Marshal Ney, it is true, had recently made a very fortunate capture of 400 oxen, 2000 sheep, 4000 quintals of maize. He had taken part for his own corps, and had given the rest to his colleagues. But the 2d corps, Reynier's, was reduced to the last extremity, and could not have been supported, had he not also recently made a valuable discovery in the isle situated at the mouth of the Alviela under the heights of Boavista, which, we have already said, might have been used as Lobau had been. In fact, at his urgent suggestion, Massena had consented to resign to him some of the boats of the pontoon-equipage, in order to penetrate that isle, which seemed to possess great resources. Captain Parmentier first resigned himself to the current of the Zézere, and then to that of the Tagus, and, leaving Punhete at break of day, had on the following morning reached the island in question, without any other impediment than a considerable but ineffectual discharge of musketry from the left bank. In this isle, so favourably situated, they had found grain and cattle, which Reynier so much required, and the vexatious conviction that they might have made use of it to cross the Tagus. The enemy having collected there in force, it was now too late to adopt that method, and it had become necessary to renounce the passage of the Tagus in the place where it would have been most practicable and safe. This is the principal and almost the only fault which can be charged upon Massena,—a fault excused, but not wholly effaced, by the opinion of General Eblé, and one which Napoleon would not have committed, because his mind, equal to every thing,—to the functions of the engineer as well as to those of the commander-in-chief,—and indefatigable in labour, would never have rested till he had made the necessary discovery. But to every difficulty, in war as well as elsewhere, there is commonly a solution, if there be the genius to discover it and the ardour of character which allows no rest till it is found.

It was possible, then, for Reynier to live some days longer; but at the end of February he announced that he was about to break in upon his reserve of biscuit. The chiefs of corps had frequently spoken of having recourse to this extreme measure; but this was a mere threat to alarm the commander-in-chief, and to which he had never given heed. But it was now impossible to doubt the reality of his wants; and he might convince himself by his own eyes and ears of the eager desire to depart which had seized the army, deprived of every aid, of every intelligence, and deserted at the extremity of the continent for nearly six months. Especially since they had lost hope of being reinforced by Soult they could scarcely be restrained; and even some symptoms of insubordination might be apprehended under the influence of officers

who had not the prudence to set a restraint upon their own speech. Massena had never expected the arrival of Marshal Soult, and this he had frequently said to an officer in his confidence. His sole object in waiting was to render evident to all the necessity of withdrawing, and that he might leave no chance of fortune untried. The month of March having come, the presence of Marshal Soult being no longer expected, there being no prospect of passing the Tagus, (the only chance having been lost because its existence was not believed,) the impossibility of supporting themselves without crossing, the reserve of a fortnight's biscuit (the only resource in case of retreat) being threatened, Massena determined at length to execute a retrograde movement on the Mondego, which he had always regarded as the wisest step, and which he would have taken immediately after the conferences of Golgao, if it had not been necessary to obey the express order of Napoleon to remain on the Tagus till the last extremity. Yet it was important to know whether, if the retrograde motion were once begun, it would be possible to stop midway, and whether they might not be drawn on to the very frontier of Spain. But, whatever might result from the first movement, it was rendered necessary to set out by the hasty approach of famine. They must quit Santarem, just as they must quit a fortress when reduced to their last ration. Massena gave his orders so as to be in full retreat on the 4th or 6th of March. The prudence and boldness of his plan indicated the genius of a true commander, who had lost nothing of his coolness and intelligence by the ill-fortune he had experienced.

Before beginning the retreat of the army, it was indispensable to send forward the sick and wounded and the heavy baggage at least two days in advance, to avoid any risk of their impeding the road by their numbers, of being exposed to positive danger by the hasty movements of the army pursued by the enemy. But these preliminary operations might awaken the attention of the English and attract them too soon to our path. If they should follow us too closely on the road of the Tagus, they might be checked by a halt on our part. But on the road by the sea, along the reverse of the Estrella, it was to be feared lest, warned by our retreat, they should move rapidly upon Leyria, Pombal, Condeixa, and should thus get before us to Coimbra and the Mondego. In this case it would be necessary to relinquish the attempt to establish ourselves at Coimbra, or even perhaps to follow the valley of the Mondego, and to adopt a short but dangerous retreat by the valley of the Zézere, which is south of the Estrella. All these inconveniences might be avoided by occupying Leyria in force by a well combined and seasonable movement. This Massena devised and executed with singular precision.

He determined that the sick and the heavy baggage should leave on the 4th of March, giving out that this was done in order to facilitate the concentration of the army on Punhete, where it was always supposed that the French would pass the Tagus. Though this report should not be fully credited by the enemy, it was calculated to occasion them so much uncertainty as to prevent any decided movement. The

whole army was to be in motion by the night of the 5th. Ney, who had but a short space to traverse in order to cross the heights by passing from Thomar to Leyria by Ourem, was to repair to Leyria with the two divisions of Mermet and Marchand, and with the cavalry of Montribun, placed at his disposal for this purpose. As he would find at Leyria Drouet with the Conroux division, also placed at his disposal, he could not have less than 18,000 or 19,000 infantry and 3000 or 4000 cavalry, forming a total of 22,000 or 23,000 men of the first excellence; and with these forces he was confident that he could arrest the whole strength of the English and Portuguese, should they overtake him. His third division, that of Loison, was to remain at Punhete to keep up the supposition of an intended passage. While Ney should thus be crossing the heights from Thomar to Leyria to cross the road by the sea, the roads of the Tagus becoming free, Reynier and Junot were ordered to decamp on the same day and at the same hour, Reynier to follow the banks of the Tagus from Santarem to Thomar, Junot to follow that which passes by Tremes, Torres Novas, and Chao de Maçans. The latter was to cross the line of the heights towards Ourem, to defile behind Ney, get before him to Pombal with the light cavalry, restore the bridge of Coimbra over the Mondego, and to occupy that town; while Reynier, crossing the heights at Espinhal, was to descend by Miranda de Corvo on the Mondego, and to occupy Ponte de Murcelha, which is the key of the left bank of that river. When they had both executed severally their movements and left the roads free, Loison, after having destroyed the bridge-equipage, was to quit Punhete, to rejoin Ney at Leyria by the road of Thomar, and to form with him the rear-guard. It was not probable that the English should succeed in mastering a rear-guard composed of such troops and commanded by Loison and Ney.

Massena had still many difficulties with his lieutenants, especially Generals Montbrun and Drouet, who were exceedingly reluctant to be placed under the orders of Marshal Ney. Drouet, more particularly, fastidious, retaining a troublesome temper under a calm exterior, instead of becoming more accommodating by the liberty accorded of regaining the frontier of Spain, wished to set off immediately, without aiding at all in the retreat. In several points of detail he even disobeyed, which Massena ought not to have allowed; however, he consented to march some days with Marshal Ney, and to aid the retreat by his presence, at least in the beginning.

On the evening of the 4th, the sick and the wounded, with the exception of a few extreme cases which it was impossible to move, and which were left to the generosity of the English, the grand park of artillery and the heavy baggage was set in motion, circulating the report of a speedy passage of the Tagus. The most precious part of this detachment—that is to say, the wounded—were carried on asses. The scarcity of horses had rendered it necessary to reduce the artillery to the smallest possible amount, and in each corps had been left only those pieces which were the most easily moved, and in such numbers as were absolutely indispensable. The gun-charges, having become useless, had been converted into cartouches by

the care of Marshal Eblé. The satisfaction of the army in leaving this position was diminished by the compulsory relinquishment of great designs. Massena, at the moment of departure, again despatched General Foy to explain at Paris the motives that compelled him to withdraw to the Mondego, and the urgent necessity of sending immediate succour if it were wished to act on the offensive or even to retain their military reputation.

The sick, the wounded, and the heavy baggage, having gained an advance of twenty-four hours, the army set itself in motion at the fall of day on the 5th. Reynier, who was at Santarem, near the enemy, kept in good order all the day. In the evening he destroyed the bridges of the Rio Mayor, and then took his way in silence on the road of Golegao. Junot, who had large detachments on the upper course of the Rio Mayor, acted in the same manner, and left Torres Vedras to follow the road nearest to the chain of heights,—that of Torres Novas, Chao de Maçans, and Ourem. That excellent man, unfortunately less prudent than brave, had, in an engagement of advanced posts, received a wound in the forehead which ultimately proved fatal, and, always devoted but self-willed, he wished to remain on horseback during the retreat. Massena, to spare him fatigue, had placed himself in person at the head of the 8th corps. Ney, on his side, had directed his course for Ourem and Leyria, to bar the high-road of Coimbra towards the sea, and to leave open Thomar, Chao de Maçans, Ourem, to the corps which should march on the side next the Tagus.

The arrangements of Massena were accomplished with great precision, every one readily co-operating in a movement universally desired. On the 6th the whole army was in full march, and was not followed by the English. On the 7th it was in line of battle, resting on the two slopes, and able to fight upon either. Reynier was at Thomar, Junot at Ourem, Ney at Leyria. Loison, remaining at Punhete, awaited the close of the day to commit to the flames the pontoon-equipage,—the wonderful but fruitless result of the labour of General Eblé. In the evening, after having burnt every thing, he left for Thomar, carrying with him some loads of implements, and having in his extreme rear-guard the battalion of sailors who escorted the wounded or sick who were detained in the march. On the 8th the whole army was beyond reach of the enemy, Reynier on the right crossing the long gorge which descends on the Mondego by Thomar, Cabcoas, and Espinhal, Junot in the centre crossing the chain of heights at Ourem, and passing behind Ney, in order with the light cavalry to occupy Coimbra and restore the bridges of the Mondego, and Ney himself having slackened his pace to allow all that should precede him to pass on, and holding himself in readiness to form an invincible rear-guard with the three divisions of Marchand, Mermet, and Loison, the cavalry of Montbrun, and the infantry of Drouet.

It was only on the morning of the 8th that Lord Wellington was exactly informed of the retreat of our army. He foresaw it from the movements discerned on the 4th, and from certain intimations that had been sent to him; but he had remained uncertain, and, with his ear

summary prudence, was unwilling to hazard any thing till he was well assured of the designs of the French. Their retreat was itself so great an advantage to him that he was right not to compromise that advantage by any rash movement which might expose him to a serious loss. He therefore resolved to follow them step by step at a short distance, ever ready to profit by the first error they should commit in this retrograde movement. At the same time, having received the news that Badajoz was reduced to the last extremity, he addressed a message to the commandant of that place, announcing speedy succour, and urging him strongly to hold out a few days more. From Abrantes he despatched Marshal Beresford with the troops of General Hill, to confirm his words by deeds, and to save a fortress which was the key of the Alentejo. Having made these arrangements, he began his march, halting every night within gunshot of our rear-guards. He had formed the highest opinion of Marshal Massena, even after this campaign, subsequently so much censured, and he was determined, though keeping close on his steps, to observe the greatest circumspection.

On the 9th of March our rear-guard—the 6th corps—was at Pombal, between Leyria and Coimbra, under Marshal Ney, whose distinguished qualities seemed to be restored by the presence of the enemy. Loison had not yet joined: his forces were divided between the two aspects of the heights towards Aniciado, connecting Ney, who was to the north of the Estrella, with Reynier, who was to the south, and was climbing the chain between Venda Nova and Espinhal to debouche in the valley of the Mondego. Junot had gained one day in advance, in order to occupy Coimbra and the Mondego. Massena, who wished to allow him time to do so, resolved to remain at Pombal on the 9th and 10th,—a position presenting some resources and being easy to defend. Besides the advantage of giving time to Junot, this halt allowed the passage of the numerous convoys of wounded, of the munitions, and of biscuit.

Ney, therefore, established the two divisions of Marchand and Mermet in front of Pombal, opposite the English army, which also halted and was soon augmented by the accumulation of forces occasioned by one day's delay, as the waters of a running stream by the first obstacle they meet.

On seeing that the French did not resume their accustomed march, but remained in position the whole of the 9th and even the 10th, Lord Wellington conjectured that, instead of quietly retiring, they wished to compensate for their retreat by a battle,—a conjecture authorized by the enterprising character of our soldiers and their commanders. Preoccupied, if not intimidated, by such a possibility, the English general sent a counter-order to part of Beresford's troops destined to succour Badajoz, and brought to him, by the highroad of Coimbra, the principal mass of his forces. He only left detachments in the rear of Loison and Reynier, on the other aspect of the Estrella.

Ney, discovering from Pombal, where he was, the concentration of the English army, warned Massena of it on the evening of the 10th, and remanded either to be allowed to decamp or to

be reinforced to such an extent as to enable him to hold his ground against the enemy. Though in the field he was the boldest and most skillful of manoeuvrers, he had not in council the calmness, almost disdainful, of Massena, due to his natural temperament and long experience. Massena hastened to the quarters of Ney, used every argument to encourage him, urged him to remain before Pombal, not to leave till the next day, boldly to dispute the position of Redinha after that of Pombal, where he should be on the third day, so as to afford all the time necessary for the occupation of Coimbra and the Mondego by Junot's troops. Massena assured Ney that the English, with their circumspection and slowness, would not engage 15,000 men, commanded by him, on a ground so well adapted to defence as the little valleys which they were to cross in succession until they arrived at Coimbra, which all afforded tributaries to the Mondego. Ney, who had seen the English near him in full force, was not as easily persuaded as Massena had wished, but promised to hold his position as long as possible. To increase the difficulty, General Drouet, ordered to support Ney, had been seized with the desire to remove, and he announced his immediate departure, which would reduce Ney to two divisions. Drouet, summoned before Ney and Massena, defended himself with obstinacy and confusion, as is customary with those who are called to perform a disagreeable duty. Massena, capable of the greatest energy when pushed to extremity, but not otherwise, failed to enforce his will by absolute authority; for, though Drouet was only an auxiliary, there could not be two commanders-in-chief in the presence of the enemy, and Massena, alone having that office in Portugal, ought merely to have issued formal orders, without troubling himself to persuade a headstrong disputant who would listen to nothing. Ney, unable to excuse himself from a certain sympathy with those who were urgent to quit Portugal, gave little support to Massena, and they separated without any very clear explanation. Drouet promised to retire slowly, but he did not fix the precise time of his departure. Ney promised to dispute Pombal with energy, but he did not say for how long. Massena was here in the wrong, both because he did not command with sufficient vigour, and because he did not think of using the position of Pombal as a method of teaching a severe lesson to the English. The position of Pombal would, in fact, have been very favourable for resistance and for making them pay dear for the glory of seeing us retreat. To this end it would have been necessary to collect a great force in his rear-guard,—an object to which, unfortunately, Massena had not paid sufficient attention. What, indeed, was Loison doing on the flank of Ney, posted on the two declivities? What was Junot doing, sent with all his forces to Coimbra, to seek for the fords of the Mondego? It may, indeed, be said that Loison was necessary to unite the troops which were marching on the south of the Estrella with those which were marching on the north, Reynier with Ney. But, admitting that Loison might be useful where he was,—though it was highly improbable that the English, cautious and slow, should think of throwing themselves between Ney and

Reynier,—why employ the whole of Junot's corps in occupying Coimbra and passing the Mondego,—an office for which Montbrun with part of his cavalry and two or three of his battalions of light troops would have sufficed,—an office which would have much more naturally devolved upon Drouet, so anxious to retire and to regain Almeida? It is in this art of distributing his forces, whether near the enemy or far from them, that Napoleon was unequalled, and could be replaced by none of his lieutenants, for it is that which requires the greatest depth and grasp of mind. Massena, it must be acknowledged, gave a handle to the ill-will of his lieutenants, by not adequately supporting one by the other and by furnishing a plausible pretext for retiring sooner than was necessary. Had Ney and Junot been united, with Loison on their flank to connect them with Reynier, and Drouet on their rear to occupy Coimbra, they would have been in a condition to punish Lord Wellington for his too great pretensions by a serious check.

Early in the morning of the next day, 11th, Ney at Pombal, on the right bank of the little river Arunça, saw the English descend the left bank in order to cross below Pombal; on which he immediately ordered retreat, without listening to Fririon, chief of the staff, who endeavoured to detain him. But the latter having urged him, and Ney perceiving that great disorder might be occasioned to the English by taking Pombal from them, sent thither a battalion of the 69th, one of the 2d, and one of the 6th light. These troops, under General Fririon, rushed impetuously into Pombal, drove back the English to the bridge of the Arunça, precipitating several into the water, set fire to the village, where the wounded English perished in the flames, and thus retarded by some hours the march of the British army.

After this vigorous stroke Ney quietly resumed his retreat, and descended the right bank of the Arunça in the face of the English, who occupied the left. The road, which keeps the course of the valley for a league, as far as Venda da Cruz, then quits the bank of the river, then pierces the high wooded ground on the left, and, passing through a ground alternately level and broken, at length descends into the valley of the Soure, at a village named Redinha. Marshal Ney halted in the evening at Venda da Cruz, at the point where the road quits the valley of the Arunça to enter that of the Soure.

Massena, warned of the engagement of Ney at Pombal, caused him to be informed that he was about to summon General Loison and one of the divisions of Junot, (a good arrangement, though late,) and to make new arrangements to detain General Drouet; but that he conjured him, when falling back the next day upon Redinha, to retire slowly, for they were now only a short distance from the Mondego, and they must not allow themselves to be too closely pressed if they wished to pass undisturbed and to secure time to establish their position.

On the next day, the 12th, Ney decamped before dawn, that he might not have the enemy on his heels in the defiles which he wished to cross.

He thus entangled himself in a broken country, where he marched sometimes in a plain, at

others on the hills. Preceded at a considerable distance by the Marchand division, Ney had immediately under command the Mermet division, consisting of 6000 admirable foot,—those of Elchingen, Jena, Friedland, which had never served but with himself, who watched his every look and were ready to rush in any direction at the first intimation. He had also fourteen pieces of artillery, two regiments of dragoons,—the 6th and 11th,—and the 8d of hussars. With these 7000 or 8000 men he retired slowly, followed by 25,000 English in three columns, the right composed of General Picton's troops and the Portuguese of General Pack, that in the centre of General Coie's troops, that on the left of General Erskine's light infantry. These columns were connected together by means of the cavalry of General Slade, the Portuguese, and the sharpshooters. Ney, like a hunted lion, kept his eyes fixed on his assailants to seize on the most adventurous. When one of these columns pressed him too closely, he covered it with shot, or charged it with the bayonet or with his dragoons, according to the nature of the ground. Massena, who had hastened to the spot, could not restrain his admiration for so much care, dexterity, and energy. When the English, suddenly checked, pushed forward their wings to force the French to withdraw by outflanking them, which they always did somewhat awkwardly, being neither quick nor agile, Ney fell back on the column which had been so rash as to outflank him, and, taking it in flank in his turn, sent it back, severely handled, to its corps. He had thus employed half a day in accomplishing two leagues at most, and was preparing for the English, on the banks of the Soure, a warm reception, which should give a worthy termination to the day. Massena, seeing him so well disposed, testified his lively satisfaction, saying that he depended upon him, urged him not to abandon the heights before Redinha, and conjured him to hold his ground as much as possible, that he might have the more to dispute on the following day, and then left him to look after the rest of the army.

At this moment Ney arrived at the chain of hills which border the Soure, at the foot of which, on the very banks of the river, is found the village of Redinha. His back then was to the bed of the Soure and Redinha, and before him was a small, well-watered plain, in the middle of which the English marched heavily along, endeavouring, as they had done all the morning, to outflank our wings either to the right or left. The position was well suited for defence, since on all sides it surrounded and commanded the little basin at the bottom of which was seen the enemy. It offered even the opportunity of a great success; for it was possible, if they repulsed the English, to drive them in confusion into the defile which they had crossed in the morning, and then to hurl them into the valley of the Arunça. Ney, with his 12,000 foot and 1200 horse, was almost sure to obtain this success; but he was held back by several prudential considerations. In fact, in his rear was a dangerous ground, from which he might be thrown into the Soure and pursued in a frightful defile which leads from Redinha to Condeixa. If he had had the Loison division in reserve, and had been able to place it on the

other bank of the Soure to receive him in case of failure, he would have been in a condition to risk a battle with the Marchand and Mermet divisions, and he would certainly have gained it; but without this reserve he dared not incur any risk.

Emancipated from Massena, who would probably have wished to come to a decided engagement, he caused the Marchand division to defile before him, ordered it to descend to the banks of the Soure, to cross that river by the bridge of Redinha, then to ascend the other side, and there take up position, which allowed him to take refuge with it if he should be hard pressed. He resolved to remain several hours before Redinha with the Mermet division alone, and his three regiments of cavalry, and some guns, as if to show what might be done with 7000 against 25,000 by skilful manœuvring on a ground well adapted for defence.

Proudly resting on the heights which he was about to dispute, he had his four infantry-regiments deployed in two ranks, his artillery a little in advance, numerous bands of tirailleurs scattered right and left in convenient positions, and his three cavalry-regiments in the rear in the centre, ready to charge through the intervals of the infantry at the first favourable moment. Behind his left a path led to Redinha, and formed his line of retreat, for which he stood prepared. Behind his right he had observed a ford, by which his cavalry might cross the Soure and escape if necessary. After having thus secured his means of retreat, he did not hesitate to engage, being always sure of being able to fall back if occasion required.

The English, drawn out in the plain, continued their manœuvre practised during the day, and endeavoured to outflank us. Generals Picton and Pack attempted to climb the heights on our left in order to dispute with Ney the retreat upon Redinha; while Generals Cole and Spencer advanced in deep columns to the centre, and Erskine's light infantry endeavoured to cross the river on our right by the fords previously selected by our cavalry. But Ney, employing every arm with equal presence of mind, began by riddling with bullets Picton's troops; and, by destroying whole lines, he obliged them to escape by an oblique movement: but, having succeeded in mastering the heights after great loss, they advanced against the flank of Ney almost on a level, and were within gunshot, when the latter, bringing to bear upon them six guns, covered them with shot, and then directed against them a battalion of the 27th and one of the 59th, and all his tirailleurs, who had rallied and been formed into a third battalion. These three small columns vigorously charged Picton's English with the bayonet, and threw them to the foot of the heights, after killing and wounding a considerable number. In a few moments the rout at this spot was complete. Lord Wellington then advanced his centre to rally and rescue his right, and to attack the position of the French in front. Allowing this force to advance, Ney opposed them with the 25th light and 50th of the line, and, with his artillery between the battalions, supporting these two regiments with the 6th dragoons and 3d bussars. After a discharge of artillery and musketry, he charged them with the bayonet, driving them

to the sloping ground. He then sent against them the 8d hussars, who broke their first line and sabred many of their foot. At this moment the confusion in the whole body of the English was extreme; and if Ney, by having kept near him the Marchand division, had been able more fully to engage that of Mermet, the rout would have been general and irrevocable. However, Ney, unwilling to compromise his troops, recalled them, drew them up in battle-array, and remained in position another hour, continually breaking the ranks of the English by ball.

It was now four o'clock P.M. Lord Wellington, touched to the quick at seeing himself thus detained and damaged by a handful of men, collected his whole army, formed it in four lines, and advanced with the evident determination to force the position at any cost. It was now time for Ney to retire; for, having no reserves, and not being anxious to maintain the ground but merely to dispute it, he could leave it without regret. He effected his retreat with the same decision and vigour as had characterized the day. While the English were advancing slowly but resolutely, each French infantry-regiment defiled before them in succession, firing in battalions, then closing into the left to descend upon the Soure by the road of Redinha. The four regiments of the Mermet division, having thus saluted the English army, withdrew by the left without being even pursued, escorting their artillery, which had preceded them; while our cavalry, defiling by the right, peaceably descended to the Soure to cross at the ford. All Ney's troops came to establish themselves on the other side of the Soure behind the Marchand division, which was there in position. The English, having then arrived at the heights which we had abandoned, hastened to descend to the bank of the river with the view of crossing it. But they perceived the Marchand division posted on the other bank, and protected by a cloud of tirailleurs, who allowed no approach. The artillery of this division had burned the town of Redinha and rendered it uninhabitable. The English were therefore obliged to halt upon the Soure after a laborious day, which had not cost them less than 1800 in killed and wounded, while we had lost scarcely 200. The French army, under the command of its ablest manœvrer, had on this occasion exhibited every form of perfection which it attains when it combines education with natural qualifications,—that is to say, vigour, address, decision, the art of opening and closing their ranks under fire as if on parade, the readiness of passing from the defensive to the offensive, and, *vice versa*, with rapidity and solidity unequalled, it must be owned, in any European army, and from which the English could not withhold their admiration. If on this occasion Ney had been as bold in command as he had been skilful in manœuvring, he would certainly have driven the English far back; but, under the influence of prudential considerations not ill-founded, he confined himself to a combat of the rear-guard, when he might have ventured on a general battle with success. The error of Massena consisted in his removal to too great a distance, and in not retaining at that point one more division. The British army would probably have experienced a sanguinary defeat, and

would have paid dear for the honour of having forced us to quit the banks of the Tagus.

However this may be, after this day the English had sufficient reason for circumspection and the French for confidence. Ney had fallen back into a defile leading from Redinha to Condeixa, ending in heights easily defended, after which the road is direct to the Mondego and Coimbra. It was the last stage in the highroad from Lisbon to Coimbra, and it was necessary to maintain his ground there vigorously, to give Junot time to throw bridges over the Mondego, and to take possession of Coimbra, which is on the other side of that river. If they did not dispute this last point with sufficient obstinacy, they would be thrown into the Mondego, or forced to ascend it again by the left bank, through a difficult country, and relinquish the plan of an establishment at Coimbra,—a plan intermediate between a prolonged stay at Santarem and a complete retreat as far as the frontiers of Spain. If, in fact, they did not hold their ground before Condeixa sufficiently long to give Junot the time that he required, and if they should be obliged, in order to escape the pursuit of the English, to reascend along the left bank of the Mondego, they would have no other resource than the position of the Sierra de Murcelha, which closes the upper basin of the Mondego on the left bank, as that of Alcoba closes it on the right. But this position was not long tenable; for the English, masters of the lower part of the Mondego, might take it in the rear by reascending the right bank of that river and placing themselves behind the Sierra de Murcelha. There was therefore no choice left: it was necessary either to become masters of the course of the Mondego, to pass it, enter Coimbra, establish themselves there, live on the resources of that town and the environs, or immediately to retire to Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, which would be to acknowledge the complete failure of the campaign. It was, however, possible still to avoid this melancholy extremity; for Montbrun, whom Junot had ordered to lead the way with his cavalry, having found an arch of the bridge of Coimbra broken down, had discovered a little lower down a place where the river, at certain seasons fordable, might be crossed on a bridge of piles. General Valaze had procured on the spot materials for these piles; but he required thirty-six hours to finish the bridge, after which their establishment at Coimbra was certain, for there were in that city only a few of Trent's guerillas to dispute the entry. By defending Ponte de Murcelha on the left, Bussaco on the right, and having Coimbra in the centre, it was easy to support themselves for some time in that position, from whence they would keep the English in check, and whence they might advantageously resume the plans of the campaign.

On the evening of the 12th, after the splendid battle of Redinha, Massena returned to Ney, congratulated him on the results of the day, expressed, with much reserve, indeed, some regret that he had not thought fit to maintain his position before the Soure, entreated him to make a stand before Condeixa, which was very practicable, owing to local advantages and to the ascendancy acquired by the 6th corps over the English. Massena repeated to him that if

Condeixa were not defended they would be either thrown into the Mondego or forced to reascend it in haste and relinquish the plan of establishing themselves at Coimbra. Unfortunately, Marshal Ney, who appeared in some degree moved by the arguments of the commander-in-chief, promised to do his best without answering for the result. He was particularly disturbed by the demonstrations of the English on the left,—demonstrations which, had they been serious, might have separated him from Loison and Reynier,—that is to say, from the main body of the army. To parry every danger from that quarter, Massena had placed Loison in an intermediate position on the heights between the valley of the Soure, the scene of Marshal Ney's operations, and that of the Ceyra, into which Reynier had descended after having crossed the chain of the Estrella towards Espinhal. Massena had also detached the Clausel division from Junot's corps, to support Loison, so that Ney had on his left two divisions to connect him with Reynier. Massena ought also to have supported Ney with the second division of Junot, leaving only one or two battalions to Montbrun to finish the work of the bridges. He ought even, if Drouet had been more obedient, to have required him to remain behind Ney as a support, and even to have remained there himself to enforce upon all the execution of his own plans. Unfortunately, he did nothing of the kind, and, believing Ney to be sufficiently protected towards the left by the Clausel division added to that of Loison, and sufficiently influenced by his orders and requests, he left on the morning of the 13th to repair to Loison, to judge of the designs of the enemy from his position.

Scarcely had he left, when Ney, remaining alone and free in the presence of the English, began to observe their slightest movements with a strange distrust of his situation, which was not in reality alarming. The English, well taught by the recent engagement, were advancing slowly, which, far from removing his anxiety, rather increased it, by leading him to suppose that they might be engaged in some operations elsewhere. A movement of General Picton on the left, which was calculated to outflank him, persuaded him immediately that all his fears were about to be realized, and that he would be separated from the main body and perhaps surrounded. This hero, infallible in courage, sometimes hesitating in mind, immovable on a ground which he could embrace with a glance, but less confident in himself when the extent of territory required the imagination to aid the eye, here experienced a degree of confusion, and, always fearing to be cut off, and undoubtedly too anxious to escape from Portugal, which had become hateful to him, disputed for a short time the heights of Condeixa, then hastily quitted them, defiling by the left across a narrow gorge, which by a passage of three or four leagues led to Miranda de Corvo, and would unite him with Loison, Clausel, and Reynier.

In adopting so serious a resolution, he ought to have referred to the commander-in-chief, who was at no great distance; for, having received express orders to hold his ground, and being exonerated from all supreme responsibility, he had no other duty than to defend

himself at Condeixa. But, up to this time, far from that post being untenable, it had not even been seriously attacked. To take this step was, therefore, to take too much upon himself, and was to expose the army to a certain evil in order to avoid a doubtful or even imaginary one, as soon appeared. However this may be, Marshal Ney entered the defile of which we have spoken; but, perceiving that he exposed Montbrun, who had been left on the banks of the Mondego, to be cut off and taken, he sent word to him of his movement, and ordered him to withdraw immediately with his cavalry, re-ascending the banks of the Mondego at a gallop, by a movement parallel to that which he was himself about to execute with the infantry of the 6th corps.

In the mean while Massena had gone to Fuente Cuberta, where Loison, supported by Clausel, formed the link of connection between Ney and Reynier, and was prepared to frustrate every attempt of the English to interpose between the two principal masses of the French army. From the elevated position which he occupied, Massena could perceive the movements of General Picton and appreciate their tendency, and from what he saw he felt no uneasiness; and therefore, when in the middle of the day it was announced to him that Ney had evacuated Condeixa, and had thus taken upon himself to decide the fate of the campaign, he was at first much irritated, and openly expressed his great dissatisfaction to the chief of the staff, Fririon, who, as far as lay in his power, repaired the faults everywhere committed, by his zeal and diligence in reconciling the different commanders. Massena was so irritated that he thought for a moment of withdrawing the command from Ney. But, while so near the enemy and in need of the union of every support, and Junot being still uncured of his wound, he felt the inconvenience of depriving himself of his principal lieutenant, and confined himself to the cold expression of his dissatisfaction, dryly ordering Marshal Ney to halt in the exit of the defile which he had entered, for it was not sufficient to have saved the 6th corps from an imaginary danger: it was necessary to save Montbrun and the heavy baggage from a real danger, by enabling them to effect a movement similar to that just effected by the 6th corps. Besides, Massena, who appeared instinctively to know mankind, had anticipated what would happen, and had in consequence ordered beforehand a part of the convoys to the road of Miranda de Corvo. Nevertheless, though sent in that direction the evening before, these convoys required a long time to reach the head of the army. The precipitate retreat of Marshal Ney exposed Massena himself, who had with him the Loison and Clausel divisions, to serious danger; for, being unprotected on the right, if the English had been more active he might have been separated from the 6th corps. But he quickly beat a retreat, and marched all night with the two divisions which accompanied him, under a clear moonlight. He debouched in the morning between Casal Novo and Miranda de Corvo, behind Marshal Ney, without having experienced any accident.

On leaving the defile between Condeixa and Miranda de Corvo, Marshal Ney was to halt at

first at the village of Casal Novo. At that point commenced a more open though unequal ground, abounding in hillocks, abutting at Miranda de Corvo, then from Miranda de Corvo extending to Foz d'Arunce on the Ceyra. On this ground Ney was to rally successively the Loison and Clausel divisions, and the corps of Junot, Reynier, and Drouet. He halted the evening at Casal Novo, promising himself, now that he had rejoined the army and that he was secure of leaving Portugal, to dispute every inch of ground, and to cause the English to lose the whole day in order to give the detachments left in the rear time to come up.

On the next day, the 14th, notwithstanding a thick fog, which scarcely allowed him to discern objects at a very short distance, he began to manoeuvre before the English with a precision, dexterity, and decision which attracted universal admiration. Almost the whole English army followed him across the plain which is watered by the Douça and the Ceyra, tributaries of the Mondego. Ney had arranged his troops with great skill on the various aspects of the ground best adapted for defence. A rear-guard under General Ferrey formed the first echelon, at Casal Novo; the Mermet division formed the second, a little beyond, and the Marchand division the third, on a raised ground near the Chao de Lamas. The Loison division, and those of Clausel and Solignac of Junot's corps, formed a last echelon, near Miranda de Corvo. The two armies were soon seen slowly advancing, the one giving ground only step by step after a judicious resistance of each echelon, the other advancing with difficulty under a destructive fire against the positions whither it was obliged to follow the enemy without ever overtaking them.

General Erskine, with the light troops, having wished to debouche upon Casal Novo, the rear-guard of General Ferrey disputed the village, under protection of some enclosures from which our marksmen in security shot the English without fail. The troops of General Erskine were exposed to this unequal fire for two or three hours before they could carry the enclosures, when the French retired, and the English wished to pursue them. Colonel Laferrière, with the 8d hussars, fell upon them and sabred the most rash. Nevertheless, the English marched forward; and, when about to reach the rear-guard of General Ferrey, they saw it disappear behind the Mermet division, which checked them suddenly by their attitude and their fire, and in their turn retired behind the Marchand division established on the heights of Chao de Lamos, unbroken, fresh, and anxious to fight, having never engaged the enemy from the beginning of the retreat, and being also very advantageously posted. Every effort of the English to entangle it was in vain. At length, at a signal from Ney, this division also retired, and formed in line with those of Loison and Mermet, and those of Clausel and Solignac of the 8th corps, on the heights of Miranda de Corvo, whither the English were obliged to follow it, losing men at every step, and gaining only the ground which they left of their own accord. The day drew to an end, and they were obliged to halt before the French army *en masse* on an almost inaccessible position. The latter, with the exception of two divisions left by Marshal Ney at Foz d'Arunce, halted on the evening of the 14th on the banks



of the Ceyra. The two armies bivouacked side by side.

This day, the 14th, so well employed by Ney,—much better, it must be confessed, than the 18th,—gave all the convoys time to regain the head of the army, and Reynier time to debouche between Miranda de Corvo and Fox d'Arunce, on the Ceyra. Montbrun, on his side, warned by Ney, had been able to withdraw, and had joined with all speed the main body of the army, by ascending the Mondego.

Nothing was compromised, except the very prudent plan of the commander-in-chief of establishing himself on the Mondego, at the height of Crimbra. All the corps of the army were brought together with their *matériel*, after incurring a loss of men at least less by three-fourths than that of the English; and after having traversed the most difficult part of the road which they had to go. Massena arrived on the Ceyra in the evening of the 14th, had reached the foot of the Sierra de Murcelha, and wished to cross it on the next day, in order to take up his position at Ponte Murcelha, on the little river of the Alva. General Drouet, yielding obedience only when it was necessary, placed himself at the head of the retreat at Ponte Murcelha, where he restored the bridges of the Alva for himself and for the army,—a task which he was fortunate in being able to accomplish; for Reynier was so occupied in foraging that nothing could be obtained from him, one-half of his soldiers being always occupied in pillage.

On the morning of the 15th, Junot found himself to the left, on the Lower Ceyra, Ney in the centre, towards Fox d'Arunce, Reynier on the right, on the Upper Ceyra. The English, who had suffered so much at Redinha and at Casal Novo, exhibited no great impatience to meet us: they seemed rather to escort than to pursue us. The great character of Massena, seconded by the talents of Ney, deprived them of all hope of occasioning us any loss or forcing us to leave an hour sooner than we chose.

Ney, on this occasion too confident, had been in no hurry to cross the Ceyra, and had allowed two of his divisions to spend the night on this side of that river, side by side with the English. Massena, however, had warned him of the danger to which he was exposed; but he had disregarded this advice, not believing that the English would have the boldness to measure themselves with them, in which, as we shall see, he was deceived. Lord Wellington, notwithstanding his circumspection, was determined to lose no opportunity of annoying us which we should have the imprudence to afford, perceived that a considerable portion of the 6th corps had not crossed the Ceyra; and he hastened on the morning of the 15th to surround with an imposing force the ground commanded on all sides, at the bottom of which had bivouacked the Mermet and Marchand divisions. The troops, surprised by this unexpected attack, ran to arms, and the Mermet division went to occupy the heights surrounding the ground where they had passed the night, in order to keep in check the enemy while Marshal Ney should direct the retreat of the Marchand division by the narrow defile of the bridge of the Ceyra. Unhappily, the light cavalry under General Lamotte, obliged for the sake of forage to establish themselves in a field at the very border

of the Ceyra, had not been able to form the guard in advance of the infantry, nor to rally in time to reach the heights where the Mermet division had just taken position. General Lamotte drew himself up in battle-array in front of the bridge, in order to let the infantry who were retreating pass by, and to charge the enemy if they presented themselves at the approaches to the river. During this time Marshal Ney, riding in the ranks of the Marchand division, began to make a defile over the bridge, then, seeing it retire undisturbed, returned to the Mermet division, which was holding the English in check upon the heights, in order to bring it up and make it pass the bridge in its turn. At this moment a battery threatened by the English turned upon a regiment of the Mermet division which was closing in, and produced in it some degree of disorder. The troops of this regiment, perceiving the cavalry in array before the bridge, thought they were about to cross it, and, fearing that it would be obstructed by them, rushed forward, that they might not be anticipated. Very soon nothing was presented but a disorderly torrent of fugitives, suffocating each other on the bridge; and, finding it encumbered by the most eager, they threw themselves into the river to endeavour to ford it. Ney wished in vain to check them, but his voice could not be heard. After some moments of this tumult he at length succeeded in rallying a battalion of the 27th and some companies of voltigeurs, regained with this handful of men the heights where General Mermet, at the head of his second brigade, maintained a death-struggle with the English, every moment becoming more urgent. The presence of this feeble reinforcement and of Marshal Ney rekindled the ardour of the troops; they charged the English, and drove them to a distance with some loss. At this interval the tumult about the bridge had subsided. The fugitives, seeing the heights well occupied behind them, had regained their confidence, and defiled more calmly. The 2d brigade of Mermet, after having disputed the heights as long as it was necessary, descended in their turn, passed the bridge in good order, and joined the rest of the 6th corps on the other bank. At the first moment Marshal Ney thought that several hundreds must have been drowned, who had thrown themselves into the river with a view of fording it. Happily, the loss was inconsiderable. Scarcely 150 soldiers were missing at the muster in the ranks of the 2d division, and of these the greater part had been killed or wounded in the combat of General Mermet's 2d brigade against the English. Marshal Ney, not wishing to take the blame to himself, ascribed it to General Lamotte, commanding the light cavalry, whom he sent to the rear of the army; though that general had little cause for self-reproach in this disagreeable tumult.

But, upon the whole, this accident was of no great importance. The army took up its position behind the Ceyra undisturbed, for the resistance of General Mermet before Fox d'Arunce had given Lord Wellington fresh proof of the difficulty of breaking in upon this army, which always showed itself great in the hour of danger. The bridges of the Alva which they were to cross after passing the Sierra de Murcelha not having been restored, they remained on the 16th between the Ceyra and the Alva, without

any attack from the English. On the 17th they went to the Alva. It will readily be believed that the feelings of Massena would be severely tried by being reduced to such a retreat by the fault of his master, who had assigned to him an impossible task, by that of his lieutenants, who had thwarted him in all his plans, by that of his neighbours, who had afforded him no aid, and finally by a combination of untoward circumstances; and he was anxious that his movement should present the aspect of a manœuvre rather than that of a retreat. For this reason he had designed a position on the Mondego, as high up as Coimbra, which was a little in the rear of that at Santarem but did not imply a total abandonment of Portugal. When the haste with which Marshal Ney had quitted his post at Condeixa had deprived him of this resource, he had wished at least to halt on the Alva, which runs parallel to the Sierra de Murcelha, which, as we have said, corresponds to the Sierra d'Alcoba. But this position was not secure, since it might be turned if the English should reascend the right bank of the Mondego, and it was not sufficiently offensive to compensate the inconvenience of being several days distant from Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, where were collected the resources of the army, and of requiring for their support means of transport which no longer existed. This manœuvre, therefore, was rather a solace to his honourable pride than one which promised great advantage should it succeed. But in any case his lieutenants were not the judges of this question; and, as soon as he had resolved to establish himself upon the Alva, it was their duty to co-operate with his designs; whereas they rendered him no more hearty service on the Alva than they had done on the Mondego.

On the 18th they were on the Alva, the bridges over which had been completely restored. Junot was on the right, (looking towards the enemy,) near the point where the Alva joins the Mondego; Ney in the centre, behind Ponte Murcelha; Reynier to the left, towards the mountains, and on the slopes of the Estrella, whence the Alva takes its source; and Drouet, no longer detained by the orders of Massena, on the road to Almeida. Massena had expressly ordered Ney to defend well the position of Ponte Murcelha; and this he had promised sincerely to do, in order to repair the mischief incurred at Fox d'Arance.

But on this occasion, as if some fatal necessity pursued the army of Portugal, disobedience was to be exhibited by the most obedient, or rather the least disobedient, of Massena's generals,—viz.: General Reynier. Marshal Ney, upon the Alva, in the position of Ponte Murcelha, endeavoured to ascertain by reconnaissance whether his wings were well guarded from any surprise. On the right he had found himself closely supported by Junot's vedettes, but on the left he could find none of Reynier's, precisely in that part where the Sierra de Murcelha, being feebly connected with the Estrella, might be crossed. On perceiving himself almost abandoned on the left, Ney bitterly complained to Massena, who sent officers repeatedly in search of Reynier, who was at length found at a great distance from the Sierra de Murcelha,—that is to say, on the Sierra de Moita, another detached branch of the Estrella, situated far in

the rear of the actual position of the army. Reynier, having never during the retreat been required to perform the duty of rear-guard, which had been assigned to Marshal Ney, had during that fortnight adopted the practice of scattering his forces to a distance, for the sake of provisions, and of dispersing his men in the villages instead of keeping them together in fighting-order. He had, therefore, selected the encampment which he had found most convenient and least confined, without concerning himself about the protection of the left of the 6th corps. It should be added in explanation that Reynier had at length conceived some displeasure against the commander-in-chief. Being at the same time an accomplished soldier, and fond of writing on the events in which he took a part, he had drawn up a species of procès-verbal of the conferences of Golegao. His recital, inaccurate in several particulars, had displeased his colleagues, and Massena had been obliged to remonstrate with him, in consequence of which, and of the example of the other chiefs, he had gradually deviated from the respect and subordination due to the aged marshal under whom he had the honour to serve. Far from obeying the order to place himself at the left of the army, he replied by a plan of an attack against the right of the English which he thought would be attended with important results. But this was not what was demanded of him, and he ought in the first instance to have connected himself with Ney so as to protect him. But, while Reynier was discussing the operations that might have been undertaken, Ney, altogether exposed, seeing the English advance beyond the Alva on his left, was constrained, by well-founded prudential considerations, to abandon Ponte de Murcelha, and thus, though involuntarily, again to frustrate the projects of Massena. The position of the Alva was no longer tenable; nor was this to be regretted, except on account of Massena, whose pride would have been consoled. There was, therefore, no alternative but to gain the frontier of Spain, from which they were now at no great distance.

The English, on their side beginning to fail of provisions, owing to the difficulty of conveying them so far from the sea, and despairing of cutting off an army which so vigorously defended its rear, felt the necessity of halting for some days. The Portuguese, who always received their rations after the English had been supplied, and who were often altogether passed by with many compliments on their sobriety, were dying from hunger, amid loud complaints. Lord Wellington, therefore, came to the unavoidable resolution of halting for three or four days between Ponte de Murcelha and Coimbra. The French army continued its march in three columns unpursued, arrived about the 22d of March on the line of heights separating the valley of the Mondego from that of the Coa, and came in sight of the frontiers of Spain, which it had left six months before for the invasion of Portugal.

The old marshal re-entered Spain heart-broken. Although this third evacuation of Portugal was very dissimilar from the two previous, and had nothing in common with General Junot's retiring from Lisbon after capitulation, nor that of Marshal Soult's returning from Oporto without artillery,—though, after having

remained nearly six months on the Tagus, without aid, without provisions, without communications, without tidings from France, in one of the most difficult positions ever occupied by a commander-in-chief,—he had in this retreat displayed all the features of a great character; although he had performed a march of sixty leagues in a barren and wasted country, followed by an army double of his own, without the loss of a gun, a wounded man, or a baggage-wagon, and had inspired so much respect that the enemy had almost relinquished the pursuit,—though he had no cause for self-reproach in his principal determinations, which had all been alike distinguished by firmness and intelligence,—and though he had merely committed some faults of detail, vexatious, no doubt, but very frequent, even in the most vaunted wars,—yet, at his age, it was truly painful, after so many labours, so many triumphs, to terminate his numerous campaigns by one which, though possessing merit in the eyes of enlightened and well-informed judges, presented the appearance of failure to the ignorant public, ever open to impressions and judging only by results. And, besides, the aspect of his army was such as to occasion him profound uneasiness. Its present condition was no less strange than the recent campaign. At the first sound of the cannon, the soldiers resumed their ranks with as much firmness and discipline, and manœuvred with as much precision, as on parade, especially in Marshal Ney's corps, which, during the retreat, had in presence of the enemy behaved admirably. But at other times they were almost scattered, and wandered in all directions in search of food. They might be seen marching out of their ranks in companies, laden with the booty they had collected, mixed with long rows of the wounded carried on asses, or in baggage or artillery-wagons drawn by oxen, for the greater part of the draught-horses were either dead or exhausted by famine. There were scarcely enough to manœuvre a few guns before the enemy; nor could the cavalry trust to theirs in their present enfeebled condition. The soldier himself, sunburnt, emaciated, in rags, and barefoot, but vigorous, inured to fatigue, haughty, arrogant, licentious in language and habits, showed, in his distress, none of that resignation which sometimes ennobles the miseries of the warrior. His discontent approached nearly to insubordination. He accused every one as the cause of so many fruitless sufferings, his immediate superiors, the commander-in-chief, and even the Emperor. Massena, whose glory at the beginning of the campaign had been so imposing, had unfortunately lost all prestige by the faults of the chiefs of corps, who had not sufficiently spared him in their remarks, and still more unfortunately by his own fault. Old, fatigued, and well entitled to repose, which he had scarcely known for twenty years, he had the weakness to seek a solace for his protracted labours in a species of pleasure little conformable to his age, and which should never be presented to the eye of those whom we may be required to command. He was followed by a woman who had never quitted him during the whole campaign, and whose carriage the soldiers were required to escort in the most difficult and dangerous roads. In victory, the soldier laughs at the irregularities of his com-

mander; in ill fortune, they are regarded as crimes. Emboldened by the unsuitable language of several generals, the soldiers of the army of Portugal had exchanged a high respect for the noble career of Massena for a liberty of speech degrading to him and to themselves. Massena perceived this loss of respect, and felt it keenly. However, far from being agitated or disconcerted in a position in which few men could have avoided being so, he thought by new labours, to which he alone was inclined, to give another signification to the retrograde movement which he had just executed. Accordingly, immediately on regaining the frontier, he proposed to allow the army three or four days of rest; to send to the strongholds of Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo the lame, the wounded, the sick; to seize any clothing that happened to exist in the magazines; to settle the pay still in arrear, the funds for which had been detained at Salamanca; to procure a change of horses, and then by Guarda and Belmonte to cross the Sierra de Gata, which, as we have said, joins the Estrella to the Guadarrama, to descend upon the Tagus by Alcantara, following the road which had been adopted by Reynier to join him in the preceding July, and thus immediately to recommence the campaign of Portugal on new principles. There remained to him, deducting the troops of General Drouet, 40,000 men of inestimable value, not one of whom was accessible to fatigue or fear; and with such a force, combined with the army of Andalusia, he hoped to penetrate Portugal by a new direction. But to hope for success in a second effort of this nature, after the failure of the first, was to presume too much, if not upon the soldiers, at least upon the commanders. Of the soldiers every thing might still be expected when refreshed by rest, by good food, and clothing; but the plans of the marshal could derive no support from chiefs without union or energy, displeased with each other and with themselves, and unwilling to owe to perseverance the success they had not obtained from good fortune. And, accordingly, as soon as these plans were intimated from head-quarters, they gave rise to the severest criticisms and to an almost universal indignation.

They were, indeed, open to criticism in various points. Without asserting, as the lieutenants of Massena diligently disseminated even in the ranks, that, if they quitted the fortresses of Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, the English, finding Old Castile open, would immediately enter it, and cut off from their base of operation all the French armies engaged in Spain,—a resolution very unlikely on the part of so prudent a general as Lord Wellington, and, moreover, little to be feared, for Marshal Massena, by a prompt movement to the rear, would have soon forced him to repossess the frontier,—without alleging these unfounded reasons, one may ask if on going to the Tagus they would be able there to subsist, and if, granting that they might there subsist, they could attain the end assigned to the army of Portugal, which was to take Lisbon and to drive away the English: but they had just learned, by a cruel experience, that without the possession of both banks of the Tagus they could not attack Lisbon with success; if, in fact, they carried or

their operations by the left bank, they could not have possession of the right, unless in starting from Alcantara they should descend the stream on both banks. In order to this a pontoon-equipage would have been requisite, which they did not possess, and it would have been necessary to protect its movements by roads parallel to the river, which did not exist: the possession of the two banks, therefore, was not probable. Moreover, 40,000 men, however excellent, were not sufficient for offensive operation. They would always have required the co-operation of the army of Andalusia, which they had no greater reason to expect when they should go to seek it than when they had waited for it at Abrantes. If in reality that army had been unable to remove from Andalusia on account of the difficulties which there detained it, it would have been no more able when they should descend towards it. If, on the contrary, it had not been willing, they would not be able to inspire it with more devotion when near than when at a distance. It was, therefore, not to be presumed that the end would be attained by this new invasion of Portugal, any more than by the preceding. All that could be done was to give another proof of the invincible obstinacy of the old defender of Genoa. A reinforcement of 50,000 men, provisions, horses, pontoon-equipage, obedience to authority, and a time of repose, were all necessary to renew the campaign of Portugal with any chance of success; but none of these were procured by the resolution to march upon Alcantara.

Full of this project, which somewhat allayed his vexation, Massena, on arriving at the frontier of Old Castile, directed his three corps towards the Sierra de Gata, and assigned to them cantonments adapted to the march that they were soon to execute. To the corps of Reynier he assigned, as a place of repose, Belmonte, which is at the source of the Zezere, on the southern aspect of the Estrella; to the corps of Junot, Guarda, which is at the sources of the Mondego; and to the corps of Ney, Celorico, which is a stony land, very dry and poor, separating the waters of the Coa from those of the Mondego. The instructions of Massena, by ordering them to disencumber themselves of the wounded, the sick, and the useless baggage, to grant a little rest to the troops, to collect the necessary objects of equipment and the funds for the pay, intimidated his ulterior designs. He in particular requested Reynier, who had lived several months in Estremadura, to inform him concerning the resources of that country. The project of Massena was no longer a secret: its disclosure little pleased the corps of Reynier, which had no occasion to be satisfied with its residence in Estremadura, and which, moreover expected to find a country wholly exhausted; neither was it more pleasing to that of Junot, which, indeed, had no experience of Estremadura, but which had no inclination so soon to renew a campaign which had proved so hard and so fruitless. In Ney's corps matters were still worse. That corps had just endured all the fatigues and dangers of the retreat, which indeed was just; for, during the sojourn at Santarem, it had always been far from the enemy and entirely preserved from want. But it had suffered much, having been obliged, during the retreat, to keep in order, and, consequently,

prevented from foraging. And, moreover, there had been assigned to it, as a resting-place, a rocky desert where could be found neither bread, nor meat, nor vegetables where the only recreation was to behold a well-fed enemy, to be subject to continual alarms in the rear, and to be deluged with torrents of rain. To announce that, after three or four days of inaction and famine in that detestable place, it should be considered rested, and required to defile before Old Castile, to descend into Estremadura, where it had remained for a while at the time of the battle of Talavera without meeting with abundance, though the country was hitherto untouched, was to drive the corps to despair. The generals of division, in the name of their respective troops, loudly remonstrated with Marshal Ney, who lent no unwilling ear; they urged him to make known their distress to the commander-in-chief, to demonstrate to him the impossibility of remaining forty-eight hours in their present position, and the equal impossibility of resuming their march without having received clothing, shoes, money, or horses. But since the clothing, the shoes, and the money, were at Salamanca, and the horses no one knew where, it was very unlikely that three or four days, or even ten, would suffice to revictual the army. Marshal Ney especially recoiled from a new campaign under Marshal Massena. Encouraged by the complaints which he heard around him, and by the popularity which he enjoyed in his own corps, he yielded to a movement of insubordination which recalled certain periods of the revolution, but which was scarcely conceivable under Napoleon, unless in Spain, in the midst of the military anarchy which springs from privations, reverses, and distance. The marshal, therefore, wrote to the commander-in-chief a letter, in which, enumerating the unheard-of suffering of his corps, the impossibility of maintaining himself at Celorico, the necessity of allowing him to return to the Coa, the inconveniences of a new campaign on the Tagus, he formally demanded the production of orders from the Emperor, and declared that if, as he believed, no such orders existed, he should find himself forced to disobey. This was an extraordinary act, and one which shows how necessary is the force of law to restrain military men within the line of duty. Marshal Ney had excellent reasons for disapproving the movement to the Tagus, though in his despatch he had not selected the best; this disapprobation he might have expressed confidentially to the commander-in-chief, if the latter had asked his advice, or even without his having asked it; but to demand the Emperor's orders was the strangest pretension, for the office of commander-in-chief entitled Massena to obedience, whether he had the instructions of the Emperor or not, and warranted his modifying them according to his judgment. He was himself the only judge, and owed explanation to none but the Emperor, without being in any degree accountable to the officers under his authority.

Marshal Massena was persuaded that the insubordination and lukewarmness of his lieutenants had prevented him carrying the enemy's position at Busaco, passing the Tagus at Punhete, securing the line of the Mondego at Condeixa, and halting on the line of the Alva at

Ponte Murcelha. He was exasperated; and he would have indicated his displeasure earlier had he not wished to avoid a disturbance in the army which might have proved dangerous during the retreat. But, roused from his habitual indifference by the last act of Marshal Ney, he instantly resolved to deprive him of his sword in the presence of the whole army. He addressed him a despatch, in which, expressing astonishment at the letter he had received, and not condescending any reply to his demand to see the instructions of the Emperor, he repeated his former orders relative to a movement on the Tagus, and demanded whether he persisted in his refusal to obey. Marshal Ney perceiving, when too late, from this peremptory rebuke, to what he was exposed, would gladly have retracted so inconsiderate a step; but, finding himself set at defiance before his own staff, the worst of all courts, he dared not do so, but insisted on the production of the Emperor's orders in terms wholly inadmissible, though not quite so unbecoming as formerly.

After this obstinacy Massena delayed no longer. He ordered Marshal Ney immediately to quit the 6th corps, and to repair to the interior of Spain, there to await the decrees of the Emperor concerning him; he ordered General Loison, as the oldest general of division in the 6th corps, to assume the command, and forbade, under the penalty of revolt, that any should yield obedience to Ney. The sycophants whose flattery had led the illustrious marshal into a degree of insubordination much to be regretted, perceiving their miserable coterie broken up by the energy of the commander-in-chief, would gladly have induced the marshal to yield. But his pride, unhappily, would not allow him to do so, though an opportunity presented itself which might have opened a door for return. The English, having received their convoys of provisions, had again set themselves in motion; and, after having for some days abandoned the traces of the French army, they had just reappeared, apparently with the intention of pursuit. The presence of the enemy made it a point of honour not to leave the command of the 6th corps. Marshal Ney, entering his protest against the order directed against him, wrote to Marshal Massena that at the approach of the English he felt in duty bound to abide by the army. Massena, who was now inflexible, repeated the order to General Loison to take the command of the 6th corps. Marshal Ney, following up a momentary error with a praiseworthy submission, quitted the 6th corps, filled with regret for his loss, but with no disposition to revolt.

After this painful sacrifice to discipline, the troops displayed less insubordination in language, but no more inclination to renew upon the Tagus those attempts which were regarded as fatal to the army and useless to the designs of the Emperor. They had made up their mind to obey, but they had conceived a genuine hatred of those who exacted obedience. Though Massena, severe towards others as towards himself, took even too little account of what was called hardship, he had consented to move the 6th corps nearer to the fortresses of Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, so as to derive from their resources the necessary supplies for his soldiers, who therefore began to live at the expense of these places.

Unhappily, the country which they entered was as bare as the troops who sought to supply themselves from its resources. General Gardanne, who had been appointed to watch the rear of the army of Portugal and to collect supplies, had not been able to procure them. General Drouet, commanding the 9th corps, (the name given to the old division of Essling,) had only time to show himself, for he had immediately entered Portugal, and had consumed the little that had been gathered. In fact, some purchases had been made at the time of the departure of the army; but this was at Salamanca, and a portion of the grain then acquired was in the wagons that had been abandoned along the roads from Salamanca to Ciudad Rodrigo. The remainder had been used for the support of the Conroux and Claparede divisions. Scarcely did there remain in the fortresses of Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo a scanty supply for moderate garrisons during a siege; and even that supply would infallibly be soon consumed by the 6th corps. A new measure recently adopted by Napoleon had aggravated by complicating this sad state of affairs. He had named Marshal Bessières, the Duke of Istria, commandant of all the north of Spain, influenced by the following motives:—

Struck with the inconvenience of having different commandants at Burgos, Valladolid, Leon, and Salamanca, and, in particular, dissatisfied with General Kellermann, whose administration he blamed and whose too bold criticism he little relished, Napoleon had formed the design of uniting all the troops dispersed through the north of Spain under the head of a single commander-in-chief, who should have under his authority the provinces of Biscay, Burgos, Valladolid, Zamora, and Leon. For this high post he had chosen Marshal Bessières, because he had already served in the north of the Peninsula, where he had gained the brilliant victory of Rio Seco, and further because he was at the head of the Imperial guard. The main body of the troops in that region being that of the young guard, amounting to about 17,000 men, and residing at Burgos, Napoleon thought he could not do better than send thither the superior commandant of his guard. The Duke of Istria was already installed at Burgos when the army of Portugal re-entered Old Castile. Massena had written to him to announce his arrival, and to communicate to him his wants, his plans, his short sojourn in the north of the Peninsula, and to demand immediate succour in provisions, ammunition, and horses.

Marshal Bessières was a very brave man, an excellent cavalry-officer, a Gascon by origin, liberal in promises, inexact in their fulfilment, readily excited, but, in other respects, honourable, ingenious, and one who, under the shelter of a devotion well known to Napoleon, ventured to utter to him many useful truths. He had not failed, as all those who assumed command in Spain, to give a faithful description of the deplorable state of things, the great number of guerillas, the extreme suffering of the population, their profound hatred of us, the miseries of the army, and especially the singular circumstance of wagons full of corn being abandoned for want of horses on the road from Salamanca to Ciudad Rodrigo. In accordance with his natural disposition, he had accompanied these vivid descriptions with a somewhat

presumptuous promise speedily to restore order from chaos. Though he expressed the greatest respect and admiration for Massena, he had addressed to Paris accounts by no means flattering of recent events in Portugal, founded on the most deceitful of all testimony,—that of a discontented army; and, while writing in this manner to Paris, he lavished on Massena personally the assurances of the most entire devotion, and excited hope of succour, which he would indeed gladly have afforded if he had been able to procure them himself. He had begun by taking at Salamanca part of the money there accumulated for the payment of the army, and employing it in the purchase of corn on no very favourable terms, so that the funds had been spent before the period of service had been completed, and, instead of sending provisions to the army of Portugal, he had sent nothing but very zealous promises.

After some days of expectation upon the frontier of Old Castile, Massena, receiving no supplies, and at the same time hearing from Reynier and several others of his lieutenants no very encouraging details of the resources derivable from Estremadura,—seeing the provisions of Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo diminish with a rapidity that made it dangerous to remove far from these forts, which could not endure more than three or four weeks if blockaded by the enemy,—seeing his cavalry and artillery destitute of horses, and seeing also the growing aversion of all to a new campaign upon the Tagus,—at length renounced a design which had been the only consolation to his griefs since the successive losses of the lines of the Mondego and the Alva. From this moment there had been no means of concealing the true character of this painful retreat by marching upon Alcantara: it became necessary to acknowledge that, after a bold march upon Lisbon and an obstinate residence of six months on the Tagus, they had been obliged, like the two armies which had previously entered Portugal, to evacuate that country so unfavourable to the French arms.

Marshal Massena immediately despatched to Paris a confidential officer to explain to Napoleon the events of the retreat, the causes which had hindered his establishment on the Mondego, those which impeded his new march upon the Tagus, and the lamentable misunderstanding

between himself and Marshal Ney. He was to demand succour, instructions, and every thing necessary to recommence the campaign without loss of time. So great was the firmness and resolution of this illustrious veteran, overwhelmed with fatigue and vexation, that he appeared not to have experienced the slightest annoyance; his demand was not for rest, but for the means of action. He had not as yet received any answer to the mission of General Foy, who had been appointed to explain the movement from the Tagus to the Mondego.

At the same time he brought back the army into Old Castile. He distributed it between Almeida, Ciudad Rodrigo, Salamanca, Zamora, in cantonments where it might be refitted, and then went in person to Salamanca to endeavour by his presence to inspire activity in the administration of the army. He hoped, by proximity, to obtain something from the restless activity of Marshal Bessières, who continually professed himself his most affectionate and submissive lieutenant.

During the retreat we have just described, Marshal Soult had continued and completed the siege of Badajoz, commenced very tardily, concluded with remarkable alacrity. The fort of Pardaleras had been taken on the 11th February; but, though a *point d'appui* so near the enceinte had been taken at that early date, they had not reached the border of the ditch in the early part of March, which they ought to have reached in six or eight days, according to the rules of art, considering the strength of the place and the garrison. It is true that the battle of Gevora had been fought in the interval; but, according to the journal of the siege, it had withdrawn the troops for only three days, and had merely relaxed without suspending the works. Had the time before Badajoz been employed as in the other sieges of Spain,—if the fort had been taken in twelve or fifteen days after the capture of the fortress of Pardaleras,—the army of Andalusia might have been free between the 23d and 26th of February, and the succour demanded by Marshal Massena and ordered by Napoleon might have arrived in time to be of service, since Massena did not leave the Tagus before the 7th of March.\* There remained, indeed, the danger of separating themselves too far from Andalusia in order to penetrate Portugal,—a danger, how-

\* The following opinion is expressed by General Lamare in his work on the different sieges of Badajoz:—

"Amid the honourable exploits of the besiegers we cannot fail to detect errors; and the frankness with which we shall expose the latter will prove the sincerity of the praises bestowed on the former.

"We have no intention, however, to enter upon a minute detail of all those which had been committed, which would require us to follow the attacks day by day, and thus as it were produce an entirely new narrative; we shall therefore merely signalize the most serious, which may be shortly thus described.

"First: The principal cause of the prolongation of the siege arose from the first point of attack—that of the centre—having been badly chosen. General Lery ought to have availed himself of the advantage presented by the salient position of the bastion, the covering of which, partly seen from the plain, was then protected only by a covered way, to direct a vigorous attack on that bastion, and make his way to the glacis so as to be master of the covered way in less than eight days. During this operation, a second attack would have been carried on in the direction of Pardaleras, to silence the guns of that fort and to take it by main force.

"On this supposition, the rules of the profession required him to open the first parallel at 500 or 600 metres from the front and from the fortress Pardaleras, strongly

supporting by good redoubts the left of the parallel at the Guadiana and the right at the Calmon.

"One may readily conceive that this plan of attack would have been preferable to that which was adopted, and that much time and loss, both of men and ammunition, might have been spared by making use of the advantages thus presented.

"Though the defence of the Spaniards had been courageous, and the operations of the siege had been retarded by the severity of the season, by continual rain, by inundations in the trenches, by the want of provisions, by the numerous sorties, by the arrival of Mendizabal, by the battle of Gevora, and by the small number of the workmen, yet we may say that in addition to the errors committed in the direction of the attacks, whether on the part of the engineers or of the artillery, the siege of Badajoz was conducted tardily, and the army lost at least eight days before that place,—a precious time, which might have allowed the Duke of Dalmatia to approach the banks of the Tagus and to change the series of misfortunes which attended the retreat of the army of Portugal."—(Account of the Sieges and Defences of Badajoz, of Olivença, and of Campo Mayor, in 1811 and 1812, by the French troops of the army of the South in Spain, under the orders of the Marshal Duke of Dalmatia, by General Lamare. Paris, 1837. pp. 82 and 83.)

The opinion of Napoleon is different, though to the same

ever, a hundred times less than that to which they would be exposed when the English, emancipated from Marshal Massena, should throw themselves *en masse* upon Marshal Soult.

However this may have been, they scarcely reached the border of the ditch by the 8d or 4th of March. On arriving there, they perceived that the besieged were raising intrenchments in the interior of the bastions, so that if one bastion were taken they would have been arrested by another. On seeing this, they quickly changed the direction of their breaching-battery, directing it upon the curtain, (the wall which connects the bastion,) so that when the assault should take place they should immediately find themselves in the interior of the fort. In proportion as they approached the enceinte, the guns of the enemy, more concentrated on the same spot, and more easy to point, became extremely violent, overthrew the heads of the saps, threw the epaulements into the trenches, and killed or wounded fifty or sixty men a day. But the news brought from all quarters rendered it obligatory to surmount all obstacles. From Andalusia they learned that Marshal Victor was in the greatest danger; that an army formed before Gibraltar with English and Spanish troops taken from Sicily, Gibraltar, and Cadiz, was marching against him, and that he had no more than 7000 or 8000 men to oppose them; that General Sebastiani, instead of being always at hand to succour Marshal Victor, had sent his principal forces towards the kingdom of Murcia; that there was, therefore, great danger of seeing the siege of Cadiz raised, and the immense *matériel* collected for that siege destroyed. From Lisbon they learned that the English were making a movement towards the strongholds of Estremadura; that already 1000 men had appeared before Elvas; and that an English army, probably that of Lord Wellington himself, was advancing to raise the siege of Badajoz, which, along with other reports, gave reason to believe that Marshal Massena had at length been obliged to withdraw from the Tagus to the Mondego or the Coa. They were, therefore, threatened with the speedy defeat of Marshal Victor, with the raising of the siege of Cadiz, and perhaps even with the appearance of the English army, which, having no longer to do with Marshal Massena, would turn their forces against Marshal Soult, now reduced to 15,000 or 16,000 men under the walls of Badajoz. This was the first punishment of the fault they had committed in not uniting the 4th and 1st corps before Cadiz, and in not hurrying on the siege of Badajoz to rush with the 5th to Abrantes. Whether the fault were to be imputed to the general staff of Paris, which had badly combined the movements, or to the staff of Andalusia, who had badly executed the orders from Paris, the consequences

effect, and he thought that they might have taken Badajoz in the month of January. It is true that it was by forming a very high estimate of the operations, and by supposing that Marshal Soult should have left Seville for Estremadura at a much earlier date.

The following is his letter:—

“TO THE MAJOR-GENERAL.

“PARIS, February 5, 1811.

“... Write to the Duke of Istria to inform him that he will find in the *Moniteur*, which you will at the same time send, the latest news from Portugal, which seem to bear date the 13th; that every thing seems favourable; that if Badajoz have been taken during January, the Duke of Dalmatia will have been able to go to the

were already severely felt, as always happens in war, where every measure meets speedy justice in its result.

On the receipt of these news, Marshal Soult went to the trenches accompanied by Marshal Mortier and the principal officers of engineers and artillery. He announced to them all that he wished to be in Badajoz in forty-eight hours. They declared that the breaching-battery would be ready on the following day, and that in a few hours it would have so broken down the curtain as to make the assault possible. But the artillery-general, contradicting, as usual, the engineer-general, professed that the breaching-battery might meet the top of the counterscarp, and that in that case it could not direct its fire sufficiently low to reach the foot of the wall they wished to beat down, and that therefore the breach might not be practicable. Two days would be necessary to reach the counterscarp by a branch, so as to demolish the summit. An animated discussion ensued on this subject between the officers of artillery and engineers, which Marshal Soult cut short by deciding that they should beat down the summit of the wall of the counterscarp by force of hand. The engineer-officers maintained that it would be impossible to execute such a work unprotected, under the guns of the fortress; but the marshal, stimulated by the recent news, would listen to no objections, and determined that on that very evening a detachment of engineers, under the cover of night, should go to beat down a part of the wall, in order that the guns might be pointed more directly into the ditch. If human life were to be thus sacrificed to rapidity, it would have been better to have done so a week earlier.

They separated to execute the order. An engineer-officer, Captain Gillet, summoned up for its execution that pride which valiant soldiers sometimes summon up, in order, at the price of their own blood, to prove the errors of their commanders. At midnight he set out with twenty-five sappers to expose himself on the counterscarp and attack the crest with pick-axes. At the first sound of the iron on the stone, the enemy, who was on the watch, poured a shower of ball upon the brave men who thus devoted themselves to military discipline. In a few moments sixteen sappers out of twenty-five were killed or wounded, and the rest scattered. Captain Gillet returned alone, justly proud of having proved, at the risk of his life, how far his arm of the service had been right in the controversy.

The fire of the breaching-battery was opened immediately afterwards, and the demonstration was complete. Notwithstanding all that the artillery had said, the guns carried low enough to demolish the wall, and they soon drove the

Tagus, and to assist the Prince of Essling in the construction of the bridge.

“It becomes, then, very important to make these arrangements which I have ordered, that General Drouet, with his two divisions, may be wholly at the disposal of the Prince of Essling.

“Write at the same time to the Duke of Dalmatia to let him know the situation of the Duke of Istria, and to repeat the order to assist the Prince of Essling in his passage of the Tagus; that I hope that Badajoz will have been taken in the course of January, and that the union with the Prince of Essling on the Tagus will have taken place before the 20th of January; that, if necessary, he may withdraw some troops of the 4th corps; finally, that every thing is concentrated on the Tagus.”

ruins into the ditch. In spite of a terrible fire, the artillery-officers, rivalling the bravery of the engineers, continued their work of destruction, and on the 10th the breach was declared practicable. Marshal Soult, who had received still more disquieting news from Andalusia and Portugal, was unwilling to lose a moment, and summoned the governor who had succeeded the brave Menacho, killed during the siege. The governor perceived the danger of resistance, but endeavoured to parley, being informed of the approach of the British army. Marshal Soult, having no intention to be trifled with, gave orders for the assault at 4 p.m. The columns of attack were drawn up in the trenches, and were ready to rush upon the breach, when the white flag was displayed as the sign of surrender.

Not hoping to resist the energy of our soldiers, the Spaniards had consented to surrender, though they reckoned on speedy succour. Our troops entered Badajoz the following day, the 11th of March, with Marshals Soult and Mortier at their head. They made 7800 prisoners; they found a large quantity of artillery and powder in the magazines, and two pontoon-equipages, which a few days before would have been very valuable. This conquest had occupied forty-two days of open trenches,—a considerable time, if compared with the duration of the sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo, of Lerida, of Tortosa, and even of Tarragona, which occurred soon after.

Marshal Soult, after devoting two days to repairing, arming, and provisioning Badajoz, in order to make head against the English, immediately thought of returning towards Cadiz, being exceedingly anxious about events in that quarter. To Marshal Mortier he left about 7500 foot, 600 horse, a few hundreds of artillery and engineers, the whole amounting to less than 9000 men, with the duty of putting Badajoz into a complete state of defence, and of guarding the frontier of Estremadura as well as possible, with liberty to throw himself into any of the conquered Spanish or Portuguese fortresses, if there were no other resource. Having entered Badajoz on the 11th, Marshal Soult left on the 13th for Seville, with nearly 7000 men, to assist Marshal Victor, who was reported to have had a very rough encounter with the English. The proceedings in the neighbourhood of Cadiz were as follows.

Always fearing the concentration of our forces on the Tagus, the English had resolved to keep in motion between Murcia, Grenada, Gibraltar, and Cadiz, to such an extent that the French detained in Andalusia should not dare to quit it, even though they should have taken Badajoz. The plan was well conceived, and the execution was greatly facilitated by numerous errors on our part. Murat, at Naples, after having made all preparations for a descent upon Sicily, finding his means insufficient, had deferred the projected expedition, which was natural; but he committed the error of dispersing his army instead of keeping it together near the Straits of Messina, and of returning in person to Naples, declaring the abandonment of the projected descent,—an error severely blamed by Napoleon, and which left the English at liberty to detach 4000 or 5000 of their best troops for Gibraltar. These troops, united to some others already at Gibraltar, and

to part of the garrison of Cadiz, had mustered at the camp of Santa Roch to the number of 8000 or 9000 English and 12,000 Spaniards, making an army of about 20,000 men. The danger would not have been great if this number had consisted exclusively of Spaniards, so little formidable in the open field, though so brave in defence of fortresses; but the new army was rendered imposing by the presence of 8000 or 9000 English, and it could be met by nothing less than the union of General Sebastiani with Marshal Victor. Unfortunately, according to the plan of the Anglo-Spanish army, General Blake had shown great activity in Murcia, and had attracted thither General Sebastiani, who, being caught in the snare, had gone thither, and had sent only a weak column of a few hundred men to Tarifa, and another of 1200 or 1500 to Ronda. These isolated columns, without adequate guidance, could be of no service to Marshal Victor.

The Anglo-Spanish army, leaving Gibraltar, was to feign a march towards Medina Sidonia, as if desirous of penetrating into the interior of Andalusia, and then to fall back quickly upon the isle of Leon, and attack the rear of Marshal Victor, while the garrison left at Cadiz should attack him in front, and endeavour to carry all the small camps which formed the line of investment. At the same time the fleet should endeavour to land forces in the road in order to get possession of the redoubts raised by Marshal Victor along the sea.

This plan had been followed with accuracy, and, were it not for the energy of Marshal Victor, it might have led to the most disastrous consequences. Obligated to guard his principal redoubts and to locate some troops variously between Cadiz and Seville, and weakened by the diseases of summer, Marshal Victor had at his disposal no more than 8000 men. In the different posts in the line of investment, he left only the smallest possible number, sent 2500 men of the Vilatte division to Santi Petri, to drive back into the isle of Leon the garrison of Cadiz, which seemed threatening to leave it, and with 5000 men of the Leval and Ruffin divisions which remained to him, and 500 horse, he marched to the left in the direction of Gibraltar to meet the hostile army, of whose strength he was ignorant.

In the mean while the Anglo-Spanish army, after having made a demonstration in the direction of Caja Vieja on the road of Medina Sidonia, had fallen back upon the sea-shore, and gone by Conil and the tower of Barrosa towards Santi Petri, where they hoped to join the garrison of the isle of Leon, and then to fall upon the French shut up in their lines. But the combinations of Marshal Victor had thwarted all their designs.

On the 8d of March, General Villatte, having surprised the Spaniards, who had just thrown a bridge over the extremity of the canal of Santi Petri and had already passed the canal, drove them back into the isle of Leon with the loss of about 100 killed, 100 drowned, and 400 prisoners. He then took up his position near the canal, awaiting the appearance of the English army, which Marshal Victor had gone to seek. On the 4th it was ascertained that it was coasting the sea-shore, and on the 5th it had appeared on the sandy hills, having the sea to the



rear, Santi Petri on the left, the tower of Barrocca on the right. If at this moment the French had employed a sufficient force this army might have been taken entire, for, if attacked in front by Marshal Victor, and driven by him to the sea, having no other issue than the passage of the canal which was defended by General Villatte, it would have had no means of retreat, and would have been reduced to capitulate. In these circumstances 4000 or 5000 of Sebastiani's men would have produced immense results, and the surrender of Cadiz might have immediately followed.

Marshal Victor, on the morning of the 5th, no longer hesitated to assume the offensive with the 5000 men under his command. Leaving on his right General Villatte, who, by occupying the banks of the canal, drew to himself part of the enemy's forces, he attacked with energy the sandy hills occupied by the Anglo-Spanish. Unfortunately our artillery, badly horsed, and dragged with difficulty along these marshy sands, could not render all the service that might have been expected; the infantry, on the other hand, formed in two columns under Generals Leval and Ruffin, attacked the English lines with impetuosity, after being exposed to a murderous fire almost at the cannon's mouth. They drove the first line upon the second, but halted when they saw three lines more to be broken, for the Anglo-Spanish, disregarding Marshal Villatte, had pressed in close ranks one behind the other, and presented four parallel lines. There was no chance of beating 20,000 men with 5000, especially when the 20,000 included 9000 English. Besides, though the enemy had lost about 2000 men in killed and wounded, we had lost nearly 1200, and we ran a great risk by sacrificing ourselves for the sake of continuing this combat. Marshal Victor then took a position a little in the rear, awaiting General Villatte, whom he had sent for, and ready, notwithstanding every danger, to renew the struggle if the disembarked army would quit the sea-shore and penetrate into the interior of Andalusia.

The enemy, who had remained for two days immovable, did not venture to renew so rough a contest, and feared lest by the arrival of reinforcements they should be driven into the sea. They, therefore, beat a retreat, and relinquished the attempt to raise the siege of Cadiz. In this strange operation we had lost five guns, sunk in the sand and deprived of their horses, which had been shot; but the enemy had not taken them away. The English fleet had taken two of our redoubts, each guarded by about twenty men; but we recovered them two days afterwards.

When Marshal Soult returned to Andalusia he found every thing repaired, the siege of Cadiz continued, but a very decided triumph lost for want of having seasonably combined General Sebastiani with Marshal Victor. Thus, by a series of errors in which certainly Marshal Massena bore the smallest part, though on him the whole reverses of the campaign were thrown, they had failed to take Lisbon and Cadiz when almost in their grasp, and, so far from having expelled the English from the Peninsula, had left them masters of Portugal, and in a condition to dispute with us the possession even of Andalusia.

Marshal Soult, in fact, notwithstanding the

conquest of Badajoz and the energy displayed in the battle of Barrocca, found himself in the most critical position. After his various engagements, Marshal Victor had scarcely the means of maintaining the blockade of Cadiz; Marshal Mortier, left at Badajoz with some thousand men, was reduced to the necessity of shutting himself up in that city or removing to a distance from it; Badajoz, recently besieged and occupied by the French, was about to be immediately besieged by the English, and probably reoccupied by them, unless assisted by an army able to keep the field; finally, Marshal Soult had at command only 7000 or 8000 men taken from Estremadura and brought to Cadiz when they were no longer required; from what source could this feeble corps be so strengthened as to raise it to the proportion of an army, so as to return to Estremadura and collect the detachment of Marshal Mortier, which would probably be reduced to a mere wreck after having furnished the garrison of Badajoz? It was plain that any reinforcements must be sought from the 4th corps; but how was it possible to afford Marshal Soult the elements of an army sufficiently strong to save Badajoz, while obliged to guard Grenada, to watch Murcia, and to succour Marshal Victor?

Full of anxiety, Marshal Soult wrote to demand kind offices and assistance from King Joseph whom he had little spared, and Marshal Massena, whom he had little aided. To Paris he wrote, requesting the restoration of the marching battalions detained by the armies of the centre and the North, a reinforcement of 15,000 foot and 1000 gunners, and that the army of Portugal, with which he had been unwilling to combine, should be ordered to join him in Estremadura.

Such then was the situation of the affairs of Spain, after so many troops had been sent thither in consequence of the peace of Vienna, after so many hopes entertained by Napoleon even at Schenbrunn, after eighteen months of every species of efforts! Massena, who was to have pushed the English into the sea, had retired from the lines of Torres Vedras, into Old Castile, with an army exhausted by fatigue, distracted by discord, emaciated by famine, without shoes, horses, or *matériel*. Marshal Soult, who had left for Andalusia with 80,000 men, after having met no difficulty either in Grenada, Cordova, or Seville, after being allowed fourteen or fifteen months to become master of Cadiz, was now rather besieged before that city than besieging it, and, though he had taken Badajoz, had no means of securing that conquest now threatened by the English.

The greater part of this intelligence was brought to Napoleon by General Foy. He was well received personally, because he knew how to make himself agreeable; but he met with little attention when he wished to enter on the defence of his commander-in-chief. Napoleon, who ought to have blamed none for their mischances, except himself, the supreme director of events, pitilessly reproached his illustrious lieutenant whom he should have consoled instead of upbraiding, like the ignorant public who judge only by the result and make no allowance for circumstances. "Why," he repeated at every interview, "why risk a battle at Busaco? why march upon Lisbon instead of

remaining at Coimbra? why remain so long inactive on the Tagus, without endeavouring to draw out the English army so as to engage it in the open field? why quit the Tagus when Marshal Soult was on the point of being able to march upon Abrantes? why retrograde so quickly and so far? why not, at least, stay at the Mondego?" We have already related the greater part of these reproaches, and shown their real value. That Massena gave battle at Buraco arose from the incessant urgency of Napoleon to throw himself upon the English at the first opportunity, and not to spare them; that he had not stayed at Coimbra arose from Napoleon having enjoined him to drive them to the sea, and from his ignorance of the existence of the lines of Torres Vedras, which Napoleon ought to have known, placed as he was in the centre of information from all parts of Europe, but which it was very excusable in Massena not to have known, while situated in Spain scarcely able to obtain any light upon the state of things a few leagues removed from himself. His prolonged sojourn on the Tagus arose from his hope of receiving there General Drouet with 15,000 or 20,000 men, and Marshal Soult with 20,000 or 25,000, and, with this double reinforcement, of crossing the Tagus and attacking Lisbon on each side of the river, as well as from Napoleon's own order to remain there as long as possible. His inaction arose from the impossibility of performing any thing great or useful, owing to the Tagus, which it was impossible to cross, and the English lines, which they could not force; to draw so prudent a general as Lord Wellington from his formidable asylum was a thing more easily discussed in the saloon of the Tuileries than executed before Torres Vedras; nor had Massena cartouches for more than one battle, and the soldiers, however brave, were unwilling to lavish their blood in daily contests which they well knew to be useless. His retirement after six months arose from his having no longer any means of support upon the Tagus, from the aid afforded by Drouet having been reduced to 7000 men, ever ready to remove, and that of Soult to a cannonade of Badajoz heard for a moment. And the movement on the Mondego had assumed the character of a final retreat into Old Castile, because the lieutenants of Massena had almost conspired to render it inevitable.

Undoubtedly Massena was in the wrong in not having correctly appreciated the possibility of crossing the Tagus at the junction of the Alviela; but General Eblé himself had shared in this error, and Napoleon at Essling had been equally deceived as to the means of crossing the Danube. It is also true that during the retreat Massena had lost more than one opportunity of inflicting a serious blow upon the English, by the want of a perfect understanding in the distribution of his troops. These reproaches were well founded; but Napoleon did not know that they were so, the true state not being perfectly known by him; but what general, even among the most renowned, has not been exposed to such as these? It is not unlikely that Napoleon would have obtained correct information concerning the facilities afforded by the island at the mouth of the Alviela, and might therefore have crossed the Tagus at that point; and that at Redinha he

would have had 20,000 more men under his command, and therefore have crushed the English. But Massena was not Napoleon; nor could Napoleon suppose that his sending him thither was equivalent to his own presence, especially when every one, and Massena among the first, told him that he was the only person capable of bringing the war in Spain to a favourable issue. It was therefore neither just nor generous nor politic to upbraid Massena, especially when the cause of all the evil lay in the illusions which were indulged at Paris, which made them reckon upon 70,000 men at the beginning of the campaign instead of 50,000; when the means of transport, always promised, reduced themselves ultimately to nothing; when General Drouet, sent to afford aid, became the source of danger; when the passage of the Tagus, recommended as the decisive movement, proved to be almost impossible even after the marvellous erection of a pontoon-equipage from nothing; when the arrival of Marshal Soult with 20,000 men ordered for January resulted in the arrival at Badajoz of 7000 or 8000 men in March, and even these obliged, after a momentary demonstration, to regain Seville with the utmost haste.

Regardless of all these truths, Napoleon was still more severe in his censure of Massena than on the former occasion, and General Foy defended him with less courage and skill. After numerous interviews with the general and other officers recently arrived, Napoleon gave the following orders to his generals commanding in Spain:—

Recognising the impossibility of making Marshal Ney serve under Marshal Massena, he recalled the former, whose energy and talents he foresaw that he should soon require elsewhere. He replaced him by Marshal Marmont, Duke of Ragusa, again committing the error of subjecting one marshal to another. Marshal Marmont, it is true, an old officer of the army of Italy, full of deference for Massena, intelligent, mild, and sociable, and of chivalrous courage, might be a submissive lieutenant, and, if necessary, a useful substitute to the commander-in-chief of the army of Portugal. Napoleon despatched him with orders to engage immediately in the recomposition of the 6th corps,—a task to which he was well adapted, being very skilful in the organization of troops. He attached General Drouet altogether to the army of Portugal, and ordered Marshal Bessières to furnish that army with horses, mules, provisions, ammunition, and, in a word, to put it in a condition to execute the original design of Massena, which was to descend upon the Tagus by Plasencia and Alcantara. Not yet sure whether it would be possible to make a new campaign in Portugal, Napoleon considered the army of Massena as that which, without once losing sight of Lord Wellington, should follow all his movements, resist him in Castile if he should remain on the Mondego, in Estremadura if he should descend upon the Tagus, and give him battle on the first opportunity, while the army of Andalusia, after receiving reinforcements, should finish the siege of Cadiz. If, in the mean while, General Suchet, after conquering Tarragona, should be able to march upon Valencia and effect an entrance, they would then have the means, Valencia and Cadiz being

taken, to direct themselves against Lisbon with a large part of the army of Andalusia and all that of Portugal. Though the plan of 1810 had failed, they had nevertheless succeeded in taking all the fortresses on the frontiers of Portugal, Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida in the North, Badajoz and Olivença in the South, and, if across this line of fortresses the English should attempt to penetrate Spain by Castile or Estremadura, Massena, reinforced and revictualled, ought to give them battle with a fair chance of success, and might in one day change the whole aspect of affairs, for a single defeat would expose the English to extreme danger. Now, unjust as Napoleon was to that illustrious marshal, he well knew that he was the only one to whom he could intrust a great operation in war, especially when Kleber was dead and Moreau in exile.

But, while with inexhaustible fertility of mind, and also, unfortunately, of illusions, Napoleon was thus rearranging his plans, he had foreseen, even before the arrival of couriers from Andalusia, the embarrassment to which Marshal Soult would be exposed. It was not probable that the army of Marshal Massena could reach the Tagus before a month; and in the mean while every thing indicated that the English would *en masse* take the road from Estremadura to regain Badajoz, or at least would send in that direction a strong detachment which Marshal Soult could not possibly resist. On this occasion, also, Napoleon, exercising a degree of energy which he no longer commonly evinced in the affairs of Spain, both because he had grown weary of them and also because he was unwilling to give positive orders at so great a distance, ordered the army of the centre and the army of the North to forward immediate reinforcements to Andalusia. He ordered General Belliard, who, under Joseph, directed the movements of the army of the centre, to restore to Marshal Soult all the detachments belonging to him; Marshal Bessières, commanding the army of the North, he ordered to despatch all the battalions belonging to the 4th, 1st, and 5th corps which composed the army of Andalusia. He had already directed towards Castile a division of reserve formed of marching battalions intended to recruit the armies of Andalusia and Portugal; he advised Bessières not to retain this, pointing out to him that he might venture to diminish his own force in some degree, being protected towards Old Castile by the return of the army of Massena into that province. He enjoined Major-General Berthier to draw up these orders in the most absolute form, adding that the military commanders intrusted with their execution would incur the charge and consequent punishment of serious disobedience if they failed to execute them fully and immediately. These measures, he thought, would procure Marshal Soult a speedy succour of 12,000 or 15,000 men, which would enable him to repair the losses sustained by the 1st corps, to reinforce the 5th, to show some resistance to the English on the frontier of Estremadura, and to wait till Massena should be able to follow the steps of Lord Wellington if he should have quitted the north for the south of Portugal.

These orders, though issued in the end of March, could scarcely be executed before the

end of April or the beginning of May, and it was to be feared that before that period some important events should have transpired either on the frontier of Old Castile or Estremadura. Lord Wellington, after being exposed to serious difficulties with the Portuguese and British governments so long as he remained behind the lines of Torres Vedras, had attained a very different position since the retreat of Marshal Massena. The Portuguese and English had been obliged to acknowledge that he was in the right, and that he alone had fully comprehended the kind of war with which it was right to oppose the French in Spain, and that in the lines of Torres Vedras he had erected the only obstacle that could arrest the fortune of Napoleon. His part, already considerable, had acquired much greater importance in the eyes of his auxiliaries and countrymen. While Massena, in all respects an adversary worthy of him, met only injustice, censure, and reproach, Lord Wellington, much thwarted for a moment, at length obtained that justice which never fails to attend success, which a free country may perhaps delay, but ultimately is sure to grant, because it derives illumination from opposition, which too often irritates without enlightening sovereigns accustomed to wield an absolute authority. Though Lord Wellington had gained no decisive victory, nor any other advantage than to have removed the French from before his lines, he had seen the whole opposition led by Lord Grey give honourable testimony to his arrangements, and declare that he had falsified all their fears and surpassed their hopes, and completely changed the aspect of affairs by his firmness in remaining within the lines of Torres Vedras. From this moment the situation of the peace and war parties in the British parliament was quite changed, and, instead of being nearly equal, the war party had assumed an irresistible and permanent ascendancy. Commercial suffering was no doubt still great, and financial difficulties embarrassing; but the British mind was removed from the state of perpetual anxiety and of fear of the utter destruction or repulse of the army. The Prince of Wales no longer thought of a change of ministry, though the physicians had pronounced the malady of his father incurable, which it was supposed would have led him to adopt one more in accordance with his previous sentiments. Gradually accustomed to those ministers whom he had at first disliked, exercising no longer any delicacy towards the opposition which evinced none towards him, confirmed in his intention to maintain the present state of things by the success of the war party, he now only thought of giving as much support to Mr. Perceval and his colleagues as could have been given by George III. The excellent opportunity offered to Napoleon was now lost, and Lord Wellington, loaded with honours, saw every obstacle give way which for a moment seemed to have barred his way to fortune. With his principal army he had followed Marshal Massena to the frontier of Old Castile, and had sent Marshal Beresford with General Hill's troops to face the army of Andalusia. He proposed to leave the main body of his forces in sight of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, and to go with the rest to reconquer Badajoz and restore affairs in Estremadura to their former condition. The succour received

from Sicily and England admitted of his performing this double task, without incurring any risk, at least for a time. The extreme destitution of Old Castile, the necessity of Massena's army dividing itself in order to obtain provision, had inspired him with the hope that he could invest Almeida without opposition and regain it simply by famine. In this confidence, Lord Wellington thought that he might absent himself for a few weeks, and had repaired to Badajoz, personally to direct the operations which were there to be undertaken.

The views of the English general were unfortunately too correct both as regarded Estremadura and Castile. It will be remembered that Massena, anxious to re-establish the efficiency of his army, had gone in person to Salamanca. Unhappily, he was there no longer at home, as during the preceding year, but with a host, full of expression and of promise, and of excitement, without malevolence, but not unwilling to obtain estimation at the expense of another, and effecting very unimportant results with the appearance of great activity. The result of all Marshal Bessières' promises since he assumed the command of the northern provinces was merely as follows:—Of the sums due to the army of Portugal 3,000,000 had arrived at Salamanca. Instead of devoting this amount to that unfortunate army, whose officers stood so greatly in need of money, Marshal Bessières had sent a million, had appropriated another to the payment of provisions, and retained the third in his own hand to meet unforeseen emergencies, undertaking to reimburse it quickly from the funds which should be received from Burgos and Bayonne. If his profession had been realized, the evil would not have been without some alleviation. But the million expended had produced a return very different from that which had been expected. Marshal Bessières had promised 18,000 fanegas of wheat, of which, if he was to be believed, 10,000 were already at Salamanca, 6000 were on the road to Ciudad Rodrigo, and 2000 were ready to be delivered. At the same time he promised the means of transport for these supplies, and, further, a quantity of biscuits, mules, horses, and, finally, as soon as the English should appear, an immediate reinforcement of 8000 or 10,000 men in infantry and cavalry. But instead of 10,000 fanegas of wheat collected at Salamanca, there were only 6000, and not one on the road to Ciudad Rodrigo; no one had heard of those which were said to be ready to be delivered; there were neither biscuit, transports, horses, nor mules. The succour afforded in *matériel* gave some idea of that which would be afforded in men. In the mean while Massena had been obliged to scatter his troops from the summit of the Sierra de Gata to Benavente, near the Asturias, to keep them in life. Apprehensive of the appearance of the English, he was unwilling that Reynier should extend so far towards the kingdom of Leon, and that the 6th should approach so near to the summit of the Sierra de Gata. But he had been disobeyed by Reynier, who, distressed at the sufferings of his men, had added to insubordination language very inconsistent with his position. Though he had ordered Drouet not to quit the neighbourhood of Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, in order to prevent those

places from being blockaded and deprived of the means of obtaining provisions, that general had retrograded as far as Salamanca, assigning the too valid excuse of the urgent want of his men. What could be done against lieutenants in a state of irritation and insubordination arising from the misery of their men? Must they be broken in the presence of the army because they had wished to supply it with bread? Such was the war of Spain, conducted by orders from Paris, where these circumstances were little known, and where they were professedly ignored in order more easily to command movements in most cases impossible.

However, two powerful reasons inspired Massena with the desire of concentrating the army,—viz.: his wish to prevent the investment of Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, which it was absolutely necessary to revictual, and his hope of inflicting a terrible blow upon the English army when deprived of its commander-in-chief and of part of its effective, which should raise the character of French arms in the Peninsula. He had just learned that Lord Wellington had repaired to Badajoz; he supposed the detachments sent into Estremadura were considerable; and he wished to make the British general repent having too lightly estimated the army of Portugal in venturing to quit its neighbourhood.

From the moment when this hope dawned upon his mind, Massena had become another man: he had used every means—authority where he could command, prayers where he could only entreat—in order to obtain what was indispensable to set his army in motion. He wished to take with him at least 3000 horse, thirty guns, biscuit for twelve or fifteen days, and a convoy for Almeida, which had only fifteen days' provisions. If the English remained two or three weeks under the walls it must surrender. It is true that Napoleon had authorized its explosion, but the pride of the defender of Genoa could not allow him to destroy it in the presence of the enemy, nor could that operation be performed without time. Massena therefore wrote to his lieutenants and to Marshal Bessières, explained the lofty motives which actuated him, and entreated them to enable him to march about the 20th April. Reynier, Junot, Drouet, and Loison, unanimously demanded some days more, for their horses had not recovered, and it was impossible to procure immediately even the small quantity of biscuit which they absolutely required. Marshal Bessières, instead of frankly alleging the difficulty of executing what was demanded, replied by additional promises, which were of doubtful fulfilment, and, along with these promises, lavished on Massena the assurance of the most absolute devotion.

But the danger of these fortresses, particularly of Almeida, was great; opportunity, so fugitive in war, was passing away, and Massena, no longer depending on the words of Bessières, and disregarding the resistance of his lieutenants, gave final orders for concentration. Through the excellent General Thiebault, Governor of Salamanca, who, though subject to Bessières, availed himself of the presence of Massena to obey him exclusively, and by means of funds taken from the pay, they had procured some quintals of grain and some salt meat to supply

Almeida: some quintals of biscuit for the army during the transit; and after collecting this feeble supply Massena had resolved to throw himself into the invested fortress over the body of the British army. The idea of a pitched battle, so alarming to many distinguished generals, animated Massena, for in these serious crises his superior *coup-d'œil* and his immovable firmness appeared conspicuously. Yielding to his peremptory commands, his lieutenants at length gradually concentrated behind the Agueda, which they were obliged to pass at the bridge of Ciudad Rodrigo, then to direct their march upon Almeida, situated at some leagues' distance from Ciudad Rodrigo.

The soldiers, though scarcely rested, were filled with ardour at the idea of a decided encounter with the English. Relieved of the weak and worn-out men, there remained scarcely 40,000 combatants, including at most 2000 cavalry,—unequaled, it is true. They brought with them about forty guns,—a very small quantity and less than one-half of the usual proportion. Though so greatly reduced, this army was capable of the utmost heroism. Unhappily, no generals except Montbrun and Fournier, who commanded the cavalry, shared in the ardour of the soldiers. Loison, though brave, was disconcerted at the want of confidence in him exhibited by the 6th corps, which had never been consoled for the loss of its commander, Marshal Ney. Junot had not recovered of his wound; Reynier, not yet recovered from the fatigues and agitations of the campaign, had no spirit for any great undertaking; and Drouet, who had been hitherto of so little use, had just learned that he was to quit the army of Portugal. Napoleon, in fact, every day more uneasy for the army of Andalusia, had ordered the 9th corps immediately to cross the Guadarrama and the Tagus in order to reach to Guadiana, ignorant that, with a view of bringing it sooner against the English, he was actually removing it from the field of battle where it might aid in their destruction. However, while urging Massena to despatch it as soon as possible, he had left him to fix the time of its departure. Massena ordered Drouet to follow it, which that general, under a sense of honour, could not refuse on the eve of an important engagement. But he was no more than the rest disposed for a last effort. Moreover, the unexpected news of a general battle disappointed the hopes of rest, though it could not affect the courage, of many officers of high rank, who had reckoned on leave after a difficult campaign of fifteen months. Men accustomed to danger brave it whenever necessary, but on condition that it has been so constantly present to their thoughts as to preserve their mind in a state of continual preparation.

Massena, sure of himself and his admirable soldiers, on this occasion bending every will to his own, took the way for Ciudad Rodrigo with no more than 34,000 men out of 40,000, having deemed it right to leave the Clausel division (one of Junot's two) on the road to Salamanca to protect his communications; for by this road he was to receive provisions, ammunition, and reinforcements. At the moment of starting he addressed some bitter words to Bessières, saying that, though left to face the enemy almost alone, without bread, guns, or horses, he would

not the less press forward, but the responsibility of all consequences in the sight of France and the Emperor would lie upon those who had afforded him so little aid. He received in reply a new letter from Marshal Bessières, of so definite a character that he thought it his duty not to neglect the succour he announced, which though feeble in quantity, was very valuable in quality. It consisted of 1500 horse, including 800 of the guard under General Lepic, and 700 light cavalry under General Wathier, a well equipped battery of six guns, and thirty artillery-teams. In the present state of the army such an assistance might decide the fate of a battle, and therefore, notwithstanding the risk to which Almeida might be exposed, and the loss of the opportunity afforded by the absence of Lord Wellington, Massena resolved to defer his movement from the 28th of April to the 1st of May.

He had already reached Ciudad Rodrigo on the line of the Agueda; he there reviewed his soldiers, weather-beaten and emaciated, but accustomed to fatigue and danger, full of confidence and pride. The sight of such men warranted the hope of speedy and brilliant success; but his hopes were diminished though not destroyed by a report which might easily have been anticipated. Lord Wellington, aroused by preparations imperfectly concealed, had returned to his army. Though the presence of such a commander could not fail to give great strength to his army, Massena, who knew no fear in the field, attached no undue importance to his return; he knew that the English army must be aware of it, concentrated, and perhaps reinforced, for the commander-in-chief could not be supposed to return alone; but no such consideration restrained him, and he moved forward conscious of superiority in himself and his soldiers. On the 1st of May he was about to leave Ciudad Rodrigo, without waiting for Marshal Bessières, who nowhere appeared, and whom he was not surprised to find once more faithless to his promises, when intimation was given of the appearance of that marshal at the head of a brilliant staff which in those days accompanied the Imperial guard. Marshal Bessières threw himself into the arms of Massena, who received him cordially, for he knew him to be brave and true, though superficial. But, as he seemed to come alone, Massena asked if his own sword was all the aid he brought. Bessières assured him that the evening would see in his camp the 1500 horse, the battery of six guns of the guard, and the thirty artillery-teams. These were in fact on the road from Salamanca to Ciudad Rodrigo.

The certainty of this succour, especially in cavalry, filled every countenance with satisfaction. They resolved to wait till the next day. Part of the provisions promised by Bessières had arrived; about 1000 fanegas of wheat, of which they proceeded to make bread. The troops, though not in abundance, had food; but it was necessary not to leave them long in their present position, which would have obliged them to use the convoy destined to Almeida, the introduction of which was the object of this new campaign. It was equally necessary to spare their ammunition; for their cartouches and gun-charges were no more than would supply a single battle.

The reinforcement of the Duke of Istria having arrived during the evening, they employed the night in sending off the artillery-teams, and prepared to take the road on the morning of May 2. The army defiled by the bridge of Ciudad Rodrigo on the Agueda, and distributed itself in the following manner. Reynier with the second corps took the right; the eighth under Junot, reduced to the Solignac division, the ninth under General Drouet, composed of the Conroux and Claparede division, occupied the centre; the sixth under Loison, united with the cavalry of the army, took the left. To the dragoons, hussars, and chasseurs under Montbrun, were joined about seven hundred light cavalry, under General Wathier, which had been brought up by Marshal Bessières. Montbrun thus commanded 2400 horse, of which 1000 were dragoons and 1400 were hussars and chasseurs; 800 fine horsemen of the guard, forming the remainder of the cavalry brought by Bessières, escorted the convoy which was to be introduced into Almeida, and which consisted of 120,000 rations of biscuit, 100 quintals of flour, 80 quintals of vegetables, 80 quintals of salt meat, and 100,000 rations of brandy. The army thus reinforced reckoned about 36,000 men under arms.

On crossing the Agueda, they found the advanced posts of the English on each side of a little river called the Azava, and behind which they retired, after some of their men had been killed or taken by our cavalry. Their true position was a little farther, on another stream, the Dos Casas, deeply imbedded, and thus presenting one of those natural obstacles which the English valued as a defence. This stream, after a course of only a few leagues, enters the Agueda, passing before the fort of the Conception, which we had half destroyed the preceding year. It was behind this stream that the enemy's army was ranged to the number of from 42,000 to 48,000 men, of whom from 27,000 to 28,000 were English, 12,000 Portuguese, and from 2000 to 8000 Spaniards, the latter under the command of Don Julian. Lord Wellington, setting out from Elvas on the 25th of April, had arrived on the 28th at his camp, and himself had made all his arrangements. Ranged behind the Dos Casas, he had placed at a distance on his right, towards the village of Poso Velho, near the very source of the Dos Casas, the skilful scout Don Julian to watch the movements of the French in this direction. Nearer his centre, in a more enclosed part of the Dos Casas, at the village of Fuentes d'Onoro, he had fixed his light division under General Crawford, with a portion of the Portuguese troops, and a little behind, three strong divisions of infantry, the first under General Spencer, the third under General Picton, the seventh under General Houston. This point of Fuentes d'Onoro was important, for it defended the principal communication of the English with Portugal,—that is to say, the bridge of Castelbon over the large river Coa. Cut off from this bridge, there remained to them only the one below Almeida, very insufficient for a retreating army, particularly for an army briskly pursued. This explains why Lord Wellington had concentrated such a strong force both in front of and behind Fuentes d'Onoro. To his left, near Alameda, at a point where the Dos Casas was

of a depth which rendered it difficult to cross, he had stationed the 6th division under General Campbell; farther yet, and forming a bend in the rear towards the fort of the Conception, the 5th under General Dunlop; then finally the remainder of the Portuguese, to unite the fort of the Conception with Almeida. Thus, with his right reinforced he defended at Fuentes d'Onoro the principal communication of his army upon the Coa, by a prolongation of his left he united himself to the fort of the Conception and the fortress of Almeida. As this field of battle covered scarcely an extent of three leagues and a half, he could, if Massena, in place of bearing directly against Fuentes d'Onoro, should defile before it to descend upon the fort of the Conception, and upon Almeida, cross the Dos Casas and throw himself upon the flank of the French. It is true that such movements, easy for the French army, were almost impracticable for the British army. But without such great pretension, and without crossing the Dos Casas, he could without difficulty fall back from his right upon his left, to concentrate his forces round the fort of the Conception, which was but partially destroyed, and which still presented a sufficient *appui* in a day of battle. The position of Fuentes d'Onoro was attended with but one inconvenience, which was that of having behind it a stream very similar to that in front; this stream was the Turones, which might either prove a danger or an additional security, according as they should have time to fall back in good order or should be thrown upon it in confusion. Such was the position behind which Lord Wellington, with his accustomed prudence and felicity in the selection of defensive sites, had resolved to await the French. Although very cautious, our want of success began to render him more daring, and this time he hazarded a meeting which he might by possibility have avoided. The time had passed when he shunned all but inevitable battles.

Massena, having remained during the night between the 2d and 8d of May a little in front of the Azava, took up his position on the morning of the 8d of May upon the Dos Casas, facing the English. Reynier, on the right, came to line the Dos Casas, opposite Alameda; Solignac, with the only division of the 8th corps present in the camp, and Drouet, with the 9th, placed themselves at the centre, between Alameda and Fuentes d'Onoro, a little behind the Dos Casas; Loison, with the 6th, and Montbrun, with the cavalry, were posted facing Fuentes d'Onoro.

After having seen the position occupied by the enemy, Massena settled his course of action. He had the choice of two plans,—either to defile by his right, executing a march in flank before Lord Wellington, to descend the course of the Dos Casas as far as the Fort of the Conception, thence to penetrate to Almeida, or else to attack vigorously by his left the right of the English, stationed at Fuentes d'Onoro, cut them off from Castelbon and from the Coa, throw them back upon their centre and their left as far as Almeida, then finally hurl them altogether upon the Lower Coa, where their retreat would be very difficult and where they might experience serious loss. The first plan had the advantage of leading to Almeida, pro-

ably without battle, in virtue of the prudence of Lord Wellington; but the avoidance of a battle was not an advantage sought by Massena, and, besides, in following up this plan, there was the danger of a march in flank before the enemy, to say nothing of the chance of finding in the fort of the Concepcion an obstacle perhaps more difficult to surmount. Massena greatly preferred the second plan. In vigorously attacking the right of the English at Fuentes d'Onoro,—in repulsing them in the centre and towards the left,—in driving them thus down to the Lower Coa,—he would engage them in a well-chosen direction,—one which rendered their retreat very problematical; further, the re-entrenching of Almeida would follow as an easy consequence, and even the least important of the victory; for after a victory it was likely that the English would take the road to Coimbra, or even as far as Lisbon, and that our army should find in the magazines formed in their rear means of pursuit which it had not possessed in the attack.

For these reasons, Massena immediately formed his plan, and on the 3d, in the middle of the day, ordered General Ferrey, who commanded the 8d division of the 6th corps, to attack Fuentes d'Onoro, while at the right Reynier should drive back the English upon Alameda; and that Solignac and Drouet, placed for observation in the centre, should connect between them the two parts of the army.

On the 3d, towards one o'clock P.M., General Ferrey, preceded by the light cavalry of General Fournier, advanced by the main road upon Fuentes d'Onoro. General Fournier, with the 7th, 8d, and 20th chasseurs, charged the cavalry of the English, as well as their light infantry, and drove them back hastily upon the village of Fuentes d'Onoro, after having killed or taken prisoners about 100 men. The advance-posts being thus swept away, General Ferrey, with his division of infantry of about 8000 men, arrived at Fuentes d'Onoro. This little village of Old Castile, now so celebrated, was situated partly on this side, partly on that side, of Dos Casas, upon the slope of a hill. It was surrounded by an enclosure easily surmounted, and filled with marksmen. The English Colonel Williams occupied Fuentes d'Onoro with four battalions of light troops, and the 2d battalion of the 88d British. Beyond the natural fences which rendered the village difficult of access, the English had stopped the principal entrance.

General Ferrey attacked Fuentes d'Onoro with 1200 men, and left in reserve a second brigade of about 1800. At the given signal he charged that part of the village which was in front of the Dos Casas, took at the point of the bayonet all the barriers raised in the principal entrance, and, in spite of a brisk fire pouring down from all points, repulsed the English beyond the Dos Casas, and followed them on the left bank of this stream. Colonel Williams was wounded. Lord Wellington, attracted by the firing, had led a reinforcement to his point. He added to the five battalions of Colonel Williams the 71st British, and drove back the French to the very banks of the Dos Casas. They disputed vigorously the passage of this stream; but we could not get beyond,

for 1200 men fought in a disadvantageous position against 4000 or 5000.

It was certainly an error, with the forces at their disposal, merely to test this position, instead of boldly attacking it with an entire division, or even with two, and carrying it before the enemy were well aware of its importance. At 5 o'clock P.M. Massena ordered a second and more serious attack, executed by the entire Ferrey division and a brigade of the Marchand division. This was another error. The enemy being this time better warned, it would have been necessary to attack Fuentes d'Onoro with the three divisions of the 6th corps, led by the brave Loison, for at that time there was great chance of carrying this position, if sufficient means were employed.

General Ferrey brought up his artillery, took possession of the village, into which poured 1500 men of the 26th and 66th, who surmounted all obstacles, conquered the lower part of Fuentes d'Onoro, took the right and left banks of the stream, and advanced to the very foot of the height. Urged on by their ardour, they endeavoured to climb it. Mounting from enclosure to enclosure, from house to house, they nearly reached the summit, but there they met the terrible fire of artillery and musketry, and perceived the utter insufficiency of their numbers for such an enterprise. Lord Wellington, who had had time to bring a new division to this point, repulsed them gradually, and finally drove them to the foot of the height. He even went so far as to turn their right and force them to fall back in disorder upon the line of the Dos Casas, where General Ferrey, rallying the troops which had been engaged in the morning, besides the Hanoverian legion and a regiment of the Marchand division, marched upon the English with fixed bayonets, and compelled them to regain the position from which they had just descended. They passed the night in this village, bathed in blood and covered with ruins, the English remaining masters of the heights, the French of the lower places, and the two banks of the Dos Casas: 600 or 700 men on the side of the English were dead or wounded in the entrances and enclosures of Fuentes d'Onoro, and about the same on our side. Thus, much blood was shed to teach Lord Wellington the importance of the position which we wished to wrest from him. Before Alameda, (that is to say, to the right of Fuentes d'Onoro according to us,) Reynier had done little; he had limited himself to the taking of this village, which the English did not care particularly to defend, because it was situated to the right of Dos Casas, and he had obliged them to retire to the left bank, which at this point was very steep. Lord Wellington had sent thither his light troops, which he had replaced at Fuentes d'Onoro by all his right divisions.

Though Massena had not that superior and ready penetration which seems to have belonged to Napoleon alone, of all modern generals, his intelligence became conspicuous on the field of battle, when others commonly lose what presence of mind they possess; and, far from being discouraged by difficulties, he permitted himself to be rendered by them still more resolute, and found moral force increase in a position where with others it would vanish altogether. After having passed the day upon the

field of battle of Fuentes d'Onoro, he had perceived that, in ascending the river towards his left, and to the right of the English, the bed of the Dos Casas became less deep, and that a kind of slightly-undulating plain formed at this point the only separation between us and the enemy. He therefore supposed that here it would be easy to approach, perhaps turn, the English, and, by driving their right upon their centre, and their centre upon their left, that he might realize his first and correct purpose,—that of throwing them upon the Lower Coa, taking from them the road leading to the bridge of Castelbon. The following day, the 4th, he examined the aspect of the English; discovered the new defensive preparations made upon the heights of Fuentes d'Onoro; maintained his resolution of seeking more to the left the suitable point of attack; sent Montbrun to reconnoitre towards Pozo Velho, and was strengthened in his conviction that it was indeed towards our left, where the earth, being but slightly ravined by the Dos Casas, presented almost a continuous plain, that it would be necessary to attack and vanquish the English.

Consequently, on the evening of the 4th of May, when it was sufficiently dark to conceal our manoeuvres, he caused his whole army to perform a movement from right to left, from Fuentes d'Onoro to Pozo Velho. He left Reynier before Alameda, with injunctions to engage the English in an attack more or less spirited, according to circumstances. He left General Ferrey in the lower parts of Fuentes d'Onoro, consigning to him the entire 9th corps, to assist in the capture of this village, when the transit made towards Pozo Velho should under this operation be practicable. He brought the Marchand and Mermet divisions of the 6th corps, all the cavalry, and the Solignac division of the 8th corps, (about 17,000 men out of 36,000,) to the plain of Pozo Velho, with orders to wheel about on the height of this village, to close round the right of the English, and, throwing them back upon their centre, take, first, Pozo Velho, then Fuentes d'Onoro, which they should attack behind, while Ferrey assailed it in front; and to continue this movement till the British army should be completely repulsed towards the Lower Coa. This plan was excellent; and, had its execution corresponded with its conception, a glorious victory must have been the result. The instructions given to Drouet and to Reynier alone were open to censure. It would have been necessary not to attack Fuentes d'Onoro and Alameda during the movement of our left, in a merely secondary way, but to attack them with much vigour, so that the English, simultaneously attracted in every direction, should be unable to hasten in a body to the assistance of their right, so dangerously threatened.

The next day, the 5th of May, the French troops had completed their movement, very early in the morning. Reynier was before Alameda, extending his left towards Fuentes d'Onoro. Ferrey was in the lower part of Fuentes d'Onoro, and Drouet behind him with the 9th corps, ready to march to his support. The Mermet and Marchand divisions of the 6th corps, and all the cavalry, except that of the guard, left a little in the rear, were on the

heights of Pozo Velho. The Solignac division of the 8th corps served them as a reserve. The army, full of confidence and ardour, felt assured that they were marching to victory.

Lord Wellington, who by the previous action had been somewhat enlightened, though little annoyed, had comprehended something of the manoeuvre of Massena; for, unfortunately, he had had all the 4th of May to divine our movements and to regulate his own accordingly. Having again secured his position at Alameda, he had removed from it the light division which he had brought thither for a moment, and had again directed it towards Fuentes d'Onoro. He had left Picton with the third division on the heights of Fuentes d'Onoro, and Spencer a towards Pozo Velho, where at first were only little on the rear with the first. He had sent the Spaniards of Julian, Ashworth's Portuguese brigade, two English battalions, part of his cavalry, and the whole 7th division of General Houston. Finally, he had brought Don Julian still more to his right, and had posted him at Nave de Avel, to obtain information at a greater distance. Though there were great precautions adopted in favour of his right, they were not enough to resist 17,000 men, brought by Massena against it.

On the morning of the 5th, the movement of the French army began with the dawn. Loison began his march towards Pozo Velho, the Marchand and Mermet divisions in front, the Solignac division in reserve. On his left he had Montbrun, with 1000 dragoons and 1400 husars and chasseurs. Montbrun wished, in the first place, to sweep away the Spaniards of Don Julian, and launched against them his light cavalry. General Fournier, taking Nave de Avel by the left, and General Wathier, taking it by the right, drove out the Spaniards, with the loss of about 100 men, and drove them beyond the Turones. After having executed this extended movement, the light cavalry came to join Montbrun and to post themselves on the wings of the reserve of dragoons. Meanwhile Marchand, turning towards the village of Pozo Velho by the left, directed thither the Maucune brigade. This village, surrounded by a small wood, was guarded by Portuguese, and part of Houston's division. The soldiers of Maucune vigorously attacked the English, drove them from the wood upon the village, which they entered with fixed bayonets; they there took about 200 prisoners, and wounded or killed about 100 men. The Portuguese fled in disorder; the English went to join Houston's division, which was slowly retiring, protected by two regiments of cavalry, one Hanoverian and one English, supporting the right by the river Turones, and the left by Crawford's light division, which hastened to their aid. The Maucune brigade, pursuing the English beyond the village, found, on leaving it, Montbrun's cavalry, which was advancing rapidly after the expedition of Nave de Avel. At sight of the English lines protected by two regiments of cavalry, Montbrun, boiling with zeal, without hesitation directed the *élite* company of his dragoons on the enemy's cavalry. This handful of men, commanded by Captain Brunel, boldly rushed on the English squadrons, and drove them back on the infantry of Houston's division. This charge, executed in sight of the



soldiers of Montbrun and Maucune, excited in the troops a degree of enthusiasm, and they urgently entreated to be led to victory. Montbrun wished them to charge the English infantry, which was stationed on ground favourable to cavalry-maneuvres, but protected by eight guns; he demanded some pieces from the battery of the guard, but that could receive no orders except from Marshal Bessières,—an etiquette of the *élite* troops which had already proved fatal at Wagram. Unable to obtain them, Montbrun addressed himself to Massena, who, aware of the difficulty, hastened to send him four guns. Unfortunately, half an hour had elapsed, during which the French troops had had time to lose their temper and Crawford's light troops to advance. At length Montbrun, provided with the necessary artillery, advanced upon Houston's division, having in front a squadron of the 5th hussars deployed to conceal his guns, the dragoons in the centre, a squadron of the 11th chasseurs on the right, and one of the 12th on the left. He thus advanced, preceded by about 100 riflemen of Wathier's brigade, in order to bring out the English line. In fact, the 51st English infantry made some movement forwards. Montbrun then disclosed his guns and covered them with ball, following up his fire by a charge of the chasseurs on our wings. The two squadrons in full charge broke the 51st English, and put to the sword their scattered foot. Continuing their advantage, they marched upon Houston's division, and, driving it before them, separated it from its artillery, which they had almost taken, when, approaching the ravine of the Turones, they became exposed to the close fire of a line of rifles posted in certain enclosures, which, being unforeseen and well directed, checked the course of our cavalry, and Houston's division, after having sustained some loss, succeeded in retiring behind the Turones, where it rejoined Don Julian. At the same moment, its place was taken by Crawford's light division.

Massena, seeing the right of the English broken and partially already driven beyond the Turones, ordered General Loison to bring forward the Marchand and Mermet divisions, which, debouching from Pozo Velho, should second the effort of the cavalry and move towards the environs of Fuentes d'Onoro, which they should take in the rear. If this movement were conducted with vigour, the right of the English would be thrown upon their centre, agreeably to the design of Massena. At the same time, he took advantage of the extraordinary *blan* of Montbrun's cavalry to throw them upon Crawford, who, at sight of our cavalry, had formed his men into three squares, with the artillery in the intervals of each of the three.

Montbrun ordered General Fournier to attack the square on our left with one of his light regiments, and in person to pour down upon the square in the centre, which he perceived to be the most considerable, with the other two. He ordered General Wathier to charge the square on our right. He himself followed with his dragoons the movement of the light cavalry, ready to support him in due time.

This large body of cavalry, commanded with admirable vigour and exactness, advanced under a tremendous discharge from the artillery

interposed between the English squares. Arrived within reach of the enemy, they pass from a trot to a gallop. The square on the left was broken in the twinkling of an eye. Fournier himself, with his two regiments, penetrated that of the centre. Fifteen hundred of the English infantry surrendered, and Colonel Hill put up his sword. The square on the right protected by a turn of the ground, alone escaped this disaster, and could not be reached by General Wathier. At this moment new discharges of ball were showered upon our cavalry. General Fournier, whose horse was killed, fell in the sight of his men, which occasioned some confusion, of which the English took advantage. Part of those who had surrendered fled, and renewed the fire; the rest, to the number of 400 or 500, remained prisoners. Montbrun, perceiving the ravages of the fire, and seeing all the English cavalry coming upon him, drew back his light horse, fearing that he had not sufficient force to support them. He urgently called for the cavalry of the guard, and for the support of the infantry in addition.

Witnessing this spectacle, Massena had already sent an officer to bring forward the 800 cavalry of the guard. The same reply was given as at Wagram; the cavalry, as well as the artillery of the guard, could only act under an order of Marshal Bessières, who was to be found, no one knew where, on this vast battle-field. The guard remained motionless. The infantry, badly commanded by Loison, had borne too much to the right, as if the only object were to take Fuentes d'Onoro in the rear, and not also to unite with Montbrun on the left, so as to embrace the whole line of the enemy by this movement. They penetrated far into the woods surrounding Fuentes d'Onoro, drove out the English, reached the brink of a ravine which separated them from Fuentes d'Onoro, and began uselessly to fire upon Picton's troops, while Ferrey renewed his attack of two days before.

Meanwhile, time passed on. Montbrun, left without the support of the guard or the infantry, had been unable to renew his attack on the English infantry, which took advantage of this respite to reform itself in line. Spencer, with the first division, rallying the Portuguese, took his place beside Crawford, and presented an imposing front supported by a numerous artillery and all the English cavalry. By his left he was connected with Picton, who always defended Fuentes d'Onoro, and by his right with Houston's division, which was on the other side of the Turones.

At this sight, Montbrun, after having a long time sustained the fire of the enemy, sheltered his men behind a turn of the ground, and thus awaited the renewal of the fight to repeat his exploits of the morning. If, at this time, Reynier, who was opposed merely by Campbell's division, had vigorously attacked Alameda, and Ferrey, freely seconded by Drouet with all the 9th corps, had been able to snatch Fuentes d'Onoro from Picton's division, already much reduced, the battle would have been gained, though the movement of the left of the French against the right of the English might have been relaxed. But Reynier, exaggerating the amount of forces to which he was opposed, supposing the task of gaining the battle consigned to others, contented himself with a few unim-

portant discharges of musketry. Ferrey attacked Fuentes d'Onoro with vigour, and, seconded by two regiments of the Claparede division, carried the heights above the village; but, for want of being supported by the rest of the 9th corps, he was obliged to abandon them. Loison, though full of ardour, had lost his way; and, turning to the right instead of to the left, had been stopped by a ravine which separated him from Fuentes d'Onoro.

Thus passed a considerable part of the day, and the brilliant success of the cavalry and of Maucune's brigade remained without result. But the invincible obstinacy of Massena was at hand to repair every error. Hastening from Montbrun to Loison, he had detected the mistake. He ordered Loison to support the left, near Montbrun; he advanced Solignac between Loison and Montbrun, and prepared to attack thoroughly the English right, composed of Spencer's and Crawford's divisions of the Portuguese and the cavalry. Formidable as was this line, he did not despair of breaking it with the divisions of Marchand, Mermet, and Solignac, and the heroic cavalry of Montbrun. Drouet, at the same time, being ordered to make a desperate effort on Fuentes d'Onoro, and Reynier to attack Alameda with energy. The ardour of Massena was shared by his troops, always confident of victory, and anxious at all cost to put an end to the English army which had so long thwarted their efforts, sometimes behind the rocks of Busaco sometimes behind the redoubts of Torres Vedras.

On occasions such as this, the sound judgment and resolute character of Massena were fully displayed. Montbrun, Loison, Marchand, and Mermet, sought no other privilege than to second his efforts. But at the moment of renewing the attack, and of deciding the victory by a vigorous stroke, General Eblé brought the melancholy tidings that there remained very few cartridges, Bessières having brought none, and the thirty teams having merely sufficed to bring a few more guns upon the field. They reckoned that all their remaining cartridges would only furnish each soldier with thirty rounds. But this was not enough for a desperate battle with the English, especially if the day should not prove decisive, and they should be obliged to fight either in retiring or in pursuing the enemy. This difficulty, insuperable to any other, did not discourage Massena; he resolved to wait till the next morning, calculating that the English would not remove, and certain that they could not be reinforced, for Picton with the 3d division was indispensable at Fuentes d'Onoro, Campbell with the 6th at Alameda, Dunlop with the 5th at the fort of the Conception. On the following day he would only be opposed to Crawford, Spencer, and the Portuguese, and he resolved to inflict upon them a terrible blow, such as he had struck formerly at Rivoli, Zurich, and Caldiero.\* He therefore consented to some hours of rest, which might bring him ammunition. Accordingly, he ordered the artillery-horses of Bessières to be sent in utmost haste to Ciudad Rodrigo for cartridges and provisions, and that part of the convoy intended for Almeida should be dis-

tributed among the troops. But Bessières resisted Massena even with violence, assigning the melancholy excuse of the exhaustion of his horses, worn out by an incessant march of several days, and unable to bear the burden allotted to them. The fortune of the old general seemed to have waned since the retreat from Portugal; six months before, no resistance would have been shown to him, now he was steadily opposed. What could he do? Should he deprive Bessières of his sword, as he had deprived Marshal Ney? There are difficulties before which the most resolute must yield. Massena, to prevent any fresh outbreak, consented to defer till the following morning sending his wagons to Ciudad Rodrigo, bivouacked upon the field of battle within gunshot of the English, and used the provisions designed for Almeida.

Such was the battle of Fuentes d'Onoro, which was rendered indecisive by so many obstacles, so many unforeseen difficulties, so many acts of insubordination, but which the bravery of the troops and the excellent arrangements of Massena, if well seconded, would have made a brilliant victory, deciding the fate of Spain, and perhaps of Europe. Massena, bent upon renewing the struggle, employed the next day, the 6th, in riding over the field, while ammunition was sent for from Ciudad Rodrigo. At this moment, the posture of the two armies was singular. From Alameda to Fuentes d'Onoro the corps of Reynier and Drouet formed a continuous line, opposed in front by the English army along the Dos Casas. At Fuentes d'Onoro our line was made to form nearly a right angle, and shut up the right wing of the English fallen back upon their centre beyond the Dos Casas. On this point Lord Wellington had accumulated his best troops, and had added artificial to natural strength of position. His soldiers, though much fatigued, had spent the whole night in forming intrenchments. He had barricaded the upper part of Fuentes d'Onoro. Between Fuentes d'Onoro and Villa Formosa, a village situated on the ravine of the Turones, he had supplied the want of natural obstacles by mounds, felled timber, and an immense artillery. Finally, at Villa Formosa as at Fuentes d'Onoro, he had multiplied barricades, guns, and every kind of defence. Behind this transverse line, which extended from the Dos Casas to the Turones, and which did not exceed three-quarters of a league, he had four divisions, the 7th, 1st, and 3d, the light division and the Portuguese, and an innumerable artillery. Massena saw with grief that the time allotted to the rest of the horses had been much more profitably employed by the enemy, and that the artificial line formed during the night would become as formidable as that which nature had formed in front from Fuentes d'Onoro to Alameda by the deep bed of the Dos Casas. However, he was fully determined to renew the battle, confident in the zeal of his troops. But Generals Fririon, Lazowski, and Eblé, who were alike devoted to Massena and to the honour of their arms, disclosed to him the melancholy truths to which he vainly endeavoured to shut his eyes, and assured him repeatedly that many officers, some worn out with fatigue, others called to serve in different armies, or ready to resign, were not sufficiently resolved on their duty as to be trusted with confidence in a des-

\* At Caldiero in 1806

perate attack. Reynier, though possessed of so much real intelligence and courage, had lost his value since he had fallen under the influence of anxiety, and he thought that at that moment he had the whole English army in hand. Drouet, on the point of leaving for the army of Andalusia, thought that he had well discharged his debt to the army of Portugal, by engaging two regiments under the brave General Girard. Bessières was inexplicable, and behaved towards Massena as ambitious men are wont to behave before a waning fortune. The commander-in-chief, therefore, was persuaded by the only influence that can affect a great mind, the advice of enlightened, devoted, and unanimous friends.

Destined to derive from this campaign nothing but vexation, Massena decided on that one of the two plans which Napoleon left to his choice, which was the least according to his own taste, which consisted in blowing up Almeida instead of reticulating it. Moreover, the convoy intended for that city was half consumed by those whose business was to introduce it, nor could they withdraw without consuming the rest. There was therefore no alternative but to destroy Almeida, where every thing was already prepared for the total destruction of the works. An order was sufficient, but that order could only be conveyed by piercing the English army. Massena called for volunteers; three presented themselves, whose names deserve a place in history, Zaniboni, corporal in the 76th of the line, Noël Lamé, a sutler of the Ferrey division, and André Tillet, chasseur of the 6th light. They carried the order to General Brenier to blow up the fortress, and then to open a passage through the line of the English posts to the bridge of Barba del Puercro on the Aguada. The 2d corps, forming the extreme right of the French army, was to be in front of this bridge to receive the fugitive garrison. General Brenier was to fire 100 heavy guns to indicate his having received the order.

On the next day, the 7th, Massena, who could not bring his mind to quit the field of battle, and was always contemplating a renewal of the attack if opportunity offered, remained in position before the English, who, alarmed by the formidable combat they had sustained, and by that which they anticipated, remained immovable behind their intrenchments; while Massena, riding before them like a lion before impassable enclosures, had all the appearance of a conqueror. On the evening of the 7th were heard the hundred guns which intimated the transmission of the order sent to Almeida. Of the three messengers, André Tillet, the only one who left without disguise, with his sword and uniform, had succeeded in reaching General Brenier and fulfilling his mission.

On the 8th, in order to give General Brenier time to complete the destruction of Almeida, Massena pretended to close in upon the English lines, and brought up the Solignac division behind Drouet's corps, as if about to attack the centre of the enemy. On the 9th he still remained in position, always simulating an offensive movement, while the English carefully kept within their lines and accumulated the means of defence without any doubt of the designs of the French general.

At length, on the 10th, the army, following the

example of some of the commanders, began to murmur at being kept to no purpose before the enemy, being ignorant of Massena's design, and as every thing implied that Brenier had had time to complete his arrangements, Massena consented to retreat on the Aguada. The army wheeling about, Drouet on the right went towards Espeja, the 8th and 6th corps in the centre marched directly upon Ciudad Rodrigo, Reynier to the left fell back upon the bridge of Barba del Puercro, where he was to meet the garrison of Almeida if it succeeded in its escape, and Montbrun covered the retreat with his cavalry. The English followed us with extreme caution, their whole attention being fixed upon the main body of the army, and not at all upon Almeida, which they believed to be finally left to its own resources, and condemned to a speedy surrender. General Campbell alone, charged to observe Reynier, followed him at a distance without regarding the bridge of Barba del Puercro.

At midnight the army learned, while on the march, by a dull explosion, that the fortress of Almeida had been destroyed. Reynier left General Heudelet in advance of the bridge of Barba del Puercro to receive the garrison. They awaited its arrival the next day with great anxiety, for it had to traverse eight or nine leagues to reach the Aguada, and it was expected on the 11th. The history of this transaction deserves to be recorded, for it is one of the most extraordinary adventures of our long wars.

General Brenier had, a long time before, undermined the principal works of the place, and only awaited the order to explode them. The order having reached him on the evening of the 7th, he caused all the cartridges to be thrown into the wells, the gun-carriages to be sawn asunder, the guns to be rendered unserviceable, and the mine-furnaces to be charged. On the evening of the 10th, all his preparations having been made, he collected his little garrison of about 1500 men, and announced to them that they were about to abandon the place, and to save themselves by piercing the enemy's lines. This news was highly gratifying to the rash ardour of our men, weary of a garrison-life in a distant and hostile country, in constant danger of dying of hunger or becoming prisoners of war, and all prepared to perform prodigies of exertion. They took arms at 10 p.m. General Brenier left Morlet, chief of battalion of engineers, in the rear with 200 sappers to set fire to the mines, and to join him by a by-path. They left the fortress by the least-observed part, which leads to the borders of the Aguada. They traversed more than two leagues without perceiving the enemy; then they met the advanced posts of Campbell's division and Pack's Portuguese brigade, and cut through them. General Brenier had the ingenuity to order a convoy to follow, the pillage of which would prevent the Portuguese disputing their passage. However, they were pursued by General Pack with General Cotton's English cavalry. By daylight they arrived at Villa de Cuervos, not far from Barba del Puercro, where they came up with the brave Morlet and his sappers, who, after having set fire to the mines, had succeeded in forcing the enemy's lines. On approaching Barba del Puercro, Pack, on the one side, began to fire upon our brave fugitive garrison, and Cotton.

on the other, to attack them with the sabre. They sowed their ground against all these attacks, and at length reached a defile, made between the excavations of a stone-quarry, where they succeeded in throwing themselves into the arms of the troops of Heudelet, who had hastened to meet them. Unfortunately, they had been obliged to pass the defile in long column, and the rear remained within reach of Cotton's cavalry. Two or three hundred men were cut off, but they took to the sides of the defile to reach the Aguada by different ways. Some fell over a precipice and brought along with them the Portuguese bent on their pursuit. Some others left in the rear were taken by the English. Thus, except about 200 men, this heroic garrison made their escape, deceiving the calculations of the English, and leaving them merely a ruined fortress. It is said that Lord Wellington, when he learned this extraordinary act, exclaimed that the deed of General Brenier was as good as a victory. We can easily suppose that vexation would exaggerate his estimate; for it was supremely disagreeable and even humiliating to see a fortress destroyed before his eyes, almost in his hands, when just about to be recovered, and the possession of which would have counterbalanced the loss of Ciudad Rodrigo. Lord Wellington, with a degree of injustice unworthy of his character, laid the blame on General Campbell, who was no more guilty than the rest of the army, nor even than the commander himself; for no one in the British camp had foreseen the issue of this short campaign,—an issue, it must be confessed, not easily anticipated.

Massena, continuing his retreat, left in Ciudad Rodrigo the remainder of the convoy destined for Almeida, besides some corn collected during the movement of the army, and thus assured to that place four months of provisions, renewed and reinforced its garrison, finally entered Salamanca, there to rest and reorganize his army. With his usual obstinacy, and in conformity to his instructions, he did not wish to lose sight of the English; but to descend on the Tagus along with them, if they should show any design of directing their course against Badajoz. For the time, though little seconded by his lieutenants, he had attained his end, which was to save the strongholds of the Spanish frontier, either by revictualling or destroying them; to keep in check the English army, and to prevent it sending the greater part of its forces into Estremadura, and, by attracting it into Upper Beira, to prevent its penetrating into Spain. This complicated object Marshal Massena had in fact attained, for Ciudad Rodrigo, which was enough for our purposes, had been provisioned for four months. Almeida, which was of no use to us, had fallen into the hands of the enemy, but wholly dismantled; and the two days of Fuentes d'Onoro had made such an impression upon the English, that they no longer thought of entering Old Castile, so long at least as the defender of Genoa and Essling was present. As for the principal act of this last period, the battle of Fuentes d'Onoro itself, it may be said, that if Massena did not perceive till too late the weak side of the enemy's position, if he lost the 3d of May in useless attacks upon Fuentes d'Onoro, the 4th in tardy reconnoissances, still, he had at length discovered the true point of

attack, which many generals perceive neither at the beginning nor the end of an engagement; on the 5th he had acted with admirable penetration and vigor, and if on that third day Reynier had been more enterprising before Alameda, and Drouet had employed his whole corps d'armée in taking Fuentes d'Onoro, if Loison had more quickly and directly aimed at the true end of his movements, if a miserable etiquette had not restrained the Imperial guard, the English would have experienced a sanguinary disaster. It must be added that, notwithstanding all these weaknesses, and all the want of hearty co-operation, if Marshal Bessières had not at the last moment thrown in fresh obstacles to success, if Massena had obtained by the dawn of the 6th the necessary ammunition, he might still, opposing his constancy to that of the English, have destroyed the fortune of Lord Wellington, before whom the fortune of Napoleon himself was subsequently to fall.

Massena then returned to Salamanca to await the judgment that should be passed in Paris on his operations. After all the meanness he had witnessed, there remained nothing for him to incur but the displeasure of his master. Of this he had heard nothing, but he readily suspected it. The bitterness of his heart and his knowledge of mankind did not incline him to anticipate justice.

At this moment, the companion-in-arms to whom he had rendered a great service, and from whom he had received none in return, whom he had relieved from the presence of Lord Wellington, and that of one or two English divisions,—Marshal Soult,—was still less fortunate, and was reaping the fruit of the errors committed by every one in the fatal campaign of 1810 and 1811. Scarcely had Marshal Massena begun his retreat, when Lord Wellington had sent Hill's corps to Estremadura, and had subsequently added to it several detachments with the view of succouring Badajoz or recovering it by a new siege, if the French had taken it. The forces assembled on that side amounted to two English divisions of infantry, several English cavalry-regiments, several Portuguese brigades, and, finally, some Spanish troops, partly escaped from Gévora, others sent from Cadiz. This army might be reckoned at 30,000 men, of which 12,000 or 18,000 might be English, 6000 Portuguese of the line, and 11,000 or 12,000 Spaniards. It had crossed the Guadiana at Jurumenha, had taken the fortress of Olivença from the French, who had just conquered it, but who had not had time to put it in a state of defence, and who had retired from it exposed to desperate engagements of the rear-guard, in order to regain Badajoz. An English division had invested Badajoz, where General Philippon was shut up, but well supplied with provisions, ammunition, and a devoted garrison of 8000 men, resolved to surrender the place only when the enemy should have entered it by main force. The rest of the Anglo-Portuguese and Spanish army, after having scoured the whole country in order to expel the French, had taken position on the Albuera to protect the siege. The 5th corps, under General Latour-Maubourg, (Marshal Mortier having been summoned to France,) was posted a little in the rear, waiting, with impatience, help from Seville, for while not more than 8000 or 9000 men remained after the do-

parture of Marshal Soult, it was reduced to almost nothing after furnishing a garrison to Badajoz.

Such were the events which transpired in Andalusia while Marshal Massena was fighting the battle of Fuentes d'Onoro and blowing up Almeida. Marshal Soult, having found security re-established before Cadiz, by the vigor with which Marshal Victor had repulsed the English, and by the return of part of the 4th corps into the province of Seville, had listened to the entreaties of the garrison of Badajoz, which was defending itself with the greatest courage, and had resolved to return thither. After having given some attention to the affairs of his army, called to himself a part of the 4th corps, placed Marshal Victor in a condition, not indeed to take Cadiz, but to defend his lines if attacked, and communicated to Madrid and Paris his need of prompt succour, he had left on the 10th of May with 11,000 or 12,000 men to join the remains of the 6th corps on the road from Seville to Badajoz. He had taken the road at the very instant when Massena entered Salamanca.

After having rallied the 5th corps which awaited him under the orders of General Latour-Maubourg, Marshal Soult found himself at the head of about 17,000 men, excellent troops in high discipline, and including 2500 of the first-rate cavalry. On the 16th of May he reached Santa Martha in sight of the English army, posted some leagues in advance of Badajoz on the hills which border the Albuera. Though the Anglo-Spanish army reckoned upwards of 80,000 men, while he reckoned only 17,000, Marshal Soult did not hesitate to attack them, as the only method of saving Badajoz and sparing himself the mortification of seeing that fortress, his only conquest, fall before his eyes.

Marshal Beresford commanded the combined army, including Stuart's English division, General Hamilton's three Portuguese brigades, and the troops which had been withdrawn from the siege of Badajoz, composed of Cole's English division, and the Spanish troops brought from Cadiz under Generals Blake and Castanos. Seventeen thousand chosen French might easily keep their ground against 80,000 enemies, including only 12,000 or 18,000 English.

The Anglo-Spanish army was posted behind the little stream of the Albuera, which was easy to cross. On the left it had the village of Albuera; its centre, formed principally of English and Portuguese, was on some slightly-raised mounds; and the right, including all the Spaniards, on the continuation of these mounds, but a little on the other side, so as scarcely to be seen. The troops withdrawn from the siege of Badajoz passing behind the English line served at once to prolong their line and to support them.

Marshal Soult determined to attack the English on the morning of the next day, May 16. Before the village of Albuera, which formed his own right and the enemy's left, he placed the 16th light with a heavy battery to cannonade the village and counterfeit a serious attack. But he had determined to make his principal effort with his left against the enemy's right. He resolved to bring two divisions of infantry, those of Girard and Gazan, across the stream of the Albuera, to confide to them the task of rapidly taking the mounds, on the reverse of

which they began to discover the English right, then to turn these mounds by his cavalry posted at his extreme left, under General Latour-Maubourg, to support this movement with a reserve of infantry under General Werlé, and, when they had thus routed the English right, to take the village of Albuera by assault, which was the support of their left, and which our artillery should previously have reduced to ruins, and rendered almost indefensible.

Marshal Soult hoped that the English, when attacked on their right, which protected their communication with Badajoz, would be more easily alarmed and beaten; and that, when beaten in that direction, the consequences would be very important.

In the morning of the 16th he set his troops in motion. Unfortunately he did not make his arrangements in person, and he kept General Gazan too long with himself; who, while commanding a division, was also chief of the staff, and one of the most firm and experienced infantry-officers in the army. Hence there was little unity and precision in the movements. The detachment which was to cannonade Albuera on our right early took up its position along the river, and poured a destructive fire on the village and on the English. The two divisions of Girard and Gazan, amounting to 8000 infantry, entered early into action, advanced in close columns and passed the stream, an obstacle easily surmounted; while the cavalry of General Latour-Maubourg, effecting a movement on their left, threatened the right of the enemy. Unhappily, in the absence of the commanders, a want of mutual understanding in the movements occasioned them to remain an hour inactive on the other side of the stream, and allowed the English time to bring up their main body to the point of danger. At length, the signal of attack having been given, the Girard division rapidly ascended the hills, followed by the Gazan division, which, instead of being arranged a little in the rear, so as to be able to deploy, was too close upon that which preceded. Scarcely had the Girard division reached the height, when it was found that the enemy had also arrived there. From the English and Spaniards it received so destructive a fire that, in the 40th of the line which formed the extreme left, 800 men were struck, and three chiefs of battalion, one of whom was afterwards General Voirol. Nevertheless, that brave division boldly pressed forward and threw back the first line composed of English and Spaniards. The rout of this first line was completed by a vigorous charge of our cavalry deployed to the left of the infantry. One thousand prisoners and several flags were taken. But at the same moment, Marshal Beresford had brought to his right the remainder of Stuart's division, and also Cole's division. These troops advanced, some deployed in line, others potence-wise, to take our troops in flank. The Girard division thus found itself met in front and flank by the accurate and well-sustained fire of the English. In a few minutes nearly all the officers were killed or wounded. It would have been necessary to deploy in order to respond to the fire, but the two French divisions being too close upon each other were unable to manœuvre, and were obliged to fall back to avoid a fire which must prove destructive only to themselves.

Though General Gazan and Marshal Soult had both come upon the spot and endeavoured to rally the men, it was too late, and it became necessary to recross the stream. Fortunately, the cavalry of Latour-Maubourg having come up in full force, and deployed in the most threatening manner on the right of the English, stopped them short; and General Ruty, on his side, having ably disposed his artillery on the mounds opposite those occupied by the enemy, covered them with projectiles, which they endured with much coolness and patience, but without daring to pursue us.

The allies lost by our artillery nearly as many men as we lost by their musketry, and saw the earth covered with a nearly-equal number of dead. The combatants therefore separated, after a singular encounter of the most sanguinary character, nearly 8000 men being placed *hors de combat* on the side of the Anglo-Spanish, and about 4000 on ours. Thus, since the battle of Vimero a species of fatality seemed to render impotent the heroism of our troops and their skillful manœuvring against the cool determination of the English, who, taking position on a well-chosen ground, contented themselves with holding it firmly, without executing any other movement than bringing to the threatened point those forces which our desultory attacks left at their disposal; while we, on the other hand, attacking them with incomparable vigour, but without unity and without sequence, withdrew without having lost a battle, but without any other result than a considerable loss of men, and a degree of vexation in the minds of the soldiers almost amounting to discouragement. The battles of Vimero, Talavera, Fuentes d'Onoro, and Albuera, had presented no other vicissitudes than these. At Fuentes d'Onoro, indeed, the English had been well attacked, though too late; but, while the genius of the general was in no degree in fault, the good-will of his lieutenants was wanting. There were only two combats—that of Rolica, fought by General Delaborde, and that of Redinha, by Marshal Ney—in which, by leaving to the English the disadvantage of acting on the offensive, they had been rudely handled. On all other occasions, the want of calculation and combination had rendered useless the courage, intelligence, and experience of our troops. Was fortune never to allow us a day in which the merit of our soldiers, seconded by the able designs of the commander-in-chief, would secure us the victory so impatiently expected, so dearly bought? This is what excited so ardent a desire for the presence of Napoleon himself to take the command against the English. Who could then foresee the circumstances in which they were to meet? Far-seeing minds, though already beginning to indulge melancholy presentiments, could not foresee that their meeting should take place on a fatal day, in which all his genius could not make up for resources entirely destroyed.

Marshal Soult, deprived of 4000 men out of 17,000, could not think of trying his strength again with the English. He collected the wounded, and went to take up his position at some distance in the rear, so as always to remain as a ground of hope to the garrison of Badajoz. He wrote immediately to Madrid, to

Salamanca, and to Paris, to make known his difficulties to King Joseph, Marshal Massena, and Napoleon. And, though he had not raised the siege of Badajoz, he had procured it a few days' respite, had given it the proof that it was not forgotten, and the confidence of succour in time if it well defended itself. The ill success of the attacks begun by the English against Badajoz increased the well-founded hopes inspired by the courage of the garrison, the firmness and ability of the chiefs.

Such was the situation of affairs in Spain in the month of May, 1811, after the great efforts of Napoleon begun the day after the peace of Vienna. In Portugal, Marshal Massena, after the conquest of the frontier-fortresses, after a journey as far as Lisbon, and six months spent before the lines of Torres Vedras, had been obliged to beat a retreat; and, in order to avoid seeing the capture of the two fortresses,—the only trophies of the campaign,—had fought a bloody but indecisive battle at Fuentes d'Onoro, sufficient simply to check the English, whom they had hoped at first to drive out of Portugal. From 70,000 men whom he ought to have had, but whom he never had,—from 55,000 whom he actually had,—he was reduced to 30,000 men, exhausted and irritated, and requiring a totally new organisation.

In the south of Spain, Marshal Soult, after having invaded Andalusia, and occupied Cordova, Grenada, and Seville, almost without a stroke, had been for fifteen months before Cadiz, where he had merely raised some batteries around the roadstead; had, indeed, conquered Badajoz in Estremadura, but, like Marshal Massena, had been obliged to risk a bloody battle to save this single conquest, which he was in danger of seeing taken from him. From 80,000 men, he was reduced by excessive heat and incessant marching to 36,000, as fatigued as the army of Portugal, but in less disorder, because they carried on the war in a rich country, where they were less exposed to privations, and because the example of their immediate commander had been of a less injurious character.

The small army of the centre, under Joseph, had performed nothing considerable, and had merely sufficed to maintain communications with Andalusia, to scatter towards Guadalaxara the bands of Empecinado, and to preserve in tranquillity the province of Toledo. The army of the North had been incessantly tormented by the guerrillas of the two Castiles. With indefatigable activity and singular energy General Bonnet had engaged the mountaineers of Asturias, and he had often seen the interruption of his communications with the Castiles and Biscay. General Reille lost his time and his forces in pursuing Mina in Navarre, and had not been able even to protect the convoys. Aragon alone presented the appearance of submission, order, and repose, where the long resistance of Saragossa seemed to have exhausted the hatred of the inhabitants, and where the wisdom of General Suchet had restored the hearts of men, worn out by a serious disaster. That general, at home, so to speak, in an enclosed province, through which no armies passed for Spain, had been able to regulate the administration, to spare the country, and to satisfy the wants of his soldiers.

Called upon to conquer, not the English, but the Spaniards, though in that kind of war in which they most excel,—that of sieges,—he had conducted his conquest step by step, and after having made himself master of Lerida, Mequinensa, and Tortosa, he prepared to attack Tarragona, the most difficult to conquer of all the strongholds of Spain; but all his measures were so well taken that success might reasonably be expected. But even in this quarter, an unfortunate incident had mingled bitterness with their satisfaction,—viz.: the surprise of Figueras, which had been given up to the enemy by a commissariat-clerk, a Spaniard by birth. The reserve division intended for Catalonia had been sent immediately to Figueras to endeavour to retake it.

To the melancholy picture presented by military affairs must be added another, not less distressing,—the state of the court of Madrid. Joseph, shut up in his capital, having authority only over the army of the centre, composed of about 10,000 men, treated with something worse than levity by the commanders of the army, especially by Marshal Soult, whom, right or wrong, he accused of the basest ingratitude, much straitened in his finances, unable to promote the happiness of his favourites, having nothing to give them, affected by the reports received from his two ministers at Paris, hearing even at Madrid the satirical remarks of his brother, who, in his excessive severity towards his weakness, undervalued his real qualities, given up to a gloomy despair, sometimes thought of abdicating, like his brother Louis, and, alternately hesitating between the dislike to reign in his present manner and the fear of not reigning at all, had demanded leave to repair to Paris, professedly on the occasion of the expected confinement of the Empress. Napoleon, inflexible as a despot, but affectionate as a brother, had consented, and even assigned to him the honourable office of godfather to the heir of the Empire, anticipated with every confidence in his fortune. Joseph left in April, almost as dejected as if he had been ultimately driven from his capital by the enemy. Such, in the month of May, 1810, was the work of Napoleon in Spain: it was surely well worth while to throw all Europe into confusion, in order to extend his authority by the enslaved and tortured hands of his brothers!

Why, then, had those two campaigns of 1810 and 1811, from which so much had been expected, so little responded to the hopes conceived of them? It is almost unnecessary to say, after the plain statement of facts which we have presented, and every one can readily understand, without any addition to our recital; yet we shall here resume the reflections inspired by the recital to increase their force by concentration.

After having once committed the error of wishing to subject, enslave, and transform the world in a few years, Napoleon had added all others which naturally resulted from it: he had added the desire of doing every thing at once in Spain, as he wished to do every thing at once in Europe; thence followed the ordinary attendant on exorbitant enterprises,—the desire of self-deception in order to self-excuse; and thence indefinite orders inconsistent with facts, the negligence, forgetfulness, indicating a genius

exhausted by fatigue, sinking under the efforts of an ill-regulated ambition. Thus, after committing the fault of wishing to enslave a nation such as the Spanish, which might have been subdued with adequate forces in sufficient time, it was at least necessary that the execution should not resemble the conception, and that he should not attempt to subjugate simultaneously the North and the South, Valencia, Andalusia, and Portugal. In 1810, with the forces left at his disposal by the peace of Vienna, he ought to have hastened against the English with all the armies of the Peninsula, pursued them into Portugal, and driven them into the sea. But the hope of taking Andalusia while invading Portugal, and thus of conquering all the South at a single blow, caused him to scatter between Grenada and Badajoz 80,000 of the best troops of France, and rendered the army of Portugal unable to discharge the task assigned to it, by being deprived of the succour on which it had relied. To this dispersion of his resources were soon added erroneous opinions, (for, after committing faults, the first want experienced is that of not acknowledging them to ourselves,) and to these false views necessarily ensued a want of purpose in the orders issued from too great a distance, and inconsistent with the real state of affairs. Certainly, with his profound experience and penetrating genius, Napoleon must have well known the loss occasioned to armies by marches, by fatigue, by battles, by the heat of summer, by the cold of winter; he must have known all this, for he had witnessed it in climates less destructive than that of Spain, and yet he would never admit that the 80,000 men under Marshal Soult could have been reduced to 38,000, nor that the 70,000 men under Massena had been successively reduced to 50,000, 45,000, and 30,000. He alternately believed it and disbelieved it; and, whether from a wish to deceive himself or to sanction his demanding more from his lieutenants, he assumed, as the bases of his plans, numbers which he knew or suspected to be incorrect by a fourth or a third, and gave orders with as much decision as if these assumed numbers had been absolutely true! And even still, if he had issued his orders with his accustomed energy, perhaps the urgency, though unjust, of his orders, might have overcome some obstacles, such as those arising from disinclination, weakness, or extreme prudence. Thus, if he had expressly ordered General Drouet to march with his two divisions to the succour of the army of Portugal, and enjoined Marshal Soult to sacrifice every thing, even Andalusia, to the succour of that army on which depended the destiny of Spain and of Europe, perhaps he might have attained the great object of the war,—the expulsion of the English from the Peninsula. But, with his remaining doubts of the accuracy of the forces he assigned to his generals, and at the distance at which he was from them, he dared not issue absolute orders lest he should occasion disasters by requiring impossibilities. He therefore recommended Drouet to succour Massena, but not to interrupt his communications; he recommended Soult to succour Massena, but not under pain of disobedience, and without sanctioning the necessary sacrifices, and then he allowed to disinclination or

timidity the means of evading orders issued without sufficient formality, widely removed from the place and period of their execution; for when they reached their destination, after a journey of 600 leagues, occupying a period of two months, they often brought with them their own absolution. And thus this clear, and accurate, and exalted genius indulged in uncertainties opposite to his nature, ruinous to his affairs, and issuing in bursts of anger against the generals, whom he often knew well to be innocent of the faults laid to their charge.

And now, who can wonder, or who can complain, if the faults of the subordinates should be added to those of the master? Thus Massena wanted combination and consistency in his command, committed an error at Busaco which he might have turned, and at the Tagus which he might have crossed; at Fuentes d'Onoro he did not perceive in sufficient time the true point of attack; thus Marshal Ney made him fail to establish himself on the Mondego, after having contributed to his abandoning that at Santarém; Drouot had been timid, and more hurtful than profitable; Marshal Soult could not bring himself to strip Grenada for the benefit of Estremadura, and showed himself but little devoted to his companion-in-arms, being unwilling to incur peril in order to assist Massena; but what wonder is it that men, though distinguished, loyal, and brave, should be sometimes careless or inattentive, disunited or jealous? Had Napoleon, in his own great soul, never seen arise these passions, jealousy and rancour, anger, perturbation, and error? And how then could he be astonished that all these miseries of heart and mind should be found also in others? Very blind and unforeseeing and severe must he be who cannot anticipate these weaknesses and regulate his conduct accordingly! A policy is condemned when the errors of its agents involve its destruction.

If, then, the great European question, which it was supremely imprudent to have transported to Spain, but which it was possible there to have resolved, was not solved in 1810 and 1811, notwithstanding immense resources, the fault must be ascribed not to the genius, but to the

policy, of Napoleon, which engendered the millary errors of his agents as well as his own. After having failed of effecting this solution in Spain, he wished to seek it in the North, (which will form the subject of the following books,) and we shall see what solution was there found; but as genius is wont to add to all its other faults that of being unwilling to acknowledge them, and of charging them upon others, Napoleon laid the blame on Massena, and recalled him; thus, as it were, inflicting disgrace on this old companion-in-arms, who had rendered him so many services, but who could not be infallible, and who in this campaign, though unfortunate, had displayed rare qualities of mind and character, and had only yielded to the force of circumstances which had conspired against the enterprise of which he had become the too passive instrument.

The aged warrior returned to France broken-hearted, perceiving his glory clouded, and seeing the base flatterers of his prosperity deserting him, and repeating everywhere that his day was past, that his energy was lost, and that henceforth he was incapable of command. Napoleon, an infallible judge when he was willing to be just, instead of inflicting a blow, ought to have regarded him with tenderness, and in his destiny to have read his own, for Massena was the first victim of fortune, and he was himself to be the second, with this difference: that Massena had not deserved his lot, and that Napoleon was soon to deserve that which awaited him; in fact, of those gigantic designs which were to draw upon their author so terrible a punishment, Massena was only the instrument, and that, contrary to his own judgment; Napoleon, on the other hand, was their true author, who, without wholly approving them, allowed himself to be led to their adoption by a fatal acquiescence to his own passions. However, let us add, that Massena also had deserved a part of this punishment, not by any trivial faults, but because he had consented to execute that which his good sense led him to disapprove; but such is the ordinary result of power unlimited and unopposed by the habit of submission, it suppresses the very thought of resistance even in minds the most intelligent and resolute.











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